ML20076J079
| ML20076J079 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1983 |
| From: | Thomas D LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ROCKFORD, IL, THOMAS, D.C. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20076J082 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8306200320 | |
| Download: ML20076J079 (32) | |
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l eg BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
< 4f In the Matter of
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) Docket Nos.
50-454 OL COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
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50-455 OL
)
(Byron Nuclear Power Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
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INTERVENOR ROCKFORD LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING ALARA AND STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INTEGRITY June 14, 1983 I
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9 I.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW A.
League Contentions 42, 111, and 112 - ALARA In general, Contentions 42, 111 and 112 assert that Byron Station cannot be operated so as to maintain radiation exposures to workers as low as is reasonably achievable
( " ALARA").
Moreover, the contentions assert that even if the Applicant maintains occupational exposures within the limits set by 10 C.F.R. Part 20, new information on the effects of Iow-level radiation exposures shows that 1
such limits will not ensure worker safety.
Because of this, we are told that we cannot make the findings required by NEPA and the Commission's regulations.
Although the specific wording of the three contentions encompasses numerous issues, the League presented evidence on only a few topics.
Its primary area of concern appeared to be whether Applicant has accurately assessed the potential risks from occupational exposure to radiation.
The remaining
(
issues the League raised relate to the general ability of Applicant ALARA program to keep occupational radiation doses ALARA and to specific concerns about radiation exposures and protection.
These issues include:
(1) whether Applicant's dosimetry program for monitoring radiation exposures to workers is sufficient to maintain doses ALARA; (2) whether Applicant's program for monitoring radiation levels inside the plant will provide accurate results; (3) whether Applicant's procedures for maintaining occupational exposure records are sufficient to maintain doses ALARA: (4) whether the size and training of Applicant's health-physics staff is sufficient; 1-1
(5) whether workers at the station, including contract or temporary workers who are not Applicant employees, are ade-quately trained in how to keep radiation doses ALARA; (6) whether Applicant's policies on radiation exposure to declared pregnant women will adequately protect the fetus; (7) whether the risk of possible industrial sabotage by anyone, especially a contract worker, is sufficiently small so as to maintain doses ALARA; and (8) whether the design bases of Byron Station and, more specifically, its steam generators, include features for reducing occupational radiation exposure.
The Applicant presented testimony on all of these issues.
Applicable Law Part 20 of the Commission's regulations,10 C.F.R. Part 20, provides two basic mechanisms for assuring that the health of workers in nuclear plants is not endangered by exposure to excessive doses of radiation.
First, Part 20 contains specific standards limiting permissible radiation doses and dose rates for individual workers.
Compliance with these limitations is insured by specific requirements (con-tained in Parts 19 and 20) that workers be equipped with personnel radiation monitoring devices, that individual records on workers exposures be maintained, that sources of radiation in the plant be evaluated periodically, and that workers be trained in radiation protection techniques.
Secoad, Part 20 provides that in addition to these specific requirenents, licensees "should...make every reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures...as low as is reasonably 1-2
cchievable."
10 C.F.R. C20.l(c).
As we read contentions they do not only raise a chal-lenge to Applicant's ability to maintain exposures of individual workers within the permissible limits set forth in the regulations.
The contentions also assert that even
(
if Applicant maintains occupational exposures at permissible levels, such exposures are unsafe, as demonstrated by new scientific information.
We may not consider this aspect of the allegations here because Commission regulations are not subject to attack in licensing proceedings except under special circumstances, which no party has alleged exist here.
10 C.F.R.
Section 2.758.
Two of the contentions also refer to NEPA, however, and we take this as implying the argument that if low doses of radiation are more hazardous than generally believed, the findings and conclusions in the NRC Staff's Final Environmental Statement ("FES") may be incorrect.
Accordingly, we will consider the League's assertions as they address hazards of occupational exposure below permissible levels as challenges to the adequacy of the FES.
See 10 C.F.R. Section 51.52 (a) (b).
The contentions do contain general challenges to Applicant's compliance with several of the other specific requirements of Parts 20, 19 and 73, such as radiation monitoring, record keeping, personnel training and plant security.
These requirements are set out below.
In addition, the contentions challenge the Applicant's ability to comply with the general principle of maintaining occupational radia-tion exposures ALARA.
Because 10 C.F.R. Section 20.1(c) states only that licensees "should" attempt to keep radiation 1-3
doses ALARA, we find it necessary to comment on the possibility that absent a condition imposed on the operating license Applicant need not establish and follow a program to do so.
Despite the regulation's use of the word "should" in place of the mandatory "shall", we conclude that under well
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established Commission practice Applicant would not be permitted to operate a nuclear power plant without an established program for maintaining radiation exposures ALARA.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Board examined Regulatory Guide 8.8, Revision 3, dated June 1978, entitled "Information Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations will be As Low As is Reasonably Achievable" (NRC Staff Testimony, Attachment C, ff. Tr. 1883), and Regulatory Guide 8.10, Revision 1-R, dated September 1975, entitled " Operating Philosophy for Maintaining Occupational Radiation Exposures As Low As is Reasonably Achievable" (NRC Staff Testimony, Attachment D, ff. Tr. 1883).
Both documents militate against a permissive interpretation of the word "should" in the regulation, j
Regulatory Guide 8.8 states that its purpose is to provide information to licensees to enable them "to meet the criterion that exposures of station personnel to radiation" will be ALARA.
Reg. Guide 8.8, p. 8.8-1 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
Regulatory Guide 8.10 describes "a general operating philosophy acceptable to the NRC staff as a necessary basis for a program of maintaining occupational exposures to radiation" ALARA. Reg. Guide 8.10, p. 8.10-1 (emphasis added).
The regulatory guides thus presume the l
necessity of an ALARA program.
Although regulatory guides 1-4 I
r are not regulations, they est out methods of implementing NRC Regulations which are acceptable to the NRC Staff.
Because of these regulatory guides, and especially because every licensed nuclear power plant has an ALARA program, the Board finds it inconceivable that the Commission would issue
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an operating license for a plant without an acceptable ALARA program.
Accordingly, the Board finds it necessary to impose a license condition that Applicant carry out its ALARA program at Byron Station.
The specific requirements of Part 20, Part 19 and Part 73 applicable to issues raised by these contentions are as follows:
Permissible Occupational Doses.
No individual may receive an occupational dose of more than 1.25 rems per calendar quarter, or more than 3 rems per quarter if the licensee has determined that his total accumulated occupational dose will not exceed a defined limit.
10 C.F.R. Section 20.101.
Dosimetry Program.
To determine individual occupational doses, a licensee must equip every person who enters a defined high radiation area with personnel monitoring monitoring equipment, such as film badges, pocket ionization chambers, pocket dosimeters, or film rings.
10 C.F.R.
Section 20.202.
In-Plant Monitoring.
A licensee must evaluate the radioactive material in a plant, including levels of radiation, to insure compliance with the requirements of Part 20 and to determine the extent of any radiation hazard that may exist.
10 C.F.R. Section 20.201.
Record Maintenance.
A licensee must maintain individual 1-5
exposure records on Form NRC-5 (NRC Staff Prepared Tesitmony, f
Attachment G, ff. Tr. 1883); the information includes the dose to the individual for a given period by type of radiation, the method of monitoring a.'A the individual's accumulated lifetime dose.
10 C.F.R. Section 20.401(a).
In addition, Regulatory Guide 8.7,
" Occupation Radiation Exposure Records System", describes an acceptable records system and in parti-cular the recording of doses by task so the licensee can obtain feedback for ALARA reviews.
While not bindina on
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the Board, this gives us guidance on a program's adequacy.
Health Physics Staff.
The regulations contain no requirements regarding a health physics staff.
The NRC Staff has developed guidelines regarding the appropriate size and training of health physics staffs in Regulatory Guide 1.8,
" Personnel Selection and Training." ANSI 18.1, " Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel," contains additional guidelines.
Training.
Under 10 C.F.R. Section 19.12, every person working in a radiation controlled area, including contract workers or temporary employees, must be instructed about the potential health risks associated with exposure to radiation, procedures to minimize exposure, and the use of protective devices.
Declared Pregnant Women.
Regulatory Guide 8.13, Rev.
1, dated Novenber 1975, provides guidelines on instruction to be given to women on prenatal radiation exposure, including the recommendation of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements that the maximum permissible 1-6
O dose to the fetus during the gestation period not exceed 0.5 rem.
Reg. Guide 8.13, p. 8.13-1.
Temporary Employees.
When any contract worker could receive, in one calendar quarter, an occupational dose in excess of 25 percent of the applicable standards, the k
licensee must require him, before entering a restricted area, to disclose in a signed statement his prior occupational dose, if any, during the current calendar quarter.
10 C.F.R.
Section 20.102.
Under 10 C.F.R. Section 20.101, a licensee must obtain a certification on Form NRC-4 (NRC Staff Pre-pared Testimony, Attachment B, ff. Tr. 1883) or an individual to enter a restricted area where he could receive doses defined in the regulation.
Industrial sabotage.
To protect against the possibility of industrial sabotage by either temporary workers or employees, a licensee must have a security plan that meets the require-ments of 10 C.F.R. Section 73.55 (b)-(h).
These regulations include provisions on restricting access, screening all workers to be given unescorted access into the plant, searching i
l vehicles, individuals and deliveries, and protecting vital I
equipment.
It is against the above regulations, statutes, and guide-lines that the Board must review the Applicant's evidence of its ability to maintain occupational doses as low as is reasonably achievable, f
I i
1-7 i
CANCER RISK ESTIMATES There is a live controversy regarding the most conservative cancer risk estimate for low radiation exposure.
This dispute centers around the plausibility of differing mathematical models for interpreting uncertain estimates of low doses received by human populations.
The Board concludes that because no studies have been able to conclusively demonstrate that exposures to low radiation does not carry a greater risk than exposure to high doses therefore, prusuant to NRC' regulations, which require that proper concern for the public health and safety, the Board rules that the most conservative risk estimate for low radiation dosage be adopted by the NRC and the Applicant in its ALARA program before a license be granted.
OTHER ALARA CONSIDERATIONS The Board concludes that Applicant has not demonstrated a vigorous commitment to its ALARA programs.
Before the Board will grant a license the Applicant must take affirmative steps to remedy the deficiencies noted in our Findings of Fact.
In addition, the Applicant must devote more time to its basis N-Get training program and institute more complete long-range ALARA training programs for radiation chemistry technicians and health physicists.
Applicant must require that prior to employment these more skilled radiation workers evidence greater knowledge of health physics.
In addition, Applicant must take steps to remedy deficiencies noted by this Board in our Findings of Fact with respect to the dosimetry program.
The Board also concludes that the Applicant institute more in-depth education to all female workers of risks of radiation 1-8
exposure to pregnant females.
The Applicant must develop an affirmative policy for mitigating disincentives for women to declare themselves pregnant.
Finally, the Board requires the Applicant to take some strong measures to in-dicates its commitment to ensuring accuracy of reporting
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for temporary workers.
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II.
FINDINGS OF FACT A.
League Contentions 42, 111, and 112 - ALARA CANCER RISK ESTIMATES 1.
In general, Contentions 42, 111 and 112 assert that Byron Station cannot be operated so as to maintain i
radiation exposures to workers as low as is reasonably achievable
("ALARA").
Moreover, the contentions assert that even if the Applicant maintains occupational exposures within the limits set by 10 C.F.R. Part 20, new information on the effects of low-level radiation exposures shows that such limits will not ensure worker safety.
2.
Contention 42 reads as follows:
As the Staff has recognized in NUREG-0410 and in the Black Fox testimony previously cited, occupational radiation exposure to station and contractor personnel has generally been increasing in recent years, and violation of the limits of 10 C.F.R. Part 20 has been avoided by C.E.,
as by other licensees, by obtaining the temporary services l
of transient workmen rather than by devoting adequate effort to reducing exposures.
Among other i
things, this practice results in using larger numbers of people and thereby increasing the risk of sabotage, operator error and similar safety-related hazards.
Furthermore, new information on low-level radiation effects indicates that the Byron design basis will not provide safe operation.
Accordingly, both because of the lack of assurance that proper exposure levels will be maintained and because of the practice of using transient workers, as a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS50.57 (a) (3) (8) and 50.57 (a) (b) cannot be made.
3.
By Stipulation dated December 6, 1982, the Parties agreed to litigate only the in-plant monitoring aspects of Contention 111.
That contention reads as follows :
2-1 l
L.
111.
C.E. has not met the requirements of NEPA and the Regs, including but not limited to C.F.R. SS50. 34 (a) and 50.36 (a) because C.E. has not adequately monitored and provided a design base for the Byron plant which will keep radia-tion levels as low as achievable as required for operation of the plant to protect the health and safety of the public.
To keep radiation levels as low as achievable, C.E. should provide and utilize:
A.
More adequate environmental and discharge monitoring of radioactive emissions from the Byron plant, which include:
(1) Monitoring devices at more locations within and without the plant site.
(2)
Provisions for more frequent reading of* monitors by independent analysts.
(3)
Better monitoring devices which include:
(a)
An automatic system of monitoring that notifies local authorities by an alarm when discharge emission exceed design limits; (b)
Monitoring devices that
. measure differences in alpha, beta and gamma dose levels, which presently are not proposed to be considered and measured; (c)
Monitoring and recording of emissions of all dangerous long lived radio-nuclides, including especially 1-129 and Plutonium; (d)
Bioaccumulative testing in a tiered system to assess the uptake of radio-active and chemical poDatants from bottom sedi-ments or soil to lower organisms and to contamina-tion of the food chain of man and other life.
B.
More accurate calculation of design doses which can be accomplished by utilizing information from the improved monitoring suggested above and also by:
(1)
Providing for and constant update and replacement of equipment and analysis to respond to new experimental and analytical results.
Byron was licensed for construction, for example, when some (including C.E. ) asserted im-properly that there was a threshold to radiation effects; (2)
Including in calculation of doses the large transient populations in the low 2-2
population zones around the plant, including school children when present in schools and other partici-pating in recreational facilities; (3)
Including internal radiation doses caused by inhaled and/or ingested radio-nuclides which are deposit 6d in different parts of the body where they give repeated radiation or until they are eliminated from the body; (4)
Including in calculation of radiation doses, cumulative doses to the general population outside the site boundary caused by overlapping circles of radiation from any nuclear facility (whether on or off the site), including Zion, Dresden, LaSalle, Quad Cities, and Braid-wood Stations, as well as any new proposed facili-ties such as the Morris Waste Disposal Site; and (5)
Including in the calculation, calculation of doses to people by utilizing actual radionuclides for and in food, animals, plants, soil, water, and in other parts of the environment in and around the Byron site.
As a result, the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.
4.
Contention 112 reads as follows:
112.
C.E. has not met the requirements of NEPA and 10 C.F.R. Part 20 because it has not adequately assessed the effect of radiation on plant workers and provided a design base for the Byron plant which will provide radiation levels as low as achievable.
To keep radiation levels as low as achievable there is a need for better use of preventive measures to reduce radiation, including neutron, exposure levels to regular plant personnel and transient workers.
These include but are not limited to:
A.
Plant designs for reducing amount of radiation exposure which take into account new evidence on low levels of radiation which were not considered in design of the plant.
B.
Improved record keeping of radiation exposures, including cumulative exposures both at the plant site and at other facilities.
C.
Better training of personnel to prevent radiation exposures, including more use of regular trained personnel rather than transient or temporary workers with little experience and training.
2-3
1 1
D.
Limiting exposure to high levels of radiation to volunteers and/or only older workers beyond the child hearing age or others incapable of biological reproduction.
E.
Better education.about radiation dangers to ensure cooperation of workers in keeping radiation exposures to a minimum.
As a result, the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made therein.
5.
For these contentions the League presented Dr. Karl Z.
Morgan, scientist, professor and researcher, one of the founders of the science and profession of health physics.
In his capacity as Chairman of the International Commission for Radiological Protection, for 20 years Dr. Morgan con-tributed to the establishment of radiation standards adopted in all countries.
After serving until 1982 as Neely Professor in the School of Nuclear Engineering of the Georgia Institute of Technology Dr. Morgan is presently developing a health physics program at Appalachian State University in his capacity as consultant of Radiation Safety and Adjunct Professor.
While we.have limited Dr. Morgan's testimony concerning the dosimetry program to his experience at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, we find that Dr.
Morgan's testimony has posed serious challenges to the ade-quacy of cost-benefit balance structure in the NRC Staff's Final Environmental Statement ("FES").
The NRC Staff's witnesses were:
Michael A. Lamastra, a Health Physicist in the Radiation Protection Section of the Radiological Assessment Branch of the NRC, who testified on the Staff's review of Byron Station's ALARA program; Edward F. Branagan, 2-4
Jr., a Health Physicist in the Radiological Impact Section of the Radiological Assessment Branch of NRC, who presented testimony on the risks of radiation exposure; and Robert F.
Skelton, Plant Protection Analyst in the Power Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch, Division of Safeguards of the NRC who testified on security aspects of Byron Station.
The Applicant presented Frank Rescek, Lead Health Physics -
Technical Services Engineer, Commonwealth Edison Company, and James R. Van Laere, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor and Radiation Protection Manager at Byron Station, to testify on the ALARA programs at the corporate level and at Byron Station, respectively.
Applicant also presented Jerome L.
Roulo, Deputy Nuclear Security Administrator, Commonwealth Edison Company, who testified about Byron Station's security i
system.
Gerald P.
Lahti, Assistant Division Head of the
't Nuclear Safeguards and Licensing Division in charge of Shielding and Radiological Safety at Sargent & Lundy, testified for Applicant on the design basis of Byron Station and Dr. Lawrence Conway, Advisory Engineer of Westinghouse Electric Corporation, testified on the design of the steam generators at the plant.
Finally, Applicant presented Dr. Jacob I. Fabrikant, a physician, radiologist, professor, and researcher, who testified on the risks associated with exposure to radiation.
6.
Scientific reports published by national and international standard-setting bodies have postulated risk estimates for cancer induction from exposure to low levels of radiation, to which Applicant's witness addresses.
(Fabrikant, Prepared Testimony, 16 ff.; Branagan, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 788, Tr. 1883).
These estimates 2-5
reflect neither scientific nor precision certainty (Fabrikant, Applicant Prepared Testimony, 16; Fabrikant, Tr. 1401; Morgan Tr. 1599-1600).
7.
For instance, the 1972 BEIR report, which was the basis for current estimates of risks associated with ex-posure to low dose, low-LET radiation (Fabrikant, Prepared Testimony, p. 16) mixes up and compares, among other types, exposures, high-LET and low-LET radiation
(" Report to Congress, Problems in Assessing the Cancer Risks of Low-level Ionizing Radiation Exposure," Volume 2 of two volumes, January 2, 1981, EMD, 81-1, referred to hereinafter as "GAO, 1981").
8.
Part of the difficulty is that the reports of these standard setting bodies are based on analyses from "epidemi-ological surveys of exposed human populations which are highly uncertain in regard to the forms of the dose-response relationships for radiation-induced cancer in man." (Fabri-kant, Prepared Testimony 10, 12).
This problem becomes acute when considering risks from low radiation (Fabrikant, Pre-I pared Testimony, 12).
The uncertainty derives from the l
nature of the available data.
This data was collected from populations exposed to medium and high doses (Fabrikant, j
Prepared Testimony, 12).
The predictions of dosage levels in the low dose range on which the BEIR III report based its results are at best imprecise, and their usefulness severely limited (Fabrikant, Tr. 1456).
Added to that handicap is the fact that the best means of extrapolating low dose effects from this. data has not been scientifically achieved (GAO, 1981 20-23).
9.
There exist competing methods of extrapolating 2-6
risk for low doses.
Each method involves a mathematical model for describing the dose response.
Applicant's witness, Dr.
Fabrikant, supports the linear model, while Intervenor's witness, Dr. Morgan, adheres to the supralinear model.
The linear model predicts that the risk of cancer rises pro-L portionally as the amount of the dose increases (Fabrikant, Prepared Testimony, p. 21).
The supralinear model, on the other hand, predicts that as the dose decreases towards zero the risk per rem increases (Fabrikant, Prepared Testimony, p. 21).
10.
Members of the BEIR III Committee could not agree among themselves either on the appropriate model or on the corresponding calculation of the cancer coefficient.
Three of the members, one of whom was the chairman of the committee, Dr. Radford, wrote a dissenting report (Fabrikant, Tr. 1401).
The chairman stated in an article in Science Journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science that he believes the cancer coefficient is twice as great as that l
l given in the report (Fabrikant, Tr. 1414-15).
Dr. Morgan l
testified that recent conversations with Dr. Radford indicate that after visiting the site of one of the major epidemiological surveys in Japan, Dr. Radford is in the process of reevaluating his choice of the more appropriate model for a dose response curve (Morgan, p. 1600).
11.
Applicant's witness testified that one of the chief sources of data used in the 1980 BEIR report (Fabrikant, Pre-pared Testimony, pp. 46-47) was the epidemiological studies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb survivors, which he termed as reliable.
Dr. Fabrikant stated that " Analysis in terms 2-7
of dose response must, therefore, rely heavily on this data."
The results from these studies, however, are currently undergoing reevaluation as new information about dosimetry is becoming available (Fabrikant, Prepared Testimony, pp. 46-7:
Tr. 1411).
This new information indicates that past re-searchers may have overestimated the degree of neutron flux and thus the doses received by the survivors also.
If the doses actually prove to be less, it is expected that the risk estimates will be greater than predicted in the BEIR III report for iow-dosage exposure (Fabrikant, Tr. 1411).
As of now the data is incomplete.
Thus, the Board for licensing purposes cannot find that the conclusions drawn from it are reliable.
Although in his prepared testimony, Dr. Fabrikant stressed the insignificance of any changes in risk estimates, on cross-examination he conceded that it is incorrect to preclude the possibility that a significant change may occur as a result of reevaluation (Fabrikant, Tr. 1411).
12.
Another chief source of data for the BEIR III 4
report was data collected from patients with ankylosing i
spondylitis treated with X-Rays in England and Wales i
j (Fabrikant, Prepared Testimony, p. 47).
Analysis of this l
i data and of the competitive models for interpreting the data has yielded the conclusion that the supralinear model provided the best fix for the data (Fabrikant, Tr. 1405).
l 13.
The fact that Researcher Dole in analyzing current l
data of selected ankylosing spondylitis patients did not use l
l the supralinear model does not resolve the controversy as 2-8
far as the Board can determine.
Dr. Doll was unable to determine a response model specific to his data (Fabri-kant, Tr. pp. 1407-8) even though he chose to apply the linear model.
In fact, it is clear that no one mathematical p
formulation provides a perfect fit for the data (Fabrikant,
- p. 1409).
14.
There are other studies which project greater cancer risk estimates than postulated by the BEIR III report.
While many of these estimates are in dispute, these studies ngnetheless contribute to our knowledge of radiation risks (Fabrikant, pp. 1442-1443).
Data for these studies continues to be collected and analyzed; conclusions cannot yet be drawn with certainty.
As the BEIR III report states "Further follow-up of the Hanford workers and of other groups occupationally exposed to similar qualities of highly fractionated radiation may eventually tell us whether the risks and the spectrum of cancer sites differ markedly from what would be expected from studies of more heavily exposed populations." (Morgan, Tr. 1585).
I 15.
Even though at present some scientists have found statistically significant positive effects of radiation ex-posure on cancer induction among Hanford, there is consensus nonetheless that the data is not sufficient to preclude the distinct possibility of finding larger effects (GAO, 1981, 16 16-41).
There is additional consensus that only the accumulation of additional data in the coming years can yield more reliable radiation effects.
As Dr. Fabr1xant himself stated about the very studies he criticized, the fact that many of these studies come under scrutiny does not mean they 2-9 I
are wrong; indeed, the likelihood may well exist that re-(
searchers have identified significant phenomena which must be scientifically pursued (Fabrikant, Tr. 1460).
The problem is that because no direct reliable data exists for the effects of low doses only statistical analyses are available s
for this range.
Statistical tests cannot show which dose response curve is right (Morgan, Tr. 1594-1597).
Thus the Board is not convinced that it is appropriate for the Applicant to ignore findings that "There are more cancers produced per rem at low dose's than at high doses".
As the GAO study also indicates the controversy about the hazards of low-level X-Rays is very much alive.
(GAO 1981 11-12)
(See also pp. 11-15 f f. )
16.
Dr. Fabrikant testified that he is of the opinion that even if there is more initial harm from low dosage radiation exposure than from high radiation the ultimate risk of harm is offset by the tissue repair that probably obtains for low radiation exposure (Fabrikant, Tr. 1452-1453).
l The Board however is not convinced of the conclusiveness of this testimony.
The Board is cognizant of the fact that the BEIR III Committee chose not to factor this possible effect into its risk estimate, because the Committee found that the sparseness of the data was not reliable enough for determining dose rate effectiveness (Fabrikant, Prepared Testimony, p. 19; Tr. 1453-1454).
Animal studies form the basis of repair documented in NCRP Report No. 64, 1980; but the GAO has cautioned that "A better understanding of the underlying mechanisms of cancer induction by radiation is necessary to allow scientists to develop risk estimates of 2-10
T low-level exposures with greater confidence."
(GAO 1981, pp. 20-38; Morgan, Prepared Testimony, p.
5).
17.
Accordingly, the Board finds too much uncertainty about the methods of calculating the hazards of low dosage effects to accept Applicant's contention that the linear k
model is sufficiently conservative.
The Board finds no credible evidence to rule out the significant and distinct possibility that exposure to low dose of radiation causes a greater cancer risk per unit dose than exposure to high dose.
The evidence shows that in designing a utility and an ALARA program, conservativeness is mandatory.
The Board therefore finds it appropriate that the Applicant adopt the supralinear dose response model for which no evidence has been adduced to invalidate.
18.
The Board finds therefore that the risk estimates of potential health effects to occupationally exposed workers as contained in Section 5.9.3.1 of the Byron Final Environ-mental Statement ("FES") are not conservative enough given the uncertainty of current scientific knowledge.
Accordingly, the Board finds that pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 51.53 (b) (5) that the license should not be issued as proposed.
19.
The Board also finds that the Applicant's operating procedure for the cost-benefit computer program be adjusted to evaluate the benefits and costs of reducing worker's ALARA according to revised cancer risk estimates basedi.upon the supralinear model (Rescek, Applicant's Prepared Testimony, pp. 6-7).
20.
The Board also finds that as a condition of its 2-11
license the Applicant should adopt record keeping pro-cedures to enable it to collect occupational exposure data which can be used epidemiologically over the life span of the plan and for appropriate periods of time sub-sequent to study the hazards of low radiation exposure.
Y ALARA Program 21.
Mr. Frank Rescek, the head Health Physics-Tech-nical Services Engineer of Commonwealth Edison Company and Mr. James Van Laere, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor and the Radiation Protection Manager at Commonwealth Edison's Byron Nuclear Generating Station, described the corporate ALARA program and its Byron Station counterpart respectively.
(Rescek, Applicant Prepared Testimony at 2-8, ff. Tr. 1157; Rescek, Tr. 1268-1273; Van Laere, Applicant Prepared Testimony at 2-10, ff. Tr. 1707).
22.
Applicant's witnesses testified to its strong commitment to its ALARA program.
However, on June 27, 1980, when Applicant's technical services engineer was lead health physicist at Applicant's Zion Nuclear Power Station in charge of what he also considered a strong ALARA program, j
the NRC released an appraisal report in which it found, i
pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 21, a series of deficiencies in Applicant's performance.
These deficiencies, with the potential i
for creating substantial safety hazards as defined at 10 C.F.R.
Section 21.3, gave rise to 8 Significant Action Items raised by the NRC (Rescek Tr. 1236).
One of the deficiencies identified was weak management and management support of the radiation protection program (Rescek, Tr. 1236).
Another of the deficiencies identified was the dilution of corporate
(
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.s
management's responsibility for ALARA concerns.
In addition the NRC pinpointed a problem with weak radiation protection program management.at all levels in the operating station.
Moreover, the NRC found deficiencies in the practical super-vising training in the ALARA program (Rescek, Tr. 1236-7).
1 23.
While Mr. Rescek testified that these findings were not applicable to Byron, the Board is not so sanguine about the evidence presented as to the projected interrelation-ship of the corporate and the Byron Station ALARA programs.
First of all, while special review committees have been created within the corporate structure the Station ALARA coordinator is not represented on any of those review commit-tees (Van Laere, Prepared Testimony, p. 3).
In addition even within the corporate structure the lead health physicist, Mr. Rescek, does not have immediate access to top corporate management in the event of an emergency.
This chain of command involves a reporting line of four individuals above Mr. Rescek.
Indeed Mr. Rescek conceded there are no written established emergency procedures for reporting emergencies (Rescek, Tr. 1212-1213).
24.
Similar problems exist in the Byron Station's organizational structure.
The Station ALARA coordinator does not report directly to the Station superintendent even though another operations official in a parallel line of authority does report directly to the Station superintendent (Van Laere, Tr. 1722,.1767).
The problem of diluted ALARA responsibility is especially severe at Byron.
Mr. Van Laere testified that the Station superintendend has many other responsibilities in addition to ALARA activities 2-13
(Van Laere, Prepared Testimony, p. 5; Tr. 1722-1723).
In addition, Mr. Van Laere, who is designated as ALARA coordi-L nator, spends only 10 to 15 percent of his time in that capacity (Van Laere Tr. 1714).
Moreover, the Board has no assurance that the Byron Station even has a Station ALARA
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coordinator in place who will continue with those respon-sibilities once operation starts up (Van Laere Tr. 1767-8).
25.
The Board is also concerned with incipient signs of weak management at all levels of the Byron Station.
The Applicant provides no sanctions for failure to support the Byron ALARA program and the ALARA coordinator lacks the authority i
to take any action for noncompliance.
Instead, such respon-sibility is left up to the vagaries of the superintendent's discre' tion.
During Mr. Van Laere'e tenure at Byron beginning in 1978 to the present, no such actions have been taken (van Laere, Tr. 1723).
26.
The Board finds Byron Station's own ALARA program i
seriously inadequate.
The Byron Station ALARA's coordinator testified that the development of the Byron Station ALARA l
program consisted mainly of the clerical function of placing i
references to the Byron Station in appropriate places of the i
corporate manual (Van Laere, Tr. 1698-1702).
Moreover, Mr.
Van Laere testified that he does not serve on corporate ALARA l
committees nor is he required to understand the technology involved in the corporate ALARA program (Van Laere, p. 1704).
The Board has serious concerns that the ALARA Station coordina-tor with the responsibility for developing a site specific ALARA program relies on clerical tasks of adjusting the cor-porate program and that there is no requirement that he 2-14 l
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i understand the technology involved in that program.
27.
The Board finds in addition that the Applicant's
" aggressive commitment to a Strong ALARA program" does not extend past the paper program it asks us to consider.
The Byron ALARA coordinator was unable'to provide direct h
substantive instances of actions taken to demonstrate this commitment (van Lstre p. 1763).
Although Edison anticipates that the health physics department will have a staff of 28 full-time and 15 part-time technicians, the department's staff at presen,t consists of 18 radiation chemistry technicians, only 4 of whom are degreed health phyaic3sts (van Laere, Tr.
1717).
Further, there is no degreed health physicist assigned to each shift at the plant.
There is no college degree requirement for these positions (Van Laere, Tr. 1718).
The Byron ALARA coordinatar is not a degreed health physicist; he receive'd an undergraduate degree in environmental health.
Mr. Van Laere also lacks any Board certification nor is he required to understand any of the technology involved in monitoring radiation doses in order to keep them ALARA (van Laere Tr. 1704).
In addition, there is no ph.D. health physicist anywhere in the corporate structure, nor does the Applicant have anyone on the corporate staff with the board certification by the American Board and Health Physics as a health physicist (Rescek, Tr. 1162, 1294).
28.
Mr. Rescek demonstrated a lack of understanding about such fundamentals as the interaction of radiation with matter; a lack of knowledge about the behavior of all the principal forms of ionizing radiation that are involved such as alpha, beta, gamma particles, neutrons--fast, thermal and 2-15
epithermal.
He was unfamiliar with maximum permissible concentrations, such as those values given in Table 1 and Table 2 of Title 10, Part 20 of NRC values (Morgan, Tr. 16 36-7 ;
Rescek Tr. 1171-3; 1217).
In practical matters, Mr. Rescek was unaware that there are two hundred area monitors at the k
Byron Station (Rescek Tr. 1178; Van Laere, Prepared Testimony,
- p. 20).
Mr. Rescek's limited expertise exemplifies Applicant's lack of commitment to providing its ALARA program with vigorous leadership.
Indeed Mr. Rescek's past performance at Zion adds weight to this finding.
Mr. Rescek's lack of concern when asked to explain the effects of a neutron ex-posure accident reflected an all too common attitude on the part of the Applicant.
When confronted with its preparedness in the event, however unelikely, of a critical accident, he answered that Commonwealth Edison has a library for this information (Rescek, Tr. 1303).
29.
The Board finds that neither the size of Applicant's health physics staff especially in the Byron Plant, the know-ledgeability of its lead ALARA officials, nor the organizational l
interrelationship of the Station and corporate ALARA programs I
l demonstrate that Applicant program will be able to maintain occupational exposures ALARA.
Training 30.
The Board also views the integration of ALARA requirements into the training program for employees as 1
extremely weak.
Both Misters Rescek and Van Leare testified
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that the only training currently in place for all workers is the one-day N Get Training program.
Applicant's witnesses concede this program is " fast".
(Rescek, Tr. 1276).
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No reference is made to ALARA requirements except that the order for suiting up in given instructions in regarding the N-Get class.
(Rescek, Tr. 1205)
Perhaps this is because ther is no published order for suiting up.
The witness said such a procedure is a matter of " common sense."
(Rescek, k
Tr. 1205) 31.
The ALARA Station coordinator has the primary responsibility for ensuring proper training in the area of radiation protection (Van Laere, Tr. 1695).
This training program is given tc all workers through the basis N-Get training program (Van Laere, Tr. 1724 ).
This program, however, provides no specific training in the area of radiation protection.
(Van Laere, Tr. 1725).
The Byron Station has no specific training requirements, save for health physicist technicians at any level from technicians to foremen or health physics engineering assistants (Van Laere, pp. 1717-1719).
32.
Although radiation chemistry technicians are required to go through a formal training program the Byron l
Station ALARA coordinator who oversees the training department does not know the qualifications of those who will train the radiation chemistry technicians (Van Laere, Tr. 1721).
33.
The Board finds that the Applicant has not carried its burden in ensuring aggressive compliance with 10 C.F.R.
Section 19.12.
l DOSIMETRY l
f 34.
Although Van Laere testified that the Byron Station l
l will have more than 200 in-plant monitoring instruments (van l
Laere, Prepared Testimony at 20-21, ff. Tr. 1707), Mr. Rescek l
l testified that there are none at the Byron plant (Rescek, 2-17 l
Tr. 1178).
35.
Although Mr. Van Laere is not familiar with the
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technology of the dosimeters to be used at Byron he stated that those employed at the plant represent state of the act, even though he conceded they were purchased in the late i
1970's and he has not reviewed what is currently available.
(Van Laere, Tr. 1735).
Mr. Van Laere was unable to state how many portable rem meters will be in use at Byron (Van Laere, Tr. 1733).
36.
As the ALARA Station Coordinator, Mr. Van Laere testified that considerations for the health and safety of the public do not necessarily outweigh the operational im-portance of a job to be performed when Byron personnel must decide whether to delay the operations until after short-lived radionuclides have been released (van Laere, Tr. 1736-1740).
37.
Installation of a manway handling device will not make the manway removing and installation totally a remote procedure which precludes relieving ALARA guidelines (Van Laere, Tr. 1742).
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38.
Mr. Van Laere, as Byron ALARA Coordinator did not know Byron Station's ALARA goals for 1983 for total man rems, l
even though REG GUIDE 8.8 Sections 1B and 1C require l
a specific measurement system to maintain radiation exposure ALARA (Van Laere, Tr. 1743).
In addition Applicant has no plans to use or independently monitor to determine the ef-ficiency of its in-house ALARA program (Van Laere, Tr. 174 5).
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The Board disagrees with Applicant's witness and finds an independent audit to be a reasonable ALARA goal (Van Laere, Tr. 1746).
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39.
The Applicant's method of ducking the accuracy of its badges with spiked badges has some weakness.
The percentages of those that are spiked is extremely small (12-15/500 badges).
There are no guidelines for determining whether the results reported demonstrate that the badges i\\
are performing satisfactorily (Rescek, Tr. 1257).
The Applicant does not expose the spiked badges to neutron doses.
(Rescek, Tr. 1225).
Although the Applicant relies on the same vendor it has dealt with before in identifying spiked reports that vendor's track record of accuracy is according to Applicant's own witness, only " fairly good". (Rescek, Tr. 1227).
40.
The Board has concerns with the calibration of protable instruments.
There are no present standard neutron sources for checking the neutron instruments and the corporate lead health physicist testified he did not know when such a source was expected to arrive at the Byron plant (Rescek, Tr. 1182).
l 41.
In addition, the Applicant has no facilities to process film badges or TLD's in emergencies.
It depends totally on the services of its outside vendor.
Results may not arrive until seven hours later.
(Rescek, Tr.
1219).
In addition Applicant does not have the facilities in-house to analyze urinal fecal samples (Van Laere Tr. 1751).
l Mr. Rescek as lead health physicist of the corporate program wac unable to state the criterion for when either urine or fecal samples should be taken to measure intake from high radiation areas.
Not until Mr. Van Laere the ALARA Station Coordinator learned of Mr. Rescek's testimony regarding the level of maximum permissible individual organ and total body 2-19 I
burdens,.did he revise his figures of 10 and 25% respectively.
PREGNANT WOMEN 42.
Applicant follows a policy of establishing limits on radiation exposures to self-declared pregnant women of 500 millirems over her gestation period (Rescek, Prepared Testi-
)
mony at 27, ff. Tr. 1157).
However, in Applicant's N-Get Nuclear General Employee Training Manual, it states that the decision whether to continue assignments in areas where radiation levels are high enough for baby to receive 500 millirems or more before birth is the pregnant female.
The training manual also characterizes the choice as involving a "small increased risk." (Rescek, Tr. 1202-1203)
The Board does not find that Applicant adequately educates every female worker or the potential risks of radiation exposure to a fetus.
43.
Moreover, the Board finds that the Applicant lacks any affirmative policy to avoid employment disincentives.
i Fear of loss of seniority or promotion are realistic built-in l
disincentives to declaring pregnancy when the only clear option 1
for a self-declared pregnant woman is reassignment with no assurance that she will not take a cut in pay scale, lose a
-promotion, her seniority or even vacation time (Rescek, Tr.
1193).
INDUSTRIAL SABOTAGE l
l 44.
Applicant does not bear the primary responsibility for establishing and implementing pre-employment screening procedures for contract workers in order to have unescorted access to the plant (Roulo, Tr. 1358).
45.
Applicant has no established statistical methods for random selection of contractors for auditing their screening procedures.
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1 46.
One of the Sig nificant Appraisal Findings of the NRC staff's audit identified vandalism as a serious deficiency in Applicant's security system (Rescek, Tr. 1250).
Despite supervisory measures that were adopted the Board finds that the screening procedures and audits conducted by Applicant h
of contractors do not-adequately address this serious safety issue.
TEMPORARY WORKERS 47.
The Board finds that because Applicant relies on the temporary worker for his dosage history it cannot keep accurate records of these workers' exposures in order to keep them ALARA.
48.
Accordingly, the Board finds that the Applicant must institute procedures at a minimum that duplicate its screening procedures for pre-employment history of contract l
workers.
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d The foregoing document, "Intervenor Rockford League of Women Voters' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding ALARA and Steam Generator Tube Integrity" is respectfully submitted by the undersigned attorney for the Rockford League of Women Voters, bb DAVID C. THOMAS i
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DAVID C. THOMAS 77 S. Wacker Dr.
Chicago, IL 60606 j
(312) 567-5050
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