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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARNOC-AE-000675, Forwards Clarification on Items Included in 990531 Response to RAI Re Proposed License Amend Associated with Operator Action for Sbloca,As Requested1999-10-21021 October 1999 Forwards Clarification on Items Included in 990531 Response to RAI Re Proposed License Amend Associated with Operator Action for Sbloca,As Requested NOC-AE-000680, Forwards Rev 5 to 0PGP03-ZV-0001, Severe Weather Plan1999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards Rev 5 to 0PGP03-ZV-0001, Severe Weather Plan NOC-AE-000683, Forwards 30-day Rept Concerning Significant Changes to Accepted Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident ECCS Evaluation Model for South Tx Project,Units 1 & 2,IAW 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(ii)1999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards 30-day Rept Concerning Significant Changes to Accepted Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident ECCS Evaluation Model for South Tx Project,Units 1 & 2,IAW 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(ii) ML20217K9341999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards SER Accepting Util 990609 Relief Request RR-ENG-2-4 for Relief from ASME Code,Section XI, Nondestructive Exam Requirements Applicable to Stp,Units 1 & 2,reactor Vessel Closure Head Nuts ML20217K9091999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards SER Accepting Util 990609 Relief Request RR-ENG-2-3 from ASME Code,Section Xi,Nondestructive Exam Requirements Applicable to South Texas Project,Units 1 & 2, Pressurizer Support Attachment Welds 05000498/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00 Re Turbine Trip That Occurred While Performing Main Turbine Emergency Trip Test.Commitments Made by Licensee Are Listed in Corrective Actions Section of LER1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00 Re Turbine Trip That Occurred While Performing Main Turbine Emergency Trip Test.Commitments Made by Licensee Are Listed in Corrective Actions Section of LER NOC-AE-000674, Forwards Requested Estimates of Needs for Operator Licensing Exams,Per AL-99-03, Operator Licensing National Exam Schedule1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards Requested Estimates of Needs for Operator Licensing Exams,Per AL-99-03, Operator Licensing National Exam Schedule NOC-AE-000625, Requests Partial Relief from ASME Section XI Visual Exam Requirements of IWA-5242(a).Relief Request Is Based on Provisions of Draft ASME Section XI Code Case N-616,which Is Expected to Be Published in Near Future1999-10-0707 October 1999 Requests Partial Relief from ASME Section XI Visual Exam Requirements of IWA-5242(a).Relief Request Is Based on Provisions of Draft ASME Section XI Code Case N-616,which Is Expected to Be Published in Near Future NOC-AE-000610, Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Code Nondestructive Exam Requirements of IWA-5250(a)(2) for Second Inservice Insp Interval,Per Provisions of 10CFR50.55a(3)(i)1999-10-0707 October 1999 Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Code Nondestructive Exam Requirements of IWA-5250(a)(2) for Second Inservice Insp Interval,Per Provisions of 10CFR50.55a(3)(i) NOC-AE-000653, Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Code Requirements of Table IWE-2500-1 for VT-3 Visual Exam of Seals & Gaskets on Airlocks,Hatches & Other Devices Required to Assure Containment leak-tight Integrity,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i)1999-10-0707 October 1999 Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Code Requirements of Table IWE-2500-1 for VT-3 Visual Exam of Seals & Gaskets on Airlocks,Hatches & Other Devices Required to Assure Containment leak-tight Integrity,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20217C3221999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-498/99-16 & 50-499/99-16 on 990808-0918.No Violations Noted.Insp Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations,Sound Engineering & Maint Practices & Careful Radiological Work Controls 05000499/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-00,re Entry Into TS 3.0.3.Licensee Commitments Listed in Corrective Actions Section of Attachment1999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-00,re Entry Into TS 3.0.3.Licensee Commitments Listed in Corrective Actions Section of Attachment ML20212L1651999-09-30030 September 1999 Responds to STP Nuclear Operating Co 981012 & s Which Provided Update to TS Bases Pages B 3/4 8-14 Through B 3/4 8-17.NRC Staff Found Change Consistent with TS 3/4.8.2 DC Sources. Staff Found & Deleted Typographical Error NOC-AE-000664, Forwards Rev 1 to STP Electric Generating Station Unit 1 Cycle 9 COLR & Rev 1 to STP Electric Generating Station Unit 2 Cycle 7 Colr1999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to STP Electric Generating Station Unit 1 Cycle 9 COLR & Rev 1 to STP Electric Generating Station Unit 2 Cycle 7 Colr ML20212J7141999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-498/99-15 & 50-499/99-15 on 990920-24 at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station.No Violations Noted.Insp Covered Requalification Training Program & Observation of Requalification Activities NOC-AE-000646, Informs NRC That STP Nuclear Operating Co Is Y2K Ready IAW Nei/Nusmg 97-07 Guidelines & Also Provides Response to NRC Ltr1999-09-28028 September 1999 Informs NRC That STP Nuclear Operating Co Is Y2K Ready IAW Nei/Nusmg 97-07 Guidelines & Also Provides Response to NRC Ltr ML20212J0651999-09-27027 September 1999 Discusses Licensee 980330 Response to GL 97-06, Degradation of SG Internals. Concludes That Response to GL Provides Reasonable Assurance That Condition of SG Internals in Compliance with Current Licensing Bases for Facility ML20212F1791999-09-24024 September 1999 Discusses 990923 Meeting Conducted in Region IV Ofc Re Status of Activities to Support Confirmatory Order, ,modifying OL & to Introduce New Director,Safety Quality Concerns Program.List of Attendees Encl ML20212E9091999-09-23023 September 1999 Discusses GL 98-01, Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps, Supplement 1 & STP Nuclear Operating Co Response for STP Dtd 990629.Understands That at Least One Sys or Component Listed May Have Potential to Cause Transient ML20212F2111999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards Review of SG 90-day Rept, South Texas Unit-2 Cycle 7 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria Rept, Submitted by Util on 990119 NOC-AE-000633, Forwards Rev 3 to SG-99-04-005, STP 1RE08 Outage Condition Monitoring Rept & Final Operational Assessment. Rept Satisfies Reporting Requirements of NEI 97-06,dtd Dec 19971999-09-21021 September 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to SG-99-04-005, STP 1RE08 Outage Condition Monitoring Rept & Final Operational Assessment. Rept Satisfies Reporting Requirements of NEI 97-06,dtd Dec 1997 NOC-AE-000634, Forwards Addl Info Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Povs. MOV design-basis Review Checklist,Encl1999-09-21021 September 1999 Forwards Addl Info Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Povs. MOV design-basis Review Checklist,Encl NOC-AE-000649, Forwards Current Annual Financial Data for STP Electric Generating Station Per 10CFR50.71(b),acting on Behalf of Central Power & Light Co,City of Austin,Tx,City Public Svc Board of San Antonio & Hl&P1999-09-21021 September 1999 Forwards Current Annual Financial Data for STP Electric Generating Station Per 10CFR50.71(b),acting on Behalf of Central Power & Light Co,City of Austin,Tx,City Public Svc Board of San Antonio & Hl&P 05000499/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00,re Esfa Following Loss of Power to Standby Transformer 2 Due to Electrical Fault.Licensee Commitments Are Listed in Corrective Actions Section of LER1999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-005-00,re Esfa Following Loss of Power to Standby Transformer 2 Due to Electrical Fault.Licensee Commitments Are Listed in Corrective Actions Section of LER ML20212D9171999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Completed Midcycle PPR of South Texas Project & Identified No Areas in Which Performance Warranted Insp Beyond Core Insp Program.Details of Insp Plan Through Mar 2000 & Historical Listing of Plant Issues,Encl ML20216F5471999-09-15015 September 1999 Discusses 990914 Meeting Conducted at Region Iv.Meeting Was Requested by Staff to Introduce New Management Organization to Region IV & to Discuss General Plant Performance & Mgt Challenges IR 05000498/19990121999-09-14014 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-498/99-12 & 50-499/99-12 on 990816-19.Three Violations Occurred & Being Treated as Ncvs. Areas Examined During Insp Included Portions of Access Authorization & Physical Security Programs 05000498/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00 Re Train 'B' CR Makeup & Cleanup Filtration Sys Being Inoperable for Greater than Aot.Util Intends to Append Addl Info Section of LER with Brief Description of Test Results,Rather than Submit Separate LER1999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00 Re Train 'B' CR Makeup & Cleanup Filtration Sys Being Inoperable for Greater than Aot.Util Intends to Append Addl Info Section of LER with Brief Description of Test Results,Rather than Submit Separate LER ML20211P8201999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards SE Authorizing 990224 Submittal of First 10-year Interval ISI Program Plan - Relief Request RR-ENG-24,from ASME Section XI Code,Table IWC-2500-1 NOC-AE-000638, Forwards License Renewal Applications & Certifications of Medical Exam for Seven Listed Licensed Operators at Stp,Per 10CFR55.57.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards License Renewal Applications & Certifications of Medical Exam for Seven Listed Licensed Operators at Stp,Per 10CFR55.57.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML20211P7671999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards SER Authorizing Licensee 990517 Alternative Proposed in Relief Request RR-ENG-2-8 to Code Case N-491-2 for Second 10-year Insp Interval of South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2,pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20211P7871999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan Request for Relief RR-ENG-31 IR 05000498/19990141999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-498/99-14 & 50-499/99-14 on 990627-0807.Apparent Violations Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy NOC-AE-000562, Requests Relief from Contruction Code non-destructive Exam Requirements for Repair/Replacement Activities During Second Inservice Insp Interval of Units 1 & 2,IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i)1999-08-31031 August 1999 Requests Relief from Contruction Code non-destructive Exam Requirements for Repair/Replacement Activities During Second Inservice Insp Interval of Units 1 & 2,IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20212A4351999-08-27027 August 1999 Discusses Investigation Rept OI-4-1999-009 Re Activites at South Texas Project.Oi Investigation Initiated in Response to Alleged Employment Discrimination Complaint. Allegation Not Substantiated.No Further Action Planned NOC-AE-000617, Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Program Performance Rept for 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d)1999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Program Performance Rept for 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) ML20211J2511999-08-26026 August 1999 Discusses Proposed TS Change on Replacement SG Water Level Trip Setpoint for Plant,Units 1 & 2 NOC-AE-000585, Provides Notification That South Texas Project Has Completed Integrity Evaluation of Units 1 & 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Casings Required by Paragraph (D) of Code Case N-4811999-08-25025 August 1999 Provides Notification That South Texas Project Has Completed Integrity Evaluation of Units 1 & 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Casings Required by Paragraph (D) of Code Case N-481 ML20211F4421999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards SE Authorizing Licensee 990513 Request for Relief RR-ENG-2-13,seeking Relief from ASME B&PV Code Section Xi,Exam Vessel shell-to-flange Welds for Second ISI Intervals ML20211F5031999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards SE Authorizing Licensee 990315 Request for Relief RR-ENG-30,seeking Relief from ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,Nde Requirements Applicable to Stp,Unit 2 SG Welds ML20212A4391999-08-17017 August 1999 Discusses Investigation Rept OI-4-1999-023 Re Activities at South Texas Project.Oi Investigation Initiated in Response to Alleged Employment Discrimination for Initiating Condition Report to Document Unauthorized Work Practices ML20210U1271999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-498/99-08 & 50-499/99-08 on 990517-21 & 0607-10.No Violations Noted.Corrective Action Program Was Reviewed ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20211B7881999-08-10010 August 1999 Transmits Summary of Two Meetings with Risk-Informed TS Task Force in Rockville,Md on 990514 & 0714 ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams NOC-AE-000603, Informs of Addition of Restriction to SRO License 42658, for KM Espinoza,Effective 990721,per 10CFR50.74.Encl Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-07-29029 July 1999 Informs of Addition of Restriction to SRO License 42658, for KM Espinoza,Effective 990721,per 10CFR50.74.Encl Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) NOC-AE-000470, Forwards Amend 12 to STP Fire Hazards Analysis Rept. Summary of Changes Made Under Provision of 10CFR50.59 Also Encl1999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Amend 12 to STP Fire Hazards Analysis Rept. Summary of Changes Made Under Provision of 10CFR50.59 Also Encl NOC-AE-000599, Forwards STP Unit 1,Cycle 9 Startup Testing Summary Rept. No New Licensing Commitments Contained in Ltr1999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards STP Unit 1,Cycle 9 Startup Testing Summary Rept. No New Licensing Commitments Contained in Ltr NOC-AE-000589, Forwards Rev to 1RE08 ISI Summary Repts for Repairs & Replacements & for Sys Pressure Tests,Corecting Date of End of Insp Interval Provided in Item 9 of from NIS-1 from 09/24/99 to 09/24/20001999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Rev to 1RE08 ISI Summary Repts for Repairs & Replacements & for Sys Pressure Tests,Corecting Date of End of Insp Interval Provided in Item 9 of from NIS-1 from 09/24/99 to 09/24/2000 ML20210F3851999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Exam Repts 50-498/99-301 & 50-499/99-301 on 990706- 15.Exam Included Evaluation of 9 Applicants for SO Licenses & 8 Applicants for RO Licenses 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARNOC-AE-000675, Forwards Clarification on Items Included in 990531 Response to RAI Re Proposed License Amend Associated with Operator Action for Sbloca,As Requested1999-10-21021 October 1999 Forwards Clarification on Items Included in 990531 Response to RAI Re Proposed License Amend Associated with Operator Action for Sbloca,As Requested NOC-AE-000680, Forwards Rev 5 to 0PGP03-ZV-0001, Severe Weather Plan1999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards Rev 5 to 0PGP03-ZV-0001, Severe Weather Plan NOC-AE-000683, Forwards 30-day Rept Concerning Significant Changes to Accepted Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident ECCS Evaluation Model for South Tx Project,Units 1 & 2,IAW 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(ii)1999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards 30-day Rept Concerning Significant Changes to Accepted Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident ECCS Evaluation Model for South Tx Project,Units 1 & 2,IAW 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(ii) NOC-AE-000674, Forwards Requested Estimates of Needs for Operator Licensing Exams,Per AL-99-03, Operator Licensing National Exam Schedule1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards Requested Estimates of Needs for Operator Licensing Exams,Per AL-99-03, Operator Licensing National Exam Schedule 05000498/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00 Re Turbine Trip That Occurred While Performing Main Turbine Emergency Trip Test.Commitments Made by Licensee Are Listed in Corrective Actions Section of LER1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00 Re Turbine Trip That Occurred While Performing Main Turbine Emergency Trip Test.Commitments Made by Licensee Are Listed in Corrective Actions Section of LER NOC-AE-000625, Requests Partial Relief from ASME Section XI Visual Exam Requirements of IWA-5242(a).Relief Request Is Based on Provisions of Draft ASME Section XI Code Case N-616,which Is Expected to Be Published in Near Future1999-10-0707 October 1999 Requests Partial Relief from ASME Section XI Visual Exam Requirements of IWA-5242(a).Relief Request Is Based on Provisions of Draft ASME Section XI Code Case N-616,which Is Expected to Be Published in Near Future NOC-AE-000610, Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Code Nondestructive Exam Requirements of IWA-5250(a)(2) for Second Inservice Insp Interval,Per Provisions of 10CFR50.55a(3)(i)1999-10-0707 October 1999 Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Code Nondestructive Exam Requirements of IWA-5250(a)(2) for Second Inservice Insp Interval,Per Provisions of 10CFR50.55a(3)(i) NOC-AE-000653, Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Code Requirements of Table IWE-2500-1 for VT-3 Visual Exam of Seals & Gaskets on Airlocks,Hatches & Other Devices Required to Assure Containment leak-tight Integrity,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i)1999-10-0707 October 1999 Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Code Requirements of Table IWE-2500-1 for VT-3 Visual Exam of Seals & Gaskets on Airlocks,Hatches & Other Devices Required to Assure Containment leak-tight Integrity,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) 05000499/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-00,re Entry Into TS 3.0.3.Licensee Commitments Listed in Corrective Actions Section of Attachment1999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-00,re Entry Into TS 3.0.3.Licensee Commitments Listed in Corrective Actions Section of Attachment NOC-AE-000664, Forwards Rev 1 to STP Electric Generating Station Unit 1 Cycle 9 COLR & Rev 1 to STP Electric Generating Station Unit 2 Cycle 7 Colr1999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to STP Electric Generating Station Unit 1 Cycle 9 COLR & Rev 1 to STP Electric Generating Station Unit 2 Cycle 7 Colr NOC-AE-000646, Informs NRC That STP Nuclear Operating Co Is Y2K Ready IAW Nei/Nusmg 97-07 Guidelines & Also Provides Response to NRC Ltr1999-09-28028 September 1999 Informs NRC That STP Nuclear Operating Co Is Y2K Ready IAW Nei/Nusmg 97-07 Guidelines & Also Provides Response to NRC Ltr NOC-AE-000633, Forwards Rev 3 to SG-99-04-005, STP 1RE08 Outage Condition Monitoring Rept & Final Operational Assessment. Rept Satisfies Reporting Requirements of NEI 97-06,dtd Dec 19971999-09-21021 September 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to SG-99-04-005, STP 1RE08 Outage Condition Monitoring Rept & Final Operational Assessment. Rept Satisfies Reporting Requirements of NEI 97-06,dtd Dec 1997 NOC-AE-000634, Forwards Addl Info Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Povs. MOV design-basis Review Checklist,Encl1999-09-21021 September 1999 Forwards Addl Info Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Povs. MOV design-basis Review Checklist,Encl NOC-AE-000649, Forwards Current Annual Financial Data for STP Electric Generating Station Per 10CFR50.71(b),acting on Behalf of Central Power & Light Co,City of Austin,Tx,City Public Svc Board of San Antonio & Hl&P1999-09-21021 September 1999 Forwards Current Annual Financial Data for STP Electric Generating Station Per 10CFR50.71(b),acting on Behalf of Central Power & Light Co,City of Austin,Tx,City Public Svc Board of San Antonio & Hl&P 05000499/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00,re Esfa Following Loss of Power to Standby Transformer 2 Due to Electrical Fault.Licensee Commitments Are Listed in Corrective Actions Section of LER1999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-005-00,re Esfa Following Loss of Power to Standby Transformer 2 Due to Electrical Fault.Licensee Commitments Are Listed in Corrective Actions Section of LER 05000498/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00 Re Train 'B' CR Makeup & Cleanup Filtration Sys Being Inoperable for Greater than Aot.Util Intends to Append Addl Info Section of LER with Brief Description of Test Results,Rather than Submit Separate LER1999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00 Re Train 'B' CR Makeup & Cleanup Filtration Sys Being Inoperable for Greater than Aot.Util Intends to Append Addl Info Section of LER with Brief Description of Test Results,Rather than Submit Separate LER NOC-AE-000638, Forwards License Renewal Applications & Certifications of Medical Exam for Seven Listed Licensed Operators at Stp,Per 10CFR55.57.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards License Renewal Applications & Certifications of Medical Exam for Seven Listed Licensed Operators at Stp,Per 10CFR55.57.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) NOC-AE-000562, Requests Relief from Contruction Code non-destructive Exam Requirements for Repair/Replacement Activities During Second Inservice Insp Interval of Units 1 & 2,IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i)1999-08-31031 August 1999 Requests Relief from Contruction Code non-destructive Exam Requirements for Repair/Replacement Activities During Second Inservice Insp Interval of Units 1 & 2,IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) NOC-AE-000617, Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Program Performance Rept for 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d)1999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Program Performance Rept for 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) NOC-AE-000585, Provides Notification That South Texas Project Has Completed Integrity Evaluation of Units 1 & 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Casings Required by Paragraph (D) of Code Case N-4811999-08-25025 August 1999 Provides Notification That South Texas Project Has Completed Integrity Evaluation of Units 1 & 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Casings Required by Paragraph (D) of Code Case N-481 NOC-AE-000603, Informs of Addition of Restriction to SRO License 42658, for KM Espinoza,Effective 990721,per 10CFR50.74.Encl Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)1999-07-29029 July 1999 Informs of Addition of Restriction to SRO License 42658, for KM Espinoza,Effective 990721,per 10CFR50.74.Encl Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) NOC-AE-000599, Forwards STP Unit 1,Cycle 9 Startup Testing Summary Rept. No New Licensing Commitments Contained in Ltr1999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards STP Unit 1,Cycle 9 Startup Testing Summary Rept. No New Licensing Commitments Contained in Ltr NOC-AE-000470, Forwards Amend 12 to STP Fire Hazards Analysis Rept. Summary of Changes Made Under Provision of 10CFR50.59 Also Encl1999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Amend 12 to STP Fire Hazards Analysis Rept. Summary of Changes Made Under Provision of 10CFR50.59 Also Encl 05000498/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-00 Re Automatic Reactor Trip Due to over-temp delta-temp Actuation.Licensee Commitments Are Listed in Corrective Actions Section of LER1999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-00 Re Automatic Reactor Trip Due to over-temp delta-temp Actuation.Licensee Commitments Are Listed in Corrective Actions Section of LER NOC-AE-000589, Forwards Rev to 1RE08 ISI Summary Repts for Repairs & Replacements & for Sys Pressure Tests,Corecting Date of End of Insp Interval Provided in Item 9 of from NIS-1 from 09/24/99 to 09/24/20001999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Rev to 1RE08 ISI Summary Repts for Repairs & Replacements & for Sys Pressure Tests,Corecting Date of End of Insp Interval Provided in Item 9 of from NIS-1 from 09/24/99 to 09/24/2000 NOC-AE-000582, Forwards 1RE08 ISI Summary Rept for Welds & Component Supports of STP Electric Generating Station,Unit 1. Summary Rept Satisfies Reporting Requirements of IWA-6000 of Section XI for Welds & Component Supports1999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards 1RE08 ISI Summary Rept for Welds & Component Supports of STP Electric Generating Station,Unit 1. Summary Rept Satisfies Reporting Requirements of IWA-6000 of Section XI for Welds & Component Supports NOC-AE-000597, Forwards voltage-based Criteria 90-day Rept for SG Tube Exam Performed Under NRC GL 95-05 During Refueling Outage 1RE08. Rept Contains Info Required by Section 6.b of Attachment 2 to GL 95-051999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards voltage-based Criteria 90-day Rept for SG Tube Exam Performed Under NRC GL 95-05 During Refueling Outage 1RE08. Rept Contains Info Required by Section 6.b of Attachment 2 to GL 95-05 NOC-AE-000598, Forwards Four Copies of 1RE08 Refueling Outage ISI Summary Rept for Steam Generator Tubing1999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards Four Copies of 1RE08 Refueling Outage ISI Summary Rept for Steam Generator Tubing NOC-AE-00586, Forwards Results of Control Rod Testing,In Response to NRC Bulletin 96-01, Control Rod Insertion Problems, Dtd 960308.Core Map Provided to Assist in Understanding Test Data1999-07-21021 July 1999 Forwards Results of Control Rod Testing,In Response to NRC Bulletin 96-01, Control Rod Insertion Problems, Dtd 960308.Core Map Provided to Assist in Understanding Test Data NOC-AE-000595, Forwards Chapters 1.0 & 16.0 to Operations QA Plan for South Texas Project.Rev Is Strictly Administrative & All Content Was Previously Submitted to NRC on 990503 & 9906151999-07-21021 July 1999 Forwards Chapters 1.0 & 16.0 to Operations QA Plan for South Texas Project.Rev Is Strictly Administrative & All Content Was Previously Submitted to NRC on 990503 & 990615 NOC-AE-000518, Requests Exemption from Various Special Treatment Requirements of 10CFR50,as Described in Encls to Ltr.Stp Believes That Pilot Application Will Assist NRC in Development & Implementation of risk-informed 10CFR501999-07-13013 July 1999 Requests Exemption from Various Special Treatment Requirements of 10CFR50,as Described in Encls to Ltr.Stp Believes That Pilot Application Will Assist NRC in Development & Implementation of risk-informed 10CFR50 NOC-AE-000536, Submits Request for Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50.34(b)(11),10CFR50,App A,Gdc 2 & 10CFR100,App a, Section VI(a)(3) Re Maint of Seismic Instrumentation.Revised Page to Procedure OERP01-ZV-IN01 Included1999-07-13013 July 1999 Submits Request for Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50.34(b)(11),10CFR50,App A,Gdc 2 & 10CFR100,App a, Section VI(a)(3) Re Maint of Seismic Instrumentation.Revised Page to Procedure OERP01-ZV-IN01 Included NOC-AE-000580, Forwards Response to NRC 990415 RAI Re Implementation of Commitments Related to GL 89-10, Safety-Related MOV Testing & Surveillance & GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs1999-07-13013 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990415 RAI Re Implementation of Commitments Related to GL 89-10, Safety-Related MOV Testing & Surveillance & GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs NOC-AE-000574, Forwards ISI Summary Repts for Repairs & Replacements & for Sys Pressure Tests Performed Between 971004 & Completion of Eighth RO on 9904281999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards ISI Summary Repts for Repairs & Replacements & for Sys Pressure Tests Performed Between 971004 & Completion of Eighth RO on 990428 NOC-AE-000557, Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Code Nondestructive Exam Requirements of App III,III-3410 for Second ISI Interval.Proposed Alternatives for Ultrasonic Exam of Piping Sys Welds,Attached1999-07-0606 July 1999 Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Code Nondestructive Exam Requirements of App III,III-3410 for Second ISI Interval.Proposed Alternatives for Ultrasonic Exam of Piping Sys Welds,Attached NOC-AE-000498, Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Code Nondestructive Exam Requirements Applicable to SG Main Steam Nozzle inside- Radius Sections.Attachment Includes Discussion of Basis & Justification for Request & Implementation Schedule1999-07-0606 July 1999 Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Code Nondestructive Exam Requirements Applicable to SG Main Steam Nozzle inside- Radius Sections.Attachment Includes Discussion of Basis & Justification for Request & Implementation Schedule NOC-AE-000573, Requests Relief from Requirements of ASME Section XI Code Case N-498,exempting Isolated Class 1 Reactor Vessel Head Vent Atmospheric Vent Piping & Valve from Being Tested at Full RCS Pressure1999-07-0606 July 1999 Requests Relief from Requirements of ASME Section XI Code Case N-498,exempting Isolated Class 1 Reactor Vessel Head Vent Atmospheric Vent Piping & Valve from Being Tested at Full RCS Pressure NOC-AE-000541, Submits Response to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Systems at Npps. Readiness Disclosure for STP, Encl1999-06-29029 June 1999 Submits Response to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Systems at Npps. Readiness Disclosure for STP, Encl NOC-AE-000571, Forwards Final Operating Exam Matls for STP Exam Scheduled for 990705.Revised Operating Exam Outline & post-validation Change Summary Has Been Included.Without Encls1999-06-24024 June 1999 Forwards Final Operating Exam Matls for STP Exam Scheduled for 990705.Revised Operating Exam Outline & post-validation Change Summary Has Been Included.Without Encls NOC-AE-000512, Responds to NRC 981201 Telcon Re Jco 93-0004,per Revised MSLB Analysis1999-06-23023 June 1999 Responds to NRC 981201 Telcon Re Jco 93-0004,per Revised MSLB Analysis NOC-AE-000560, Forwards LER 99-S02-00,re Failure to Maintain Positive Control of Vital Area Security Key.Licensee Commitments Are Found in Corrective Action Section of LER1999-06-23023 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-S02-00,re Failure to Maintain Positive Control of Vital Area Security Key.Licensee Commitments Are Found in Corrective Action Section of LER 05000498/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00,re Failure to Meet Requirements of TS Surveillance 3.7.1.2 Action B for Auxiliary FW Sys.Only Commitments Contained in Ltr Are Located in Corrective Action Section of LER1999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-005-00,re Failure to Meet Requirements of TS Surveillance 3.7.1.2 Action B for Auxiliary FW Sys.Only Commitments Contained in Ltr Are Located in Corrective Action Section of LER NOC-AE-000565, Forwards Amended Pages for Insertion Into South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Co Previously Submitted Response to NRC Rai.New Pages Include Expanded Answer to Question 4.b1999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Amended Pages for Insertion Into South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Co Previously Submitted Response to NRC Rai.New Pages Include Expanded Answer to Question 4.b NOC-AE-000548, Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Amends on Replacement SG Water Level Trip Setpoint Differences for Stp,Units 1 & 2.Nothing Contained in Response Should Be Considered Commitment Unless So Specified in Separate Correspondence1999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Amends on Replacement SG Water Level Trip Setpoint Differences for Stp,Units 1 & 2.Nothing Contained in Response Should Be Considered Commitment Unless So Specified in Separate Correspondence NOC-AE-000561, Forwards Change QA-042 to Operations QAP, Rev 13, Reflecting Current Organizational Alignment for STP & Culminating Organizational Realigment That Has Been Taking Place During Past Several Months1999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Change QA-042 to Operations QAP, Rev 13, Reflecting Current Organizational Alignment for STP & Culminating Organizational Realigment That Has Been Taking Place During Past Several Months NOC-AE-0559, Forwards STP Commitment Change Summary Rept for Period 981209-990610.Rept Lists Each Commitment for Which Change Was Made During Reporting Period & Provides Basis for Each Change1999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards STP Commitment Change Summary Rept for Period 981209-990610.Rept Lists Each Commitment for Which Change Was Made During Reporting Period & Provides Basis for Each Change NOC-AE-000499, Forwards Relief Request RR-ENG-2-3,proposing to Perform Alternative Ultrasonic Examination from Outside Surface of Skirt Attachment Weld as Described in Encl,In Lieu of Surface Examination from Inside Pressurizer Skirt1999-06-0909 June 1999 Forwards Relief Request RR-ENG-2-3,proposing to Perform Alternative Ultrasonic Examination from Outside Surface of Skirt Attachment Weld as Described in Encl,In Lieu of Surface Examination from Inside Pressurizer Skirt NOC-AE-000502, Forwards Relief Request RR-ENG-2-6,proposing That Boroscopic VT-1 Visual Examination Be Allowed as Alternative to Section XI Surface Examination of Pump Casing Welds,Or Portions of Welds within Pits1999-06-0909 June 1999 Forwards Relief Request RR-ENG-2-6,proposing That Boroscopic VT-1 Visual Examination Be Allowed as Alternative to Section XI Surface Examination of Pump Casing Welds,Or Portions of Welds within Pits NOC-AE-000500, Forwards Relief Request RR-ENG-2-4,proposing to Perform Alternative Ultrasonic Examination from Outside & End Surfaces of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Nuts,As Described in Encl in Lieu of Surface Examination of Threaded Region1999-06-0909 June 1999 Forwards Relief Request RR-ENG-2-4,proposing to Perform Alternative Ultrasonic Examination from Outside & End Surfaces of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Nuts,As Described in Encl in Lieu of Surface Examination of Threaded Region NOC-AE-000545, Forwards Response to NRC 990416 RAI Re Util Proposed Amend on Operator Action for Small Break Loca, .Draft EOP Re Small Break Loca,Encl to Aid Discussion of Proposed Amend1999-05-31031 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990416 RAI Re Util Proposed Amend on Operator Action for Small Break Loca, .Draft EOP Re Small Break Loca,Encl to Aid Discussion of Proposed Amend 1999-09-09
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The Light c o mp a n yS uth Texas Project Electric Generating station P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 ston @Q & Pm i
June 2,1997 ST-HL-AE-5652 l
File No.: G20.01, G20.02 10CFR50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk !
Washington, DC 20555 South Texas Project Unit I and Unit 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498 and 50-499 Supplementary Information re South Texas Project Pronosed Imnroved Technical Specifications
References:
- 1. Letter dated November 27, 1996 from William D. Beckner (NRC) to William T. Cottle (HL&P) entitled " Staff Comments on the South Texas Application for Conversion to the Improved Standard Technical I Specifications (TAC Nos. M95529 and M95530)".
- 2. Letter dated February 11, 1997 from Lawrence E. Martin (STP) to Document Control Desk entitled Supplementary Information re South Texas Project Proposed Improved Technical Specifications (ST-HL-AE-5517).
Representatives of the South Texas Prc, Net met with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff on April 3,1997 to discuss the review of the South Texas Project proposed Improved Technical Specifications. The meeting provided useful insights to facilitate the review and i approval of the STP proposed Improved Technical Specifications by the NRC staff. As discussed in the meeting, STP is providing a clarification of the philosophy for adapting the Standard Westinghouse Improved Specifications (NUREG-1431) to the STP three-train Engineered Safety Feature configuration. !
\'
9706110193 970602 PDR ADOCK 05000498 *'* lh P pyg 00G1 r oject u. . . Bes ir or ine r eticie ts i the so ia Texas e<ejeet e:\mp\nl\nrc-wk\ misc-97\$652. doc sTI: 30287594
l 1
Houston Lighting & Power Company
) South Tomas Project Electric Generating Station ST-HL-AE-5652 l
File No.: G20.01, ;
G20.02 i
Page 2 i s .
' As discussed iri Reference 2 and in the April 3 meeting, the South Texas Project plans to !
submit a comprehensive supplement to its initial application by June 30, 1997. This I comprehensive supplement will address NRC comments and issues identified in Reference 1 and the " pilot" supplement submitted in Reference 2. It will also include the incorporation of amendments to the current Technical Specifications, a Relocation Matrix describing where information relocated from the Technical Specifications was placed, a disposition of proposed generic changes (TSTFs), and a list of pending and planned changes to the STP Technical Specifications.
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Following resolution of any remaining NRC comments, STP will submit a certified Proof {
and Review version of the Improved Technical Specifications targeted to support NRC approval
{, of the proposed amendment by the end of 1997.
, Ifyou have any questions, please contact Mr. A. W. Harrison at 512-972-7298 or Mr. M. A. McBumett at 512-972-7206.
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l Lawrence E. M m
' General Manage ,
Nuclear Assurance and Licensing JMP/
Attachments: 1. Clarified South Texas Project Philosophy for Incorporating Three Train Design into Improved Technical Specifications
- 2. Table 1 - STP Improved Technical Specification Allowed Outage Times i 4
1 c:\wp\nParc-wk\ misc.97\5652. doc STI: 30287594 4
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f ST-HL-AE-5652 IIouston Lighting & Power Company File No.: G20.01 South Texas Project Electric Generating Station G20.02 Page 3 Rufus S. Scott Ellis W. Merschoff Associate General Counsel Regional Administrator, Region IV llouston 1.ighting & Power Company U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 61067 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Ilouston, TX 77208 Arlington, TX 76011-8064 Institute of Nuclear Power Thomas W. Alexion Operations - Records Center Project Manager, Mail Code 13H3 700 Galleria Parkway U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Dr. Benram Wolfe David P. Loveless 15453 Via Vaquero Sr. Resident Inspector Monte Sereno, CA 95030 c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
P. O. Box 910 Richard A. Ratliff Bay City, TX 77404-0910 Bureau of Radiation Control Texas Department of Ilealth J. R. Newman, Esquire 1100 West 49th Street Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Austin, TX 78756-3189 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036-5869 J. R. Egan, Esquire Egan & Associates, P.C.
M. T.11ardt/W. C. Gunst 2300 N Street, N.W.
City Public Service Washington, D.C. 20037 P. O. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission J. C. Lanier/M. B. Lee Attention: Document Control Desk City of Austin Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Electric Utility Depanment 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704 Central Power and Light Company ATTN: G. E. Vaughn/C. A. Johnson P. O. Box 289, Mail Code: N5012 Wadsworth, TX 77483 1
Attachment 1 ST-IIL-AE-5652
,, Page1of3 Clarified South Texas Project Philosophy for Incorporating Three Train Design into Improved Technical Specifications This attachment describing the South Texas Project (STP) philosophy for incorporating the STP three train design into the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) has been revised to address NRC comments provided at the April 3,1997 meeting. This description was originally attached to STP's letter to the NRC dated February 11,1997. !
The Standard Improved Technical Specifications w:re written for standard plants with two trains of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) equipment. For such standard plant designs, the j safety functions are degraded (loss of single failure protection) when a single train of an ESF 1 function is inoperable, and there is a loss of safety function when two trains of an ESF function !
are inoperable. Consequently, there is generally no allowed outage time in the Standard Technical Specifications for situations where two trains of an ESF function are inoperable.
The South Texas Project has three trains of ESF equipment and ESF suppon equipment.
Therefore, when only one of the three ESF trains is inoperable, STP retains a high degree of redundancy, which is substantially greater than for a two-train plant during conditions where one ESF train is inoperable. In addition, unlike a two-train plant, STP does not experience a complete loss of safety function when two of three trains of an ESF function are inoperable.
Thus it is appropriate for STP to have extended allowed outage times when one of three trains is inoperable and a reasonable allowed outage time for conditions where two of three trains are inoperable.
Generally, the conversion of a two train Standard Improved Technical Specifications to Improved Technical Specifications suitable for a three train plant involves application of the three concepts described below. These concepts are generally applied throughout the South Texas ITS submittal with some adjustment for specific system designs and redundancies. In each case, the deterministic conclusion has been tested with the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) to account for integrated effects and to ensure there is appropriate probabilistic justification.
Concepts for Converting Two Train Technical Specifications to Three Train Technical Specifications:
- l. Two train specifications have action statements that cover the progression from all i trains available to no trains available. To convert from two train specifications to I
three train specifications, it is necessary to add action statements to cover the pmgression from three trains available to no trains available.
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t Attachment 1 ST-HL-AE-5652
,, Page 2 of 3 1
- 2. The three train plant has substantially more capability to mitigate design basis events (including single failures) with one train out of service than a two train 3
plant with one train out of service (i.e., no single failure mitigation capability).
The allowed outage times (AOTs) associated with the loss of'one train are increased based on this additional capability.
f 3. The three-train plant has capability to mitigate most design basis events without a
! single failure if two trains are out of service wlmre the two-train plant has no
} capability with two trains out of service. This additional capability warrants 4
provision of short AOTs in lieu of immediate shutdown requirements.
Consequently, AOTs are provided for two trains out of service.
STP has structured'its application for Improved Technical Specifications to incorporate the three train design concepts described above. The first entry in Table 1 below outlines a general comparison between the philosophy of a typical two-train plant and a three-train plant.
The time allowed to be in a condition with less than three trains operable is based on a reasonable time to restore operability and the capability of the remaining operable equipment. The STP Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) shows that the risks incurred by the proposed allowed 3
outage times are acceptable and consistent with guidance contained in the EPRI PSA Application Guide. It is also important to note that a condition where two of three trains are inoperable would be an unexpected, involuntary condition since STP would not normally plan to remove two trains from service. (A detailed discussion of the application of the STP PSA for establishing a technical basis for extended allowed outage times in the STP Improved Technical Specifications is provided in the Topical Report that accompanied the original STP application for the Improved Technical Specifications.)
l Table 1 describes the changes to the allowed outage times that are being proposed in the STP Improved Technical Specification submittal. The values in'" bold italics" denote proposed changes to the current Technical Specification requirements. The Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) is included for completeness, although it is a four-train system at STP. The general l philosophy is still applicable since AFW is usually a three-train system at a " standard" plant. It l
can be seen that the philosophy described in the first " general case" entry has been incorporated '
in the proposed changes. In some cases, the proposed changes are more restrictive than the i
current Technical Specifications, which reflects the incorporation of risk informed elements used '
to develop the technical basis for the proposed allowed outage times. (Note that Table 1 is for illustrative purposes and does not include all the detail of the specification requirements.)
The deterministic bases for the proposed allowed outage times have been described to the NRC staff in STP's application for extended allowed outage times for its standby diesel generators, Essential Cooling Water System, and Chilled Water System. This application was !
approved in Amendments 85 and 72 to the STP Unit I and Unit 2 Operating Licenses, respectively. '
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Attachment 1 ST-HL-AE-5652 i -
,, Page 3 of 3 1
4 In that application and supporting correspondence, STP described the capabilities of a single train of ESF equipment to mitigate design basis accidents. Because the governing event is a condition where only one train of ESF equipment is postulated to be available, the analyses and evaluations performed in support of Amendments 85 and 72 are directly applicable to the j evaluations of the changes to the allowed outage times being proposed in the Improved Technical
- Specifications. The results of the deterministic evaluation done in support of those amendments show that with only one train of ESF equipment available, and allowing for some operator i
actions, STP can mitigate nearly all design basis events. STP is proposing no configurations in the Improved Technical Specifications that are not bounded by the evaluations for Amendments j 85 and 72.
4 i Staggered Testing at the South Texas Project
! The South Texas Project will include the definition of staggered test basis in our j Improved Technical Specifications. The frequencies will be adjusted to account for the three i
train design (four Auxiliary Feedwater trains). Variation from the standard is typically only a j few days. The proposed alternative for the frequency continues to meet the intent of the definition for staggered testing.
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TAELE1 .
STP IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ALLOWED OUTAGE TIMES (Page 1 of10)
System / Condition Standard Two . Current STP Three Proposed STP Safety Comparisom ' Three Train Comments Train Specification Train Specification Three Train Specification General Case All Trains Operable Unlimited Unliniited Unlimited Two train and three train meet design basis, including single failure criteria.
I Train Inoperable 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (typ.) 7 days (typ.) 7 days or greater 2-train clant: no loss of safety Capabilities exceed those of a function, but does not meet two-train plant. Action times of single failure criteria. 7 days (or grea. r in some cases) are appropriate.
STP (3 train =): no loss of safety function; meets single failure criterie in most cases.
2 Trains Inoperable T.S 3.03 or T.S. 3.03 or 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 2-train olant: complete loss of STP's capabilities exceed those equivalent equivalent (typ.) safety function and non-accident of a 2-train plant. 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> safe shutdown capability. allowed outage time recognizes +
the capabilities and limitations STP (3 trainth loss of safety and provides reasonable time to function only for specific low take corrective actions probability events; retains safe shutdown capability for non-accident conditions.
3 Trair Inoperable NA T.S.3.03 or T.S. 3.03 or Loss of safety function equivalent equivalent t
TABLEI STP IMPROVED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION ALLOWED OUTAGE TIMES (Page 2 of10) -
System /Coedition - Standard Two Current STP 7hree Proposed STP Safety Comparison Thute Train Comedets Train Specification Train SpecificaLon Thrte Train -
Specifation Safety injection (STS 3.5.2) (CIS 3.5.2) (ITS 3.5.2)
All Trains Operable no action no action no action 1 Train Inoperable 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 7 days 7 days 2-train plant: no loss of safety 7 days is unchanged from function, but does not meet Current Tech Specs. No new single failure criteria. extension is proposed in ITS.
STP (3 traind: no loss of safety function, meets single failure except for specific low probability events.
2 Trains Inoperable T.S. 3.03 T.S. 3.03 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 2-train plant: complete loss of STP's capabilities exceed those safety function. of a 2-train plant. 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed outage time recognizes
_STP (3 traind: loss of safety the capabilities and limitations function only for specific low and provides reasonable time to probability events. take corrective actions 3 Trains Inoperable NA T.S. 3.03 T.S. 3.03 Loss of safety function
TABLEI .
STP IMPROVED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION ALLOWED OUTAGE TIMES (Page 3 of10) '
System / Condition Standard Two Current STP Three Proposed STP Safety Comparison Three Train Consueemts Train Specification Train Specification Three Train -
Specirication Essestial Cooling (STS 3.7.8) (CTS 3.7.4) (ITS 3.7.8)
Water:
All Trains Operable no action no action no action I Train Inoperable 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 7 days 7 days 2-tram plant. no loss of safety 7 days is unchanged from j function, but does not meet Current Tech Specs. No new single failure criteria. extension is proposed in ITS.
STP (3 traim): no loss of safety function, generally meets single failure for most probable design ,
basis events.
2 Trains Inoperable T.S. 3.0.3 T.S. 3.0.3 24 kones 2-train olant: complete loss of STP's capabilities exceed those safety function and non-accident of a 2-train plant. 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> safe shutdown capability. allowed outage time recognizes ;
the capabilities and limitations STP (3 trains): can meet almost and provides reasonable time to all its safety design bases with take corrective actions.
only one operable train, including all of the more probable accidents and anticipated operational occurrences as defined in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
3 Trains Inoperable NA T.S. 3.0.3 T.S. 3.0.3 Loss of safety function
TABLEl-
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STP IMPROVED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION ALLOWED OUTAGE TIMES (Page 4 of10) -
System / Condition Standard Two Current STP Three Proposed STP Safety Comparison Three Train Comments Trals Specification Train Specification Three Train '
Specification Essential Chilled (STS no spec) (CTS 3.7.14) (ITS 3.7.10)
Water All Trains Operable no action no action I Train Inoperable 7 days 7 days 2-train niant: no loss cf safety 7 days is unchanged from function, but does not meet Current Tech Specs. No new single failure criteria. extension is proposed in ITS STP (3 trains): no loss of safety function, generally meets single failure for most probable design basis events.
2 Trains inoperable T.S. 3.03 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 2-train olant: complete loss of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is consistent with safety function and non-accident Essential Cooling Water safe shutdown capability, specification and recognizes reasonable time to take STP (3 trainst can meet almost corrective action.
all its safety design bases with i only one operable train, including all of the more probable accidents and anticipated operational occurrences as defined in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
3 Trains Inoperable T.S. 3.03 T.S. 3.03 Loss of safety function
TABLEI '
STP IMPROVED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION ALLOWED OUTAGE TIMES
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(Page 5 of10)
Systesi/ Condition Standani Two Current STP Three - Proposed STP . Safety Comiparison nree Trais Comissents Train Specification Train Specification Three Train t Specification Control Roose (STS 3.7.10) (CTS 3.7.7) (ITS 3.7.1I)
Envelope HVAC '
(MODE 1-4)
All Trains Operable no action no action no action i Train Inoperable 7 days 7 days 7 days 2-train plant: no loss of safety 7 days unchanged from Current function, but does not meet Tech Specs single failure criteria.
STP (3 trains): no loss of safety function, generally meets single ,
failure although system may not be able to maintain 1/8" positive pressure in all areas with a single train 2 Trains Inoperable TS 3.03 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> N hosers 2-train olant: complete loss of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> reflects a reduction of safety function. allowed time based on risk insights from the STP PSA and STP (3 trains): system is is consistent with the general functional although it may not case.
be able to maintain 1/E positive pressure in all areas.
3 Trains Inoperable NA TS 3.0.3 TS 3.03 Loss of safety function I .
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TABLE 1 .
STP IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ALLOWED OUTAGE TIMES '
(Page 6 of10)
Systean/ Condition Standard Two Current STP Three Pmposed STP . - Safety Coasparison Three Train Cossaments Traia Specification Train Specification Three Train Specification Comeposest (STS 3.7.7) (CIS 3.73) (ITS 3.7.7)
Cooling Water:
All Trains Operable no action no action no action I Train inoperable 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 7 days 14 days 2-tram plant no loss of safety STP proposes to increase the function, but does not meet allowed outage time from 7 days single failure criteria. to 14 days since only one train of CCW is necessary to fulfill STP (3 traine): no loss of safety the safety function.
function and pr rally meets single failure with rppropriate operator action.
2 Trains Inoperable T.S. 3.03 T.S. 3.03 24 howrs 2-train plant: complete loss of STP's capabilities exceed those -
safety function and non-accident of a 2-train plant. 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> safe shutdown capability. allowed outage time recognizes i
the capabilities and limitations :
STP (3 traint): can meet almost and provides reasonabic time to all its safety design bases with take corrective actions.
only one operable train assuming appropriate operator action.
3 Trains Inoperable NA T.S. 3.03 T.S. 3.03 Loss of safety function
TABLEI .
STP IMPROVED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION ALLOWED OUTAGE TIMES (Page 7 of10)
System / Condition . Standard Two Current STP Three Proposed STP Safety Comparison Three Train Comme'ats Train Specification - ~ Train Specification Three Train Specification Residual Heat (STS 3.5.2, treated (CTS 3.5.6) (ITS 3.52)
Removal as ECCS)
All Trains Operable No action No action No action 1 Train inoperable 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 7 days H days 2-tram plant. no loss of safety STP proposes to extend the function, but does not meet allowed outage time to 14 days single failure criteria. based on the redundancy of the 3 trains of RHR and the STP (3 traint): no loss of safety functional redundancy of the function; generally meets single Low Head Safety injection failure and Low Head Safety (LHSI). RHR at STP is not an injection provides functional ECCS injection system. It redundancy. functions solely for the long-term removal of decay heat after the RCS is depressurized for both normal operation and post-accident conditions. LHSI is capable of performing the long-term cooling under post-accident conditions.
2 Trains inoperable TS 3.0.3 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 2-train olant: complete loss of STP's capabilities exceed those safety function and non-accident of a 2-train plant. 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> safe shutdown capability. allowed outage time recognizes the capabilities and thitations STP (3 trainth can meet almost and provides reasonable time to all its safety design bases with take corrective actions only one operable train.
3 Trains inoperable NA Immediately take immediately take Reflects Current Tech Specs.
action to restore action to restore Appropriate action is to take action to restore since a shutdown would place the plant in a condition where the inoperable system #would be ,
needed.
TABLE 1 ,
STP IMPROVED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION ALLOWED OUTAGE TIMES (Page 8 of10)
- System / Condition Standani Two Current STP Three . Proposed STP Safety Comparison Three Train Comments Train Specification Train Specification Three Train Specificatica Reactor (STS 3.6.6A) - (C13 3.6.23) (113 3.6.6) SIP PSA analysis shows that Containment Fan RCFCs and Contamment Spray Coolers are not risk-significant systems.
All Trains Operable No action No action No action I Train Inoperable 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 7 days 28 days 2-train niant: no loss of safety 28 days is proposed for one train function, but does not meet out of service based on STP single failure criteria. analysis that shows that the system has substantial STP (3 traimt no loss of safety redundancy.
function; generally meets single failure criteria.
2 Trains Inoperable 7 days TS 3.03 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 2-train plant: complete loss of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is a reasonable time for safety function. corrective action for conditions with two trains of RCFCs STP (3 trains): one train inoperable.
maintains the function although Control Room and Technical Support Center doses will increase under design basis accident conditions.
3 Trains Inoperable NA TS 3.03 TS 3.03 Loss of safety function
TABLEI STP IMPROVED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION ALLOWED OUTAGE TIMES
~
(Page 9 of19)
System / Condition ' Standard Two Carerat STPThree ' Proposed STP Safety Comparison -Three Train Comments Train Specification Train Specification Three Train Specification Containment Spray (STS 3.6.6A) (CTS 3.6.2): (ITS 3.6.6) STP PSA analysis shows that RCFCs and Containment Spray are not risk-significant systems.
All Trains Operable No action No action No action i Train Inoperable 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 7 days 23 days 2-train olant: no loss of safety 28 days is proposed for one train function, but does not meet out of service based on STP single failure criteria. analysis that shows that the containment retains substantial ;
STP (3 trains): no loss of safety margin for design basis events function; generally meets single where one or more trains of failure criteria. containment spray are postulated to fail.
2 Trains Inoperable TS 3.0.3 TS 3.0.3 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 2-train plant: complete loss of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is a reasonable time for safety function. corrective action for conditions with two trains of containment STP (3 traint): one train spray inoperable maintains the function although Control Room and Technical Support Center doses will increase under design basis accident conditions. >
3 Trains Inoperable NA TS 3.0.3 TS 3.0.3
TABLE 1 .
STP IMPROVED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION ALLOWED OUTAGE TIMES (Page100fl0) '
SystendCondities Standard Two Train Current STP Dree Proposed STP Three Comments ' Three Train Ceanments s Specifiestion Train Specifiestion Train Specification ;
Auxiliary (STS 3.7.5) (CTS 3.7.1.2) (ITS 3.7.5) STP has 3 motor driven trains of Feedwater AFW and I turbine driven AFW train. **
All Trains Operable No action No action No action I Train inoperable 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />' 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 28 days Standard Plant no loss of safety STP's Auxiliary Feedwater design function, but consideration of single is essentially the " standard plant" ,
- 7 days if the steam (no distinction between failure results in increased with an extra motor driven train of '
supply to the turbine motor driven and dependency on the turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater. STP proposes driven train is turbine driven trains) train. that 28 days be allowed for the inoperable " extra" train to be inopersle. One ,
SIE: no loss of safety function. of four AFW trains must operate e Single failure does not result in and deliver flow to its respectise increased dependence on the Steam Generator for success. "
turbine-dri en train because of the third motor-driven train.
21 rains inoperable 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 6 hobrs' 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Standard Plant: function may be STP has substantially greater lost if loss of off-site power is the capability than the Standard Plant.
- 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if the (no distinction between initiating event. The 72-hour proposed allowed combination includes motor driven and outage time is consistent with the the A train motor turbine driven trains) SIP; STP still has two trains of allowed outage time of a Standard driven AFW Auxiliary Feedwater operable, Plant with the same number of either of which is capable of operable trains (2). For an ATWS removing decay heat. event two of four AFW trains are required for success. "
3 Trains Inoperable immediately take 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Standard Plant: function is lost. STP has substantially greater action to restore capability than the Standard Plant.
SIE; function is not lost. One train The 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> proposed allowed is still operable and capable of outage time is consistent with the removing decay heat. allowed outage time of a Standard Plant with the same number of onerable trains (l).
41 rains Inoperable NA Immediately take immediately take Function is lost.
action to restore action to restore
" - STP analysis shows that there is no significant difTerence between a motor-driven train being out of service or the turbine-driven train being out of service.
STP has a unique Westinghouse design, in that, each AFW has a 100% capability to their respective Steam Generator.
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