ML20077J097
| ML20077J097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1983 |
| From: | Becker B, Bloom J, Crowley C, Furse M, Mark Miller COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20077J095 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8308120246 | |
| Download: ML20077J097 (162) | |
Text
r v 00tKETED U$bPC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '83 AUG l1 A11 :37 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD,,.,.,. e g ,e yl0$5biIiiNSE8v" BRAi4CH In the Matter of )
)
)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-454 OL
, ) 50-455 OL
)
(Byron Nuclear Fower Station, )
Units 1 & 2) )
APPLICANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL l
l l
l August 9, 1983 SgOS120246830009 O ADOCK 05000454 PDR
f . 6 I
TABLE OF CONTENTS OPINION H. ROCKFORD LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS' (LEAGUE)
CONTENTION lA -- QUALITY ASSURANCE AND 1
QUALITY CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
APPLICABLE LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE AND CORPORATE ORGANIZATION . . . . 4 BYRON STATION MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . 6 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL DURING CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF THE BYRON PLANT . . . . . 8 A. Construction QA/QC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Commonwealth Edison Quality Assurance Audits and Surveillance of Contractor Quality Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 NRC Staff Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 The NRC Staff Region III Special Team Inspection at Byron . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Other Items of Noncompliance. . . . . . . . .17 SALP Evaluations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 NRC Staff Region III Conclusions. . . . . . .18 Stop-Work Orders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 l
Encouraging Workers To Volunteer Information l Concerning Construction Problems and Deficiencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 l
i l The Steam Generator Bolting Problem at Byron and Braidwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Allegations of Intervenor Witnesses . . . . . .25 1
e .
II B, Operational QA/QC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Compliance History At Other Commonwealth Edison Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO THE SALEM TRIP BREAKER EVENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 FINDINGS OF FACT H. ROCKFORD LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS' (LEAGUE)
CONTENTION 1A -- QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 CONTENTION AS LITIGATED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 WITNESSES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE AND CORPORATE ORGANIZATION . . . . 3 BYRON STATION MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION. . . . . . . 7 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL DURING CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF THE BYRCN PLANT. . . . . 9 Construction QA/QC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Commonwealth Edison Quality Assurance Audits and Surveillance of Contractor Quality Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 NRC Staff Inspections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The NRC Staff Region III Special Team Inspection at Byron. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Other Items of Noncompliance . . . . . . . . . . 20 SALP Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Stop-Work Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Encouraging Workers To Volunteer Information Concerning Construction Problems and Deficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 L
o a.
III The Steam Generator Bolting Problem at Byron and Braidwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Allegations of Intervenor Witnesses . . . . . . . . 29 Mr. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Mr. Gallagher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Mr. Stomfay-Stitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 OPERATIONAL QA/QC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Compliance History At Other Commonwealth Edison Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101 APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO THE SALEM TRIP BREAKER EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118
r-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 1 In the Matter of )
)
)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-454 OL
) 50-455 OL
)
(Byron Nuclear Power Station, )
Units 1 & 2) )
APPLICANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL OPINION II. CONTENTIONS H. Rockford League of Women Voters' (League)
Contention lA -- Quality Assurance and Quality Control League Contention lA challenges both the ability and the willingness of the Applicant to implement adequate quality assurance programs for both construction ano operation of the Byron Station. On the basis of constructicn quality assurance deficiencies documented to date at the Byron site, and also on the basis of a recently imposed civil penalty at Applicant's Braidwood site, Intervonor contends that Applicant is both~
unwilling and unable to construct the Byron Station in accor-
l dance with Commission regulations. On the basis of Applicant's past history of noncompliance at all its operating plants, including incidents involving shipments of low-level waste, l Intervenor alleges that Applicant will be unable to operate the Byron Station in compliance with Commission regulations.
Although not explicitly articulated in the contention, it is clear that Intervenors' contention and their evidentiary presentation (both by way of direct and cross-examination) went far beyond assertions regarding specific quality assurance deficiencies. The claim in the contention that Applicant lacks the " willingness" to comply with Commission regulations suggests l that broader questions of management attitude and Applicant's I
technical qualification under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.
$$2201 et. seg., to possess an operating license for Byron are i here at issue. The evidentiary presentations of all parties attempted to address these underlying issues. For example, Applicant presented the testimony of Cordell Reed, a vice-president with responsibility for Applicant's overall nuclear program, to testify regarding the corporate commitment to safe operation and quality construction of its nuclear power plants.
Finally, both Applicant's corporate attitude and the organizational integrity of its quality assurance program are called inte question by the allegation in the contention that the quality assurance program does not require sufficient independence of quality assurance functions from other func-tions within the company.
4 APPLICABLE LAW 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, establishes specific criteria which a nuclear power plant quality assurance program must meet. Among these criteria is the requirement that per-sons and organizations performing quality assurance functions have sufficient organizational independence from cost and scheduling concerns to be able effectively to identify problems and verify their resolution. The quality assurance program must establish procedures for control of design, documents, purchased equipment and materials, and special processes. In addition, there must be a formally documented inspection pro-gram established to verify that all design requirements are-met.
These quality assurance requirements are intended to ensure that:
(a) Applicable regulatory requirements and the design bases, as defined in 10 CFR S 50.2 and as speci fied in the license application, for structures, systems, and components are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, pro-cedures, and instructions.
i (b) stems and components fabricated and tested in manufacturers' facilities conform to l these specifications, drawings, procedures, and l instructions.
(c) Structures, systems, ano components constructed and tested at the facility conform to these specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.
(d) Succeeding activities, such as operat-ing, testing, repairing, maintaining, and modify-ing, are conducted in accordance with quality assurance practices consistent with thos.e employed during design and construction.
g . .
(35 Fed. Reg. 10499, June 27, 1970, as amended at 36 Fed. Reg. 18301, September 17, 1971).
In addition, an applicant for an operating license must include in its Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) a description of the technical qualification of the applicant to engage in the proposed activities in accordance with Commission regulations. 10 CFR $50.34(b)(7). The Commission in turn, in determining that an operating license will be issued to an applicant, will be guided by its appraisal of the applicant's technical qualification to operate in compliance with Commis-sion regulations. 10 CFR 550.40(b).
MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE AND CORPORATE ORGANIZATION Uncontradicted testimony by both Applicant and the NRC Staff has established that at the corporate level Edison has a strong commitment to operating its nuclear plants safely and in compliance with Commission regulations. (Findings 451-455.) This commitment was re-emphasized in a recent cor-porate order, Vice-President's Instruction No. 1-0-17, which was issued by the vice-president of nuclear operations. The order states. "the primary concern of the Company with respect to the operation of its nuclear generating pzants is to ensure the health and safety of the public as well as station person-nel." (Reed, Applicant's Prepared Testimony, Exhibit 2, ff.
Tr. 2594.)
Applicant has taken an active role in industry groups formed t address new and ongoing safety concerns, including support for the activities of the Atomic Industrial Forum and
the Edison Electric Institute. Applicant participates in ad hoc groups formed to address specific technical safety issues, and contributes money and the advice of experienced personnel to safety related research conducted by the Electric Power Research Institute. Applicant has been instrumental in the formation of industry-wide groups which enhance nuclear safety, such as the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center and the Institute for Nuclear Power Operation. (Findings 452-453.)
This commitment to nuclear safety and compliance with Commission regulations is supported by an adequate and effec-tive corporate organization. (Findings 456-467.) Based on the recommendations of a panel of distinguished scientists and business leaders, Applicant recently reassigned responsibility for the operation and maintenance of its nuclear facilities to a single corporate vice-president. (Finding 456) In addition, the corporate reporting chain parallels the organization of the nuclear stations, providing corporate direction and company-wide standardization of practices and procedures at the stations.
(Finding 457.) Moreover, Applicant's nuclear operations are reviewed independently by its nuclear safety department and quality assurance department, and by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). (Findings 456-466).
The organizational independence cf the Applicant's quality assurance department has been established by uncontra-dicted testimony. The quality assurance program is managed at the corporate level by the manager of quality assurance. The manager of quality assurance reports directly to the corporate L
vice-chairman, and is therefore separate from and independent of cost and scheduling constraints and responsibilities on the production side. (Finding 462.)
The NRC Staff Region III panel testified that Appli-cant's construction quality assurance program provides suffi-cient independence of function from other departments. In addition, on the basis of preoperational testing done to date, the Staff testified that Applicant's operational quality assur-
- ance program has demonstrated sufficient organizational freedom and independence. (Finding 468.)
BYRON STATION MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION Byron Station management has the same strong commit-ment to safe operations as has the corporate management. This commitment is carried out at the station level by making cer-tain that proper procedures exist for the safe operation and maintenance of the station, and that these procedures are performed satisfactorily. (Querio, Applicant's Prepared Testi-mony at 2-4, ff. Tr. 2714.)
The Byron Station superintendent fulfills the posi-tion of plant manager as described in American National Stan-dard ANSI N18.1-1971. He is responsible for the direct manage-ment of the station, including the planning, coordination and direction of the operation, maintenance, refueling, and techni-cal activities. He is also responsible for the final approval of all station procedures and reports. (Finding 471.)
_ . . _ . - _ _ . _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ , . _ m r- ,
j When Byron becomes operational, its staff will be organized into four main functional groups: the operating group, the maintenance group, the administrative and support services group, and the personnel administration group. There are three assistant superintendents and a personnel administra-tor in charge of the four functional areas, and they report directly to the station superintendent. (Finding 472.)
Within the Byron Station organization is a station quality control group, headed by a supervisor of quality con-trol. This group of approximately six to ten people is responsi-ble for quality control activities at the station. These activities include reviewing drawings, specifications, mainten-ance/ modification procedures and purchase requests for compli-ance with applicable quality requirements; performing receiving inspection for ASME and safety related incoming materials and items; inspecting fabrication and installation activities; and ensuring that nondestructive examination and other testing is performed as required. The station quality control supervisor l reports to the administration and services assistant superin-l l tendent in order to function independently of the station i
operating and maintenance groups. (Finding 473.)
The Byron quality control group is to be distin-guished from the Byron quality assurance group. There are currently approximately 29 quality assurance employees on site at Byron. These employees comprise two different quality assurance groups: (1) the station (or operating) quality assur-ance group, and (2) the construction quality assurance group.
f The construction quality assurance and station quality assur-ance groups function independently of both the station operat-ing department and the project construction department. The station quality assurance supervisor reports off-site to the director of quality assurance for maintenance and to the direc-tor of quality assurance for operating activities. They in turn report to the corporate manager of quality assurance, and the corporate manager reports directly to the vice-chairman of the company. Similarly, the Byron construction quality assur-ance superintendent reports to the quality assurance director for engineering and construction, who in turn reports to the corporate manager of quality assurance. (Finding 474.)
QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL DURING CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF THE BYRON PLANT A. CONSTRUCTION QA/QC The Commonwealth Edison construction quality assur-ance group at Byron, headed by the quality assurance superin-tendent, is composed of approximately twenty people and is responsible for ensuring that the Byron Station is constructed in conformance with Commission regulations. The construction 1
1
! quality assurance group fulfills this responsibility by conduct-l ing audits and inspections of work done h; centractors and materials supplied by vendors. (Finding 475.)
The current quality assurance superintendent at Byron has held that position since the position was established in l
January, 1981. (Finding 476.) The position was established,
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along with two new supervisor positions, to provide a better supervisory span of control and to achieve more comprehensive and stronger supervisory coverage over the daily site quality assurance organization activities. Before 1981, a site quality assurance supervisor was in charge of the site quality assur-ance organization at Byron, supported by lead technicians covering structural, electrical, mechanical and documentation areas of activity. Prior to the superintendent, there were four quality assurance supervisors. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 13-14, ff. Tr. 2364.)
The four supervisors who preceded the superintendent replaced each ether according to the normal corporate manage-ment development and promotional sequence available to promis-ing management personnel. (Except for one supervisor who was killed in an automobile accident.) To have deprived these people of promotion would have resulted in their leaving Com-monwealth Edison Company. (Id. at 15.)
Walter Shewski, Applicant's corporate manager of quality assurance testified that these changes in quality assurance personnel did not have an adverse effect on quality assurance implementation at Byron. To the contrary, as con-struction work progresses through different project phases (e.g., from concrete and structural work te mechanical and electrical work to preoperational testing and startup modes) it is beneficial periodically to replace the quality assurance person in charge with someone new who has experience matching a particular project phase. (Id. at 16.) Moreover, any disrup-l
e
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tion is short lived because continuity during a supervision change is sustained through the overall membership of the site quality assurance group. (Id.)
Between March 29 and May 11, 1982, the NRC Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement conducted a special team inspection of Byron construction activities. (Stanish, Appli-cant's Prepared Testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 2619.) During the inspection, the NRC Staff raised questions concerning the turnover of quality assurance personnel, and in particular the turnover of supervision. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testi-mony at 14, ff. Tr. 2364.) However, the subsequent inspection report did not contain an item of noncompliance with respect to quality assurance staffing and management policy. (Shewski, Tr. 2523.) An open item was issued with respect to these items. (Id.) Applicant responded to the open item by explain-ing the reasoning behind the quality assurance personnel moves.
(Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 14-15, ff. Tr.
2364.) The open item was subsequently closed without an item of noncompliance being issued. (Id. at 15; Shewski, Tr. 2523.)
The Applicant's construction quality assurance group does not directly perform all of the audits or inspections of work done by contractors and equipment supplied by vendors at Byron. Instead, each contractor or vender is required to have its own quality assurance program and inspections and audits.
Such a delegation of the work of establishing and executing a portion of the quality assurance program is expressly permitted in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The ultimate responsibility for
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the effectiveness of the entire program, however, remains that of Applicant. (Finding 477.)
All contractors performing safety related work at the Byron site have been required by Applicant to commit, in their quality assurance programs, to employing qualified quality control inspectors. (Finding 478.) Such a program was a prerequisite to Applicant granting an award to a contractor.
The contractor's quality assurance program, which included this commitment, was made part of the contract award pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testi-mony at 23-24, ff. Tr. 2364.)
Control of the quality of equipment and materials purchased from vendors is achieved through evaluation of ven-dors, through regular surveillances of their operations, and through appropriate inspections. These quality control acti-vities are carried out by Applicant quality control personnel, if Applicant is purchasing directly from a particular vendor, or by a contractor, if the contractor is the direct purchaser.
All in-coming equipment and materials are inspected by Appli-cant, or by the appropriate contractor, to ensure physical integrity and compliance with procurement document require-ments. In addition, for ASME Code and sarery-related items that have not been inspected at the vend:r's plant, specific l
receipt inspection meAct res, such as material and dimensional !
checks against approved drawings and specifications, are per-
! formed to verify conformance with procurement requirements.
(Finding 479.)
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Commonwealth Edison Quality Assurance Audits and Surveil-lances of Contractor Quality Assurance Activities To ensure that contractor quality control inspectors perform competent work in accordance with regulatory require-ments, Commonwealth Edison's Byron site quality assurance group has conducted regular audits and surveillances of the construc-tion work and contractor inspection activities. The quality assurance group is also responsible for verifying that appro-priate corrective action is taken to remedy deficiencies, whether identified by quality assurance, station quality con-trol, or others. (Findings 480-484.)
In addition, an independent testing agency, the Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory (PTL), performs in-line accep-tance inspections and over-inspections of portions of all con-tractors' work. PTL has about 50 people on site and reports directly to the construction quality assurance group. PTL's activities are not limited to inspection of contractors that have experienced items of non-compliance as a result of NRC inspections, but involve all contractors. (Finding 485.) PTL is currently performing an over-inspection of the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning system at Byron. (Finding 486.)
In September 1982, Applicant's corporate manager of quality assurance instituted an addition =2 program of inspec-tion, which he refers to as a " unit concept" inspection. Under this program, every week an element of the plant is selected, and every aspect of that element is then reinspected by the Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory. Applicant often selects a space between two floors and bound by four columns, and reinspects 1
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r 1
, . l l
l everything contained within that area. The unit concept inspec-J tion has been used, for example, to reinspect the entire diesel generator room. (Finding 487.)
Applicant's quality assurance program also requires that a management audit of the program's implementation, both during construction and operation, be performed every two years. Applicant's hires an independent organization to do the management audit, and the results are reported directly to the corporate vice-chairman. (Finding 488).
NRC Staff Inspections At the top of the pyramid of inspection activities, above the contractors, above the independent testing agency, and above the Applicant, is the Inspection and Enforcement i
branch of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Region III is responsible for NRC Staff inspection activities at the Byron site. The purpose of '.he Region III construction inspection program is to verify, by means of inspections done on a samp1-ing basis, that the Byron station is constructed in accordance with Commission requirements and Applicant's commitments. The keystone of this inspection program is verification that Appli-cant has an adequate quality assurance program and that the quality assurance program is being effecriev y implemented.
(Finding 500.)
With few exceptions, when a noncompliance with Com-mission requirements is identified, enforcement action is taken. (Finding 501.) The severity level assigned to a par-ticular item of noncomplaince is determined in the first in-
stance by the Region III inspector who discovers the item.
These findings are then reviewed by management personnel. The NRC Staff Region III panel testified that often there is an element of judgment involved in determining what severity level an item of noncompliance falls into. This subjectivity was illustrated by the Staff's disagreement concerning the scope of the present severity levels. (Finding 503.)
Generally, the number of noncompliances identified by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement has increased in recent years for all nuclear sites under construction. One reason for the increase has been a greater emphasis on construc-tion quality assurance by the Commission. Another reason is the recent implementation by the Commission of a resident inspector program. (Finding 504.)
In recent years the number of noncompliances docu-mented at the Byron site has increased. In 1978, a total of three items of noncompliance were identified at Byron by the NRC Staff: two infractions and one deficiency. In 1982, 30 items of noncompliance were documented. (Finding 505.)
There are also reasons specific to Byrcn why the number of noncompliances has recently increased at the Byron site. The number of inspector hours spent on site has increased, from 361 in 1978 to, conservatively, 2547 ir. 1982. In addi-tion, closer attention by Region III has been paid to Byron as it approaches its fuel-load date. (Finding 506.)
Attachments B-2 and B-3 to NRC Staff Region III prepared testimony shows numbers of noncompliances for differ-
s .
ent construction sites within Region III. The Staff panel testified that simply tabulating numbers of noncompliances without additional information is not very helpful. Relevant additional information includes the amount of civil penalties imposed, the severity levels of items of noncompliance, and conclusions contained in the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfernance (SALP) reports. (Finding 507.) During construc-tion the Byron Station has never been the subject of a civil penalty. (Finding 508.)
The NRC Staff Region III Special Team Inspection at Byron.
Between March 29 and May 11, 1982, the Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement conducted a special team inspection of Byron construction activities. Within the areas inspected, the Byron quality assurance program was deemed good.
Examples of program implementation deficiencies were identified which required corrective action by the Applicant (Finding 509.)
Nine items of non-compliance (four Severity Level IV and five Severity Level V) and ten unresolved or open items were identified. (Finding 510.) Michael Stanish, Applicant's construction quality assurance superintendant at Byron, testi-fied extensively to Applicant's corrective actions in response to the items of a noncompliance. Mr. Stanich described correc-tive measures taken for eight of the nine items of noncompliance.
He described measures taken to resolve the particular items, and he also described measures taken by Applicant to ensure that such noncompliances will not reoccur. (Stanish, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 5-19, ff. Tr. 2619.)
Applicant's corporate manager of quality assurance testified to corrective action taken with respect to the remain-ing noncompliance item, which concerned the qualification and certification of quality control inspectors. The NRC Staff felt that the qualification program at Byron was lacking because Applicant had not established minimum features and methodologies to be employed when certifying QA/QC personnel. To correct this perceived deficiency, on June 9, 1982, Applicant issued a directive to all site contractors listing specifically the minimum requirements to be used as the basis for certification.
This directive was intended to standardize the certification process at Byron. Quality control inspection personnel on site at Byron have been recertified to the new quantified require-ments of the June 9, 1982 directive. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 31-33, ff. Tr. 2364.) In addition, Commonwealth Edison made commitments to reinspect earlier work by quality control inspectors. (Id. at 35; Forney, Tr. 3658.)
Applicant has submitted a sample reinspection plan which is acceptable to the NRC Staff's Region III.* (Id.; Forney, Tr.
3659.)
The Region III panel testified both to the relatively minor significance of the noncompliance items and to the fact that corrective actions taken for many of the items have been evaluated by Region III inspectors and found acceptable.
- The Board, by Order dated June 21, 1983, has reopened the record with respect to Hatfield Electric Company's quality assurance program and subsequent reinspections of its work.
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i (Forney, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 28-29, ff. Tr. 3586.)
Corrective actions taken by Applicant for four of the nine items of noncompliance have been reviewed by Region III inspec-tors, found acceptable and closed by subsequent inspection reports. Five of the ten open or unresolved items have been reviewed by Region III inspectors, found acceptable and closed by subsequent inspection reports. In addition, Michael Stanish testified for the Applicant that all of the remaining items have been resolved to the satisfaction of Applicant; all that remains is for the NRC Staff to complete its inspections and close these items. (Finding 511.) Considering the kinds of noncompliances identified, the Region III panel testified that Applicant's Quality Assurance program is a good one. (Find-ing 513.)
Other Items of Noncompliance.
Other items of noncompliance at Byron were discussed in detail in the testimony of Michael Stanish, the construction quality assurance superintendent at Byron. For each item, Applicant took thorough corrective action. The NRC Staff Region III panel testified that where items of noncompliance were identified, Applicant's response was generally timely and i
adequate. (Finding 514.)
SALP Evaluations.
The SALP program is an integrated NRC Staff effort to collect available observations on an annual basis and evaluate licensee performance based on these observations. (Forney, NRC l
s .
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Staff Prepared Testimony at 13, ff. Tr. 3586; Del George, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 14, ff. Tr. 2344.) The SALP process is oriented toward furthering the Commission's under-standing (1) how the licensee management directs, guides, and provides resources for ensuring plant safety, and (2) how licensee resources are used and applied. (Forney, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 13, ff. Tr. 3586.)
The SALP-1 (1980) report rates the Byron Station an average performer compared to other licensees both in Region III and nationwide. Moreover, no reactor sites under construction were rated above average. SALP-2 (1981) again demonstrates that Byron's performance was within the regional average.
(Finding 515.)
NRC Staff Region III Conclusions.
As of December 1982, the NRC Staff had performed 125 construction-related inspections at Byron. To accomplish this program, experienced inspectors spent approximately 4800 hours0.0556 days <br />1.333 hours <br />0.00794 weeks <br />0.00183 months <br /> (600 man days) at the construction site, corporate offices, and vendor manufacturing facilities. The great majority of the inspections involved observation of actual installed equipment and work activities or review of associated procedures and i
records. In addition, two in-depth reviews or Applicant's 1
! quality assurance program, one in 1979 and one in 1982, were conducted. (Hayes, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 8, ff. Tr.
3586.)
The NRC Staff testified that, although a number of noncompliances with Commission requirements have been identi-
fled by Staff inspectors during the eight years of construction activity at the Byron site, Applicant's quality assurance program has made certain that effective action was taken to correct identified deficiencies before they could develop into major problem areas. Based on the inspections conducted to date, which have included examinations of procedures and records, interviews with craftsmen and other employees, and in-depth observations by inspectors in specialized technical areas, the NRC Staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that Byron has been constructed in accordance with Commission re-quirements and Applicant's commitments, and can be operated safely. (Id. at 10.)
Stop-Work Orders A significant portion of the evidentiary record dealt with Applicant's approach to stopping work at Byron because of quality problems. While stop-work orders are but one method of assuring quality, their use indicates management willingness to put quality ahead of other considerations such as most and schedule. Such stop-work orders remain in effect until satis-factory corrective measures are implemented. Responsibility for issuing formal stop-work orders rests with the corporate manager of quality assurance. The Applican. nas formally stopped work on site at Byron on nine occasions since the beginning of construction. The Applicant has also stopped work off-site at a vendor plant on two occasions. (Finding 516.)
While the corporate manager of quality assurance is ultimately responsible for the issuance of formal stop-work
orders, if he is unavailable and a serious matter is identi-fled, any person in Commonwealth Edison Company's quality assurance organization has the authority to stop work. (Find-ing 517.) In addition, during day-to-day activities, many short-term stop works, directed against discrete activities and not against the contractor in general, are issued on the spot by Applicant's quality assurance personnel, by contractor quality control inspectors, or by inspectors from the on-site independent testing agency. (Finding 518.) That certain stop-work orders may be expensive for the Applicant is of no concern to the quality assurance organization. While the overall emphasis of Commonwealth Edison as a company is on production, the emphasis of its quality assurance organization is totally en quality. (Finding 519.)
Both Applicant's witnesses and members of the Region III panel testified with respect to stop-work orders issued by Edison against certain Byron contractors and vendors. The record contains detailed discussions concerning stop-work orders against Hatfield Electric Company, the electrical con-tractor at Byron; Systems Control Corporation, (SCC) a Byron vendor of cable trays, main control boards and instrument l
l panels; and Reliable Sheet Metal, the contractor responsible l
for installation and inspection of heating, ventilating and air-conditioning systems and components. (Findings 520-532.)
( The stop-work orders against Hatfield and SCC were lifted after each had initiated corrective actions satisfactory to Edison j and the NRC Staff. (Findings 522, 528.) The stop-work order against Reliable remains in effect, and will continue until
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Reliable's QA/QC program is entirely acceptable to Applicant's quality assurance organization. The projected fuel load date for Byron will not affect the duration of the stop-work order.
(Finding 532.)
The testimony shows that the Applicant has acted appropriately and responsibly to ensure that vendors and con-tractors supply materials and workmanship of adequate quality.
(Findings 520, 529.) Moreover, once a problem with a contrac-tor or vendor is identified, work previously performed or materials already supplied may be thoroughly reinspected.
(Finding 525.)
Encouraging Workers To Volunteer Information Concerning Construction Problems and Deficienciec Any worker at Byron with knowledge of construction deficiencies may contact either Applicant's quality assurance organization or the NRC Staff resident inspector. The resident inspector testified that workers have come to him to report perceived problems. Reports from construction workers on site have led to items of noncompliance. Requests for confidential-ity are respected. (Finding 533.)
Both the Applicant's witnesses and the NRC Staff Region III testified that they knew of no practice or policy, on the part of Applicant or any of its ccr. tractors, to dis-courage workers from reporting problems at the Byron plant.
(Finding 534.) Michael Stanish, the construction quality assurance superintendent at Byron testified that his door was always open to workers with such information, although in his opinion that most workers view the NRC Staff as the major L
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reporting avenue. (Stanish, Tr. 2705.) Mr. Stanish also testified that contractor quality assurance people have ap-proached him informally with information received from con-tractor workers. (Stanish, Tr. 2706-2707.) Robert Querio, the Byron station superintendent, testified that signs had been posted throughout the plant advising workers to report any perceived inadequacies in the care and preservation of equipment to either their supervisor or to control room personnel.
(Querio, Tr. 2741.) Finally, Mr. Stanish testified that he could see no benefit to the Applicant in discouraging workers from reporting potential problems. (Stanish, Tr. 2711.)
To encourage workers to report problems, large signs describing reporting procedures are conspicuously posted through-out the Byron plant. These signs give both a Commonwealth Edison Company phone number and a Staff NRC phone number. A caller is not required to give his name. In addition, NRC Form 3, posted on bulletin boards throughout the plant, pro-vides information to both contractor and Applicant personnel concerning their right to contact the NRC Staff concerning perceived construction problems or deficiencies. (Finding 535.)
The Board finds that there is presently adequate and ample dissemination of information to all workers, whether employed by the Applicant or by contracters, advising them to report any problems to the NRC Staff or to Commonwealth Edison Company. (Finding 535.)
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i
i s The Steam Generator Bolting Problem at Byron and Braidwood A recently imposed civil penalty at the Braidwood site concerning the bolting of steam generators was relied upon by the Intervenors to challenge the overall integrity of the Applicant's construction quality assurance program. They charge that Applicant has failed to take advantage of an earlier experience at Byron to avert the Braidwood problem. In response, Louis O. Del George, Applicant's Staff Assistant to the Assis-tant Vice-President for Nuclear Engineering, Nuclear Fuel Services and Nuclear Licensing, offered extensive testimony on this matter. (Del George, Tr. 2454-2487.)
In 1978, Westinghouse informed Commonwealth Edison of potential problems in holddown bolting for steam generators at facilities similar to Byron and Braidwood. Applicant took action to correct any potential problems with the steam genera-tor bolting at Byron. The potential problem at Eyron was thereby averted, and there remains no problem with steam gener-ator bolting at the Byron facility. (Finding 536.)
In 1982, a notice of noncompliance was issued with respect to the bolting of NSSS equipment at Byron, which in-cluded the bolting of steam generators. (Forney, Tr. 3636.)
The Region III panel testified that this noncompliance did not represent a breakdown in Applicant's quality assurance program at Byron. (Forney, Tr. 3637.) While a February 2, 1983 trans-mittal letter (Intervenors' Joint Exhibit 6, at 1.) makes reference to a breakdown in the Applicant's quality assurance program at Byron, D. W. Hayes of the NRC Staff Region III panel
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A testified that this reference was a mischaracterization, thqt' I the wrong version of the transmittal letter was originally sent '-
to the Applicant, and that the proper ver_sion subsequently 86nt
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contained no such reference. (Hayes,.Tr. 2451, 3637-3638.')
The potential problem in steam generator bolting was addressed at the Braidwood facility about 18 months after it.
was addressed at Byron. The problem was addressed later at c Braidwood because Braidwood is ahproximately two years behind Byron in construction. .During the bolting process at Braid-wood, correctiveacyionsimilartothattakenatByhonwas" ,
^
initiated. However, the specific circumster.ces at Braidwood were such that this action was inadequate- to resolve the Braid-
~
s wood problem. While the Byron problem;had been resolved by a '
, 4 change in length of the bolts used to restrain the steam genera- '-
tors, the generator alignment and bolting procedures a'.
t Braid-wood were such that a change in bolt length al'one was insuffi-s cient to correct the problem. The NRC Staff Reg' ion III testi-fied that the situations at the two facilities were in this respect disoimilar. (Findiny 537.) '
In February,1983, a notice of noncompliance and pro-i posed civil penalty was issued, citing _the steam generator w ;
bolting problem at Braidwood. (In*.ervenors' Joint Exhibit,s.)
The noncompliance was issued because the NF.C Staff believed -
?' '
.x s that corrective action at Bra'idwood had not been taken'in-a s -
I timely manner,'especially censidering the earlier bolting ,
problems at Byron. In addition, Applicant'was considered late s y in reporting the Braidwood probish to the Commission under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e). (Finding 538.)
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The Region III panel considered the Braidwood problem before filing testimony in this proceeding, and neither the problem nor related testimony elicited from witnesses during the hearing changed the panel's conclusion that it had not identified any Applicant policies or attitudes which indicate that noncompliances at one of Applicant's sites will create similar problems at other Edison sites, Byron in particular.
(Finding 539.) The Board agrees with the NRC Staff's assess-ment of Applicant's policies and attitudes. Indeed, witnesses both for Applicant and for the NRC Staff have testified that Applicant does have a program utilizing experience at any particular plant to improve performance at all plants. (Find-ing 540.)
Allegations Of Intervenor Witnesses In addition to relying on cross-examination of Appli-cant and Staff witnesses and documentary evidence, Intervenors submitted the direct testimony of three witnesses, Messrs.
Smith, Gallagher and Stomfay-Stitz. Mr. Smith is a former employee of Hunter Corporation, the piping installation con-tractor at the Byron site, and Messrs. Gallagher and Stomfay-Stitz were employed by Blount Brothers, the contractor at Byron responsible for, inter alia, concrete placement and structural steel erection. Mr. Smith was a quality assurance auditor, Mr. Gallagher operated a concrete batch plant and Mr. Stomfay-Stitz worked as a materials controller and performed some quality control surveillances of structural steel erection.
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The testimony of each of these witnesses consisted of a series of assertions that various aspects of the quality control / quality assurance functions were not being properly performed. The Applicant and Staff each presented responsive testimony and exhibits. Because of the diffuse nature of the assertions made by Messrs. Smith, Gallagher and Stomfay-Stitz, the evidentiary presentations by the Applicant and Staff were lengthly, involving eleven different witnesses.
The apparent thrust of the Intervenors' testimony is that despite the elaborate quality assurance programs of Appli-cant and its contractors and the extensive inspection activi-ties of the NRC Staff, there are significant, widespread, and undetected quality problems at Byron. The Board disagrees.
Applicant and Staff witnesses convincingly demonstrated that virtually all of the concerns set out by the Intervenors' witnesses were trivial and/or had been addressed by an aspect of the quality programs. In addition, each of Intervenors' witnesses made significant changes to his direct testimony, either by way of initial revisions to the pre-filed testimony or as a result of cross-examination. In every instance, the changes diminished the significance of the assertions found in the direct testimony, as filed. Finally, the Board is reluc-tant to base any findings on the testimony of Mr. Stomfay-Stitz.
His demeanor on the witness stand, his apparent evasiveness in responding to questions and his general nervousness cause us to doubt the credibility of his testimony.
After considering the evidentiary record as a whole, the Board finds that Applicant's construction quality assurance
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program is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the Byron streion will be built in accordance with Commission regulations. The Board also finds that the construction qual-ity assurance program has sufficient organizational indepen-1 dence from cost and scheduling concerns to enable it effectively to identify problems and verify their resolution.
B. OPERATIONAL QA/AC The Applicant's station (or operating) quality assur-ance group, composed of approximately nine people and under the direction of a station quality assurance supervisor, is responsi-ble for ensuring that the Byron Station operates safely and in compliance with Commission regulations. This group will perform inspections, surveillances, and audits of all safety related and ASME code related work performed by operating plant per-sonnel, contractors, and other Applicant personnel. This group may be broken down into two subgroups, one responsible for plant operators, i.e., control room operators and equipment operators out in the plant, the other responsible for plant maintenance activities. (Finding 685.)
The station quality assurance supervisor reports to the director of quality assurance for maintenance and to the director of quality assurance for operating activities. They in turn report to the corporate manager of quality assurance and the corporate manager reports directly to the Applicant's vice-chairman. (Finding 686.)
Two senior reactor operators (SRO) are required to be on site at Byron at all times. The Byron Station will have
sufficient SRO personnel so that under normal circumstnces at least three SRO's will be at the station. A senior SRO on the station staff will be assigned on-call duty so that administra-tive level support is available to the shift engineer on a 24-hour-a-day basis. (Finding 687.)
John Spraul, an NRC Staff quality assurance engineer in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, testified that Applicant's description of its operational quality assurance program meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
(Spraul, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 2-3, ff. Tr. 3562; Spraul, Tr. 3581.) Mr. Spraul stated that Applicant's organi-
=ation provides the quality assurance department sufficient independence from cost and scheduling, sufficient authority to effectively carry out quality assurance program operations, and sufficient access to management at a level necessary to perform quality assurance functions. (Spraul, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 2-3, ff. Tr. 3562; Spraul, Tr. 3575, 3578.) The Board so finds.
I Attached to Mr. Sprauls prepared testimony is that portion of the Byron Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dealing with Quality Assurance. Pages 17-1 through 17-3 list seven items that were not found in Applicant's topical report on j quality assurance, and thus not incorporated by reference into the Byron Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). (Spraul, Tr.
3581.) Mr. Spraul testified that formal commitments to these seven items were not required by the Commission's Standard Review Plan (SRP) at the time the Byron SER was prepared.
(Spraul, Tr. 3567, 3572-3573, 3579.) However, due to recent
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revisions made to the SRP, if Applicant were submitting its FSAR today, commitments to these items would be required.
(Spraul, Tr. 3572-3573.) These recent revisions are not retro-active. (Spraul, Tr. 3573.) Mr. Spraul stated that the seven j items were not listed as a criticism of Applicant's quality assurance program. (Spraul, Tr. 3572.) They do not represent significant deficiencies. They represent minor points picked up in the latest version of the SRP. (Spraul, Tr. 3573.)
Mr. Spraul also testified that he did not know whe- l ther one or more or all of the seven items were in fact being implemented by, and a part of, Applicant's quality assurance program. He stated: "All I'm saying here is that the commit-ments of Commonwealth Edison to do this are not in their topi-cal report on quality assurance." (Spraul, Tr. 3581.) In fact, the NRC Staff resident inspector at Byron testified that Applicant has practices or procedures in effect at Byron that meet at least six of the seven items. (Forney, Tr. 3678-3682.)
Compliance History At Other Commonwealth Edison Plants Intervenors contend that past incidents of noncom-pliance at all of Applicant's plants demonstrate an unwilling-ness and inability on Edison's part to maintain an adequate l
operating quality assurance program and to operate the Byron Station in compliance with Commission regulations. In response, 1
Louis O. Del George, testified extensively concerning viola-tions at plants of Applicant which have resulted in civil l
penalties.
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f Since 1974, Applicant has been fined an aggragate of
$313,000.00 by the Commission in connection with the operation of seven reactors and the construction of six additional reac-tors. (Finding 690.) As detailed in Mr. Del George's testi-mony, responses by Applicant to the underlying noncompliances were timely and far reaching. (Finding 691-698.) Signifi-cantly, for the period 1979-1982, all Edison facilities were below the national and regional averages for civil penalties.
(Finding 690.)
Since 1980, Applicant has been denied access to low-level waste burial sites on eight occasions. On three of these occasions, the Commission also assessed a fine. (Finding 699.) The five other instances of denial of access involved minor deviations from facilities' specific rules, and did not violate Commission regulations. (Finding 702.)
Mr. Del George discussed each of the three incidents which led to Commission fines. In one instance, the underside of a rad-waste transport trailer gave unduly high radiation readings. (Finding 700.) Another instance involved a defec-tive closure on a rad-waste shipping container. (Finding 701.)
The final nonconformance involved free-standing water in a shipping cask. (Finding 702.) In each case, Applicant took prompt and thorough corrective action to ensure that these violations would not be repeated. (Findings 700-702.) In fact, Mr. Del George's testimony indicates that at least two of the three violations have not reoccurred. (Findings 700, 701.)
In addition to instituting an independent review by quality assurance personnel of all rad-waste shipments, Common-L_
I wealth Edison has established the position of radioactive waste management administrator in its technical services department.
The administrator maintains detailed records of radioactive j waste shipments, and works closely with station personnel as
) well as appropriate state officials. This has improved Appli-cant's rad-waste shipment performance. (Finding 704.)
Due to improved rad-waste processing technology and i
increased administrative controls, Applicant is reducing the amount of solid waste actually produced at its stations.
Applicant is also upgrading waste handling systems to further improve volume reduction, it is implementing methods to elimi-nate free-standing liquids within packaged wastes, it has improved control of the design of packages used in shipment of radioactive materials, and it has increased quality inspections of prepared shipments of radioactive waste materials. The equipment and administrative controls at the Byron Station will incorporate improvements suggested by prior operating experi-ence. (Finding 705.)
t In April 1977, former employees of the Pinkerton Security Agency made allegations concerning the security system and plant operations at Applicant's Quad-Cities Station.
Pinkerton at that time supplied guard services to Quad-Cities.
The Commission immediately investigated these allegations and
! found certain of Edison's activities to be in noncompliance with Commission regulations. These items were referred to l Commission headquarters in Washington, D.C. for consideration 1
of monetary fines. (Findings 706-707.)
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r Because the allegations concerned the security of a nuclear power station the FBI also conducted an investigation.
The FBI investigation led to a grand jury hearing, and the grand jury returned an indictment against Edison and two of its employees. A trial was held and Applicant and its employees were found not guilty. (Finding 708.)
The Commission deferred administrative action until the Department of Justice concluded its work. Following the aquittal, the Commission again considered the items of non-compliance. In its letter closing out the matter, the Com-mission stated: " recognizing that Commonwealth Edison took prompt corrective action on the specific items of noncompliance which were identified, and recognizing the impact of the Depart-ment's course of action in focusing Commonwealth's attention on security requirements, we conclude that the assessment of a civil penalty at this time is inappropriate and unnecessary to assure lasting corrective action." (Finding 709.)
Unlike the Quad-Cities Station, the Byron Station has been designed with industrial security as one of its design criteria. This will eliminate many of the difficulties Appli-cant experienced developing effective security programs at its earlier operating stations. In addition, Appilcant now has a corporate level security administrator who will aid in the development of the Byron Station security program. (Findings 710-711.)
The security system at Byron Station will be the most sophisticated of any installed at a Commonwealth Edison facil-ity. The security plan for Byron Station has been developed to L
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eliminate many of the problems that existed at earlier facili-ties. It provides alternate compensatory measures to address any problems which may arise during startup and subsequent operation. (Finding 712.)
Mr. Del George testified that details concerning noncompliances at a particular station are communicated through the division vice-president of nuclear stations to the other stations. The division vice-president of nuclear stations is responsible for advising the other stations of any need to amend practices and procedures. Applicant does not assume that any given incluent of noncompliance with applicable regulations is an isolated incident. (Finding 713.)
APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO THE SALEM TRIP BREAKER EVENT The Board ordered a presentation to be made concern-ing the automatic reactor scram systems at Byron in light of the failures of such systems at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit I (" Salem") operated by the Public Service Elec-tric Company. Applicant presented two witnesses, Mr. Robert Querio, the Station Superintendent at Byron and Mr. Lee Sues the Assistant Superintendent of Maintenance and Stores at Byron, to address this concern. Witnesses for the NRC were Kevin Connaughton and William Forney, resident NRC inspectors at Byron. (Finding 714)
At Salem, Westinghouse type DB-50 trip breakers failed to automatically " trip" or shutdown the nuclear reaction in the reactor, making it necessary for an operator in Salem's u
i s control room to do so manually. The Salem system failed because of improper maintenance and lack of a preventive maintenance program. In addition, personnel in the Salem control room failed to make an adequate post-trip analysis of the initial trip breaker incident after its occurrence. (Findings 715, 729.)
The Applicant's presentation examined all aspects of the trip breaker system at Byron as they related to the Salem incident. Through use of a trip breaker as a demonstrative exhibit they described its parts and operation, and activated and operated it. (Findings 716-718.) Applicant, through Mr.
Sues, also presented evidence concerning Byron's general pre-ventive maintenance inspection procedures, both as they were written before the incident and as they were modified after the Salem event. Mr. Sues explained how the Byron procedure incor-porated the vendor manual instructions and recommendations for breaker maintenance and outlined the schedule of maintenance for trip breakers, using the new inspection procedure, both before and after plant operation begins. Changes have also been instituted in the on-line testing procedures for the trip breakers. (Findings 720-722). Finally, both Mr. Sues and Mr.
Querio described the specific repair procedures for trip breakers.
Mr. Querio discussed the responses and activities which occur in the control room during and after a trip, includ-ing a detailed explanation of the various devices in the con-trol room which record the presence of a trip condition in the plant and the events attendant to it and the type of analysis made after a trip occurs. Because of the Salem event, a group at Byron is preparing changes to some aspects of trip analysis L
> s procedures. Among other things, a formal trip analysis proced-ure with a written checklist will be developed to provide reminders to complete any necessary notifications and to review all pertinent data recorded during the trip event. (Finding 728)
Mr. Connaughton of the NRC testified that since the trip breakers were safety equipment everything related to them had to be governed by Commonwealth Edison's Quality Assurance Program. Since the Salem event, the NRC has directed specific licensee testing of trip breakers. The NRC's Region III office will perform inspections at Byron and other plants to verify that the applicable tests were made. Mr. Forney of the NRC testified concerning the NRC's involvement in reactor trips. A licensee is required to notify the NRC of any trip incident.
The NRC analyzes the event and, if necessary, it assigns a senior resident inspector to investigate the trip. In addi-tion, a senior resident inspector monitors a licensee's post-trip actions. If necessary, he can prevent a reactor startup following a trip. (Findings 725-729)
While The Board initiated its inquiry into the Byron trip breakers because of the Salem incident, the evidentiary presentations enabled us to evaluate management attitude regard-i ing quality-related matters. Edison's presentation concerning its efforts to insure the safe and reliable operation of the automatic reactor scram system at Byron gives the Board confi-dence in this system and in the ability of the Station personnel to deal with problems which may arise concerning it. In addi-l tion, the thoroughness of Applicant's quality programs for i
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9 s maintenance testing and power plant operation with respect to the trip breakers are a strong indication of Applicant's com-mitment to quality in the overall operation of Byron.
CONCLUSIONS The Board concludes that the Applicant has utilized operating experience at other plants to improve quality assur-ance at all its plants. The Board also concludes, on the basis of the Applicant witnesses who testified that Applicant has both an appropriate management attitude toward compliance with Commission regulations and the requisite technical qualifica-tion to obtain an operating license and that Applicant has both the willingness and ability to comply with Commission regula-tions.
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00LKETED Uit.FC FINDINGS OF FACT
'83 fdB 11 A11 :37 III. CONTENTIONS r - r n;p ;c
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H. Rockford League of Women Voters' (League) Contention lA -- Quality Assurance and Quality Control 449. League Contention lA, as litigated, provides:
lA. Intervenor contends that Edison does not have the ability or the willing-ness to comply with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, to maintain a quality assur-ance and quality control program, and to observe on a continuing and adequate basis the applicable quality control and quality assurance criteria and plans adopted pur-suant thereto, as is evidenced by Edison's and its architect-engineers' and its con-tractors' past history of noncompliance at all Edison plants (whether or not now operating). In addition, Applicant's quality assurance program does not require sufficient independence of the quality assurance functions from other functions within the Company.
450. To address the contention, Applicant presented a total of thirteen witnesses. Cordell Reed, Applicant's Vice-President of Nuclear Operations, testified to the Applicant's strong corporate commitment to operating the Byron Station safely and in compliance with Commission regulations. Robert Querio, Applicant's Byron Station Superintendent, described the Byron Station organization, the qualifications of Byron Station personnel, and the overall commitment of the station staff to safety and compliance with Commission regulations. Mr. Querio also described procedures for the packaging and transport of J
p waste materials. Louis O. Del George, Applicant's Staff Assis-tant to the Assistant Vice-President for Nuclear Engineering, Nuclear Fuel Services and Nuclear Licensing, described the Applicant's corporate organization and the procedures by which officers at the corporate level attempt to ensure compliance with Commission regulations at all of Applicant's plants. In addition, Mr. Del George discussed past occasions where the Applicant was denied access to low-level waste burial sites.
On several of these occasions, the Applicant was also fined by the Commission for violating Commission regulations. Mr. Del George described the nature of each violation, the corrective measures taken in response, and also longer range changes, both substantive and procedural, made to ensure that violations with respect to waste transport would not reoccur. Finally, Mr. Del George described other incidents of non-compliance at the Applicant's operating stations which have been the subject of fines by the Commission, and he particularly stressed the corrective measurer taken to prevent similar violations.
Walter J. Shewski Applicant's corporate manager of quality assurance, described in great detail the Applicant's quality assurance program as it applies to the Eyron Station. Michael A.
Stanich, the Construction Quality Assurance Superintendent at the Byron Station, discussed items of noncompliance with Commis-sion regulations which have been identified at the Byron site.
Mr. Stanish detailed the responsive actions taken by the Appli-cant to ensure future compliance.
The NRC Staff presented a five member panel from che Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement to address the u ;
adequacy of the Applicant's construction quality assurance program at Byron. In addition, the NRC Staff presented the testimony of John G. Spraul, a Quality Assurance Engineer in the Quality Assurance Branch of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, who addressed the adequacy of the Applicant's operational quality assurance program at Byron.
451. Applicant has a strong commitment to the safe operation of its nuclear plants. (Reed, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 4, Exhibit 2, ff. Tr. 2594; Forney, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 14, ff. Tr. 3586; Forney, Tr. 3860.)
452. Applicant has taken an active role in industry groups formed to address new and ongoing safety concerns, including support for the activities of the Atomic Industrial Forum and the Edison Electric Institute. Applicant participates in ad hoc groups formed to address specific technical safety issues, and contributes money and the advice of experienced personnel to safety related research conducted by the Electric Power Research Institute. (Reed, Applicant's Prepared Testi-mony at 4, ff. Tr. 2594.)
453. Applicant has been instrumental in the formation of industry-wide groups which enhance nuclear safety, such as the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) and the Institute for Nuclear Power Operation (INPO). (Id.) Applicant's nuclear plants, both those operating and under construction, have been evaluated by INPO a number of times, and Applicant fully sub-scribes to INPO principles. (Reed, Tr. 2605.)
454. Commonwealth Edison has been operating nuclear j power plants since the late 1950's and is considered by other
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utilities a leader in the industry. This is evidenced by the fact that several of Commonwealth Edison's people, past and present, serve or have served on standards committees, research advisory committees and policy committees within the nuclear power field. (Del George, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 3-4, ff. Tr. 2344.)
455. The Board finds that Commonwealth Edison is fully committed at the corporate level to operating its nuclear plants safely and in compliance with Commission regulations. !
l 456. In 1979 Applicant engaged a panel of distinguished scientists and business leaders to evaluate the effectiveness of its nuclear operation. (Id. at 5) As a result of recom-mendations made by this panel, Applicant reassigned responsi-bility for the operation and maintenance of its nuclear facili-ties to a single corporate vice-president. The purpose of this change was to allow Applicant to better focus its efforts on safety and on the overall quality of nuclear operations. (Id.)
457. Reporting to the vice-president of nuclear operations is the division vice-president of nuclear stations.
Three functional managers report to the division vice-president of nuclear stations: one for operations, one for maintenance and one for technical services. This corporate organization parallels the organization of the nuclear stations, providing corporate direction and company-wide standardization of prac-tices and procedures at the stations. This is one way Appli-cant is able to effectively utilize experience at each of its 1
facilities to improve its operations at all of its facilities.
(Id. at 5-6.)
458. Applicant's nuclear operations are reviewed by two independent organizations within the company: the nuclear safety department and the quality assurance department. (Id.
at 8.)
459. The individuals comprising the nuclear safety department are highly experienced senior employees of the Applicant. This group reviews deviation reports, licensing event reports and station operation to determine whether any long-term trends adverse to safety are occuring at any nuclear plant. This group also has the authority to perform an indepen-dent design review function in which it decides, apart from compliance with regulatory requirements, the adequacy of design of various plant structures, systems and components. In this respect, they perform a function analogous to the Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. (Id. at 10.)
460. The head of the nuclear safety department reports directly to Applicant's chairman and president, and on a day-to-day basis works with the vice-president of nuclear operations.
(Id.)
461. A four-person on-site team from the nuclear safety department will be assigned to the Byron Station when it is placed in operation. (Id.)
462. Quality Assurance is one cf the administrative controls employed by Applicant to make certain that all activi-ties important to safety, both in the construction of plants and in their operation, are performed in conformance with NRC regulations. The establishment of an appropriate quality l
assurance program is required under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
l Under that provision, the ultimate responsibility for the assurance of quality and compliance with Commission regulations in all phases of plant construction and operation rests with the Applicant. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 2364; Shewski, Tr. 2367.)
463. Applicant's quality assurance program is managed at the corpe.cate level by the manager of quality assurance.
The manager of quality assurance reports directly to the Appli-cant's vice-chairman, and is therefore separate from and inde-pendent of cost and scheduling constraints and responsibilities on the production side. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testi-mony at 7-8, ff. Tr. 2364; Shewski, Tr. 2580.)
464. Each operating station has several quality assurance employees on site during normal working hours and during other hours such as during a refueling outage. (Del George, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 9, ff. Tr. 2344.)
465. Applicant's quality assurance department audits more aspects of Applicant's operation than is the case for any other nuclear utility. (Id. at 8-9.)
466. An independent group which monitors and evalu-ates Applicant's nuclear operations is the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). ASME is the primary code setting body for nuclear vessels, piping systems and concrete contain-ment. Each of Applicant's nuclear operating units has an N-Stamp granted by ASME. The N-Stamp is required for Applicant I to perform work on items subject to the ASME code. Applicant is one of only a handful of utilities which have obtained an l
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N-Stamp and are technically qualified to perform their own ASME code related work. (Del George, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 2344.)
467. Applicant has obtained an ASME N-Stamp for the Byron Station. (Id.)
468. The NRC Staff Region III panel testified that Applicant's construction quality assurance program provides sufficient independence of function from other departments. In addition, on the basis of preoperational testing done to date, the Staff testified that Applicant's operational quality assur-ance program has demonstrated sufficient organizational freedom and independence. (Forney, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 15, ff. Tr. 3586.)
469. The Board finds that Applicant's corporate structure is fully adequate to implement the strong corporate commitment to safety and compliance with Commission regulations.
470. When fully operational, and after all start up tests, there will be approximately 470 employees assigned to the Byron Station to operate and maintain the plant. During initial startup there will be additional personnel. Currently, approximately 450 persons are assigned to the station, involved both in preparation of the plan +. for operation and the perform-ance of various preoperational testing and checks. (Queric, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 2714; Querio, Tr.
2718.)
471. The Byron Station superintendent fulfills the position of plant manager as described in American National Standard ANSI N18.1-1971. He is responsible for the direct 1
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management of the station, including the planning, coordination and direction of the operation, maintenance, refueling, and technical activities. He is also responsible for the final approval of all station procedures and reports. (Id. at 5.)
472. When Byron becomes operational, its staff will be organized into four main functional groups: the operating group, the maintenance group, the administrative and support services group, and the personnel administration group. There are three assistant superintendents and a personnel administra-tor in charge of the four functional areas. They report di-rectly to the station superintendent. (Querio, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 2714.)
473. Within the Byron Station organization is a station quality control group, headed by a supervisor of qual-ity control. This group of approximately six to ten people is responsible for quality control activities at the station such as reviewing drawings, specifications, maintenance / modification procedures and purchase requests for fulfillment of applicable quality requirements; performing receiving inspection for ASME and safety related incoming materials and items; inspecting fabrication and installation activities; and ensuring that nondestructive examination and other testing is performed as required. (Id. at 10-11; Shewski, Tr. 2535 2537, 2543; Querio, Tr. 2718.) The station quality control supervisor reports to the administration and services assistant superintendent in order to function independently of the station operating and maintenance groups. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 7, ff. Tr. 2364; Shewski, Tr. 2537; Spraul, Tr. 3564-3565.)
_g.
474. The Byron quality control group is to be distin-guished from the Byron quality assurance group. There are presently 29 quality assurance employees on site at Byron.
(Shewski, Tr. 2536.) These employees comprise two different quality assurance groups: (1) the station (or operating) quality assurance group, and (2) the construction quality assurance group. (Shewski, Tr. 2536.) Edison's construction quality assurance and station quality assurance groups function independently of both the station operating department and the project construction department. The station quality assurance supervisor reports off-site to the director of quality assur-ance for maintenance and to the director of quality assurance for operating activities. They in turn report to the corporate manager of quality assurance, and the corporate manager reports directly to the vice-chairman of the company. Similarly, the construction quality assurance superintendent reports to the quality assurance director for engineering and construction, who in turn reports to the corporate manager of quality assur-ance. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 7-8, ff. Tr.
2364.)
475. Applicant's construction quality assurance group at Byron, headed by the quality assurance superintendent. is composed of approximately twenty people and is responsible for ensuring that the Byron plant is constructed in conformance with Commission regulations. The construction quality assur-ance group fulfills this responsibility by conducting audits and inspections of work done by contractors and materials supplied by vendors. (Shewski, Tr. 2545, 2559) w _- _ _ - _ - - . _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ . .. . .. ..
.a .
476. The current quality assurance superintendent at Byron has held that position since the position was established in January, 1981. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 13-14, ff. Tr. 2364.)
477. Applicant's construction quality assurance group does not directly perform all the audits or inspections of work done by contractors and equipment supplied by vendors at Byron.
(Shewski, Tr. 2370; Williams, Tr. 3686.) Instead, each contrcc-tor or vendor is required by Applicant to have its own program of inspections and audits. Such a delegation of the work of establishing and executing a portion of the quality assurance program is expressly permitted in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
The ultimate responsibility for the effectiveness of the entire program, however, remains that of Applicant. (Shewski, Tr.
2526.)
478. All contractors performing safety related work at the Byron site have been required by Applicant to commit, in their quality assurance programs, to employing trained and qualified quality control inspectors. (Shewski, Tr. 2525.)
479. All in-ccming equipment and materials are inspected by Applicant, or by the appropriate contractor, to ensure physical integrity and comp 12ance with procurement document requirements. In addition, for ASME Code and safety-related items that have not been inspected at the vendor's plant, specific receipt inspection measures, such as material and dimensional checks against approved drawings and specifica-tions, are performed to verify compliance with procurement i
t requirementu. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 6-7, ff. Tr. 2364; Williams, Tr. 3686.)
480. Applicant's Byron construction quality assurance group has conducted regular audits and surveillances of the I l
construction work and contractor inspection activities. (Shew-ski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 26, ff. Tr. 2364.) The quality assurance group also verifies that appropriate correc-tive action is taken to remedy deficiencies, whether identified 1
by quality assurance, station quality control, or others. (Id.
at 5-6.)
481. An audit is a formal investigation of the work activities of contractors in order to determine whether the contractor is meeting its contract requirements with respect to specifications, standards, Commission regulations, and the ASME Code. In performing an audit, Applicant's quality assurance personnel rely in part on documents generated by the particular contractor being audited (Shewski, Tr. 2373, 2569.) In addi-tion, the auditors observe the operations and activities taking place at the site. (Shewski, Tr. 2374, 2569.)
482. Applicant's quality assurance auditors are trained to examine documents and to look for alterations or discrepancies, in order to determine whether the documents have been falsified. (Shewski, Tr. 2376.)
483. In 1976, 1977 and 1978, Applicant's Byron site i
quality assurance group performed 37, 50, and 68 formal audits, respectively. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 26, ff. Tr. 2364.)
i l
484. A surveillance is a less formal type of examina-tion. It entails visiting the plant, observing work being perforced, and determining whether that work conforms to writ-ten procedures. (Shewski, Tr. 2371.) In 1977 and 1978 Appli-cant's Byron site quality assurance group performed 486 and 550 surveillances, respectively. Applicant's project construction department also performed surveillances of the contractors' work activity. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 26, ff. Tr. 2364.)
485. An independent testing agency, the Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory (PTL), performs in-line acceptance inspec-tions and over-inspections of portions of all contractors' work. (Id; Shewski, Tr. 2381.) PTL has approximately 50 people at Byron. PTL reports directly to the construction quality assurance group. (Shewski, Tr. 2545.) PTL's activi-ties are not limited to inspection of contractors that have experienced items of non-compliance as a result of NRC inspec-tions, but involve all contractors. (Shewski, Tr. 2567.)
486. PTL's range of over-inspection is from five percent to as high as one-hundred percent, depending upon the particular circumstances. Generally, a one-hundred percent over-inspection is reserved for situations of quality concern.
(Shewski, Tr. 2567.) Currently, PTL is performing an over-inspection of the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning system at Byron. (Shewski, Tr. 2514; Stanish, Tr. 2664.)
487. In September 1982, Applicant's corporate manager of quality assurance instituted a " unit concept" inspection.
Under this program, every week an element of the plant is c___ - _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ _
. _ ...l
selected, and every aspect of that element is reinspected by PTL. Applicant often selects a space between two floors and bound by four columns and PTL then reinspects everything con-tained within that volume. (Shewski, Tr. 2572.) Some items are inaccessible to reinspection, e.g., bolts that have been concreted in. (Shewski, Tr. 2590.) The unit concept inspec-tion has been used to reinspect the entire diesel generator room. (Shewski, Tr. 2572.)
488. Applicant's quality assurance program also requires that a management audit of the program's implementa-tion, both during construction and operation, be performed every two years. Applicant hires an independent organization to perform the management audit, and the results are reported directly to Applicant's corporate vice-chairman. (Shewski, Tr. 2569.)
489. The Board finds that the construction quality assurance program has sufficient organizational independence from cost and scheduling concerns to enable it effectively to identify problems and verify their resolution.
490. On January 25, 1973, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) approved a document, designated N45.2.6-1973, which provided guidelines for the qualification of inspection personnel. This document was endorsed by the Atomic Energy Commission in Regulatory Guide 1.58, dated August, 1973. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 24, ff. Tr.
2364.)
491. During the early stages of construction at Byron, Applicant committed in its licensing documents to comply to this industry standard. (Id.)
492. A revised standard for qualifying quality con-trol inspecto s was approved by ANSI on August 31, 1978. The revised standard provided more specific guidance for qualifying inspection personnel and also significantly reduced many of the recommended requirements of the 1973 version. The revised version of the standard was formally issued on January 15, 1979. (Id. at 27.)
493. In September 1980, the Commission issued Regu-latory Guide 1.58, Revision 1, which endorsed the 1978 Standard with certain exceptions. Regulatory Position 10 allows an individual to qualify even if he does not meet recommended education and experience levels, if documented objective evi-dence is shown which demonstrates that the individual possesses comparable or equivalent competence. To preserve the right to so demonstrate, Regulatory Position 6 requires that an excep-tion be taken to the specific education or experience recom-mendations. (Id. at 27, 28; Shewski, Tr. 2527-2530.)
494. In its Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),
Applicant took exception to the education requirement. (Shew-ski, Tr. 2530.) Applicant took the position that personnel could be trained, evaluated, and tested to determine if they are qualified for a specific test or inspection function, regardless of whether they have achieved the recommended speci-fit level of fermal education. The NRC Staff subsequently u_____ J
issued its Safety Evaluation Report (SER), and the SER did not contain any open items with respect to Regulatory Guide 1.58, Revision 1.
495. Applicant committed to Regulatory Guide 1.58, Revision 1, in its Topical Report CE-1-A, Kevision 16, dated March 16, 1981. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 28, ff. Tr. 2364.)
496. Throughout the period of construction at Byron, the NRC Staff performed inspections during which the qualifi-cations of quality control inspectors were thoroughly reviewed.
Any identified inadequacies were promptly corrected by Appli-cant. (Id. at 29-32.)
497. As a result of recommendatiLns made by the NRC Staff following the special team inspection in the Spring of 1982, Applicant on June 9, 1982 issued a directive to all site contractors listing specifically the minimum requirements for certification of quality control inspectors. This directive standardized the certification process at Byron. Quality control inspection personnel on site at Byron [have been recerti-fied] to the new quantified requirements of the June 9, 1982 directive. (Id. at 32, 33.)
498. With respect to quality control inspectors whose employment at Byron ended prior to the June 9, 1982 directive, Applicant reanalyzed their certification records to determine the extent of their compliance with the new requirements. (Id.
at 33. )
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s-
. n
^
499. The Board-finds that Applicant is taking adequate
. steps to ensure that quality control inspec". ors are properly . '.
qualified to the most recent qualification guidelines.
. 500. At the top of the pyramid of inspection activi-ties is the Inspection and Enforcement branch of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (Forney, Tr. 3692.) Re'gion III is responsible for NRC Staff inspection ac;tivities at trA Byron i
site. (NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 2-3, ff. Tr. 3586.)
The purpose of the Region III construction inspection program is to verify, by means of inspections.done on a sampling basis, that the Byron station is constructed in 'ecmpliance witn Com-mission regulations and Applicant's commitments. (Hayes, Tr. 3688.) The keystone of this inspection program is verifi-cation that Applicant has an adequate quality assurance program and that the quality assurance program is being effectively implemented. (Konklin, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 5, ff.
Tr. 3586.)
1 501. With few exceptions, when a noncompliance with Commission regulations is identified, enforcement action is taken. For most noncompliances, a Notice of Violation is sent from the Regional Office, requiring a formal response describ-ing corrective action. For a relatively small number of cases involving more serious violatione, elevated enforcement action is taken which may include (1) the imposition of civil penal-ties, (2) the issuance of orders modifying, suspending or revoking a license, or (3) the issuance of orders to cease and desist from designated actions. (Forney, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 7, ff. Tr. 3586.)
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l I 17 502. Noncompliance items are categorized by severity
( level. Prior to 1980, the Commission used three categories of noncompliances and imposed fines based on the severity of the noncompliance. The three categories in order of increasing severity were deficiency, infraction and violation. The maxi-mum fine that could be imposed was $5,000 per violation and the total amount for any 30 day period wac limited to $25,000. In 1980 and 1981, the Commission used six categories of noncompli-ance and imposed fines based on the severity level of noncom-pliance. The six categories of noncompliance in order of decreasing severity were Level I, II, III, IV, V and VI. The maximum fine that could be imposed varied with the severity level, the largest being $100,000 per day. Since 1982, the Commission has used five categories of noncompliance and imposes fines based on the level of noncompliance. The five categories of noncompliance in order of decreasing severity are Level I, II, III, IV, V. The maximum fine that can be imposed varies with the severity level, the largest being $100,000 per day.
(Id. at 7-8; Forney Tr. 3629.)
503. The. severity level assigned to a particular 1:em of noncompliance is determined in the first instance by the Staff inspector who discovers the item. (Forney, Tr. 3599.)
These findings are then reviewed by management personnel.
(Hayes, Tr. 3600.) There is often an element of judgment involved in determining what severity level an item of noncom-pliance falls into. (Forney, Hayes, Tr. 3601.) This subjec-tivity was illustrated in this proceeding by the Staff's dis-1
agreement concerning the scope of the present severity levels.
(Forney, Yin, Hayes, Tr. 3596-3597.)
504. Generally, the number of noncompliances issued by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement has increased in recent years for all nuclear sites under construction.
< (Hayes, Tr. 3590.) One reason for the increase has been a i
greater emphasis on construction quality assurance by the Commission. (Hayes, Tr. 3591-92.) Another reason is the recent implementation by the Commission of a resident inspector program. (Hayes, Forney, Tr. 3592.) Byron received its first resident inspector on October 5, 1981. (Forney, Tr. 3592.)
505. In recent years the number of noncompliances documented at the Byron site has increased. In 1978, a total of three items of noncompliance were identified at Byron by the NRC Staff: two infractions and one deficiency. (Forney, Tr.
3602.) In 1982, 30 items of noncompliance were documented.
(Hayes, Tr. 3604.)
506. There are additional reasons specific to Byron why the number of noncompliances has recently increased at the Byron site: (1) The number of inspector hours spent on site has increased, from 361 in 1978 to, conservatively, 2547 in 1982. (Hayes, Forney, Tr. 3601-3603, 3805-3810.); (2) Closer attention by Region III has been paid to Byron as it approaches
^
its fuel-load date. (Forney, Williams, Tr. 3605-3607.)
l 507. Simply tabulating numbers of noncompliances without additional information is essentially meaningless.
l (Yin, Tr. 3613-3614: Williams, Tr. 3903, 3938.) Relevant l
additional information includes the amount of civil penalties
- =
- imposed, the severity levels of the items of noncompliance, and conclusions contained in the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) reports. (Forney, Tr. 3614-3615.)
508. The Byron Station has never been the subject of a civil penalty. (Del George, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 12, ff. Tr. 2344; Del George, Tr. 2352. )
509. Between March 29 and May 11, 1982, Region III conducted a special team inspection of Byron construction activities. (Stanish, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 4, ff.
Tr. 2619.) The inspection was performed by six inspectors and one supervisor, and involved 662 inspector hours on site evalu-ating Applicant's quality assurance program, compliance history, corrective action system, design control, material traceabil-ity, electrical work activities, in process inspections, weld rod control, and quality control inspector effectiveness. The inspection consisted of selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel. (Forney, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 28, ff.
Tr. 3586.) The Byron quality assurance program was deemed good. (Id.; Applicant's Ex. 8; Hayes, Tr. 3907-8.) Examples of program implementation deficiencies were identified which required corrective action by Applicant. (Applicant's Ex. 8.)
510. Inspection Report 82-05 (Applicant's Ex. 8.)
documented nine items of non-compliance (four Severity Level IV and five Severity Level V) and ten unresolved or open items.
(Forney, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 28, ff. Tr. 3586.)
Applicant took prompt corrective measures with respect to the items of noncompliance. (Stanish, Applicant's Prepared Testi-
mony at 5-19, ff. Tr. 2619; Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 31-32, 35, ff. Tr. 2364; Forney, Tr. 3658, 3659.)
511. Corrective actions taken by Applicant for four of the nine items of noncompliance have been reviewed by Re-gion III inspectors, found acceptable and closed by subsequent inspection reports. Five of the ten open or unresolved items have been reviewed by Region III inspectors, found acceptable and closed by subsequent inspection reports. (Forney, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 28-29, ff. Tr. 3586.) The remain-ing items have been resolved to the satisfaction of Applicant; all that remains is for the NRC Staff to complete its inspec-tions and close these items. (Stanish, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 2619; Stanish, Tr. 2683-2684.)
512. The NRC Staff Region III special team inspection was conducted at all construction sites, although not necessar-ily by the same team. There was no perception of any particu-lar problem with Applicant's construction sites. (Forney, Tr. 3833.) The team inspection was conducted because the regional administrator wanted a better perspective of the construction activities of all operating license applicants.
(Id.)
513. The special team ingyection at Byron was quite extensive and very thorcugh. (Forney, Tr. 3723, 3533.) The Staff panel testified that Applicant's quality assurance pro-gram is good. (Forney, Tr. 3881.)
514. Applicant's response to other items of noncom-pliance has generally been timely and adequate. (Forney, NBC
- e. .
Staff Prepared Testimony at 14, ff. Tr. 3586; Stanish, Appli-cant's Prepared Testimony at 21-33, ff. Tr. 2619.)
515. The SALP-1 (1980) report rates the Byron Station an average performer compared to other licensees both in Region III and nationwide. No reactor sites under construction were rated above average. (NRC Staff Prepared Testimony, Attachment C, ff. Tr. 3586.) SALP-2 (1981) again demonstrates that Byron's performance was within the regional average. (Id. attachment D.)
516. In the event a relatively serious quality assur-ance problem with a contractor is indicated, all work being performed by the particular contractor at the site may be ordered stopped by Applicant, and the "stop-work" will remain in effect until corrective measures satisfactory to both Appli-cant and the NRC Staff are implemented. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 16, ff. Tr. 2364: Shewski, Tr. 2405, 2580-81.) Responsibility for formal stop-work orders rests with the corporate manager of quality assurance. (Shewski, Tr. 2532, 2533, 2551.) Applicant has formally stopped work on site at Byron on nine occasions since the beginning of construc-tion at the Byron site. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testi-mony at 16-20, ff. Tr. 2364.) Applicant has stopped work off-site at a vendor plant on two occasions (Shewski, Tr. 2406-2407.)
517. While the corporate manager of quality assurance is ultimately responsible for the issuance of formal stop-work orders, if he is unavailable and a serious matter in need of immediate action is identified, any person in Applicant's
T quality assurance organization has the authority to stop work.
(Shewski, Tr. 2533, Stanish, Tr. 2694. )
518. During day-to-day activities, many short-term stop works, directed against discreet activities and not against the contractor in general, are issued on the spot by Applicant quality assurance personnel, by contractor quality control inspectors, or by inspectors from the on-site independent testing agency. (Shewski, Tr. 2550.)
519. That certain stop-work orders may be expensive for Applicant does not concern its quality assurance organization.
(Shewski, Tr. 2405.) While the overall emphasis of Common-wealth Edison as a company is on production (Shewski, Tr. 2402.),
the emphasis of its quality assurance organization is totally on quality. (Shewski, Tr. 2580; Spraul, Tr. 3569-3571, 3578.)
520. In January 1981, Applicant ordered Hatfield Electric Company to stop work on safety-related cable pulling activi-ties. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 17, ff. Tr.
2364; Shewski, Tr. 2578; Williams, Tr. 3654.) This stop work was issued as a result of NRC inspection report 80-25 (Inter-venors' Joint Exhibit 5) which identified a series of deficien-cies in Hatfield's quality assurance program. (Shewski, Appli-cant's Prepared Testimony at 17, ff. Tr. 2364: Shewski, Tr. 2578.)
NRC Staff Region III considered the problems to be quite ser-ious (Williams, Tr. 3653-3654.) and agreed that the stop-work order was appropriate given the findings in inspection report 80-25. (Williams, Tr. 3655.)
521. Different problems with Hatfield Electric Company had previously been identified in NRC inspection reports 78-07 and 79-18 (Intervenors' Joint Exhibits 3, 4; Shewski, Tr. 2575-2577; U
Hayes, Tr. 3644-3652.) These problems gave no indication that Hatfield had a broader problem with implementation of it's quality assurance program. (Shewski, Tr. 2577). All problems identified in these reports were subsequently resolved to the satisfaction of NRC Staff Region III. (Hayes, Tr. 3648, 3650.)
A stop-work order would have been an inappropriate response by the Applicant to the problems identified in either of these earlier inspection reports. (Shewski, Tr. 2575-2577; Hayes, Tr. 3648; Williams, Tr. 3655.)
522. Following issuance of the stop work order in 1981, Hatfield undertook, at Applicant's direction, a broad range of f
J 1
corrective actions. These corrective actions satisfied both Applicant and the NRC Staff. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 18, ff. Tr. 2364.) The stop work was lifted in April 1981. (Shewski, Tr. 2578.)
523. In May 1977, Applicant audited Systems Control Cor-poration (SCC) and found major deficiencies with the SCC qual-ity assurance program. (Shewski, Tr. 2504.) SCC is a vendor to the Byron Station of cable trays and supports, main control boards and instrument racks. (Hayes, Tr. 3848.) As a result of the audit, Applicant issued a formal stop-work order to SCC.
(Shewski, Tr. 2504.) Applicant also filed a report with the Commission pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
(Williams, Tr. 3844.) The stop-work order was lifted in June 1977. (Shewski, Tr. 2506.)
524. Between 1977 and 1979, audits and surveillances by Applicant quality assurance personnel found further deficien-cies in the SCC quality assurance program. (Shewski, Tr. 2506-2508, 2579; Hayes, Tr. 3843.) Applicant issued a second formal stop-work against SCC in June, 1979. (Intervenors' Joint Exhibit 8.)
525. In February 1980, Applicant assigned personnel of the Pittsburg Testing Laboratsry (PTL), tne independent testing agency at Byron, to the SCC plant to do a 100% reinspection of all items. All items were required to pass inspection by PTL before being shipped either to Byron or Braidwood. (Shewski, Tr. 2579.) Panels already shipped and received at Byron were reinspected and repaired. (Shewski, Tr. 2509, 2579; Hayes, Williams, Tr. 3898-3899.)
526. An NRC Staff investigation of SCC was begun in March 1980, and NRC inspection report 80-04 (Intervenors' Joint Exhibit 8.) found that SCC had falsified its audit records, i (Shewski, Tr. 2509; Williams, Tr. 3844.) The inspection report also found that the SCC quality assurance / quality control (QA/QC) manager was unqualified for his position, and that SCC did not have adequate QA/QC separation from production. (Wil-liams, Tr. 3844.) In addition, certain instrument panels which had passed inspection by the SCC QA/QC organization were found by the NRC Staff to be unacceptable. (Williams, Tr. 3845.)
527. In February 1980, an investigation of instrument panel welds was undertaken by Region III both at the SCC plant and at the Byron site. (Williams, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 29-30, ff. Tr. 3586.) Concurrently, the Region IV Vendor Inspection Program Branch conducted an inspection at the SCC plant. (Ed.: Williams, Tr. 3843, Stanish, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 31-33, ff. Tr. 2619.) The results of the Region IV inspection were documented in Vendor Inspection Report No.
99900712/80-01. This report resulted in the issuance of IE Information Notice No. 82-34 on August 25, 1982. (Williams, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 30, ff. Tr. 3586.)
528. Following the NRC inspection, all QA/QC program deficiencies at SCC were corrected and verified by Region IV inspectors in a follow-up inspection. Since early 1980, both Applicant and the NRC Staff have made certain that problems associated with equipment supplied to Byron by SCC have been corrected. (Id.) With respect to correction of any deficient
~26-welds, only a final seismic analysis report by Westinghouse remains outetanding. (Id.; Hayes, Tr. 3847, 3898-3899.)
529. Applicant's conduct in response to problems with SCC was very responsible. (Hayes, Tr. 3850, Williams, Tr. 3852.)
530. In 1978, NRC Inspection Report No. 78-07 (Intervenors' Joint Exhibit No. 3.) indicated that Reliable Sheet Metal, a contractor responsible for installation and inspection of safety-related heating, vcntilating and air conditioning (HVAC) systems and components, had failed to prescribe in an approved documented instruction the experience required for quality assurance inspection personnel. (Shewski, Tr. 2511.)
531. On September 17, 1982, Applicant ordered Reliable Sheet Metal to stop work on all new installation of safety-related HVAC systems and attachments to safety-related struc-tures. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 19, ff.
Tr. 2364; Shewski, Tr. 2513-2517.) The stop-work was issued because of inadequate and incomplete inspections, inadequate procedures, lack of documented evidence that some material r purchased by Reliable met procurement requirements, and a number of open audit deficiencies. (Id.)
532. The stop work order against Reliable remains in effect, and it will continue until Reliable's QA/QC program is entirely acceptable to Applicant's quality assurance organi-zation. (Shewski, Tr. 2580.) The present anticipated fuel load date will not effect the duration of the stop work order.
(Shewski, Tr. 2581.)
533. Any worker at Byron with knowledge of construction deficiencies may contact either Applicant's quality assurance
organization or the NRC Staff resident inspector. (Stanish, Tr. 2702-05; Forney, Hayes, Tr. 3708-3709.) In the past, workers have reported perceived problems to the resident inspec-tor. (Forney, Tr. 3660.) Reports from workers have led to items of noncompliance. (Forney, Tr. 3661.) Requests for confidentiality are respected. (Forney, Tr. 3661.)
534. Neither Applicant nor the NRC Staff knows of any practice or policy, on the part of Applicant or any of its con-tractors, to discourage workers from reporting problems at the Byron site. (Stanish, Tr. 2703, 2711; Querio, Tr. 2740-2742; Forney, Tr. 3660, 3662.) (Stanish, Tr. 2706-2707.) Applicant will take no disciplinary action against an employee who comes forward to report a problem. (Stanish, Tr. 2703.)
535. To encourage workers to report problems, large signs describing reporting procedures are conspicuously posted through-out the Byron plant. (Querio, Tr. 2741; Forney, Tr. 3708; Hayes, Tr. 3895.) These signs give both a Commonwealth Edison phone number and an NRO phone number. (Hayes, Tr. 3895.) A caller is not required to give his name. (Hayes, Tr. 3895.)
In addition, NRC Form 3, posted on bulletin boards throughout the plant, provides information to both contractor and Appli-cant personnel concerning their right to contact the NRC Staff concerning perceived construction problems or deficiencies.
(Stanish, Tr. 2703-2704; Forney, Tr. 3662-3664; Hayes, Tr. 3895-3896.) The Board finds that there is presently adequate and ample dissemination of information to all Byron workers, whe-i
ther employed by Applicant or by contractors, advising them to report any problems either to the NRC Staff or Applicant.
(Hayes, Tr. 3897.)
536. In 1978, Westinghouse informed Applicant of potential problems in holddown bolting for steam generators at facilities similar to Byron and Braidwood. (Del George, Tr. 2459; Hayes, Tr. 3635.) Applicant took action to correct any potential problems with steam generator bolting at Byron. (Del George, Tr. 2460.) The potential problem at Byron was thereby averted, and there remains no problem with steam generator bolting at the Byron facility. (Del George, Tr. 2469-2470.)
537. The potential problem in steam generator bolting was addressed at the Braidwood facility about 18 months after it was addressed at Byron. (Del George, Tr. 2466-2468.) The problem was addressed later at Braidwood because Braidwood is approximately two years behind Byron in construction. (Del George, Tr. 2467-2469.) During the bolting process at Braid-wood, corrective action similar to that taken at Byron was initiated. (Del George, Tr. 2460.) However, the specific circumstances at Braidwood were such that action similar to that taken at Byron was inadequate to resolve the Braidwood problem. (Del George, Tr. 2461.) While the Eyron problem had been resolved by a change in length of the bolts used to re-strain the steam generators, the alignment of the generators at Braidwood was such that a change in bolt length alone was insufficient to correct the problem. (Del George, Tr. 2461.)
The situations at the two facilities were dissimilar. (Forney, Tr. 3639, 3642-3643.)
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538. In February 1983, a notice of noncompliance and pro-posed civil penalty was issued, citing the steam generator bolting problem at Braidwood. (Intervenors' Joint Exhibit 6.)
The NRC believed that corrective action at Braidwood had not been taken in a timely manner. (Del George, Tr. 2461-246?.,
2467-2468; Forney, Tr. 3639; Hayes, Tr. 3837.) Applicant was also considered late in reporting the Braidwood problem to the Commission under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e). (Del George, Tr. 2471.) Applicant disagrees with the NRC Staff's assessment regarding the timeliness of corrective action at Braidwood, and on this basis it intends to challenge the pro-posed civil penalty. (Del George, Applicant's Prepared Testi-mony at p. 13 ff. Tr. 2344; Del George, Tr. 2462. )
539. The Braidwood problem was considered by the NRC Staff panel prior to filing its direct testimony in this proceeding (Hayes, Tr. 3837.), and neither the problem nor related testi-mony elicited from witnesses during the hearing changed the panel's conclusion that it had not identified any policies or attitudes of Applicant which indicate that noncompliances at one Commonwealth Edison site will create similar problems at other Commonwealth Edison sites, Byron in particular. (Forney, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 13-14, ff. Ir. 3586; Region III Panel, Tr. 3929-3930.)
540. The Board agrees with the NRC Staff's assessment of Applicant's policies and attitudes. Indeed, Applicant has a program utilizing experience at any particular plant to improve
- e' performance at all plants. (Del George, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 7-8, ff. Tr. 2344; Forney, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 14, ff. Tr. 3586.)
541. Intervenors presented the testimony of three witnesses who challenged the effectiveness and integrity of the Quality Assurance and Quality Control programs of two contrac-tors involved in construction of the Byron site. Peter Stomfay-Stitz and Daniel Gallagher, both former Blount Brothers employees, generally alledged that Blount Brothers QA/QC program was ineffective creating the possibility that non-conforming mater-ials were used in construction. Michael Smith, a former audi-tor for the Hunter Corporation, challenged the efficiency and integrity of that contractor's inspection and auditing program.
Applicant presented witnesses to address the allega-tions. Hunter Corporation was the contractor primarily respons-ible for the installation of pipes and pipe supports. Hunter Corporation's Quality Assurance Supervisor, Malcom Somsag, testified on behalf of the Applicant and addressed the allega-tions of Michael Smith. In addition to Mr. Somsag's testimony regarding the effectiveness and integrity of Hunter Corpora-tion's QA/QC program, Michael Zeise, one-time lead auditor for that organization, submitted an affidavit regarding a specific Smith allegation. The Applicant introduced as witnesses var-ious employees of Blount Brothers, the contractor responsible for inspecting, producing and installing concrete, masonry blocks and other elements of primary construction. To answer
l l
the claims made by Daniel Gallagher regarding the conformity of the concrete mixed and used at Byron, Applicant presented the testimony of Mr. Gallagher's supervisor Donald Pope, Blount's Two employees at Pittsburgh 4
head concrete batch plant operator.
Testing Laboratories, Marvin Tallent Jr. and Joseph Johnson,
' explained the testing procedures and results which verified
. that the concrete produced and used at Byron conformed to the specified requirements. Another Blount Supervisor, who headed up materials control and inspection Richard Barnhart, refuted the allegations of Peter Stomfay-Stitz. Mr. Barnhard testified that the Blount QA/QC program was independent, effective and did not permit construction use of non-conforming materials.
Mr. John Mihovilovich was applicants' lead structural engineer, responsible for overseeing Blount's activities. Mr. Mihovilovich's testimony refuted Mr. Stomfay-Stitz's allegations that tendons and aggregate used in construction were as a general rule improperly inspected and stored. Mr. Mihovilovich also explained the corrective measures taken to ensure that no non-conforming aggregate or damaged tendons were used in actual construction.
542. Intervenors proffered the testimony of Michael A. Smith. Mr. Smith is a former employee of Hunter Corporation, i
the contractor responsible for the installation and inspection of piping and piping component supports at Byron. Mr. Smith l made the following allegations: (1) Hunter Corporation produc-tion and inspection personnel were not using or documenting permissible adjustment tolerances in documenting the location of component supports and inspection personnel were unable to accept as-built data for such supports; (2) while pcrforming
- s. .
his duties as an auditor, Mr. Smith discovered component sup-ports which did not have documentation and found documentation for supports which could not be located; (3) drafts of audit reports were modified by Malcolm Somsag, Hunter Corporation's Quality Assurance-Quality Control Supervisor, in order to lessen the impact of the final audit reports; (4) the audit of the Authorized Nuclear Inspector was superficial; (5) a Hunter Corporation supervisor signed off on weld inspections without verifying that the inspections had been performed; (6) Hunter Corporation's QA manual and procedures were improperly revised; and (7) Mr. Smith was prevented from contacting the NRC while he was employed by Hunter Corporation.
543. Michael Smith worked at the Byron site from November, 1978, until January, 1980. (Smith, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 1, ff. Tr. 3243.) He initially was hired by Hunter Corporation to perform surveillance inspections. He was trained for approximately two months. His training included written tests on Hunter Corporation's site implementation l
I procedures and quality assurance manual. (Id. at 13.) Mr.
l Smith also received on-the-job training as a surveillance inspector. (Id. at 14.) After performing as a surveillance inspector for three months, Mr. Smith became an auditor for Hunter Corporation's QA program. (Id. at 14-15.) He was certified as an auditor when it was felt he was capable of performing those duties. (Id.) Mr. Smith was fired by Hunter Corporation in January, 1980, for 20% absenteeism. He subse-quently tried to get his job back but was not rehired. (Smith, Tr. 3244.)
4 I
544. Applicant offered the testimony of Malcolm Somsag to address Mr. Smith's allegations. Mr. Somsag has been Hunter Corporation's QA/QC Supervisor at Byron since April 4, i 1977. In this capacity he oversees Hunter Corporations's
- quality assurance and quality control program at the plant.
3 (Somsag, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 1-3, ff. Tr. 2883.)
He and Michael Zeise, the lead QA auditor, were Mr. Smith's supervisors during Mr. Smith's employment at Hunter Corpora-tion. (Id. at 2-4; Somsag, Tr. 2886.) Mr. Somsag has been involved with quality assurance since 1973, serving as both an inspector and an auditor. He also assisted in drafting the l written QA/QC procedures utilized by Hunter Corporation.
(Somsag, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 3, ff. Tr. 2883.)
He defined quality control to be an inspection function, while quality assurance is an audit function which ensures that the QC inspectors are properly performing their duties. (Id.) Mr.
Somsag explained that the Hunter Corporation QC inspectors are responsible for inspecting the on-going installation of piping and component supports for conforr..ance to design drawings or design tolerances. (Id. at 10-12.) The QA inspectors and auditors perform surveillances and audits to ensure that both production and inspection forces are performing their work in 1
l conformance with requirements. A surveillance is an informal audit which examines on-going work. In contrast, an audit is a j
formal review and evaluation of completed work. (Id. at 7.)
545. A panel of NRC Staff witnesses testified to the 1
i results ef the Staff's investigation of Mr. Smith's allegations.
(NRC Prepared Testimony at 25-28, ff. Tr. 3586.) Attached to this testimony is the inspection report which reflects the investigation conducted by NRC staff member Isa T. Yin. (Id.,
Attachment G.)
546. Mr. Smith first raised his allegations in an affidavit dated September 21, 1982. (Smith, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony, Ex. A, ff. Tr. 3243.) In his direct and cross-examination testimony, Mr. Smith acknowledged that the affidavit, which he had signed under oath, contained a number of errors and inaccuracies. For example:
a) Mr. Smith alleged in his affidavit that Audit 059-3, an audit of component support location, was initiated in response to construction workers' com-plaints. (Id., Ex. A, at S 9-11.) He admitted on cross-examination, however, that this audit was a regularly scheduled audit which was not prompted by workers' complaints. (Smith, Tr. 3257, 3259.)
b) In his affidavit, Mr. Smith stated that in auditing component support location he discovered supports that were mislocated by as much as four feet. He further stated that none of the 100-150 supports audited were in their proper location.
(Smith, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony, Ex. A, at 111, ff. Tr. 3242.) On cross-examination, Mr. Smith acknowledged that this statement was misleading and incorrect. (Smith, Tr. 3267, 3271.) In fact, Mr.
Smith acknowledged that he audited only five compon-ent supports for location. (Smith, Tr. 3387.)
t c) In his affidavit Smith alleged that he was told to " forget" the audit of component supports after he and his co-auditor had made their findings. (Smith, Intervenor's Prepared Testimony, Ex. A, at 117, ff.
Tr. 3242.) During his testimony before the Board, however, Mr. Smith admitted that he was not told to forget the audit. Mr. Smith agreed that an audit can not be " forgotten". (Smith, Tr. 3276-3278.)
In light of Mr. Smith's testimony modifying his affidavit, the Board ordered that Mr. Smith's modifications and deletions be noted on the Exhibit. (Smith, Tr. 3292-3298.)
Eight of the paragraphs of Mr. Smith's affidavit have been marked as " modified by testimony". (Cite) 547. Mr. Smith alleged that Hunter Corporation pro-duction and inspection personnel were not using or documenting permissible tolerances in documenting the location of component supports and that inspection personnel were unable to accept as-built data for such supports. His allegations are based on his participation in Audit 059-3, entitled " Hanger Process Control." This audit was conducted in July and August, 1979.
! (Smith, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 29, ff. Tr. 3243.)
I
{ Audit 059-3 examined installation of componen supports, com-pleteness of documentation of support installation, and docu-mentation of the location of supports. (Id., Ex. C.) Mr.
I Smith claimed that there was a reluctance on the part of Hunter l Corporation to perform this audit (Id. at 30.) However, he admitted on cross-examination that Audit 059-3 was a regularly
scheduled audit which had been scheduled months before it occurred. (Smith, Tr. 3257.) Mr. Somsag testified that Audit 059-3 was scheduled for summer, 1979, because installation of component supports was increasing to a significant level at that time. (Somsag, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 12-13, ff. Tr. 2883.)
548. Mr. Somsag described the manner in which audits are performed. In preparation of an audit, auditors consult the audit instructions which indicate the subject of the audit and suggest topics for an audit checklist. The auditors then familiarize themselves with the procedural and technical require-ments pertaining to the work being audited. (Somsag, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 8, ff. Tr. 2883.) The audit is preceded by an entrance meet 2ng which includes the auditors and produc-tion and inspection personnel. The purpose of this meeting is to ensure the auditors' maximum familiarity with the subject of the audit. (Id.)
The audit is conducted according to a checklist of items prepared by the auditors. Problems discovered by the audit are classified as either findings or* observations.
Although a finding represents a more serious problem than does an observation, both result in recommendations of appropriate corrective action. (Id. at 14.) After the audit an exit meeting is held in which the auditor's conclusions are discussed.
(Id. at 3.) The auditors then prepare a formal report. A follow-up audit is performed to ensure that problems, both findings and observations, identified in the initial audit are
e' remedied. (Id.) All audits are scheduled at the beginning of the year. (Id. at 7.)
549. Audit 059-3 contained two checklist items per-tinent to the documentation of component support location.
Checklist item 10 examined whether proper as-built data reflect-ing the use of adjustment tolerances was provided on construc-tion drawings; checklist item 11 examined whether QC inspectors were accepting such as-built data. (Smith, Tr. 3363.) The adjustment tolerances to be utilized in the location of compon-ent supports were establi.thed in Sargent & Lundy Mechanical Drawing M916, which provided the permissible latitude for adjustment of support location in situations in which installa-tion in accordance with original design drawings could not be achieved. M916 was incorporated into Hunter Corporation's Site Implementation Procedures through inter-company correspondence HC-QA-23, which set forth the procedures to be followed by production and inspection personnel in the installation and documentation of supports per adjustment tolerances. (Somsag, Applicant's Prepared Testimony, Ex. 2, ff. Tr. 2883.) HC-QA-23 was sent in March 1979, to all supervisors responsible for installation of component supports. (Smith, Tr. 3354.)
550. In auditing checklist items 10 and 11, Mr. Smith reviewed documentation for five component supports, the same supports for each item. (Smith, Tr. 3268.) With regard to item 10, the audit found that M916 was properly referenced for two of the five supports, incompletely or erroneously refer-enced for two of the supports, and not referenced at all for 4
one support. (Smith, Tr. 3372-3373.) Thus, use of M916 was documented, albeit improperly for two of the supports, on four of the five component supports reviewed. As corrective action the audit recommended that cognizant production supervisors must provide proper as-built data. (Smith, Intervenors' Pre-pared Testimony, Ex. C, ff. Tr. 3243.)
551. With regard to checklist item 11, Audit 059-3 found that of the five component supports reviewed, as-built data had been properly accepted by the QC inspectors in only one instance. As corrective action the audit recommended that acceptance or rejection of as-built data be properly accomp-lished, either through training of inspectors to M916 or through removal of responsibility for acceptance or rejection from the inspectors. (Id.)
552. A follow-up audit to Audit 059-3 was performed in September and October, 1979. The follow-up audit verified that the problems identified in the initial audit with regard to checklist item 10 had been resolved. (Id., Ex. D.) Mr.
Smith testified that the findings of Audit 059-3 were the result of Hunter Corporation's failure to provide training in M916 to its personnel. (Id. at 33.) Thus, the follow-up audit stated with regard to checklist item 11 that in the absence of training to M916 inspector acceptance of as-built data could not be accomplished. Rather, the audit noted that the QA supervisor had committed to train the inspectors to M916, with the training to commence at his discretion. (Id., Ex. D.)
553. Mr. Somsag testified that training of inspectors in the use of M916 commenced in November, 1979, one month after j
==
- the follow-up audit to Audit 059-3. (Somsag, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 19, ff. Tr. 2882; Tr. 2918-2919.)
554. Mr. Smith and Mr. Somsag agreed that Audit 059-3 examined only the documentation of component support location, and did not examine actual physical installation of supports.
( Smith, Tr.3W3 3W4; Somsag, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 16, ff. Tr. 2882.) Mr. Smith acknowledged that he was not aware of any component supports that were actually installed in an improper fashion, or that were installed outside of adjust-ment tolerances. (Smith, Tr. 3275.)
555. Mr. Smith testified that the purpose of an audit in to uncover problem areas. He agreed that Audit 059-3 re-vealed that problems existed with regard to the location of component supports, and that therefore the audit did precisely what it was cupposed to do. (Smith, Tr. 3347-3348.)
556. A second follow-up audit to Audit 059-3 occurred in March, 1980. Audit 059-3 therefore was not officially closed until completion of the second follow-up audit. As Mr.
Smith conceded on cross-examination, however, the second follow-up audit did not involve the issue of component support loca-tion. (Smith, Tr. 3398-3401.)
557. Subsequent to Audit 059-3 significant changes occurred in Hunter Corporation's program of inspecting the location of component supports. Prior to March, 1980, Hunter Corporation did not inspect the location of a support until the system in which the support was located was stabilized in its final configuration. Thus, there was no timeliness requirement
which resulted in supports being inspected for proper location within a particular time of initial installation. NRC inspec-tor Yin acknowledged that this was the general industry prac-tice at that time. (NRC, Tr. 3668.) The NRC Staff, however, after an investigation of Hunter Corporation's component sup-port system in March, 1980, concluded that inspection of com-ponent support location should be performed within a relatively short time of installation. The NRC Staff believed that under the existing inspection system serious problems could remain undetected, making resolution more difficult at a later date.
In response to the NRC Staff investigation Hunter Corporation modified its inspection procedures to provide for more timely inspection and acceptance of component support location.
(Somsag, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 20-21, ff. Tr.
2882.)
In its March, 1980, investigation the NRC Staff also was critical of the absence of specific inspection requirements pertaining to the location of component supports. Although inspections performed by Hunter Corporation QC personnel did encompass all pertinent items involving support location, Hunter Corporation did not have a specific inspection checklist which segregated each of the items for documentation purposes.
In response to the NRC Staff investigation Hunter Corporation in conjunction with Commonwealth Edison developed a checklist for use in the inspection of support location (Id.)
In sum, subsequent to Audit 059-3 and the NRC Staff investigation of March, 1980, Hunter Corporation's procedures I
.. 1
for the inspection and acceptance of component support location were significantly modified. As-built data was generated as production forces installed the component supports, and inspec-tion personnel were trained to M916 in order to enable them to be able to accept or reject as-built data which utilized adjust-ment tolerances. Inspection of component support location was performed on a timely basis, and inspection results were docu-mented on a checklist which segregated the individual segments of the overall inspections. (Id.)
As a result of the changes to Hunter Corporation's procedures for the inspection of component support location, a 100% reinspection program of support location was conducted.
Mr. Somsag testified that he did not believe that the inspec-tion program in effect before March, 1980, was inadequate. He testified that the primary purpose of the 100% reinspection of component support location was to bring inspection documenta-tion up to date with the new procedural requirements. (Id. at 22-23.)
558. The NRC Staff testified that the actions taken by Hunter Corporation in response to the Staff investigation of March, 1980, were verified to be effective. (NRC Staff Pre-pared Testimony at 25, ff. Tr. 3586.) In a special safety investigation conducted in December, 1982, and January, 1983, the Staff substantiated Mr. Smith's allegation that as-built documentation was deficient. The Staff concluded that there was an informal as-built data collection requirement during the time frame of Mr. Smith's employment at Hunter Corporation, and that a formal procedure for obtaining as-built data did not
exist until March, 1980. The Staff examined the present system for as-built data documentation and concluded that it is being implemented effectively. (Id., Attachment G.)
559. The Board finds that Mr. Smith's allegations with regard to the inspection of component support location reflect his participation in Audit 059-3. The audit did what an audit is supposed to do; it identified deficiencies in Hunter Corporation's program for documenting the location of component supports and accepting as-built data involving the location of supports. The audit was regularly scheduled by Hunter Corporation's QA/QC Department, and it resulted in corrective action being implemented. In sum, the Board finds that Mr. Smith's allegations in this regard demonstrate that the Hunter Corporation quality assurance program was function-ing effectively. In response to an NRC Staff investigation of March, 1980, Hunter Corporation significantly modified its procedures pertaining to support location, to the satisfaction of the NRC Staff, and subsequently conducted a 100% reinspec-tion of component supports installed before March, 1980. The Board finds, therefore, that the documentation, inspection and acceptance of component support location by Hunter Corporation since March, 1980, has been performed in a timely and satisfac-tory fashion, and that there is reasonable assurance that component supports installed before March, 1980, have been properly documented, inspected and accepted.
560. Mr. Smith alleged that there were occasions in which he reviewed items which did not then appear in his audit reports as items that had been audited. Specifically, Mr.
Smith testified that on several occasions he found documenta-tion for component supports but could not locate the actual supports. He testified that Mr. Somsag told him to ignore these problems, because the hanger foreman and the quality assurance department had discussed the problem and were taking steps to resolve them. Mr. Smith testified that although a
" hanger field problem" form should have been prepared for each instance to which he referred, he did not find such documenta-tien. According to Mr. Smith, Mr. Somsag refused to allow him to document in audits that supports appeared to be missing.
Mr. Smith called this process of not documenting an apparent problem " tabling" the problem, and he claimed that tabling occurred at least once or twice a week. Mr. Smith testified that Mr. Somsag told him that any such problems would be caught at walk-down of the system, the final review of the entire system. (Smith, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 22-23, ff.
Tr. 3243.)
561. Mr. Smith did not identify any specific com-ponent supports which were the subject of tabling. He testi-fled, however, that in performing Audit 059-3 he and his co-auditor found one or two supports that had documentation but could net be located, and two supports which apparently had ne documentation. With regard to the one or two supports which could not be located despite the existence of documentation, Mr. Smith acknowledged that it was his assumption that the supports had been taken down during construction for one reason or another. Mr. Smith then testified that it "possibly" was his assumption that the supports would be reinstalled when
construction had proceeded to the point that reinstallation was appropriate. Mr. Smith testified that he and his co-auditor were told to delete these particular items from the aucit because the problems they represented did not fall within the scope of checklist items 10 and 11 of the audit. (Smith, Tr.
3382-3383, 3447-3448.)
562. In his prepared testimony Mr. Smith stated that he never tabled items on his own initiative, only at the request of Mr. Somsag. On cross-examination, however, Mr. Smith admitted that his direct testimony in this regard was " incomplete,"
since there were occasions on which he and his co-auditor, Mr.
Zeise, made the decison to table an item they had found. The auditors would table items in circumstances in which they were satisfied that the quality assurance department was aware of the problem and had responsibility for resolving it. The quality assurance department's awareness of the particular item noted by Mr. Smith and his co-auditor would be evidenced on occasion by the existence of a hanger field problem concerning the item. This testimony was in direct contradiction to Mr.
Smith's prepared testimony, in which he claimed that hanger field problems apparently were not implemented for the compon-ent support problems which were tabled. (Smith. Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 22, 24, ff. Tr. 3243; Smith, Tr. 3383-3385, 3448.)
563. The NRC Staff investigated Mr. Smith's allega-tion, set forth in his affidavit, that in October and November, 1979, he and his co-auditor found that one support had no
documentation at all. The NRC Staff concluded that this alle-gation was unsubstantiated. (NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 25, ff. Tr. 3586.)
564. The Board finds that there is insufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that items allegedly tabled by Mr. Smith constitute serious and ongoing deficiencier in Hunter Corporation's component support system. It appears that Hunter Corporation's quality assurance department was aware of i the problems found by Mr. Smith, and there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that each problem ultimately was not the subject of corrective action. The evidence as a whole suggests that Mr. Smith and his co-auditor came across the component support problems to which he has testified while they were performing an audit or audits on issues different than that represented by the problems; therefore, it would be appropriate to refer the items to the quality assurance department for corrective action rather than include them in the audit being performed.
565. Mr. Smith alleged that his superior, Mr. Somsag made changes in drafts of audit reports which lessened the impact of the final audit reports. Mr. Smith referred specifi-cally to changes which allegedly were made in Audit 059-3, the follow-up to Audit 059-3 and Audit 058-2. These reports are attached as exhibits C, D and F, respectively, to Mr. Smith's prepared testimony. (Id. at 27-29.)
566. Audit 058-2 was an audit of the Hunter Corpora-tion QA/QC organization. Mr. Smith testified that Mr. Somsag deleted or modified portions of Mr. Smith's draft audit report i
which were critical of Hunter Corporation's training procedures.
(Id.) On examination by the Board, Mr. Smith agreed that the first statement which allegedly was deleted by Mr. Somsag, as set forth on page 26 of Mr. Smith's prepared testimony, was conclusionary in nature, and he admitted that Mr. Somsag did not delete from the audit any of the facts upon which the conclusionary statement was based. Mr. Smith agreed that deletion from an audit of the facts upon which a conclusionary l 1
statement is based would be more important than deletion of the conclusionary statement itself, and he acknowledged that Mr.
Somsag did not delete any of the facts which provided the basis for the statement at issue. (Smith, Tr. 3433.)
Mr. Smith testified that Mr. Somsag deleted a portion of the summary of the draft audit report, replacing it with a recommendation that a " site management committee" be established l to participate in training of personnel. Mr. Smith stated that he and his co-auditor were seeking a commitment to adherence to procedures regarding training, and in his view establishment of a committee to participate in the administration of a training program would be an inadequate response to the problems identi-fied in the audit. On cross-examination, Mr. Smith's attention was directed to Audit 056-2, and he admitted that he had mis-read the word " commitment" in the final audit report to be the word " committee." (Smith, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 27-29, ff. Tr. 3243; Smith, Tr. 3420-3422.)
567. Mr. Smith also testified that Mr. Somsag made extensive changes to the draft of Audit 059-3 which lessened the impact of the audit. On cross-examination, Mr. Smith
l stated that he had gone through the audit paragraph by paragraph i
in preparation for his testimony before the Board. Despite 4
this review of Audit 059-3, however, Mr. Smith was unable to identify any findings, observations, or comments of any kind that were deleted from the rough draft of the audit by Mr.
Somsag. (Smith, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 9-10, ff.
Tr. 3243; Smith, Tr. 3406-3410.)
Mr. Smith testified that he could not identify changes made by Mr. Somsag to the audit because he was not able to review-the rough draft of the audit. (Smith, Tr. 3409.) Mr.
Sousag testified that he had searched the files of Hunter Corporation for the rough draft and had been unable to locate it. He could not explain the absence of the draft. Mr. Somsag acknowledged that Hunter Corporation procedures required that all audit drafts be retained, and he stated that primary respon-sibility for ensuring that all drafts were placed in the files rested with the lead auditor, who was Mr. Zeise with regard to Audit 059-3. Mr. Somsag acknowledged that he had no reason to believe that Mr. Smith was responsible for the absence of the rough draft from the files. (Somsag, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 17-18, ff. Tr. 2883: Somsag, Tr. 2891-2895.)
568. Mr. Smith also testified that Mr. Somsag exten-sively rewrote the draft of the follow-up audit to Audit 059-3.
He was able to identify only two changes which he attributed to Mr. Somsag, however. First, Mr. Smith testified that Mr.
Somsag was responsible for the statement at the conclusion of the follow-up audit which states "In addition, training of Q.C.W.I.'s to the M916 tolerances has been committed by the QA
~ .=
Supervisor, and will commence at his discretion." Mr. Smith testified that he did not believe that such a statement, which leaves future training to the discretion of the QA Supervisor, represented an appropriate way in which to close an audit finding because the audit did not promise a timely training program. This training, however, commenced within one month of completion of the follow-up audit, and Mr. Smith conceded that the training thus was begun in timely fashion. (Smith, Inter-venors' Prepared Testimony at 34-35, ff. Tr. 3243; Smith, Tr.
3395, 3415-3417.)
Second, Mr. Smith testified that in preparing the follow-up audit he and his co-auditor found a component support with no documentation of installation, but they were instructed to not include this support in the audit. Mr. Smith testified, however, that the reason he and his co-auditor were so instructed was that a hanger field problem had already been initiated for the support and the problem was resting with Sargent & Lundy and Hunter Corporation quality assurance. (Smith, Tr. 3412-3413.)
569. Mr. Somsag explained that he would customarily review an auditor's handwritten draft to make sure the conclu-sions were clear and substantiated. He recalled occasionally changing the audit reports of Mr. Smith in order to clarify or define the reports, or to remove unprofessional language. Mr.
Somsag was certain that he never directed his auditors to change an audit so that it would not properly identify a prob-lem. (Somsag, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 17-18, ff. Tr.
2883; Somsag, Tr. 2895.)
.__ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _~ _ _
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1 570. The NRC Staff inspector who investigated the allegations of Mr. Smith, Mr. Yin, testified that he examined a number of Hunter Corporation audits in which Mr. Smith partici-pated, as well as audits prepared by other auditors. Mr. Yin concluded that the changes in Mr. Smith's audits were editorial in nature only; the audits continued to include the findings made by the auditors. Mr. Yin concluded that the paragraphs deleted by Mr. Somsag invloved the personal concerns of Mr.
Smith, and that the changes made by Mr. Somsag did not have safety impact. (NRC Prepared Testimony at 26-27, Attachment G, ff. Tr. 3586.)
- 571. The Board finds that changes in audits prepared by Mr. Smith were not extensive and did not result in the deletion of any audit findings. The evidence does not suggest that the changes made by Mr. Somsag had the effect of lessening l the impact of the audits.
572. Mr. Smith alleged that the audit he conducted of the Authorized Nuclear Inspector ("ANI") was superficial. Mr.
Smith testified that the audit lasted only two days and entailed a checklist almost identifical to that used in the previous l
audit of the ANI. (Smith, Intervencr's Prepared Testimony at 16-17, ff. Tr. 3243.)
573. Mr. Somsag explained that the ANI is employed by a separate inspection agency and charged with monitoring and inspecting the implementation of the Hunter Corporation QA program. Hunter Corporation is required to provide the ANI with information and documentation to enable review of the QA program. (Somsag, Tr. 2905.) The Hunter Corporation audit of
- . - . = _ -
l the ANI (Audit 057-2) consisted of verifying receipt of these materials. It did not involve audit of the actual work performed l l by the ANI. Mr. Somsag stated that the ANI's work performance is audited by his own employer. (Somsag, Tr. 2912.)
574. Mr. Smith characterized his audit of the ANI as superficial because it did not encompass that inspector's work performance. He admitted that the audit was complete with regard to its limited purpose of verifying receipt of QA mater-ials and documents. Each checklist item was audited and no items of non-compliance were identified. Mr. Smith could not identify any additional items he would have included in an audit of the materials provided by Hunter Corporation to the ANI. (Smith, Tr. 3305-3311.)
575. The Board finds that the audit of the ANI was performed properly. The audit was intended only to verify receipt by the ANI of certain Hunter Corporation QA materials.
Mr. Smith testified that the audit he performed completely fulfilled that purpose.
576. Mr. Smith alleged that while working as a sur-
- veillance inspector he found unsigned welding inspection docu-ments. He was instructed to verify that the inspections had taken place by checking to see if the inspectors' daily records i indicated that the inspections had been performed. (Smith Prepared Testimony at 15, ff. Tr. 3243.) Mr. Smith would then have the inspectors sign-off on the inspection documents.
l l
(Smith, Tr. 3426.) If ne was unable to verify that the inspec-l tion had taken place, Mr. Smith would give the documents to the inspection superintendent, Frank McGhee, to follow up. Accord-
~ ..
ing to Mr. Smith, McGhee would then initial the documents without first checking to see if the actual inspections had been done. Mr. Smith testified that he witnessed Mr. McGhee sign-off on such documents approximately ten times between 1977 and 1979. (Smith, Tr. 3427, 3429.)
577. Michael Zeise was the lead auditor in the Hunter Corporation Quality Assurance Department at this time. (Somsag, Tr. 2886.) In his stipulated testimony, Mr. Zeise stated that he is aware of only three instances in which Mr. McGhee initialed an inspection report where there was not conclusive evidence that an inspection had taken place. Mr. Zeise stated that it was unlikely that there were other occasions when Mr. McGhee initialed reports in this manner, since Mr. Zeise was in a position to observe Mr. McGhee do so and since Mr. McGhee changed job positions soon after the three instances occurred.
(Zeise Stipulated Testimony at 1-2, ff. Tr. 7025.)
578. With respect to the three instances, Mr. Zeise believed that subsequent tests were run on the piping which would have revealed any weld deficiencies. Mr. Zeise would have been informed of any failed tests had they occurred.
(Id.)
579. The Board finds that the occasions on which Mr.
McGhee apparently signed-off on weld inspection documents without conclusive evidence that the inspections had occurred were isolated incidents. There is insufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that Mr. McGhee's apparently infrequent practices significantly impaired the effectiveness of Hunter Corporation's quality assurance-quality control program. The i
f l
~ .-
Board finds that in view of Mr. Zeise's stipulated testimony that he believed that subsequent tests were run which would have demonstrated any weld deficiencies Mr. McGhee's sign-offs do not indicate an ongoing safety problem at Byron.
580. Mr. Smith alleged that the manner in which Hunter Corporation made revisions to quality assurance proced-ures was improper. He testified that Hunter Corporation would make revisions by adding on to an_ existing procedure rather than by rewriting the entire procedure, and that this resulted in ambiguous and hard to follow procedures which provided excessive discretion to personnel. (Smith, Intervenors' Pre-pared Testimony at 11, ff. Tr. 3243.) Mr. Smith specifically criticized Hunter Corporation's practice of updating its Site Implementation Procedures (" SIP") by adding inter-company correspondence to the end of the pertinent SIP section, and he referred in this context to Hunter Corporation inter-company correspondence HC-QA-23. (Id. at 36; Smith, Tr. 3437.)
581. Mr. Smith testified that in preparing an audit checklist he and his co-auditor would review the Site Implemen-tation Procedures, along with any attachments to the SIP's.
Thus, in preparing the checklist for Audit 059-3 Mr. Smith and Mr. Zeise reviewed Hunter Corporation inter- company correspon-dence HC-QA-23, which was appended to the S!P concerning hanger process control. Audit 059-3 checklist items 10 and 11 were then based on the component support location requirements set forth in HC-QA-23. (Smith, Tr. 3357-3362.)
582. Mr. Somsag testified that in its March, 1980, investigation of Hunter Corporation activities the NRC Staff I
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disapproved of the use of inter-company correspondence to update site implementation procedures. The NRC believed that.
this manner of revision bypassed document control requirements.
(Somsag, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 21, ff. Tr. 2883.)
583. The Board finds that there is no evidence which would warrant the conclusion that the manner in which Hunter Corporation revised its site implementation procedures prior to March, 1980, impaired the effectiveness of the company's qual-ity assurance-quality control program. The only specific example before the Board of a revision which allegedly was made improperly involves Hunter Corporation inter-company correspon-dence HC-QA-23, and there is no indication in the record that the inclusion of this correspondence as an attachment to an SIP, rather than as a portion of the body of the SIP, had any effect on the implementation of Audit 059-3.
584. Mr. Smith alleged that he and other Hunter Corporation employees were kept from talking with NRC personnel about Hunter Corporation's work at Byron. He testified that when NRC personnel were on site, he and other employees were told to " stay out of sight, and, if approached, to answer a point 'yes' or 'no' and get out of their way." (Smith, Inter-venors' Prepared Testimony at 39, ff. Tr. 3243.)
585. On cross-examination, however, Mr. Smith testi-fled that at the time he was employed by Hunter Corporation he had "very little knowledge" concerning the function of the NRC.
Although Mr. Smith was aware that the NRC inspectors at Byron l
l were at the plant to uncover problem areas, and although he believed the problems he observed at Hunter Corporation to be l
l
serious, Mr. Smith admitted that he did not contact the NRC to discuss his concerns after he was fired by Hunter Corporation in January, 1980. (Smith, Tr. 3245-3246.)
586. Mr. Somsag testified that he never instructed Hunter Corporation auditors to avoid NRC inspectors. (Somsag, Tr. 2906-2907.)
587. NRC inspector D. W. Hayes investigated this allegation, and concluded that it was unsubstantiated. Mr.
Hayes testified that he spoke with individuals at Byron and was unable to find any policy that would preclude personnel at Hunter Corporation or at Commonwealth Edison Company from talking to an NRC inspector. Mr. Hayes concluded that it was not the policy of these entities to prevent any of their em-ployees from talking to an NRC inspector, and he added "In my inspection activities at Byron, I have never run into a case where I could not talk to anyone I wanted to." (NRC, Tr.
3798-3799.)
588. The Board finds that there is no evidence to support Mr. Smith's allegation that he was prevented from presenting his concerns to the NRC while he was an employee of Hunter Corporation. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that Hunter Corporation did not prevent :s employees from coming into contact with NRC inspectors.
589. The Board finds that on a number of occasions in cross-examination Mr. Smith changed or modified his prepared testimony so as to undermine the credibility of his testimony.
For example, in his prepared testimony, Mr. Smith stated that he never tabled items on his own initiative, only on the request
of Mr. Somsag. On cross-examination, he admitted that there were occasions when he and his co-auditor made the deicsion to table an item (Smith, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 22, 24, ff. Tr. 3243; Smith, Tr. 3383-3385, 3448.) Smith stated in his prepared testimony that piping support policies were not adequately defined according to the most current applicable codes. Yet on cross-examination, he conceded he was unfamiliar with what the codes required (Smith, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 6, ff. 3243; Smith, Tr. 3254-55.) Mr. Smith also admitted on cross-examination that his prepared statements that none of Blount Brothers' Production personnel used M916 were
" misleading." In fact at least part of the production staff was using M916 and it was mentioned on documentation for four of the five supports he checked in Audit 059-3. (Smith, Inter-venors' Prepared Testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 3243; Smith, Tr. 3372-3375.) The Board notes these instances, in conjunction with the numerous corrections required in Mr. Smith's affidavit, in evaluating his testimony.
i 590. Intervenors also proffered the testimony of Daniel Gallagher. Mr. Gallagher is a former concrete batch plant operator for Blount Brothers Corporation. Mr. Gallagher alleged that: 1) nonconforming aggregate was used in the batching of concrete; 2) water was surreptitiously added at placement sites to safety-related concrete; 3) a Blount Brothers 1
supervisor made misrepresentations to NRC investigators concern-l ing maintenance of the concrete batch plants: 4) Commonwealth l
(
Edison production supervisors applied excessive pressure to l
Blount Brothers with regard to concrete quotas; 5) cement which ,
I
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j l
was contaminated with oil was used in the batching of concrete; and 6) he was discharged by Blount Brothers for refusing to batch safety-related concrete, when he believed that the batch plant was incapable of batching safety grade concrete.
591. Mr. Gallagher worked for Blount Brothers at Byron from August, 1975, to November, 1977, and from February, 1978, to June, 1979. (Gallagher, Intervenors' Prepared Testi-mony at 1, ff. Tr. 3459.) He was hired as an oiler, which is an apprentice batch plant operator. (Gallagher, Tr. 3460.)
Mr. Gallagher was trained in the operation of a concrete batch plant by Donald Pope. In addition, Blount Brothers sent him to a course held in Erie, Pennsylvania, which involved the opera-tion of the Erie-Strayer batch plant, one of the two batch plants on the Byron site. (Gallagher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 2-4, ff. 3459.) After working as an oiler, Mr.
Gallagher became a batch plant operator. (Gallagher, Tr.
3460.)
592. Applicant proffered the testimony of three witnesses to address Mr. Gallagher's allegations. The first of these witnesses was Donald Pope, who was employed by Blount Brothers as a batch plant operator throughout the time that Mr.
l Gallagher was employed at Eyron. Mr. Pope has oeen a batch plant operator for sixteen years, having worked at Commonwealth Edison's Zion Station before coming to Byron. Mr. Pope and Mr.
Gallagher arrived at Byron at the same time, in 1975, and Mr.
Pope continues to work for Blount Brothers at Byron at the present time. (Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 1, ff.
Tr. 2833.) As the batch plant operator Mr. Pope's responsibili-
= _.
1 ties include the operation and maintenance of the batch plant at the site. As the experienced batch plant operator Mr. Pope taught Mr. Gallagher how to batch concrete out of the plants at the Byron site; Mr. Gallagher described Mr. Pope as a "conscien-tious" operator who "would never mix a bad batch," and who taught him "to be a goed, conscientious worker who always made a quality product." Even after leaving Byron Mr. Gallagher would seek Mr. Pope's advice about the machines Mr. Gallagher was running on other jobs. (Gallagher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 16, ff. 3459.) Both Messrs. Pope and Gallagher have been and are members of Operating Engineers Local 150.
(Gallagher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 1, ff. 3459; Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 2, ff. Tr. 2833.)
Applicant also proffered the testimony of two employees i
of Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory, Marvin Tallent, Jr., and Joseph Johnson. Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory is the indepen-dent testing firm at Byron which, among other functions, per-forms tests on concrete and its component materials. (Tallent and Johnson, Tr. 3961-3962.)
Mr. Tallent has been the site. manager at Byron for Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory since June, 1982. His prior experience includes work at various nuclear generating plant construction sites, including Commonwealth Edison's Braidwood Station. (Tallent and Johnson, Tr. 3961.) Mr. Johnson has worked for PTL at Byron since September, 1977, initially as a civil technician and presently as Civil Supervisor-Quality Control. (Id.)
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593. In addition, a panel of NRC Staff members ad-dressed Mr. Gallagher's allegations. The Staff's investigation of several of the allegations was summarized in its prepared testimony. (NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 23-25, ff. Tr.
3586.) The investigation itself was appended to the Staff's prepared testimony as Attachment F. (NRC Staff Prepared Testi -
mony, Attachment F, ff. Tr. 3586.)
594. A batch plant is the facility where the ingre-dients used in concrete (cement, water, admixtures and aggre-gate) are mixed. At the time Mr. Gallagher worked for Blount there were two batch plants at the Byron site, the Erie-Strayer and Ross plants. (Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 3, ff. Tr. 2833.) At present, only the Ross plant remains at the site. (Pope, Tr. 2867-2868.) The Erie-Strayer plant was a central mix plant which produced a " wet" batch; that is, the concrete was mixed at the plant and simply had to be trans-ported to the placement site. The Ross plant, in contrast, is a " dry batch" plant, in that the ingredients are poured unmixed into trucks which then do the actual mixing. The Erie-Strayer plant was computerized; ingredients were weighed and batches mixed automatically. At the Ross plant, en the other hand, the i
batch plant operator manually controls the weighing and mixing of the ingredients. (Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 3-5, ff. Tr. 2833.)
595. Mr. Gallagher alleged that the aggregate at the Byron site contained an excessive amount of " fines." (Galla-gher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 11-14, ff. Tr. 3459.)
Fines are small particles of crushed rock and other materials l
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amidst the larger rocks which compose concrete aggregate, and the aggregate must not include an excessive percentage of fines. (Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 10, ff. Tr.
2833; Tallent and Johnson, Tr. 3963.) In testifying that the aggregate contained an excessive amount of fines Mr. Gallagher stated that the aggregate was muddy when it became wet and was dusty when it was dry. In addition, he stated that Mr. Pope informed him in 1975 that the aggregate did not appear to meet specifications. Finally, Mr. Gallagher testified that in 1976 i an Israeli engineer visiting Byron commented that the aggregate appeared too " dirty" to be used in safety-related concrete.
(Gallagher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 11-14, ff. Tr.
3459.) Mr. Gallagher concluded that the problem of excessive fines existed from 1975 until the aggregate pile was condemned several years later, and that therefore approximately 100,000 yards of concrete with nonconforming aggregate was placed.
(Gallagher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 12, 14, ff. Tr.
s 3459.)
596. In addressing this allegation Mr. Pope noted that wet aggregate becomes muddy regardless of the percentage of fines, and likewise dry aggregate will always be dusty.
l (Pope, Tr. 2E71.)
597. Mr. Pope testified that in McVember, 1975, he l
! became concerned that the aggregate contained an excessive amount of fines, based on the appearance of the aggregate.
l Consequently, he contacted the Blount Brothers Quality Assur-i ance Department and requested to see the results of the cylin- !
l i
l
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der tests performed on the concrete being batched. (Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 17-18, ff. Tr. 2833.)
A cylinder test, also known as a break test, consists of the breaking by compression of sample cylinders of concrete.
The cylinders are taken at intervals during the placing of the concrete, with several cylinders being made at each interval.
The cylinders are then broken at designated times -- 7 days, 14 days, 28 days, and 91 days -- after the pour. This compression testing ensures that the concrete is hardening properly and that the final hardened concrete will withstand the pressures, in pounds per square inch, to which it will be subjected.
Although numerous tests are performed on batched concrete and on the components of the concrete, Mr. Pope characterized the cylinder test as "the name of the game," the ultimate measure of the strength of the concrete batched at the site. (Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 12, ff. Tr. 2833.)
Mr. Pope testified that by observing the actual break in a cylinder of concrete he could determine whether the aggre-gate was satisfactory. Unsatisfactory aggregate would weaken the concrete, and the concrete would therefore fail the cylin-der tests performed on it. (Pope, Tr. 3472.) The test results he observed in 1975 assured Mr. Fope that the aggregate that was being used was satisfactory. The break of the concrete went through the aggregate, rather than around it, which indi-cated to Mr. Pope the acceptability of the aggregate being used. (Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 18, ff. Tr.
2833.)
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Mr. Gallagher testified that he was unaware of the 2
fact that Mr. Pope had contacted Blount Brothers Quality Assur-ance and had observed the results of the cylinder tests performed on the concrete batched with the aggregate in question. (Galla-gher, Tr. 3478.)
598. Messrs. Tallent and Johnson testified that during the time that PTL had been at Byron, from September 1977, to date, only one-half of one percent of the 500 cylin-
! ders made have failed the compression testing to which they are subjected. Mr. Tallent noted that the cause of a cylinder test failure is not necessarily a problem with the concrete; cylin-der failres can be attributable to improper testing techniques, such as molding or maintenance of the cylinders. Mr. Tallent j
further testified that at a site such as Byron, where concrete is subjected to a variety of tests, and not merely cylinder tests, the percentage of cylinder failures attributable to improper testing is likely to be greater than at a site which does not have the control factor of other types of testing.
- (Tallent and Johnson, Tr. 3968, 3978-3979, 3982-3984.)
3 599. Mr. Gallagher premised his allegation that nonconforming aggregate was used from 1975 until the aggregate l
was condemned several years later, in 1979, on the fact that I
the appearance of the aggregate remained unchanged for the entire period of time. (Gallagher, Tr. 3477-3484.) He acknow-(
! ledged, however, that cylinder tests'were regularly performed on the concrete batched and that, in addition, the aggregate l
itself was tested daily by PTL. (Gallagher, Tr. 3480-3482.)
I 1
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Messrs. Pope, Tallent, and Johnson testified to the tests performed on aggregate at the Byron site. A sieve test was performed on the aggregate on a daily basis; the aggregate was washed over a 200 sieve in order to determine the percen-tage of fines in the aggregate. If a sample of aggregate demonstrated an excessive percentage of fines, two additional samples would be taken from the area of the aggregate pile where the initial sample was taken. If one of these two addi-tional samples also failed the sieve test that portion of the aggregate pile was condemned and was not used in the batching of concrete. Mr. Tallent testified that between September, 1977, and June 1, 1979, the date Mr. Gallagher last worked at the site, the aggregate failed a sieve test only on three occasions, each in March, 1979. The failed tests in March, 1979, ultimately led to condemnation of the aggregate pile.
(Tallent and Johnson, Tr. 3962- 3965, 3980-3981.)
Mr. Gallagher acknowledged that he "was too far down the ladder" to receive the aggregate test results. (Gallagher, Tr. 3481.) Therefore, he had no knowledge of the aggregate having failed the tests performed on it between 1975 and the time the aggregate was condemned in March, 1979. (Gallagher, Tr. 3483.) In fact, Mr. Gallagher testified that he had as-sumed that the aggregate was conforming during this time period.
(Gallagher, Tr. 3515.)
600. Mr. Gallagher acknowledged that the Israeli
! engineer who visited the site in 1976 did not look at any of the aggregate test results. (Gallagher, Tr. 3480.) Mr. Pope 1
l -. , _ . . . - - - - -
testified that the visiting engineer never mentioned to him that the quality of the aggregate appeared to be inadequate.
(Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 18, ff. Tr. 2823. )
601. In its investigation of Mr. Gallagher's allega-tions the NRC Staff found that there were only two occasions in which the aggregate at Byron was found to be nonconforming.
These occasions were necember, 1975, and March, 1979. The Staff found that both situations were properly documented through deviation reports and that corrective measures were taken. A portion of the 1975 nonconforming aggregate was used in safety-related concrete pours, based on an engineering evaluation. In 1979 nonconforming aggregate was segregated and used for backfill, and was not used in safety-related pours.
(NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 23-24, ff. Tr. 3586; NRC, Tr.
3889-3890.)
602. Mr. Gallagher stated that the aggregate condemned in March, 1979, was not used in the batching of concrete.
Further, Mr. Gallagher was unaware of any instance in which nonconforming aggregate was used in the batching of safety-related concrete. (Gallagher, Tr. 3483-3484.)
i Likewise, Mr. Pope testified that he was unaware of' any use of aggregate that had failed tests performed on it in concrete that was placed at Byron. (Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 20, ff. Tr. 2823.)
603. The Board finds that aggregate which had an excessive percentage of fines was used in safety-related con-I crete only in December, 1975, and that use of the aggregate on this occasion was based on an engineering evaluation. At all l
. u ..
other times during Mr. Gallagher's employment at Byron conform-1 ing aggregate was used in the batching of concrete. The Board notes that Mr. Gallagher himself assumed that the aggregate was conforming between 1975 and 1979, and in view of the testimony of Mr. Pope that he examined cylinder tests in 1975 and the testimony of Messrs. Tallent and Johnson that the only failed sieve tests between September, 1977, and June, 1979, occurred in March, 1979, the Board finds that this allegation of Mr.
Gallagher is without merit.
604. Mr. Gallagher alleged that water was surrep-titiously added to concrete at placement sites. He testified that concrete truck drivers and other workers told him water was often added to concrete without the knowledge of Blount Brothers QA/QC personnel. Concrete workers surreptitiously added water in order to make the concrete easier to work with.
(Gallagher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 19-21, ff. Tr.
3459.) Because he was at the batch plants, and not at the placement sites, Mr. Gallagher did not personally observe water being added to concrete. (Gallagher, Tr. 3469-3470.)
605. Water is one of the ingredients of concrete.
The amount of water that could properly be mixed into a batch of concrete, the water-cement ratio, war c-allneated in the concrete's mix design established by the Eyron architect-engineer.
Since the amount of water added at the batch plants to generate an acceptable batch of concrete often was less than the maximum amount permitted to be mixed into the batch, the batch ticket which was prepared for the batch would, under the heading
" Water Trim," indicate the number of gallons of water that
I permissibly could be added to the concrete at the placement Water would be added by the truck drivers under the 4
site.
supervision of Blount Brothers QA/QC personnel or PTL techni-cians. (Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 21-22, ff. Tr.
2E33; Tallent & Johnson, Tr. 3978.) Water added to the concrete at the placement site would be noted on the batch ticket which accompanied the batch to the placement site. After the pour copies of the batch ticket went to the batch plant, Blount Brothers, PTL, and Commonwealth Edison. (Gallagher, Inter-venor's Prepared Testimony at 21, ff. Tr. 3459; Tallent and i
Johnson, Tr. 3986.)
The amount of water that could be added was subject to the limitation that the maximum allowable for the concrete could not be exceeded. Slump tests were performed on concrete which arrived at the placement site. Like cylinder tests, slump tests were performed at regular intervals. A slump test is performed as follows: a sample of concrete is placed in a cone; the cone is then lifted from the wet concrete; the empty cone is then turned over, and the amount of inches by which the released concrete slumps down in comparison to the top of the turned-over cone represents the slump. For example, a distance l
of four inches between the slumped concrete and the top of the cone is a slump of four inches. The greater the slump, the greater is the water content of the batch. Concrete could not exceed a specified maximum slump, since concrete with excessive slump would be too watery and thus too weak. (Pope, Applicant's
, Prepared Testin.ony at 11-12, ff. Tr. 2833.) If concrete arrived at the placement site with insufficient slump, Blount Brothers L
(
QA/QC personnel or PTL technicians would supervise the addition of water, up to the maximum amount of gallons permitted by the batch ticket, to raise the slump to within the acceptable range. (Pope, Tr. 2842; Tallent and Johnson, Tr. 3986.) If water were added to concrete at the placement site, the concrete was retested for slump. (Tallent and Johnson, Tr. 3966.) Mr.
Johnson testified that water rarely was added to the placement site, because the concrete usually arrived at the site with acceptable slump. He estimated that water would be added as infrequently as once per month. (Id. at 3966-3967.)
If concrete arrived at the placement site with exces-sive slump it would be rejected. If concrete had already been placed when testing determined the slump was excessive, cylin-der tests would determine whether the concrete reached required strength. If the concrete failed cylinder tests, the Byron architect-engineer, Sargent & Lundy, would analyze the concrete further through core tests to determine whether it should be rejected. (Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 13, ff. Tr.
2833; Tallent and Johnson Tr. 3970.)
606. Mr. Gallagher agreed that there were occasions in which water was properly added to concrete at the placement
( sites. Moreover, on cross-examination, Mr. Gallagher clarified his allegation by testifying that he was not claiming that excessive water, water in excess of specifications, was added
' at the placement sites; his claim was only that water was added surreptitiously. Mr. Gallagher admitted that he could not identify any instances in which concrete with excessive slump was placed. (Gallagher, Tr. 3491-3495.)
i
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1 607. Mr. Johnson testified that in his view water could not be added surreptitiously to concrete at a placement
- site. PTL technicians worked within 25 feet of the trucks that t
poured the concrete. (Tallent and Johnson, Tr. 3966.) The source of water added to concrete was a large tank located inside the concrete truck itself, and the water therefore would be added to the concrete inside the truck. (Gallagher, Tr.
3540.) In order to integrate the additional water into the concrete the drum of the truck would have to be run at an increased number of revolutions, which would noticeably increase the sound of the truck. Thus PTL technicians would both see and hear any addition of water. Moreover, the concrete itself would visibly change appearance as a result of the added water, and Mr. Tallent testified that he believes such a change of appearance would be readily visible to the PTL technicians at the placement site. (Tallent and Johnson, Tr. 3977-3978.)
608. The NRC Staff investigated Mr. Gallagher's allegation that water had been added surreptitiously to con-crete at the placement sites, and concluded that there was no evidence to indicate that water above design and specification limitations was added to concrete. The NRC inspector reviewed Blount Brothers deviation reports generated as a result of excessive slump, and concluded that in each instance of exces-sive slump the maount of water that had been added to the concrete did not exceed the number of gallons permissible by design and specification limitations. That is, the number of gallons of water added in each instance examined did not exceed the water trim amount. The inspector determined that the
1
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number of deviation reports generated as a result of excessive slump was not out of the ordinary in light of the amount of concrete placed and the variables that affect slump. (NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 24, F, ff. Tr. 3586.)
609. The Board finds that there is no evidence that l water in excess of design and specification limitations was added to concrete at the Byron placement sites. The Board notes that Mr. Gallagher himself acknowledged that he was not testifying that excessive water was added, and that the NRC staff concluded after its investigation that it found no indi-cation that water in excess of design and specification limi-tations had been added to concrete. The Board also finds that there is insufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that water was surreptitiously added to concrete at the placement sites; Mr. Gallagher's testimony on this issue is based entirely on hearsay, and the Board notes that Mr. Tallent and Mr. Johnson offered contradicted testimony that the addition of water at a placement site presumably would be seen and heard by PTL tech-nicians working in close proximity to the concrete trucks.
Further, the testing performed by PTL and reviewed by the NRC
! staff shows that the concrete in question passed strength tests. Therefore, we conclude there is no evidence that exces-sive water was added on-site and resulted in the production use l
of non-conforming concrete.
l 610. Mr. Gallagher alleged that a Blount Brothers QA/QC official, Lou Andre, lied by telling NRC inspectors that Blount Brothers had a maintenance schedule for its batch plants.
1
Mr. Gallagher testified that there was no regular maintenance schedule for the batch plants. (Gallagher, Intervenors' Pre-pared Testimony at 14-15, ff. Tr. 3459.)
611. The scales in the batch plants were calibrated every 90 days. (Gallagher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 3459; Gallagher, Tr. 3485.)
612. Mr. Gallagher admitted that he was not alleging that plant maintenance was shoddy. He testified that he and Mr. Pope conscientiously maintained the batch plants. (Galla-gher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 16, ff. Tr. 3459; Gallagher, Tr. 3486.)
613. The NRC Staff testified that the NRC monitors calibration of the batch plants, but does not exercise juris-diction over routine equipment maintenance, which is left to the contractor. After interviewing Mr. Gallagher in November, 1982, the Staff concluded that Mr. Gallagher's allegation wes based on his misunderstanding of the scope of NRC inquiries with regard to maintenance. (NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 24-25, Attachment F, ff. Tr. 3586.)
614. The Board finds that maintenance of the batch plants was performed conscientiously by Messrs. Pope and Galla-gher. In view of the testimony of the NRC Staff the Board finds that Mr. Gallagher's allegation invciving Mr. Andre was based on Mr. Gallagher's misunderstanding of the scope of the NRC's involvement with batch plant maintenance. The Board therefore finds that there is insufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that Mr. Andre made misrepresentations to the NRC. .
u s 615. Mr. Gallagher alleged that Commonwealth Edison l
put pressure on Blount Brothers to increase concrete production and that this pressure led to the simultaneous running of both batch plante during safety-related pours. He claimed that Edison superintendent, Gunnar Sorenen would complain to Blount Brothers supervisors that concrete quotas were not being met.
(Gallagher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 10-11, ff. Tr.
3459.)
616. On cross-examination, however, Mr. Gallagher testified that this alleged pressure had absolutely no adverse effect on the quality of concrete batched. (Gallagher, Tr.
3475.)
i 617. In investigating this allegation the NRC Staff assumed that the premise of Mr. Gallagher's testimony was that Commonwealth Edison pressure somehow undermined Blount Brothers' QA/QC program. Based on an extensive review of concrete-related QA/QC documentation plus his sense of the adequacy of Blount Brothers' QA/QC program, the NRC inspector concluded that there was nothing to indicate that "the concrete QA program was not administered diligently and conscientiously." (NRC Staff Prepared Testimony, Attachment F, ff. Tr. 3586.)
618. The Board finds that there is no evidence to suggest that alleged pressure from Commonwealth Edison had an adverse effect on the quality of concrete batched at Byron, or that such pressure affected the effectiveness of Blount Brothers' concrete quality assurance program. This finding is based on f
l Mr. Gallagher's own testimony that pressure from Commonwealth ;
Edison did not adversely affect the quality of concrete, and on i
~ s the testimony of the NRC Staff that in its opinion Blount Brothers' concrete quality assurance program was administered diligently and conscientiously.
619. Mr. Gallagher alleged that oil leaked into the cement which was used in the batching of concrete. Mr. Galla-gher testified that his statements with regard to oil in cement were based entirely on statements made to him by Glen Garrison, who was the " pig" operator at the batch plants. Mr. Gallagher did not observe this problem himself. Mr. Gallagher testified that he was informed by Mr. Garrison that oil was leaking from a blower located in one of the pigs; the pigs were the storage bins for cement, and the blowers generated compressed air to force the cement from the pigs into the batch plants. Accord-ing to Mr. Gallagher, Mr. Garrison informed his superiors of this problem several times, but Mr. Gallagher asserted that the problem was not fixed promptly. (Gallagher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 22-24, ff. Tr. 3459.)
620. Mr. Pope verified that there had been a problem with oil leakage but testified that the problem was immediately rectified. The blower was taken off line and completely rebuilt.
(Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 24, ff. Tr. 2833.)
Mr. Pope denied that the oil problem continued for a couple of months before it was remedied. (Pope, Tr. 2848-2849.) Mr. Pope testified that he reviewed this incident recently with Mr. Gar-rison to confirm his, Mr. Pope's, recollection of the facts, and Mr. Garrison confirmed that the machine had been repaired promptly. (Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 25, ff.
Tr. 2833; Pope, Tr. 2848.)
e -
621. Oil contamination would weaken the concrete, and thus concrete mixed with significantly contaminated cement would fail the cylinder tests performed on it. (Pope, Appli-cant's Prepared Testimony at 24, ff. Tr. 2833; Gallagher, Tr. 3497-3498.) Mr. Pope testified that he was never told of any such failures and he concluded therefore that if any oil did get into the concrete the amount was insignificant. (Pope, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 24, ff. Tr. 2833.) Mr. Galla-gher likewise knew of no cylinder test failures due to oil contamination; he testified that any such problem would have been brought to Mr. Pope's attention. (Gallagher, Tr. 3498.)
622. The NRC Staff concluded that a small amount of oil may have gotten into the cement through a blower. (NRC Pre-pared Testimony at 24, ff. Tr. 3586.) An NRC inspector reviewed Blount Brothers' equipment maintenance records, and found that repair work was performed on two blowers, on one occasion in August, 1978, and on one occasion in October, 1978. The inspec-tor reported that any significant oil leak would have resulted in machine failure within a short period of time unless oil was continuously fed into the machine. The compressive strength records for the concrete produced at these times'were reviewed and the data showed strengths in compliance with design and speci-fications. The NRC inspector therefore concluded that any oil contamination would have been extremely low and did not affect the strength of the related concrete. (Id., Attachment F.)
623. The Board finds that the evidence demonstrates I
that if concrete was contaminated by oil the amount of oil in-volved was insignificant and did not adversely affect the strength l
l
~ e of the concrete. In addition, the Board finds that in view of the testimony of Mr. Pope that the problem was promptly remedied, l Mr. Gallagher's testimony that Mr. Pope conscientiously maintained the batch plants, and the statement of the NRC Staff inspector that significant oil leakage would cause early machine failure, the evidence indicates that the broken blower was repaired in timely fashion.
624. Mr. Gallagher was fired on June 1, 1979 for refusing to run a batch of allegedly safety-related concrete at the Ross plant. He claimed that he refused because he knew, from previous experience with the Ross plant, that the resulting concrete would be " incompetent". (Gallagher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 24, ff. Tr. 3459.)
625. Mr. Gallagher testified that in 1977 he attempted to mix Catagory I concrete at the Ross plant. On that occasion, it was necessary to add ice to the batch and the Blount Brothers trucks were incapable of integrating the ice in the mixture.
Different mixer trucks were rented to resolve the problem. The resulting concrete was rejected and not placed in safety-related construction. (Gallagher, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 24, Ex. A 1-2, ff. Tr. 3459; Gallagher, Tr. 3505-3507.) According to Mr. Gallagher, ice would have been used on June 1, 1979 and the rented trucks were no longer available. (Gallagher, Tr. 3522.)
The NRC Staff reported that only two safety-related concrete batches were mixed in the Ross plant. Both these occurrences took place in 1976. (NRC Prepared Testimony at 23, Ex. F at 4, ff. Tr. 3586.) Both these batches had been trans-ported in non-rented trucks that had been qualified to uniform by
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mix concrete. (NRC, Tr. 3885-3887.) The NRC Staff concluded that there all safety-related concrete from the Ross plant that had been transported in trucks currently tested for the ability to property mix concrete. (NRC Tr. 3762-3765.)
626. Mr. Gallagher stated that on June 1, 1979 he re-ported to work with no prior knowledge that he'd be asked to work the Ross plant that day. Mr. Gallagher admitted he preferred working at the Eric-Strayer plant. The controls for the Erie-Strayer plant are in a trailer separate from the plant. The Erie-Strayer plant was air-conditioned and less noisy than the Ross plant. (Gallagher, Tr. 3502-3582.) According to Mr. Pope, the Ross plant operator sat next to the discharge machines and, "He's got rocks falling on his head sometimes." (Pope, Appli-cant's Prepared Testimony at 6, ff. Tr. 2833.) Gallagher ad-mitted that his co-workers teased him about the fact that he had to go to the Ross plant that day. (Gallagher, Tr. 3502.)
627. Mr. Gallagher testified that the Ross plant was used primarily to mix Catagory II concrete and was incapable of mixing a safety-related concrete. (Gallagher, Intervenors' Pre-pared Testimony at 7-8, ff. Tr. 3459.) Mr. Pope stated that the Ross plant is capable of producing conforming safety-related con-crete. The Eric-Strayer plant was dismantled in 1980 due to de-crease in concrete demand at the Byron site. Mr. Pope testified that since that time he has used the Ross plant to produce safety-related concrete. He stated there is no problem mixing conforming safety-related concrete from the Ross plant. (Pope, Tr. 2863-2867.) l 628. Both Mr. Pope and Mr. Gallagher agreed that had the June 1, 1979 batches proved non-conforming they would have been 1
l l
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rejected and not used in safety-related construction. (Pope Pre-pared Testir. tony at p. 15, ff. Tr. 2823; Gallagher, Tr. 3508-3509.)
Mr. Gallagher had refused to even attempt to run a batch on June 1, 1979. He explained that since he knew the batch would be rejected and he believed this would be wasteful. (Gallagher, Tr. 3509.) On cross-examination, Mr. Gallagher estimated the cost of a Ross plant batch would run between $180 and $200.
(Tr. 3544.)
629. Mr. Gallagher alleged that he was wrongfully discharged for his refusal to mix concrete which, if accepted, would have endangered lives. He never filed a union grievance.
Mr. Gallagher explained after talking with his business agent and a union official he opted to forget about filing a grievance.
(Gallagher, Tr. 3513-3512.) Mr. Pope, who is a member of the same union, stated that if a union member believed himself to ,
have been fired for refusing to perform work which would have endangered others, he would have grounds to file a grievance.
(Pope, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 16, ff. Tr. 2833.)
630. The Board finds that there is insufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that Mr. Gallagher was wrongfully discharged because of his refusal to batch concrete he believed would have been non-conforming. Mr. Gallagher testified that had the concrete proved non-conforming it would not have been used in Catagory I construction. He refused to even attempt to run the ccncrete batch and based this refusal l
l on his assumption that the trucks available were incapable of properly mixing this batch. The NRC noted that each of the Blount Brothers trucks had passed uniformity tests and were
e r used on the two occasions safety-related batches were produced at the Ross plant. According to Mr. Pope the Ross plant can and has produced conforming safety-related concrete. The Board notes that despite his claim of wrongful discharge, Mr. Gallagher never filed a grievance. The Board finds the circumstances of Mr. Gallagher's discharge do not persuade the Board that Blount Brothers did not conduct an effective concrete Quality Assurance-Quality Control program.
631. Intervenors also proffered the testimony of Peter Stomfay-Stitz, a former employee of Blount Brothers Corporation ("Blount Brothers"). Blount Brothers was res-ponsible for structural construction at the Byron site, which included installation of concrete and structural steel. Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz alleged that: (1) He received inadequate training for the job of QA/QC materials controller; 2) Blount Brothers' QA/QC program was not sufficiently independent of its production program; 3) Blount Brothers did not follow its procedures in receiving and inspection of materials; 4) Tendons used in construction were inadequately stored and inspected; 5) Non-conforming masonry blocks were used in safety-related construc-l tion; 6) Non-conforming aggregate was used in safety-related 1
l construction: 7) His inspections of structural steel bolting-in were inadequate; 8) Structural steel beams were improperly I
deleted during construction.
632. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz worked at the Byron site from j June 1978 through April, 1979. The Blount Brothers job was his first full-time job after graduating from high school. Although initially hired as a pay-roll time checker, within five months
~ r he became a Quality Assurance / Quality Control Materials Controller trainee. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at p 1-3, ff. Tr. 2939.) Mr. Stomfay-Stitz was certified as a mater-ials controller in January, 1979. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 2950.)
633. Applicant proffered the testimony of four wit-nesses to address Mr. Stomfay-Stitz's allegations. One of these witnesses was Richard Barnhart. Mr. Barnhart was respons-ible for training Mr. Stomfay-Stitz for the position of mater-ials controller and was one of Mr. Stomfay-Stitz' supervisors.
Mr. Barnhart currently is a project engineer for Blount Brothers.
He has been employed by Blount Brothers in a variety of posi-tions at the Byron site since July 1976. (Id. at p. 1). Mr.
Barnhart immediately preceded Mr. Stomfay-Stitz in the position of materials receiving controller at the Byron site. In addi-tion to training Mr. Stomfay-Stitz for that position, Mr. ,
Barnhart also instructed Mr. Stomfay-Stitz in " bolting-in",
which involved reviewing bolted connections in structural steel. (Barnhart, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 1-3, ff.
Tr. 2979.)
Applicant also proffered the testimony of John Mihovil-ovich. Mr. Mihovilovich has been the lead structural engineer for Commonwealth Edison and the Byron site since 1975. Mr.
Mihovilovich holds a degree in engineering and has been an engineer with Commonwealth Edison Company for thirty years.
Mr. Mihovilovich's responsiblities include ensuring that var-ious structural contractors, including Blount Brothers, fulfill their contractual obligations. (Mihovilovich, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at p. 1, ff. Tr, 2750.)
l
~ e Applicant also proffered the testimony of Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory employees Marvin Tallent, Jr. and Joseph Johnson.
634. The NRC conducted its own investigation into some of Mr. Stomfay-Stitz' allegations. The NRC Staff witnesses summarized their conclusions in their prepared testimony. (NRC Prepared Testimony at 20-28, ff. Tr. 3586.) The result of the Staff's investigation was appended to its testimony. (Id.,
Attachment H.)
635. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz alleged that his training for the position of QA/QC materials controller was inadequate. He claimed that Blount Brothers records grossly overstated the the time he actually spent training. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 6-7, ff. Tr. 2939.)
A Blount Brothers QA/QC materials controller was responsible for ensuring that materials and accompanying docu-ments conformed to specifications. The materials controller documents his inspection of received materials on a checklist form referred to as Receiving and Inspection ("R&I") report.
The materials controller was also responsible for ensuring that material storage areas met certain requirements. (Id. at 7-8.)
636. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz was trained for this position by his predecessor and supervisor, Mr. Barnhart. This training consisted of study, on-the-job training and testing. In addi-tion Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that he performed some inspec-tiens under the surveillance of Mr. Barnhart. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 4-5, ff. Tr. 2939.) During the months of October through December, 1978, while Mr. Stomfay-
e <
Stitz was still a trainee, Mr. Barnhart cosigned each of Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz' R&I reports to indicate that these inspections had been properly performed under his supervision. (Barnhart, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 2, ff. Tr. 2799.) Mr. Stomfay-Stitz was certified as a QA/QC materials controller in January, 1979. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 2950.)
637. On cross-examination Mr. Stomfay-Stitz asserted that he received adequate training for his position as QA/QC materials controller. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 2950.) He testified that he quickly learned the procedures for materials receiving inspections and was capable of doing those inspections at the time he was still training. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 2945-2948.)
Mr. Stomfay Stitz believed he mastered receiving and storage inspection procedures. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 35, ff. Tr. 2939.)
638. The Board finds that Mr. Stomfay-Stitz was ade-quately trained to perform the job of materials centroller. He was a trainee for two to three months, and received training in the form of study, on-the-job training and testing. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz was supervised in his training by the former materials controller, Mr. Barnhart. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that he believed his training to be adequate and that he had mastered his responsibilities.
639. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz alleged that Blount Brothers' QA/QC program was not sufficiently independent of the company's production program. This allegation was based on his assump-tion that Blount Brothers' QA/QC manager, Richard Donica, conferred with Blount Brothers' production supervisors, Charles I
Smith and William Beesig, regarding Mr. Stomfay-Stitz' requests for a pay raise and overtime. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 8-10, ff. Tr. 2939.) According to Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz, Mr. Donica informed him that Smith and Beesig had made the decision to deny Stomfay-Stitz a pay raise. (Id.
at 10.)
Mr. Stomfay-Stitz was not present at any meeting between Mr. Donica and the production personnel concerning his pay raise. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 2982.) In his affidavit, Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz stated that he personally consulted production supervisors only regarding requests for time off. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony, Exhibit A at 7, ff. Tr.
2939.)
640. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that he knows of no instance when Blount Brothers' Production Department kept its QA/QC staff from identifying quality problems. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3222.)
641. The NRC Staff investigated this allegation and concluded that Blount Brothers' quality assurance organization had the necessary independence to identify and correct quality probleme. (NRC, Tr. 3744.) Messrs. Forney and Hayes inter-viewed a number of inspectors, including some who were working for Blount Brothers at the same time as Mr. Stomfay-Stitz.
They asked these inspectors if there was any reluctance to make adverse findings if those findings would impact on the construc-tion schedule. Based on their responses, Mr. Forney concluded that these inspectors were not stifled or intimidated in their work. (NRC, Tr. 3756-3759.) Messrs. Forney and Hayes both
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explained that it was not unusual or inappropriate for QA personnel to coordinate work schedules with production person-nel and ascertain whether there was need for overtime. (NRC, Tr. 3749, 3750.) They stated that their investigation did not concern the salary issue, and admitted that production should not control the salaries of QA inspectors. (NRC, Tr. 3762.)
642. The Board finds, based on the NRC Staff investi-gation and Mr. Stomfay-Stitz' own testimony, that the interac-tion between Blount Brothers quality assurance program and its production program did not undermine the integrity or effec-tiveness of the QA/QC program. The Board recognizes that there must be some contact between production and quality assurance programs in order to effect orderly scheduling of inspection and construction activities. The Board notes that-Intervenors have presented no documentary evidence that Blount Brothers production personnel controlled the salaries of Blount Brothers' QA/QC personnel.
643. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz alleged that he prepared Re-ceiving and Inspection reports in a manner contrary to Blount Brothers procedures. Specifically, he claimed that Receiving i and Inspection ("R&I") reports for shipments of steel embeds and masonry blocks that were received without proper documen-tation were improperly postdated. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' ,
i Prepared Testimony at 13, ff. Tr. 2939; Tr. 3060-3061.) Fur-l I ther, he alleged that he signed off on R&I reports for mater-ials he had not personally inspected. (Stomfay-Stitz, Inter- l l
Venors' Prepared Testimony at 38, ff. Tr. 2939.)
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644. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz explained that as a materials controller he was required to ensure that materials received were accompanied by complete documentation. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 12, ff. Tr. 2939.) The materials and documentation were inspected by the QA/QC Mater-ials Controller for conformance to specifications; conformance was then noted on the R&I report. Blount Brothers procedures require that any materials received be accepted, rejected, quarantined or placed on hold. (Mihovilovich, Applicant's Prepared Testimony, Exhibit 1, ff. Tr. 2750.) Mr. Mihovilovich explained the distinction betwcen quarantine and hold as fol-lows: Quarantined materials simply lack documentation, while hold materials lack some information necessary to establish whether the goods can be accepted or rejected. (Mihovilovich, Tr. 2772-2773.) According to Blount Brothers procedures mater-ials may be removed from quarantine when documentation for full identification is received. A supplementary R&I report is then prepared. The supplementary R&I is given the same number as the original R&I report, with the simple addition of a post-script letter to indicate preparation of a supplemental report.
I (Mihovilovich, Applicant's Prepared Testimony, Exhibit 1, ff.
l Tr. 2750; Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 2953-2954.)
645. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz claimed that one material supplier, Mid-City, consistently failed to send proper documen-tation with its shipments of steel embeds. However, he stated that the documentation would customarily arrive no more than two days later. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3147-3150.)
(
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)
1 1 l
Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that he knew of no embeds used in construction prior to receipt of complete documentation.
(Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3151-3152.)
Mr. Barnhart explained that it had been his practice as materials controller to have the Mid-City embeds unloaded in a quarantine area. He would then contact Mid-City to verify that the documentatiori was on the way. He stated that the R&I reports for embeds would be held separately in a special tray until the documentation arrived and the reports could be com-pleted. (Barnhart, Tr. 2808, 2816.)
646. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that the embeds themselves were physically conforming. Selected testing per-formed on these materials proved them to be conforming. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3152.) Mr. Stomfay-Stitz was unaware of any defec-tive embeds being used in construction. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr.
3151-3152.)
647. Although masonry blocks sometimes arrived on site without accompanying documentation, this documentation usually arrived at the site just hours after the shipment itself. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3061.)
Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that during the course of his activities as a materials controller, he received and inspected a variety of materials including welding materials, concrete expansion anchors and post tensioning tendons. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 2950-2951.) With the exception of various steel embed and masonry shipments, Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that '
l Blount Brothers procedures for the receipt of materials were followed. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3146.)
~ s 648. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that he was in-structed to sign off on R&I reports for materials he had not personally inspected. According to Mr. Stomfay-Stitz this would occur when shipments would arrive at the time when he was elsewhere on the site and therefore unable to perform an imme-diate inspection. On those occasions either Mr. Donica or Mr.
Barnhart, who were both qualified to perform receiving inspec-tions, would inspect the shipments. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3053.)
They would then tell Mr. Stomfay-Stitz how to fill out the R&I reports and they would later review the R&I reports completed by Mr. Stomfay-Stitz. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3053-3058.) Mr.
Barnhart testified that in addition to informing Mr. Stomfay-Stitz of the results of the inspections, he would request Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz to locate the materials and make his own inspec-tions. (Barnhart, Tr. 2805.) According to Mr. Stomfay-Stitz, he never inspected these shipments. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3056-3058.)
649. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz stated that to his knowledge all inspections performed by Mr. Donica or Mr. Banhart when he was elsewhere on the site were adequate. He knows of no non-conforming materials which were improperly accepted. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3058.) ,
650. The Board finds that Blount Brothers' practices in the receiving and inspection of materials were adequate to ensure that all materials received were conforming. Although Mr. Stomfay-Stitz' testimony suggests that on occasion strictly adhere to its procedures, the evidence indicates that ultimately l l
all documentation was received for shipments and that no non-conforming materials were improperly accepted for use at the site.
651. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz alleged that tendons were stored under deficient conditions. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 18-19, ff. Tr. 2939.) He also claimed that an inspection of tendon buttonheads prompted by the dis-covery of cracked buttonheads was inadequately performed.
(Id., at 21-23.)
652. A tendon, also known as a post-tensioning ten-don, is a cable consisting of a number of steel wires and is i
installed in containment buildings to provide additional strength.
The buttonhead is a small steel knob at the end of the cable.
The tendons arrived on site rolled around wooden beams and sealed in plastic. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 16-17, 21, ff. Tr. 2939.) Upon arrival at the site the bundles were opened and the cables were inspected for dust, rust, or knicked or bent wire. (Id.) Tendons were then stored in warehouses on site; each tendon was greased and placed under two sheets of protective plastic. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3029.) The tendons sat on large wooden pallets that stood 10" inches above the ground. (Mihvcilovich. Applicant's Pre-pared Testimony at 9, ff. Tr. 2750.)
653. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that one of his duties as materials controller was to inspect the tendon stor-age areas. He would then prepare a tendon storage report which included a checklist of storage conditions. (Stomfay-Stitz, l Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 18, Exhibit G-1, ff. Tr.
l l
2939.) Mr. Stomfay-Stitz stated that he believed that three of the checklist items on the tendon storage report should have been marked as unacceptable: accessibility, aisle spacing and security. Messrs. Donica and Barnhart, however believed that these checklist items were in fact satisfactory and therefore Mr. Stomfay-Stitz prepared the storage reports in accordance with the views of Messrs. Donica and Barnhart. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz agreed that this could be characterized as professional disagreement with regardto interpreting the storage report forms. (Stomfay-Stitz, 3031-3034.)
With regard to security, Mr. Stomfay-Stitz conceded that in his inspections he never found any evidence of tampor-ing with the tendons. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3036.) Mr. Stomfay-Stitz also conceded that he never found rust, dirt, mud or condensation on any of the tendons. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 19 ff. Tr. 2939, Stomfay-Stitz Tr. 3030.)
654. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that documents produced to him by Commonwealth Edison during his discovery deposition indicated that rust was found on tendons after he left Byron. In June, 1979, rust was discovered on a number of stored tendons. (Mihovilovich Applicant's Prepared Testimony i l
at 8-9, ff. Tr. 2750.) Mr. M1hovilovich explained that the rust had developed on stored tendons where the vertical posts holding them in place had caused the protective grease to rub off. The rust had previously been undetected because of the difficulty of visually inspecting the locations where the tendons came into contact with the vertical posts. Subsequently
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the rust was removed and the tendons were recoated with protec-tive grease. (Mihovilovich, Tr. 2779-2780.)
Upon discovery of the rust all stored tendons were inspected and a number were rejected. Sargent & Lundy reviewed and revised the acceptability criteria for rust on the tendons and subsequently procedures were implemented by Blount Brothers to determine the acceptability of tendons on which rust was found. All tendons were brought into compliance with specifi-cations and Blount Brothers generated an appropriate deviation report. (Mihovilovich, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 9-10, ff. Tr. 2750.) In addition, every tendon was reinspected as it was installed. (Mihovilovich, Tr. 2781.)
655. The NRC Staff did not substantiate Mr. Stomfay-Stitz's allegation regarding improper tendon storag'e. (NRC, Tr. 3732-3733.) NRC inspectors had regularly examined storage conditions and found them to be satisfactory. (Mihovilovich, Applicant's Prepared Testimony, Exhibit 5, ff. Tr. 2750.) The NRC Staff was aware of the rust problem during the time it occurred. Subsequently they accepted both Mr. Mihovilovich's explanation for its cause and the remedial measures implemented to correct the problem. NRC inspector Hayes explained that the rust problem was not a result of storage conditions and that rust would have resulted, in these circumstances, no matter how j clean or dry the storage garns were. (NRC, Tr. 3734-3735.)
656. At one point it was discovered that some of the l
tendon button heads had cracks or splits. Mr. Stomfay-Stit:
testified that in response to this discovery Blount Brcthers QA/QC personnnel conducted a special inspection of all stored
~ a tendons. He alleged that this inspection was inadequate in that as many as 5% of the tendons were not inspected. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 21-23, ff. Tr. 2939.)
Mr. Mihovilovich explained that this review of buttonheads performed by Blount Brothers was not an acceptance inspection, but instead was an informal review performed simply to ascer-tain the extent of the problem. (Mihovilovich, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 10 ff. Tr. 2750.) Subsequently INRYCO, the supplier, took action to resolve the problem with button-head cracks and conducted a 100% reinspection of the button-heads on site to ensure their compliance with specifications.
(Id. at 10-11)
Mr. Stomfay-Stitz admitted that he has no knowledge that any defective tendons were installed at the Byron site.
(Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3044.)
657. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz claimed that on learning of the INRYCO plans for buttonhead reinspection the quality of his tendon receiving inspection slacked off. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 20 ff. Tr. 2939.) Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz admitted he was not told to slack off on his inspections and that he continued to scrutinize each shipment 1
for conformity to R&I requirements. He could not identify any instance of acceptance of nonconforming tendons due to his 1
! slacking off. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3010-3011.) j l
658. The NRC Staff was aware of the problem with the l l buttonheads at that time and investigated the problem along i
I with applicant. (NRC, Tr. 3739-3740.) Satisfactory Resolution
! 1
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of this problem was noted in NRC Reports. (NRC Prepared Testi-l mony at 21, ff. Tr. 3586.)
659. The Board finds that the storage conditions for tendons were adequate. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz admitted that he did not observe defects during the course of his inspections.
Moreover, NRC inspectors consistently found that tendon storage conditions were adequate. The Board finds that there is no evidence to suggest that nonconforming tendons were used in construction. The record indicates that the measures taken to correct the presence of rust on the tendons were adequate and the Board notes that all tendons were reinspected prior to installation. The Board further find that the inspection of the buttonheads performed by Blount Brothers was an informal review only and not an acceptance inspection. The Board is satisfied that remedial measures were implemented in response to the buttonhead problem and that these measures ensured resolution of this problem.
660. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz expressed his concern that nonconforming Category II masonry blocks were used in Category I construction. He testified that wet cement masonry blocks were tagged and quarantined for Category II use only. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 15, ff. Tr. 2939.)
Even though these blocks were properly tagged with yellow tags and quarantined, he believe they may have been used in safety-related construction because they were stored in close proxi-mity to safety related construction areas. (Id. at 16.) The !
i basis of his allegation was Mr. Stomfay-Stitz inherent distrust
)
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1 i
of on-site construction workers. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3020-3022.)
661. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz admitted that his belief that Category II blocks were used in Catagory I construction was purely speculation. He admitted that his duties did not include supervision of masonry installation which was the responsibil-ity of the masonry superintendent. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that he was not aware of any specific instance where non-conforming masonry was used in Category I construction. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3024-3025.)
662. The Board finds there to be no credible evidence that Category II masonry blocks were used in Category I con-struction. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz admitted his belief is specu-lation only and that he was not responsible for the supervising the installation of masonry. The Board has no reason to believe that construction workers did not respect the yellow tags or the quarantine status of the masonry blocks in question.
663. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz made a number of allegations pertaining to the quality of aggregrate used in the batching of concrete at Byron. He alleged that: the sampling procedures for tests performed on the aggregate were so imprecise that there was no reliable way to identify the portion of the aggre-gate pile from which a failing sample was taken; the testing laboratory would simply take test samples until it found a sample which passed the test, not reporting failed tests; and workers may have taken aggregrate from the condemned portion of l the aggregrate pile for use in the mixing of Category I concrete.
l
~ o (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 24-29, ff.
Tr. 2939.)
664. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz conceded he was unfamiliar with and not involved in the testing performed on the aggregrate at the Byron site. His duties did not include reviewing writ-ten test results, and the testing laboratory would usually contact Mr. Donica to report if the aggregrate failed a test.
(Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3103-3105.) Mr. Stomfay-Stitz sole duty with respect to aggregrate was to segregate the portion of the aggregate pile which failed a test, so that the condemned aggregate was not used in safety-related concrete. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony, pp. 23-24, ff. Tr.
2339.)
665. The aggregate at Byron was tested by Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory. (Cite.) Messrs. Tallent and Johnson testified that if an aggregate sample failed a sieve test (a test to determine the percentage of " fines" in the aggregate) two additional samples would be taken from the same approximate area as the initial sample. (Tallent and Johnson, Tr. 3974-3975.) If one of these samples failed the test, the pertinent portion of the aggregate pile would be condemned. (Id. at
- 3964.) Mr. Stomfay-Stitz admitted he was not familiar with the testing procedures used by PTL. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3103-3105.)
He admitted it was not surprising that he did not hear of
- passing test results since he would only be informed when I
aggregrate failed a test. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3118.) Normally l
the testing laboratory would contact Mr. Donica to report if i
the aggregrate failed a test. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3104.) In sum, Mr. Stomfay-Stitz acknowledged that he had no way of knowing whether PTL either falsified or failed to report nega-tive test results. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3115.)
666. In March, 1979, a portion of the aggregrate pile was condemned, followed shortly thereafter by condemnation of the entire pile. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz' duties required him to segregate the area condemned and ensure that the condemned aggregrate was not used in the mixing of safety-related concrete.
(Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3124-3128.) Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that he daily checked on the segregated aggregrate to ensure that it was not being used. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3129-3131, 3140.)
667. During this period of the condemnation of aggre-gate, Mr. Stomfay-Stitz authored a series of memoranda relating to the procedures he followed with regard to the condemned aggregrate. (Miholovich, Applicant's Prepared Testimony, Exhibit 9, ff. Tr. 2750.) On cross-examination Mr. Stomfay-Stitz conceded the accuracy of the facts contained in the memoranda. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3125-3138.) The memoranda authored by Mr. Stomfay-Stitz reflect that on March 22, 1979, the eastern face of the aggregrate pile was condemned for failing gradation tests. In subsequent memoranda Mr. Stomfay-Stitz reported that signs and rope which segregated the condemned area were in place, and Mr. Stomfay-Stitz noted that workers were removing aggregrate only from the non-condemned portion of the pile. (Miholovich, Applicant's Prepared Testimony, Exhibit 9, ff. Tr. 2750.) A memorandum authored by Mr. Stomfay-Stitz
~ o dated March 27, 1979, asserts that the entire aggregrate pile has been segregated due to the failure of the sieve tests.
Subsequent memoranda record that no use has been made of the condemned aggregrate in that pile. (Id.) In sum, Mr. Stomfay-Stitz conceded that the proper procedures were followed regard-ing segregration of the condemned aggregrate. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3125-3135.)
Mr. Stomfay-Stitz acknowledged that he has no way of knowing whether condemned aggregrate was either intentionally or unintentionally used in the mixing of Category I concrete.
(Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3139-3141, 3144.)
668. The NRC Staff concluded that Mr. Stomfay-Stitz' allegations regarding the use of nonconforming aggregate were unsubstantiated. (NRC Prepared Testimony at 21, ff. Tr. 3586.)
The Staff's investigation of the allegation concluded that Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz had no first-hand knowledge nor any information that nonconforming aggregrate had been used to produce Category I concrete. In addition the Staff's investigation found that Mr. Stomfay-Stitz took appropriate steps to verify that noncon-forming aggregrate was not improperly used. (Id., Attachment E.)
669. The Board finds that there is no evidence that nonconforming aggregrate was us*d in safety-related concrete at Byron while Mr. Stomfay-Stitz was employed by Blount Brothers.
The evidence indicates that the testing procedures utilized by I Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory were adequate to ensure that t
nonconforming aggregate was detected and segregated. Moreover, t
l there is no evidence to suggest that PTL falsified or failed to
e o l report test results. Finally, Mr. Stomfay-Stitz' own memoranda demonstrate that proper procedures were followed when the aggregrate was condemned and, that nonconforming aggregrate was j not used in the batching of concrete.
670. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz alleged that the bolting-in inspections he performed were inadequate because he was not properly trained to perform such work. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz challenged the veracity of Blount Brothers documents which indicate that he received a certain amount of training for this job and stated that he received virtually no training for this task. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 30-34, ff. Tr. 2939.)
Mr. Stomfay-Stitz described the bolting-in training that he received to consist of several hours spent with Mr.
Barnhart in learning'to read design drawings. (Id. at 30.) He also stated that Mr. Barnhart would accompany him on occasion to instruct him in performance of the procedure. (Id. at 33.)
671. Bolting-in involved the review of fixed and slotted structural steel connections. In a slotted connection the bolt and nut assembly is movable in order to compensate for building movement due to thermal expansion and contraction.
The bolts are burred, or scored, to prevent the attached nut from coming off. This connection is installed to be finger tight, and therefore, is not torqued to a particular tightness.
By comparison, in a fixed connection the bolt and nut assembly is torqued to a particular value to keep it from loosening.
(Barnhart, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 3, ff. Tr. 2797.)
l
~ a 672. Bolting-in of slotted connections involved checking that each hole in a structural steel connection had a nut and bolt in it, that each nut was finger tight, and that each bolt was burred. (Barnhart, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 3, ff. Tr. 2797, Stomfay-Stitz Tr. 3208, 3215.) Bolting in of fixed connections involved checking that bolts were placed where they were supposed to be, i.e. that a bolt filled each hole in the structural steel connection. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testimony at 32, ff. Tr. 2939.) Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz testified that he was not required to check on the torque or tightness of fixed bolt and nut assemblies.
(Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3214.) In order to perform bolting-in, Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz took a copy of a design drawing with him to the field which would indicate the location of the connections; slotted connections would be marked on the drawing with an "s".
(Barnhart, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 2797.)
Mr. Stomfay-Stitz would then indicate on the drawing with
- different colored markers whether a connection was conforming i
or whether it was not conforming because a bolt was missing or was not burred. (Id.) A sample of these design drawings is attached to Mr. Barnhart's prepared testimony. (Id., Exhibit 1.)
673. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz agreed with Mr. Barnhart's description of the mechanics of the bolting-in process. He testified that his duties required his confirming that the number of bolts installed reflected the number of bolts on a drawing. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3200.) He would note problems discovered with colored markers on the design drawings he brought with him to the field. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3208-3209.)
674. Mr. Barnhart testified that bolting-in was not a final inspection for acceptance purposes but rather a surveill-ance or spot-check of on-going work. (Barnhart, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 4, ff. Tr. 2797.) Mr. Stomfay-Stitz testified that he perforened bolting-in while ironworkers were still working in the area. Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3209.) When he received the design drawings back from Mr. Stomfay-Stitz, Mr.
Barnhart stated that he initiated appropriate remedial action on the problems reported (Barnhart, Applicant's Prepared Testi-mony at 4, ff. Tr. 2797.) According to Mr. Barnhart, Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz had no responsibilities with regard to fixed connections. (Barnhart, Tr. 2801-2802. )
675. Subsequent to the bolting-in performed by Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz new design criteria were established which required replacement of all slotted connections. (Barnhart, Tr. 2819.)
Therefore, the slotted connections examined by Mr. Stomfay-Stitz ultimately were replaced and the new connections were subjected to a 100% reinspection. (Barnhart, Applicant's Prepared Testi-mony, at 5, ff. Tr. 2797; Barnhart, Tr. 2814.)
676. The torque of the fixed connections reviewed by Mr. Stomfay-Stitz was subsequently inspected by PTL. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3214.)
677. The Board finds that Mr. Stomfay-Stitz's train-ing to perform bolting-in was adequate in view of the nature of his responsibilities. There is no evidence that he was unable to perform any of the duties encompassed in bolting-in. The Board further finds that the slotted connections reviewed by Mr. Stomfay-Stitz were subsequently replaced and 100% reinspected.
1 1 i l
l The Board also notes that the torque of the fixed connections reportedly inspected by Mr. Stomfay-Stitz, were subsequently given torque inspections by PTL.
678. According to Mr. Stomfay-Stitz his duties re-quired him to ascertain whether structural steel beams were l
located in approximately the same location as indicated on design drawings. (Stomfay-Stitz, Intervenors' Prepared Testi-mony at 40, ff. Tr. 2939.) He alleged that on a number of occasions he found beams either missing or in locations other than those indicated on the design drawings. He stated that when he reported his observations to Sargent & Lundy it would generate the appropriate paperwork to cover his findings, the paperwork stating that the beam was deleted because it was unnecessary or because it could be changed to Category II. Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz testified that a beam would be changed from Category I to Category II if it "was too difficult or expensive to replace redoing (sic) it." (Id. at 41.)
679. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz admitted that he has no back-ground in engineering. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3193.) On cross-examination Mr. Stomfay-Stitz could specifically recall only l
one occasion of finding a missing beam. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr.
l 3191.) He stated he did not know if the decision to delete that beam or any beam was accompanied by appropriatg engineer-ing analysis performed by Sargent & Lundy. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr.
l 3199.) In sum, Mr. Stomfay-Stitz admitted that he had no l knowledge whether the absence of the beam was due to a conscious design change or was inadvertent. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 3197.)
\
680. The NRC Staff attempted to determine whether the ;
deleted beam was a mistake or a conscious design change but was unable to do so since Mr. Stomfay-Stitz could neither recall the location of the beam nor the name of the person he contacted at Sargent & Lundy. (NRC Tr. 3742-3743.)
681. The Board finds that there is insufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that a structural steel beam or beams was mistakenly or improperly deleted during construc-tion. Mr. Stomfay-Stitz does not have an engineering background and his conclusions are purely speculation. The Board has no reason to believe that if in fact Mr. Stomfay-Stitz contacted Sargent & Lundy concerning a missing steel beam, or beams that Sargent & Lundy did not perform an appropriate engineering analysis in evaluating the status of these beams.
682. The Board finds that Mr. Stomfay-Stitz's demeanor during his testimony undermined the witness' credibility. On at least two occasions during cross-examination by Applicant's counsel, Mr. Stomfay-Stitz appeared to be evasive in his responses.
The first occasion involved questions on Blount Brothers' Work Procedures for receiving and inspection. At that time Judge Smith commented that Mr. Smith was being evasive or was confused in light of the fact that Applicant's counsel had been attempt-ing to elicit responsive answers to his inquiries for fifteen to twenty minutes. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 2974.) Subsequently, when cross-examined on the accuracy of memoranda relating to the condemnation of aggregate, Mr. Stomfay-Stitz's equivocation prompted Judge Smith to state, "There is no question about it I
I on this one. [Mr. Stomfay-Stitz) is-just being evasive, and _
I
why don't you just get right down to it and answer the ques-tion?. . ." (Stomf ay-Stitz, Tr. 3123. ) These instances, in conjunction with the frequent and lengthy pauses between ques-tions posed by Applicant's counsel and the witness' answers, indicate to the Board that Mr. Stomfay-Stitz was not a forth-right witness. The Board notes this fact in evaluating Mr.
Stomfay-Stitz's testimony.
683. Each of the Intervenor's witnesses testified that he believed the problems he had observed while employed at Byron constituted serious safety issues. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 2940, Smith, Tr. 3245, Gallagher, Tr. 3534-15.) Yet, on cross-examination by Applicant's counsel, each admitted he had made no effort to contact the NRC prior to coming forward preliminary to these proceedings. (Stomfay-Stitz, Tr. 2941, Smith, Tr. 3246, Gallagher, Tr. 3516. ) The Board therefore finds that the failure of these witnesses to contact the NRC concerning their safety concerns is a pertinent factor to be considered in its evaluation of their testimony.
684. The Board finds that Applicant's construction quality assurance program is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the Byron station will be built in accordance with Commission regulations.
685. Applicant's station (or operating) quality assurance group, composed of approximately nine people and I
under the direction of a station quality assurance supervisor, is responsible for the operating quality aspects of the Byron Station. (Shewski, Tr. 2536.) This group will be primarily involved in inspections, surveillances, and audits of all
l
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-100- '
safety-related and ASME code related work performed by operat-ing plant personnel, contractors, and other Applicant person-nel. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 5, ff. Tr. 2364.)
This group may be broken down into two subgroups, one respons-ible for plant operators, i.e., control room operators and equipment operators out in the plant, the other responsible for plant maintenance activities. (Shewski, Tr. 2541.)
686. The station quality assurance supervisor reports off-site to the director of quality assurance for maintenance and to the director of quality assurance for operating activi-ties. They in turn report to the corporate manager of quality assurance and the corporate manager reports directly to the vice-chairman of Commonwealth Edison. (Shewski, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 7-8, ff. Tr. 2364.)
687. Two senior reactor operators (SRO) are required to be on site at Byron at all times. The Byron Station will have sufficient SRO personnel so that under normal circumstances at least three SRO's will be at the station. A senior SRO on the station staff will be assigned on-call duty so that admini-strative level support is available to the shift engineer on a 24-hour-a-day basis. (Querio, Applicants Prepared Testimony at 7, ff. Tr. 2714; Reed, Tr. 2608-2610.)
688. Applicant's description of its operational quality assurance program meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. (Spraul, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 2-3, ff. Tr. 3562; Spraul, Tr. 3581.) The Board finds that Applicant's operating quality assurance organization as described has sufficient independence from cost and scheduling, suffi--
=
~ *
-101-cient authority to effectively carry out quality assurance )
program operations, and sufficient access to management at a level necessary to perform quality assurance functions. (Spraul, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 2-3, ff. Tr. 3562; Spraul, Tr.
3575, 3578.)
689. The SALP-1 (1980) report concludes that Common-wealth Edison's operating plants are average performers compared to other licensees both in Region III and nationwide. (Forney, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 13, Attachment C, ff. Tr. 3586.)
SALP-2 (1981) again demonstrates that Edison's performance is within the regional average. (Id. attachment D.)
690. Since 1974, Applicant has been fined a total of
$313,000.00 by the Commission in connection with the operation of seven reactors and construction of six additional reactors.
(Del George, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 12; ff. Tr.
2344; Del George, Tr. 2346, 2352.) For the period 1979-1982, all of Applicant's facilities were below the national and regional averages for civil penalties. (Forney, NRC Staff Prepared Testimony at 11-12, ff. Tr. 3586.)
691. In December 1974, Applicant was fined $25,000 i
for cighteen violations at its Dresden station in three broad areas: (1) the release of approximately 1100 gallons of laun-dry water, (2) deficiencies in rad-waste procedures, and (3) de-ficiencies in implementing security procedures. None of the violations posed a threat to the health and safety of the public. (Del George, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at Appen-dix, p. 1, ff. Tr. 2344.) Applicant thereafter implemented new procedures and training for operators to reduce the likelihood
- 102-of operating errors such as the laundry water discharge. A l l
special review of the design operation in management of rad- l waste systems at Dresden resulted in changes in a number of areas. Security guard training was increased and physical security equipment was improved. (Ig.)
692. In October 1975, the Commission fined Applicant
$25,000 for violations at its Quad-Cities Station. $8,000 was for an error in control rod withdrawal which caused fuel damage but did not threaten the health and safety of the public. The remainder of the fine was for deficiencies in implementation of the new station security plan. None of the violations posed a threat to the health and safety of the public. (Ig. at Appen-dix, pp. 1-2.) In response, training procedures were changed 4
to improved the control and use of control rod withdrawal sequences. Specific changes were made to address each cf the security violations. Improvements were made in the analysis and trending of abnormal occurrences and equipment failures. A new program was instituted to give personnel errors the same degree of investigation and analysis given to serious accidents.
(Id. at Appendix, p. 2.)
693. In May 1976, Applicant was fined $13,000 for
- excessive radiation exposure to an employee. There was no threat to the health and safety of anyone except the employee involved and no apparent affect on his health. (Id.) Specific changes were made to administrative controls to prevent recur-rence of this overexposure. These included special locks and special training for all station personnel. Outage planning and coordination practices were also reviewed to emphasize the
-rw -. - - , , , ~ - + - , , .
~ .
-103-special need for proper planning of maintenance activities where radiation hazards are involved. A special review of radiation protection practices resulted in a number of changes which increased the staff and improved the organization of the radiation protection department. (Id. at Appendix, pp. 2-3.)
694. In September 1977, Applicant was fined $21,000 for the inadvertent draining of the pressurizer at Zion Station.
The reactor was shut down at the time of the occurrence, and there was no threat to the public health or safety. Extensive changes were made in response to this violation. In addition to specific changes made to prevent recurrence of the event, the operating organization reporting chain was streamlined to minimize conflicting assignments of work. In addition, audits of station operations by Applicant's quality assurance depart-ment were initiated. (Id. at Appendix, p. 3.) j 1
695. In March 1978, Applicant was fined $21,000 for seven items of noncompliance at Dresden Station which occurred between October 1977 and January 1978. In response to these noncompliances, administrative controls were improved, special training was conducted, and shift starting times were adjusted to prevent recurrence. Changes in station organization were also instituted. (Id. at Appendix, pp. 3-4.)
696. In October 1980, the Commission proposed a fine of $40,000 for alleged inattentiveness of operators at Dresden Station. Applicant protested this fine and the associated noncompliance on the basis of its own investigation, which determined the operators in question were present at their prescribed stations and able to perform all required functions.
i
~ *
-104-1 The actual fine paid was $18,000 as a compromise with the ,
Commission. The event posed no threat to public health and safety. Revised procedures concerning control room personnel conduct were implemented following this incident. (Id. at Appendix, pp. 4-5.)
697. In March 1981, Applicant was fined $80,0000 for an occurrence involving excess radiation exposure to two con-tractor employees at Dresden Station due to the failure of sta-tion personnel to survey the working environment. There was no threat to the health and safety of anyone except the employees involved and no apparent affect on their health. (Id. at Appendix, p. 5.) In response, Applicant implemented new pro-cedures and a new timekeeping policy regarding the monitoring of radiation exposure by contractor personnel. Self-reader radiation detectors were purchased and are now worn by all contractors in high-raliation areas to confirm daily timekeep-ing results. During the recent Dresden Unit Three outage the same work was performed which resulted in the overexposure at Dresden Unit Two. The new procedures were followed and no overexposure occurred. (Id.)
698. In July 1982, Applicant was fined $100,000 for an occurrence at Zion station involving excessive radiation exposure to an employee who entered a high-radiation area without taking proper precautions. There was no threat to the health and safety of anyone except the employee involved, and
! no apparent affect on his health. (Id.) In response, a number of changes were instituted. Reactor cavity locks have been re-placed with special locks. Administrative procedures for
~ o .
l
-105-containment access control were revised. Pursuant to manage-1 ment changes, the rad-chem foreman now reports to the lead health physicist. The Radiation Work Permit program was insti-tuted. This event is re-emphasized in RCT retraining. (Id. at Appendix, p. 6.)
699. Since 1980, Applicant has been denied access to low-level waste burial sites on eight occasions. On three of these occasions, the Commission also assessed a fine. (Del George, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 22, ff. Tr. 2344.)
700. In February 1980, Applicant was excluded from the Richland low-level burial site because of high radiation readings on the underside of the trailer used to transport the waste to the site. This violation was caused by Applicant's misinterpretation of the requirements on radiation readings and on accessible areas of transportation vehicles. The Commission fined Applicant $4,000. Following this violation, Applicant changed procedures to ensure that all vehicles will now be inspected before they are released from the site. In addition, all packages will now be surveyed before loading them on the truck to provide further assurance that high radiation readings at the accessible areas of the vehicles will not occur. Appli-cant has not had a similar violation since instituting these new procedures. (Id. at 22-23.)
701. In May 1950, Applicant was again denied access to the Richland low-level waste burial site. This denial was caused by a defective closure on a rad-waste shipping container.
The Commission fined Applicant $4,000. Applicant's records indicate that these closures were in proper condition at the i
l
- t. _ _
I
- a j -106-l l
l time of shipment and Applicant believes they became defective in route to the burial site. Applicant has since improved its closure devices and since this incident has not had a similar violation. (Id. at 23.)
702. In February 1982, Quad Cities Station was denied access by the state of South Carolina for a nonconforming rad-waste shipment to the Barnwell, South Carolina burial site.
The nonconformance involved freestanding water in the shipping cask. The Commission fined Applicant $1,000. As a result, shipping procedures were changed to include an inspection of the drain connection prior to shipment. (Id.)
703. The five other instances of denial of access involved minor deviation from facilities' specific rules, and did not involve a violation of Commission regulations. (Id.)
704. In addition to instituting an independent review by quality assurance personnel of all rad-waste shipments, Applicant has established the position of radioactive waste management administrator in its technical services department.
The administrator maintains detailed records of radioactive waste shipment, and works closely with station personnel as well as with appropriate state officials. This has improved Applicant's rau-waste shipment performance. (Id. at 24. )
705. Due to improved rad-waste processing technology !
and increased administrative controls, Applicant is reducing the amount of solid waste actually produced at its stations; it is upgrading the waste handling systems to further improve volume reduction; it is implementing methods to eliminate free-standing liquids within packaged wastes; it has improved
- - -107-a control of the design of packages used in shipment of radio-active materials; and it has increased quality inspections of prepared shipments of radioactive waste materials. The equip-ment and administrative controls at the Byron Station will incorporate improvements suggested by prior operating experi-ence. (Querio, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 13, ff. Tr.
2714.)
706. In April 1977, former employees of the Pinkerton i
Security Agency made allegations concerning the security system 1
and plant operations at Applicant's Quad-Cities Station.
I Pinkerton at that time supplied guard services to Quad-Cities.
The Commission immediately investigated these allegations. As
, a result of its investigation, certain of Applicant's activi-I '
ties were found to be in noncompliance with Commission regula-
- tions. (Del George, Applicant's Prepared Testimony at 19; ff.
1 Tr. 2344.)
707. None of the items of noncompliance represented a
- direct threat to the health or safety of the public. Eleven items were categorized as infractions and five were categorized as deficiencies. These items were referred to Commission lt headquarters for consideration of monetary fines. (Id. at 20.)
708. The FBI also conducted an investigation of these same activities at Applicant's Quad-Cities Station. The FBI investigated whether security-related documents had been im-properly processed so as to fail to disclose information regard-ing apparent problems with the security system. Later, a
- federal grand jury considered this matter and returned an indictment against Applicant and two of its employees charging 4
r-,,- w n, , - - - , .,, - . - . . - . ,, - - , - - . , - , - , - . .- , - - - - - - , - - , - , _ - , ~ - - - - -,
~ o
-108-violations of 18 U.S.C. 51001, the so-called false statement provision of the United States criminal code. A trial was held and Applicant and its employees were found not guilty. (Id.)
709. The Commission deferred any administrative action until the Department of Justice concluded its work.
Following the trial, the Commission again considered the six-teen items of noncompliance. In its letter to Applicant clos-ing out the matter, the Commission stated: " recognizing that Commonwealth Edison took prompt corrective action on the speci-fic items of noncompliance which were identified, and recogniz-ing the impact of the Department's course of action in focusing Commenwealth's attention on security requirements, we conclude that the assessment of a civil penalty at this time is inappro-priate and unnecessary to assure (sic) lasting corrective action." (Id. at 20-21.)
710. Unlike the Quad Cities Station, the Byron Sta-tion has been designed with industrial security as one of its design criteria. This will eliminate many of the difficulties Applicant experienced developing effective security programs at its earlier operating stations. (Id. at 21.)
711. Applicant now has a corporate level security l
l administrator who will aid in the development of the Byron l
l Station security program. (Id.)
712. The security system at Byron Station will be the most sophisticated of any installed at a Commonwealth Edison facility. The security plan for Byron Station has been deve-loped to eliminate many of the problems that existed at earlier facilities, and provides alternate compensatory measures to
~ *
-109-address any problems that might arise during start-up and subsequent operation. (Id. at 21-22.)
713. Details concerning noncompliances at a particu-lar station are communicated, through the division vice-president of nuclear stations, to the other stations. The division vice-president of nuclear stations is responsible for advising the other stations of any need to amend practices and procedures. Applicant does not assume that any given incident of noncompliance with applicable regulations is an isolated incident. (Id. at 7-8.)
714. On March 21, 1983, the Board ordered that an evidentiary presentation be made concerning Byron's automatic reactor scram (trip breaker) systems in light of the failures of such systems on February 22 and 25, 1983 at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit I (" Salem") operated by the Public Service Electric Company. On April 11, 1983 applicant presented two witnesses, Mr. Robert puerio, Byron's Station Superinten-dent and Mr. Lee Sues, the Station's Assistant Superintendent of Maintenance and Stores, to address this concern. Witnesses for the NRC were Kevin Connaughton and William Forney, resident NRC inspectors at Byron.
I 715. At Salem, Westinghouse type DE-50 trip breakers failed to automatically " trip" or shut-down the nuclear reac-tion in the reactor, making it necessary for an operator in Salem's control room to manually do so. (Board Order of March 21, 1983; Querio, Tr. 3997; 4056-57.) A trip breaker is a device which, when closed, allows an electrical power supply to pass i
! from motor generator sets, through contacts in the trip breakers,
. . l 1
-110-to the control rod drive system of a nuclear reactor. (Querio, Tr. 3992.) When the breaker " trips" or opens the contacts, it interrupts the power supply to the control rods, causing them to fall into the reactor, shutting doen the reaction. (Querio, Tr. 3993; Sues, Tr. 4001-02, 4008-13.) This system at Salem failed because improper maintenance and lack of a preventive maintenance program allowed dirt to accumulate within the trip breaker's internal mechanicm, jamming it and preventing it from functioning. (Querio, Tr. 4060-63; Connaughton, Tr. 4085.)
716. Byron uses Westinghouse type DS-416 low-voltage switch gear trip breakers; these are classified as safety related equipment. (Sues Tr. 3997, 4023.) Although these function similarly to the type used at Salem, they have differ-ent internal mechanisms. (Id. at 3997.) Each reactor unit at Byron is controlled by two trip breakers, connected in series.
(Querio, Tr. 3993.) This provides a redundancy feature which enables the trip breaker system of each unit to function in the event that the companion component does not operate. (Querio, Tr. 4043.) There are two additional identical trip breaker devices for each unit, called trip by-pass breakers, used for testing. (Quario, Tr. 3993.)
717. A trip breaker's mechanism can be operated in three ways: automatically, manually and mechanically (Querio, Tr. 3995-97; Sues, Tr. 4004.) The trip breaker operates auto-matically through an undervoltage coil within the breaker.
There are 23 input sensors monitoring various parameters of safety systems throughout the plant. (Querio, Tr. 3995-96.)
When activated by certain conditions in the plant which indi-l
- a
-111-cate an operating transient condition is beginning, such as steam generator, low water, one of these input sensors will send a signal to the energized undervoltage coil in the breaker, deenergizing it. (Id.; Querio Tr. 4066-67.) This releases a lever moving the interlocking works within the trip breaker which, in turn, opens the trip breaker contacts, interrupting power to the control rod drive mechanism. (Sues, Tr. 4001-02, 4008-13.)
The trip breaker operates manually through the use of a shunt coil within the breaker. The operator in the control room can manually turn a switch on the control panel, energiz-ing the shunt coil. (Querio, Tr. 3996.) This releases the shunt trip lever which moves the trip breaker's interlocking works to open the breaker contacts. (Sues, Tr. 4000-01.) The manual control panel switch also de-energizes the undervoltage coil, causing it to instigate the operation of the trip breaker's internal contact opening mechanisms. (Querio, Tr. 3997.)
Finally, to function mechanically, a button on the outside panel of the breaker can be pushed which operates the interlocking works without electricity, and opens the contacts.
(Id.)
718. A Westinghouse DS-416 by pass trip breaker from the Byron Station was used as a demonstrative exhibit during the hearing. After removing its front cover, Mr. Sues described its parts and operation. (Sues, Tr. 4003-4009.) With an auxiliary electrical power source, he activated the trip breaker and operated it, demonstrating how its contacts open through l
l use of the undervoltage coil. (Sues, Tr. 4009-12.)
I i
7
l 1
-112-719. Recently, Westinghouse alerted Commonwealth Edison that during tests at a nuclear power plant type DS-416 trip breakers failed to operate properly. (Sues, Tr. 4015.)
The failures were attributed to the incorrect manufacture of the undervoltage coil mechanism. (Id.) Westinghouse provided the critical dimensions of the mechanism and asked that all DS-416 breakers be checked against them. Byron's Operational Analysis Department made these measurements and found that the Byron trip breakers were within the required tolerances.
(Sues, Tr. 4015-16.)
720. Prior to the Salem event, Byron developed a general preventive maintenance inspection procedure for West-inghouse switch gear which included the DS-416 trip breaker.
(Sues, Tr. 4016-19; Applicant Ex. 13.) The procedure incorpor-ated the vendor (Westinghouse) manual instructions and recom-mendations for breaker maintenance. (Sues, Tr. 4017.) The Commonwealth Edison Quality Assurance manual requires such reference to vendor manuals in all maintenance procedures.
(Id.) There is also a specific procedure to assure that any vendor initiated changes for the maintenance of trip breakers are incorporated into Byron's maintenance program. (Sues, Tr.
4022.)
721. Shortly after Commonwealth Edison received NRC notification of the failure of the automatic trip breakers at I
Salem, these maintenance procedures were reviewed. (Sues, Tr.
4016.) A new procedure for the inspection of DS-416 trip breakers, separate from the general switch gear maintenance procedure, was developed. (Sues, Tr. 4019; compare Applicant
-113-Ex. 13 with Applicant Ex. 14.) It includes a form to record all inspections, surveillances and repairs done to a particular breaker assuring that the particular trip breaker's history is traceable. (Id.)
722. Prior to the operation of the plant, both Byron's Operational Analysis Department and its Maintenance Department will inspect the trip breakers using the new inspection proced-ure. (Sues, Tr. 4022.) After the first six months of their operation, the breakers will again be inspected; after that the frequency of inspection will be 12 months, coordinated with the refueling cycle of a unit. (Sues, Tr. 4021.) This schedule for inspection, as all inspections, will be monitored and issued under a computerized program. (Sues, Tr. 4050.)
723. Since a trip breaker is categorized as safety related equipment, repairs on it are controlled by a specific procedure. (Sues, Tr. 4022-23.) This procedure requires the review and approval by both the Quality Control and the Quality Assurance Departments of all the repair procedures to be used on the breaker. (Querio, Tr. 4026.) The procedure also per-mits either department, at its discretion, to verify the actual repair work during the repair process. (Id.) If a spare part is required for the trip breaker, the procurement documentation must be reviewed both in Byron and in Chicago by Commonwealth Edison's Production Stores Department and the order must be approved by the Manager of Quality Assurance. (Sues, Tr.
4027.) Finally, Commonwealth Edison's Quality Assurance Depart-ment randomly audits repair packages to assrre that the proper quality levels have been maintained. (Id.) If a vendor works
j -114-on a trip breaker at Byron there are procedures to assure that the vendor's work is accomplished according to Byron's repair and maintenance procedures; any variation from these procedures must be specifically approved. (Sues, Tr. 4023.)
724. Sometime ago there were isolated failures of Westinghouse type DS-50 trip breakers at Commonwealth Edison's Zion Station caused by improper maintenance. (Querio, Tr.
4043-44; Sues, Tr. 4045.) Since the Zion maintenance proced-ures were corrected, however, there have been no failures.
(Id. at 4045.)
725. The Salem event also prompted changes in Byron's program for the on-line testing or " surveillance" of the trip breakers. (Querio, Tr. 4023-24.) Byron's surveillance proced-ures schedule its Operating Department to perform monthly tests i
on the trip breakers to verify that the input sensors will operate through the reactor protection logic system to activate the undervoltage coil. LI_d.) After reviewing the Salem event, a modification of this procedure has been proposed to permit the testing of the actual operation of the trip breaker's mechanism while the reactor is on-line. (Id.)
726. An automatic trip is signaled in the control
! room on an annunciator panel by the sounding of a horn and the flashing of a light. (Querio, Tr. 4027.) Upon receipt of this signal, the operator verifies that an automatic trip has occurred by observing that (1) control rod bottom lights on the control panel indicate the rods have fallen into the reactor, (2) reactor trip breaker lights indicate that the contacts have opened, and (3) recorders on the control panel indicate that i ,
~ .
-115-reactor power is decreasing. (Querio, Tr. 4028.) This takes i i
no more than 5 seconds. (Querio, Tr. 4059.) If any one of those conditions is missing, the operator manually actuates the
- 1 trip switch on the control panel to open the contacts. (Querio, Tr. 4028.)
727. Several devices in the control room record the presence of a trip condition in the plant and the events attend-ant to it. (Querio, Tr. 4028-29.) First, the annunciator light on the control panel signaling the trip condition is i back-lit red, contrasting with other control panel sensor lights in white. (Id.) Second, a sequence of events recorded chronologically records all annunciator actions in the plant as of the moment of their occurrence. (Id.) Finally, the plant process computer prints out a log of plant parameters indicat-ing their values for the time periods before, during, and after the actual trip. (Id.)
728. After a trip occurs and the operators secure the l
plant to a safe shut-down condition, they are required to l
analyze the circumstances surrounding the trip before the l reactor is restarted. (Querio, Tr. 4030-31.) At Byron, all reactor re-starts must be approved by the Station Superinten-dent, after a trip analysis is made. (Querlo Tr. 4030-31.)
In making a trip analysis, the operator fills out a deviation report describing the events involving the trip. (Id.) This report is reviewed and supplemented by the operating engineer and the senior reactor operator. (Id.) The senior reactor operator is generally the station control room engineer (SCRE),
a technically degreed engineer with a senior reactor operator
> l
-116-license and advanced technical training. (Querio, Tr. 4033-34.)
In addition to control room personnel, Byron's Technical Staff participates in the analysis by completing the deviation report and documenting the causes and circumstances related to the trip. (Id.) The deviation report is again reviewed by Common-wealth Edison's Off-Site Review Group. (Id.)
729. At Salem, during the post trip analysis of the i
l initial incident on February 22, control room personnel did not identify the failure of the automatic reactor scram system.
(Querio, Tr. 4055-57.) Because of the Salem event, Byron is preparing changes to some aspects of their post trip analysis.
(Querio, Tr. 4035.) The changes involve developing a formal trip analysis procedure with a written checklist. (Id.) Among other things, the list will provide reminders to complete the necessary notifications contained in the deviation report and to review the sequence of events log pertaining to the trip.
(Id.) The checklist will also advise review of all pertinent computer data. (Id.)
730. Byron Station also has a " required reading program" for the control room and senior reactor operators.
(Querio, Tr. 4037.) The program routes to operators various
(
kinds of information, including all NRC Eulletins such as those l pertaining to the Salem event. (Id.) Any information so l
. routed also contains a cover sheet whereby a person receiving i
the material must indicate they have read it. (Querio, Tr. l l
4037-38.) The Byron Station Training Department monitors the I
close-out of these cover sheets. (Id.)
~ .
-117-731. Mr. Connaughton of the NRC testified that since l the trip breakers were classified as safety related equipment, l their procurement, receipt, storage, handling, preventive and corrective maintenance, and testing had to be governed by r Commonwealth Edison's Quality Assurance Program. (Connaughton, Tr. 4079.) Since the Salem event, the NRC has directed speci-fic licensee testing of trip breakers. (Connaughton, Tr.
4080.) The NRC's Region III office will perform inspections at Byron and other plants to verify that the applicable tests were made. (Id.)
732. Mr. Forney of the NRC testified concerning the NRC's involvement in reactor trips. (Forney, Tr. 4080-82.) A licensee is required to notify the NRC of any trip incident.
(Id.) The NRC analyzes the event and, if necessary, it assigns a senior resident inspector to investigate the trip. (Id.) In addition, a senior resident inspector monitors a licensee's posttrip actions. (Id.) If necessary, he can prevent a reac-tor start-up following a trip. (Id.)
733. The Board finds nothing in the record to indi-cate that Edison lacks the willingness or ability to conform to the regulations as asserted in the Intervenors' contention.
Edison's presentation concerning its efforts to insure the safe and reliable operation of the automatic reactor scram system at Byron gives the Board confidence in this system and in the ability of the Station personnel to deal with problems which may arise concerning it.
734. The testimony of Mr. Querio and Mr. Sues demon-strated a good working knowledge of the plant and ample quali-
~ a
-118-fication for conducting plant operations. From their descrip-tion of the procedures and practices in place at Byron at the time of the Salem incident, the Board finds that the Byron
)
maintenance, preventive maintenance, surveillance and vendor interface programs already in place would have been sufficient q
to prevent a similar occurrence at Byron. From their detailing of the adjustments they intend to make in the various proced-ures and practices because of the Salem incident, we are satis-
- fied that they have effectively dealt with the broad implica-i
, tions of the event. The Board therefore concludes that Edison has taken reasonable steps to make certain that the Byron trip breaker system is, and will continue to be safely maintained and operated. In addition, the thoroughness of Applicant's quality programs for maintenance, testing, and power plant operation with respect to the trip breakers are a strong indi-cation of Applicant's commitment to quality in the overall operation of Byron.
735. The Board finds that Applicant has utilized its operating experience at other plants to improve its quality assurance program at all plants.
736. The Board further finds that Applicant is both willing and able to maintain an adequate operating quality assurance program, and to operate the Byron Station in compli-l ance with Commission regulations.
737. The Licensing Board has reviewed the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the par-ties, and based on the preponderance of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record of this proceeding and
. ._, .= - -
~ a
-119-l the foregoing findings of fact related to Commonwealth Edison Company's quality assurance program and managerial attitude, the Board concludes:
- a. Commonwealth Edison's quality assur-ance program complies with the quality assurance requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 50, Appen-dix B. In particular, Commonwealth Edison's quality assurance program has sufficient author-ity and organizational independence from cost and scheduling to enable it effectively to identify problems, provide solutions, and verify satisfactory resolutiors;
- b. Commonwealth Edison is currently implementing its quality assurance program in compliance with Commission regulations;
- c. Commonwealth Edison's management understands and accepts its responsibility to ensure proper implementation of quality assur-ance during the remainder of the construction activities at the Byron site and has taken effective measures to carry out this responsi-bility.
- d. Commonwealth Edison Company has the willingness and ability to operate the Byron Station facility in conformance with regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
l
i The foregoing document, " Commonwealth Edison Company's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Quality Assurance and Quality Control" is respect-fully submitted by the undersigned attorneys for Commonwealth Edison Company. -
.3 '/ .
l Michael I. Miller h b Bruce D. Becker JoAnne[. Bloom
'M/A _ kuArct Mark C. Furse
~ W Catherine T. Crowlp ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE Three First National Plaza >
Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 558-7500 90405 Dated: August 9, 1983
i
\
m I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-454 OL
) 50-455 OL (Byron Nuclear Power Station, )
Units 1 & 2) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned, one of the attorneys for Common-wealth Edison Company, certifies that he filed the original and two copies of the attached " COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL" with the Secretary of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and served a copy of the same on each of the persons at the addresses shown on the attached service list. Service on the Secretary and all parties, unless otherwise indicated, was made by deposit in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid, this 9th day of August, 1983.
A One of the attorneys for Commonwealth Edison Company ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE Three First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60602
, (312) 558-7500 l
90405 l
l
>s .-O SERVICE LIST l COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY -- Byron Station Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455 l *Mr. Ivan W. Smith Secretary Administrative Judge and Attn: Chief, Docketing and Chairman Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Board Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. Betty Johnson Washington, D.C. 20555 1907 Stratford Lane Rockford, Illinois 61107
- Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and-Licensing Ms. Diane Chavez Board Panel SAFE U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 326 North Avon Street Commission Rockford, Illinois 61103 Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Dr. Bruce von Zellen Board Panel Department of Biological U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Sciences Commission Northern Illinois University Washington, D.C. 20555 DeKalb, Illinois 60115 Chief Hearing Counsel Joseph Gallo, Esq.
Office of the Executive Isham, Lincoln & Beale Legal Director Suite 840 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 1120 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Commission Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20555
- Dr. A. Dixon Callihan *Douglass W. Cassel, Jr.
Union Carbide Corporation Jane Whicher P.O. Box Y BPI Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Suite 1300 109 N.'Dearborn
- Mr. Steven C. Goldberg Chicago, Illinois 60602 Ms. Mitzi A. Young Office of the Executive Ms. Patricia Morrison Legal Director 5568 Thunderidge Drive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Rockford, Illinois 61107 Conmission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. David Thomas 77 South Wacker 1 Atomic Safety and Licensing Chicago, Illinois 60621 Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
- lland delivered