ML20148M987
| ML20148M987 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1988 |
| From: | Tanya Hood ERIN ENGINEERING & RESEARCH, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148M966 | List: |
| References | |
| C115-87-04, C115-87-4, NUDOCS 8804060280 | |
| Download: ML20148M987 (139) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i t SAFETY EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM DESIGN MODIFICATIONS Prepared for: Portland General Electric Co. Prepared by: ERIN Engineering and Research, Inc. 1850 Mt. Diablo Blvd. Walnut Creek, California 94596 March 15, 1988 Project Manager: Date: 3[lT 86_ u ), Bb Reviewer: Date: Preparer: b W- Date: 3 # 8804060280 000331 DR ADOCK 05 j4
)
TABLE OF CONTENTS I Pace I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 3 II.1 System Operation / Functions 3 II.2 System Modifications 6 III. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 11 III.1 Tornado Frequency Evaluation 14 III.2 Tornado Wind Impacts on Plant Structures 18 III.3 Tornado Missile Impacts on Plant Structures 19 III.4 Tornado Induced Hazards 26 IV. RESULTS 31 IV.1 Base Case - With Intake Pipe Extension 32 IV.2 Case 2 - With Pipe Extension and External Dampers 33 IV.3 Case 3 - With Pipe Extension and External Dampers With Protected Air Supply 34 IV.4 Case 4 - Pipe Extension and External Dampers With Tornado Missile Protection 34 IV.5 Case 5 - Pipo Extension, Dampers and Filter 35 IV.6 Case 6 - Pipe Extension, Dampers and Filter With Reduced Wind Loading Design Basis 36 IV.7 Case 7 - Pipe Extension, Dampers and Filter With Protected Air Supply 36 IV.8 Case 8 - With Missile Protected Pipe Extension, Dampers, Filter 37 IV.9 Conclusions 37 V. References 41 Appendix A - CB-1 Fault Tree Appendix B - Quantification Bases Appendix C - Minimal Cutset Summary i C115-87-04
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P LIST OF FIGURE 8 : i Flaure No. Title Page 1 CB-1 Flow Diagram 4 2 CB-1 Intake System With Pipe Extension 7 3 CB-1 Intake System With Pipe Extension 8 and Dampers 4 CB-1 Intake System With Pipe Extension, 10 Dampers and Filter i 5 Trojan Threatening Tornado Impact 17 Frequency 6 Component Fragility For Various Design 20 Windspeeds LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title Page 1 Capabilities of Structures to 13 Withstand Tornados 2 Tornado Occurrence Frequency Summary 16 3 Fragility of Trojan Site Structures 21 In Tornados 4 Tornado Missile Survey Results 24 5 Summary of Results 39 11 C115-87-04
I. INTRODUCTION Portland General Electric has determined that certain modifications should be made to the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System of the Trojan plant (CB-1). These modifications enhance the capability of the system to perform its isolation function for toxic gas release and its emergency ventilation function for radiological hazard conditions. The modifications involved adding an extension to the intake ducting to place the intake point at a greater distance from the containment (completed in 1986), the future installation of redundant airtight dampers and installation of supplemental high efficiency particulate (HEPA) and charcoal filtration capability (tentative conceptual design only). A 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.59 ovaluation was performed per Portland General Electric's Nuclear Division Procedure 100-5 to determine whether these modifications involve unreviewed safety questions. Section 3.3 of the Trojan Final Safety Analysis Report requires that CB-1 be protected from tornado missiles and high winds. Due to space limitations, it is necessary to install the dampers and filtration units on the roof of the control building. Further, due to weight limitations, it is difficult to provide tornado missile protection for the portions of the system installed on the roof of the control building. Due to the fact that dampers, filters and ducting may be exposed to tornado winds and missiles, the overall tornado induced risk of habitability loss may increase due to these modifications. This analysis quantifies this increased risk to determine if tornado missile and wind protection is required. Nuclear plant systems are designed to provide high rollability of safe and orderly shutdown for a variety of postulated accident conditions. These accidents are very unlikely and are not i 1 C115-87-04
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expected to occur during the plant lifetime. In some cases, systems provided to support the achievement of safe shutdown are only called upon to function in extremely unlikely conditions. In such cases, it is useful to consider the impact of modifications and design alternatives on a full spectrum of such postulated accidents to assure that the overall net impact of such modifications is understood. Probabilistic risk assessment techniques have been developed for such studies. In order to evaluate the implications of the identified modifications to the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System, a detailed probabilistic risk evaluation has been performed. This report focuses on the overall implications of alternativo design features in terms of the increase or decrease in assessed safety of the facility. These types of analyses are often called "risk assessments" as the benefit of a modification can be viewed as the reduction in risk. It is important to maintain the perspective that overall risk values such as 10-6 or 10~7/ year are exceedingly small incremental or residual risk values. They are very unlikely and are in no way expected to occur in the life of the plant. The methodology involves the development of a baseline risk model which reflects the current design of the system and the development of model changes to reflect each design change. By analyzing the various model formulations it is possible to determine the risk for each configuration. Comparison of each result with previous results allows a determination of overall risk effectiveness of each modification. The analysis demonstrates that the modifications have very little impact on the risk of control room habitability loss. The incremental benefit of tornado missile protection is very small relative even to the already small risk. Therefore, this additional protection is of little value and high cost. 2 C115-87-04 i
II. SYSTEM DESCMIPTION II.1 System Ooeration/ Functions Control Room Emeroency Ventilation System The control room emergency ventilation system (CB-1) is designed to provide the cooling, filtration, and ventilation required to maintain habitability of the control room and integrity of the equipment in the control room under conditions where the outside air is contaminated with toxic gas or airborne radioactive material. The system is designed to meet Seismic category I requirements and meets the tornado design criteria outlined in Section 3.3 of the Trojan Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis + Report (FSAR) and General Design Criteria 4 (with the exception of the current extended inlet duct on the control building roof which does not meet the tornado criteria). The system consists of two independent, full capacity trains each containing a recirculation fan, filter train assembly (pre-filter, pre-carbon HEPA filter, carbon filter, and HEPA filter), various dampers (isolation, fire and volume control), heaters, coolers, and filters. A system schematic of one of the trains is shown in Figure 1. This figure also shows the relationship of the air intake system to the rest of the CB-1 system. When the plant is operating in MODES 1 through 4, both trains of CB-1 are required to be operable to ensure that the control room personnel are prevented from receiving doses in excess of 5-rem whole-body or equivalent (General Design criteria 19) in the event of a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and are prevented from being exposed to >15 parts por million (ppm) chlorine gas within 2 minutes after they are made aware of the presence of chlorine (Regulatory Guide 1.95). 3 C115-87-04
Figure 1 Control Room Emeroency Ventilation System (CB-1) Flow Diagrarn (Typical of Two Trains) f isolation Domper Boloncing From Air f Air Existing Damper
> Filter Intake System
[ Heater Train Volume
. Control Domper Boloncing Domper Air Air
/
h Cooler Heoter [ [ Evoluotor il N/
? Air AIT \
con ,OOm S in :rO T inC OSure omt -
In the event of failure of the normal ventilation system or a non-nuclear contamination event, the CB-1 system can be initiated either manually or automatically. Automatic initiation occurs only when a safety injection signal (SIS) is received from the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System. When a safety injection signal or a high control room area radiation signal is received, the control room normal ventilation system stops its recirculation fan, supply fan, outside air makeup fan, and closes its outside air damper. Additionally, other control building ventilation systems are isolated. In the original CB-1 design, the operator was required to manually open the CB-1 outside air dampers to admit makeup air and maintain the control room enclosure in a pressurized condition. The system is designed to prevent the introduction of unfiltered, potentially contaminated air to the control building by maintaining a positive pressure in the control room. When a chlorine alarm signal is received from one of the onsite chlorine monitors, all sources of outside air to the control building are isolated, except the CB-1 air intake. During the 1988 outage, the CB-1 intake will be modified to isolate automatically when a signal is received from the chlorine monitor. When CB-1 is used during a chlorine rslease event, it is operated in the recirculation mode only, with outside dampers remaining closed. To ensure isolation, a chlorine alarm signal overridos all signals which might cause the outside air dampers to open. In summary, the CB-1 system has two primary functions to perform in support of control room habitability: (1) filtration in the event of radioactivity release; and (2) isolation in the event of a chlorine release. 5 C115-87-04 1
. _ . - .-. - _ .-_. - _ _ - - - _ - - . ~ ._. .. -..
l i II.2 System Modificatigna l The original design basis for the CB-1 control room emergency ventilation system called for 150 cubic feet per minute (cfm) of filtered outside makeup air to be provided via an intake I enclosure on top of the control building. However, operational 4 testing found that the design basis air intake flow rate was
- insufficient to ensure that the control room could be maintained pressurized. Further testing found that the design basis outside
! air makeup ficw rate would have to be increased to 525 cfm. This j higher flow rate resulted in calculated radia*; ion doses to l operators during an accident that exceeded 10 CFh 50 General Design Criterion 19. Therefore, to reduce the calculated doses, j the CB-1 intake point was re-located in 1986 approximately 80 l feet further from the containment to take advantage of j atmospheric dilution of the radioactivity levels in the intake air. This configuration is shown in Figure 2.
i l l Review of the system design also identified a potential single point failure mode for the CB-1 intake system. The original CB-1 i design utilized one damper per train for isolation of the system from outside. In the unlikely event one of the dampers failed l open in a toxic gas event, control room habitability could be i lost. For this reason, Portland General Electric is considering j modifying the design by installing a redundant set of isolation j dampers on each of the CB-1 trains. The new design would use two i new, zero leakage, air operated butterfly valves as dampers on each train to be installed on the roof of the control building, { j This design is shown in Figure 3. I The dampers to be installed are designed with air to open, l spring return operators. The dampers are designed for bubble tight leakage at 1/2-inch W.G. pressure difforential. Air for l 6 C115-87-04 1
i e w s e r io i n n o g g i s inre n t i s ist u n xF l i o e t c u E H t D x t r e e E m ia D e '6 p 7J i P P , l'
,ij h ,e c
t A c$ i 2 w e m r u e t g i s y F S A e k A g a l t o r n i t I n A nl d ou i i r CB A A t c 1 u D r
- te e
B io D m A C " 4 1 8 7 N 0mb e _ 4 I ! i!
Figure 3 CB-1 Air intake System with Pipe Extension and Dampers Zero Leakage Air Operated Dompers. 14" Diomgter Duct _ 12" Di metu Duct
\
p 5 6 6 5 T 5
/.ir Flow Monitor Con trol Building memme, eoicac n9 Domper Ex.t.is ing Filter Housing !3 a
inoi re sccrei
damper operation is to be provided to one accumulator per train from the existing plant instrument air system. Air to open the dampers is to be provided from the accumulators to the damper operators through electric solenoid valves. The damper system is designed to fail closed upon loss of instrument air or power to the system. Indication of isolation damper position is provided to the control room by the use of a single pair of open/ closed indicating lights for each train. In the case of the design with redundant dampers, these lights will indicate the combined system condition for each train of isolation dampers. A further design enhancement is also being considered. This would involve adding a filter train to each of the CB-1 intake trains on the roof of the control building. This design would provide greater filtration and thereby increased margin for radioactive releases which might threaten control room habitability. The filter design has not been finalized. It is assumed that each of the filter housings would be roughly 4'x4'x10' in overall dimension. The layout of this system design is shown in Figure 4. 9 C115-87-04
i l Figure 4 l i CB-1 Air intake System with Pipe Extension, Dampers, and Filter Zero Leakoge , Air Operated Dompers. Proposed Future 14' Digmeter Duct p;l 12' Diamete- Duct h -d 5 Housing e O la 8 8 8 A T . , n Air Row Monitor Con trol Building oomeo, Beacin9 :s; E x . t . ---is ing Damper i Filter Housing S t; lNot To Scolel u d
III. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW The evaluation of CB-1 system modifications is performed utilizing a standard risk assessment methodology to evaluate the potential loss of control room habitability due to failure of the CB-1 system. As discussed, control room habitability can be lost due to failure of CB-1 to perform either of two missions: o failure to isolate in the event of a toxic gas hazard or o failure to provide adequate filtered makeup air to maintain the control room pressurized in the event of a radioactivity hazard. To evaluate the performance of various CB-1 design concepts in each of these missions, a comprehensive fault tree was developed to quantitatively analyze the likelihood of loss of control room habitability. In particular, the susceptibility of the Trojan Nuclear Plant to tornado effects was modeled to allow evaluation of the risk / benefit of different design concepts. Such events are potentially capable of damaging CB-1 and causing a simultaneous release of toxic gas or radioactivity. Seismic effects were not modeled as the modifications evaluated do not change seismic capability and are therefore unaffected. Additionally, random and dependent failures of CB-1 to perform its mission were modeled. Random failures of CB-1 components include failure to open, failure to close, failure to start and failure to run. The modeled dependencies include AC power dependence, common cause failure dependence, and tornado dependent failures. The Trojan Nuclear Plant is capable of withstanding the effects of a broad range of tornado challenges without jeopardizing the ability to achieve safe and order.'y shutdown. Some failures may nevertheless be caused by tornados or severe winds. 11 C115-87-04
)
The design basis wind velocity for all Seismic Category I and Category II buildings is 105 miles per hour (mph) at 30 ft. above the normal ground elevation. Also included in the design basis is a 1.1 gust factor above the 105 mph, effectively increasing the design basis wind loading to 116 mph. Further, structures 50 to 150 feet in height are designed for 138 mph winds (125 mph wind loadings plus 1.1 gust factor). In addition to these minimum wind loading design bases, all structures needed to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition are capable of withstanding 200 mph tornado loads and many are further capable of resisting 300 mph tornado loads. Table 1 identifies these structures and their tornado resistant capabilities. In addition to effects of tornado winds, these structures have been designed to withstand ovner tornado threats including tornado missile impingement and differential pressure transients. This study focuses primarily on the impacts of tornado winds and missiles on Trojan structures and, in particular, on exposed CB-1 equipment. Differential pressure effects were considered to have a negligible impact on CB-1 performance. Susceptibility of the filter to large, rapid pressure differentials was also considered of negligible significance since the isolation dampers are normally in the closed position, thereby protecting the filters from excess pressure differentials and air flows induced by the tornado. The Pacific Northwest region of the United States is a relatively mild tornado region. However, there is some potential for a tornado to occur of sufficient severity to challenge plant structures. A thorough review of tornado sources was undertaken l l 12 C115-87-04 i
TABLE 1 Capabilities of Structures to Withstand Tornados
- Desian Basis Tornado Impacts, Structures 200 moh Desian Basis
- 200 mph wind loading - Control Building Below over entire height Cable Spreading Room
- 1.5 psi pressure differential - Diesel Generator Rooms in 1.5 seconds
- 4" x 12" x 12' wood plank - Switchgear Rooms on end at 200 mph
- 3" diameter, 10' long ASA - Auxiliary Feedwater schedule 40 pipe at 75 mph Pump Rooms
- 4000 lbs passenger car - Auxiliary and Fuel at 40 mph, below 25' from grade Building Above Grade
- Spent Fuel Pool 300 moh Desian Basis
- 300 mph wind loading - Containment over entire height
- 3.0 psi pressure differential - Control and Cable in 3.0 seconds Spreading Rooms
- 4" x 12" x 12' wood plank - Auxiliary Building on end at 300 mph Below Grade
- 3" diameter, 10'long ASA - Main Steam Penetration schedudle 40 pipe at 100 mph Areas
- 4000 lbs passenger car - Cable Trays Between at 50 mph, below 25' from grade Containment and Control Room
- Intake Structure
- From Trojan FSAR, Rev. 6, Section 3.3.2.1 l 13
! C115-87-04
in this study to assess the probable frequency and severity of tornado impact at the Trojan Nuclear Plant site. This evaluation is described in Section III.1. The evaluation of tornado effects on plant designs can be divided into two potential impacts: wind related failures and tornado missile related failures. Tornado wind impacts on the plant can be evaluated in terms of the structural fragility of components and structures over the range of winds predicted in tornados. The methodology used in the evaluation of tornado wind impacts on plant structures is summarized in Section III.2. Tornado missile impacts on the plant can be evaluated through the assessment of the likelihood of impact of tornado missiles on vulnerable areas of the plant including exposed portions of the CB-1 system, offsite power supply equipment, and cooling water supplies (i.e., condensate storage tank (CST) and refueling water storage tank (RWST)). An overview of methodology used in assessing the likelihood of tornado missile impact on plant structures is presented in Section III.3. The methods used in the evaluation of the likelihood of release 1 I of hazardous materials (i.e., toxic gas and radioactivity) due to tornado induced damage are described in Section III.4. This area is concentrated on because of the potential for simultaneous damage to CB-1 and hazardous material release due to a tornado. III.1 Tornado Frecuency Evaluation A number of sources of tornado severity data were consulted in the assessment of tornado frequency for the Trojan site. These l sources included regulatory reports (Ref. 1,3), Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) reports (Ref. 4,5,6) , FSAR data (Ref. l 12), and National Service Storm Forecast Center (NSSFC) reports (Ref. Pi ) , The determination of a quantitative frequency of occurrence of tornados for Trojan is made difficult by two 14 C115-87-04
factors. First, tornados are infrequent occurrences. This means that the data base from which to draw conclusions is small. Second, tornados are only added to a data base if they are observed. That is, unlike many other extreme weather and naturally occurring threats, tornados must be observed and reported by a person to be included in a data base. Many other natural hazards can be detected by remote means (seismograph, radar, etc.) without relying on human observations and reporting. When considering the potential impacts of tornados on plant structures, it is necessary to consider only those tornados with Fujita scale severity of F'1, or greater. Tornados classified as less severe than F'l are not of sufficient size nor duration to present a significant hazard. Thus, this study focused on the assessment of frequency for F'l or greater tornados for the Trojan site. A cummary of the tornado occurrence frequency evaluation performed in this study is presented in Table 2. These data support the use of a tornado occurrence frequency of greater than 10-5 per square mile-year for the site and do not invalidate the licensing basis assumed tornado frequency. Nevertheless, as a conservatism, this study utilized the highest tornado (:currence frequency found in the investigation, 4.4 x 10-5 per square mile-l year, from EPRI-NP-768 by Twisdale et al. (Ref. 4). l The study which developed this overall occurrence frequency also quantified the frequency of impact of tornados for a generic nuclear plant site on the basis of severity. These values were used in this study as the input frequency of occurrence of each l tornado severity for the Trojan site. Based on this data, the total tornado impact frequency for the Trojan site is 1.95 x 10-4/ year. A plot of tornado frequency versus severity is presented in Figure 5. 15 C115-87-04
. _ _ . - _ - w
TABLE 2 Tornado Occurrence Frecuency Summary Tornado Frequency Source (per square mile-year) WASH-1300 (Ref. 1) 7.9 x 10-6 EPRI-NP-2005 (Ref. 6) 1.2 x 10-5 Trojan FSAR Data (Ref. 12) 1.8 x 10-5 NSSFC Data 3.12 x 10-5 for 50 mi Radius Around Portland, OR (1950 - 1987) (Ref. 13) EPRI-NP-768 (Ref. 4) 4.4 x 10-5 Value used in this study: 4.4 x 10-5 16 C115-87-04 J
i i 1.0E-03/YR -- FIGURE 5 TROJAN THREATENING TORNADO IMPACT FREQUENCY BASED ON EPRI-NP-768 1.0E-04/YR - 8.6E-05/YR 6.9E-05/YR , r
" FREQUENCY OF 2.9E-05/YR ,
l OCCURRENCE l 1.0E-05/YR -- 7.9E-06/YR ' 2.9E-06/YR { ) g G 1.0E OC/YR F'1 F'2 I F'3
! E"IF'4 F'S (73-112 MPH) (113-157 MPH)(158-206 MPH)(207-260 MPH)(261-318 MPH)
I 5 i
? TORNADO SEVERITY Z
III.2 Tornado Wind Impacts on Plant Structures The methodology utilized in this study for the evaluation of wind impacts on plant structures is based on the concept of component fragility. The fragility or vulnerability of a component is defined as the conditional probability of its failure given a specific hazard. In the case of tornados, the hazard considered in this analysis is wind loading. NUREG/CR-2300 (Ref. 2) develops an equation for the quantification of component fragility based on tae wind loading applied and the capacity of the component. The form of the equation is as follows: fragility = f' =4 EC ,R where f(-) is the standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function, V is a given wind loading (mph), C is the components capacity to withstand wind loadings (mph) S C ,U and S C ,R are the standard deviation due to uncertainty in component capacity and standard deviation due to random variations in wind loading, respectively. Q is tSe probability that the true component fragility is less than f', and 4-1(-) is the inverse of the standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function (arc 4(-)). As described in NUREG/CR-2300, the structural capacity of a j structure C can be taken as one and one-half times the design j windspeed (i.e., design basis wind loadings contain approximately 50% margin). For the purposes of this study which uses best l estimate values, a value of 0.50 is used for Q to calculate the median value of f'. NUREG/CR-2300 develops values for the standard deviation factors of 0.38 and 0.25 for PC ,U and S C ,R respectively. Substituting in these values, the equation simplifies to: 18 C115-87-04
In fe ,, (1.5+vd / 0.25 Using this simple equation, best estimate fragility curves can be developed to allow quantification of component failure probability over the range of wind speeds expected in tornados. Fragility curves for the four primary wind loading design bases of 116 mph, 138 mph, 200 mph and 300 mph are shown in Figure 6. In the quantification of wind related hazards for the evaluation of control room habitability, several specific structures are evaluated. Table 3 lists these structures, their wind loading design basis, and the failure probability used for each of the five Fujita tornado classes. As can be seen from this list, there exists a finite probability that some structures will fall in even relatively mild tornados (F'2 or less). III.3 Tornado Missile Impacts on Plant Structures Missiles from a tornado can result in damage to facilities and equipment. The probability of missile damage is dependent upon several variables such as tornado intensity, the area of the target, and the number of missiles. This analysis includes a comprehensive treatment of the frequency of damage as a result of tornado missiles to CB-1 system components and other safety and nonsafety related structures. Many structures at Trojan are designed for 200 or 300 mph tornado impacts. These structures' susceptibility to tornado missiles are considered negligible. There are, however, several I structures which could be affected by tornado missiles. These I structures include buildings, tanks and components designed for l 19 Cll5-87-04
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TABLE 3 Fracility of Troian Site Structures In Tornados Conditional Probability of Failure Tornado Severity (Average Wind Speed) u Wind Loading F'1 P'2 F'3 F'4 F'S P Structure (s) Design Basis :(93 mph) (135 mph) (182 mph) (234 mph) (290 mph) Offsite Power Supply 116 6.0E-3* 0.16 0.57 0.90 0.98 Conductors Chlorine Building AFW Pump Rooms 200 <1E-5 7.OE-4 2.3E-4 0.16 0.44 Diesel Generator Rooms o " CB-1 Piping (Duct) 300 <1E-6 <1E-5 1.0E-4 4.4E-3 3.9E-2 Y 5 h
- 6.0E-3 = 6.0x 10 -3
winds less than 200 mph such as the chlorine building, tanks, and switchyards and transmission towers. EPRI report NP-768, "Tornado Missile Risk Analysis" (Ref. 4,5), provides the basis necessary to determine the risk to plant facilities and equipment due to tornado missiles. Based on the data presented in the EPRI report from numerous tornado missile computer simulations, the probability of a missile hitting any square foot of area per missile per tornado can be determined. The EPRI simulations utilized the TORMIS computer code, a state of the art model of tornado missile injection, flight and impact dynamics. These simulations can be used to calculate the mean probability of hit, moderate damage, and significant damage to all exposed vertical surfaces in a plant site based on a given tornado severity and missile population within 2000 feet of the site. In this analysis, the EPRI calculated probability of hit is conservatively applied as the probability of failure of a component or structure. The following table gives the EPRI calculated probability of missile hit per square foot per available missile per tornado for each tornado intensity, F'1 to F'5. Missile-Strike Probability Tornado Intensity Per Unit Area / Tornado / Missile 11 F'1 F'2 2.89 3.57 x x 10 10-11 F'3 9.06 x 10-11 11 F'4 F'S 6.05 x 10 1.39 x 10-10 These generic probabilities can then be applied specifically to l the Trojan plant after determining the number of missiles l available on the Trojan site. 22 C115-87-04
In an effort to develop an estimate of the number of tornado missiles available at the Trojan plant, a tornado missile survey was conducted. This survey consisted of a thorough walkthrough of all areas of the plant site. When potential missiles were identified in the survey, conservative estimates of the number were made for use in the analysis. Since the Trojan site is surrounded by a heavily wooded forest, an estimate of the number of trees per unit area was developed during the site visit. Then, based on photographs of the plant site the amount of forested area within 2000 ft. of the plant was estimated. A summary of the tornado missile survey is presented in Table 4. The probability of a missile hitting facility equipment at Trojan per square foot per tornado is shown in the following table by tornado intensity: Missile-Strike Probability Tornado Intensity For Trojan (K) (missile hits per square foot per tornado) F'1 4.9 x 10-7 i F'2 6.1 x 10~76 F'3 F'4 1.6 1.0 x x 10 10-6 l F'S 2.4 x 10-6 i l ( The probability of a missile hit on any facility or equipment at l Trojan can now be determined. Using the area of the facilities and equipment that could contribute to an accident initiated by a tornado involving loss of control room habitability and the missile strike probability, the probability of hit is calculated. The areas of importance for this analysis are listed in the ! following table: 23 C115-87-04 l l
TABLE 4 Troian Missile Survey Results (All Missiles within a 2,000 ft. radius of the containment building.) Object Quantity Light containers 30 Truck tractors 2 Scaffolding 1900 Ladders 30 Tool boxes 60 Pallets 300 Conduit 370 Unistrut 50 Threaded rod 30 Timber - 2"x4"x8' 100 Scrap iron 200 Building siding 3500 Large pipes > 4" 15 Small pipes & tubing <1" 800 4" Pipes 20 Drums - 55 gal. 275 Scrap steel (small) 1000 Gas bottles (large) 10 Gas bottles (standard) 100 Gas bottles (small) 100 Disposable resin tanks 20 Disposable resin tanks <2" 500 Steel sided bldg. (3) 300 Angle iron- 3"x3" 25 Siding from 37 trailers 1480 Refuse dumpster 3 Cylinders (air) 30 Steel & pipe <3" 100 Barricades - wood 100 Wirespools - loaded 200 l Tanks - 10' dia. 6 l Telephone poles 2 F, Fencing material 100 Trees S T.13 l Cars in parking lot 300 TOTAL MISSILES: 17,194 l l l l 24 C115-87-04 l
Facility Equipment Area (Square Feet) Switchyard 250,000 Chlorine Building 3,480 Refueling Water Storage Tank 6,451 Condensate Storage Tank 6,500 The probability of hit to CB-1 equipment located on the control building roof requires the consideration of both a direct hit and the ricocheting of missiles. This is necessary due to the location of the turbine building relative to the control building. The likelihood of both direct and ricochet missile hits has been included to provide a more realistic probability of hit to CB-1 equipment located on the control building roof. Another variable to be considered in evaluating CB-1 vulnerability is the equipment required to support the two intended functions of CB-1, (i.e., control room habitability I during a radiological release and control room isolation during a toxic hazard release). These two functions are dependent on different portions of CB-1. For a radiological release, the equipment required is all CB-1 equipment located on the roof. This is required because missile impact may cause isolation of the system or creation of a different intake point by opening the duct. For toxic hazard release, the only CB-1 equipment vulnerable to tornado missiles is the intake duct between the proposed dual isolation dampers and the intake enclosure. If penetrated by a missile, this section of duct would bypass the isolation of the system. In cases with the proposed filter, the filter housing was also analyzed as a potential missile target and failure point. The direct hit of a missile on the enclosure containing the two chlorine monitors was considered and determined to be negligible. The small area of target of the chlorine monitor housing and the frequency of a tornado results in a damage frequency of less than 10-9/ year. The monitor currently utilizes small tubing as the 25 C115-87-04
sample supply line to the monitor. These tubing runs are relatively short (-2 feet), but could be damaged by small missiles. PGE currently plans to replace these sections of tubing during the 1988 outage with double heavy walled pipe to minimize the potential for tornado missile damage. Thus, loss of the chlorine monitor in a tornado would be a negligible contributor to system isolation failure. An additional conservatism was added to the study to account for design options utilizing instrument tubing as the air supply lines to the dampers. For instrument air lines of this type, the probability of hit by small missiles is considered to be 1.0. For design options utilizing either protected instrument tubing or heavy walled pipe, the probability of damage was calculated on the basis described above, utilizing the total area surrounding the pipe, dampers, and accumulators. III.4 Tornado Induced Hazards Tornado impacts on the plant can result in the initiation of various hazards to the plant. Toxic gas release is a potential result of a tornado event due to the relatively low wind loading design basis for the chlorine building. Radioactivity release also has the potential to occur due to the ausceptibility of the some structures to the wind loadings and missiles present in a tornado and the potential for inducing a station blackout. This evaluation of the loss of control room habitability explicitly f models the potential for both of these types of tornado induced l hazards impacting control room habitability. l Modeling of toxic gas release includes the potential for a ! release from the chlorine building due to tornado and the l potential for loss of CB-1 isolation due to either random or tornado induced causes. Each tornado severity is modeled individually to allow assessment of the likelihood of release and failure on a tornado specific basis. 26 Cll5-87-04
The release of chlorine in a tornado is conservatively treated as occurring any time the mean fragility of the chlorine building structure is exceeded and anytime a missile strikes the structure. This conservative treatment results in a conservatively high frequency of chlorine hazard due to tornados. In addition, the treatment of atmospheric dispersion of a chlorine release was cont arvative in that meteorological conditions capable of supporting high chlorine concentrations were always assumed to be present if the wind direction was in the quadrant in which the chlorine cloud would be transported toward the intake. Tornado induced damage to a passing chlorine rail car is of extremely small probability and was, therefore, not considered to affect the overall results. Thus, the challenge to the integrity of the CB-1 isolation is modeled in a conservative manner. The modeling of radioactivity hazards is based on the frequency of core melt. In the case of random release of radioactivity, the frequency of core melt is taken from the draft NRC Safety Goal of 1 x 10-4/ year. The likelihood of a random event caused core melt occurring concurrent or immediately following a tornado is judged to be negligible and, as such, is not modeled. The frequency of tornado induced core melt is modeled in a conservative, simplified manner. Based on the results of past PRA studies of tornado risks, the dominant plant core damage risks due to tornados are related to loss of all AC power, (i.e., station blackout). Typically, offsite power supplies are not tornado protected, thus, the occurrence of a tornado often results in a loss of offsite power event. The Trojan plant has multiple offsite power supplies, but all are supplied to the plant through a common right of way and switchyard. Further, the offsite power transmission towers utilize conductors which are designed for 105 mph winde and the i 27 C115-87-04 m
switchyard is not protected from tornado missiles. Utilizing the wind fragility and tornado missile methodologies described above, it is possible to calculate the likelihood of loss of offsite power for individual tornado severities. A loss of offsite power event automatically initiates reactor trip and diesel start signals. However, there exists some likelihood that the plant diesels will fail to start either due to random causes or due to tornado induced causes. The Trojan diesel generator rooms are designed for 200 mph tornado winds and missiles. However, some tornados generate winds in excess of 200 mph and the structural integrity of the diesel room could be challenged. In this study, failure of both diesel generators was conservatively assumed to occur 10% of the time when the structural fragility of the diesel generator rooms was exceeded. This assumption is based on the configuration of the diesel generator room and is consistent with the treatment of room failure impacts on diesel generator operability in other probabilistic studies of tornados (Ref. 11). The diesel generator room has only one, relatively small, external wall on the west side which could be exposed to tornado loadings. The diesels are located perpendicular, in series relative to the external wall such that only one is in proximity to the external wall. Should either one or both diesels successfully start and survive l the tornado, core cooling can be maintained through either the secondary auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system or, as a backup, by RCS primary feed and bleed. The primary makeup system is l dependent on AC power and coolant supply from the refueling water i l storage tank (RWST). The AFW system contains three pumps, two ! not AC powered (one steam driven and one diesel driven) and one l motor driven pump which can be connected to either diesel l generator in the event it is needed. 28 [ Cll5-87-04 l l l l
The diesel driven AFW pump does not require AC power to start, but cooling of the pump is normally provided by the service water system which is dependent upon AC power. However, in the event of loss of service water, plant operating procedures instruct the operators to install a cross connection from the fire header to the diesel motor coolant loop. This connection allows the use of the diesel fire pump as a coolant motive force in the event of a station blackout. Susceptibility of the diesel fire pump to tornado impacts was judged to be negligible due to its location in the tornado protected intake structure. Therefore, in the event of a station blackout, both the turbine driven pump and the diesel driven pump are expected to be available. Susceptibility of the AFW system to tornado impacts is primarily limited to wind loadings on external walls of the AFW pump rooms , and loss of coolant makeup due to CST failure. The same assumntions for wall failure impacting the three AFW pumps are used for AFW pump room failure as with the diesel room failure. These assumptions are considered conservative due to the location of the AFW pump room relative to the containment which should provide considerable shielding of the pump room walls. The likelihood of the CST (and RWST) failure due to tornado winds is judged to be negligible due to the increased stability of the j tank in its normally full condition. However, tornado missile impacts on those tanks are possible and are treated as described in Section III.3. In cases where onsite AC power is lost, the primary feed and i bleed system is lost and plant shutdown is dependent upon the AC independent systems. In these cases, AFW system control power is provided by the station batteries. Recent analysis by PGE shows that station batteries will currently sustain operation without recharging for less than four hours. During the upcoming 1988 outage, a station battery upgrade (per Request For Design Change (RDC) 87-007) will be made to ensure a battery life of four 29 C115-87-04 l
hours. For the purposes of this study, a battery life of four hours was assumed. Thus, given the loss of all AC power, the plant can survive for up to four hours without risk to the plant. While it is realistically expected that offsite power could be restored within 4 hours, for the purpose of this analysis, it was conservatively assumed that in the event of a tornado induced loss of power, offsite power would not be recovered within 4 hours. The capability to recover from this conservative scenario is then driven by recovery of the diesels. Diesel generator recovery is modeled using a standard exponential repair model with a mean time to repair of 19 hours (Ref. 7). This results in a very low probability of recovery within 4 hours (0.02). A tornado ralated station blackout event results in the loss of the CB-1 system, since the CB-1 recirculation fans are dependent upon AC power. This dependence is a major contributor to tornado related loss of control room habitability. Other potential tornado related core damage scenarios were investigated but determined to be of negligible importance for Trojan. These include small and large break LOCA events with loss of injection. The typical tornado induced small break LOCA is the loss of seal injection to the reactor water coolant pumps. For Trojan, this scenario is judged to be of negligible importance due to the tornado design basis of structures containing the necessary equipment (i.e., intake structure, control building, etc.). Large break LOCA in a tornado event was also judged to be negligible as no tornado related cause for a large LOCA could be identified and the independent occurrence of a LOCA duritig a tornado is highly unlikely. l I 30 l Cll5-87-04 l t
IV. RESULTS Utilizing the comprehensive fault tree developed to model loss of control room habitability contributors, it is possible to perform comparative analyses of the impact / benefit of different design configurations. In this study, eight different CB-1 design configurations were modeled utilizing the fault tree model shown in Appendix A. These eight configurations are represented by eight quantitative model inputs. A description of the quantification values and bases for each of these cases is provided in Appendix B. The top 20 minimal cutsets for each case are provided in Appendix C. The control room emergency venti.lation system exists to provide confidence that the control room can remain occupied for postulated accident conditions. In order to evaluate the implications of design modifications to the system, it is possible to assess the frequency of loss of control room habitability under a variety of conditions. The two dominant conditions that contribute to potential habitability loss involve toxic gas release (onsite or offsite) and radiation release. These two conditions are somewhat dissimilar. The toxic gas release involves situations in which the primary plant equipment may be unaffected due to the presence of such gases. The radiation release situation involves an event in which some plant degradation has occurred. In either situation, the capability to shut down the plant safely outside the control room is provided. Therefore, an assessment of loss of control room habitability is not equivalent to an evaluation of frequency of core damage. This evaluation addresses loss of habitability only. The results should therefore not be confused with significant release of radioactivity offsite or significant core damage situations. A brief description of the eight designs analyzed and the results of the quantitative evaluation of each is given in Table 5. 31 C115-87-04
IV.1 Base Case - With Intake Pine Extension In order to address the original design deficiencies, the intake point for CB-1 was extended during the 1986 refueling outage approximately 80 feet further from the containment by the installation of an intake duct on the roof of the control building (Figure 2). This modification results in a calculated reduction in loss of habitability frequency of 5.18 x 10-7/ year. In this case, the majority of the loss of control room habitability frequency (-79%) is contributed by a tornado induced station blackout resulting in loss of CB-1 and core melt related radioactivity release. Another significant contributor to loss of habitability is common cause failure of the isolation dampers (-18%) in the event of a random caused radioactivity release. As expected, tornado impacts on the plant are dominated by the more severe tornados, F'3, F'4 and F'5, which contribute to 82% of the frequency (13%, 28% and 41%, respectively). Toxic gas impacts on control room habitability contribute to less than 1% of the overall frequency. This is primarily due to the low frequency of toxic gas hazard occurrence. This frequency is made up of two contributors: tornado induced toxic gas hazards and random caused toxic gas hazards. In this study, tornado l induced toxic gas hazards are conservatively assumed to occur every time the chlorine building fragility is exceeded or the chlorine building is hit by a missile, if the wind is blowing toward the CB-1 intake. Random caused releases are assumed to occur at a frequency of 2 x 10-6/ year. This is based on a minimum design basis frequency of 1 x 10-6/ year for both onsite and offsite hazards. Sensitivity studies with the model have j shown that, in order for random caused toxic gas hazards to ! significantly influence the results, the frequency of toxic gas hazards would have to be much higher (-1 x 10-4/ year). Since 32 C115-87-04
this study was focused o- '"rnado inpacts on CB-1, it is appropriate that the ra 'om used toxic gas hazards be a non-dominant contributor. IV.2 Case 2 - With PiDe Extension and External Dampers This modification to CB-1 includes the installation of redundant dampers in each train of the CB-1 intake ducts on the control building roof (Figure 3). A base assumption for this design is that standard instrument tubing is used in the air lines from the instrument air loader. In this analysis, the use of this type of air line is conservative 1.y assumed to lead to system failure due , to missile impact in all tornados. The design does minimally decrease overall system reliability because of the redundant dampers. This design requires that both dampers on one train
- successfully open in the event of a radiological release. This modification results in a calculated frequency of loss of l habitability of 5.27 x 10~7/ year.
1 i' Here again, the dominant contributor to loss of control room habitability (-77%) is a tornado induced station blackout resulting in loss of CB-1 and a radioactivity release. However, the higher reliability of the new dampers reduces the l contribution of common cause failure by a factor 3 to l approximately 5%. This reduction is, hnwever, offset by the increased potential for tornado damage to CB-1 equipment due to l its location on the control building roof. Failure of CB-1 equipment due to tornado impacts contributes approximately 13% of the total loss of control room habitability frequency. Nearly all of this (-11%) is contributed by failures of the CB-1 piping due to tornado wind loadings resulting in a toxic gas hazard in the control room. 33 C115-87-04
~.
IV.3 Case 3 - With Pipe Extension and External Dameers With Protected Air Supply The design configuration of this case is similar to Case 2 except the air supply to the damper operators is assumed to be protected in some manner. This could be accomplished by either providing shielding to any instrument tubing used or by using heavy gauge pipe (schedule 80) for the air supply lines. r The analysis of this case resulted in only a slight reduction in frequency of loss of habitability to 5.18 x 10-7/ year. This incremental benefit accrues from the reduced likelihood of failure in radiological events. Failure of tha instrument air supply in the case of a toxic gas event is a safe failure condition. All other contributors to loss of control room habitability remain the same as in Case 2.
- IV.4 Case 4 - Pine Extension and Dampers With Tornado Missile Protection As previously discussed, due to weight restrictions on the control building, missile protection of equipment on the roof is I very difficult and expensive. Further, space limitations prohibit the installation of the equipment inside the building.
i However, as a sensitivity case, tornado missile protection of all CB-1 equipment was analyzed to determine the potential impact on loss of habitability. j l l The addition of missile protection is calculated to reduce the l total loss of control room habitability to 5.14 x 10-7/ year. The incremental decrease from Case 3 is 4 x 10-9/ year. This minima) reduction is due to the elimination of only tornado missile f related failures of CB-1 equipment. Wind loading failure is assumed to occur with the same component fragility as with exposed piping since the entire control room enclosure is rated for 300 mph, the same as the piping. Such a small reduction in 34 Cll5-87-04
frequency does not merit consideration of missile protection of CB-1 equipment. IV.5 Case 5 - Ploe Extension, DamDers and Filter This case is similar to Case 2 with installation of the extension pipe and dampers with instrument tubing air supply except it includes filters for each train to be located on the control building roof. It is difficult to assess the positive effects of the increased filter capacity in a quantitative manner. The filtration capability is essentially doubled by the incorporation of this modification. This would allow a release of increased severity prior to control room habitability loss. Without a detailed source probabilities term analysis, it is not possible to assess the exact or even an approximate value for the frequency of such releases. It is noted, however, that the ability to withstand a more severe release without habitability loss has positive benefit for overall safety that has not been quantified in this study. The negative impact of installing the filter on the roof can be assessed in terms of potential tornado missile or wind impact. In this case, the wind loading design basis for the filter housing is assumed to be the same as for the piping (300 mph). The assessed value increases for this modification to 5.32 x 10-7/ year. This represents a very small increase (5 x 10-9/ year) in habitability loss due to tornado and wind l conditions over Case 2. This small increase is due to the l exposure of increased area to tornado missile impacts due to the
- filters. All other contributors to loss of habitability are the same as Case 2. This minimal increase in habitability loss is a l
trade off against the unquantified ability to withstand more severe radioactivity release without habitability ir, 't. 35 i C115-87-04 l
IV.6 Case 6 - PiDe Extension. DamDers and Filter With
; Reduced Wind Loadina Desian Basis This case is similar to Case 5 with the pipe, dampers, and filter located on the roof of the control building except the filter housing wind loading design basis is assumed to be 200 mph instead of 300 mph. The purpose of this sensitivity case is to evaluate the need for the high wind loading design basis for the filters.
The result of this sensitivity case is that the overall frequency of loss of habitability is increased to 1.4 x 10-6/ year. This is
! due to the filter acting as the weak link in the intake system in tornado induced events. On a relative basis, this increase is quite high (-270%), but on a solely incremental basis the increase is still quite modest (9 x 10-7/ year). The increased component fragility of the filter housing in this design significantly changes the contributors to loss of control room habitability. For this case the dominant contributors become
! tornado rotated chlorine releases with tornado wind caused failure of the filter housing for tornado severities F'3, F'4, and F'5 which contribute a total of 55% to the total (9%, 27% and 30%, respectively). Another 29% is contributed by tornado induced station blackout related hazards. The remaining 5% is contributed from a variety of small contributors. IV.7 Case 7 - Pipe Extension. DamDers and Filter With Protected Air SuDolv This case is similar to Case 3 with the pipe extension and dampers exposed on the roof and protected air supply lines except the filter housing is included in the analysis. As expected, the frequency of loss of habitability is reduced somewhat from Case 5 (with instrument tubing) to 5.23 x 10-7/ year. Here again, the incremental benefit is small for tornado protecting the instrument tubing. The only difference in contributors between 36 C115-87-04
this case and Case 3 is the exposure of the filter housings to tornado missile impacts. This is a minor contributor to the overall loss of control room habitability frequency (5 x 10~9/ year or -1%). IV.8 Case 8 - Pipe Extension Dampers and Filter With Missile Protection This case involves the installation of all equipment (pipe, dampers, and filter) on the roof of the control building with missile protection. This model is the same as case 4 and the resultant risk reduction due to missile protection is very small (9 x 10-9/ year) as compared to Case 7. This small, but finite reduction brings the total loss of habitability frequency to 5.14 x 10-7/ year. IV.9 Conclusions The incorporation of tornado missile protection for: (1) the existing intake pipe extension, (2) the redundant isolation dampers in the CB-1 air intake system, and (3) the proposed roof-mounted filter trains in CB-1 would reduce the risk to control room habitability an almost insignificant amount. Therefore, it is proposed that tornado wind and missile protection is unnecessary for these design features. These analyses contain numerous conservatisms in the assessment of tornado impacts on the plant. In all cases where clear technical evidence was unavailable to provide calculational bases, conservative assumptions were made as to the likelihood and consequence of tornado impacts. These modeling conservatisms have resulted in what is judged to be a conservatively high overall frequency of loss of control room habitability. Additionally, it is expected that the relative impact of the various design concepts have been conservatively modeled. 37 C115-87-04
The analysis did not include explicit evaluation of uncertainty. It is noted that there are numerous sources of uncertainty inherent in risk evaluations. Component failure rates vary by a factor of three to ten. Tornado frequency of occurrence is expected to vary by a factor of five to ten. The frequency of tornados was chosen to reflect the higher population area data as human reporting is more likely in more densely populated areas. The treatment of wind direction, missile failure likelihood, and wind induced failures are conservative. In addition, the potential for recovery of failed equipment is not included except for the diesels. It is concluded that the results are subject to uncertainty of a factor of 10 in the direction of increased risk and a factor of 100 in the direction of lower risk. The results are thereby expected to have a conservative bias. 1 l l l 38 C115-87-04
TABLE 5
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS Case Description of case Frequency of Included in Comment Ventilation Loss Analysis CB-1 (#/ year) Existing CB-1 intake Allows adequate time for 5.18E-07 1 (base) system operation under wide design. variety of situations and increased severity. 2 As base case but with Provides more reliable 5.27E-07 redundant leak tight isolation for toxic gas dampers installed on releases. However, redundant roof of control building. dampers contribute to less reliable intake operation. Air control lines are modeled as tubing which fails in all u tornados. For toxic gas hazard
- this is not a problem as tubing failure leads to isolation.
3 As 2 but with Air Control Provides more reliable 5.18E-07 Lines hardened to provide performance for wind induced improved missile protection. radiation release case. Routine maintenance Incremental improvement caused damage would be of 9E-09 is considered f reduced but is not negligible but finite. l modeled. ( l 4 As 3 but with full Reduces risk of tornado 5.14E-07 tornado missile protection. damage. Value of 4E-09 is p considered negligible but e finite. m I m 4 1
TABLE 5
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS (cont'd) Case Description of Case Frequency of Included in Comment Ventilation Loss Analysis CB-1 (f/ year) 5 As 2 with new HEPA filters Model does not include 5.32E-07 added (in series witn ability to tolerate increased existing filters). Filter release of radioactivity located on roof and not without loss of habitability. missile protected. Filter cases are all consistent Filter housing designed and can be compared to each for 300 mph wind loading. other. 6 As 5 but with 200 mph Frequency of loss increased 1.4E-06 wind loading design basis. by a factor of 2.7. This is conservative as wind conditions may disperse toxic g gas or radiation release. 7 Intake modification, new Conservative treatment of 5.23E-07 dampers with air tubing filter benefit as noted above. hardened, filters added with 300 mph design value, no tornado missile protection. 8 As 7 but with tornado Overall reduction of 9E-09 - 5.14E-07 missile protection. considered negligible but finite. Uses same model as Case 4. l 0 a a I
t s l V. REFERENCES
- 1. Markee, E.H. , Jr. , et. al., "Technical Basis For Interim Regional Tornado Criteria", WASH-1300, US AEC, May, 1974, i
- 2. "PRA Procedures Guide", NUREG/CR-2300, Vol. 1&2, American (
Nuclear Society and IEEE, January, 1983. j
- 3. Read, J.B., et. al., "An Assessment of the Bases For Selecting Criteria For Protection Against Tornado Entrained ,
Debris", US NRC, May, 1977. l r 1
- 4. Twisdale, L.A., et. al., "Tornado Missile Risk Analysis",
EPRI-NP-768, Electric Power Research Iastitute, May, 1978. . i
- 5. Twisdale, L.A., et. al., "Tornado Missile Risk Analysis -
Appendixes", EPRI-NP-769, Electric Power Research Institute, May, 1978. l
- 6. Twisdale, L.A., et. al., "Tornado Missile Simulation and Design Methodology", EPRI-NP-2005, Vol. 1&2, Electric Power Research Institute, August, 1984.
i
- 7. Philadelphia Electric Co., "Limerick Unit 2, Probabilistic Risk Assessment".
- 8. Electric Power Research Institute, "Oconee PRA", NSAC-60, June, 1984.
- 9. Kennedy, R.P., et. al., "Probabilistic Seismic Safety Study i
of an Existing Nuclear Power Plant", Nuclear Encineerina and l Desian, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 315-338.
- 10. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., "Indian Point j Probabilistic Safety Study", 1981.
l i 41 ! C115-87-04 i i i
REFERENCES (cont'd)
- 11. New Hampshire Yankee, Inc., "Seabrook Probabilistic Risk Assessment".
- 12. Portland General Electric, "Final Safety Analysis Report -
Trojan Nuclear Plant", July, 1985.
- 13. National Severe Storm Forecast Center, "Portland Oregon -
125 Mile Radius Tornado Plot", January, 1988. 42 C115-87-04
APPENDIX A CB-1 MODIFICATION FAULT TREES C115-87-04
APPENDIX A Table of Contents Paces CB-1 Modification Fault Tree (Sheets 1 through 6E4) A-1 through A-31 A-1 C115-87-04
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APPENDIX B QUANTIFICATION BASES i l i
APPENDIX B List of Tables Paces Table B-1: ~ Basic Event Probability Bases B-1 through B-8 Table B-2: CB-1 Fault Tree Basic Event Data B-S through B-12 l i i B-i
BASIC EVENT PROBABILITY BASES TABLE B-1 BASIC EVENT (S) NAME(S) BASIS / SOURCE (S) Random caused release RANREL Based on draft NRC of radioactivity (internal Safety Goal, event caused core melt) Onsite toxic gas hazard RONHAZ Assume min. design basis event frequency (1E-6/yr) Offsite toxic gas hazard ROFFHAZ Same as RONHAZ i Limit switches fail on LSFAILA IREP database for random damper operators LSFAILB failure of limit switch i (Train A, Train B) and generic common cause failure probability i m 4 4 Operator fails to detect - OPDETA Human Reliability Handbook loss of isolation in CB-1 OPDETB NUREG/CR-1278 (Train A, Train B) j Dampers fail open DM1A1FO IREP database for dampers (ncrually closed, DM1A2FO modified (base case), IREP 1 air to open damper) DM1B1FO database for air operated Train A(2), Train B(2) DM1B2FO valves (all other cases). Solenoid valves fail SV1A1FO IREP database for solenoid open or leak (normally SV1A2FO valve failure o closed, power to open) SV1B1FO (Train A(2), Train B(2)) SVlB2FO E f' Tornado impacts F10CCURS ERIN-NP-768 for Region II y the Trojan plant site F2 OCCURS tornado frequency o (for tornado severities F3 OCCURS F'1 through F'5) F4 OCCURS F50CCURS
BASIC EVENT PROBABILITY BASES TABLE B-1 (cont.) BASIC EVENT (S) NAME(S) BASIS / SOURCE (S) Tornado winds induce F1CL2WND Integration of wind frequency failure of chlorine building F2CL2WND distribution and building resulting in release F3CL2WND fragility per NUREG/CR-2300 of C1 2 F4CL2WND methodology FSCL2WND Tornado winds fail F1FILWND Integration of wind frequency filter housing resulting F2FILWND distribution and filter in breach of CR-1 F3FILWND fragility based on intake piping F4FILWND NUREG/CR-2300 methodology FSFILWND Tornado winds fail piping F1PIPWND Integration of wind frequency m downstream of dampers F2PIPWND distribution and piping a resulting in breach of F3PIPWND fragility per NUREG/CR-2300 piping F4PIPWND methodology Tornado missiles F1PIPMIS Strike probability for given damage piping downstream F2PIPMIS tornado severity, missile of dampers resulting in F3PIPMIS population and impact area. breach of piping F4PIPMIS Impact area taken as direct F5PIPMIS hit area plus richocet area off turbine building (EPRI-NP-768) Tornado missiles F1FILMIS Same as above for downstream o damage filter housing F2FILMIS piping missile impact except [ resulting in breach of F3FILMIS areas for filter housings m system F4FILMIS (EPRI-NP-768)
$ F5FILMIS 1
BASIC EVENT PROBABILITY BASES TABLE B-1 (cont.) BASIC EVENT (S) NAME(S) BASIS / SOURCE (S) Adverse wind conditions WINDDIR Assumed to be independent exist which would move of tornados and severity. chlorine release toward Uses wind rose data for 90* CB-1 intake structure quadrant encompassing the CB-1 system (Trojan FSAR) Adverse stability class STABILIT Conservatively assumed to exists which would support always exist chlorine concentrations high enough to cause hazard at CB-1 intake Damper 1 fails to open DM1AlFC IREP database modified for m on demand DM1A2FC damper (base case),IREP data 6 DMlBlFC base for air operated valve DMlB2FC (all other cases) Solenoid valve fails SV1A1FC IREP database for solenoid to open upon demand. SV1A2FC operated valve failure to This results in no control SV1BlFC open air to damper SV1B2FC CB-1 recirculation fan AFANSTRT Air Force Design Features fails to start BFANSTRT Manual database for fan (Train A, Train B) failure to start o P CB-1 recirculation fan AFANRUN Air Force Design Features Manual 5 fails to run for required BFANRUN database for failure to run
$ period of time (24 hours) for 24 houro w
i
BASIC EVENT PROBABILITY BASES TABLE B-1 (cont.) BASIC EVENT (S) NAME(S) BASIS / SOURCE (S) Recirculation fan out of AMAINT Based on IDCOR IPE service for maintenance BMAINT methodology for single (Train A, Train B) component maintenance unavailability Tornado winds cause failure F1WNDCB1 Integration of wind of CB-1 intake equipment, F2WNDCB1 frequency distribution dampers, accumulators, F3WNDCB1 with equipment fragility per solenoids, tubing F4WNDCB1 NUREG/CR-2300 methodology F5WNDCB1 Tornado missiles cause F1MISCB1 Strike probability for m failure of CB-1 intake F2MISCB1 missiles given tornado i equipment F3MISCB1 severity, missile population F4MISCB1 and area of impact. Area of FSMISCB1 impact is area of direct hit plus area for richocets (EPRI-NP-768) Tornado winds cause F1WDLOSP Integration of wind loss of offsite power F2WDLOSP frequency distribution F3WDLOSP and equipment fragility F4WDLOSP based on NUREG/CR-2300 F5WDLOSP methodology n [ Tornado missiles cause F1MSLOSP Strike probability for m loss of offsite power F2MSLOSP missiles given severity, 5 F3MSLOSP missile population and area y F4MSLOSP of impact. Area of impact o FSMSLOSP dominated by switchyard (EPRI-NP-768)
BASIC EVENT PROBABILITY BASES TABLE B-1 (cont.) BASIC EVENT (S) NAME(S) BASIS / SOURCE (S) Tornado winds cause F1WNDEDG Integration of wind failure of Diesel F2WNDEDG frequency distribution and Generator building F3WNDEDG fragility based on F4WNDEDG NUREG/CR-2300 methodology FSWNDEDG and 10% likelihood that building external wall failure causes failure of both EDGs (Seabrook PRA) Tornado missiles cause F1MISEDG Assumed to be zero due failure of Diesel Generator F2MISEDG to missile design basis building F3MISEDG F4MISEDG FSMISEDG-EDG fails to start in EDGEAST EDG reliability data for the event of loss of EDGWEST Trojan (INPO submittals for offsite power 1984-1987) Common cause failure EDGBETA Common cause beta factor o' second EDG for diesels (EPRI NP-3967) Tcrnado winds cause F1WDRWST Assumed to be zero due to failure of RWST F2WDRWST additional tank stability F3WDRWST due to contents (water) n F3WDRWST [ F4WDRWST m F5WDRWST
BASIC EVENT PROBABILITY BASES TABLE B-1 (cont.) BASIC EVENT (S) NAME(S) BASIS / SOURCE (S) Tornado missiles cause FlMSRWST Strike probability based failure of RWST F2MSRWST on severity, missile F3MSRWST population, and area. F4MSRWST Area based on area of FSMSRWST tank (EPRI-NP-768) Tornado vinds cause FlWNDAFW Integration of wind failure of AFW pump building F2WNDAFW frequency distribution F3WNDAFW and building fragility F4WNDAFW based on NUREG/CR-2300 F5WNDAFW methodology and a 10% likelihood that all AFW pumps will be damaged by a failure of external wall
& (Seabrook PRA)
Tornado missiles cause FlMISAFW Assumed to be zero due failure of AFW pump building F2MISAFW to additional tank F3MISAFW stability due to contents F4MISAFW (water) FSMISAFW Tornado winds cause FlWNDCST Assumed to be zero due failure of CST F2WNDCST to additional tank F3WNDCST stabillity due to contents o F4WNDCST (water) [ F5WNDCST Tornado missiles cause FlMISCST Strike probability based y failure of CST F2MISCST on severity, missile o F3MISCST population, and area. Area F4MISCST based on size of CST tank FSMISCST (EPRI-NP-768)
BASIC EVENT PROBABILITY BASES TABLE B-1 (cont.) BASIC EVENT (S) NAME(S) BASIS / SOURCE (S) Failure of steam driven AFWSTM IREP database for steam AFW pump driven pump failure to start Failure of diesel driven AFWDIESL IREP database for diesel AFW pump driven pump failure to start Failure of motor driven AFWMOTOR IREP database for motor driven AFW pump pump failure to start EDG out of service for MAINTDGE IDCOR IPE methodology maintenance m O Battery depletion occurs FLBATDEP Based on likelihood of repair before AC power can be of diesels using 19 MTTR and standard. restored (battery life = repair model. Offsite power 4 hours) recovery conservatively assumed impossible within 4 hours after tornado damage Filtration provided by FILTINAD Original filter / intake design CB-1 inadequate conservatively assumed to be inadequate, filtered makeup air to maintain control room o pressurized. New designs do. e y Common cause failure SVBETA EPRI-NP-3967 (modified) m of second solenoid valve 2 Common cause failure DMBETA EPRI-NP-3967 (modified) of second damper
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TABLE B-2 CB-1 FAULT TREE BASIC EVENT DATA EVENT DESCRIPfl04 8ASE CASE CASE-2 CASE-3 CASE-4 CASE-5 CASE-6 CASE-7 e AFANRUM TRAIN A FAN FLS TO RUN 2.7E-03 2.7E-03 2.7E-03 2.7E-03 2.7E-03 2.7E-03 2.7E-03 FANBETA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CB-1 FANS 9.0E-06 9.0E-06 9.0E-06 9.0E-06 9.0E-06 9.0E 06 9.0E 06 AFANSTRT TRAIN A FAN FLS TO STRT 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 # AFWDIESL FAIL OF DIESEL DRIVEN AFW PMP 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E 03 1.0E-03 AFWMOTOR RAND FAIL OF AFW MOT DRIV PMP 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E 03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 AFWSTM FAIL OF STEAM DRIVEN AFW PMP 3.0E-02 3.0E-02 3.0E-02 3.0E-02 3.0E 02 3.0E-02 3.0E-02 AMANT TRAIN A OUT OF SVC FOR MAINT 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E 03 1.0E 03 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 BFANRUM TRAIN B FAN FLS TO RUN 2.7E-03 2.7E-03 2.7E 03 2.7E-03 2.7E-03 2.7E-03 2.7E-03 BFANSTRT TRAIN B FAN FLS TO STkT 3.CE-04 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 BMANT TRAIN B OUT OF SVC FOR MAINT 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E 03 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 DM1A1FC DAMPER 1A1 FAILS CLOSED 1.0E-02 3.0E 03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 DM1AIFO DAMPER CB-1A1 FAILS OPEN 1.0E-02 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E 03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 DM1A2FC DAMPER 1A2 FAILS CLOSED 0.0E+00 3.0E-03 3.0E 03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E 03 3.0E-03 DM1A2FO DAMPER CB-1A2 FAILS OPEN 1.0E+00 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E 03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 DM181FC DAMPER 181 FLS CLOSED 1.0E-02 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 DM181FO DAMPER CB-1B1 FAILS OPEN 1.0E-02 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E 03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 DM182FC DAMPER 182 FLS CLOSED 0.0E+00 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0F-03 DM182FO DAMPER CB-182 FAILS OPEN 1.0E+00 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E 03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 DMBETA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF DAMPERS 8.1E-04 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 2.5E-04 EDGBETA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF EDGS 1.8E-05 1.8E-05 1.8E-05 1.8E-05 1.8E-05 1.8E-05 1.8E-05 CD EDGEAST EDG-EAST FAIL DUE TO RAND DWNS 3.3E-03 3.3E-03 3.3E 03 3.3E-03 3.3E-03 3.3E-03 3.3E 03
- EDCUEST EDG-WEST FAIL DUE TO RAND CAUSE 3.3E-03 3.3E 03 3.3E-03 3.3E-03 3.3E-03 3.3E-03 3.3E-03 40 F1CL2 MIS F'1 INDUCED MISSILE FAIL OF CL2 BLDG 1.7E-03 1.7E-03 1.7E 03 1.7E 03 1.7E-03 1.7E-03 1.7E-03 FICL2WND F'1 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 6.0E-G3 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 FIFILMIS F'1 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT NOUSE 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E*00 0.0E+00 2.7E-04 2.7E-04 2.7E-04 FIFILWIN F'1 WINDS FAIL FILTER HOUSE 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.0E-06 1.0E-05 1.0E-06 F1MISAFW F'1 TORN MIS CAUSE Fall AFW PMP BLDG 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 F1MISCB1 F'1 TORNADO MISS CAUSE FAIL CB1 INTAKE 6.1E-04 1.0E+00 8.5E 04 0.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 F1MISCST F'1 TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 F1MISEDG F'1 TORM MISL CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 F1MSLOSP F'1 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP 1.2E-01 1.2E-01 1.2E-01 1.2E 01 1.2E-01 1.2E-01 1.2E-01 F1MSRWST F*1 MIS CAUSE FAIL OF RWST 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 F10CCURs F'1 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT 8.6E-05 8.6E-05 8.6E-05 8.6E-05 8.6E-05 8.6E-05 8.6E-05 FIPIPMIS F'1 MISSILES DAMAGE DWNSTRM PIPE 0.0E+00 1.3E 04 1.3E-04 0.0E+00 4.1E-05 4.1E 05 4.1E-05 F1PIPWND F*1 WINDS FAIL DWNSTRM PIPING 0.0E+00 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E 06 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 F1WOLOSP F'1 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 6.0E-03 6.0E 03 6.0E-03 r) F1WDRUST F'1 WNDS CAUSE FAIL OF RWST 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 pa F1WNDAFU F'1 TORN UND FAIL AFW PMP BLDG 1.0E 06 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E 06 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E-C6 P' F1WNDCB1 F'1 TORNADO WNDS CAUSE Fall OF CB1 INTKE 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E 06 1.0E-05 1.0E-06 LD F1WNDCST F'1 TORN WND CAUSE FAIL CST 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 chF1WNDEDG F'1 TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM Fall 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E 06 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 sJ F2CL2 MIS F'2 INDUCED MISSILE FAIL OF CL2 BLDG 2.1E-03 2.1E 03 2.1E-03 2.1E-03 2.1E-03 2.1E-03 2.1E-03 I F2CL2WND F'2 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 l C3 F2FILMIS F'2 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 3.3E-04 3.3E-04 3.3E-04 i
F2FILWIN F'2 WINDS FAIL FILTER HOUSE 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.0E-05 7.0E-04 1.0E-05 F2MISAFW F'2 TORN MIS CAUSE FAIL AFW PMP BLDG 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 i
i J TABLE B-2 ] C81 FAULT TREE BASIC EVENT DATA (continued) EVENT DESCRIPfl04 BASE CASE CASE-2 CASE-3 CASE-4 CASE-5 CASE-6 CASE-7 I F2 MISC 81 F'2 TORNADO MISS CAUSE Fall C81 INTAKE 7.6E-04 1.0E+00 1.1E-03 0.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.3E-03 1.3E 03 i F2MISCST F'2 TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL 3.9E 03 3.9E-03 3.9E-03 3.9E-03 3.9E-03 3.9E-03 3.9E-03 ? F2MISEDG F'2 TORN MISL CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 l F2MSLOSP F'2 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 1.5E 01 1.5E-01 1.5E-01 1.5E-01
- F2MSRWST F'2 MIS CAUSE Fall OF RWST 3.9E-03 3.9E-03 3.9E-03 3.9E-03 3.9E-03 3.9E-03 3.9E-03 i F20CCURS F'2 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT 6.9E-05 6.9E-05 6.9E-05 6.9E-05 6.9E-05 6.9E-05 6.9E-05 J
F2PIPMIS F'2 MISSILES DAMAGE DWNSTRM PIPE 0.0E+00 1.6E-04 1.6E-04 0.0E+00 5.1E-05 5.1E-05 5.1E 05 F2PIPWND F'2 WINDS FAIL DWNSTRM PIPING 0.0E+00 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 l F2WOLOSP F'2 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 1.6E-01 J F2WDRWST F'2 WNDS CAUSE Fall 0F RWST 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0 F2WNDAFW F'2 TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP BLOG 7.0E-05 7.0E-05 7.0E-05 7.0E-05 7.0E-05 7.0E-05 7.0E-05 l F2WNDC81 F'2 TORNADO WNDS CAUSE Fall 0F C81 INTKE 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.0E 05 1.0E-05 7.0E-04 1.0E-05 F2WNDCST F'2 TORN WND CAUSE FAIL CST 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
; F2WNDEDG F'2 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL T.0E-05 7.0E-05 7.0E-05 7.0E-05 7.0E-05 7.0E-05 7.0E-05
. F3CL2 MIS F'3 INDUCED MISSILE FAIL OF LL2 BLDG 5.6E-03 5.6E-03 5.6E-03 5.6E-03 5.6E 03 5.6E-03 5.6E-03 i 5.7E-01 F3CL2WND F'3 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL28LDG 5.7E-01 5.7E-01 5.7E-01 5.7E-01 5.7E-01 5.7E-01 ! F3FILMIS F'3 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 8.7E-04 8.7E-04 8.7E-04 F3FILWIN F'3 WINDS FAIL FILTER HOUSE 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 1.0E-04 2.3E-02 1.0E-54 F3MISAFU F'3 TORN MIS CAUSE FAIL AFW PMP SLOG 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 eg F3 MISC 81 F'3 TORNADO MISS CAUSE FAIL CB1 INTAKE 2.0E-03 1.0E+00 2.8E-03 0.0E+00 1.0E+00 3.4E 03 3.4E-03 , I F3MISCST F'3 TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL 1.0E-02 1.0E 02 1.0E-02 1.0E-02 1.0E-02 1.0E-02 1.0E-02
>' F3MISEDG F'3 TORN MISL CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 C) F3MSLOSP F'3 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP 4.0E-01 4.0E-01 4.0E-01 4.0E-01 4.0E-01 4.0E-01 4.0E-01 F3MSRWST F'3 MIS CAUSE FAIL OF RWST 1.0E-02 1.0E-02 1.0E-G2 1.0E-02 1.0E-02 1.0E-02 1.0E-02 F3 OCCURS F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT 2.9E-05 2.9E-05 2.9E-05 2.9E 05 2.9E-05 2.9E-05 2.9E-05 F3PIPMIS F'3 MISSILES DAMAGE DWNSTRM PIPE 0.0E+00 4.2E-04 4.2.-04 0.0E+00 1.3E-04 1.3E-04 1.3E-04 F3PIPWND F'3 WINDS FAIL DWNSTRM PIPING 0.0E+00 1.0E-04 1.0E-04 1.0E-04 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 F3WDLOSP F'3 TORNADO WND OMG UFFST PWR SUP 5.7E-01 5.7E-01 5.7E-01 5.7E-01 5.7E-01 5.7E-01 5.7E 01 F3WDRWST F*3 WNDS CAUSE FAIL OF RWST 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 F3WMDAFW F'3 TORN WND FAIL AFU PMP 8LDC 2.3E-03 2.3E-03 2.3E-03 2.3E-03 2.3E-03 2.3E 03 2.3E-03 F3WNDCB1 F'3 TORNADO WNDS CAUSE FAIL OF C81 INTKE 1.0E-04 1.0E-04 1.0E-04 1.0E-04 1.0E-04 2.3E-02 1.0E-04 F3WMOCST F'3 TORN WND CAUSE FAIL CST 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 F3WNDEDG F'3 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 2.3E-03 2.3E-03 2.3E-03 2.3E-03 2.3E-03 2.3E-03 2.3E-03 F4CL2 MIS F'4 INDUCED MISSILE FAIL OF CL2 BLDG 3.5E-03 3.5E-03 3.5E-03 3.5E-03 3.5E-03 3.5E-03 3.5E 03 F4CL2WND F'4 INDUCED WI2C FAIL OF CL2 BLDG 9.0E-01 9.0E-01 9.0E-01 9.0E-01 9.0E-01 9.0E-01 9.0E-01 F4FILMIS F'4 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 5.5E-04 5.5E-04 5.5E-04 r) f4FILVIN F*4 WINDS FAIL FILTER MOUSE 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 4.4E-03 1.6E-01 4.4E-03
>d F4MISAFW F'4 TORN MIS CAUSE FAIL AFW PMP BLDG 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 6' F4 MISC 81 F'4 TORNADO MISS CAUSE FAIL C81 INTAKE 1.2E-03 1.0E+00 1.7E-03 0.0E+00 1.0E+00 2.1E-03 2.1E-03
\fF4MISCST F'4 TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL 6.5E-03 6.5E-03 6.5E-03 6.5E-03 6.5E-03 6.5E-03 6.5E-03 03 F4MISEDG F *4 TORM MISL CAUSE FDG RM F AIL 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
%J F4MSLOSP F'4 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP 2.5E-01 2.5E-01 2.5E-01 2.5E-01 2.5E-01 2.5E-01 2.5E-01 a p4ysgysy y.4 MIS CAUSE FAIL OF RWST 6.5E-03 6.5E-03 6.5E-03 6.5E-03 6.5E-03 6.5E-03 6.5E-03
$dF40CCURS F*4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT 7.9E-06 7.9E-06 7.9E-06 7.9E-06 7.9E-06 7.9E-06 7.9E-06 F4PIPMIS F'4 MISSILES DAMAGE DWNSTRM PIPE 0.0E+00 2.6E-04 2.6E-04 0.0E+00 8.0E-05 8.0E-05 8.0E-05
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TABLE s-2 CS-1 FAULT TREE SASIC EVENT DATA (continued) EVENT DESCRIPTION BASE CASE CA$E-2 CASE-3 CA$E-4 CASE-5 CASE-6 CASE-T SW182FO SOLEN 0ID VLV CB-152 FLS OPEN/ LEAKS 0.0E+00 1.0E-03 1.0E 03 1.0E 03 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 1.0E 03 SVsETA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF SOLENOIDS 0.0E*00 3.1E 05 3.1E-05 3.1E-05 3.1E-05 3.1E 03 3.1E-05 WINDOIR ADVERSE WINO DIR EXISTS 3.3E-01 3.3E-01 3.3E 01 3.3E-01 3.3E-01 3.3E 01 3.3E 01 to I H to O H H (n I Co 4 i o b
m I MINIMAL CUTSETS
SUMMARY
8 f a f C115-87-04
i l APPENDIX C List of Tables 2AEM Table C-1: Minimal Cutsets - Base Case C-1 through C-7 Table C-2: Minimal Cutsets - Case 2 C-8 through C-13 Table C-3: Minimal Cutsets - Case 3 C-14 through C-20 Table C-4: Minimal Cutsets - Case 4 C-21 through C-27 Table C-5: Minimal Cutsets - Case 5 C-28 through C-33 Table C-6: Minimal Cutsets - Case 6 C-34 through C-39 Table C-7: Minimal 02tsets - Case 7 C-40 through C-45 C-i Cll5-87-04
-j TABLE C 1 MINIMAL CUTSETS - 8ASE CASE
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT STST - BASE CASE - REV 0 ********************
TOP EVENT PROSABILITY = .51784E-06 FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 1 .237E+00 CUT SET 62 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .123E-06 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5WNDEDG .440E-C1 .000 CONSTANT I T TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .U00 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR SEFORE BAT DEP 2 .215E+00 CUT SET 68 MIN CUT SET PROSASILITY = .111E-06 f) BASIC EVENT MFAN PRosA81LITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION 8 F40CCURS 790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNA00 IMPACTS PLANT F4WDLOSP .900E+UO .000 C04STANT F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F4WNDEDG .167E- 01 .000 C04STANT F'4 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 3 .156E+00 CUT SET 3 RIN CUT SET PR08 ABILITY = .810E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSA81LITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION DMBETA .810E-03 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF DAMPERS RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADIOACTIVITY 4 .145E+00 CUT SET 64 O >* MIN CUT SET PR08 ABILITY = .750E 07 (( BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBARILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTICM - I 03 F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP =J y5octuas ,290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT 8 c) F5WWJEDG 440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TURN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 45 FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP
1ABLE C-1 MINIMAL CUTSETS - BASE CASE
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT STST - BASE CASE - REV 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RA** IMPORTANCE 5 .720E 01 CUT >ET 74 MIN CUT SE! PR08 ABILITY = .373E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION 8ASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3 OCCURS .290E-04 .000 COJSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F3WDLOSP .570E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 6 .598E-01 CUT SET TO MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .310E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION FA!!C EVENT DESCRIFTION F4MSLOSP .250E*00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST Pl'R SUP
} F40CCURS .790E 05 .fe /0 C0"JTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPAC1s PLANT pa F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .r P r ,NSTANT F'4 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBAfDEP .980E+00 . CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 7 .50$E-01 CUT SET 76 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .261E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3MSLOSP .400E*00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F3 OCCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT Fe3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FL8ATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR SEFORE BAT DEP 8 .111E-01 CUT SET 63 f3 MIN CUT SET PR08 ABILITY = .575E 08 h$ BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION un I F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORRADO IMPACTS PLANT CD F5WOLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F*5 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP
]f F5WNDAFW F5WNDEDG
.460E 01
.440E-01
.000
.000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP BLDG C3 CONSTANT F'5 TORN UND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL b
TABLE C-1 MINIMAL CUTSETS - BASE CASE
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT CR EMERG VENT SYST - BASE CASE - REV 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANC IMPORTANCE 9 .680E-02 CUT SET 65 MIN CUT SET PR08 ABILITY = .352E-08 BASIC EVENT 3EAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTIDW f5MSLOSP .600E*00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUF F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F 5 WND A F W .460E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND FAIL ArW PMP BLDG F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL to .521E-02 CUT SET 22 MIN CUT SET PR08 ABILITY = .270E-08 BASIC EVERT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION 8FAhBUN .270E-02 .000 CONSTANT TRAIN B FAN FLS TO RUM f3 DM1A1FC .100E-01 .000 CONSTANT DAMPER 1A1 FAILS CLOSED [a RANNEL .100E-03 .000 CONSTA 1T RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY 10 .521E-02 CUT SET 29 MIN CUT SET PR08 ABILITY = .270E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTICN BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AFACRUN .270E-02 .000 CONSTANT TRAIN A FAN FLS TO RUN DM101FC .100E-01 .000 CONSTANT DAMPER 181 FLS CLOSED RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDON CAUSED REL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY 11 .362E-02 CUT SET 66 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .188E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION O (( F5MISCST .150E-01
.290E-05
.000
.000 CONSTANT F'S TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL (n F50CCURS CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT I F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP Cj F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL I
O b
TABLE C-1 MINIMAL CUTSETS - 8ASE CASE TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - SASE CASE - REV 0 FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE l 12 .351E-02 CUT SET 69 MIN CUT SET PROAA8ILITY = .182E-08 SASIC EVENT MEAN PROSASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F4WDLOSP .900E*00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F4WNDAFW 160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP SLDG F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F84 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 13 .222E-02 CUT SET 67 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .115E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PR08 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5MISCST .150E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL f F5MSLb3P .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP as F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CCNSTANT F'5 TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 14 .193E-02 CUT SET 23 MIN CUT SET PROSASILITY = .100E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AMANT .100E-02 .000 CONSTANT TRAIN A DUT OF SVC FOR MAINT DM181FC .100E-01 .000 CONSTANT DAMPER 181 FLS CLOSED RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY 14 .193E-02 CL'T SET 20 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .100E-08 [3 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY EAROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION H Ln BMANT .100E-02 .000 CONSTANT TRAIN 8 OUT OF SVC FOR MAINT I DM1A1FC .100E-01 .000 CONSTANT DAMPER 1A1 FAILS CLOSED [] RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDON CAUSED REL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY I O ts
i TABLE C 1 MINIMAL CUTSETS - BASE CASE TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - BASE CASE - REV O FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 15 .174E-02 CUT SET 2 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITI = .900E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION FANBETA .900E-05 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CB-1 FANS RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY 15 .174 E - 02 CUT SET 1 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .900E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION FANBETA .900E-05 .000 CON 3 TANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CB-1 FANS RAMREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDLM CAUSED REL OF RADIOACTIVITY [ Ln 16 .146E-02 CUT SET 80 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .757E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F2 OCCURS #,90E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'2 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F2WDLOSP '60E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'2 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F2WNDEDC .100E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'2 TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .930E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 17 .143E-02 CUT SET 72 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY * .739E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F4MISCST .650E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORM MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL (3 F40CCUR$ .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT pa F4WOLOSP .900E+00 .0C0 CONSTANT F84 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP Ln F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL I 03 4 I O 4
TABLE C-1 MINIMAL CUTSETS - BASE CASE TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - BASE CASE - REV 0 FUSSELL-VESELY RANC IMPORTANCE 18 .137E-02 CUT SET 82 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .710E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F2MSLOSP .150E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'2 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F20CCURS .690E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'2 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F2WNDEDG .700E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'2 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 19 .105E-02 CUT SET 319 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .545E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAR PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION DM181F0 .100E-01 .000 CONSTANT DAMPER CB-151 FAILS OPEN f F3CL2WND F30CCURS
.570E+00
.290E-04
.000
.000 CONSTANT F'3 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG 0% CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT OPDETB 100E-01 .000 CONSTANT OP FLS TO DETECT LOSS OF ISOL STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 19 .105E-02 CUT SET 339 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .545E 09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION DM1A1F0 .100E-01 .000 CONSTANT DAMPER CB-1A1 FAILS OPEN F3CL2WND .570E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2BLOG F30CCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT OPDETA .100E-01 .000 CONSTANT OPER FAILS TO DET LOSS OF ISOL STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS
[3 WINDD!R .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS U1 1 C1 4 I O b
/%
TABLE C-1 MINIMAL CUTSETS - BASE CASE TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - SASE CASE - AEV 0 FUSSELL-VESELY RANE IMPORTANCE 20 .?76E-03 CUT SET 71 i MIN CUT SE. PROBAtlLITY = .506E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F4NSLOSP .250E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT j F4W#0AFW .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WWO FAIL AFW PMP SLDG
- F4WWDEDC .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL I
i 1 , f) 6 1 O w H (fl I CD 4 8 O b
TABLE C-2 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 2
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSEMNT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 2 - REV 0 ********************
TOP EVENT PROSABILITY = .52723E 06 FUSSELL-VESELY RANC IMPORTANCE 1 .232E+00 CUT SET B6 MIN CUT SET PROSABILITY = .123E-06 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION 8ASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND CAUSE EOG RM FAIL FLSATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 2 .211E+00 CUT SET 92 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .111E-06 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION I} F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT c'o F4WDLOSP .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 3 .142E+00 CUT SET 88 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .750E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION FSMSLOi? .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMFACTS PLANT F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP O w H U1 l CD 4 I O b
TABLE C-2 MINIMUM CUTSETS - CASE 2 TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSEMNT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 2 - REV O FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 4 .707E-01 CUT SET 98 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .373E-07 DASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3 OCCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F3WDLOSP .570E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .930E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 5 .694E 01 CUT SET 158 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .366E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION FSCL2WND .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG fg F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT WD F5PIPWND .390E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 WINDS FAIL DWNSTRM PIPING STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 6 .587E-01 CUT SET 94 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .310E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F4MSLOSP .250E*00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO MIS DMG CFFST PWR SUP F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN UND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP g) 7 .496E-01 CUT SET 100 pa MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .261E-07 LD BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION I [$ F3MSLOSP .400E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP I F30CCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT C) F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP
TABLE C-2 MINIMUM CUTSETS - CASE 2 TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSEMNT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 2 - REV 0 FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 8 474E 01 CUT SET 3 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .250E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTIDW BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTICN DMBETA .250E-03 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF DAMPERS RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDON CAUSED REL OF RADIOACTIVITY 9 .196E-01 CUT SET 179 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .103E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F4CL2WND .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F84 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL28LDG F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F4PIPWND .440E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'4 WINDS FAIL DWNSTRM PIPING f Fe STABILIT WINDDIR
.100E+01
.330E+00
.000
.000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS O
10 .109E-01 CUT SET 87 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .5 75 E - 08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORWADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5WNDAFW 460E-91 .000 COMETANT F'5 TORh WND FAIL AFW PMP BLOG F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CON 5sANT F'S TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 11 .668E-02 CUT SET 89 MIN CUT SET PRO 8 ABILITY = .352E-08 (3 F.ASIC EVENT MEAN PRO 8 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION H Ln F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP 3 F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADG IMPACTS PLANT [$ F 5 WND A FW 460E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP SLDG F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL o b
TABLE C-2 MINIMUM CUTSETS - CASE 2 TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSEMNT CR EMERG VENT SYST
- CASE 2 - REV 0 FUSSELL-VESELY RMdK IMPCRTANCE 12 .588E-02 CUT SET 4 MIN CUT SET PROBA8ILITY = .310E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PR05 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUT!)N BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADIOACTIVITY SYBETA .310E-04 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF SOLEN 0!DS 13 .435E-02 CUT SET 204 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .229E-08 SASIC EVENT MEAN PRCIABILITY ERROR FACTUR DISTRIBUTION SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3CL2WND .570E+00 000 CONSTANT F'3 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2BLOG F30CCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT g) F3PIPMIS .420E-03 .000 CONSTANT F'3 MISSILES DAMAGE DWNSTRM PIPE STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS rd WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WING DIR EXISTS H
14 .372E-02 CUT SET 154 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .196E-05 SASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTIDW BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5MISCs1 .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO MISS CAUSE FAIL CB1 INTAKE F5MSRWST .150E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 MIS CAUSE FAIL OF RWST F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F 5WDLO5P .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5WNDAFW .460E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP SLDG 15 .356E-02 CUT SET 90 f3 MIN CUT SET PR05A81LITY = .188E-08 pa BASIC EVENT MEAN PR08 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION Ut 8 F5MISCST .150E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL [$ F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT e F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP C) F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CcWSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL b
TABLE C-2 MINIMUM CUTSETS - CASE 2 TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSEM4T - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 2 - REV 0 FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 16 .345E-02 CUT SET 93 MIN CUT SET PR08 ABILITY = .182E-08 2ASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTIDW SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F40CLJRS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F4WOLOS* .900E+00 .000 ConSTAuf F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F4WW3AFW .160E-01 .000 ComSTAuf F'4 TORM WND FAIL AFW PM7 BLDG F4WuDEDG .160E-01 .000 CouSTANT F'4 Totu Wuo CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 17 .314E-02 CUT SET 201 M N CUT SET PROBAh!LITY = .165E-08 8ASIC EVENT MEAN PR08 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTIDW SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3 MISC 81 . 00E+01 .000 CONSTAuf F'3 TotNADO MISS CAUSE FAIL CBI INTAKE F341SCST .100E 01 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL f ka F3MSEWST F30CCURS
.100E-01
.290E-04
.000
.000 CONSTAuf F'3 MIS CAUSE FAIL OF RWST COWSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT hJ F3WDLOSP .570E+00 .000 Co#STAuf F'3 10aNADO WND DMG OFFS 7 PWR SUP 18 .228E-02 Cbi SET 155 MIN CUT SET PRosasILI17 = .120E-08 SASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTIDW F5 MISC 81 .100E*01 000 C04STANT F'S 70aNADO MISS CAUSE FAIL CB1 INTAKE F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 C0uSTAuf F'S TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5MSRWST .150E-01 .000 CONSTAuf F'5 MIS CAUSE FAIL OF RWST F50CCuts .290E-05 .000 CONSTAuf F'S 70aNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WNDAFW 460E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORM WWD FAIL AFV PMP SLDG
) 19 .220E-02 CUT SET 202 h$ MI4 CUT SET PRotABILITY = .116E-08 Ln SASIC EVENT MEAN PRotABILITY ERRot FACTOR DISTRIBUTIDW SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTIDW t
[$ F3 MISC 81 .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT F'3 70eNA00 MISS CAUSE FAIL C81 INTAKE
- F34ISCST .100E-01 .000 CouSTANT F'3 7044 MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL C3 d'
F3MSLOSP .40CE+00 .000 CouSTANV F'3 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F3MSRWST .100E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'3 MIS CAUSE FAIL OF RWST F30CCURS .290E-04 .000 CouSTANT F'3 T0a4 ADO IMPACTS PLANT
TABLE C-2 MINIMUM CUTSETS - CASE 2 TROJA4 SAFETY ASSESSEMNT - CR ENERG VENT SYST - CASE 2 - REV 0 FUSSELL-VESELY RAeHC IMPORTA#CE 20 .218E-02 CUT SET 91 MIN CUT SET PROSAsILITY = .115E-08 BASIC Evf4T MEAN PROSASILITY ERROR FACTOR OS$TRIBUTION SaSIC EVENT DESCRIPTIOu F5mISCST .150E-01 .000 ConSTAuf F'S Toeg MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL F5MSLOSP .600E*00 .000 ComSTAuf F'5 TORNADO MIS D00G OFFST PtNt SUP F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 ComSTAuf F'S ToesADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WmDEDG .440E-91 .000 C0eSTANT F'5 70tw nas0 CAUSE EDG DM FAIL O e W SJ O W W Ut E 03 4 9 O b
TABLE C-3 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 3 TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 3 - REV 0 TOP EVENT PRotABILITY = .51784E-06 FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 1 .237E+00 CUT SET 86 MIN CUT SET PROSABILITY = .143E-06 BASIC EVENT MEAN PR05 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM F AIL FLEAfDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL 70 REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 2 .215E+00 CUT SET 92 MIN CUT SET P90BASILITY * .111E-06 BASIC EVENT MEAN PR08 ABILITY ERROR F ACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION O [, F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT ds F4 WDLOSP .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLSATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR 8EFORE BAT DEP 3 .145E+00 CUT SET 88 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .750E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PR05 ABILITY ERPOR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORMADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WWOEDG 440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR 8EFORE SAT DEP (3 4 .720E-01 CUT SET 98 bn MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .373E 07 I 8ASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION co
]3 F30CCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT C) F3WDLOSP .570E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP dh F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLSATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR REFORE BAT DEP
TABLE C-3 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 3
..****************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR ENERG VENT SYST - CASE 3 - REV 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 5 .706E-01 CUT SET 158 MIN CUT SET PROSABILITY = .366E-07 BAstC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5CL2WND .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2SLDG F50CCURS .290E 05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5PIPWND .390E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 WINDS FAIL DWNSTRM PIPING STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 JosifANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 6 .598E-01 CUT SET 94 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .310E-07 SASIC EVENT MEAN PP05 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION I F4mSLOSP .250E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP pa F4CCCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT Ln F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .0G0 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR SEFORE SAT DEP 7 .505E-01 CUT SET 100 MIN CUT SET PR08 ABILITY = .261E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PR05 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTR 25UTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3MSLOSP .400E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PW2 SUP F30CCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLSATDEP .980E+0U .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE 8AT DEP 8 .483E-01 CUT SET 3 7 h$ MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .250E-07 (n BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION I f$ DMBETA .250E-03 .000 CONSTANT COMM04 CAUSE FAILURE OF DAMPERS I RANREL .100E-03 .G00 CONSTANT RANDON CAUSED PEL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY O b
TASLE C-3 MIN!hAL CUTSETS - CASE 3 TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG YEN 1 STST CASE 3 - REV 0 ***************?**** , FUSSELL-VESELY RANC IMPORTANCE 9 .199E-01 CUT SET 179 MIN CUT SET PROSABILITY e .103E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTI0d BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F4CL2WND .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2BLOG F40CCURS .790E-05 000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F4PIPWND .440E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'4 WINDS FAIL DWNSTRM PIPING STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 10 .111E-01 CUT SET 87 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .575E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PR08 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BAS!C EVENT DESCRIPTION F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 COCSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT bd F5WDLOSP .980E+00 000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO WND DMG 07FST PWR SUP cm F5WNDAFW 460E-01 .000 CONSTANT F*5 TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP SLDG F5WNDEDG 440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 11 .680E-02 CUT SET 89 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .352E-03 BASIC EVENT MEAN PRO 8A8ILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 ccNSTANT F'5 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CON ST AN T F'5 TORNAP9 IMPACTS PLANT F5WNDAFW 460E-01 000 CONSTAhT F'5 TORE LMD FAIL AFW PMP BLDG F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL g) 12 .599E 02 CUT SET 4 H Ed MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .310E-08 f BASIC EVENT MEAN PR05 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRI90 TION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION k$ RANREL .100E-UL .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CA'?tED REL OF RADIOACTIVITY I SYSETA .310E-04 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAD.E FAILURE OF SOLENOIDS O b
, T ' '
TABLE C-3 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 3 TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 3 - REV O FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 13 442E-02 CUT SET 204 MIN CUT SET PROBA81LITY = .229E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTIDW BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3CL2WND .570E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 INDUCES WIND FAIL OF CL28LDG F30CCURS .290E 04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F3*IPMIS 420E-03 .000 CONSTANT F'3 MISSILES DAMAGE DWNSTRM PIPE STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CogSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WIhDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 14 .362E-02 CUT SET 90 P.IN CUT SET PRO 1 ABILITY = .188E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTIDW 3 F5MIwCST .150E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORM MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL
- p. F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT
%J F5WOLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 15 .351E-02 CUT SET 93 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .182E-08 BASIC EVENT I 'u PR06 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIRUTION SAS!C EVENT DESCRIPTION F40CCURS .e E-05 .000 CONSTANT t'4 TDRNADO IMPACTS PLANT F4WDLOSP .9uCE+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F4WNDAFW .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORM WND FAIL AFW PMP SLDG F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND CAUSE EDG tM FAIL 16 .222E 02 CUT SET 91 O
h$ MIN CUT SET PR08 ABILITY = .115E-08 (n SASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIFTION I
- 0) F5MISCST .150E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL g F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP C3 F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT Fe5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT
- .4402-01 .000 F5WND ED G CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL
TABLE C-3 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 3 TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EPERG VENT SYST - CASE 3 - REV O FUSSELL-WESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 17 .174E-02 CUT SET 1 MIN CUT SET PROSABILITY = 000C.G9 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION FANSETA .900E-05 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CS-1 FANS RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY 17 .174E-02 CUT SET 23 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .900E-09 SASIC EVENT MEAN PROSASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION DM1A2FC .300E-02 .000 CONSTANT DAMPER 1A2 FAILS CLOSED D4181FC .300E-02 .000 CONSTANT DAMPER 181 FLS CLOSED RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY O 8, 1T .174E-02 CUT SET 2
=
MIN CUT SET PROSABILITY = .900E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ESROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION FANsETA .900E-05 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CS-1 FANS RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RAND 0K CAUSED REL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY 17 .174E-02 CUT SET 22 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = 900E-09 BASIC EV~RT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRISUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION 041A2FC .300E-02 .000 CONSTANT DAMPER 1A2 FAILS CLOSED DM182FC .300E-02 .000 CONSTANT DAMPER 152 FLS CLOSED () RAMREL .100E 03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY w H tF3 8 03 4 I O b
TABLE C-3 MINIMAL CUTSETS CASE 3 TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 3 - REW 0 FUSSELL-VESELY RANC IMPORTANCE 17 .174E-02 CUT SET 26 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .900E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTIDW BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION DM1A1FC .300E-02 .000 CouSTAuf DAMPER 1A1 FAILS CLOSED DM152FC .300E-02 .000 CouSTAuf DAMPER 152 FLS CLOSED RANREL .100E-03 .000 ComSTAuf RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RAOICACTIVITY 18 .156E-02 CUT SET 37 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .810E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBU 104 BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTIDW BFAWRUN .770E-02 .000 CONSTANT TRAIN B FAN FLS TO RUN DM1A2FC .300E-02 .000 CONSTAuf DAMPER 1A2 FAILS CLOSED hI RAWREL .100E-03 .000 CowSTAuf RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADIDACTIVITY w u) 18 .156E-02 CUT SET 38 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .810E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIEUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION BFAhRue .2 TDE -02 .000 CousTANT TRAIN 8 FAN FLS To RUN DM1A1FC .300E-02 .000 CouSTAuf DAMPER 1A1 FAILS CLOSED RAWREL .100E-03 .000 CowSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY 18 .156E-02 CUT SET 54 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .810E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR F ACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTIOg f3 AFAhtuu .270E-02 .000 CONSTANT TRAIN A FA4 FLS TO RUN ps DM151FC .300E-02 .000 CoeSTANT DAMPER 181 FLS Closed Ln RAmREL .100E 03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY I 03 -4 0 O to I
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=.=d
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en W e e o en W e e a e en tas e o e e 4E 4 E 4E
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- UU M N tad a UO 3 O.J Q >
U a MU 44 U =d O e M@ lae *e 3eM W 4 em OE4 "a 3 e had M E te
** ** UOE E O 3 .s e M tad 4 EM 4 *= 3 E 44 e 3> 4A == 4 em E4 4 == 4 N 4 == 4 4444 4 46 E ** Ee 4 Q EK *= Ea m te tb N .4ab *= E se w es te w e me o e e 4
e e W so & O 9 3 *= s= N e 4 as C-20 C115-87-04
TABLE C-4 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 4
******************** TROJAN SAFETT ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT STST - CASF 4 - PEV 0 ********************
TOP EVENT PROSASILITY = .51366E-06 FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 1 .239E+00 CUT SET 86 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITT = .1232-06 BASIC EVENT MEAN PR08 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION 5ASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5WNDEDG 440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLSATDEP .980E*00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE SAT DEP 2 .21TE+00 CUT SET 92 MIN CUT SET PROSABILITT = .111E-06 g) SASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION I hJ F40CCUR$ .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT bd F4WDLOSP .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F 4WNDED G .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLSAfDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR SEFORE SAT DEP 3 .146E+00 CUT SET E8 MIN CUT SET PR05 ABILITY = .750E-07 SASIC EVTNT MEAN PR05 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTIDW F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT 55WNDEDG 440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WhD CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLSAfDEP 980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL 70 REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP [3 4 .725E-01 CUT SET 98 C* LM MIN CUT SET PR08 ABILITY = .373E-07 8 C0 SASIC EVENT MEAN PR05 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTIDW 4 s F30CCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT C3 F3WDLOSP .570E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLSAfDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP
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ii TABLE C-4 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 4
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR ENERG VENT SYST - CASE 4 - REV 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 9 .201E-01 CUT SE) 179 i MIN CUT SET PROSABILIT1 = .iO3E-07 i SASIC EVEuf NEAM PSDBASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTI0e SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F4CL2WuD 900E*00 .000 CONSTAuf F'4 ImOUCED WINO FAIL OF CL2SLDG F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 COWSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F4PIPWWD .44DE-02 .000 C04STAuf F'4 W m05 FAIL DWWSTRM PIPING STASILIT .100E*01 .000 CouSTA2T ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS
.dINDDIR 330E*00 .000 C0esTAuf ADVERSE WINO DIR EXISTS 10 .112E 01 CUT SET 87 MI4 CUT SET PROBASILITY = .575 E - 08 BASIC EVENT REA4 PFOSABILITY ERROR FACica DISTRIDUTIDW BAS!C EVENT DESCRIPTION M
f F50CCURS F5WOLOSP
.290E 05
.980E+00
.000
.000 CDeSTAmt CDuSTAmi F'S ToenA00 IMPACTS PLAuf F'5 70esADO W#0 DMG OFFST PWR SUP
'd 460E-01 .000 CowSTAuf F 5 WWD A F W F'5 TORM WWO FAIL AFW PMP SLDG F5WEDEDG 440E-01 .000 Consfasi F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 11 .686E-02 CUT SET 89 MIN CUT SE1 PROSABIt !TY = .352E-08 BASIC EVENT pfA4 PFOSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTIO4 8ASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5NSLOSP .600E+00 .000 COuSTAuf F'S TORWADO MIS Dec 0FFST PWR SUP F50cCURS .290E 05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 70RmADO IMP? CTS PLAuf F5WuoAFW 460E*01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN We0 FAIL AFW PMP BLDG F5WootDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORu Wm0 CAUSE EDG PM FAIL
() 12 .604E-02 CUT SET 4 bd MIN CUT SET PROBABILIT* = .310E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PR08 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION Of
$ RA#REL .100E-03 .000 CDeSTAuf RAe004 CAUSED REL OF RADIDACTIVITY I SVSETA .310E 04 .000 ComSTAuf Comm0N CAUSE FAILDRE OF SOLEDOIDS O
b
.m . _ _. .. ..
TABLE C-4 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 4
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VEET STST - CASE 4 - REV 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VF Y RAut '* . *AuCE 13 .305E-02 CUT SET 90 M14 E'JT SET PR084tiLITY = .188E-08 SASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERR 04 FACTOR DISTRIBUT104 SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTIDE F5MISCST .150E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S 70Ru MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 ComSTAuf F'5 TORuAD9 IMPACTS PLAuf F5WDLOSP 980E+00 .000 CouSTAuf F'5 T0tuA00 We0 DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5WuDEDG 440E-01 .000 CouSTAuf F'S TORE Wuo CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 14 .354E 02 CUT SET 93 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .182E 03 SASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY ERR 04 F ACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVEuf DESCRIPTION g) F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CowSTAuf F'4 70RuADO IMPACTS PLAuf g F4WDLOSP .900E+00 .000 CouSTAuf F'4 TotNADO W40 DMG OFFST PWR SUP ha F4WND A F W .160E-01 .000 CouSTAuf F'4 704u WED FAIL AFW PMP SLOG 8" F4WNDEDG .160E 01 .000 CouSTAuf F'4 T0ta WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 15 .224E-02 CUT SET 91 Miu CUT SET PROSABILITY = .115E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTIDs SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5u!SCST .150E-01 .000 CouSTAuf F'S TORu M'S CAUS CST TO FAIL F5MSiOSP .600E+00 .000 ConSTAuf F'S TORMADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CouSTAuf F'S TORMADO IMPACTS PLAuf F 5WuoEDG 440?-01 .000 ConSTAuf F'5 TORE Wuo CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 16 .175E-02 CUT SET 2 f) MIM LUT SET PROBA51LITf = .900E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN Pt08 ABILITY ERRot FACTom DISTRIBUTIDs BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION >4 Ut I FANSETA .900E-05 000 CouSTAuf COMoon CAUSE FAILURE OF CS-1 FAWS 0$ RAuREL .100E-03 .000 ComSTAuf RANDOM CAUSED REL OF R ADIDACTIVITY O Am
.m,. .. ..m_. - . _ _ - _, ._ . & . L ..m u A l TABLE C-4 i
MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 4
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR ENERG VEuf SYST - CASE 4 - REW 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RAhC IMPORTANCE 16 .175 E - 02 CUT SET 1 MIN CUT SET PROSABILITY = .900E-09 BASIC EVENT MEAN PRotABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTIOe BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTIDW TAW 8 ETA .500E-05 .000 CoeSTAuf CDPmou CAUSE FAILURE OF CB-1 FANS RAeREL .1001-03 .000 CONSTAuf RANDON CAUSED REL OF RADIDACTIVITY 16 .175 E- 02 CUT SET 23 MIN CUT SET PROSABILITY = .900E-09 SASIC EVEnf MEA 4 PROSASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION DM1A2FC .300E-02 .000 COeSTAuf DAMPER 1A2 FAILS CLOSED DM151FC .300E-02 .000 ComSTAuf DAMPER 151 FLS CLOSED () RAmREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTA 47 RANDOM CAUSED REL OF R ADICACTIVITY 8 BJ 16 .175E-02 CUT SET 25 U1 M!u CUT SET PROSABILITf = .900E-09 SASIC EVENT MEAM PR05 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTIDW SASIC EVEuf DESCRIPTIOW DM1A1FC .300E-02 .000 CONSTAuf DA#PER 1A1 FAILS CLOSED Dm182FC .300E-02 .000 C04STA47 DA#PER 152 FLS CLOSED RAmREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDON CAUSED REL OF RADIDACTIVITY 16 .175 E - 02 CUT SET 22 MIN CUT SET PROSASILITY = .900E-09 8ASIC EVENT MEAu PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION c) DM1A2FC 300E 02 .000 COWTIANT DAMPER 1A2 FAILS CLOSED
>s Date2FC .300E-02 .000 COESTANT DARPER 152 FLS CLOSED bd RAuREL .100F-03 .000 CoaSTAmi RAeDon CAUSED REL OF RADIDACTIVITY (n
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TABLE C-4 i MINImAI 7JTSETS - CASE 4
******************** TROJAW SAFETY A55E55mEuf - Ce ENERG VENT SYST CASE 4 - REV 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VESELT R Amit IMPORTAtCE i 18 .147E-02 CUT SET 104 MIN CUT SET PROSAtlLITT = . 757E - 09 SASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERRot FACTOR SISTRIBUTIDW SASIC EVEuf DESCRIPTION F20CCURS .690E-04 .000 C0e5 TANT F'2 ToteADO IMPACTS PLANT F2WDLosP .160E+00 .000 CouSTANT F*2 TORMADO WWO DMG OFFST PWR SUP F2VsDEDG .700E-04 .000 CouSTAuf F*2 TORu Wup CAUSE EDC RM FAIL FLBATDEP 980E*00 .000 C045TAuf FAIL TO REC PWR SEFORE SAT DEP 19 .144E-02 CUT SET 96 P MIN UT SET PROSABILITY = .739E-07 BASIC EVENT #EAN P905AtiLITY ERRot FACTOR DISTRIBUT!ON BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F4mISCST .650E-02 .000 CouSTAuf F*4 Toes MIS CAUT CST 10 FAIL Q F40CCURS 790E-05 .000 CouSTAuf F*4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLAuf y F4WDLOSP 900E+04 .000 CouSTAWT F'4 TORNADO WWO DMG OFFST PWR SUP
-J F4WuDEDG .160E-01 .000 CouSTAuf F'4 TORu Wuo CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 20 .138E-02 CUT SET 106 Mig ( JT SET PROSAs LITT = .710E-09 SASIC EVEuf MEAN PRA ABILITY ERRot FACTOR DISTRIBUTION SALIC EVEuf DESCRIPTI0e F2W5LOSP .150E+00 .00G ComSTAuf Fe2 ToteADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F20CCURS .690E-04 .000 CoustAe7 F*2 TORMADO IMPACTS PLANT F2WuDEDG .700E'-04 .000 CouSTAuf F'2 TORu WmD CAUSE EDG RM FAIL
.$5AfDEP .980E+00 .000 CouSTAuf Fall TO REC PWR REFORE BAT DEP O
w W f 02 4 9 O b
TABLE C-5 EINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 5
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 5 - REV 0 ********************
TOP EVENT PP7BABILITY = .53150E 06 FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 1 .231E+00 CUT SET 67 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .123E-06 BASIC EVENT MEAU PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION FSOCCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F85 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 2 .210E+00 CUT SET 73 MIN CUT S.: PROBABILITY = .111E-06 c) BASIC EVEN. MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION I hJ F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT 03 F4WDLOSP .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F84 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 3 .141E+00 CUT SET 69 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .750E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBLTION BASIC EllNe JESCRIPTION F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F85 TORNADO MIb JMG OFFSY PWR SUP F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM Fall FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 4 .701E-01 LUT SET 79 H LD MIN CUT StT PROBABILITY = .373E-07 03 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION 4 5 F3 OCCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT C3 F3WDLOSP .570E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP
TABLE C-5 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 5
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 5 - REV O ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 5 .688E-01 CUT SET 103 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .366E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBA8ILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRl30 TION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5CL2WND .980E+00 .000 CONSTAhT F'S INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2BLOG FSFILWIN .390E 01 .000 CONSTANT F'S WINDS FAIL FILTER HOUSE F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 4 .583E-01 CUT SET 75 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .310E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRI!"?!ON BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION O F4MSLOSP .250E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP bJ F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT T'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT M3 F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORK WND CAUSE EDG RM Fall FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 7 .492E-01 CUT SET 81 MIN CUT SET PROSAB!LITY = .261E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DIST2IBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3MSLOSP .400E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F3 OCCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FL8ATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F4IL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP c) 8 .470E-01 CUT SET 3 Fd MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .250E-07 f BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION 8ASIC ZVENT DESCRIPTION
$ DMBETA .250E-03 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAU*E FAILURE OF DAMPERS 1 RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADIOACTIVITY o
b
TABLE C-5 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 5
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 5 REV 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 9 .194E-01 CUT SET 117 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .103E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROCABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F4CL2WND .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2BLOG F4FILWIN .440E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'4 WINDS FAIL FILTER HOUSE staC; ORS .790E 05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 10 .104E 01 CUT SET 68 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .550E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT LJ F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP C) E5WNDAFW 440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP BLDG F5WWDEDG 440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 11 .893E-02 CUT SET 133 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .475E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3CL2WND .570E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2BLOG F3FILMIS .870E-03 .000 CONSTANT I'3 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE F3 OCCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS f3 12 .634E-02 CUT SET 70 6* LD MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .337E-08 [o BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION 4 i F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP C3 F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WNDAFW .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP BLDG F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL
TABLE C-5 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 5
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 5 - REV 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 13 .583E-02 CUT SET 4 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .310E-08 4 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DIETRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION i RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADI0 ACTIVITY SVBETA .310E-04 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF SOLENOIDS 14 .353E-02 CUT SET 97 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .188E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION 8ASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5MISCB1 .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO MISS CAUSE FAIL CB1 IMTAKE F5MSRWST .150E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S MIS CAUSE FAIL OF RWST c) F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPtCTS PLANT a F 5 WO LOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO WND DMG 07FST PWR SUP La f5WNDAFW .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP SLDG H 14 .353E-02 CUT SET 71 MIN CUT SET PROSA81LITY = .188E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION 8ASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5MISCST .150E-01 .000 CONS. ANT F'5 TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO WuD DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 15 .342E-02 CUT SET 74 g) MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .182E-08 po BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION ya LD F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT l F4WOLOSP .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP go
%J F4WNDAFW .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND FAIL AFW FMP BLOG I F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL o
Jb
TABLE C-5 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 5
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 5 - REV 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 16 .311E-02 CUT SET 128 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .165E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3MISCB1 .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO MISS CAUSE FAIL CB1 INTAKE F3MISCST .100E-01 .C00 CONSTANT F'3 TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL F3MSRWST .100E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'3 MIS CAUSE FAIL OF RWST 23 OCCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F3WDLOSP .570E*00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP 17 .243E-02 CUT SET 118 MIN CUT SET FROBABILITY = .129E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION O I F4CL2WND .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG
'd F4FILMIS .550E-03 .000 CONSTANT F'4 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 18 .229E-02 CUT SET 104 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .122E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILIT) ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION FSCL2WND .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG F5FILMIS .130E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'S MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE FSOCCURS .29CE-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS
() WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND SIR EXISTS H U1 1 CD 4 I o b
TABLE C-5 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 5
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 5 - REV O ********************
FUSSELL-VELELY RANC IMPORTANCE 19 .226E-02 CUT SET 141 MIN CUT SET *ROBASILITY = .120E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F2CL2WND .160E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'2 INDUCED UIND FAIL OF CL28LDG F2FILMIS .330E 03 .000 CONSTANT F'2 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE F20CCURS .690E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'2 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 *0NSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 20 .218E-02 CUT SET 129 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .116E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIFTION F3MISCB1 .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO MISS CAUSE FAIL CB1 INTAKE LJ F3MISCST .100E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL LJ F3MSLOSP .400E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F3MSRWST .10CE-01 .000 CONSTANT F'3 MIS CAUSE FAIL OF RWST F30CCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT O w H U1 1 03 4 I O b b 4
TABLE C 6 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 6
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST CASE 6 - REV 0 ********************
TOP EVEPT PROBABILITY = .14000E-05 FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 1 .295.+00 CUT SET 103 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .413E-06 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION . FSCL2WND .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG FSFILWIN .440E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 WINDS FAIL FILTER HOUSE F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 2 .268E+00 CUT SET 117 c) MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .375E-06 I BASIC EVENT ME4N PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION W
#b F4CL2WND .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG F4FILWIN .160E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 WINDS FAIL FILTER HOUSE F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 3 .896E-01 CUT SET 132 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .125E-06 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3CL2WND .570E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG F3FILWIN .230E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'3 WINDS FAIL FILTER HOUSE g) F3 OCCURS .290E-04 000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT pa STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS F* WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS Un I
CD 4 8 O b
TABLE C-6 MINIMAL CUTSETS CASE 6
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 6 - REV O ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 4 .875E-01 CUT SET 67 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .123E-06 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT , F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FL8ATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE 8AT DEP 5 .796E-01 CUT SET 73 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .111E-06 8ASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTIOh BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION g) F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT I F4WDLOSP .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP LJ F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL LD FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 6 .536E-01 CUT SET 69 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .7505-07 basic EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WNDFDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FL8ATLEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 7 .266E-01 CUT SET 79 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .373 r - 07 F' BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY ERROR FACTOR DE;TRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION U1 o'o F30CCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT a F3WDLOSP .570E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP I F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL C[ FL8ATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP
._--a
TABLE C-6 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 6
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 6 - REV O ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 8 .221E-01 CUT SET 75 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .310E-07 8ASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F4MSLOSP .250E+00 .003 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR SEFORE 8AT DEP 9 .187E-01 CUT SET 81 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .261E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION c) F3MSLOSP 400E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F3 OCCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT LJ F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL C\ FLBATDEP .980i+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 10 .179E-01 CUT SET 3 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .250E-07 8ASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION DMBETA .250E-03 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF DAMPERS RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADIOACTIVITY 11 .411E-02 CUT SET 68 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .575E-08 g) BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION H Fd F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT LD F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO WND OMG OFFST PWR SUP g'g F5WNDAFW .460E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP BLDG sa F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL B O 4=
TABLE C-6 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 6
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 6 - REV 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANC IMPORTANCE 12 .339E-02 CUT SET 133 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = 475E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PRO 8 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION SASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3CL2WND .570E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG F3FILMIS .870E-03 .000 CONSTANT F'3 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE F3 OCCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 13 .253E 02 CUT SET 107 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .354E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION O I F5CL2 MIS .840E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'S INDUCED MISSILE FAIL OF CL28LDG LJ F5FILWIN 440E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S WINDS FAIL FILTER HOUSE
'd F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 14 .252E-02 CUT SET 70 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .352E-08 8ASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION 8ASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WNDAFW .460E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP BLDG FSVNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL O
pa 15 .221E-02 CUT SET 4 ha la MIN CUT SET PRO 8 ABILITY = .310E-08
$3 BASIC EVENT MEAN PRO 8 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVEdT DESCRIPTION -a I RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADIOACTIVITY C[ SV8 ETA .310E-04 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF SOLENOIDS
TABLE C 6 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 6
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 6 - REV O ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 16 .182E-02 CUT SET 140 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .255E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F2CL2WND .160E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'2 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG F2FILWIN .700E-03 .000 CONSTANT F'2 WINDS FAIL FILTER HOUSE F2 OCCURS .690E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'2 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 17 .134E-02 CUT SET 71 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .188E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION O I F5MISCST .150E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL
'# F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT 03 F5WDLCSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP E5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 18 .130E-02 CUT SET 74 MIN CUT SET PRCBASILITY = .182E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F4WDLOSP .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F4WkOAFW .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP BLDG F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL
() 19 .104E 02 CUT SET 121
>' MIM CUT SET PROBABILITY = .146E-08 m
f BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY IRROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION
-J F4CL2 MIS .350E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'4 INDUCED MISSILE FAIL OF CL2 BLDG I F4FILWIN .160E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 WINDS FAIL FILTER HOUSE j[ F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR CXISTS
TABLE C-6 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 6
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 6 - REV 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 20 .922E-03 CUT SET 118 MIN CUT SET PR09 ABILITY = .129E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSABILITY ERRC4 FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVEMT DESCRIPTION F4CL2WND .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL28LDG F4FILMIS .550E-03 .000 CONSTANT F'4 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 C04STAWT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WIN 0DIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS O I LJ Q p. H LD I 00 %J I o b
TABLE C-7 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 7
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 7 - REV G ***********O********
TOP EVEhT PROBABILITY = .52348E-06 FUSSELL-VESELY RANC IMPORTANCE 1 .234E+00 CUT SET 67 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .123E-06 8ASIC EVENT MEAN PRO 8 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION FSOCCURS .290E-05 .00C CONSTAET F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5dDLOSP .98CE+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F5WNDEDG .440E-C1 .000 LONSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 2 .213E+00 CUT SET 73 MIh CUT SET PROBASILITY = 111E-06 r) BASIC EVENT MEAN PRC8 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION I F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CON, TANT Fe4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT C) F4WOLOSP .900E+00 .000 CONSTAN7 F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP F4UNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP 3 .143E+00 CUT SET 69 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = . 750E -07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROSA81LITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION 8ASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5MSLCSP .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO "IS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WNDEDG .440F 01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBAfDEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWk BEFORE BAT DFP O Fa 4 .712E-01 CUT SET 79 Y f 03 FIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .373 E - 07 BASIC EVENT MEAN OROSABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPT!ON 4 8 F3CCCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT j[ F3WDLOSP .5 70E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO WNC DMG OFFST PVR SUP F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM Fall FLBATCEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT DEP f 1
r TABLE C-7 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 7 TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 7 - REV 3 ******************** FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 5 .699E-01 CUT SET 103 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .366E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PRO 8 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTl'N FSCL2WND .,980E* 00 .000 CONSTANT F'S INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG FSFILWIN .390E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S WINDS FAIL FILTER HOUSE l F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORWADO IMPACTS PLANT l STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS W!rDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ALVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 6 .592E-01 CUT SET 75 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .310E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PR08A81LITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVrNT DESCRIPTION O I F4MSLO3P .250E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PVR SUP Jh F40CCURS .790E-CS .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F4WNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TCRN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL
! FLBATOEP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFORE BAT D6p 7 .499E-01 CUT SET 81 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .261E-07 8ASIC EVENT MEAN PRORASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTEISUT!ON BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3MSLOSP .400E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP
. F3 OCCURS ,290E-94 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F3WNDEDG .230E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL FLBATDEP .983E+00 .000 CONSTANT FAIL TO REC PWR BEFCRE BAT DEP f () 8 .478E-01 CUT SET 3 i pa F' MIN CUT SET PR08 ABILITY = .250E-07 j' Basic EVENT MEAN PRO 8 ABILITY EtROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION 8ASIC EVENT DESCtIPTION 1 03
%J DM8 ETA .250E-03 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF DAMPERS I RAWREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF F.ADIOACTIVITY o
b
y TABLE C 7 MINIMAL CUTSETS CASE 7
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 7 - REV O ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 9 .197E-01 CUT SET 117 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .103E-07 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F4CL2WND .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG F4FILWIN .440E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'4 WINGS FAIL FILTER HOUSE F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN ADO IMPACTS PLANT STASILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 10 .110E-01 CUT SET 68 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .575E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT Jh F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP h) F5WNDAFW .460E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP 6LDG F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 11 .907E-02 CUT SET 133 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .475E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F3CL2WND .570E+00 .000 COhSTANT F'3 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG F3FILMIS .870E-03 .000 CONSTANT F'3 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE F3 OCCURS .290E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'3 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS [3 12 .673E-02 CUT SET 70 Y" MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .352E-08 j, BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION 4 I F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP C) p50CCURS .290E 05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WNDAFW .460E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP BLDG F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL
f ~1 TABLE C 7 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 7
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 7 - REV O ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 13 .592E-02 CUT SET 4 MIN CUT SET PROSABILITY = .310E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADIOACTIVITY SVBETA .310E-04 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF SOLENOIDS 14 .358E-02 CUT SET 71 MIN CUT SET PROBA81LITY = .188E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F5MISCST .150E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL F50CCURS .290E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT c) F5WDLOSP .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST PWR SUP I F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN WND CAUSE EDG RM Fall b
'd 74 15 .348E-02 CUT SET MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .182E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F4WOLOSP .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO WND DMG OFFST FJR SUP F4WNDAFW .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORN WND FAIL AFW PMP BLDG FOiNDEDG .160E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORM WND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL 16 .247E-02 CUT SET 118 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .129E 08 c) 8ASIC EVENT MEAN PRO 8 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION ha Ed F4CL2WND .900E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'4 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL28LDG LD F4FILMIS .550E-03 .000 CONSTANT F'4 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE ch F40CCURS .790E-05 .000 CONSTANT F'4 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT -J STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS I WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS o
b
T TABLE C-7 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 7
******************** TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 7 - REV 0 ********************
FUSSELL-VESELY RANK IMPORTANCE 17 .233E-02 CUT SET 104 MIN CUT SET PROBASILITY = .122E 08 8ASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION 8ASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION FSCL2WND .980E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL2 BLDG FSFILMIS .130E-02 .000 CONSTANT F'5 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE F50CCURS .290E 05 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STA81 LIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 18 .230E-02 CUT SET 141 MIN CUT SET PROSA8ILITY = .120E-08 BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRI8UTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION () F2CL2WND .160E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'2 INDUCED WIND FAIL OF CL28 LOG Jh F2FILMIS .330E-03 .000 CONSTANT F'2 MISSILES DAMAGE FILT HOUSE F2 OCCURS .690E-04 .000 CONSTANT F'2 TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT STABILIT .100E+01 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE STABILITY CLASS EXISTS WINDDIR .330E+00 .000 CONSTANT ADVERSE WIND DIR EXISTS 19 .219E-02 CUT SET 72 MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .115E-OS BASIC EVENT MEAN PROBASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION FSNISCST .150E 01 .000 CONSTANT F'5 TORN MIS CAUS CST TO FAIL F5MSLOSP .600E+00 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO MIS DMG OFFST PWR SUP F50CCURS .290E 05 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORNADO IMPACTS PLANT F5WNDEDG .440E-01 .000 CONSTANT F'S TORN UND CAUSE EDG RM FAIL () Fe 20 .172E-02 CUT SET 2 H LU MIN CUT SET PROBABILITY = .9006-09 c'n BASIC EVENT MEAN PRO 8 ABILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION 8ASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION
-a 8 FAN 8 ETA .900E-05 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CB-1 FANS j[ RANREL .100E-03 .000 CONSTANT RANDOM CAUSED REL OF RADIOACTIVITY
~~
I TABLE C-7 MINIMAL CUTSETS - CASE 7 - TROJAN SAFETY ASSESSMENT - CR EMERG VENT SYST - CASE 7 - REV 0 FUSSELL-VESELY RANit IMPORTANCE ! 20 .172E-02 CUT SET 1 MIN CUT SET PROSA8!LITY = .900E-09 SASIC EVENT MEAN PROSASILITY ERROR FACTOR DISTRIBUTION BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTICN FANSETA .900E-05 .000 CONSTANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CB 1 F.tNS RANREL .100E-03 .000 C0alSTANT RANDON CAUSED REL OF RADIOACTIVITY ; O b UI O w W U1 1 03 4 I O b
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