ML20059A704
| ML20059A704 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1993 |
| From: | Chernoff H PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| HKC-213-93, NUDOCS 9310270072 | |
| Download: ML20059A704 (28) | |
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Ponlan'd General Electric Company i
Trojan Nuclear Plant
.j 71760 Columbia River Hwy.
j Rainier, Oregon 97048 (503) 556-3713 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (11)*
HKC-213-93 TO:
ATT: Document Control Desk Washington DC 20555 Copies 31-41 FROM:
H. K. Chernoff DATE:
October 21, 1993
SUBJECT:
Iransmittal of DSAR Errata Enclosed is your errata of the Trojan Nuclear Plant Defueled Safety Analysis Report.
Please acknowledge receipt of your errata by completing the lower portion of this transmittal and returning it to the location given below.
F HKC/cah Enclosure 10/20/93 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Errata Trojan Nuclear Plant Defueled Safety Analysis Report I hereby acknowledge receipt of Controlled Copy Number (s) of the subject document.
Signature of Copy Holder Date Return to:
Carole Hodgdon, TCB-3 TF/ Licensing Portland General Electric Company Trojan Nuclear Plant 71760 Columbia River Hwy Rainier, OR 97048
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TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT Defueled Safety Analysis Reoort l
ERRATA TO REV. 0 The following information is furnished as a guide for the insertion of new sheets for the l
Errata to Rev. O into the Trojan Nuclear Plant Defueled Safety Analysis Report.
i New sheets should be inserted as listed below:
Insert Delete (Front /Back)
(Front /Back)
Page iii/Page iv Page iii/Page iv Page ix/Page x Page ix/Page x Page xxii / blank Page xxii / blank Page xxiii/Page xxiv Page xxiii/Page xxiv Page xxv/ blank Page 1.5-1/ blank Page 1.5-1/ blank Page 2.0-1/ blank Page 3.1-7/Page 3.1-8 Page 3.1-7/Page 3.1-8 Page 33-1/Page 33-2 Page 33-1/Page 33-2 i
Page 33-3/Page 33-4 Page 33-3/Page 33-4 Page 33-11/Page 33-12 Page 33-11/Page 33-12 i
Page 33-15/Page 33-16 Page 33-15/Page 33-16 Page 4.0-1/ blank i
4 Figure 5.2-3/ Figure 5.2-4 Figure 5.2-3/ Figure 5.2-4
- Figure 5.2-5/ Figure 5.2-6 Figure 5.2-5/ Figure 5.2-6 i
Figure 63-1/ blank Figure 63-1/ blank j
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CHAPTER 2.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS l
t Section Title Page I
2.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS..........................
2.0-1 2.1 Geonraohv and Democraohv.........................
2.1-1 l'
I 2.1.1 Site Location and Description.........................
2.1-1 2.1.1.1 Specification of Location...........................
2.1-1 2.1.1.2 Si t e Area M ap...................................
2.1-2 i
2.1.13 Boundaries for Establishing Effluent Release Limits 2.1-3 2.1.2 Exclusion Area Authority and Control...................
2.1-3 2.1.2.1 Au thority...............
2.1-3 2.1.2.2 Exclusion Arcs Activities Unrelated to Plant Operation....
2.1-4 2.1.23 Arrangements for Traffic Control..
2.1-5 t
2.1-6
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2.13 Population Distribution...................
2.13.1 Population Within 10 Miles........
2.1-6 i
2.13.2 Population Between 10 and 50 Miles..............
2.1-8 2.133 Transient Population.
2.1-8 l
2.13.4 Low-Population Zone............................
2.1-9 e
2.13.5 Population Center.................
2.1-10 2.1.4 Uses of Adjacent Lands and Waters.............
2.1-10 2.2 Nearby Industrial. Transportation and and Militarv Facilities..
2.2-1 t
2.2.1 Locations and Routes 2.2-1 2.2.2 Descriptions 2.2-4 2.2.2.1 Description of Products and Materials.................
2.2-4 2.2.2.2 Pipeli n e s........................
2.2-5 2.2.23 Wa t e rways......................................
2.2-6 2.2.2.4 Airports 2.2-6 2.23 Evaluation of Potential Accidents.......................
2.2-7 2.23.1 Explosions................
2.2 'i j
2.23.2 Toxic Che micals..........................
2.2-17.
2.233 Fires 2 2-19 2.23.4 Ship Collision with Intake Structure....................
2.2-20 I
2.23.5 Oil or Corrosive Liquid Spills in River.................
2.2-21 2.23.6 Cooling Tower Collapse 2.2-22
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CHAPTER 2.0 h,
SITE CHARACTERISTICS Section Title P_ age 2.3-1 2.3 Meteorology 23-1 23.1 Regional Climatology...
23-1 23.1.1 General Climate.......
23.1.2 Regional Meteorological Conditions for 2.3-1 Design and Operation Bases....
23.2 Local Meteorology...
23-2 23.2.1 Normal and Extreme Values of Meteorological Parameters.
23-2 23.2.2 Potential influence of the Plant 23-4 and its Facilities On Local Meteorology......
23.23 Local meteorological Conditions for 23-6 Design and Operation Bases.
23-6 233 Onsite Meteorological Measurements Program 23-6 233.1 Past Meteorological Facility Operations 23-7 233.2 Measurements 23-8 23.4 Diffusion Estimates..
O 2.4 Hydrologic Engineering..
2.4-1 2.4-2 2.4.1 Ilydrologic Description 2.4-2 2.4.1.1 Site and Facilities 2.4-2 2.4.1.2 Hydrosphere 2.4-3 2.4.2 Floods 2.4-3 2.4.2.1 Flood History....
2.4-4 2.4.2.2 Flood Design Considerations 2.4-5 2.4.23 Effects of Local Intense Precipitation..
2.43 Probable Maximum Flood of Streams and Rivers..
2.4-5 2.43.1 Probable Maximum Precipitation..
2.4-5 2.4-8 2.43.2 Precipitation Losses 2.4-9 2.433 Runoff Model 2.4-12
?43.4 Probable Maximum Flood Flow................
2.4-18
- 1. d.5 Water Level Determinations...
2.a '.6 Coincident Wind Wave Activity.
2.4-19 iv
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. CHAPTER 3.0 h
FACILITY DESIGN Section Title Page 33.9 Plant Discharge.and Dilution Structure 3 3-17 3.3.10 Primary Sampling System........
33-1F 3 3.11 Fire Protection System and Program....................
3 3-19 3 3.12 Control Room liabitability.........
3 3-19 3 3.13 Seismic Instrumentation..............................
3 3-19 3.4 Electric Power.............
3.4-1 3.4.1 Offsite Power System.........
3.4-1 3.4.1.1 Description...........
3.4-1 3.4.1.2 Analysis....
3.4-1 3.4.2 Onsite Power Systems 3.4-2 3.4.2.1 Description..........
3.4-2 4
3.4.2.2 Analysis 3.4-6 3.5 Compliance with NRC Regulatorv Guides................
3.5-1 3.6 References 3.6-1 b
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1 CHAPTER 4.0 hl OPERATIONS Section Title Pace 4.0 O P E RATI ON S....................................
4.0-1 4.1-1 4.1 Operation Description....
4.1.1 Criticality Prevention.....
4.1-1 4.1.2 Ch e mist ry Con t rol..................................
4.1-2 4.1.3 Instnime ntation...................
4.1-2 4.1.4 Maintenance Activities 4.1-3 4.1.5 Administrative Control of Systems 4.1-3 4.2-1 4.2 Spent Fuel Handling....................
4.2.1 Spent Fuel Receipt, Handling, and Transfer..........
4.2-1 4.2-1 4.2.1.1 Functional Description.
4.2-2 4.2.1.2 Safety Features 4.2.2 Spent Fuel Storage 4.2-3 4.3
. Spent Fuel Cooling and Suonort Systems...
43-1 4.3.1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling.......
4.3-1 4.3.1.1 Off-Normal Operation of the Spent Fuel Cooling System...
4.3-2 4.3-2 4.3.1.2 Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level.............
4.3-3 43.1.3 Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling...................
4.3-4 4.3.1.4 High Spent Fuel Pool Level........
4.3-4 4.3.1.5 Safety Criteria and Assurance 4.3.2 Electrical Distribution...
4.3-5 4.3-5 4.3.3 Support Systems 4.4 Control Room Area......
4.4-1 4.5 References 4.5-1 x
I LIST OF FIGURES DEFUELED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Number Title a
5.2-1 Gaseous Radioactive Waste System 5.2-2 Containment Purge Supply System (CS-1)
I 5.2-3 Containment Purge Exhaust System (CS-2) 1 5.2-4 Fuel / Auxiliary Building Ventilation Supply System (AB-2) l 5.2-5 Fuel / Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust System (AB-3) 5.2-6 SFP Ventilation Exhaust System (AB-4)
.j 5.3 1 Clean Radioactive Waste System 53.2 Dirty Radioactive Waste System
-.i 5.3-3 Liquid Radwaste Demineralizers 5.41 Solid Radioactive Waste System 6.1-1 Waste Gas Storage Tank Rupture Whole Body (Beta plus Gamma) Dose
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6.3-1 Decay Heat Generated from Stored Fuel 6.32 SFP Heatup Rate versus Time After Reactor Shutdown 6.3-3 Time for SFP to Boil Upon Loss of Forced Cooling 6.3-4 SFP Boil Off Rate Without Makeup versus Time After Reactor Shutdown 6.3 5 Makeup Rate to Maintain SFP Level During Boil Off versus Time After Reactor Shutdown 1
63-6 Boil Off Time to 10 Feet Above Fuel Versus Time After Reactor Shutdown s
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i LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES v
DEFUELED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Section Effective Paces Date Title Page N/A Rev. 0 Table of Contents i - xxii Rev.O List of Effective Pages xxiii - xxv Rev. 0 l
1.0 1.0-1 Rev.0 1.1 1.1-1 Rev. 0 1.2 1.2-1 through 1.2-2 Rev.0 1.3 1.3-1 Rev.0 1.4 1.4-1 through 1.4-5 Rev. 0 1.5 1.5-1 Rev. O Figure 1.1-1 N/A Rev. 0 2.0 2.0-1 Rev. 0 2.1 2.1-1 through 2.1-12 Rev. 0 2.2 2.2-1 through 2.2-22 Rev. 0 2.3 2.3-1 through 2.3-12 Rev. O 2.4 2.4-1 through 2.4 36 Rev. O Os 2.5 -
2.5-1 through 2.5-47 Rev. 0 2.6 2.6-1 through 2.6-10 Rev.O Tables 2.3-1 through 2.3-6 N/A Rev.O Figure 2.3-1 N/A Rev. O Figures 2.4-1 and 2.4-2 N/A Rev. 0 3.0 3.0-1 Rev. 0 3.1 3.1 1 through 3.1-28 Rev.0 l
3.2 3.2-1 through 3.2-40 Rev. O 3.3 3.3-1 through 3.3-19 Rev. O t
3.4 3.4-1 through 3.4-6 Rev. 0 3.5 3.5-1 Rev. 0 i
3.6 3.6-1 through 3.6-3 Rev.O i
Tables 3.1-1 throgh 3.1-7 N/A Rev. O Tables 3.2-1 through 3.2-5 N/A Rev.O Table 3.5-1 N/A Rev. 0 Figures 3.1-1 through 3.1-19 N/A Rev. 0 l
Figures 3.2-1 through 3.2-30 N/A Rev. O i
Figures 3.3-1 through 3.3-3 N/A Rev. O C) xxill f
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES g
DEFUELED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Section Effective Pages Date 4.0 4.0-1 Rev. 0 4.1 4.1-1 through 4.1-4 Rev. 0 4.2 4.2-1 through 4.2-3 Rev. 0 43 4.3-1 through 4.3-6 Rev. 0 4.4 4.4-1 through 4.4-2 Rev. 0 4.5 4.5-1 Rev.O Tables 43-1 N/A Rev. O Figures 4.2-1 and 4.2-2 N/A Rev.0 5.0 5.0-1 Rev. 0 5.1 5.1-1 Rev.0 5.2 5.2-1 through 5.2-7 Rev. O 5.3 5.3-1 through 5.3-8 Rev. 0 5.4 5.4-1 through 5.4-4 Rev.0 5.5 5.5-1 through 5.5-10 Rev. 0 5.6 5.6-1 through 5.6-9 Rev.O i
5.7 5.7-1 Rev. O I
5.8 5.8-1 Rev. 0 5.9 5.9-1 through 5.9-2 Rev. O Tables 5.5-1 N/A Rev. O Figures 5.2-1 through 5.2-6 N/A Rev. 0
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Figures 5.3-1 through 5.3-3 N/A Rev. 0 Figure 5.4-1 N/A Rev. 0 6.0 6.0-1 through Rev. 0 6.1 6.1-1 through Rev. 0 6.2 6.2-1 through Rev.0 6.3 6.3-1 through Rev. 0 6.4 6.4-1 through Rev. O Tables 6.0-1 through 6.0-5 N/A Rev. O Tables 6.2-1 and 6.2-2 N/A Rev. O Tables 6.3-1 and 6.3-3 N/A Rev.O Figure 6.1-1 N/A Rev. O Figures 6.3-1 through 6.3-6 N/A Rev. 0 XXIV
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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES DEFUELED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Section Effective Pages Date 7.0 7.0-1 Rev.0 7.1 7.1-1 through 7.1-6 Rev. 0 7.2 7.2-1 through 7.2-6 Rev.O i
7.3 7.3-1 through 7.3-3 Rev.0 7.4 7.4-1 Rev.0 7.5 7.5-1 Rev. 0 7.6 7.6-1 Rev. 0 8.0 8.0-1
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9.0 9.0-1 Rev. 0 f
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1.5 MATERIAL INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE NJ Certain program manuals and topical reports have been incorporated into the DSAR by reference and are listed in the last section of each chapter. The reports include topical reports written by PGE as well as by Westinghouse, Bechtel and other organizations.
Some documents that are incorporated by reference continue to be updated to assure that the information presented is the latest available. These documents include those listed below:
(1)
PGE-1060, " Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan".
(2)
PGE-1012, " Fire Protection Plan".
(3)
PGE-1017, " Security Plan".
O (4)
PGE-1020, " Report on Design Modifications for the Trojan Control-Building".
(5)
PGE-1037, " Trojan Nuclear Plant Spent Fuel Storage Rack Replacement Report".
(6)
PGE-8010, " Nuclear Quality Assurance Program".
(7)
PGE-1052, " Quality-Related List Classification Criteria for the Trojan Nuclear Plant."
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2.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS i
This chapter discusses the general characteristics of the Trojan Nuclear Plant site and vicinity as they relate to the area's geology, seismology, hydrology, and meteorology.
l Population distribution, land use, and site activities and controls are also discussed. Tlus chapter presents, in complement with more detailed discussions provided in other DSAR chapters,information showing the overall adequacy of the site for nuclear operations.
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1 and reporting of radioactive effluents meet the requirements of Regulatory Guides 1.21 and 4.1.
j Criterion 64 is met by Trojan design.
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3.1.2 CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES. COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS I
i The classification of structures, components and systems for the facility will be per the l
quality related definition as described in Topical Report PGE-8010 " Nuclear Quality 1
Assurance Program". Implementation of the classification is described in PGE Report l
PGE-1052, "Ouality-Related List Classification Criteria for the Trojan Nuclear Plant"*.
For the permanently defueled condition, the Control, Auxiliary and Fuel Building Complex; SFP, including the spent fuel racks; the fuel transfer tube; and those portions of the service water system used to provide makeup to the SFP are the only structures, systems, or components that are classified as Seismic Category I (safety-related). The i
Containment Structure and the Fuel Building Steel Superstructure are classified as-Seismic Category II/1.
3.1.3 WIND AND TORNADO LOADINGS The Trojan Facility is capable of withstanding the effects of severe winds or tornadoes without loss of capability of the safety systems to perform their safety functions. The j
following sections provide the basis for the design wind and tornado parameters and methods used in meeting the wind and tornado criteria for the Facility.
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3.1-7
3.1.3.1 Wind Loadings O
3.1.3.1.1 Design Wind Velocity The design wind velocity for all Category I and Category II structures is 105 mph at 30 ft above the nominal ground elevation of 45 feet MSL. Section 2.3 provides meteorological data for the site.
3.1.3.1.2 Determination of Applied Forces S:. ape factors, variation of wind velocity with height, gust factors and methods of converting wind velocities into loads to be resisted by the structures are based on ASCE Paper No. 3269, " Wind Forces on Structures",1961. Table 3.1-1 indicates the design loads. These loads are considered in the design of all Category I and Category II structures. However, since wind and earthquakes are not assumed to act simultaneously, for structures where seismic forces exceed the wind loads, no further analysis is performed. For structures where wind load governs, the load is combined with other appropriate loads as required by the various load equations.
Wind loads are applied to the structures as uniform static loads on the vertical and horizontal projected areas of the structure walls and roof. Roof loads due to wind are treated the same as roof dead and live loads with the direction of loading taken into account. Only dead load is considered as resisting uplift. Horizontal wind loads are distributed by the walls to the floor and roof diaphragms which,in turn, transfer the loads to the lateral load carrying elements of the structures.
3.1.3.2 Tornado Loadings In the continental United States, west of the Rocky Mountains, the occurrence of tornadoes is unlikely. However, to ensure that any damage which may be sustained by e
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3.3 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS O
This section discusses the auxiliary systems that are used to support the storage of spent fuel at Trojan. This section includes discussions on the fuel handling system, SFP cooling and demineralizer system, component cooling water system, service water system,
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compressed air system, bearing cooling water system, makeup water treatment system, equipment and floor drain systems, Plant discharge and dilution structure,' primary sampling system. fire protection system and program, control room habitability, and seismic instrumentation. With the exception of the those portions of the service water system which provide makeup to the SFP, these systems do not perform any safety l
functions with the reactor defueled.
3.3.1 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM l
The fuel handling system consists of equipment and structures utilized for handling spent h
fuel assemblies during fuel transfer operations. This discussion is limited to fuel-handling equipment used for transfer operations within the SFP. The transfer of fuel to the Containment Building or to a spent fuel shipping cask is prohibited under Trojan's current license.
j 3.3.1.1 Design Bases i
The fuel handling system is designed to minimize the possibility of mishandling or maloperation that could cause fuel damage and potential fission product releases. The j
following design bases apply to the fuel handling system:
j (1) Fuel handling devices have provisions to avoid dropping or jamming of fuel assemblies during transfer operations.
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3.3-1
(2) The fuel handling equipment has been designed for the loading that would occur during a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). The fuel handling equipment will not fail so as to cause damage to any fuel elements should a SSE occur during fuel transfer operations.
(3) The hoist used to lift the spent fuel assemblies has a limited maximum lift height which is determined by the length of the long-handled tool, so that the minimum required depth of water shielding is maintained.
Environmental conditions of the fuel handling equipment, such as exposure to barated water and high humidity, are considered in the design and selection of the material.
3.3.1.2 System Description 3.3.1.2.1 General Description O
Fuel assemblies are moved in the SFP using the SFP bridge hoist. When lifting spent fuel assemblies, the hoist uses a long-handled tool to assure that sufficient radiation shielding is maintained. Fuel assembly inserts, such as thimble plugs, burnable poisons rods, rod control clusters, and source rods, may also be transferred between positions within the SFP.
3.3.1.2.2 Component Description 3.3.1.2.2.1 Fugl Building bridge crans. The Fuel Building bridge crane is an indoor electric overhead travelling bridge crane complete with a single trolley and all the necessary motors, control, brakes, and control station. The main hoist of the crane is rated at 125 tons and the auxiliary hoist at 25 tons. The crane and accessories have been designed and constructed for indoor service and were designed to handle new and spent fue1 containers between the railroad cars and loading and unloading pits. Movement of 9
3.3-2
6 heavy loads outside the approved load path discussed in Section 4.2.1 must be authorized prior to implementation. Neither the main hoist nor the auxiliary hoist are capable of being immersed in SFP water.
3.3.1.2.2.2 SFP bridge hoist. The SFP bridge hoist is a wheel-mounted walkway, l
spanning the SFP, which carries an electric monorail hoist on an overhead structure. The fuel assemblies are moved within the SFP by means of a long-handled tool suspended from the hoist.
The manufacturer's construction drawing details include the following information:
The SFP bridge hoist has a 2000-pound capacity with a 21-foot maximum lift. The l
hoist uses stainless steel Type-304 cable and a safety load hook.
i The SFP bridge hoist incorporates design features to minimize the probability of a fuel O
8 aiies ceiae 1.18eee re terce i cieoe:
(1) Tiie SFP bridge cannot be moved unless the hoist is in the full up position (with the exception of jogging). An interlock prevents simultaneous operation of the SFP bridge drive and hoist.
(2) Hoist travel in the up direction is terminated by a limit switch that also provides the " full up" interlock for the bridge drive with a hoist geared limit switch providing backup. Hoist travel is designed to maintain safe shielding depth of fuel assemblics by limiting maximum lift height with the spent fuel handling tool attached.
(3) A geared limit switch is provided to automatically stop downward motion when the hoist drum does not have a sufficient number of cable wraps remaining.
3.3-3
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(4) Indexing of the SFP bridge crane to spent fuel storage racks is accomplished by means of a grid sy; tem laid out on the bridge rails and on the handrail.
13.1.2.2.3 Spent fuel handline tool. The spent fuel assembly handling tool is a long handle tool which is about 30 feet long that is used t move spent fuel assemblies in the j
SFP. The tool is mechanically operated by an operatoi on the SFP bridge. The tool l
may also be used to handle debris baskets and specimen assemblies. The length of the tool assures that a minimum depth of 10 feet of water will remain above the active fuel during fuel movements.
The spent fuel assembly handling tool employs four cam actuated latching fingers, which grip the underside of the fuel assembly top nozzle. The operating handle that actuates the fingers is located at the top of the tool. When the fingers are latched, a lock pin is inserted into the operating handle (held by a ball and detent) to prevent accidental unlatching.
3.3.1.3 Design Evaluation 3.3.1.3.1 Seismic Consideration The maximum design stress for the structures and for parts involved in gripping, supporting or hoisting the fuel assemblies is one-fifth the ultimate strength of the material. This requirement applies to normal working load and emergency pullout loads, when specified, but not to earthquake loading. To resist design basis earthquake forces, the equipment is designed to limit the stress in the load bearing parts to 0.9 times the ultimate stress for a combination of working load plus design basis earthquake forces.
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installed in the nitrogen supply lines between the nitrogen sources and the surge tanks.
The pressure may also be adjusted manually using the solenoid valves installed in the nitrogen supply lines from the Plant n;trogen storage system. Each tank is equipped with two safety relief valves to prevent overpressurizing the system.
Provisions exist for adding corrosion inhibitor to the system.
Two identical CCWS makeup pumps are installed to furnish makeup water to the system. Normal makeup water is supplied from the demineralized water storage tank using the demineralized water transfer pumps.
For the defueled condition, train independence and automatic isolation of selected loads are not required. A single CCWS pump and a single CCWS heat. exchanger provide excess heat removal capacity for the current heat loads.
Piping in the portions of the CCWS providing SFP cooling is seamless carbon steel,'
fabricated and installed in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B31.1.0, Code for Power Piping.
Radiation detectors are installed at the outlet of each CCWS heat exchanger as-described in Section 5.5.
3333 Design Evaluation The CCWS does not perform any safety functions. Loss of component cooling water to the SFP cooling water heat exchangers will cause the SFP water temperature to slowly rise. If the component cooling water cannot be restored to the heat exchangers, then the SFP water temperature will continue to rise, increasing the evaporation rate and possibly_
resulting in boiling within the SFP. The only requirement to assure adequate cooling of the spent fuel is to maintain the water level in the SFP above the spent fuel elements.
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Section 6.3 analyzed the loss of forced cooling to the SFP and determined that sufficient time exists to effect repairs to the cooling system or to establish makeup flow prior to uncovering the spent fuel. Makeup water is available from a variety of sources as described in Section 4.3.1.
3.3.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The SWS, shown in Figure 3.3-3, is designed to provide water from the Columbia River to cool equipment and to supply water to various systems and equipment. With the reactor permanently defueled, the primary functions of the SWS are reduced to providing cooling water to the component cooling water heat exchangers, selected room cooler units and emergency diesel generators as well as provide makeup to the spent fuel pool.
3.3.4.1 Design Bars The SWS is designed to deliver the minimum required flows of water to equipment g
assuming a minimum water level of 1.5 feet below MSL in the Columbia River. With the reactor permanently defueled, system design requirements are reduced substantially from the original design bases of the system.
Heat transfer equipment was selected based on a temperature of 75*F, which exceeds the highest recorded Columbia River water temperature.
Portions of the SWS are designed as a Seismic Category I system.
The system design includes provisions for inhibiting long-term corrosion and organic fouling of the system water passages.
3.3-12
4 The SWS provides a reliable source of makeup water to the SFP.- The system can be
.O powered from the onsite standby power sources. Portions of the SWS used to provide SFP makeup water meet Seismic Category I requirements.
Loss of the SWS will cause the SFP water temperature to slowly rise due to loss of heat removal capability from the SFP cooling water heat exchangers (due to loss of component cooling water cooling). The only requirement to assure adequate cooling of the spent fuel is to maintain the water level in the SFP above the spent fue1 elements.
Section 6.3 analyzed the loss of forced cooling to the SFP and determined that sufficient time exists to effect repairs to the cooling system or to establish makeup flow from an ahernate makeup source prior to uncovering the spent fuel.
3.3.5 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM The compressed air system provides the Plant compressed air requirements for pneumatic instruments and valves and for service air outlets located throughout the Plant which are used for operation of pneumatic tools. The system does not perform any safety functions.
The cooling water for the aftercoolers and compressors is supplied from the bearing cooling water system. The air receivers are connected to a common compressed air header which connects to the air filter unit. The discharge of the air filter unit connects to the air-dryer unit inlet and the service air header. The instrument air header is connected to the air-dryer unit discharge. Each air header supplies branch lines which supply instrument air and service air to the required loads throughout the Plant. The instrument and service air system provides air to the inflatable seals for the SFP gates and to the CCWS air-operated isolation valves (CV-3303, CV-3287, CV-3304, and CV-3288).
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Loss of instrument air to the CCWS isolation valves would cause them to fail close causing a loss of forced cooling to the SFP (due to loss of component cooling water to the SFP cooling water heat exchangers). The only requirement to assure adequate cooling of the spent fuel is to maintain the water level in the SFP above the spent fuel elements. Section 6.3 analyzed the loss of forced cooling to the SFP and determined that sufficient time exists to effect repairs to the cooling system or to establish makeup flow prior to uncovering the spent fuel.
3.3.6 BORIC ACID HATCII TANK The boric acid batch tank will normally be used to supply barated water to the SFP.
Procedural controls will be used for this process.
3.3.7 MAKEUP WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM The Makeup Water Treatment System provides demineralized water of the required quality to meet Plant needs. Makeup water is processed and then stored in the demineralized water storage tank where it is available to meet Plant needs. The DWST is a source of SFP makeup water. The water is transferred to the SFP using a demineralized water transfer pump.
3.3.8 EOUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAIN SYSTEMS The following equipment and floor drainage systems are provided for the Plant:
(1) Dirty Radioactive Waste Treatment System (DRWS) drains.
(2) Clean Radioactive Waste Treatment System (CRWS) drains.
(3) Oily waste system.
O 3.3-16
I 4.0 OPERATIONS l
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This chapter discusses facility operations related to the safe storage of irradiated fuel; including criticality prevention, chemistry control, instrumentation, maintenance activities, and administrative controls of systems. Also discussed are spent fuel handling and spent j
fuel cooling.
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9.5.10 Yeais After Reactor Simidown Figure 6.3-1 Decay Ileat Generated From Stored Fuel
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