ML20076K002
| ML20076K002 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1983 |
| From: | Thomas D LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ROCKFORD, IL |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 79-411-04-PE, 79-411-4-PE, ISSUANCES-OL, ISSUANCES-PE, NUDOCS 8307070209 | |
| Download: ML20076K002 (23) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD f.,
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73, g'
/s_
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[b.f 4?
Before Administrative Judges:
-1 1g
'U Ivan S. Smith, Chairman Dr. Dixon Callihan g Mf' N
Dr. Richard F. Cole In the Matter of
) Docket Nos.
STN 50-454 OL
)
STN 50-455 OL COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
)
(Byron Nuclear Power-Sta_ tion _,
). _ _ _. July 1, 1983 Units 1 and 2)
)
ROCKFORD LEAGU'E OF WOMEN VOTERS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING LIOUID PATHWAY AND CLASS NINE ACCIDENTS July 1, 1983 DAVID C. THOMAS 77 South Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 567-5050 l
i 8307070209 830701 PlWTt ADOCK 05000454 3)s03
. - - -... - ~ -
CONTENTIONS i
Rockford League of Women Voters' and DAARE/ SAFE Consolidated e
Contentions 39 and 109 -- Liquid Pathway Consolidated Contentions 39 and 109, as litigated, pro-vide:
Since the ground water system underlying the Byron site has not been characterized adequately, the consequences of radionuclide releases to the under-lying aquifer cannot be predicted with confidence.
In consequence, no proper NEPA analysis of _this important subject can be made.
In addition, as -
a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by,10 C.F.R.
- 50. 57 (a) (3) (i),
50.57 (a) (6), and 10 C.F.R. 50.34 (b) (4) cannot be adequately made.
APPLICABLE LAW Prior to issuance of an operating license, the Comis-sion must find, inter alia, that the Byron Station has been constructed in accordance with its rules and regula-tions, and that reasonable assurance exists that the activi-ties authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public.
10 C.F.R. Sections 50.57 (a) (1) and 50.57 (a) (3).
These regulations are implemented with respect to the evaluation of design basis accidents by the provisions of 10 C.F.R. Part 100.
Generally, the acceptability of the radiological con-sequences of design basis accidents is governed by the NRC regulations which require applicant to assume a fission product release from the core and calculate the consequences of such a core meltdown on the site, set forth in 10 C.F.R.
Section 100.11.
(See also section 15 of the NRC Standard l
Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Rev. 2, July 1981).
FINDINGS OF FACT 1.
To address the contention, Intervenors presented the testimony of Dr. Bernard Wood, a professor geology at North-western University, who discussed the basis for the view that the Applicant mischaracterized the groundwater system j
underlying the Byron site.
__2.
The_NRC Staff. presented.the consolidated testimony of Dr. Richard Codell and Mr. Gary Staley, who together sponsored the FES liquid pathway risk evaluation, and also addressed the inadequacy of the characterization of the groundwater system underlying the Byron site.
3.
To address the ::antention, Applicant presented the testimony of three witnesses.
Mr. Lawrence Holish, of Sargent &'Lundy, described the measures taken to charac-terize the site geology and hydrogeology for the purpose of determining the nature of the groundwater system underlying the Byron site, and he explained the assumptions used in determining the time it would take radioactive contaminants released to the groundwater system to travel i
to drinking water sources.
Mr. Gerald P. Lahth also of Sargent & Lundy, analyzed the consequences of a postulated design basis accident involving the release of radioactive contaminants to the hydrosphere.
Mr. George C. Klopp, of Commonwealth Edison Company, assessed the adequacy of the NRC Staff's Final Environmental Statement (FES), NRC Staff Exhibit No. 2, as it relates to risk from the liquid pathway.
l 4.
Byron Station lies on top of a thin mantle of glacial _-
l drift.
Underneath this stratum are dolomites and limestone of the Ordorician-age Galena-Platteville groups.
(Wood, Intervenor's Prepared Testimony at 4; Holish Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 6 ff. Tr. 6750).
5.
These dolomites are extremely fractured near the top but become denser with depth.
At the Byron site the depth of the dolomites ranges from 100-225 feet fHolish, Tr. 6743-4; Wood, Tr. 688-9).
6.
The top of the groundwater table is in the highly._
fractured zone of the dolomite linestone stratum.
(Codell, Tr. 6711).
7.
The fracturing on the site is a regional phenomenon (Holish, Tr. 6755).
This fact raises the serious problem of groundwater and surface water contamination and conse-quent threat to the health and safety of the public if a serious accident were to occur at the Byron site.
8.
In addition there are many springs which flow radially outward from the site.
They are recharged from the Galena-Platteville aquifer through pathways that follow the surface expression of factures in this aquifer (Wood, Intervenor Prepared Testimony at 6: Tr. 6825).
The substantial numbers of springs are strong indicators that the fracturing of the dolomite limestone aquifer is extensive (Wood, Intervenor, Prepared Testimony, at 6; 7-8)
The geographical distribution of the springs is consistent with the joint pattern.
l l
(Wood, Tr. 6925).
9.
Where the pathways created through fracturing are enlarged, because areas of extensive fracturing the rate of transportation increases velocity, especially increased -
as porosity decreases.
This permeability of the aquifer increases as porosity decreases.
This will hold true when the nature of the fracturing system is continuous and ex-tensive.
At this point in time it is not possible to say that there is not a continuous joint running from the site to the Rock River (Holish, Tr. 6767). (Staley, Tr. 6711; Wood, Intervenor Prepared Testimony at 6; Tr. 6941) 10.
There are essentially two different ways to cal-culate. expected velocity _ rates.__One way is_to treat the 1
rock formation as a uniform porous medium.
Under this approach Darcy's equation is applicable.
(Wood, Tr.
i 6941-43; Holish, Tr. 6766).
The second method of calculation i
is predicated on treating the rock formation as con-taining joints at irregular intervals, rather than a.c a homo-geneous medium.
Under this approach the applicability of Darcy's equation breaks down (Wood, Tr. 6882).
11.
The selection of the calculation method vastly alters 4
the determination of a value for groundwater velocity (Wood, Tr. 6941).
The result therefore is that when fractures follow a joint pattern, or in other words, create a flow pathway, along definite fixed directions, application of Darcy's j
law could significantly underestimate velocities.
(Wood, Tr. 6942)
Therefore, the most conservative estimate would be reached by treating the aquifer as concerning continuous extensive fractures.
Groundwater velocity is principally a function of the permeability of the bedrock, the hydraulic gradient and the effective porosity of the aquifer (Holish, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 16, ff. Tr. 6750.
12.
The Applicant and the NRC differ from the Intervenor on two points.
The first is how to characterize the fracturing that all parties agree exists.
The second point of contention is on the appropriate investigatory measures which provide the best basis for that characterization (Holish, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 16, ff. Tr. 6750; Codell, Staley, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 11, ff. Tr.
6649; Wood, Transcript 6915).
13.
Applicant contends it carried out a site investigation which identified the geologic and-hydrogeologic properties--
of the underlying rock formations.
Applicant, however, was unable to state how many of the 154 core borings intersected joint fractures, even though it is feasible to obtain that information (Holish, Tr. 6751; Wood, Tr. 6942-3).
14.
In addition initially Applicant calculated the travel time of radioactive contaminants on the basis of data from only two wells for a brief period of time.
As a result, revisions were necessary in the FSAR to correct the values of transmissivity determined originally. (Holish, Tr. 6754; Wood, Tr. 6914).
15.
The Applicant has not used the time of its involvement with the site to actually trace migration of contaminants from the site to or towards the Rock River, (Holish, Tr. 6767) despite the fact that the technique of tracing movements of contaminants is available (Holish, Tr. 6768).
16.
The Applicant calculated the travel time based on the assumption that the bedrock is an equivalent porous media, despite the fact that it acknowledged this would be erroneous if extensive connected fractures were present in the aquifer. :
b
Applicant is unable to say that there is not a continuous n
joing running from the site to the river.
(Holish, Tr.
6766-6767).
17 In addition, Applicant miscalculated contaminant velocity when it calculated an effective porosity that was then found to be 10 times less than the actual porosity.
As a result the figure given by the Applicant in response to the League's contention is 10 times too slow (Holish,
.Tr..6774).
18.
The NRC Staff in its FES relied on methods which specifically avoid measuring data 'Codell, Tr. 6644).
19.
The NRC Staff made no direct measurements of flow, but rather assumed the direction of the flow (Codell, Tr. 6645).
20.
NRC Staff conceded that it is possible that con-taminatier could move as Dr. Wood calculated.
NRC Staff cited a Florida study which corroborated Dr. Wood's specula-tion that contaminants in limestone can move a few feet a day.
This information has not been checked at the Byron site (Codell, Tr. 6700).
21.
In addition, NRC Staff conceded that it has no site-specific knowledge of the joint pattern under the Rock River (Staley, Tr. 6593), nor was the NRC Staff witness familiar with the nature of limestone when it decomposes.
Staff witness testified that he did not know whether increased porosity results from limestone decomposition (Codell, Tr. 6587).
22.
The Board thus finds that neither the Applicant nor the Staff has presented evidence which sufficiently addresses,.
l the basis for reliance on the assumption that the aquifer under the plant is a uniform porous medium.
-Therefore, g
the Board finds that both the Applicant and the Staff did not adequately characterize the Byron site.
Consequently the Applicant's ir.terdictive measures must be redesigned.
l l
l CONCLJSIONS OF LAW l
l The character of rock formations underlying a nuclear power plant site determines to a great extent the velocity with which contamination released travels to a source of public exposure (Finding 7).
The way the medium is charac-terized can cause vast differences in calculations of velocity rates.
Assuming the nature of a hydraulic gradient, effective porosity or permeability of the bedrock or in-ferring this information from inadequate data can lead to underestimations of the veloc'ity rate and thus the ability to apply interdictive measures (Findings 11 and 12).
The Applicant and the NRC staff made investigations which failed to inquire adequately into the actual nature of the fracture system underlying the plant site (Findings 13 - 21).
Therefore, the Board.cannot accept either the NRC's or the Applicant's characterizations of the hydrogeologic properties of the Byron plant site (Finding 22).
Consequently, the conse-quenceu of radionuclide releases to the underlying aquifer cannot be predicted with confidence.
In consequences, no proper NEPA analysis of this important subject can be made.
The Board holds as a matter of law that the findings re-quired by 10 C.F.R. 50. 57 (a) (3) (i), 50. 57 (a) (6), and 10 C.F.R. 50. 34 (b) (4) cannot be adequately made and on these grounds the Board must deny the Applicant an operating license.
l r
1 1 I
f i
CONTENTIONS Rockford League of Women Voters ' Contention 8, Class 9 Accidents Contention 8, as litigated, provides:
Neither C.E. nor the Staff has presented a meaningful assessment of the risks associated with the operation of the proposed Byron nuclear facility, contrary to the requirements of 10 C.F.R. E 51.20(a) and E 51.20(d).
Studies carried out by the NRC have identified accident mechanisms, considered credible, which would lead to uncontrollable accidents and release to the environment of appreciable fractions of a reactor's inventory of radioactive materials.
Traditionally, these accident potentials have been downplayed or ignored on the basis of.the. Rasmussen Report.
However,.the-Lewis Committee has now called into serious question the entire metho-dology, as well as the findings and conclusions, of the Rasmussen Report, which led the NRC to withdraw official reliance on the Rasmussen Report, yet the Staff still regulates upon the validity of the basic conclusions therein.
In addition, NRC Staff scudies, which are not common public knowledge, have cast doubt upon numerous of the specific conclusions of the Rasmussen Report.
For example, in one secret NRC study, estimates of the " killing distance" were made, referring to the range over which lethal injuries would be received under varying weather conditions from the release of radioactive material in a nuclear power plant accident.
Depending upon prevailing weather conditions, this
" killing distance" was estimated to be up to several dozen miles from the accident-damaged reactor.
Unpublished document from Brookhaven National Laboratory, USAEC.
In addition, the Liquid Pathways Study, NUREG-04 4 0 (February, 1978), highlights the incomplete safety assessment currently performed by the NRC, particularly with respect to incomplete review of all credible accident sequences.
A General Accounting Office report pertaining to that study criticizes the NRC's failure to consider core-melt accidents in assess-ments of relative differences in Class 9 risks.
The March 7, 1978 letter from the NRC's Mr. Case to the Commissioners (Secy-78-137) also urges the inclusion of core-melt considerations in site comparisons in the case of sites involving high population density, such as Byron and the surrounding area in which live nov (or at time of proposed operation) upwards of 500,000 persons.
Moreover, neither C.E. nor the NRC Staff has presented an accurate assessment of the risks posed by operation of Byron, contrary to the requirements of 10 C.F.R. E 51.20(a) and E 51.20(d).
The decision to issue the Byron construction permit did not, and the presently filed analysis of C.E. and the Staff do not, consider the consequences of so-called Class 9 accidents, particularly core meltdown with breach of containment. -
These accidents were deemed to have a low probability of occurrence.
The Reactor Safety Study, WASH-14 00, was an attempt to demonstrate that the actual risk from Class 9 accidents is very low.
However, the Commission has stated that it "does not regard as reliable the Reactor Safety Study's numerical estimate of the overall risk of reactor accident."
(NRC Statement of Risk Assessment and the Reactor Safety Study Report (WASH-1400) in Light of the Risk Assess-ment Review Group Report, January 18, 1979.)
The withdrawal of NRC's endorsement of the Reactor Safety Study and its findings leaves no technical basis for concluding that the actual risk is low enough to justify operation of Byron.
Rockford League of Women Voters ' Contention ~62 -- Class _9-Accidents Contention 62, as litigated, provides:
The design of Byron does not provide protection against so-called " Class 9" accidents.
There is no basis for concluding that such accidents are not credible.
Indeed, the Staff has conceded that the accident at TMI falls within that classification.
Therefore, there is not reasonable assurance that Byron can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public, see also Contention 8, supra.
T DAARE/ SAFE Contention 2a -- Class 9 Accidents Contention 2a, as litigated, provides:
Due to the concentration of nuclear power plants already in Northern Illinois; the applicant's record of incidents and violations in existing plants which have emerged since the granting of a Construction License for Byron; and the credibility which must now be given to large scale accident scenarios since TMI, Inter-venors contend that the addition of Byron Station operations places an undue and unfair burden of risk from exposure to radioactive materials from accidental releases on DeKalb-Sycamore and Rockford area residents.
With the addition of two more nuclear power units in operation at Byron, the potential for cumulative dose effects from discrete accident events at plants in Northern Illinois under unfavorable meteorological conditions poses an unreasonable level of risk to the health and safety of DeKalb-Sycamore and Rockford area residents.
i l
l 1
APPLICABLE LAW Concurrently with its application for a permit, the l
Applicant must submit an environmental report, in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 51.20.
10 C.F.R. 51.20(a) states that this document, entitled " Applicant's Environmental Report - Construc-tion Permit Stage," shall contain a " description of the proposed action, a statement of its purposes, and a description of the
-environment affected and which discusses the following consi-derations:
1.
The probable impact of the proposed action on the environment; 2.
Any probably adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemen-ted; 3.
Alternatives to the proposed action; 4.
The rela-tionship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity;
- and, 5.
Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented... ".
10 C.F.R. 5120(d) states further that such data "should not be confined to data supporting the proposed action but should include adverse data as well."
Prior to issuance of the operating license, the Commission must find that the Byron Station has been constructed in accordance with its rules and regulations, and that reasonable assurance exists that-the activities authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public...
10 C.F.R. 50.59 (a) (1), and 50.57 (a) ( 3) and 50.57 (a) (6).
It implicitly follows that the findings under 10 C.F.R. 50.57 cannot be met for the issuance l i
of an operating license if t.he Applicant has failed to meet i
the permit requirements under 10 C.F.R. 51.20.
2 A determination on whether 10 C.F.R. 50.57 has been met is therefore dependent on whether the applicant has complied with the permit requirements under 10 C.F.R. 51.20(a) and 51.20(d).
6 I
FINDINGS OF FACT 1
1.
To address the contention, the N.R.C. staff presented the consolidated testimony of L. G. Hulman, Branch Chief, Accident Evaluation Branch, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation; Millard L. Wohl, Nuclear Engineer in the Accident
)
Evaluation Branch, Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation; Scott Newberry, Risk Analyst in the Reliability and Risk Assessment Branch, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation;
~
Edward'F. Bra'nagan, Jr.,-~ Health ~ Physicist 'in the Radiological Assessment Branch, Office of. Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
2.
The Applicant presented the testimony of Mr. Saul Levine, an expert and consultant to Commonwealth Edison Company.
3.
WASH-1400 was the original study which established industry-wide techniques for probabilistic risk assessment.
(Levine, Applicant Prepared Testimony at 8.)
4.
State-of-the-art probabilistic risk assessment has significantly advanced over WASH-1400.
Much better models are now available for seismic and fire analyses in comparison with the rudimentary models used in WASH-1400. (pd.)
5.
The probabilistic risk assessment offered by Applicant for the Byron plant was derived from WASH-1400.
6.
Byron's pressurized water reactor is significantly I
different than the one used in WASH-1400. (Levine, Tr.2002-3).
l 7.
WASH-1400 doesn't treat the possibility of accidents l
in progress being misdiagnosed which would turn off the safety systems needed to cool the core.
(Newberry, Tr.2151).
l 8.
It does not include fires within its accident risks. (Id.). ;
l
9.
It does not analyze fault effects and systems inter-actions originating in power supplies for control and instrumentation.
(13. at 2152).
10.
It does not consider degraded core accidents.
(Levine, Tr. 2279).
11.
WASH-1400 did not predict TMI series of events.
(Levine, Tr. 1951).
- 12..
WASH-14 00 did. not address other _ severe accidents such as Browns Ferry, the Browns Ferry fire, and the Rancho Seco power supply failure.
(Newberry, Tr. 2150, 2274).
Its i
i proven inability in this regard calls into serious question the comprehensiveness of WASH-1400 to include future events of this type.
(Newberry, Tr. 2275).
13.
The validity of WASH-1400 expired in October 1980.
(Levine, Tr. 2071-72).
14.
WASH-1400 was attacked as not reliable by the Lewis Report for inaccuracy of uncertainty factors.
(Id. 1975).
15.
The NRC has also disavowed the reliability of the WASH-1400 accident probability estimates.
(Id. at 1977).
16.
Therefore the probabilistic risk assessment offered by the Applicant which is modelled on WASH-1400 is not meaningf ul.
17.
No site-specific PRA was done for Byron.
(Levine, Tr.1940).
18.
The document that Applicant tendered for notification of a modified version of a Byron PRA was also not site-specific.
It relies on work done at Zion.
(Gallo, Tr. 2186).
18.
Nothing in the above document caused NRC staff to -.
change their criticism of reliability of PRA's for Zion and s
Indian Point.
Moreover, NRC staff attacked the validity of basing Byron PRA on that of Indian Point.
(Newberry, Tr. 2273) ; (Hulman, Tr. 2113, 2121, 2112).
19.
The risk estimates of external events relied on by Applicant from Zion and Indian Point PRA's are criticized by the NRC staff as a consensus as being too low.
Applicant quantified the risks of external events as being 10 times that of internal events. _ A more_ appropriate order of magnitude is 100.
(NRC Staff, Tr. 2112; 2248-50, 2250).
20.
The NRC included no estimate of the contribution to risk by external events in its FES (NRC Staff, Tr. 2243).
21.
Therefore, the Board finds that external events are a significant contribution to risk; the Applicant must develop probabilistic risk assessments which address external events specific'to the Byron plant.
22.
Applicant claims that it has developed several design features for Byrcn intended to prevent serious accidents.
(Levine, Applicant Prepared Testimony at 19).
23.
One of these is the Reactor Protection System and Backup Shutdown System.
However, Applicant's expert consultant conceded that the reaction protection systems. breakers have failed to open on demand at least 35 times.
(Levine, Tr. 1971).
24.
Applicant's expert consultant on this contention, Mr.Saul Levine, made a vague and unsupported claim for Byron's incorporation of design features which would mitigate rather than prevent severe accidents.
(Levine, Applicant's Prepared i
Testimony, p. 19).
l 25.
Mr. Levine who was director of WASH-1400 has never l
visited Byron, was unable to remember 20 safety issues of safety significance, had no familiarity with Byron's emergency plan.
Moreover, Mr. Levine has never studied the public health ef fects of Three Mile Island; he does not know how many of the NRC's Post TMI 2 Action Plan Requirements have been implemented at Byron.
Finally, Mr. Levine has done no studies or analysis of the Byron facility.
(Levine, Tr. 1938, 1939, 1941, 1942, 1952, 1967, 1982, 1999, 2001).
26.
Therefore the Board finds Mr. Levine's testimony on behalf of the Applicant unreliable.
27.
Within a sixty mile radius dhere are presently a concentration of four nuclear power reactors.
(Levine, Applicant Prepared Testimony, 23).
28.
Applicant's witness conceded that the chances of accident are exponentially increased with the presence of each nuclear power plant.
(Levine, Tr. 2021).
With every reactor that goes on line there is a corresponding increase in the risk to residents in the area.
There is a point at which that risk becomes too great.
(Hulman, Tr. 2203).
29.
Byron is a large area with a population of significant density.
This density is increased daily by the presence of a population which arrives in the area to engage in recreational activities.
The influx of this significant population group was not factored into Byron population density estimate.
(Levine, Tr. 1983).
l l
30.
Risk of serious accidents extends beyond the immediate area, however, because of meteorological conditions which can exacerbate the damage from a serious accident in which there -
i was uncontrolled radioactivity released to the environment.
a (Wohl, Tr. 2179).
31.
For instance, a very elevated plume could be carried by wind to a high population density center such as Chicago.
(Id. at 2179, 80).
32.
Two principal ef fects of nuclear plant accidents include early fatalities and latent cancer fatalities.
(Levine, Prepared Applicant Testimony at 24).
The fact that there are more nuclear po'wer plants in the ~ area indicates a coupling of -
~'
~
latent cancer fatalities.
(Id. at 2020).
Applicant disregards health effects of cancer of thyroid nodules.
(Id. at 1993).
33.
A facility's emergency measures are those intended to remove or minimize the harmful effects of emergency accidents on the public.
(Wohl, Tr. 2176).
34.
Byron does not have emergency protective measures in a completed stage even though it is due to go on line by 1985.
(Wohl, Tr. 2180).
I 35.
The Consequence model in WASH-1400 was called CRAC.
There is a newer evacuation model which has been updated,but Applicant's witness avoided stating whether it has been adopted for Byron.
(Levine, Tr. 1977).
Even if this model were adopted by Byron, it explicitly excludes 30-40% of the population based on an assumption that this percentage of the nearby population would not move.
36.
In addition, the CRAC model is not designed to evacuate high population density areas, such as Chicago.
The reason for this is that "in higher density areas, people move faster because there are better road systems."
(Id. at 1979). _,
Mr. Levine, however, concedes that evacuation measures are not efficient.
37.
Therefore the Board finds that Byron has not demons-trated that it has any emergency protective measures which can be effectively implemented to protect the public health and safety from the consequences of nuclear plant accidents.
l i
i.-.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW R
In order to qualify for a license, an Applicant must demonstrate that it has made a meaningful assessment of the risks associated with the operation of the proposed Byron nuclear facility.
The Applicant was unable to meet this regulatory requirement.
Primarily, the Applicant relied on the WASH-1400 study which has been thoroughly invalidated, even by the study's own director.
(Findings 7-15).
Applicant's Probability Risk Assessment would alter-natively be invalid because'of its inappropriately low calculation of effects of external events on risk estimates.
(Findings 19-21).
Further, Applicant's witness testified as to specific design features to be incorporated in Byron to safeguard against emergency nuclear accidents.
Cross-examination, however, revealed that Mr. Levine has negligible familiarity with the Byron facility and its emergency plan.
(Finding 25).
Therefore, the Board cannot accept as reliable his testimony as to the implementation of specific design features.at Byron.
Therefore, the Board must conclude that Byron has not developed any design features which could prevent or forestall serious nuclear accidents.
Finally, Applicant has no effective, efficient means of implementing emergency protective measures.
Therefore, the Board concludes as a matter of law that the Applicant has failed to meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R.
E51.20(a) and E51.20(d), and must be denied'a license.
l l
O The foregoing document, "Intervenor Rockford League of Women Voters' Froposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Liquid Fathway and Class Nine Accidents" l
is respectfully submitted by the undersigned attorney for the Rockford League of Women Voters.
ud $
YhW DAVID C. THOMAS l
I DAVID C. THOMAS 77 S. Wacker Dr.
Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 567-5050 l
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
) Docket Nos.
50-454 OL COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
)
50-4 55 OL
)
(Byron Nuclear Power Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned, attorney for Intervenor Rockford League of Women Voters, certifies that he filed the original and two copies of the attached "INTERVENOR ROCKFORD LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS ' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING LIQUID PATHWAY AND CLASS NINE ACCIDENTS" with the Secretary of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,on the 1st day of July, 1983 and served a copy of the same on each of the persons at the addresses shown on the attached service list.
Service on the Secretary and all parties, unless otherwise indicated, as nade by deposit in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid, on the 1st day of July, 1983.
OO G DAVID C. THOMAS Attorney for the Rockford League of Women Voters DAVID C. THOMAS 77 S. Wacker Dr.,
Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 567-5050
SERVICE LIST COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY -- Byron Station Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455 Mr. Ivan W. Smith Douglass W.
Cassel, Jr.
Administrative Judge and Chairman Jane Whicher Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel BPI U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 1300, 109 N.
Dearborn Washington, D.C.
20555 Chicago, IL 60602 Dr. Richard F.
Cole Michael Miller, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Michael Goldstein, Esq.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Isham, Lincoln & Beale Washington, D.C.
20555 Three First National Plaza Suite 5200 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Chicago, IL 60602
-U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission --
Washington, D.C.
20555 Chief Heating Counsel Office of the Executive Legal Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. A.
Dixon Callihan Union Carbide Corporation P. O. Box Y Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Mr. Steven C. Goldberg Ms. Mitzi A. Young Office of the Executive Legal Director US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission K uhington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Secretary Attn:
Chief, Docketing and Service Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Ms. Diane Chavez SAFE 326 N. Avon St.
Rockford, IL 61103 Dr. Bruce von Zellen Department of Biological Sciences Northern Illinois University DeKalb, IL 60115 Joseph Gallo, Esq.
Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 840, 1120 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
_ _ _ _