ML20076J048

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Reply Opposing Rockford League of Women Voters Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Re Seismology. Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20076J048
Person / Time
Site: Byron  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/09/1983
From: Goldfein M
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO., ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE
To:
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8306200300
Download: ML20076J048 (10)


Text

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Dated: 6/9/83 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REG LATORY COMMISSION

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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD JU//

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In The Matter of )

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  • COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-454 OL '

) 50-455 OL

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(Byron Nuclear Power Station, )

Units 1 & 2) )

APPLICANT'S REPLY TO THE LEAGUE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING SEISMOLOGY As authorized by 10 CFR S2.754 (a) (3), Commonwealth s

Edison Company (" Edison" or " Applicant") files the following reply to the Rockford League of Women Voter's (" League" or "Intervenor") Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Seismology Issues.

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Introduction League Contention 106 raised three issues with respect to the seismology of the Bryon site and the seismic

, design of the facility. The first issue concerned the League's assertion that Edison should be required'to perform ~

strain gauge tests on faults cutting basement rock. Second, the League asserted that evidence of ground acceleration 4

9

E values associated with recent earthquakes in Arkansas suggest that the Byron safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) peak ground acceleration value of .20g and the operating basis earth-quake (OBE) ground acceleration value of .09g are insufficiently conservative. Finally, the League asserted that there was insufficient evidence from which to determine that the Plum River Fault which is located near the Byron site is not a capable fault. In its proposed findings the League does not pursue its contention that strain gauge testing should be required prior to licensing the Byron facility. Apparently, the League does not dispute that the evidentiary record developed during the course of the hearings demonstrates there is no basis either in law or in fact for imposing such a requirement. Consequently, we will not address this aspect of the League's contention further.

The findings and conclusions that the League would have this Board adopt with respect to the Plum River Fault and the appropriateness of the SSE and OBE ground acceleration values are based upon certain obvious misunderstandings regarding the evidentiary record and the requirements imposed by NRC regulations. Accordingly, as discussed in greater detail below, Applicant submits that these findings should be rejected by this Board.

1. Plum River Fault League Proposed Findings 11 and 12 assert that

there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the Plum River Fault is not within five miles of the plant site.

Given the record in this proceeding, these findings are simply not relevant. Under 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, IV (b) , an investigation must be made with respect to any fault greater than 1000 feet long, any part of which is within five miles of the site, to determine whether the fault is capable. If the fault is deemed capable, then a determination must be made as to whether the facility need be designed to withstand the effects of surface faulting.

10 CFR Part 100, Appencix A, V(b) and 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, VI(b). In contrast, if a fault is deemed noncapable, surface faulting considerations need not be taken into account in designing the plant. Thus, the issue of significance to the Board's decision is not whether the Plum River Fault is within the five-mile radius of the site, but rather whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the fault is noncapable. (See, Alterman, Tr. pp. 813-

  • /

814.)-

League Proposed Findings 13 through 21 set forth l

the League's position that there is insufficient evidence to

-~*/ In passing, we would point out that contrary to the suggestion contained in League Proposed Finding 11, there is no evidence that any part of the Plum River Fault Zone is within five miles of the site.

conclude that the Plum River Fault is not capable. The basic thrust of the League's position is that although there is no eviden't that indicates the Plum River Fault is capable, additional investigations could be conducted to provide further assurance that the fault is not capable.

Specifically, the League asserts that Edison should undertake to excavate the fault and directly observe the till-fault interface to determine whether there has been any till displacement. In light of the evidence adduced at the hearings, such a requirement should riot be imposed.

Substantial, unrefuted evidence supports the conclusion that the Plum River Fault is not capable. It is undisputed that the surface material overlying the Plum River Fault has not been disturbed. (Alterman, Tr. 762.)

It is undisputed that seismic refraction work conducted by l

l the Illinois State Geological Survey does not indicate the t

existence of a fault escarpment on the Fault. (Alterman, Tr. 794.) Further, there is no evidence of seismicity associated with the Fault. (Alterman, Tr. 788.) Finally, the investigations regarding regional tectonics conducted by the Illinois State Geological Survey has led that group of experts to conclude that faulting in Illinois is not younger than 65 million years. (Alterman, Tr. 818.) These factors I

taken together led both the NRC Staff and Applicant experts l

to conclude that the Plum River Fault is not a capable l

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fault. (Applicant Proposed Findings 19, 23, 24.) Signif-icantly, Dr. Woodard, Intervenor's witness, agreed that the opinion expressed by these experts was reasonable and supportable. (Woodard, Tr. 710.) Thus, it is obvious that there is ample evidence from which to conclude that the Plum River Fault is not capable. In contrast, there is no evidence in the record that the Fault is capable.

I Finally, Intervenor's Proposed Finding 20 states that there is no evidence to establish there has been no l recurring movement in the Plum River Fault in the past 500,000 years. This simply is not the case. Mr. Yonk testified that there is no evidence of any recurring move-ment on any fault in the Byron region within the past million years. (Yonk, Applicant Prepared Testimony, at 7, ff. Tr. 478.) This testimony is totally unrefuted; no contrary evidence was brought out either on cross examina-tion or through Intervenor's direct case. Accordingly, Intervenor's proposed findings regarding the Plum River Fault are not supportable and should therefore be rejected by the Board.

2. SSE and OBE Ground Acceleration Values Intervenor's Proposed Findings 23 through 39 challenge the appropriateness of the Byron SSE and OBE ground acceleration values. These findings display Inter-venor's apparent confusion regarding the manner in which

Applicant derived its SSE ground acceleration value and the differences between the nature of regulatory requirements regarding the selection of safe shutdown and operating basis earthquakes.

In its Proposed Conclusions of Law, at p. 15, Intervenor asserts that Applicant ignored the only instru-mentally measured data that directly correlates a magnitude value of an earthquake occurring in similar kinds of rock at Byron with a ground acceleration value, and that, therefore, the ground acceleration value selected for the SSE is insufficiently conservative. Based on this assertion, Intervenor argues that the selection of the OBE ground acceleration value, which is less than one-half the SSE ground acceleration value, is also insufficiently conserva-tive. In response, it should be pointed out that the Sequoyah site-specific spectrum utilized in determining the ground acceleration value for the Byron SSE is based upon actual instrumentally measured data, i.e., accelograms, derived from earthquakes with magnitudes similar to the Byron SSE recorded at sites similar to the Byron site. The evidence adduced at the hearings regarding the earthquakes experienced in Arkansas explained that these earthquakes were of short duration with very little energy, and that therefore the ground acceleration values that may have been associated with these earthquakes are insignificant in

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terms of the seismic design of the Byron plant. (Rothman, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony, at 7, ff. Tr. 760; Rothman, Tr. 758, 806-11.) Thus, these data do not call into question the appropriateness of either the SSE or OBE ground accel-eration values selected for Byron.

Intervenor also appears to challenge the OBE ground acceleration value based on the fact that Applicant utilized a different method of analysis in selecting the SSE ground acceleration value than in selecting the OBE ground acceleration value. Under the Commission's regulations, the SSE is selected based upon an evaluation of the maximum earthquake potential of a site. Thus, Applicant analyzed data derived from earthquakes with a similar magnitude as the Byron SSE in determining the appropriate ground acceler-ation value associated with that earthquake. In contrast, the OBE is the earthquake which could reasonably be expected to affect the plant site during the operating life of the plant. Thus, the Applicant, as well as NRC Staff consul-tants, performed a probablistic evaluation to determine the frequency with which the selected operating basis earthquake could occur at the plant site. By any calculation, it was demonstrated that it was relatively unlikely that such an earthquake would occur during the 40-year life of the plant.

(Rothman, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony, at 5, ff. Tr. 760; Rothman, Tr. 758; Singh, Applicant Prepared Testimony, at 6-7, ff. Tr. 431.) As such, the conclusion that the OBE

ground acceleration value is sufficiently conservative is amply supported.

In sum, the findings and conclusions that Inter-venor proposes in support of its seismic contention are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, Applicant respectfully requests that Intervenor's proposed findings and conclusions on this contention not be adopted by the Board.

Respectfully submitted,

/ / /

Michael R. Goldfein' One of the Attorneys for Commonwealth Edison Company Alan P. Bielawski Michael R. Goldfein ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE Suite 5200 Three First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 558-7500 l

l l

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-454 OL

) 50-455 OL (Byron Nuclear Power Station, )

Units 1 & 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned, one of the attorneys for Common-wealth Edison Company, certifies that he filed the original and two copies of the attached " Applicant's Reply to the League's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Seismology" with the Secretary of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and served a copy of the same on each of the persons at the addresses shown on the attached service list.

Service on the Secretary and all parties, unless otherwise indicated, was made by deposit in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid, this 9th day of June, 1983.

One of the attdrneys for Commonwealth Edison Company ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE Three First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 558-7500

SERVICE LIST COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY -- Byron Station Docket Hos. 50-454 and 50-455 Mr. Ivan W. Smith Secretary Administrative Judge and Chairman Attn: Chief, Docketing and Atomic Safety and Licensing Service Section Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 428 Washington, D.C. 20555 East West / West Towers Bldg.

4350 East West Highway Ms. Betty Johnson Bethesda, MD 20114 1907 Stratford Lane Rockford, Illinois 61107 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Ms. Diane Chavez Board Panel SAFE U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 326 North Avon Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Rockford, Illinois 61103 Atomic Safety and Licensing Dr. Bruce von Zellen Board Panel Department of Biological Sciences U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Northern Illinois University Washington, D.C. 20555 DeKalb, Illinois 60115 Chief Hearing Counsel Joseph Gallo, Esq.

Office of the Executive Isham, Lincoln & Beale Legal Director Suite 840 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1120 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20036 Dr. A Dixon Callihan Douglass W. Cassel, Jr.

Union Carbide Corporation Jane Whicher P.O. Box Y BPI Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Suite 1300 109 N. Dearborn Mr. Steven C. Goldberg Chicago, IL 60602 Ms. Mitzi A. Young Office of the Executive Legal Ms. Patricia Morrison Director 5568 Thunderidge Drive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rockford, Illinois 61107 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. David Thomas - -

Atomic Safety and Licensing 77 South Wacker Appeal Board Panel Chicago, IL 60621 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

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