ML20117K191

Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.1.1 - RPS Instrumentation & TS 3/4.3.2.3 - Anticipatory RTS Instrumentation Increasing Trip Device Test Interval

ML20117K191
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	05/28/1996
From:	CENTERIOR ENERGY
To:
Shared Package
ML20117K180	List: ML20117K178 ML20117K187 ML20117K191
References
NUDOCS 9606100095
Download: ML20117K191 (8)

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LAk 95-0006 Page 8 T m e i.2 INFORMATION ONI.Y '

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FREQUENCY NOTATION 1

FREQUENCY i NOTATION

! S At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. l D At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

W At least once per 7 days. I At least once per 31 days.

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, Q At least once per 92 days.

SA At least once'per 6 months.*

R At least once per 18 months.*

Prior to each reactor startup.

f S/U I N/A Not applicable.

• In these Technical Specifications, 6 months is defined to be 1 184 days, and 18 months is defined to be 550 days.

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t 960610o095 960528 6

. DR ADOCK 0500 DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 1-8 Amendment No. 37,S$,170 9

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LAR 95-0006 Page 9

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INFORMATION ONLY 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM' INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION L

3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Protection System instrumentation l channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 3.1.1.1 Each Reactor Protection System instrumentation channel shall l be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK. CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

TSIR 4. 3.1.1.2 The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at 89 4o12 least once per 18 months during CHANNEL ' CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

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4:3.1.1.3 The REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip. function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" column of Table

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3.3-1.

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DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-1

TABLE 4.3-1 NE

= :o

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REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS e ET

.. g jg CHANNEL ' MODES IN WHICH 8

5 CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE P FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED

1. Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. S/U(1) N.A.

g 2. High Flux S D(2) and 0(6.9) N.A. 1. 2

3. RC High Temperature S R SA(9) 1. 2

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4. Flux - AFlux - Flow S(4) M(3) and 0(6.7.9) N.A. 1. 2  !

5. RC Low Pressure S R SA(9) 1. 2  !

6. RC High Pressure S R SA(9) 1. 2 >

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• 7. RC Pressure-Temperature S R SA(9) 1. 2 i

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8. High Flux / Number of Reactor Coolant Pumps On S O(6.9) N.A. 1. 2

9. Containment High Pressure S R SA(9) 1. 2

10. Intermediate Range. Neutron

@ Flux and Rate S R(6) N.A.(5). 1, 2 and*  ;

Pg  !

~g- 11. Source Range. Neutron Flux gg and Rate S R(6) N.A.(5) 2. 3. 4 and 5 i

& 12. Control Rod Drive N.A. N.A. SA

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M(8.9) and S/U(1)(8) 1. 2 and* i Trip Breakers p -

w 13. Reactor Trip Module Logic N.A. N.A. $#jM(9) 1. 2 and* t y

, 14. Shutdown Bypass High Pressure S R SA(9) 2**.3**. 4**. 5** }

p t

- 15. SCR Relays N.A. N.A. R 1. 2 and*

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LAR 95-0006 Page 11 TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

Not.t4o; INFORMATION ONLY i (1) - If not performed in previous 7 days.

(2) - Heat balance only, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(3) - When THERMAL POWER [TP] is above 50% of RATED THERMAL' POWER TRTP],

and at steady state, compare out-of-core measured AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE [ API,] to incore measured AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE (API,] as follows:

HIE (API, - APli ) - Offset Error i TP -

j Recalibrate if the absolute value of the Offset Error is 2 2.5%

(4) - AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE and loop flow indications only.

(5) - CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is not applicable. Verify at least one decade overlap prior to each reactor startup if not verified in previous 7 days.

(6) - Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

l (7) - Flow rate measurement sensors may be excluded from CHANNEL  !

CALIBRATION. However, each flow measurement sensor shall be  !

calibrated at least once per 18 months.

(8) - The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of both the undervoltage and shunt trip devices of the Reactor Trip Breakers.

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I (9) - Performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

l *- With any control rod drive trip breaker closed.

• • - When Shutdown Bypass is actuated.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-8 gnj5nt No.43.J08.J23.

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LAR 95-0006 Page 12 INFORMATION ONLY INSTRUMENTATION ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I I

l 3.3.2.3 The Anticipatory Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels of Table 3.3-17 shall be OPERABLE. l APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-17  ;

ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-17 ,

5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4

4.3.2.3 The Anticipatory Reactor Trip System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-17. l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-30a Amendment No. 77,135

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g TABLE 4.3-17 $

U ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS -

.$ CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH c CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE IS 5 FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REOUIRED

-i (a) (c) (b)

1. Turbine Trip S Not Applicable SA 1

2. Main Feed Pump (c)

Turbine Trip S Not Applicable SA 1 a

2 {gy Y 3. Output 1ogic Not Applicable Not Applicable Sf M 1 l$

a.

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A (a) Trip automatically bypassed below 45 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER

& (b) Applicable only above 45 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER (c) Perform on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS U

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LAR 95-0006 Page 14 INFORMATION ONLY 2/4.3 !NSTRUMENTATION 3ASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETT SYSTEM i

j; INSTRUMENTATION iI ll The OPERABIl.ITT of the RPS, SFAS and SFRCS instrumentation systems ensure that i

1) the associated action and/or trip vill be initiated when the parameter j monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or j maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for RFS, SFAS and ::fRCS purposes from diverse parameters.

l The OPERABILITT of these systems is required to provide the overall i

. reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in the facility design l

I for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The l l

integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the l assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillacca tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the RPS, SFAS, and SIRCS action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times '

! 'l indicated as not applicable.

! Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or l

total channel test seasuresents provided that such tests demonstrate the total I

channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times. l l

An SFRCS channel consists of 1) the sensing device (s), 2) associated logic and l l

output relays (including Isolation of Main Feedvater Non Essential Valves and

! Turbine Trip), and 3) power sources.

The SFRCS response time for the turbine stop valve closure is based on the combined response times of main steam line low pressure sensors, logic cabinet delay for main steam line low pressure signals and closure time of the turbine stop valves. This SFRCS response time ensuresthat the auxiliary feedvater to

' the unaffected steam generator vill not be isolated due to a SFRCS lov l pressure trip during a main steam line break accident.

t DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 5 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 73,125 (Neat page is B 3/4 3-la)

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INFORMATION ONLY 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

Safety-grade anticipatory reactor trip is initiated by a turbine trip (above 45 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER) or trip of both main feedvater pump turbines.

This anticipatory trip vill operate in advance of the reactor coolant systen high pressure reactor trip to reduce the peak reactor coolant system pressure and thus reduce challenges to the pilot operated relief valve. This l l

anticipatory reactor trip system was installed to satisfy Iten II.K.2.10 of NUREG-0737. The justification for the ARTS turbine trip arming level of 45% is given in BAV-1893, October, 1985.

1 DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 a 3/4 3-la Amendment No. 71.

Y75, ygg , 135

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