ML20147E549
| ML20147E549 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001201 |
| Issue date: | 02/14/1997 |
| From: | Jennifer Davis, Dennis Morey, Ting P, Troskoski W NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20147E547 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1201-97-202, NUDOCS 9703170151 | |
| Download: ML20147E549 (14) | |
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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20565-0001 4
9 . . . . . ,o OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY INSPECTION REPORT REPORT NO: 70-1201/97-202 DOCKET NO: 70-1201 LICENSE NO: SNM-1163 LICENSE":: Babcock and Wilcox Company (Framatome Cogema Fuels)
P.O. Box 11646 Lynchburg, VA 24506-1646 FACILITY NAME: Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division INSPECTION DATES: February 13-14,1997 INSPECTORS: W.M. Troskoski, Senior Inspector Inspection Section, Fuel Cycle Operations Branch J.R. Davis, Nuclear Process Engineer (Criticality)
Inspection Section, Fuel Cycle Operations Branch D.C. Morey, Criticality Safety Inspector Inspection Section, Fuel Cycle Operations Branch APPROVED BY: Philip Ting, Chief Fuel Cycle Operations Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS ENCLOSURE 9703170151 970313 PDR ADOCK 07001201 C PDR
, sNM-Il68 i 70-1201/97 202 TABLE OF CONTENTS B AC K G RO UN D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 EX EC UTI V E S UMM A RY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ........... ............. ...... 1 ,
1 M aj o r Resul ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 RE PO RT D ETA I LS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
- 01. MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES FOR NCS . . . . . . 2 1
01.1 License Application Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 2
- 02. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY FUNCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 02.1 NCS Computer Code Validatian Methods . . . ................... 3 02.2 Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 03. PL ANT ACTI VITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 03.1 General Plant Condition . . . . ............................ .... 5 3 1
1 03.2 NCS Postings / Procedure.s Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 04. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CHANGE CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 7
- 05. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY TRAINING ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 06. NUCLEAR CRITICAI.ITY SAFETY INSPECTIONS, AUDITS, AND INVESTIG ATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 07. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY EMERGENCY RESPONSE . . . . . . . . 10 07.1 Fire Pretection Administration . . . .................... 10 FOLLOW-UP ON PREVIOUS OPEN ITEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1 M ANAG EM ENT M EETING S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 ACRONYMS USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .. .................... . 12 l NMSs FCIS O
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l BACKGROUND The Lynchburg Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant (CNFP) operated by Framatome Cogema Fuels, Inc. produces nuclear fuel assemblies for use in commercial nuclear power plants. The process involves the receipt of uranium dioxide (UO2) fuel in the form of pellets which are unpacked, inspected, and loaded into fuel rods. The loaded rods proceed through an automated process which performs certain functions and testing including X-ray, end cap welding, helium leak testing, and rod washing. The inspected rods are assembled into fuel assemblies and either stored or packaged into fuel casks ready for shipment. Facility capabilities also exist for the return and disassembly of unused or defective fuel rods. The pellets are recovered from the fuel rods for further processing.
EXECUTIVE SUMM ARY Introduction The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) performed a routine, announced nuclear criticality safety inspection of the CNFP on February 13 and 14,1997. The inspection was conducted using NRC IIcadquarters staff. The focus of the inspection was the plant criticality safety program and associated programmatic interfaces. The major nuclear criticality safety (NCS) related areas reviewed included:
01 Management and Administrative Practices for NCS I 02 NCS Function (NCS evaluations, computer code validation) l 03 Plant Activities (including NCS controls implementation) 04 NCS Change Control 05 NCS Training Activities 06 NCS Inspections, Audits, and Investigations 07 NCS Emergency Response (fire fighting in moderator controlled areas)
Maior Results No violations were identified during this inspection; however, several inspector follow-up items are noted. The identified items below are supported by the Report Details Section addressed later.
- 1) The values of various limits applicable to specific uranium enrichments or license conditions are not consistent throughout the ticense. In one case, documented evidence was not readily available to demonstrate compliance of neutron poison requirements to license specifications.
- 2) Double contingency is not always explicitly identified in NCS evaluations, and no procedure for conducting NCS evaluations exists.
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- 3) The NCS postings required by license conditions do not meet the expected rigor and formality of accepted industry standards.
- 4) A process to rigorously document the completion of procedure, posting, and operator training revisions prior to startup of new or revised facilities has not been established.
- 5) Implementing guidance for health and safety audits needs to be revised to clearly parallel the four elements in the license.
- 6) Written guidance, management controls, and lines of communication and organizational interface have not been clearly established for fire fighting activities in moderator controlled areas.
REPORT DETAILS
- 01. MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES FOR NCS 01.1 License Apolication Maintenance
- a. Scope Prior to and during the inspection, various sections of the License Application were reviewed to assure technical consistency between the various limits and controls identified in different sections and to verify that a documented basis was maintained for selected parameters referenced in the Nuclear Safety Section.
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- b. Observations The inspectors noted that the values for a geometrically safe container identified in License Application Section 1.6.9 and the safe mass identified in Section 1.6.13 did not match the associated values in Section 4.2.3.2," Safe Units." It appears that Section 4.2.3.2 was revised to allow the processing of enrichments up to 5.1
- wt% while most of the values in Section 1,6 were for enrichments of 4.1 wt%.
This apparent discrepancy was brought to the attention of the licensee and the NRC's Fuel Cycle Licensing Branch for clarification and resolution.
License Application Section 4.2.4.2 indicates that a neutron poison (B 4C) is used to maintain subcriticality in the event ofloss of moderation control in the Pellet Vault Storage Room. According to the license application, the neutron poison must be equivalent to 35wt% B4 C in a 0.168-inch thick aluminum plate with an overall minimum density of 2.46 gm/cc. Although not specifically identified in the license application, the licensee also relies upon a similar neutron poison in the Fuel Assembly Inspection Pit.
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When the inspectors requested documentation to demonstrate that the neutron poisons met the parameters specified in Section 4.2.4.2, only vendor information i for the Pellet Vault could be located by the licensee: a certificate of compliance l for the neutron poison in the Inspection Pit could r m. be secured during the l inspection. Without this information, the NCS evaluations which take credit for .
the neutron poisons do not have any objective evidence that the installed plates meet the specifications as listed in the current license.
ANSI /ANS 8.17, Section 4.9 which deals with the handling and storage of Light Water Reactor (LWR) fuel outside reactors recommends that if reliance is placed on neutron absorbing materials, control shall be exercised to maintain their -l continued presence and intended distributions and concentrations. The licensee i
routinely inspects for the presence of the boral plates as part of the internal, semi-annual NCS audits. Since the intended distribution and concentration of the boral l plates is not expected to significantly change when used with virgin fuel, vendor ;
- documentation of the original specifications would be sufficient to meet accepted l l industry standards. Therefore, the Licensee committed to obtaining the certificate 1 l- of compliance for the neutron poison being used in the Inspection Pit and to l_ including copies of such compliances with the associated NCS evaluations. This is Inspector Follow-up Item 97-202-01.
- c. Conclusions i
I _ The values of various limits applicable to specific uranium enrichments or license j conditions are not clearly identified throughout the license. In one case, l documented evidence was not readily available to demonstrate compliance of l neutron poison requirements to specifications identified in the license.
- 02. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY FUNCTION 02.1 NCS Comnuter Code Validation Methods
- a. S ane The analytical computer methods used at CNFP to conduct criticality safety evaluations were reviewed to verify that the methods are appropriately validated l
and validation documentation is appropriately maintained.
- b. Observations CNFP Procedure 0902-06," Software Certification," controls the validation of l computer codes used for criticality safety evaluations. The licensee has developed
[ and maintains a certification file which contains a record of sample analytical cases NMsS FCIS l
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that were used for validation. For NCS calculations, the licensee uses the j analytical computer code package SCALE and certifies only those SCALE functional modules required to complete a criticality calculation,i.e., KENO.V, 1 BONAMI (resonance self-shielding), NITAWL (resonance self-shielding), and :
XSDRNPM (cross section weighting).
]
l CNFP has used the criticality code KENO.V for recent NCS evaluations.
Certification of the KENO.V module is based on previous certification of the KENO.IV module and is not completely independent. Rather than a direct l comparison with experimental results, the KENO.V validation compares output with KENO IV output and conflims that the results are within the limits of the 2% bias that the licensee routinely establishes as their minimum suberitical margin.
l Section 4.2.3.3 of the License Application commits CNFP to generally use the 123 1 group cross-section for NCS calculations at CNFP. Two years ago the licensee became aware of problems associated with this set due to the failure of the set to account for resonance self-shielding of U-235. Because many calculations at CNFP were performed using the 123 group set, the licensee reviewed analysis performed on operational units to determine if any calculations were non-conservative or that ;
might not meet license limits. The analysis demonstrated that for the enrichments l encountered at CNFP, the calculations remain conservative. New calculations are !
performed with the more reliable 27 group cross section set.- l l
- c. Conclusions Certification of KENO.V complies with ANSI /ANS requirements for validation and fulfils the license commitment to use validated computer software. The certification package is adequately maintained and the computer system in which the code resides is controlled to industry acceptable quality assurance levels.
02.2 Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations
- a. Scope Nuclear criticality safety evaluations were reviewed to determine the technical adequacy and demonstrable safety of plant operations in accordance with license conditions as specified in Section 4.1.2 of the License Application.
- b. Observations I
License conditions mandate that NCS evaluations support the double contingency principle, are performed by qualified NCS specialists, and are independently j reviewed by an individual meeting the qualifications of NCS specialist.
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. The inspectors reviewed select evaluations which included: 1) analyses 6567 01, -02, and -03 which dealt with the nuclear safety of pellet storage; 2) analysis l 15-1258255-01,"New Vacuum System - LMF Pellet Loading Room;" and 3) l analyses supporting license amendment application, " Processing Uranium l Enriched up to 5.1 Weight Percent U-235."
l The inspectors reviewed the evaluations and determined that the double contingency of operations was not explicitly identified, although the controlled parameters could be determined by a skilled criticality safety individual. While the analyses were l determined to be performed by qualified analysts, it was not readily apparent (i.e.,
documented) that the earlier evaluations were independently verified. However, l~ since current analyses which rely upon historical results are independently verified, these older analyses can be considered to be independently reviewed.
The inspectors noted that the quality of the documented analyses had progressively improved over time. However, no procedure is in place to standardize the NCS evaluation process, and as a result, consistency among evaluations varies widely.
During discussions at the exit meeting, the licensee committed to develop a procedure for conducting NCS evaluations. This is Inspector Follow-up Item 97-202-02.
The technical adequacy of the evaluations was also reviewed and determined to be satisfactory. The computer models, geometry, and postulated accident conditions were credible and far more favorable to criticality then is expected in the actual l case. Suberitical margins to account for uncertainties in the calculations and
- models were established and areas of applicability suitably applied.
- c. Conclusions Although no unanalyzed, non-conservative, or common mode failures were identified in the analyses reviewed, double contingency was not explicitly l identified in all cases. No procedure for conducting NCS evaluations is in place to l standardize the evaluation process.
- 03. PLANT ACTIVITIES 03.1 General Plant Condition
- a. Scope j A general plant tour and fissile material area walkdown was completed to evaluate i the objectives and characteristics of operating and emergency practices consistent i
{ with the established license conditions and industry standards.
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- b. Observations l
l The inspectors reviewed the entire plant operations including waste recovery activities and filtered exhaust ventilation. Generally, the operations and equipment were well maintained and the operating areas were free of combustible material loading to the extent practicable. Discussions and observation of plant personnel during the tours indicated a knowledge level of NCS aspects relevant to operations under their respective control.
l c. Conclusions 1
Daily plant activities and associated operating equipment are generally well maintained and positive controls are in place to preclude an inadverten't criticality to the extent practicable.
03.2 NCS PostingdProcedures Implementation
- a. Scope Postings and procedures were reviewed to assure that NCS limits and controls were positively identified and clearly posted. NCS postings were further reviewed ta assure consistency with applicable operating procedures. A field review of such
! postings and selected procedures was conducted to verify that the license conditions of Section 4.1.5 were being md.
- b. Observations License Application Section 4.1.5 requires nuclear safety postings to be maintained specifying nuclear safety parameters that are subject to procedural controls.
During a plant review, the inspectors noted that the nuclear safety parameter requirements of at least one posting was inconsistent with the associated operating procedures. More specifically, procedures MA-470, Revision 34 and MA-292, Revision 9 dealing with the assembly, packaging, shipping, and container storage had requirements which were inconsistent with posted NCS limits. Section 5.2.1 of each procedure listed the stacking and spacing requirements of shipping casks from other arrays but did not address the 18-inch edge-to-edge interarray spacing specified in the NCS posting. In fact, both procedures stated that shipping containers may be stored in unlimited accumulations which appears to contradict the posting. Postings are a supplement to procedures and therefore can not, by themselves, replace or supersede operating procedures.
It was further observed that the postings for the fuel storage racks in the Pellet Receiving area were of such size and type inat they provided limited usefuir. css.
Postings for the vertical fuel storage area were confusing as written and postings NMSs FCis
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for the cask loading area were inter-mingled with general safety requirements.
More generally, the NCS postings throughout the facility were found to be difficult to read at-a glance, were not always posted in conspicuous locations, and lacked the rigor and formality expected of such nuclear safety practices.
Discussions with plant staffindicated that these concerns had already been identified through an internal report, FM096154," Semi Annual NCS Audit of the Lynchburg Manufacturing Facility," dated December 19,1996 which identified the NCS postings as having human factors problems and in need of revision.
Therefore, a review of the adequacy of the licensee's long term corrective actions is being tracked as Inspector Follow-up Item 97-202-03.
- c. Conclusions The NCS postings at CNFP do not meet the expected rigor and formality as found at other NRC licensed facilities or as generally accepted in industry. The current ,
condition, locations, and format of some postings provide limited operator support l and are not always maintained consistent with applicable operating procedures.
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- 04. NCS CHANGE CONTROL ADMINISTRATION l
- a. Scope o The Change Control Program was evaluated to verify that it met the intent of License Application Section 2.3 for review and pre-operational evaluations of new or revised l facilities.
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- b. Observations l AS-1120, "CNFP Safety Review Board," Revision 5, provides the administrative l guidance for proposed changes to plant operations to ensure that nuclear safety requirements have been satisfied. Review criteria covers security, environmental protection, industrial safety (fire and hazardous materials), radiation safety, and nuclear safety in a checksheet form (AS-1120-1, Revision A).
Under the Nuclear Safety Section, the inspectors noted that the effect of the proposed
- change on limits and controls was considered. However, there did not appear to be a rigorous documentation requirement to trace the implementation of limit and control changes through the operational safety basis. Specifically, the change packages did not identify revisions to procedures, postings, or operator training that would be required prior to implementation of the change. Discussions with licensee management indicated
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! that the above revisions and training was accomplished on an as-needed basis. The
! licensee committed to revise the program to provide formal documentation that the l
NMss FCis l ._
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sNM Il68 8 70-1201/97 202 l , operating safety basis (procedures, postings, and operator training) was established for new or revised facilities prior to startup. This is Inspector Follow-up Item 97-202-04.
Section 4.1.3.1 of the License Application identifies specific areas that are allowed to be l modified with the concurrence of the Safety Review Board (SRB). Inspector review of l AS-1120 and discussions with the SRB Chairman indicated that appropriate controls l were established to meet the intent of the license in this area. The procedure provided l adequate guidance for what constituted either a minor or a major change. Inspector l review of active change packages indicated that the plant processes few (less than ten)
I changes each year and that each change is reviewed by the appropriate discipline managers. I
- c. Conclusions l The licensee has established a change control program that generally meets the intent of License Application Sections 2.3 and 4.1.3. However, the licensee has not established a l process to rigorously document the completion of procedure and posting revisions or !
operator training for new or revised facilities prior to startup.
- 05. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY TRAINING ACTIVITIES
- a. Scope
! I The nuclear criticality safety training documentation was reviewed to ensure that the continuing proficiency of operations personnel was demonstrable and that the licensee met the conditions of Section 2.5 of the license application. The scope of the review was l limited to those individuals who specifically work with fissile material.
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- b. Observations The inspectors reviewed training exam documentation and discussed the training philosophy and practices with management personnel. The design and development of the NCS training piogram at CNFP is based uponjob performance requirements and standards, although a general understanding of nuclear physics is required of all. The training evaluation methods included written and operational examinations and were based upon predetermined performance criteria. Refresher training requirements were determined and documented and such retraining is provided annually.
- c. Conclusions i
l The NCS training documentation of operational personnel was adequate. The training l material content for these individuals was also found adequate.
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- 06. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY INSPECTIONS, AUDITS, AND INVESTIGATIONS
- a. Scope -
The licensee's internal Health and Safety inspection program was reviewed to verify that j plant activities were periodically monitored for nuclear criticality safety in accordance i with license conditions. Program elements reviewed included the Monthly Safety Inspections and the Independent Nuclear Safety Audits. The involvement of the NCS Staff with the monitoring and assessment of process operations and performance for NCS was also evaluated.
- b. Observations The inspectors reviewed the records of the Monthly Safety Inspections for the past year.
To meet the requirements of Section 2.7 of the License Application, the licensee conducted the inspections for different 1.ortions of the plant on a weekly basis so that the i
entire plant was covered each month. A comprehensive checksheet had been developed to provide general guidance in such areas as fire, industrial, radiation and nuclear safety.
Inspector tours of the plant indicated that the checksheet approach was adequate to meet the intent of the license commitment.
l Section 2.7 further requires that independent auditors conduct nuclear safety, fire safety and health physics inspections on a semi-annual basis. The audit scope is to include the i following four elements: 1) effectiveness of procedural controls impacting on operational safety parameters; 2) audit of operating records, where such records provide a means of verifying procedural c( mpliance with safety specifications; 3) review and evaluation of contamination survey data; and 4) ascertaining the overall performance of the plant functions in providing adequate controls, surveillance, and follow-up to assure safety and license compliance.
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Procedure AS-1125," Health-Safety Audits," Revision 14, provides the administrative
! guidance for ' meeting the semi-annualindependent audit requirements for nuclear, i industrial, and health physics safety. 'lhe inspectors noted that the audit scope specified in Section 6.2 of the procedure did not parallel all of the elements specified in Section 2.7 of the Application. Specifically, AS-1125 did not appear to cover all aspects of the fourth element. However, the inspectors dete rmined through discussions with the nuclear safety auditor and plant management that the intent of the program element was being met. The licensee committed to revising procedure AS-1125 to clearly parallel the four audit elements specified in the license. This is Inspector Follow-up Item 97-202-05.
The semi-annual nuclear safety audit records were reviewed by the inspectors to verify that plant operatsons and performance were independently inspected for NCS. The
- inspectors noted that the audit documentation was sparse in that the checksheets used as
! inspection guidance for each plant nrea also served as the basic audit report.
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. Although this type of report contains a minimum amount ofinformation, the inspectors
, determined that the documentation was adequate based on the size of the facility and the
~ knowledge of plant supervision.
- c. Conclusions The licensee has established a monthly safety inspection program and a semi-annual nuclear safety audit program that meets the intent of the requirements in Section 2.7 of the License Application. However, the implementing guidance contained in AS-1125 needs to be revised to clearly parallel the four elements in the license. Documentation of audit activities, although minimal, is sufficient for the process. ,
- 07. NCS EMERGENCY RESPONSE.
07.1 Fire Protection Administration i
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- a. Scope Fire protection emergency procedures associated with moderator controlled areas were reviewed to ensure appropriate management controls, lines of l communication, and organizational interfaces were clearly established in order to ;
maintain adequate nuclear safety control during fire fighting activities. i
- b. Observations
- 1) NCS Specialist Interface
- The CNFP fire protection program is administered by the Health Safety Section with the Manager, Safety and Licensing overseeing the program. Areas under I moderation control throughout the facility have specific fire fighting requirements l (i.e., use only one fire hose, identification of management control, etc.) and are q prominently posted. Although management approval is required to use additional
( or different fire fighting techniques, specific methods, lines of communication, and organizational interfaces are not clearly established.
! Specifically, AS-1106," Safety and Licensing Emergency Procedure," Revision 20, allows the Senior Health Physicist to determine under what conditions a fire should I be extinguished without consultation of a criticality safety specialist. The simple l criteria given in Section 16.6 of this procedure is not adequate as stand-alone direction for the Senior Health Physicist to make a determination of the impact of various fire fighting actions on nuclear safety. Further, the limiting control of only
- one fire hose as a general guideline is only appropriate as to interstitial array j moderation and not valid under geometrical rearrangement (i.e., if the one fire hose
. is aimed directly on fissile material with sufficient force to dislodge material).
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.- l sNM ll68 H N20lM 202 A determination of whether the fire should be extinguished and by what means or the decision to let it burn itself out must be made in consultation with a criticality safety specialist to fully compare the risks and consequences of such activities.
ANSI /ANS 8.19, Section 4.4 recommends ths management provide personnel familiar with the physics of nuclear safety and wit .bassociated safety practices to furnish technical guidance appropriate to the scope of operations. In verbal discussion with plant staff, it appeared that personnel were knowledgeable of the NCS implications of fire fighting activities and inacated that a criticality safety specialist would be notified, but no written guidanee is given to this effect.
- 2) Offsite Suppon Interface Although the CNFP uses an internal fire brigade which is trained annually on fire fighting techniques and on the nuclear criticality safety considerations involved, it receives support from off-site agencies which do not receive refresher training.
Both ANSI /ANS 3.8.4, Section 3.1 and 8.19, Section 10.2 recommend that all individuals having emergency assignments including offsite support personnel be trained in the duties they will be expected to perform and should further include periodic drills as part of this training. Further, offsite personnel should be trained with respect to their organizational interface.
Part II, Section 10.5.6 of the License Application indicates that offsite support personnel have been informed of CNFP's operations, materials, and characteristics of potential fires, but the management controls and organizational interfaces of such plans are not clearly communicated in plant emergency procedures. Both the criticality safety specialist interface and the offsite support interface issues'were brought to the licensee's attention for evaluation. This is Inspector Follow-up Item 97-202-06.
- c. Conclusions Written guidance, management controls, and lines of communication and organizational interfaces have not been clearly established in emergency procedures for fire fighting activities in fissile material processing and storage areas.
FOLLOW-UP ON PREVIOUS OPEN ITEMS No specific NCS follow-up items were reviewed by the NRC inspection staff.
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, sNM 1168 12 70-120I/97 202 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS Exit Meeting Summary The NRC Inspection Team met with CNFP management throughout the inspection. An exit meeting was held on February 14,1997. No classified or proprietary information was identified.
The following is a partial list of exit meeting attendees:
B&W Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant Charles W. Carr, Vice President, Manufacturing and Service .
Gayle Elliott, Manager, Safety and Licensing Gary Hanson, Manager, Fuel Management and Operational Analysis Brian Palmer, Criticality Safety Analyst Darryl Gordon, Senior Health Physicist Dick Deveney, Supervisor Nuclear Technology Group Nuclear Regulatory Commission William Troskoski, Team Leader, NRC Headquarters Jack R. Davis, Nuclear Process Engineer (Criticality), NRC lieadquarters Dennis Morey, Inspector, NRC Headquarters .
ACRONYMS USED A NS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . American Nuclear Society ANSI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . American National Standards Institute B ONA M I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cross-Section Processing Module (part of SCALE)
CNFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant KENO.V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Three-Dimensional . Monte Carlo Code LMF................. ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . Lynchburg Manufacturing Facility NCS............... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nuclear Criticality Safety N ITA WL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cross-Section Processing Module (part of SCALE)
NRC............................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLR ............... .. ........ .. .. ........... . . . . . . . . . Pellet Loading Room SCALE..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluations S RB . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... . .. .................. Safety Review Board XSDRNPM .. ..... ....... ...... ..... Cell Weighting Module (part of SCALE) t NMss rCIS
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