ML20078B498
| ML20078B498 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1983 |
| From: | Chackes K CHACKES & HOARE, JOINT INTERVENORS - CALLAWAY |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| ALAB-740, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8309270097 | |
| Download: ML20078B498 (127) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:O O 1 i 00CKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCI, EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL, DOARD '83 SEP 26 Pl2:26 CFFICE 0~ Hea. ? in the Mntter of ) GCCNETmc A stL v BR A NC's
) Docket No. STN 50-483-OL UNION Et,ECTRIC COMPANY )
(Callaway Plant, Unit 1) ) 1 PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION Joint Intervenors, Coalition for the Environment, St. Louis Region; Missourians for Safe Engery; and Crawdad Alliance, hereby petition the Atumic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board to reconsider its decision entered September 14,1983 (ALAB-740) in light of new evidence regarding the adequacy of Applicant's quality assurance program and the issue whether the Callaway Plant has been properly constructed. Submitted herewith is a copy of an NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement-Integrated Design Inspection Program Report (82-22), and portions of prior drafts thereof. The subject report came to the attention of Joint Intervenors too late to allow for analysis and submission to the Appeal Board prior to its decision herein. Ilowever, as the Applicant noted in its letter to the Appeal Board dated April 8,1983, the parties to Commission proceedings have an obligation to alert adjudicatory bodies directly regarding new information that is relevant and material to the matters being adjudicated. INTRODUCTION The Integrated Design Inspection Program Report (IDIP) is the result of an inspection conducted by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement in November and December 1982 into the design process and activities at the Callaway Plant. The inspection focused on the auxiliary feed water system. The IDIP is significant regarding the general quality assurance issue raised by l Joint intervenors in that it contains 29 negative findings,12 unresolved items und 9 observations for licensee consideration regarding the design process and activities for 8309270097 830923' l PDR ADOCK 05000483 C PDR '}ybg
w W ' the noxilinry feedwater system. See IDIP pages lii-iv. " Findings" are defined as 3 i negative findings relating to procedural violations, errors and inconsistancies. Follow- j up action is required on all findings. See page 1-1. " Unresolved items" are defined ) as open questions which could become findings if not satisfactorily resolved. See pages T 1-1 to 1-2. " Observations" are defined as recommendations for licensee consideration. : See page 1-2, 1 SPECIFIC CONSTilUCTION DEFICIENCIES I The IDIP is significant also regarding the specific construction issues raised by Joint Intervenors. A few examples follow:
- 1. Embedded Plates $
Several findings of the IDIP support Joint Intervenors' argument that Applicant has failed to prove the safety of the several hundred structural steel plates that were cmbedded in concrete before welding defects were discovered. Joint Intervenors contend that those plates are not adequate to carry the loads imposed on them.
- For example, with regard to a computer program used to calculate loads on embeds due to seismic anchor movement, the IDIP indicates "there might be a non-conservatism in the calculation . . ." See IDIP, page 3-3 (Unresolved item No. 3-1) In an earlier draf t of the same section of the report, the "non-conservatism" is referred to as "a potential error." See Attachment 1, page 3 of draft by stress analysis group.
i The IDIP determined that the loads imposed by the floors of the auxiliary building, which in some cases are supported by embedded plates installed before the discovery of defects (see Joint Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, V15, page 8), were calculated incorrectly during the original design of the plant such that the as-built loads " exceeded the original spectra that had been used in design, by significant amounts in some cases." A further prob!cm identified by the IDIP was the failure of Applicant and Bechtel to communicate the increased loads to all of the engineering discipline groups to allow them to evaluate the effects of the g
O O greater loads upe o their systems and components. See IDIP, page 4-9. Omitted from the IDIP was the following statement of concern by the NRC Inspector: Those portions of the floor response spectra of the as-built auxiliary building that exceeded the floor response spectra used for design were highlighted in a 17-page conclusion and they were later replaced by an one-half page conclusion which tended to minimize the problems. It is the NRC Inspector's opinion that the replacement action of the conclusion is improper because it not only replaced a correct technical conclusion with warning flags by a too brief and vague conclusion, but also cre ated a potential danger that the problems might go unnoticed when other reviewers, especially those who had not been involved in developing the original conclusions, who would not have the chance to see the original conclusivn as the NRC Inspector did. By reading the original conclusions written in August 1981, it was obvious that problems existed and must be dealt with. For exampic, at one place, the two horizontal floor response spectra of the as-built auxiliary building execeded the corresponding ones in the frequency range between 10 liZ and 20117, with 80 percent in one direction and 58 percent in the other. See attachment 2, pages 6 and 7 of IDIP draft. Regarding floor response spectra generally, see Regulatory Guides 1.60, December 1973 and 1.122, February 1978. An additional problem with design calculations regarding loads on embedded plates was identified by the IDIP where loads were assumed to be centered but were mislocated on the installed plates. See IDIP, page 4-1G. This provides further evidence that the defective plates may be unable to support the loads imposed on them. In addition, in support of Joir.t Intervenors' argument that the embedded plates were improperly selected, the IDIP found that, "in general, no specific design calculations ) existed for embedded plates to document the basis for their seicetion t.nd placement on design drawings designating the type of plate for use at a given location." See IDIP, page 4-17. Finally, the IDIP indicates that where a legitimate question exists as to the ! safety of the embedded pintes, va.lous alternatives or repair methods are available. I The report discusses the use of " surface mounted plates or chipped and grouted e nbed i
- l I
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l I l plates instead of embedded plates" and the use of "through bolting for plates as well l l as grouted bolts." See IDIP, page 4-11. l l
- 2. Piping With regard to the claim of Joint Intervenors that Union Electric has failed to prove the safety of SA-312 piping, Intervenors refer the Appeal Bonrd to the finding of the IDIP regarding an instance of improper calculation of pressure within piping.
See page 2-5. CONCLUSION . The IDIP provides further support for Joint Intervenors' arguments that the quality assurance program at the Callaway Plant failed to operate effectively and that Union Electric has failed to meet its burden of proving that the plant has been constructed so that it can be operated safely. As many items are still open in the IDIP, Joint Intervenors believe it necessary to provide Union Electric and the NRC staff an opportunity to provide the Appeal Board (or on remand, the Licensing Board) with evidence regarding the issues raised in the IDIP. CilACKES AND IIOARE W -. Kenneth M. Chackes Attorneys for Joint Intervenors 314 North Broadway St. Louis, Missouri 63102 314/241-7961 1
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'J% ? .* L UNITED STATES OF AMElt!CA NUCLEAR RGULATORY COMMISSION 10 SEP 26 P12 26 BEFORE TiiE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEALrPDARD ,
00CKEiutG & SEvvu BRANCH In the Matter of )
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UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket No. STN 50-483-OL '
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(Callaway Plant, Unit 1) ) , CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copics of Joint Intervenors' Petition for Reconsideration were served on September 23, 1983 by deposit in the United States mail on the persens indicated below. Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Robert Perlis, Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Office of the Executive Legal Director Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washingten, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Gary J. Edles James P. Gleason, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Chairman Appeal Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 513 Gilmoure Drive Washington, D.C. 20555 Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy Mr. Glenn O. Bright Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board , Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Thomas A. Baxter, Esq. - Dr. Jerry R. Kline Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Atomic Safety nnd Licensing Board 1800 M Street, N.W. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20036 Wnshington, D.C. 20555 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretnry U.S. Nuelcar Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
- %,.g[/ /El N Kenneth M. Chackes l Cil ACKES AND llOAltE
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Docket tio. 5 -48 D' AA #' a/ns S_C S - py, m {p6km !}LO ' - Union Electric Company ATTN: Mr. Donald F. Schnell g.L! Vice President. Nuclear *.~' 1 ni P.O. Box 149 Mail Code 400 /) 'fi u .MM ' St. Louis...Missout i 63166 .a
<-Gentlemen: . .
SUBJECT:
Intecrated_Dr n n Insnection.50-4E3/82-22 .r ..b M. This refers to the in'tegrated design inspection conducted by the Office of
/ Inspection and Enforcement on November 10 - flovember 19, 1982 and liovember 29 -
N December 14, 1982 at the Callaway Plant, your St. Louis corporate office, Iluelear Projects Incorporated. Bechtel Power Corporation and k'estinghouse Electric Corporation. The 4nspection team was composed of personnel from the fiRC's Office of. Inspection and Enforcerent, Office of !!uclear Reactor Regulation, the Region IV Office and consultants. This ir.spection covered activities authorized by NRC Construction Pimit CPPR-139. This inspection is the f.irst of a series of integrated design inspections that I. ' the Office of Inspection'and Enforcement plans to conduct with assistance from
]cther (1RC offices and consultants.: The results of these inspections will te 4 tused to evaluate control of the design process and quality of desien activities at nuclear plants. --- -
i i The enclosed report identifies the areas examined during the inspection, whic5 ' c fq_cuseLon the _euxiliary feedwater system as q selyt.ed _sagic. Activities in-cluded examTnation of procedures, records,' training and inspection of the system as installed at the plant. Emphasis was placed upon reviewing _the adequacy of cesi ~gn details as a [\ Tor means of measuring how well the desigt. process had the selected sample. [Findinoslregarding err _g_rs, procehral violations and intensistencies are identi-fled in the report. IUnresolved items! are identified where insufficient infor..ation was developed to allow final determinations on the adequacy of specific features or 1 practices. OtherfoEs'ervationW are identified where it was considered appropriate to call attention to a matter that was not i specific fincing or unresolved item.
/They include items reconpended for.your consideration but for which there are no
\ specific regulatory requirements.
(APR I 6 t?c3'
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p j; 1 5 Mr. D. F. Schnell -2 . APR 4 1983 'j , Section 1 of the report provides a sum.ary of the results of the inspection and , the conclusions reached by the inspection team. No eervnive breakdown in the design process was identified; however, your prompt attention is needed for
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. rcsolution of the sgfic_ deficiencies identified. ,
I The most significant negative findings or deficiencies are sum.arized as - follows: - (1) There was a lack of formal rentrol over Bechtel's use of plant ' disign newsletters. Thus, these newsletters, which described . . acceptable hodeling and stress analysis techniques., were not being
,, applieduniformlytoprojectdesignwork(Section3.1.2). '
(2) The auxiliary'{eedwater pump turbine exhaust pipe was not classi-fled as Seismic Category I and safety grade throughout its entire Y-1ength. No 3ustification was available. This represented incom- ! plete detailed analysis to support pump operability requirements. A similar classification was identified in two other systems (Section2.4). (3) The ability of cotor controllers to withstand fault currents had ' not been considered or assured. This represented an instance of improper detailed design (Section 5.2). (a) The team identified needs for improvement in control of the design . l process at Bech'tel in certain areas such as those related to high . energy line. break analyses (Section 2.4), guidance for two dasign. grcups (Sections 3.1.4 and 3.2.4), interface definitions (Section ' 4.4) and baseplate design (Section 4.5). (5) Three instantes were identified where specific FSAR comitments were r.:t ret, one of which involved t.e turbine exhaust pipe discussed tieve (Settions 2.3, 2.4, and 6.E..
; M' O.e oce: tion of the matters identified in the findings and or.e observation
{ ccr.:e-r.ir.c delay in resolving a design issue, the team considered the general t cdect r.!.acement to be a strength. Nearly all the detailed design information reviewed v.as acecuate and consistent, indicating a controlled design process. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosures will te placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by tele-
;tne, within 15 days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhcld information contained herein within 30 days of the date of this letter, hch applications must be consistent with the requirements.of 10 CFR 2.790(b)(1).
- ,,, O O Mr. D. F. Schnell -3 APR 4 1983 i
You are requested to respond in writing to the findings and unresolved items within 45 days after receipt of this letter. With respect to the deficiencies i identified in findings, the response should address the cause, extent, correc-tive actions ano any other information you consider relevant. For unresolved items, the response should provide information concerning acceptebility of the specific feature or practice involved. The response should be addressed to the l NRC Region III Office, with copies to the NRC Region IV Office,and this office. l As discussed in the report, the NRC's followup efforts will be managed by the l Region III Office with assistance from other NRC offices as needed. Some of the items identified in the report may provide bases for enforcement actions. The Regional Office will initiate any enforcement actions considered appropriate.
. Should you have anyJg' u estions concerning this inspection, please contact us or
.. Ames E. Konklin, Chief,-Reactor Projects Section IA, in the Region Ill Office.
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. Sincerely,
'Orisica3 Signed Er R. C. DeYounga Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-483/82-22 ' cc: See Page 4 I t SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES QUAS:QASIP:IE DD:QASIP:IE D:QASIP:IE 0:lt /f/[ DP Allison BK Grimes JM Taylor ierek RC
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icsny 3/ /83 kle 3/ /83 3/ /83 /83 j/ g /E3
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. O O Mr. D. F. Schnell APR 4 1933 ,
cc: Mr. W. H. Weber Manager, Nuclear Construction i P.O. Box 620 I Fulton, Missouri 65251 l
- 1 Mr. 5. E. Miltenberger Plant Manager i Cal?away Plant P.O. Box 620 -
{
.. Fulton, Missouri ~ 65251 * !
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Mr. G. L. Koester VicePresident,Nuc} ear - Kansas Gas and Electric Company l 201 North Market 5tr'eet Wichita, Kansas 67201 . Mr. N. Petrick
- Executive Director - SNUPPS .
5 Choke Cherry Road - Rockville, Maryhnd 20850 t i Mr. Ronald Fluegge - Utility Division .. Missouri Public Service Commission t P.O. Box.3601 . - Jefferson City, Missouri 65102 - Mr. E. P. Wilkinson President Institute for Nuclear Power Operations { H 00 Circle 75 Parkway i Suite 1500 - Atlarta, Georgia 30339 ' l L
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Distribution (w/ Report): SECY OPE OCA (3) W. J. Dircks, EDO H. R. Denton, NRR J. Heltemes, AEOD H. Boulden, DIA NRC Resident Inspector NRR Project Manager Regional Administrators Inspection Team Members R. C. DeYoung, IE , J. H. Sniezek IE . E. L. Jordan IE *~
.J. H. Taylor. IE B. K. Grimes, IE ,
T. .L. Harpster. IE - R. L. Baer, IE . D. P. Allison IE - U. Pctapovs RIV R. Vollmer, NRR R. Mattson, NRR ! D. Eisenhut, NRR ' H. Thompson, NRR IE Files
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IE Reading UASIP Reading ~ - ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' QUAB Reading DPAllison Reading PDR - - LFDR i NSIC NTIS l 1
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W ' U.S. IlUCLEAR REGULATOP.Y C0'HISSION
, OFFICE OF INSPECTI0ll A'O E!;FORCEMEllT '
DIVISIO!! 0F QUALITY A55URAf;CE, SAFEGUARDS, A!;D IliSPECTIOfi PR03 RAMS QUALITY ASSURAllCE'BRAilCH . Report !!o. 50-483/82-22 UNDER , 00cket I:o. 50-483 REVIEW FOR Licensee: Union Electric Company P. D. Box 149 St. Louis, Missouri ' PROPRIET RY 63166 Facility Neme: Callaway Plant, Unit 1 INFORMA TION
-- fnspection at: Cal.1away ' Plant, Fulton, Missouri; Union Electric Company.
St Louis, Missouri; Nuclear Projects Incorporated. Gaithersburg, Maryland; Bechtel Power Corporation Gaithersburg; Maryland, and . Westinghouse Electric Corporation Monroeville Per.nsylvania fr.s;ection Conducted: , tiev' ember 10-Noveeber 19, and November 29-December 14, 1582 fr.spection Team Members: l'echenical Systems /) m
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y# ., D.P. Allison, Techr.ical Assistant Oli (Team Leecer) De e _- 7 j.
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- 7b f 5' D.P. Norkfa, Reactor Construction Engineer, DIE -
Date P!:har.ical Components I 'b
. Fair, Senior tachenical Engineer, ole 3 /._5 /g
, Date
. Wad 6A~ 4 -
D.K. Morton, Consuitent,9 fiEL-EG6G Idano hhsie Civil and Structural /jedt
'R. E. Shevriaker, tr.ior Civil Engineer, Oli Dete
% ff J.5. Ma, Structurai Engineer, h p 3/2.1f?j Date
O . O . Report I;o. 50-483/82-22 l I l Eleetrical Power M ew fc 1 T. Ahmed Electricai' Engineer, NRR 27h3 Date
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;P..L. 5p.rague, consultantr INEL-EG&G Idaho 3 21 .5 ate ont o , f m h "D.D: Chamberlain, Fetctbr Engineer, Region IV
] 27h3 Date
- <m fyC""! - sL 2.7 >$
'R.O. Karsch, Reacter En)ineer, NRR ' Date
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# sccor.;ianying PersonntTi##
*E.L. Jordan, OIE .
' T.L. Harpster, OIE -
'G.E. Edison, NRR (Project Manager)
'J.k. !!eisler, Region III (Resident Inspector) '
'J.E. Konklin, Region 111
'H.I'.. k'esectt, Region III ~
Approved By: .
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Brian K. Grimes, Deputy Director ate Division of Quality Assurance. Safeguards, and Inspection Programs, O!E
*Present part-time at certain sheetings as described in report.
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. O' O TABLE OF C0f E';TS
. Page 1.0 Introduction and Sumary 1.1 Objectives 1-1 1.2 Definitions 1-1 1.3 Callaway Project Organization 1-2 1.4 Inspection Effort 1-3 1.5 Conclusion 1-4 2.0 Mechanic.a1 Systems ,,
2.1 Designlitformation ' 2-1 2.2 Personnel and Guidanc'e 2-2 2.3 System Desigh. 2-3 - 2.4 High and Moderate Energy Line Breaks 2-6 2.5 Westinghouse Information 2-9 2.6 Conclusion- "- 2-10
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3.0 Mechanir- .mpenents ' ' 3.1
- Su .;s Analysis Broup : -
- 1 3.1.1 De. sign' Information 3-1 3.1.2 Personnel and Guidance 3-2 3.1.3 Analysis Review 3-4
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3.1.4 Summary' ' " ' 3-6 s 3.2 Pipe Support Group 3-7 - 3.2.1 Design Information 3-7
- 3.2.2 Personnel and Guidance 3-8 v. -
3.2.3 Analysis Review 3-9 3.2.4 Sumary 3-11 3.3 Mechanical Equipment 3-12 3.4 Conclusion 3-13 4.0 Civil and Structural Engineering 4.1 Involvement of Union Electric Corpany and Nuclear Projects,Inc. 4-1 4.2 Personnel and Guidance 4-5 4.3 Auxiliary Building Floor Response Spectra 4-8 4.4 Generic Embedded Plate Program 4-10 4.5 Pipe Supports, Hangers ana Restraints 4-13 4.6 Control of FSAR and Design Changes - 4-18 4.7 Bechtel Site Liaison Engineering 4-21 4.8 As-Built Programs for Reinforced Concrete and Steel 4-22 4.9 . Conclusion 4-23 1
O' O Page 5.0 Electric Power 5.1 Auxiliary Feedwater Components 5.2 5-1 Class IE tbtor Control Centers 5-1 5.3 Equipment Qualification Reports 5-2 5.4 Cable Sizing and Voltage Drop
.- 5.5 Battery Ventilation _5-4 5-4 5.6 Circuit Breaker. Study 5.7 : 5-5 Relay Coordination 5-6 5.8 Change and Deviation Documents 5-6 5.9 Test Procedures 5-7 5.10 , Tracking NRC Generic Communications 5-7 5.11. Auxiliary Shutdown Panel -
5-8
.r 5.12 Storage.of Class IE Equipment '
. 5-9
. .... 5.13 Conclusion - -
5-9 6.0 Instrumentatio.nahd.$ontrolC.
. 6.1 Design Int 5rface Information 6-1 6.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Design 6-1
/ 6. 3 Auxiliary Fiedwater System Installation 6'4 - 6.4 Westinghouse Information 6-4
- 6. 5 Pre-Operational Testin.g .
6-5 6.'6 Conclusion 6-5
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- 7. 0 Reference Material '
7.1 General 7-1 7.1.1 Background Documents 7-1
.;;' 7.l.2 Meeting Attendants' 7-6 7.2 Mechanical Systems 7-9 7.2.1 Documents 7-9 7.2.2 Personnel Interviewed 7-13 7.3 Mechanical Components 7-14 7.3.1 Documents 7 '4 7.3.2 Personnel Interviewed 7. 7 7.4 Civil and Structural Engineering 7-18 7.4.1 Documents 7-18 7.4.2 Fersonnel Intervieved 7-27 7.5 Electrical Power 7-28 7.5.1 Documents 7-28 7.5.2 Personnel Interviewed 7-34 7.6 Instrumentation and Control 7-35 7.6.1 Documents 7-35 7.6.2 Personnel Interviewed 7-39 7.7 Other Information -
7-40 7.7.1 Chronology 7-40 ii
O O Y b - List of Findings Unresolved Items, and Observatuns Item Page Finding 2-1 Turbine exhaust pipe classification 2-4 7 Unresolved Iten 2-1 Pump room temperature 2-5 Finding 2-2 Discharge pipe pressure calculation 2-6 Finding 2-3 Pump head calculation 2-6 Finding 2-4 Zone of influen~ce drawing procedure 2-7 Finding 2-5 P.ipe whip determination method 2-8 Finding 2 .~ . Dynamic effects analysis controls 2-8
'-finding 2-7 " -
' Pipe br.eak protection commitment 2-9
.v. Finding 3-1 Stress newsletter control 3-2 Unresolved Item 3-1 '.': Skewed restraint analysis 3-3 Finding 3 , -
- Enveloped response spectrum 3-5 Finding 3-3 . Steam line connectien drawing 3-5
- Finding 3-4 3 tress intensification factor documentation 3-5 Finding 3-5 . Thermal expansion analysis
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3-6 Finding 3-6 - Low temperature analysis 3-6 Unresolved Item 3-2 Functional capability check 3-6 Observation 3 Gui'dancef for design assumptions - ; '- - 3-7 Unreso1~ved Item 3 # Strut stiffness 3-9 , Unresolved Item 3-4 ' Lateral vibration cf struts and rods 3-9 Finding 3-7 Support vertical clearance 3-10
- ? Findin'g 3 -
##rTnubber iitiffndss checks -
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3-10 Unresolved Item 3-5 ; Piping collapse loads - 3-11 Unresolved Item 3-6 Stiffness at I-beam attachment 3-11 Observation 3e2 . Guidance f5r structural details '3-12 Unresolved Item 3-7 Panel angle supports 3-13 Unresolved Item 3-8 Turbine nozzle stiffness 3-13 Observation 3-3 Consider review of design reports 3-13 Finding 4-1 Procedure governing reviews 4-2 Finding 4-2 Personnel training record 4-5 Finding 4-3 Delay in microfilming 4-9 Observation 4-1 Delay in resolving seismic design issue 4-10 Unresolved Item 4-1 Electrical rac2way supports 4-10 Finding 4-4 Definition of subunit interfaces 4-13 Observation 4-2 Consider retention of coordinating prints 4-14 Unresolved Item 4-2 Standard tolerance for support location 4-16 Finding 4-5 " Release prior to calculation approval 4-17 Finding 4-6 -Documentation of base plate selection
- 4 a4 4- N Unresolved Item 4-3 Exterior wall penetration 4-19 Finding 4-7 Delayed identification of concrete voids 4-20 Observation 4-3 Considerations - structural verification program 4-22 iii x r..bi - w po -
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O O Page Item Consideration regarding field date 4-23 Observation 4-4 Motor starter fault current capability 5-2 Finding 5-1 5-3 Finding 5-2 Equipment qualification spectra Equipment qualification report 5-4 Finding 5-3 5-6 Observation 5-1 Consider transient voltage effects Review of logic diagrams 6-2
- Finding 6-1 6-2 Finding 6-2 Error in logic diagram .
Failure to meet FSAR comitment 6-3 Finding E-3 6-4 Finding 6-4 --+ Release prior to calculatic, approval Distribution of service bylletin information 6-5 Observation 6-1
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O- O g 1. INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
1.1 Objectives In August 1982 the NRC staff undertook a nurler of initiatives to improve assurance of quality in design and construction of nuclear projects. One of those initiatives was to develop and implement an integrated design inspection program to assess the quality of design activities, including examination of as-built configuration. The objective was to expand the NRC examination of quality assurance into the design process. The approach would provide a comprehensive examination of the design development and implementation for a selected system. (Reference 1.56). Sincehh'iswas.bothThefirstinspectioninthatprogramandatrial inspection,-it had p ~ dual objective - evaluating the design process for the Callaway Plant and developing the methodology for conducting future inspections. Thifreport covers only the first objective, evaluating the design process based-on examination of the auxiliary feedwater system.
- 1.? Definitions ' Y' -: Findings " ~
In our evaluation we found many design actions that were b&ing' well eie'cuted. Some,of these positive findings are described in the text of the following sections. They are not flagged and numbered in the text
' . . . _ nor listed at the front of this report since follow-up is not required.
. v. n .
s Negative findings include such items as procedure violations, errors ard inconsistencies. They are described in the text of the following sections. The negative findings are flagged and numbered in the text since followup action is required for licensee resolution and NRC evaluation of the resolutions. Thi; interoffice NRC effort was structured as an inspection of the Callaway Plant, for which the NRC's Region III Office is responsible. Accordingly, NRC follow-up on these items will be managed and tracked by the Region III Office with assistance as required from the Region IV Office which manages the vendor inspection program and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement which managed this ir.spection. Some of the items identified may form the bases for enforcement action. ! The Regional Offices will review them and initiate enforcement action as l appropriate. Unresolved Items
- i !!nresolved items are questions for which the inspection team did not
- develop enough infonnation to reach a conclusion. These items could i
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+ - - - - -- - - - - - - - -
1 O O become findings, depending upon the nature of'further information. Un-resolved items are described in the text of the following sections. They are flagged and numbered since licensee response and NRC evaluation are required. As with the findings, the NRC follow-up will be managed by the < Region III Office with assistance as required from other offices. l Observations l The report contains a number of other cbservations that are flagged and numbered. Th?se represent cases where it is considered appropriate to call attention to matters that are not specific findings or unresolved items. They include items recomended for licensee consideration but for which there was no specific regulatory requirement. 1.3 Callaway Project Organization The Callaway Plant, Unit 1 (Union Electric Company) and the Wolf Creek Generating Stati.on (Kansas Gas and Electric Company and Kansas City Power v and Light Comp'any) 'are two standard plants being constructed under the
.- Standardized Nuclear Unit P~ower Plant System concept (SNUPPS). This concept has included other units and other utilities but, currently, only Callaway 1 and Wolf Creek remain under active construction. Our ! inspection was conducted for the Callaway Plant, Unit 1. Since the designs are standardi some of our findings and conclusions apply equally to the Wolf Creek. Generating Station. A copy of this report will be forwarded te the Wolf Creek licensee for information. However, separate responses with respect to Wolf Creek will not be needed. ,,,
Un'icn Electric Company holds the construction permit for the Callaway plant and is re'sponsible for assuring proper design. Union Electric and
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the other utilities participating in SNUPPS have contracted with Nuclear
.; , - - - frojects Incorp6iitid (NPI) 40 assiit them in carrying out:this :
respcnsibility. Basically, NPI takes an item such as a proposed design, a decision to be made, or a problem to be resolved, obtains comments from 2 the util.ities' engineers, faciJitates resolution of the comments untiUa single positi)n has been agreed upon and then promulgates that position. Utility decisions affecting design are reached in this manner prima'rily thrca;h the operation of a Technical Cemittee, although other committees such as a l'.anagerent Comittes and a Quality Assurance Comittee are also irportant. NPI is also sometimes called the SNUPPS Project Office. However, we will refer to it as NPI in this report to avoid confusion with the SNUPFS project organization at Bechtel Power Corporation. Tne power tiock is that part of the plant encompassed in the SNUPPS concept. It includes the reactor building, auxiliary building, turbine building, diesel building, control building, fuel building, radwaste building and hot machine shop. Bechtel Power Corporation is the architect-engineer responsible for design of the power block. In addition, Bechtel is responsible for designing the ultimate heat sink and
'the associated cooling water sys'tems. The Bechtel scope of design includes all the areas relevant to our inspection of the auxiliary feedwater system. Accordingly, we did not conduct any inspections of Sverdrup and Parcel which is the architect-engineering finn responsible 1-2
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O. O for designing items such as administration buildings, warehouses, shops and switchyard facilities. Bechtel Power Corporation, which is organized by projects, executed the design of the SNUPPS units (Callaway ar.d Wolf Creek) as a single project known as the SNUPPS project. The :wo units have the sane design within the power block. The ultimate heat sirks, although net the same at the two units, are designed by the same StGPS project or5anization. The utilities provide guidance and exchange information with Bechtel via the NPI organization as discussed above. In turn, Bechtel manages the contract with the reactor manufacturer, Westinghouse Electric Company, so that interchange of information with Westinghouse is via Bechtel. Daniel International Corporation is the constructor responsible for building the Callaway Plant and conducting the quality control portion of the quality assurance program for construction. Daniel does not perform design work. However, Daniel does develop and exchange information related 'to design with Bechtel such as Field Change Requests to resolve design and construc, tion problems. . 3 There is, in essent.e, no field engineering function; design work is performed at the Bechtel Gaithersburg office. Bechtel does have a site liaison engineeri.ng group at the construction site which processes docu-ments such as FididiChange Requests. However, it functions as a liaison group - not as a design organization. 1.4 Inspection Effort
- ; . 1 =.
We selected the. auxiliary feedwater system for this inspection. This is a system importan't to nuclear safety. The components, functions and interfaces involved are typical of those found in a number of other safety systems. . =~=-= = . :: :: - The inspection was n interoffice NRC effort conducted with contractor
..: assistance. Team selections were made to provide technical expertise.and design experience in the disciplines listed. Half the team members had previous experience as employees with architect-engineering firms working on large commercial nuclear power plants. The others had related design experience such as working elsewhere on commercial nuclear f cilities, test reactors or naval reactors.
Beginning on October 20, 1982 the inspection team devoted 3 weeks to the study of background information and preparation of inspection plans. Then 4 weeks of direct inspection activities were conducted at Union Electric Company, Nuclear Projects Incorporated Bechtel Power Corporation, Westing-house Electric Compan'y and the Callaway Plant, concluding on December 14, 1982. A more detailed chronology of inspection activities is provided in Section 7 of this report. , The inspection team reviewed the ' organizations' staffing and procedures and interviewed personnel to determine the responsibilities of and the relation-ships among the entities involved in the design process. The general levels 1-3
~O O i
of personnel qualification and the guidance provided were also noted. Pri-mary emphasis was placed upon reviewing the adequacy of design details (or products) as a means of measuring how well the design process had functioned in the selected sample area. In reviewing the design details the team focused on the following items: (1) Validity of design inputs and assur.ptions. (2) Validity of design specifications. (3) Validity of analyses. (4) Identification of. system interface requirements. (5) Potential indirect effects of changes. (6) Proper component classification. (7) Revision-control. , (8) DocumentatiorG ontrol. (9) Verificatiorj. o as-built condition. In some areas, such as the review of piping stress analyses, the sample
-r was narrowed to include only a part of the auxiliary feedwater sistem. In other areas, such as electrical power, the sample was broadened into areas that were not related solelyf to the auxiliary feedwaterisystem. More detailed descriptions of the review are provided in following sections of this report.
m -1. 5 Conclusions == .- c' << u ; Although the inspecbon sampled ,a very small part of the design effort,
.~ the team did reyiew hundreds c.f specific items. The most significant: .
deficiencies are summarized as follows: (1) There was a lack of formal control over Bechtel's use of plant design newsletters. Thus, these newsletters, which described acceptable modeling and stress analysis techniques, were not being applied uniformly to project design work (Section 3.1.2). (2) The auxiliary feedwater pump turbine exhaust pipe was not classified as Seismic Category I and safety grade throughout its entire length. No justification available. This represented incomplete detailed analysis to support pump operability requirements. A similar classi-fication was identified in two other systems (Section 2.4). (3) The ability of motor controllers to withstand fault currents had not been considered or assured. This represented an instance of improper detailed design (Section 5.2). 1-4
O. O (4) The team identified needs for improvement in cortrol of the design process at Bechtel in certain arets such as those related to high energy'line break analyses (Section 2.4), guidance for two design groups (Sections 3.1.4 and 3.2.4), interface definitions (Section 4.4) and baseplate design (Sectior. 4.5). (5) Three instances were identified where specific FSAR corr:.itments were not met, one of which involved the turbine exhaust pipe discussed above (Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 6.2). Prompt attention is needed for the resciution of these specific deficiencies and others identified in the following sections. However, the team concludes that these items are not indicative of any pervasive breakdown in the design process. k'ith the exception of the matters identified in the findings and an instance 4 of delay in. resolving a design issue (Observation 4-1), the team considered the gene'ral project management to be a strength. Several utilities' staffs were involvedin the development of design criteria and guidance. Effective
~
follow-up and proje'ct manag'ement assistance were provided by l'PI. Bechtel utilized a competsfst project organization to execute the detailed design work. Interfaces. Ancluding those with Westinghouse, were generally well controlled as evidenced by the consistency of design documents. Nearly all the detailed des'ign information reviewed was adequate and consistent, indicating a e ntrolled design process. , Sections 2 through 6 below provide more detailed descriptions of our evaluations in the five' discipline areas that we reviewed. Section 7 provides a chronology, lists of documents reviewed or referenced and lists
~
- of personnel interviewed.
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_. > 2.0 Mechanical Systems ' nm- t The objective of this portion of the irspection was to evaluate the rech-anical systems aspects of the design with emphasis on the ex:hange and control of interface information. The team reviewed the system design and a number of sample areas of work which focused primarily upon the Bechtel Mechanical /iaclear Group. 2.1 Desien Information . This section summarizes the basic mechanical systems design infomation reviewed. Design commitments t( the NRC are contained in the FSAR and related cor-respondence submitted in support of the operating license application. The basic system design, de~ sign bases, functional requirements, failure analyses and comportent data are described in these documents along with more general infomation such as relevant accident analyses, high energy line break analyses and seismic requirements. These licensing commitments were prepared and sdbmitted by NPI acting on the behalf of Union Electric Company and other.SNUPPS utilities, with considerable assistance from
.- Bechtel Power Corporation and Westinghcuse Electric Ccmpany. An~ area of emphasis in our inspection was to determitie whether or not the actual design met the licensing comitments. : : t:
The reactor manbfacturer's basic design recommendations and ir.terface
-' - infomation are contained in the Westirghouse Steam System Design Manual.
This infomation?-has7 been au'gmented:cor.siderably by correspondence between Bechtel and Westinghouse over the life of the project. A great deal of the correspondence that we reviewed was related to exchange of infom-1 . ation about the, plant safety analyses cescribed in the FSAR, which wene l performed by Westinghouse. One aim of cur inspection was to detemine whether or not this information had bean properly considered and whether the actual design was consistent with the interface needs of the nuclear steam supply system. ! .The l'echanical/ Nuclear Group at Bechtel is a central focus for system l design and for coordination with other entities such as NPI,1estinghouse, j and Eechtel's Stress Analysis Group. ine Mechanical / Nuclear Group produces a number of documents describing the auxiliary feedwater system design, , including the following principal docurents: l l (1) A system description which descrites such items as design bases, ! system functions and operation, component data, instrumentation requirements, and single failure analysis. (2) A flow diagram which describes flew paths and calculated flows, temperatures and pressures for various conditions of operation. 2-1
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O O " (3) A piping and instrumentation diagram which describes the sche:ratic arrangement of the piping, pumps, valves and instruments. I (4) Numerous other documents such as general mechanical / nuclear design 1 criteria, the auxiliary feedwater purp specification, and specific calculations. The Mechanical / Nuclear Group at Bechtel also takes a lead and coordinating l role in the performance of high energy line break analyses. The results of our review of the mechanical systems aspects are described in the following sections. 2.2 Personnel and Guidance This section summarizes the basic staffing and guidance information reviewed in the mechanical systems area. e The supervisingfeng.ineer at Union Electric responsib1e -for the mechanical and electrical area's on the' SNUPPS project had held that position for more than 6 years and ha.d 26 years professicnal experience with Union Electric. The mechanical. engineer responsible for the auxiliary feedwater system (among other systems) had held that position for li years and had 14 years professional expirience with Union Electric. In addition, the NPI staff
.: contained a number of individuals with censiderable experience in regu-latory matters:and nuclear plant systets design. ~ ~
The team briefly reviewed th.e organization for the Mechanical / Nuclear Group at Bechtel. The group supervisor had been in that position for the SNUPPS project 'for 1.5 years. The three supervisors reporting to him
/r had each been working on the SNUPPS prcject for at least five years.
' The Mechanical /Mcleair Group:had a: total of 21 engineers (including the above supervisors). fessional engineers .Five Thehad mastars average degrees experience and 6 were ir.cluded registered 8.8 years of pro-
.: engineer.ing, 5 5 years on nucinar applications, and 2.6 years on the .. .
SNUPPS project. Prior to October 1981 new engineers in the group had attended lectures on the basic cuality procedures involved, Bechtel Engineering Departtent Pro-cedures (EDP) and Engineering Department Project Instructions (EDPI). Attendance sheets for these lectures were retained by the project c.uality engineer. For those assigne f t, the group since October 1981 (8 individuals) the instructions were assigneo .... ' on a' self-study basis. A training record was maintained indicating the t ions assigned for reading and the date they were read. Engineers also a tt. ' +echnical training courses, which were voluntary.- Subject courses included u. har plant design overview, (2) fossil plant design overview, (3) technm Mnars on components (e.g., feedwater pumps), and (4) Engineer-In-Tra and Professional Engineer in-house review courses. Our interviews indicated that engineers in the Mechanical / Nuclear Group generally were familiar with the instructions and followed them. The 2-2 4
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- supervisors reflected substantial knowledge of nuclear plant design and regulatory requirements in the mechanical / nuclear area.
The results of our review of design details in the mechanical systems area are described in the following sections. 2.3 System Design ' The objective of this portion of the ir.spection was to evaluate the adequacy and the control of basic auxiliary feedwater system design information. ' The team reviewed the. basic auxiliary feedwater system design information contained in the FSAR, the system description (Reference 2.27) the piping and instrumentation diagram (Reference 2.36) and the system flow diagram In addition, the applicant had submitted the ' (References 2.23 and 2.24). 1 results of an auxiliary feedwater system reliability study (Reference 2.37) l' and had discussed th( system design extensively at a meeting with the NRC
-- staff (Referen'c e 2g8). ,
The auxiliary feedwater system included two motor driven pump trains powered and control.le.d from separate Class IE alternating current power supplies. Each motor driven train fed two of the plant's four steam generators. The'sysitem also included a steam turbine driven pump train controlled from direct current electrical power supplies. The turbine driven pump train fed all four of the plant's steam generators' arid Modu-had about twice the pumping capacity of a single motor driven train. lating control valves were employed in the motor driven:pumptdischarge lines to each steam > generator to avoid excessive flow to postulated broken ' lines. Fixed drifices were employed in the turbine driven pump discharge The system was not intended to be employed lines to avoid excessive flow.
< t- for normal startup ean'd shutdcwn operations since an. electric driven feed-water pump had been .provided for this purpose in the main feedwater system. The Appropriate automatic starting s.ignals and indications were provided. .
i < . ;.- auxiliary feedwater system wotdd start and run without operator action; when needed due to pipe breaks, loss of offsite nower or loss of the main feedwater system. The turbine driven train was capable of operating for at least two hours during a loss of alternating current power supplies The normal supply of auxiliary feed-(includir,5 the diesel generators). Automatic 5.ater was from a non-safety grade concensate storage tank. transfer functions were provided to switch the pumps' suction to the safety-grade essential service water systen in the event of low suction pressure from the condensate storage tank. The switchover function did depend upon alternating current electrical power supplies. The basic syste'm design as documented in the licensing submittals, had been previously reviewed and found acceptable by the NRC staff (Refer-In the areas reviewed during this inspection, ences 2.44 and 2.45). acceptability of the basic de. sign in accordance with regulatory guidance was generally confirmed. In addition, further details were reviewed as described below to determine their adequacy and consistency. > r '5
. 2-3
O. O The team reviewed the auxiliary feedwater pucp specification (Reference 2.33) and found it to be consistent with other design documents and the systemdesiin. A few examples are discussed below to illustrate the nature of this review. Two turbine oveespeed trip devices were specified, set at 110% and 115% of rated speed. Trese setpoints were consistent with assumptions used in system flow and pressure calculations (Reference 2.22). The trip and throttle valve was specified to open within 10 seconds and the pump was specified to come up to rated flow and head within 20 seconds which was consistent with Westinghouse reccanendations and the plant safety analyses. Although no minimum closing tire was specified, we found that Bechtel's files contained documentatior. of a telephone conversation with the vendor which indicated that testinc had shown the valve to close in a range of 0.5 to 0.9 seconds. This supported the assumptions used by Bechtel's Stress Analysis Group in evaluating the effects of a turbine trip on the steam supply line. The environmental qualification conditions were the same as given in the FSAR for the pump rooms. Flow, temperatures, pressures, water quality and functional requirements were all generally consistent with.valufs '" contained in nurerous other dccuments that we reviewed. '
. ~ .
During the team's %echanical components review, an instance of improper classification was .found on a portion cf the system. For the turbine exhaust line a boundary anchor had been provided at the auxiliary building penetratiofFwhere the pipe changed to non-seismic and non-safety and ran through the non-Category I ' auxiliary boiler room. The i anchor was designed for piping collapse loads from the downstr'eam pipe. However, we considered the non-Category I sections of pipe to be contrary to FSAR Section 3.9(b)i3.2.2.1 which classified the auxiliary feedwater
~
j pumps as active. components and stated that active components were qualified l for operability during safe shutdown earthquake conditions. As was ir.di-cated in the Westinghouse design reconrendations for this system, the i Tr turbine vent pipTnHhould ricrmally be sifety grade.since,tif it were blocked, turbine operations would be affected. We did note that Figure 10.4-10 of the FSAR showed the class change on the turbine exhaust line.
.. Nevertheless, no justification was available to demonstrate that the -
auxiliary feed pump turbine met the recairements for an active component since the exhaust path was not completely qualified. Also, a brief review of the piping and instrumentatic . diagrams indicated similar class changes for the diesel generator exhaust pipes and the atmos-pheric steam dump exhaust pipes. This appeared to represent incomplete detailed support for pump operability requirements. It was one of three examples of failure to meet FSAR commit ents. Findings 2-7 and 6-3 pro-vide discussions of the other examples. (Finding No. 2-1) The team reviewed the environmental qualification temperature specified
. for the turbine driven pump room. The raximum room temperature specified in the FSAR Tables 3.11(B)-1 and 3.11(b)-2, for both accident and normal conditions, was 150 F. The turbine driven pump was being qualified fcr conditions at least that severe. Since the~ room did not have safety grade ventilation or cooling, room temperature would be assumed to be controlled by heat transfer to adjacent spaces when the turbine. pump was operating.
The two worst cases to be considered were (1) operating after a main steam 2-4
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O O ! line break when the space above would be heated by escaping steam and (2) operating for at least two hours following a loss of alternating current , electrical power. We found that the available air conditioning calculations did not support the specified temperature of 150F; however, on a judgment basis it appeared that the specified temperature could be supported. A series of calculations had addressed temperatures in the turbie.e driven pump room. The #irst cal-culation GF 175, was performed in 1975, approved in 1977 as a final calculation and superceded in 1978 (Ref. 2.39). The result was a calculated long term (steady state) temperature of 170 F based on heat transfer to 1 adjacent spaces at 122 F. This answer was too high for the purpose of this discussion and heating of adjacent spaces had not been assumed. However, since the analysis was conservative and the actual accident conditions would be transitory rather than steady state, this did not indicate that the room would actually exceed 150 F. The superceding calculation, GF 274, had been voided prior, to approval. The third calculation HV 319 (Ref. 2.40), was pe'rformed in 1981. It addressed room temperature based on nonnal ventilation syst'emiflow wit,h outside air at various temperatures, which was not a worst case condition. A fourth calculation, GF-415, was in progress during odbinspection. This calculation was intended to address the worst case conditions and, thus, the validity of the environmental qualification temperature specified. It appeared from the heat loads and heat transfer pFths involved that the validity could be demonstrated.
' These efforts should be completed to determine whether this question might 4
have any effect on design (Unresolved Item No. 2-1). The system dese.-iption,# systim flow diagram and some of thi Gnberlying calculations we.re changed during our inspection. We reviewed both the latest revision and the previous versicns of these documents. The - __ _ changes consisted.of .updatin,q information to reflect design changes tht'ttad beerf made and actual pump per,such items asformarice da In general, we found the details contained in these documents to be technically sound and consistent with the other doctenents we reviewed._ The team reviewed the Calculation AL-22 (Ref. 2.22) concerning system pressure. Five conditions were evaluated, representing various operating
- r. des. The maxirum pressure was calculated for a condition where suction was taken from the alternate source (the essential service water system) l since this provided water at a higher pressure than the condensate storage t a r.k . The electric driven pumps were assumed to be running with no flow tc the steam generators - essentially placing them at their maximum shutoff head based on actual pump capabilities. All pressures were within the design pressure of the piping.
There was an erroneous assumption in the maximum pressure case. Flow had $ been assumed in the pump discharge line with attendant pressure drops taken from calculations for other cases. This was inconsistent with the assumption of no flow to the steam generators and resulted in an under-prediction of pressure for three ' points in the discharge piping by 4,10, and 35 psi, respectively. Since the team found no similar errors, this did net appear to be a systematic error. It had no effect on the design. The ccrrected pressure result for the three points would be 1814 psia, the same 2-5
. :. O .
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, as at the pump discharge. The design pressure' for the piping at these points was 1815 psi.a. the same as at the pump discharge. (FindingNo.2-2).
The team reviewed Calculation AL-20 (Reference 2.4) related ~to total pump head requirements for the turbine driven pump and Calculation AL-16 (Reference 2.19) concerning suction head available for the pumps. No significant problems were found with ei-her calculation. The assumptions end results were generally consistent with system functional requirements, lhey supported the values used in containment pressure analyses, assuring that auxiliary feedwater flow through the steam generator to a ruptured main steam line would not add excessively to the containment pressure. Appropriate interface information had been exchanged with Bechtel's Nuclear Staff Group on this matter and care had been taken to assure that revisions did not void the consistency of the two efforts. There was an error in Calculation AL-20. A value for head loss in the flow restriction orifices that appeared on page 2 of the calculation had
~' "
been cTianged from 350 feet to 425 feet in Revision A. The sare value had not been changed where it a.lso appeared on page 8. This did not appear to be a systematic. error. It had no effect on the results since more than enough margin had'been allowed in subsequent steps. (Finding No. 2-3). The team also noted.that Bechtel and Westinghouse had exchanged information several times conceWiing maximum flow unde.r accident conditions. This
# appeared to have been properly considered and it resulted in design changes to assure that the pumps would be protected from conditions of inadequate suction head at high flow .-
rates.
.- : : e ..
As' discussed above,# Findings 2-2 and 2-3 involved detailed calculational deficiencies that had no apparent adverse effect on the design and did not appear to indicat.e d syste Findin.g 2-1 concerning
-~ -
classification of'the tu'rbingatic weakr. esses. e exhaost pfpe appeared to be more significant. It represented incomplete detailed support for pump operability require-ments and similar classifications appeared to exist for exhaust pipes in other systems. The other systim design features reviewed were adequate and consistent, indicating a controlled design process. 2.4 Hich Energy and Moderate Eneray Line Breaks The objective of this portion of the inspection was to evaluate the adequacy and control of high and moderate energy line break analyses related to the auxiliary feedwater system. Bechtel procedures for inter-discipline coordination and documentation
, of high energy line break analyses on the SNUPPS project were detailed in a memorandum from the Project Engineering Manager (Reference 2.31).
The Bechtel Stress Group performed the stress analyses necessary to deter-mine postulated pipe break locations and produced pipe-break isometric drawings indicating the locations and type of breaks to be considered. i The Mechanical / Nuclear Group calculated thrust and jet forces, determined what targets might be affected by pipe whip or jet impingement and deter-mined whether any damage would be acceptable for a particular break. Where damage to targets would not be acceptable the Mechanical / Nuclear 2-6 m- _ .
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O. O Group prepared action plans and provided instructions to other groups to obtain corrective action. For example, the Civil Group might design a whip restraint to preclude pipe whip. Potential targets for the postulated breaks were determined primarily by reference to the scale model of the plant. After a particular room had been reviewed it was flagged and any changes to the model (and thus to design locations) were controlled by reating through the Mechanical / Nuclear Group. Here they were checked for effects en the high energy line break analyses before being implemented. If necessary, the analyses would be updated. This appeared to be a sound procedure for maintaining the high energy line break analyses as reasonably current working files and for ' controlling design changes so as to minimize the inadvertent introduction of pipe break vulnerabilities that might require correction later. The team reviewed six postulated breaks in the steam supply line to the auxiliary feedwater p, ump turbine, including field inspection of the locatirens involved, review of the analysis of effects, and review of one associated thrust fprce calculation. The auxiliary feedwater system was s-the only safety related system of interest in proximity to these breaks. The system was generally well protected by compartmentalization. For instance, a break in .the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room might damage equipment associated with that pump (which also would be lost because of theireak) but no equipment associated with the other pumps was located.in the compartment. Generally, we found the. protection to be adequate'and the analyses to be soundly based. However, we did have some concerns about procedures, traceability and control as dis-cussed below. ! '- - ' 5 We found that z'one of influence drawings were not being prepared for the
~
high energy line break analyses. This was contrary to the instructions
-# 3 in the Project Eiignie'eri~ gn Pfanager"s meiorandum (Reference 2.31)'-which 1 required preparation.of such drawings. Bechte' personnel indicated that zone of influence drawings were -not cost effective. We would agree that 3 the scale model.and other docunients that were being prepared in accordance with the instructions appeared to be effective and adequate tools for determining the influence of breaks. However, the procedure and actual practice should be consistent. (Finding No. 2-4)
We found that the Dynamic Effects Analysis (target sheet) for high energy break number FC 01-01 erroneously stated that there would be no pipe whip for a postulated break in the steam supply line near the auxiliary feed-water pump turbine. Field inspection indicated that, since there were no anchors close enough to the postulated break to preclude pipe motion, the I correct statement would have been that the pipe could whip and the effect on potential targets should have been evaluated. This item had no adverse effect on the design. The conclusions would remain the same because there were no unacceptable targets in that area. We noted that the target sheets for other breaks generally indicated that there would be no pipe whip. However, they did not indicate a'ny basis for the determination, i.e., a comparison to indicate that the moment (thrust times distance to the nearest anchor) was less than the pipe's moment resisting capability. We also had general concerns about traceability and checking as discussed 2-7
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O O ! below. Accordingly, based on our work, we could not make a firm deter-mination that this was an isolated errer. This matter should be addressed in resolving the item. (Finding No. 2-5) The break by break Dynamic Effects Analyses (target sheets) were being treated quite informally. For each break these target sheets listed the calculated thrust forces, jet cone cha scteristics and determinations on pipe whip. They also listed the poter.:ial targets and evaluations of the effects on those targets. Our concern was that the sheets were not signed, dated, -hecked or approved. It was not possible to tell when an analysis had been performed or even what revisicn of the jet force calculations or the piping isometric drawing they had teen based upon. Bechtel personnel stated that they did not consider these analyses to be like design calcu-lations (which would be subject to femal controls for checking, approval and revision). Further, they indicated that, near the end of the project the sheets would be reviewed along with other related calculations before being finalized. It, control at that. time.yas We not concluded intended, that however, to bring them the documents should under formal be better
! controlled,"at' leas;t before, they are finalized. These analyses provide ! e part of the Nsis for design documents and they provide back-up for information supplied to regulatory agencies - two of the objectives that define project. design calculations in Eechtel Procedure EDPI 4.37-01.
(Reference 1.16) (Figding No. 2-6) In addition to the six breaks discussed above, the team also reviewed f protection arrangements and related correspondence for a postulated main steam line break or main feedwater line break in the space above the auxiliary feedwater,pum'p rooms. In the original design, br'eiki had not be'en postulatedc in that area due to the low stress levels and high quality requirements for the piping. In response to developing NRC staff positiens, design changes had been initiated to provide protection for such breaks in T~ 1977. The brea W piss'tulated ? were dbfined as non-mechanistic breaks. This meant that a single. ended guillotine break would be assumed. Str0ctural integrity of walls and floors and environmental qualification of electrical
; equipment located in the space were required. However, pipe whip and jet i impingement protection were not required.
Generally, the protection features described in the licensing commitments had been incorporated into the design. However, we found that, in one instance, the design did not meet a licensing com-itrent. A letter to ! .the NRC in 1977 (Reference 2.41) and FSAR Section 3.B.4.2 had stated that there would be no drainage (from the break area above the auxiliary feed-water pump rooms) to lower levels of tre auxiliary building and that penetrations through the floor would be waterproof. Large drain lines had been installed to shunt drainage from the break areas to the turbine building. Waterproof. teals had been provided where piping penetrated the floor. We reviewed the seal designs and found them adequate. However, field inspection indicated that several small drain lines through the floor had remained in place. The appropriate drawings (References 2.42 and 2.43) indicated that these lines had remained in the design, were interconnected witn drains from the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms and did drain to lower levels of the auxiliary building. There were no isolation provisions to prevent steam from entering various critical areas via these 2-8
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. i . O' O drains. We did not determine the potential effects on design, which would depend upon,how much steam might enter critical areas thrcugh the small drain lines. This flow path should be blocked or the safety significance should be addressed and, if justified, the FSAR should be changed. Since the other protection features had been incorporated in the design, this specific item did not appear to indicate a systematic weakness in providing high energy line break protection. It was one of three examples of failure to meet FSAR commitments. Findings 2-1 and 6-3 provide discussions of the other examples. (Finding 2-7)
In general, the moderate energy line hazards analyses had not yet been completed in the area of our inspection. However, several flooding - protection calculations related to these analyses had been completed. The team reviewed two iample calculations, FL-01 and FL-13, related to flooding levels in the auxiliary building basement and the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms (References 2.34 and 2.35). Both calculations demon-strated adequate prot,ection for safety related equipment on a conservative basis brid indicated Eompliance with the appropriate FSAR comitments.
.a :
i As discussed abovef we' foun'd a need for improved control of certain analyses (break by. break dynamic effects analyses) and found an error in one of- those analyses.. There was one specific failure to meet a licensing commitment that did .not appear to be a systematic error. The procedural violation concerninfzone of influence drawings had no apparent effect since the actual practices appeared adequate. In other respects we generally found the protection adequate and the analyses soundly, based, indicating adequate con, trol., , ,, 2.5 We'stinghouse Information
~2 C The objective of this portion of the inspection was to evaluate design interfaces with'~thphuclear 5 team supply system. '
1 - We revieved the Westinghouse design recommendations and interface informa-tion in.the Steam Systems Design Manual. We also reviewed about 12 letters between Bechtel and Westinghouse which served to amplify and, in some cases, to modify this information. Westinghouse recommendations were not necessarily requirements that must be met. The team's object was to determine that 4 ther the system design was consistent with Westinghouse recommendations r, where this was not the case, to determine that the differences in .. ign features had been evaluated and were known to be adequate. We found a number of minor differences which Bechtel personnel were readily able to justify on sound technical bases. For example, Westinghouse Steam
' Systems Design Manual had literally recommended use of automatically closing valves to prevent other systems from depleting the water in condensate storage tank below the required minimum when the auxiliary feedwater system was needed. In the SNUPPS design, the other systems' suction lines were located high in the tank so they.were incapable of depleting the condensate storage tank below the required level. This was clearly acceptable.
2-9 r m , - - - , - . - - - _m_-,_ - - - - , _ _ - - , , , . - , . , , _,_y . , . . , , _ , , , - - , - , , _ , - _ - _ , , , , , , , , . _ , -_ ., ,, , , , , , , - - - - _ - , . , - , - . - - - - - --
O . O
~ Wereviewedcorrespondencerelatedtothesta$dardWestinghouserecom-mendation to. employ a safety grade source of condensate quality water as the primary suction source. The SNUPPS design employed, as the primary source, a non-safety grade condensate storage tank. Automatic provisions were provided to switch the system's suction to a safety grade source (the essential service water system) in the event of low suction pressure from the condensate storage tank. This alternate safety grade source was not of condensate quality, being essentially Missouri River concentrated by a factor of four as a result of cooling tcwer evaperation. From the initial exchanges of correspondence it appeared that Westinghouse had preferred a safety grade condensate quality source (or an equivalent source based on heat exchangers). However, Westinghouse had in the end provided Bechtel a letter stating that the SNUPPS practice was not a safety problem.
Westinghouse personnel demonstrated the basis for this determination. Their calculations indicated that using ultimate heat sink water for one coolddQn cycle.of about 24 hours would result in a chemical environment far less severe ~tha) that which experimental data had indicated might cause steam generator tube failure or tube support sheet failure, even for steam generator des.igns that were considerably more susceptible to damage than the SNUPPS steem generators. The team reviewed itIterface infonnation related to accident analyses J involving the auxiliary feedwater system to determine that the values provided by Bechtel to Westinghouse were current and correct. The accident analyses we reviewed were those for main feede:ater line rupture, main steam line rupture and main feedwater system failure. Bechtel had pr'ovided auxili.ary feedwater system flow rates, temperature limits, purge volumes and startup time:; which were consistent with the actual system design. One of the important considerations was the maintenance of a sustained flow hde%f 470 giillonsjer clinute from the turbine dHven pump following a main feedwater line break accident. The team checked"Bechtel Calculation AL-26 (Reference 2.11) and found that pump flow had been cal-7 culated,Jbased on pump and turbine characteristics, for eight conditions corresponding to points after the accident This demonstrated that the necessary flow would be maintained during the course of the accident with the various values of steam pressure and temperature that would be available for the turbine driven pump. With one exception (classification of the turbine exhaust pipe discussed in Section 2.3 of this report) we found that the design features we reviewed were consistent with Westinghcuse recommendations or that the differences had been evaluated and justified, indicating exchange and control of interface information. 2.6 Conclusion As discussed in the preceeding sections, nearly all of the design information we reviewed was adequate and consistent indicating a controlled design process. We found a need for improved control in certain parts of the high energy line break analyses and we found one inst'ance where the high energy line break protection features did not meet a licensing commitment 2-10
..- - - - - . _ - . _ - . - - - - - - -=
O. O
- which did not appear to be a systematic error.t Nevertheless, we generally
-found the high energy break protection adequite and the analyses soundly based. Accordingly, the design process appeared to be controlled.
d4 A:.
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O O .
> 3. 0 vMechani
_ cal Components m-The objective of this portion of the ir. piction was to evaluate the mech-anical components aspects of the design with emphasis on the control of design information and assumptions used in the evaluations. inis review included sample areas of work in the Stress Analysis Group and the Pipe Support equipment.Group at Bechtel Power Corporation and sample items of mechanical 3.1 Stress Analysis Group . 3.1.1 - Design Information
- ~
This s'ec' tion summariies the basic design information reviewed in relation to the Stress' Analysis Group. - Design information~41 sed by the Stress Analysis Group is generally provided by other Bechtel internal design groups. The design data include project specifications for. piping, piping isometric drawings and vendor component allowable loads. Dfswings and specifications are formally controlled
-' documents containing coordination sign off stamps and are referenced in the stress analysis cover sheets. Valve weight data are contained on the piping isometric drawings. Information on component allowable loads and system operating conditions .is transmitted from the Mechani' cal / Nuclear Gr'oup by memora.nda nnd retained in the stress analysis problem file.
Seismic response spectra are maintained in Bechtel Computer Program ME 909
~ ' -
(Reference 3.26) and are obtained by specifying the building and elevation data point showtMn"The ' civil mathift.atic'ai models. -The stress group leader maintains a notebook.containing the civil mathematical models and ccrres-ponding spectra. e the spectra. Also contained in the notebook are ME 909 printouts of Building). One data point was checked (Data Point No.11 in the Auxiliary The ME 909 spectra printout for this data point matched, the envelope spectra obtained from the civil specification. Spectra enveloping between different buildings and elevatitns is performed by the computer program. i Loads and pipe mevements at pipe support locations are transmitted from ( the Stress Analy.is Group to the Pipe Support Group by memoranda. Movements at small file. problem pipe branch connections are maintained in the stress analysis Since the Pipe Support Group performs the design of small diameter piping, the stress analysis package is checked by that group to obtain the correct movements at attachr:ent points. f~~ Feedback from the field on "as-built" conditions is largely in the Field Change Requests (FCR) which must be approved by Bechtel. The design philosophy for the SNUPPS project is intended to limit Field Change Requests by requiring the system to be fabricated within the tolerances contained in s Bechtel Specification M-204 (Reference 1.24). As a result, no field change i 3-1 l
O O requests for piping were available in the Str5ss Analysis Group for inspec-tion team review. In addition to limiting the field changes on piping, Bechtel plaris to conduct final "as-built" walkdowns when construction is complete. Since support fabrication on the sample system was not complete at the time of the inspection, no assessrent could be made of the imple-mentation of "as-built" controls for piping. The results of our review of sample work areas are described in Section 3.1.3. 3.1.2 - Personnel and Guidance This section describes our review of training and guidance information related to the Stress Analysis Group. Inexperienced engineers were first assigned to the Bechtel staff rather than a specific project. There, they received classroom training (approx-imately 150 hours) wfiich gave them an overview of analysis techniques and . { procedures for varipus load,ing conditiens. Once the training wa . com-i - - - - pleted, the engineers were assigned to a specific project. There, the
~
first assignments Ior new personnel were checking and reviewing completed (and previously checked) problems to be:ome further acquainted with the group's work. Then typical work was assigned. No formal training _clas_s notets were availablf_tA rtview for class effecti.veness. The training program had only been available within the past two or three years. The Stress Analysis Group uses centralized guidance documents such as computer manuals and stress hewsletters. The inspection team studied the stress news. letters and the user's r.anual for Bechtel computer program ME 101 (Reference 3.27) which was the computer program used for piping analysis. The stress newsletters are a collection of letters issued from
" ~
time to time by"the nsitress gYoups of var'ious Bechtel' offices indicating acceptable analysis techniques, analysis clarifications, and suggested analytical procedures. We noted that the newsletters had not been evaluated
-> for use on the SNUPPS project.= They were being used in some cases buti on the whole, there was no system in place to determine what should be used where. This was in violation of Bechtel Procedure EDPI 4.1-01 (Re'ference l 1.11) which states that " Design criteria on the SNUPPS project are detailed in discipline design criteria documents which shall be revised and documented in accordance with this instruction." (Finding No.-3-1)
Finding 3-2 (Section 3.1.3) concerned an error that tight have been avoided by use of the appropriate newsletter. Based on the nature of the newsletters i a.d the lack of controls, there appeared to be a potential for other such errors. In addition, Finding 3-5 (Section 3.1.3) concerned assumptions made at a piping class boundary. This appeared to indicate a need for more formal guidance in other areas as well. These matters should be addressed in resolving the above finding. One newsletter that the team reviewed cealt with welded attachments to ASME Class 2 and 3 piping systems. During this review, Bechtel personnel indi-cated that if the loads on the attachment produced a stress less than 8 ksi, the attachment was considered adequate. If the welded attachment resulted 3-2
.---,e- - , . . --e. . - - - .--#w,.--m---- -.-,,-r,,-----.---- - - - - - .--,.-------.--e,. -----4-------,,---.%-,--,.we----,,,-,-.+-.-%,--m ---- -. . -- .-. - - , - -n-
O O in a stress greater than 8 ksi, a more detailSd analysis procedure would be utilized. The initial welded attachment stress analysis would be performed by the Pipe Support Group using Bechtel Ccmputer program ME 210 (Reference 3.28). If the results indicated stresses greater than 8 ksi. Class 1 allow-able stress limits would be used for co=parison of lug stresses combined with the piping stresses for primary upset, primary plus secondary, and faulted load combinations. Sections NC-3645 and ND-3645 of the 1974 Edition of the ASME Code require the consideration of local stresses in the pipe resulting from attachments but do not define explicit stress allowable criteria. The NRC staff is currently reviewing criteria for piping attachments on a generic basis. However, at present, the Bechtel procedure appears to reet the require-ments of the above sections of the ASME Code. From the team's review of a user's manual for the ME 101 program, it was b noted.that there might be a non-conservatism in the calculation of seismic anchor movements forlkewed restraints. The ME 101 Program Users Manual discussed the' method used by the program to compute loads due to seismic anchor movements. Tor skewed supports (which did not align with east-west, north-south or vertical directions), the anchor movement applied to the support was the global movement multiplied by the cosine vector. This might yield non-conservative results for some cases. This question should be addressed by further study and, if needed, appropriate corrective action ~ should be taken. .(Unresolved Item No. 3-l') . . For seismic analysis of piping systems, the FSAR referenced Revision 3 of Bechtel Topical Report -BP-TOP-1 (Reference 3.5). The Stresv Analysis Group Leader had a copy of Revision 2 for reference and there was no documented evidence that the group members had fomally reviewed Revision 3. This indicated a lack of awareness of what was specified in the FSAR. However, a brief comparisen-iridicated>that Revisi~o n 3 incorporated a discussion of closely spaced modes.and Class 1 piping cyclic criteria, and specified that three simultaneous directions of earthquake input be utilized. No evidence
+- was found that Stress Analysis-Group personnel had violated these criteria.
The Stress Ar.alysis Group Leader also maintained a copy of Bechtel Speci-fication M-200 (Reference 3.3) dealing with design of ASME Section III piping. Stress allewable linits and load combinations were contained on Gaithersburg Power Division standardized forms used by the Stress Analysis Grec;. For support leads, only maximum design loads were summed. This proviced the cost conservative load corbination to the Pipe Support Group. A number of ceneral questions arose during the inspection concerning the analytical procedures utilized for the piping system analyses for she SNUPPS project. One question dealt with the analytical procedure for incorporating " missing mass" or zero period acceleration effects. For the SNUPPS project, the Stress Analysis Group was using a 33 Hz frequency cutoff. No zero period acceleration loads were being incorporated into the support load tables. However, Bechtel personnel indicated that SNUPPS Project criteria required that (1) minimum stiffnesses be used, (2) worst case loads (typically faulted) be used to design supports to normal and upset allowable stress levels, and (3) that a minimum design load of 100 3-3 m - - v-.- --, ,,.w - - . - -# - - . - . . - - - -- --.---_-.------y- . . - - - , . - , - . - - - ---,,.--.i
O O lb/ inch diameter of pipe be used. The team bilieves that sufficient con-servation exists in the calculation of support loads to cover zero period acceleration effects in these particular circumstances. Another question concerned checking to see if response spectra peaks were straddled. This would result in an analysis that was sensitive to small changes in input parameters and modelirg assumptions. Bechtel did not conduct formalized checks. However, typically the first mode for the piping systems reviewed was greater than the fundamental spectra peaks and, therefore, peak straddling was not observed, t
, Finally, the stiffness values used in the piping analyses were explored.
Bechtel personnel indicated that very high stiffnesses were used in the weight and thermal expansion analyses while realistic minimum stiffnesses were used for the seismic analyses. This meant that therm 31 expansion results should be conservative, seismic results adequate, and that weight results can be non-conservative. However, the non-conservatism in the weight- results wouldmot be of engineering significance.
... In summary, the StNss Analysis Group used standardized forms and the ME 101 computer program wh.ich provided good assurance of consistent application of the ASME Code reau.irements specified in the FSAR. In the more judge-mental areas of analysis and modeling assumptions, improvements in the guidance were needed-as discussed above in relation to Finding 3-1.
The results of-our review of specific analyses are described i~n the following section.
,. + s ~.
3.1.3 - Analysis Rev,iew < The objective of this portion of the ir.spection was to evaluate the adequacy e .=- and control of specific Stress Analysis ' Group products. .. Two stress analysis packages were selected for detailed review: (1) the
., auxiliary feedwater turbine driven pump discharge line, Problem No. 70, (Reference 3.9) and (2) the steam supply line to the turbine, Problem No.
60, (Reference 3.7). The team reviewed the input information referenced, i the assumptions used in the analysis, and the stress ar.d load summary sheets for compliance with FSAR criteria. i l Problem No. 60 referred to Revision 13 of Specification MS-1, the Piping l Class Sunrnary, whereas Revision 14 (Reference 1.23) had been issued by the time the analysis was finally approved and Revision 15 had been issued by the time of our inspection. A similar situation existed with Problem No. 70. However, the team's review indicated that the later revisions did not affect l . these analyses. In addition, to demonstrate the procedure for controlling j such information, Bechtel personnel previded a memorandum (Reference 3.39) , that documented the piping analyses affected by the latest revision (Rev 15) to the Piping Class Summary. .
. The analyses indicated that 3% damped SSE response spectra had been used as input whereas 2% should be useo for small piping. However, we found notes' indicating that the 3% spectra analysis results had been multiplied 3-4 , .-- ii %. - - - . . - , - , y~~ . - - - - - , . - - - - 1 - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - . - ---w-.-m-,~-. --,_------------_-,w,--,.,.--.---,._.me,,---,-.. ,m_, - - - _ - --
; O O by a factor of 1.25 to conservatively tound the 2% spectra acceleration values. This was a valid practice.
The analysis packages indicated that the. main run piping did not have stress intensification factors greater than 1.0 at points where branch piping was located. The plant design staff statcd this was a standard procedure for the SNUPPS project. (This applied to cases where the branch pipe was smaller than the run pipe as defined by footnote (6) to Figure NC-3673.2(b)-1 of the ASME Code.) Since the 1974 Edition of the ASME Code was ambiguous in this area, Bechtel's interpretation was that the run piping need not be stress intensified. We believe this approach is not conser-vative; however the significance is not expected to be major. The Code ambiguity was clarified in the Sumer 1979 Addenda where a minimum stress intensification factor'of 1.5 was required. However, the licensee is not required to meet the later versions of the ASME Code. We found that Problem No. 60 had not ecployed the correct enveloped seismic resporise spectrum. FSARSection3.7(B)3.7statedthat"Theseismicdesign. of the piping. arid equipment included the effect of the . seismic. response of >
... the supports, equipment, structures, and components." The enveloped response spectra used on Problem No. 60 were not conservative in that they did not include the effect's'of the main steam lines to which the supply lines in cuestion were attache'd. A correct response spectrum should have been obtained if the a'ppmpriate plant design stress analysis newsletter, as discussed in Finding 3-1 above, had been employed. Since no femal design
. requirements existed to addresss response spectra input for branch lines, this problem may apply to other analyses where branch lines have been decoupled from larger piping. systems. (Findir.g No. 3-2) ,,, We found that Drawing M-03AB01 (Reference 3.29) did not reflect the correct "as-built" condition at the connection between the steam supply to the . _ . . _ - auxiliary.feedntetypump turbine and the. main steam. loop 3. header. The . pipe fabricator (Dravo) had supplied a different configuration than described in the Bechtel drawing. Revisio.n SA to the Dravo drawing (Reference 3.30), which had been received at site ~with the spool shipment, showed the correct "as-built" condition. However, the Bechtel site records maintained by the Sechtel Site Liaison Engineering Group contained the earlier Revision 5, (F.eference 3.31), which did not reflect the "as-built" condition. This a;; eared to be a paperwork error by either Bechtel or Dravo. (Finding No. 3-3) - With respect to the same connection, we found that Problem No. 60 did not cc .tcin cocumentation for the calculation of the stress intensification fac;cr used. This was contrary to Bechtel Procedure EDPI 4.37-01 (Refer-ence 1.16), which required a statement of how design data were developed if detailed calculations were not performed. This was a procedural item which we would not expect to adversely affect the analysis. (FindingNo. 3-4) Ore aeditional piping run was reviewed to determine the adequacy of the assumptions used at Seismic Category I boundaries. This was the auxiliary feed. vater suction piping from the condensate storage tank Problem No. 44A (Feference 3.8). Review of Problem No. 44A indicated that no anchor was 3-5
O O designed at the Seismic Category I bou .dary where the buried pipe entered the auxiliary building. The effects of the Non-Category I pipe had been considered by modeling approximately ten feet of massless pipe with three directional soil sprin;s located at tws foot intervals. It'was ncted th:; building settlement was considerea in e.c a"lasis in ace:rdar.ce mth Eechtel Specification M-200 requirements. ! We found that Problem No. 44A did not contain an evaluation of the imposed loads and movements due to the thennal expansion of the attached buried piping outside the building. This is contrary to Section ND-3651 of the 1974 Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code which states that the design of the complete piping systeri shall be analyzed between anchors for the effects of thennal expansion. This appeared to be a unique situation involving an interface, without an anchor, between Non-Category I buried pipe and Category I pipe inside a building. (Finding No. 3-5) In addition, we found that the same problem did not contain an analysis of
~-
piping from the.condinsate storage tank inside.the building for the cold condition. -This~ is contrary to Section ND-3624 of the 1974 Edition of the
. ASME Boiler and Pre;ssure Vessel Code which requires that the design of piping systems tahinto account forces and moments resulting from thermal expansion and contraction. This specific error in Problem 44A did not appear to be a systematic error since e check of the suction from the Essential Service Witer System and the Auxiliary Feedwater discharge piping confirmed they had been analyzed for the low temperature condition.
-r (Finding No. 3-6)
Ia a meeting with the NRC staff on June 9-10, 1981, the'SNUPPS applicants co'mmittted to meet the staff's position on functional capability for ASME Class 2 and 3 p'iping systems (Reference 3.32). At the time of the inspection of the auxiliary feedwater piping system, the analyses had not been checked
- T for compliance nth <t'he techhical Vosition. Our review of the stress analysis packages ir3dicated that stresses at some points in the piping systems exceeded the minimum limits given in the technical position.
J Further evaluation is necessary to assure functional capability of these piping systems in accordance with the technical position. (Unresolved
- Item No. 3-2)
The piping systems required to meet the functional capability criteria in the technical position were identified by marked-up P&lD's that were transmitted from the Mechanical / Nuclear Group. However, r.o list was l available to irientify which analysis problems required evaluation for the functional capability criteria. Ir. order to check the it;1erentatier of the functional capability criteria en current work, the team checked Stress Analysis Problem No. 12, (Reference 3.33). Review of the stress I summary verified that the functional capability criteria had been con-sidered in the analysis. , 3.1.4 - Suninary This section summarizes the results of our review concerning the Stress Analysis Group. 3-6 l l
-+ -e* y. c.re- iy-e---wy--y.w.--w ww e.- - w .w-a,.,w - + - e---e, v.- ,ey-- p,--.ea --m,-*rg. &-r-yy-c -- .---&m--p--,,&eg-- w-vw-y,gm,------ - y,-mp-*=-y7yw-.-,-q-- -y-1
; O O As discussed above, three findings related to' Stress Analysis Group guidance for analysis techniques and modeling assumptions, The most significant (No.
3-1) involved a lack of control over the use of stress newsletters. The second (No. 3-2) concerned seismic response . spectra input for branch lines. The third (No. 3-5) involved the assumptions made at a piping class boundary. Although the majority of assumptions used appeared adequate, the negative findings indicated that more formal guidance was needed for consistent and correct application of design assumptions. (Observation 3-1) There was one finding (No. 3-3) concerning control of design input information. This involved feedback of "as-built" information from the vendor drawing of the steam supply cont.ection to the main steam line. The overall control over feedback of "as-built" infomation could not be assessed because system construction had not been completed and "as-built" walk downs had not been performed. 1 The review of design , input information supplied oy other Bechtel design groups included.syst#m operating parameters, component allowable loads, seismic input and pjping class specifications. Based on the inspection
. e. sample, design input information appeared to be controlled.
The review of sample calculations indicated that the basic criteria specified in thefSAR for ASME Code allowable stresses and design load combinations were followed. Two findings did not appear to be systematic errors. One~(No. 3-4) concerned a lack of documentation for a stress intensification factor and the other (No. 3-6) concerned failu~re'to analyze suction piping for the cold condition. Accordingly, based on the inspection sample ' adequate control was indicated. : t - j 3.2 Pipe Support Group T F.2.1 - Design InforestioW ' t 3 : : I This section sumarfzes the basi.c design information reviewed in relaticn J to the P.ipe Support Group. c. :- ! The basic input information comes from the Stress Analysis Group in' the
- form of memoranda transmitting the support lead sumary sheets and piping iscretrics showing the location of the supports. Data containing pipe thermal and seismic movements at the suppcrt locations are listed on the
. support load sheets. -
Coordination with the Civil Group for structural attachments was achieved by sending the Civil Group the working drawing of the support which, in all samples examined, contained the imposed loads and the location of the ! support. The Civil Group then stamps the working drawing " Approved" prior ; to the Pipe Support Group issuing the hanger drawing. Working drawings had j been retained for reference, although ther, was no evidence that this was , required by Bechtel procedures. The most recent procedure implemented by . Revision 17 to Bechtel Procedure EDPI 4.46-01 (Reference 1.17), requires ' an index sheet to be maintained "for each isometric drawing. The index sheet contains a list of all supports on the piping isometric along with the 3-7 L - _ - - _ - _ _ - - _ - _ - _- - _ _
O O revisions of the support design. k' hen supports are revised, the index sheet along with all new support revisions are sent to the Civil Group which signs the coordination sheet. In our review of the sample calculations as discussed in the following sections, we found the original procedure had been followed and the docu-mentation had been retained. Implementation of the current procedure should improve the coordination between groups and the retrievability of the records in the Pipe Support Group. The majority of the supports on the system selected had not been completed and had not received the field QC check at the time of the inspection. Feedback from the field on "as-built" ccnditions was similar to that dis-cussed in Section 3.1.1 for piping. The major difference with supports was that the Daniel procedure for field change requests (Reference 3.38) allowed construction to proceed on the basis of the proposed change prior to Bechtel approval of M FCR. This was called a " Red Line Procedure" and it required.a " Red L.ne Tag" be attached to the support until the FCR was dispositioned by Bechte,1. - - The results of cur ~ review of sample work areas are described in Section
- 3. 2. 3.- - ..
- 3.2.2 - Parsonnel and' Guidance This section describes our review of training and guidance inf'or5ation related to the Pipe Support Group.
Interviews with..Bechtel personnel indicated the Pipe Support Group con-ducted a training course for new personnel. The training course consisted of approximately 60 hours of classwork. As with the Stress Analysis Group,
-v r it was noted thatthe trainihg prog' ram had only recently been available.
A key document used'by the Pipe Support Group was Bechtel Specification u M-217 concerning pipe supports:(Reference 3.16). This specification listed general design requirements such as required stiffness of supports. Another document used by the Pipe Support Group was Bechtel's Plant Design Hanger Engineering Standards (Reference 3.17). This document contained guidance for items such as evaluation of standard details for welcs and attachments. Standard components such as clamps, snubbers and sway struts were selected based on manufacturers' catalogue load ratings. Suppie entary steel framing was generally evaluated using the computer program STRUDL to obtain member stresses and attachment loads. Evaluation of welded attachments to piping was performed by the Pipe Support Group as previously discussed in Section 3.1.2. The basic design criteria involved evaluation of supports for the maximum loads transmitted by the Stress Analysis Group and maintaining the stresses within the ASME Code upset limits. This was more conservative than the FSAR criteria. Bechtel personnel indicated that more detailed evaluations using FSAR load combinations and stress limits might be used to evaluate 3-B
.. ; O O the adequacy of existing supports or for evalSation cf welded attachr.ent
~-
stresses if needed. The results of our review of specific.aralyses are described in the l following section. 4 3.2.3 - Analysis Review ! The objective of this portion of the inspection was to evaluate the adequacy and control of specific Pipe Support Group products. Several pipe support calculation sheets were reviewed. Support ALO2-C009/ 135Q was chosen for review because it contained welded attachments to the pipe. The loads matched the loads calculated by the Stress Analysis Group. The welded attachment analysis appeareJ adequate. Support ALO4-C009/135,Q (incorporating two rigid struts) was reviewed. No stiffness calculatio~ns had been made. Bechtel personnel indicated that it was standard proced_ure not ,to calculate stiffness of struts when Hanger
- - - - Engineering Standard (HES) number 16. Revision 1 was utilized. This standard limited the angle between two struts (analytically modeled as ,
orthogonal) to be between 30* and 150'. It also illustrated a " cookbook" method for calculati.ng the imposed axial loads. No evaluation was available at the tie of the inspection to. verify that the strut , stiffnesses met the requirements of Specification M-217 for th.e entire range of allowed angles. Since the piping analysis used the stiffness given in Specification M-217, this question should be addressed to determine whether it ha's any' affect on the design. (Unresclved Item No'. 3-3) ,
- In general, lateral vibrations of struts and rods were not considered for
~' - the SNUPPS projett-sid no criteria'kere 'available for evaluatingithe frequency of supports in the unrestrained direction. FSAR Section 3.7(B).3.7 stated that the seismic design of piping included the effects
+ of the seismic response of supports. Significant lateral vibration of the support would reduce its buckling capacity ar.d could affect the response of the piping system. This question should be addressed to determine whether it has any effect on the design. (Unresolved Item No. 3-4)
Support ALO1-R005/135Q was a box frame on the suction piping providing
. lateral support in one direction. Attached to the bottom of the frarne was spring hanger ALO1-H001/135Q. The loads used to analyze the support frame did not match the loads from the piping analysis. However, the loads used in the frame analysis were much higher than the loads from the piping i analysis. The frame dimensions used in the STRUDL analysis did not match the dimensions on the. support drawing. The STRUDL analysis was dated 10/04/76 and Rev 2 of the support drawing was dated 6/23/78. Apparently, the STRUDL analysis for this case was based on a preliminary design or a similar design of another frame support and was not updated with current loads and as-built" dimensions because of the conservatism in the loads used in the analysis. Because the loads used in the analysis were much greater than the current piping loads, the frame design should be satis-factory and the apparent assumption was justified. The support design 3-9 l
; o O contained an evaluation of the frame stiffness which demonstrated that Specification M-217 requirements had been met.
Field inspection of support ALO1-R005/135Q indicated that the frame pro-vided no vertical clearance at the bottom of the pipe. This frame was not intended to provide vertical support. The cause was that the length of the vertical members sMcified in the bill of materials did not match the dimensions shown on the hanger sketch. This appeaced to be a non-systematic error that was not detected in the design checks or the initial field quality control check of the har.;er. It is expected that this error would be detected by a system walkdown performed in accordance with the NRC's IE Bulletin 79-14. The support will require rework to obtain the proper vertical clearance. (Finding No. 3-7) Spring hanger ALO1-H001/135Q was attached to the box frame discussed above. The analysis package contained correct loads and movements from the piping analysis. The design of the members was based on a load from a previous analys.is revision whith was less than the current load. A note in the hanger calculation stated that the new load and movements would not affect
. .. the member sizes. This des'ign appeared to be satisfactory.
Support FC01-RD20/05.Q consisted of two lateral snubbers on the steam supply line to the turbine. The loads and movemects used in the support evaluation were the.'same as those contained in the pipe stress analysis, i The evaluation of. support stiffness considered only the structural steel elements of the support which, in essence, assumes that the sn'ubbers in-volved were rigid. We found that this did not meet the requirements of Bechtel Specification M-217 ;(Reference 3.16). Section 4.2(b.) of the specification required that either the stiffness requirements of Table 1 in that specification be met, the frequency equation be satisfied or the stress problem reanalyzed using the actual stiffness of the' support. Test
.r - .c data from.Pacif.4ct Scientifichshowed, that- the snubber. stiffness for this snubber (type R/2 .65) was less than the minimum stiffness required by Table 1 of Specification M-217. However, the piping stress analysis.
.. , Problem .No. 60 had.used the stf ffness value from the table. (Finding.No. .
3-8) Since it appeared that snubber stiffnesses were not generally being checked for compliance with Specification M-217 requirements, similar situations may exist for other supports using snubbers. In addition, unresolved Items 3-3 and 3-6 concerned lack of evidence that support stiffness requirements had l been checked for specific struts and I-beam attachments. Apparently, it was generally being assumed that standard components would be satisfactory l rather than checking to determine that the project interface requirements in Specification M-217 had been met. In addition, Unresolved Item 3-4
. concerned an apparent. assumption that standard struts and rods would auto-matically be satisfactory from a standpcint of lateral vibrations. Based on these considerations it appeared that improved guidance and procedures were needed to assure that project requirements were met for standard pipe support components and structural details. These matters should be i
addressed in resolution of the above finding. Ancho'r ALO1-A002/125Q on the auxiliary feedwater suction piping was reviewed to verify the method used to evaluate welded attachment stresses. The 3-10
!- O O
- evaluation used the ME 210 computer program to evaluate welded attachment stresses at the pipe attachment point. Since the stresses exceeded 8 ksi, an evaluation was performed using ASME Class 1 allowable stress limits for the following load cases: (1) primary upset limits for weight + OBE (2) primary faulted limits for weight + SSE and (3) primary plus secondary limits for weight, thermal, OBE and seismic anchor movements. The items :
reviewed, which focused on the methods for handling attachment stresses, appeared acceptable. Anchor FC01-A002/135 was designed by the Civil Group. This anchor was a boundary anchor between the Seismic Category I steam supply line and the non-seismic supply line from the auxiliary boiler. The design loads from the Stress Analysis GroJp considered piping collapse. loads from the non-Category I section of the piping. It was noted during the team's civil engineering review that these moments were reduced by the ASME Code stress intensification factor at the nearby elbow. The Bechtel Civil Group provided procedure TB-011 (Reference 3.21), which had been provided by the Stress Anal This procedure allowed reduction of collapse
~- moments by the ysis G'roup.
ASME Code stress intensification factor at any fitting located within three piping' ciameters of a restraint. While this procedure may produce acceptable results for elbows, we considered its general val-idity questionable.since the Code stress intensification factors would not generally correla.te with section collapse properties. This matter should be addressed to determine its potential effects on design. (Unresolved ItemNo.3-5) . Field Change R quest 2FC-1191-MH was reviewed as an example of field feedback. The FCR involved relocation of the structural steelaattachment of a sway strut.approximately six inches to avoid interference with existing conduit. The relocation was accepted and the Civil Group had signed off on the coordination sign off sheet. The change involved a - support which placedan exis-ting structu'ral I-beam in torsion; the change increased the. torsional moment on the I-beam. I-beams generally have low torsional stiffness, es.pecially for the case where the load is applied . locally.through the flange. No evidence existed at the n tirre of our inspection to verify that Specification M-217 stiffness requirements had been considered when this change was approved. This should be addressed to determine whether or not it would have any effect on the design. (Unresolved Item No. 3-6) 3.2.4 - Sumary This section sumarizes the results of our review concerning the Pipe Support Group. As discussed above, there was one finding (No. 3-8) concerning the failure to meet the support stiffness requirements of Specification M-217 with respect to snubbers. In addition there were two unresolved items (Numbers 3-3 and 3-6) regarding a lack of evidence' that support stiffness requirements had been met for specific struts and I-beam attachments. The specification provides interface requirements to assure the consistency of piping analyses with support stiffness. Apparently, it was assumed that standard components would automatically be satisfactory rather than checking to 3-11 l
. _ _ . _ ~ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . .
- o- o stresses present in the angles. The ar.gle supports should be checked using appropriate analytical methods. (Unresolved item No. 3-7)
The inlet nozzle loads used in the qualification report were the same as the loads used by the Stress Analysis Group for Problem No. 60. The stiffness of the nozzle could not be determined from the review of the report. There-fore, it could not be verified that the assumption of the nozzle as a rigid anchor in the piping analysis was valid. It was noted that dynamic testing results presented on page 52 of the turbine report listed frequencies ranging from 2.5 to 6.7 Hz, indicating that the turbine was not a rigid component. This item should be addressed to determine whether or not there is any effect on the piping analysi:. (Unresolved Item No. 3-8) There was no indication that the Stress Analysis Group reviewed the above vendor design reports and we had some concern about whether the stress analysis assumptions in those reports were being checked for consistency with Bechtel pipe str,ess analyses. However, since we found no violations
" of refulatory requirements, this matter is mentioned as a recommended area for licensee considpration.. (Observation No. 3-3) ' '
The team reviewedt1 he qualification report for valve HV12 (Reference 3.36) as well as the valve data sheet supplied by Masoneilan, dated 8/19/77 which provided the actual. weight of the valve. The weight given on the data sheet was approximafely 6% greater than the weight used in the piping -? analysis (Problem No. 70). When questioned about this difference, Bechtel personnel produced the current revision of isometric drawing M-04ALO4 (Reference 3.37), which contained the correct valve weight. They also produced the Bechtel cr'iterion for reanalysis of piping problems due to ch'anges in valve weights. This criterion stated that reanalysis was not required if the valve weight change was less than 175. This was based on
~'# # generic calculations performed by the Pl. ant Design Staff. We did not review t' e docusintaiion supSorting the 17% criteria! however, the weight difference for valve.HV-12 in Problem No. 70 was not considered significant.
The seismic input that Bechtel:had provided for valve qualification con-sisted of generic envelope spectra for the plant. These spectra enveloped the output accelerations from the piping analysis and were conservative. As discussed above, our review in this area resulted in two unresolved items and one reco . endation for licensee consideration. Based on the limited review of equipment, it appeared that adequate controls existed to ensure basic design inputs such as nozzle allowable loads, seismic inputs and vahe weights were properly transmitted between the Stress Analysis Grcup and th:: component suppliers. 3.4~ Conclusion On the basis of the sample included in the inspection, the design process appeared to be controlled in the mechanical components area. As discussed in the preceeding sections, weaknesses were identified, the most signifi- l cant involving guidance concerni'ng design assumptions and standard j components. Nevertheless, the inspection sample in this area appeared ; to indicate adequate control. - I 3-13 l
.- i.
O O j . . S 4.0 Civil and Structural Engineering v n ,w -w , , , - - - . The objective of this portion of the inspection was to evaluate civil and structural engineering design details and practices with emphasis upon control and exchange of information as well as the technical execution of the design. The team reviewed the involvement of Union Electric Company and Nuclear Projects Incorporated and the execution of
.. design by the Bechtel Power Corporation. Areas of review included personnel qualifications, guidance provided, and a npmber of technical and procedural areas as described below.
4.1 Involvement of Union Electric Company and Nuclear Projects Inc. The objective of thir portion of the inspection was to determine, on the
~- basis of a limited-sample of technical items, the manner and depth of
. . . . involvement of the11censee', Union Electric Company and the SNUPPS Utilities' contractor, Nuclear, Projects Inc. (NPI), in the design of the Callaway facility in the cidl.-structural discipline area.
. The Union Electric Company. Nuclear Engineecing nepartment responsible for the Callaway facility consisted of 26 enaineers at the time of the inspec-
..- tion. Two of those engineers were civil-structural. Union Electric personnel indicated that the group had been formed about May of 1976. At that time a supervisory engi.neer in the civil-structural area ;and another civil-structura.1 engineer were assigned to the Nuclear Engineering Depart-ment. Prior to that time these two engineers had been involved along with a third civil-structural engineer on assignment to the Callaway e- project from the:ifnien Electric Enyineering and Construction Department.
~
FSAR Section 1.4.1.I describes the technical qualifications of Union
.a Electric and provides the com;tany philosophy with respect to engineering, design and construction of the nuclear facility. That section states that "UE does not maintain engineering and construction staffs for the design and construction of power plants, but rather engages reputable engineering and construction firms for these purposes. UE has a staff of engineering personnel that directs site investigation activities, guides plant design,
. implements a quality assurance program, and prepares for construction and operation of the plant." Union Electric Procedure QA-303 (References 4.5 and 4.6), which governs the Union Electric review process, is consistent with the FSAR comitments in this subject area.
The team reviewed the work assignments of the three individuals for the May 1975 time frame when many of the basic decisions in the civil-structural discipline were made. The work was divided between the power block work (Bechtel scope of design) and site (Sverdrup and Parcel scope of design).
'The site work apparently consumed a significant portion of the time available to the Union Electric personnel. In addition, the supervising civil-structural engineer was responsible for all disciplines with respect to site-related design work.
4-1
O O
'. The function of these Union Electric civil-structural engineers was to provide coments and input to the Company's representative on the SNUPPS Technical Cbmittee for consideration by that Comittee for incorporation into the standard plant design. Once a design or engineering decision was reached by the SNUPPS Technical Comittee, or the Management Committee if necessary, NPI would provide the direction to Bechtel. Various other com-mittees and groups existed within the D'JPPS ccncept to pruvide input, to complete reviews and to give direction to the various management decisions which had to be made, including those related to engineering and design.
We reviewed in excess of 125 letters and reeting sumaries and 13 speci-fications related to Union Electric Co pany's involvement in the civil structural design (References 4.9, 4.10, and 4.13 to 4.23). Generally they indicated involvement, coordination, and responsiveness to regulatory concerns with work conducted in accordance with Union Electric Ccmpany's procedures and FSAR comitments. We found that Union Electric was involved in the review process of the
-- basic civil-st'ructural design criteria after imptember.1973 when Specifi-
... cation C-0 (Referente 4.10) was issued by Bechtel for the SNUPPS utilities' e3 N
approval. The Uniqn Electric review was conducted before Union Electric < had a formal procedur.e to govern such reviews since Union Electric Pro-cedure QA-303 (Reference 4.5) was not issued until March 1974. This appeared to be I6ntrary to Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 which requires such procedures.7he team's examination of the items noted by
.. Union Electric..during the review process and the resolution of coments did not indicate that improper consideration was given during the review to the pertinent safety issues. Therefore there was no apparent impact on the review work performed or actions taken by Unicn Electric prior to the issuance of C'-303. It was Qrocedural matter that had been corrected in March 1974 with issuance of the appropriate procedure. (FindingNo.4-1.)
.- -: :- .+ u :: : , . . ,
Currently, the/Npl staff. includes 13 technical nersonnel (ccmpared with 8 to 9 at the start'of the project). They are organized into project
., functional areas w.ith the civij-structural crea being addressed by two. .
systems enginee'rs under the Technical Director. The only civil-structural entineer involved is the Manager of Technical Services. Earlier (1-975-1976) cre additieral civil engineer was involved. This staffing level appears tc te cor.sistent with the NPI role of coordinating and consolidating ui'.i y ef forts since the utilities previde civil-structural engineering i e>;ertise for the review process. i ihe trincipal means for the utilities and HPI staff to provide input into the cesign process is by the Technical Cormittee's actions. The team revie..ed the records related to several sample areas of Technical Cornittee activity in detail, including meeting minutes. It appears that all parties were aware, at the outset of the project, of the need to define interfaces among the various groups involved in design, engineering, construction and management. In addition, levels of review anc categories of coments for design docements produced by Bechtel had been defined. The team reviewed several letters and minutes from early in the prcject related to the Technical Comittee's review of the basic civil and 4-2
l O O structural design criteria document. We also'found that the Technical Committee had been fairly active in the early phases of the project when many of the basic design decisions were being made. The Committee averaged one day per week in session from June 1973 to June 1974. We noted and examined the following items that involved the Technical Comittee in the a civil-structural area for selected time frames: 1973 !
- 1. Bechtel - Sverdrup and Parcel interface
- 2. Review of Civil-Structural Design Criteria, C-0
- 3. Plant layout planning Early 1974 ~
- 1. Concrete aggregat'e sources, testing, etc. '
- 2. Reinforcing steel procurement
- 3. Third level reviews for safety review of selected systems
- 4. Functioning of the Technical Comittee
- 5. SistemsdescriptionsandSARconsistencyand. updates
. . - . 6. Procedures: of design review '
- 7. Procedures for-bid packages
- 8. QA requirements _on the operation of the Technical Comittee
' ~"
Late 1975
. 1. Status Report .3 ids - Specification C-202; Pipe Hangers and Supports and Miscellaneous Metal .. 2. Bid recomendation on Specification C-202 -
- 3. Development procedure for bidder's lists
- 4. Civil . structural design . review . .
Early 1976 -
- 1. Reactor cavity design
. . . __ 2. Third level.Jey.iews <.. . , ,
- 3. Base mat seismic design .
- 4. Bid award for Sp'ecification,C-202
,, 5. Desi,gn reviews. _
( Late 1981 i 1. Deletion of selected pipe whip restraints Late 1932
.l . Retrofit of specifications and drawing revisions
- 2. Disposition of field reports
- 3. Installation tolerances for surface mounted plates
- 4. Intermediate design change packages
- 5. Walkdown of piping systems
- 6. Nonstandardization - Startup Field Reports, Field Change Requests and Nonconformance Reports
- 7. Hanger status
- 8. Penetration closures The team also reviewed a number.of items related to efforts of the Construction Review Group to evaluate the consideration of items such as constructability, cost, schedule and sequence. A brief line item summary 4-3
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i l l
O' O i of the subjects noted and exa~ mined for selected time frames is provided i below. 1976 .-
- 1. Coments on Specifications C-101,103 and 131
- 2. Schedule and concrete placement in the auxiliary building
- 3. Field Change Requests - Site interfaces and com.unications
- 4. Concrete specification .
- 5. Field Change Requests and Nonconformance Reports and waivers
- 6. Structural steel bolting
- 7. Construction details and blockouts 8 Blockout reinforcing steel spacing
- 9. Resolution of coments on Specification C-103
- 10. Construction Review Group's recomendation for field run pipe
- 11. Pipe whip restraints
- 12. Technical Comittee review levels
- 13. Construction joint at containment-auxiliary building wall inter-
~
sections. , ,
.. 1977 -
- 1. Concrete probl, ems
- 2. Reinforci.ng deta.iling problems / errors
- 3. Component support boundaries
. 4 Wall reinfofcing steel erection
- 5. Construction. Review Group Charter and Management Comittee Action
. 6. Nonconformance Reports on minor concrete deviations - *
- 7. Design drawings vs. American Concrete Institute Standard 318 and resulting conflicts ? . . u.
- 8. Reinforcing steel placing tolerances
- 9. Construction Review Group meetings
- 10. Procedures for Field Change Requests and Construction Variance
.- Requests :::.::: n u : -. .
- 11. Reinforcing steel interferences .-
- 12. Auxiliary building reinforcing steel The team did no't review the activities of other groups, such as the Management Committee and the Quality Assurance Comittee.
Additional inspection was performed of the NPI involvement in the design and engineering effort by selective review of specifications in the civil-structural discipline. This was conducted in the same manner as for Union Electric Company by selecting distinct specifications and the related correspondente. The areas inspected included the documents reviewed at Union Electric. In addition, two other specifications and related correspondence files were reviewed (References 4.17 and 4.18). It appeared that most of the independent technical input in the civil-structural area had originated with the utilities. The coordination and consolidation function performed by NPI was evident. NPI had set an excellent example from a quality assurance standpoint on items related to the civil-structural design criteria in diligently pressing for resolution of issues. 4-4
O O
', Based on the information reviewed, it appears'that the relevant comitments in FSAR Section 3.8.4 have been correctly translated into specific project design documents such as specifications, drawings and procedures. The basic civil-structural design criteria document (Reference 4.10). which contained the civil-structural design criteria fcr the facility, is c' nsistent with the comitments contained in the FSAR. This document appe;.rs to have been adequately reviewed, controlled and maintained. The individual design sub-jects and criteria comitments were develcped into technical specifications addressing the acquisition of materials, the fabrication of assemblies and the erection of various portions of the civil-structural items. These documents have also been subjected to a review process which was controlled
.- and the documents have been maintained.
Our review indicated 't'het the transmittal of informa' tion between the various groups involved in civil-structural design and engineering process was good. Coordination meetings and effective connunications centributed to this good level.of design interface. Where problems seemed to develop there had been timely recognition of them by engineering and project management through
- .- the controls that had been instituted before and during the project. <
,,... Resources were directed to the problems until a solution was prescribed, implemented and mogitored for the desired results.
4.2 Personnel ard' Guidance
. .e This section describes our review of staffing and guidance information
.: in the civil-structural area. -
At Union Electric Company, the supervising civil-structural engineer had 30 years experiencerin civil engineering with the company and had been working on the Callaway project as a supervising engineer since 1973. The 4 other civil engineer had 5 years experience in civil engineering with the .
- e. r .. company and had;been: assigned to the Callaway project since 1976, Bcth had BS degrees in civil engineering, were registered professional-
'; engineers and had r6ceived additional company training in quality
.: assurance in connection with tbdir Callaway assignments. ..
At NPI, the civil engineer that remained on the project had 30 years professional experience, mostly related to nuclear plant design, followir.g receipt of a BS degree in civil engineering. He had also received an MS degree in nuclear engineering and.a law degree and was a registered pro- '
;fessional engineer. This individual was originally involved with the i
SNUPPS project as the licensing engineer and was the Manager of Technical l Services at the time of our inspection. [The training and experience records for a civil-structural engineer who (was employed by NPI from June 1975 to May 1976 could not be located. This was contrary to Cr_iterion XVII _ of _ Apper. dix B_ to 10 CFR 50, which requires that records shall also include data such _as qualifications of personnel. l I We found no adverse effects on the design from this specific item, which was a record keepinq.1rror. (Finding 4-2) I l 4-5 l
- - . O' O At Bechtel, a cross-section of 6 civil-struct0ral engineers, ranging from junior io senior levels, representing working design engineers as well as supervisors"; was selected as being representative of the civil-structural engineers that had worked on the project over time. Their qualifications were sum arized as shown on Table 4-1. Additionally, all had received training while at Bechtel, including project related quality assurance training.
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~ '
'.~.
. e .
. # 4 4 g ,,y, m" 4* . fi.: :: a' .* 4: :: ;
4-6
O O TABLE 4-1 BECHTEL PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION SAMPLE l i l Engineer Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 Function Group Special Group Group
.. Designer Designer Leader Problems Leader Supervisor Degrees BSCE" BSCE BSAE Techn'ical BSCE BSCE MSCE Institute MSCE PhDCE Graduate Registration- ,
EIT EIT , PE PE PE
.... Years of Experience - *
- a. Total Professional. 1,5.. 27 5 24 12.5 12
- b. Nuclear Plant
. Construction ' k 2
- c. Nuclear Plant .
.. Design .. 1.5 8 5 7 8.~ 5
- 7.5
- d. SNUPPS Project . 1.5 .- ,5 5 6 ., . 8.5 6.5
.- . .w...- . ,, : : .
~
- U i
I l 4-7
t O- O The team reviewed the records of the project telated training required by Bechtel procedures for individuals working on various aspects of the project for the civil-structural group. The requirements related to training and indoctrination were addressed in Bechtel Procedure EDP 5.34..(Reference 4.52). The Bechtel project quality engineering group had also implemented supplemental procedures. Basically the group supervisor was responsible for defining which specific procedures were necessary for a given indi-vidual to read and understand. A log was maintained identjfying the individual records of these required reviews. As new assignments or functions were detailed to individual engineers the group supervisor was responsible for reviewing the individual's training and indoctrination record to ascertain whether the individual must receive training on additional procedures. For revised procedures the project quality engineer, who was responsible for the procedures, issued a memorandum to project group supervisors noting the substance of the changes. The individual group supervisors then deterrained how they would pass that information to the individuals within
. . . their group 17 ..
~
Our review of the p,roject's execution cf training and indoctrination of project procedures',an,d instructions for the civil-structural group indicated that it was consistent with the Bechtel procedures. Interviews and contacts with the various individual engineers in the civil-structural group during the design inspection led us to conclude that the individual
. engineers generally knew the procedures and followed them. -
The results of our review of; design details in the civil-structural area are described in the following sections. 4.3 Auxilir.ry Building and Floor Response Soectra '
.- -= :::. : ;: :: :
Tha objective of this portion of the inspection was to examine the adequacy and coordination of analysis, design, and the resulting.f13cr respon_s_e
,, .s_pe_ car 3,for the Auxiliary buil. ding which housed the auxiliary feedwater v system. We als~o examined the as-built structure.
The auxiliary building was designed with both exterior and interior concrete l walls to transfer lateral shear force from ceismic loads and steel columns L to transfer only vertical loads. The capacities of. concrete walls were , mostly governed by, and designed for, missiles and were later checked for ! seismic capability. The team checked a sample of design calculations for the auxiliary building and found them correct and adequately documented. Two engineers who were involved in the design were interviewed and both had a good understanding of the overall design concept of the auxiliary building and were able to relate the constructicn drawings to design calculations quickly. Based on these spot checks of the design calculations and drawings, and interviews, it appeared that the overall design of the auxiliary building l had been properly executed. Our review of seismic analysis was somewhat hampered because the seismic model of the auxiliary building was a part of an integrated power block structures model which was quite complicated and could not be fully 4-8 D
, _ . - - , - _ , - , . - . _ _ , , . - . . ~ . _ , , _ , . . _ . , . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ .
. :. O O evaluated within the time frame of our inspection. Ievertheless, it .
app ared to us that the geometry of the auxiliary building had been preperly represented in the mathematical irodel. Some problems were found in the dissemin'ation and coordination of updated floor response spectra. - i We found that seismic analysts calculations on the auxiliary building had been given final approval by the civil grcup supervisor in March 1982, but had not been sent for microfilming at the time of our inspection in December 1982 This violated Bechtel procedure EDPI 4.37-01, Section 4.2, which required tha.t all calculatiens completed or revised during the month be submitted for, microfilming by the 15th day pf the follcainc month (Reference 4.39). This was a procedural matter that had no apparent effect on the design. (Finding No. 4-3) Floor. response spectra are not only used as design loads for civil structures, but also are used as basic input loads for other engineering
~.
disciplines, sikh as piping, mechanical, and electrical. equipment. Sechtel had calculated tions for the auxiljary revtsed building.floorSomeresponseof the revised spectra spectra exceeded using actualth'e as-buil original spectra that had been used in design, by signifigan1 amounts in /
~
some cases. The calculations had been completed and checked in August
. 1981. During ouf inspection, in December 1982, the effects of these revised spectra had not yet been accounted for in the design. Revised spectra had not yet been sent to the other discipline groups,'such as mechanical and electrical, to evaluate the effects of the greater seismic loads upon systems and.-components. a : t. e.
I was appropri' ate, in these circumstances, for the Civil-Structural Group to examine means by which the spectra might be reduced before providing m .- the revised seismicednputs to other: groups in order.to minimize the irpact. Judging from the amount of exceedance, however, it appeared that some revised floor response spectra would have to be sent to other groups
.y eventually. The team was conepned about the amount of time taken to . .
-echieve a resol'ution of this matter. The time scale of 16 months without yet achieving a final resolution did not appear consistent with efficient Ldesign and project management needs.
A memorandum in May 1982 (Reference 4.127) indicated that the Civil Group had discussed the situation to some degree with other groups. However,
'the matter had not yet been resolved and new spectra had not been entered in the central file system which was the controlled system for obtair.ing current response spe-tra. Our intervieves indicated that personnel in other groups were not generally aware of the item. Accordingly, the delay introduced a likelihood that someone might base new work on the older spectra and such work might eventually have to be corrected or justified when the matter was resolved. However, the concern in this regard was not a finding or an open item. No adverse effect on the final
< l design was expected _because_the issue was recognized, was oeing worked on and would not have been overlooked.
4-9
. ~
- _ . - . __-_--,.m ,-.y ,,,.. _
,--.,,.,,,y,-.,-,3--,__.. ,m,._ ,wy._ . - _ . - _ _ ,
. : O O Accordingly, this delay in disseminatien of design input information is mentioned as an area reconnended for licensee consideration with respect to efficier.cy and project management needs. (Observation No. 4-1) The team examined essential shear walls that transferred lateral loads in the plant. The walls were constructed consistenc with the drawings which themselves reflected the design conditions and no voids or sianificant cracks were_found. .
~
The team identified a questionable as:;u ption concerning typical electri-cal raceway supports in the electrical penetration room and the lower cable spreading room. A typical support consisted of a vertical square structural steel tube section connected (at the floor) to a base plate by two welded angles on opposite sides of the tube. Both the angles and the welds were designed for horizontal shear forces but not for bending moments because the baseplate attachment was assumed to act as a hinge in the math-ematical model. This assumption corresponded to a normal civil-structural design. practice for a typical hinged ccnnection between a beam and a column.
,,... However, in..this installation the tube was butted against the baseplate in contrast to the normal practice of providing a gap to allow rotation between the beam and column. Thus the installation had a degree of fixity and would attrac.t some momen( under seismic loading rather than acting purely as a hinge. Accordingly,"the welds and angles should be evaluated in terms of
. the actual fixit of the attachment to determine whether or not adequate strength exists. ,(Unresolved Item No. 4-1).
~
. ._3 4.4 Generic Embedded plate Program The objective of th.is portio'n of the inspection was to review samples of specific des ~ign calculations and entineering work concerning embedded plates to ascertain whether or not:
- 1. design commitments were being met, .
- 2. design controls were effective, and
.: 3. proper informat. ion flow and. interfacing were evident. .,
A major discipline interface occurred in the design of the SNUFPS plants generally in the area of the boundaries between structural support plates and supported elements. The defined ir.:erfaces which occurred on this project were between the Civil-Structural Group and Plant Design Group (mechanical items), between the Civil-Structural Group and the Electrical Group and between the Civil-Structural Group and the Instrumentation and Control Group. This section of the re; ort represents the review of a sample of the interfacing between two cistinct design disciplines. Specifically the review of the generic embedded plate program instituted by Bechtel for this project is discussed. Specific use of the methodology and details for a given support are addressed in Section 4.5. FSAR Section 3.8.4.6.4 defines relevant general comitments for embedded base plates. Loads and load combinaticns were defined in Section 3.8.4.3 and the design and analysis procedures were defined in Section 3.2.4.4 as conventional analytical methods of star.dard engineering practice and com-puter methods as defined in Appendix 3.EA. The basic materials were 4-10
O O ,
. i identified in Section 3.8.4.6.4 as well as erection, examination and /' !
quality control aspects. The design comitments provided in the FSAR were properly reflected in Bechtel Specifications C-0, C-121 and C-131 g.. (References 4.10, 4.17 and 4.18). Drawings allowed the use.of Jurface 7.q g
.mountedJtlates or chipped and grouted embed plates jnsteadaf embsdded plates placed prior to the casting of the concrete elements. Owner
( approval was required to exercise these options. Details of the options I were provided on approved drawings. Use of the substitution was to be , documented and traceability of the plate and bolt materials maintained. i Other variations to these had also been developed which censisted of &rou.gh
. bolting for plates as well as grouted bolts. These alternates had also been
.. -detailed on 6pproved drawings. The need for alternates to embedded plates yI arose from several reasons: (1) development of locations and/or loads for i
specific plates lagge~d concrete placement, and (2) changes made from the original design. Further comitments for base plate design and engineering had been made
-- in ths.SNUPPS reply -to an NRC Bulletin 79-02 (Reference 4.110). It was
. . . . noted that the' design efforts and programs in this area had been well underway before the-bulletin had been issued.
Analyses for the aimledded plates were completed using the computer programs ANSYS and BSAp as cfes'cribed in FSAR Sections 3.8.A.I.9 and 3.8. A.1.10 and
. Appendix 3.8.A. 'Theymodels used to consider the various embedded plate configurations included the flexibility of the plate, the flexibility of 1 .. the anchorage device (tension) and the concrete (compression); and the loading interactions as well as the geometrical parameters. Based on the 1 analyses, a series of design aids in the form of nomographs had been developed for use on the project to allow sizing or checking of a specific plate assembly for a given set of conditions. If multi-directional loading '
was involved, it was necessary to utilize one of a series of interaction _ . - .-- . formulas which .werec.also anarlyticably develcped for. use on.the project along with empirically derived constants. The use of these design aids also considered construction tol.erances by performing analyses for the worst
~
-+ location of the at.tachment witbin the midd.le_ third of the plate. The.
definition of the middle third used in the analytical work had been re-flected in the design documents in several cases. If the geor.etry and conditions were not such that the attachment could be made within the middle _ thi I d then the constructor filed a middle third deviation report which ust be resolved by Eechtel. This dispositicn required an engineer-
.ing review and detennination of ac'ceptability based on the specific
' geometry and loading for that case. The controls for dimensions of such items as attachments, bolt holes and edge distance surface mounted plates were provided as notes on approved drawings. The control of those attach-ments outside the middle third was also addressed in Bechtel Procedure EDPI 4.62-01(Reference 4.47). We reviewed Revision lj to this procedure with respect to Middle Third Deviation Notices and found it to be consistent with the design assumpti_ons and that it had been used correctly.
We conducted specific checks of several individual calculational packages which formed the basis of the design aids for embeddedJ ates. l They were: 4-11 l
O O
- 1. Calculation 03-53.4-F, " Capacities of Embedded Plate Type EP912A_" (Reference 4.54)
% 2. Calculation 03-107-F, " Formulation of Load Capacity Coefficients ofEmbeddedandJeplacemen,tPlates"(Reference n 4.55)
- 3. Calculation 03-109-F, " Load Nomographs for Embedded and P.eplacement Plates" (Reference 4.56) ,
We reviewed these calculations to verify that the assumptions, boundary conditions and input data and analyses were correct. The model used in
-+ the computer based analysis for Plate Type EP 512A reflected the geometry and material properties for the actual structure and input data appeared to be properly and accurately prepared.
Several of the Bechtel procedures were reviewed in part during this effort since they directly provided controls and guidance for the design process in this area. They were:
' 1. EDPI 4.25-01 Design Interface Control (Reference 4.36)
- 2. EDPI 4.37-01, Design Calculations (Reference 4.39)
- 3. EDPI4.46.01,TrojectEngineeringDrawings(Reference 4.41)
. The project procedJfe on design interface Control (EDPI 4.25-01, Section
.__. 4.0) appeared somewhat ceneral. The requirements for defining interfaces
.. are contained in Regulatory Guide 1.64 (Reference 4.126) and ANSI N45.2.11 (Reference 4.125) to which the licensee had connitted in FSAR Section 17.1.2.
The procedure addressed interfaces among Project Engineering.. Project Construction, speciality groups and other Bechtel divisions and companies. However, there was no precise definition or prescribed procedure for design interface between subunits within the project such as the Stress _- Analysis Group .4nd-tbe CivihGroupu Subunit interfaces were addressed by [ the following statement: "The interGciiYe~sponsibilities are wel] under-L stood through existing organizational agreements and established practice."
.7 ,
~.
g' These agreements and practices g;;1gd in formality, orecisinn and the degree of personnel awarenen . For the most part, our reviews indicated that inter-faces a c nc discipline groups were uncerstood. However, the following items are examples of problems:
- 1. Zone of influence drawings not being prepared, contrary to the memorandum that defined interfaces and responsibilities for hich enerav line break analyses. (Finding 2-4 in Section 2.4)
~
- 2. Failure of dis:ipline groups to exchange information or take action i needed to meet pipe suonort stiffness requirements (Finding 3-8 and l Unresolved Items 3-3 and 3-6 in Section 3.2.3) l 3. Failure of a standard support location tolerance provided by the Stress Analysis Group to reflect the Civil Group's needs regarding
, load oath (Unresolved Item 4.2 in Section 4.5) Accordingly, in our judgment, the general statement (in EDPI 4.25-01) that I 1 sMt interfaces were well understood through existing agreements and 4-12
O O
'W -j established practices was not uniformly borne'out in practice. We con-clude that this is contrary to the licensing commitments discussed above.
The licensee should employ more fomal and precise methods or trainino to enhance'the effectiveness of subunit interface control. (FindingNo.4-4) As discussed above.,Lweakness was identified in the definition of internal interface controls. This finding and the associated examples applied to
-){ the project in general _. However, as discussed in this and other sections, for the most part our reviews indicated that internal interfaces were under-stood.
.. With respect to embedded plates, based on our review and interviews, we con-cluded that adequate procedures generally existed to, control the transmittal of design related information. Calculations we reviewed in this area re-flected correct input and were current with other design documents being utilized for design and construction. The designs and analyses had been conducted in accordance with the appropriate procedures. Assumptions were judged.to be valid. - ,
~. . -. . . .
d .. 4.5 Pipe Supports, Hangers and Restraints The objective .of kh[is portion of the inspection was to determine, for a sample of hangers, _ipiping sunoorts and restraints selected by our inspection
. team's mechanical systems, components, and piping engineers, whether or
- not: ,
- 1. the licenIee's design comitments contained in the FSAR and other relevant documents had been met, .. .t a correct design information had been coordinated and complete inter-
~
2. faces made through a rational design process,
.: . .- 4: :: : ~
- 3. desian e_ngineers had sufficient training experience and guidance to complete the necessary desi.gn work, and
- 4. thecomple~ted'designwasidequate.
hoe _Hangej 0-ALO4-C009/135(Q) supporting the turbine driven . auxiliary feedwater pump discharae pipe, was designed by the pipe support group It consisted of a double sway strut vee assembly hung from the bottom
. flange of a structural steel beam which formed part of the structural Q uilding frame supporting a concrete slab floor. The attachment of this hanger assembly to the flange was through field welds. The team found no discrepancies related to this hanger. The review is described below to illustrate the nature of the coordination necessary in such designs.
A review of documents' indicated that Revision 4 of the hanger drawing l M-06ALO4 (Reference 4.97) had been coordinated with the Civil Group as a markup working orint prior _to_ issuance by the Pipe Support Group. The markup contained the location of the needed welded attachments to the structural steel as well as the revised forces and displacements at the centerline of the pipe. Also included was information clearly defining the orientation of the pipe forces and displacements. The coordinated 4-13
O' O markup also contained a reference to the correct and current civil drawing associated with the structural steel framing to which the hanger was attached. - Action by the Civil Group was documented only on the markup work print which carried a civil coordination starp with the date and initials of the individual reviewing for the Civil Grcup noted. Discussion within the Civil Group regarding their normal actions on such an item indicated that a check would be made that there was in fact a structhrALitte.l_bfam at the location defined in the drawing. B5 Intel procedure EDPI 4.46-01 (Reference 4.41) generally described the coordination, review and approval process. The requirements for documentation are contained in ANSI N45.2.11 (Reference 4.125) to which the licenste committed in FSAR Section 17.1.2. From discussions with personnel in both the Civil and Pipe Support Groups it appeared that the process defined in the Bechtel procedure had been followed. The procedure required no records related to internal coordination of drawinos_and_cments thereon once the drawing had been approud and released by the project engineer. Coordinating prints could
. . . be destroyed..although they were generally being saved.by the originating
~ group for those instances examined by the team. Without the Pipe Support Group saving the marked up working print, the Civil Group has _no record of the actions on bas'e plate selection. This item is noted as an area recom-
~ -
mended for licensee c'onsideration. (Observation No. 4-2) The resolution of the above item may be related to Finding No. 4-6. ~ p. m
~
Thequestionoitheload'seffectonthestructuralsteelinthiscasedid not require unique considera. tion since the maximum pipe.focce..was 3.1 kips and the pipe loads were not 'in an area with heavy piping concentrations. The civil-structural design criteria, specifically address the manner in which pipino dead loads are to be treated as follows:
< .- . a, , < ., .. . ,,
"For permanently attached small equipment, piping, conduits, and cable trays, a minimum of'50 psf shall be added where appropriate. In the
., event structural design must precede the availability of piping loadst a conceritrated load of 20 kips shall be applied in the above areas or in other areas of concentrated piping (in lieu of the actual piping loads) l to maximize moments and shears."
l The structural loads resultino from pipe reactions during normal operating or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient er steady state conditons, were addressed in the civil-structural design criteria and were consistent with the FSAR. In this case no specific values for
-y live lo_a_d were defined with the apparant assumption that the prescribed dead load values were sufficient for design. Based en inspection of the actual pipe loads provided by the Pipe Support Group to the Civil Group we determined that the loads represented a conservative combination of all piping loads at the support point, including dead load. normal _
operatino l p_e i reactions and seismic 1 cad _s. Since the loading combination elements in each of the combinations which must be considered had identi-cal load factors in all cases, it was in fact not necessary to specifically separate the two load effects. 4-14
. :. O O 1
For this instance, the prescribed allowance for a 50 psf uniform dead load l and the 20 kip concentrated load application was considered by the designer g to be sufficient to encompass the imposed loads from the hanger. Based on the dates of erection of structural steel in this area and the date of gM Rev. O of this specific hanger drawing no specific loads would have been available at the time of the basic stri,ctural steel design. Based on the above facts we concluded that the correct design information had been transferred from the Pipe Support Group to the Civil Group and that appropriate action had bet..) taken by the Civil Group. The design commit-ments in the FSAR had been correctly transferred into the civil-structural
.. design criteria document. Considering the loads used in design of the basic structural steel framing and the tagnitude of the actual loads for this hanger and obsen/ation that no other_sienificant loads were currently suoDorted by the beam we concluded that the civil structural design was adequate for the hanger assembly. It should also be noted that additional margins besides that resulting from the magnitude of the load existed since all loads were considered for resistance capacity at allowable stress levels
._~ whereas the. criteria would allow for increased' stresses. of 50 and 60 percent under the working stress methods for certain load combinations.
Other hangers, suports and restraints were examined during the inspection based on the selecti6ns made by the mechanical engineers from the inspection team. This group'of= piping support hardware (along with hanger 1-AL01-C009/ 135Q discussed at the beginning of this section) included interfaces and design input to the Civil Group for standard pipe struts, spring hangers, support frames, stanchion type anchors and isolation restraints. Some were supported by structural. steel buildina frg_mel and_others by embedde.d. plates in concrete walls. .Two piec'es of pipe support hardware designed by the Civil Group were also included among these. The following is a list of the other support hardware and related interfaces examined during the inspection. G Hangers 0-ALO1-H001/.135Q and 0-ALO1-R005/135Q represented a combknation spring hanger and support frame with the hanger suspended from the
- frame. This combination supported the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
'~~ / pump suction pipin'g. The support was found by field inspection to have ~
been installed outsioe the middle th_ird_of the embedded plate and there-
; fore was requir~ed to be checked. No middle third deviation notice (MID!1) had been prepared for this as-built condition. ti.ow_e.yAr, the licensee's representatives indicated final acceptance had nofbeen completed for his assembly. Based on our field measurements the Bechtel Civil Group
'in Gaithersburg performed an evaluatior, for the as-built conditions utilizing the project's interaction equations and four.d more than adequate margin with respect to allowatle stress levels for the support plates.
-)( GHanger 0-FB01-A002/135Q represented _a stanchion-tvoe oice anchor designed to be welded to a pair of embedded plates and to resist pipe collapse loads.
' It was located on the steam supply piping from the auxiliary boiler to the turbine for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Based on early criteria set for this project, _a load creater than 15 kips placed_thc. . anchor desian respo_n11bility Jith the Civil lroup. We found that ,loadincs _had betLrey.ised on 10/14/81. Because of this change the issued drawing,
/
4-15
O O M-06FB01 (Reference 4.108), was undergoing a change to reflect the agg
.inads. At the time of the inspection the Civil Group had completed the design of the necessary additional increases in the stanchion's cross-section based on calculations (Reference 4.59) approved on S/29/82. The drawing had been revised but had not yet been processed and issued.
/Our field inspection indicated that _the load transfer path used in the Ndesign calculations did notaaf.1 met .(c,tgal conditions (References 4.59 and 4.108). The stanchien had been mislocate7 5 H bout 4 inches, Since the piping design group allowed a 6 inch tolerance for this situation, the licensee's representatives at the site indicated that they would consider the installation satisfactory. However, in this case, such a tolerance was _
noe consistent with the desj_sn load path that had been used 6y the Civil Doup for design. The desian calculations had assumed that the stanchion ~ would_be centered _ over_ and connected to two embedded plates which would share the load. The 4 inch..mislocation had niaceddhe stanchion on one M
. plate only. In our judgment this condition would likely not have been '
~
detected in' subsequent system walkdowns. This specific condition, however,
.. - turned out to.bd adequate. During our inspection Bechtel personnel
~ [rvised he calculations for'tliis design toWdres,s the as-built condition and _ oun a eTulitliiToiid carryino capacity irLtAefn.2 1e clatt_(Reference ~
~ 4.59).. However, in; the team's judgment, further evaluation should be con-ducted to determine whether or not there are other similar instances where,!
Mj the standard HangerA roup tolerance does not match the Civil Group's load ]
- path. (Unresolved Item No. 4-2).
@ Onger 0-ALO3dO10/135Q and 0-ALO3-C011/1350 were two of five identical spport frames designed by the Pipe Support Group which.were,.fjelo welded .
to embedded plates,: Type EP 912B, provided by the Civil Croup. They support the discharge piping from the notor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (Pump B). The worst case selected for the support frame design was _2 _ based on Hanger.-:0-ALO2-C009M35Q. u - l Interfacing betweed groups in design indicated good information f'10w. The
~ team checked loads., selected by the. Pipe Support Group as representing the worst case for the supports, against the embeddeMateJsian. We utilized the interaction curves (Reference 4.56) to check the adequacy of the plates which had been selected and found them to have substantial marrgin...
G lsolation restraint FCO2 consisted of a series of plane frames which geo-r.etrically formed a space frame whose purpose was to serve as eight pairs of restraints at a tee pipe intersection on the steam supply line to the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine. This structure was designed by the Civil Group with interaction between the Civil Grcup and the Pipe Support Group for loads and stiffnesses. .The design ca_lculations.for this restraint (Reference 4.58) had been grfgmed rf and checked in_h'ovejnber 1982, b_ut were +4 itilL t underaoina review for approval. The detail drawing had been used for ' fabricatien in January 1982 as Revision 0 (Reference 4.93) and was issued for construction in November 1982 as Revison 2 (Reference 4.93) before the calculations discussed above were performed. He nuestiDnt.d_what_ design g calculations had. existed in ordgr_.for_the d_rawino to have been released _ for fabrication or construction. A set of calculations that had pt S&iILed final acoroval_ had existed in the group. They had been overtaken )y field 4-16 _ _ _ - _ . . _ _ _ _ . . - - ~ , . --
- _ - _ . - _ - _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ . . - _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . , _ _ _ _ _ , _ . ~ . -
. : O O 4
conditions in the form of interferences. These field problems had been detailed in drawing change notices which were subsequently considered when the final calculation was made. "hese actinnt were contrary _to. 8echte_1 procedures EDPI 4.37-01 and EDPI 0.46-01 (References 4.39 and 4.41) which required aooroved calculations .gr This item'did not have any apparen{or,tot adverse 'effectrelease on of thedrawinos final design for constragtion. product. It is one of two examples of release of design infor_mation prior ,. _tp approval of c~alculations. Finding 6-4 provides a discussion of the other
~
example. (Finding No. 4-5) ye did not review _the_ calculation _ package of _5_4_shee1Lin_ detail. We
.. noted that interfacing information between the Civil and the Pipe Support /
Pipe Stress Groups did occur and the calculation pac,kage appeared to contain the neccesary information.
; @ Suppo_rt 2-Al.01-A002/125Q was a stanchion type anchor for which a field
_ change request had been prepared because of a_2_" differential between the design height ind the as-built condition. The initial request was
. - - . . . processed through the' Pipe Support Group and then coordinated with the Civil Group which evaluated the embedded plate _ design (EP 912B) and elected to add stiffness to the plate-stanchion connection. The team requested a check of the oriafn'al _ plate's sejts. tion as no documentation was maintained for each individual Dl4_te 5tl stian. Basid on this ciIrrent evaluation it'
, was concluded by'Bechtel that, githough an initial _theck indicated over- g ,g-stressing, furjher analysis demonstrated the plate as originally detailed
. ., would have Peen ade$iale. It was assured that when an engineer evaluated the information on the Field Change Request he stopped with the initial check and elected to added the stiffeners. Based on the current evaluation the anchor is adequate for the design loads, p .- . We found that, in general,[no specific dts_ign calculations , existed for %
. 2- .-- embedded plates o to, document 4the bas:is for their selection and placement on design drawings designating the type of plate for use at a given Jocation.
In some cases the selection of a specific plate could be completed by the
., use of one of a se. ries of nomographs but in many cases the selection was.
based on the re'sults of calculations using the appropriate interaction equation. The lack of documented analyses for each specific plate was contrary to EDP14.37-01 (Reference 4.39) which required that design f NC ; calculations be made to provide the basis of drawings used to construct 7 'the facility. However, the team was still able to conclude that a (Finding - - _ controlled process for these selections had been in effect.
~ Ho. 4-6)
In summary, there existed excellent evidence of the interface action between the plant design groups (Stress Analysis Group and Pipe Support Group) and the Civil Group on the examples reviewed. There appeared to be good coordination of the necessary information from one group to another. Examples of the analysis completed by cne group being translated into l input for the other group existed. , While it was possible to check the selection of a specific type of_ embedded , plate in accordance with the standard techniques, documentation did not exist gto ascertain how the actual selection had been made. Nevertheless, in our 4-17
. -- - - --. - -~ ._ _ _ - _
d /~ u. - r. *-,7 opinion, based on $be s_ ample examined and discussions with the personnel 0 involved, there was a_ consistent process for designing supports and o i restraints in the Civil Group includina the embed!!stpl_ates. 01 e iqstang was identified where there was a question of why the or gina desTgner had selected a particular type of plate. The original selection ' was apparently a .iudoment cal _l, as it was unlikely that the refined analysis which was performed during our inspection was in fact performed originally to support the selection. However, the more refined analysis did support the original design, validating the judgment been made by the original designer. Overall, there was evidence that when an interface oroblem was identified, management had taken corrective action and the inspector was able to see how thj_coprdination a proce_ss had improved although the written procedures mi5 ht not in every case reflect the actual function.ing p'rocess as a requirement. d
-----> 4 . 6 Contril of FSAR and -Design Changes .
... The objective of this portion of the inspection was to examine whether
,+ licensing comitments were being met and maintained as chances and deficiencigLazoTe7socess. well as toteam The evaluate the flow reviewedia sample of information of procedures and,to thele evalua,si.gn,Sontrol pr.coverage of the design process and implementation.
. te their adequacy, The procedures reviewed were: - -
EDPI 4.221 01, Freparation and Control of SAR (Reference 4.34) '
. EDPI 4.23-01, SAR Chang'e Control (Reference 4.35)
EDPI 4.47-01, Drawing Change Notice (Dgi) (Reference 4.42) _
-- .- . =-::. :.c: . n as s . ,
EDPI4.60,ProcessingCorrectiveActionReports(,CA_R)'(Reference 4.45)
.- EDPI 4.61,01,. Nonconformapce Reports (tjtR) (Reference 4.46) .,
EDPI 4.62-01, Field Change Request, Construction Variance Request and Middle Third Deviation Notice (FCR, CVR, MTDN) -~ '~ (Reference 4.47) EDPI 4.65-01, Design Deficiency Processing (Re'ference 4.48) No items within this group of procedures were identified as being question-able nor were any specific omissions of necessary procedural controls identified. The similarity of the flow path for information and actions in i the NCR, FCR and MTDN process presented a decided advantage in that each type of tracking control did not require that different actions be taken i on the part of project individuals. In the cases where the Bechtel Site Liaison Group had authority for preliminary disposition under certain l defined conditions, all such actions were reviewed by the Gaithersburg 1 Office before becoming final. During the condc of this inspection the l use of these procedures by design and engineering personn'el was observed as well as the results of using the procedures. Several specific examples l 4-18
, _ . , - . , ,,_.-_,_._,_,m ..,_.,y , _ , _ . , _ _ . , _ .___._._.,__._.,_._m_,. - _ , . , _ , _ _ , _ , , , , _ _ _ . . , , . . , , , _ . _
O O
. some of which directly related to the civil-structural engineering aspects are provided below.
We reviewed Drawing C-0003 (Reference 4.60) and DCN's which had been issued p.7 1 against it. This specific drawing cont'ained many important references and notes since it contained most of the structural steel and concrete related general notes for the project. DCN Nc. C-0003(Q)-8-5 (Reference 4.111) was reviewed to see if EDPI 4.47-01 had been followed. We found the DCN form had been properly completed. During our inspection four DCN's dating from 8/23/82 to 11/8/82 were reviewed. (References 4.112 to 4.115) We found no deficiencies related to meeting commitments or controlling the design process relative to DCN's. During inspection activities at the Callaway site s&veral FCR's (References 4.116 to 4.119) were selected from the FCR log which was maintained within the Bechtel site liaison engineer's organization. Four FCR's were reviewed to ascertain what types of changes were being requested by the constructor, the reason for the changes and the disposition of the requests. Action was taken"on the FCR's during the last half of Octotier 1982 and the first half
~~~
- } ( of Novembailh2. Qhree oflhe_fgr involved missino o,y interferring
\ embedded _planf f.or supporting electrical or mechanical items and the fourth involved interferences and tolerance problems on elastic shock Cabsorption_pateriaiandpipesuccor.1s. Three of the four cases had been Tnitially resolved py the Bechtel Site Liaison Group. We noted that in all three cases of disposition in the field by Bechtel site liaison engineering, the FCR contained a notation of persons in project enginee; ring at 8echtel
' Gaithersburg who had discussed the item in coordination with the field liaison effort and the.date.this had occurred. This appeared..to be an excellent'wayofdocum'entingthecoordinationeffortregardindthecon-sultation between f.he field and project engineering at Bechtel Gaithersburg although the procedures did not require it. The completed FCR would then be routed to th,q.Gaithersburg "
Offi.ce for review and . final approv.a1 as
~' -
' required'by pr6H ddFes. .
During the team inspection at _the site it was noted tha' the exterior. wall penetration at-Elevation 1991'-0" in the auxiliary building for the suction line to the auxiliary feedwater pumps from the condensate storage tank _w as not as detailed on Drawinos C-0C1931, C-0029, and C-0019, (References N 4.89, 4.69 and 4.67). No information such as an FCR or D_CN_ apparently The licensee should address the acceDtabi)ity_of addressed this change.
~
the achaT'instaHa_ tion. (Unresolved Item No. 4-3)
~ ) During the team's inspection at the site on 11/11/82 it was notstd that
~
h a number of[vo'IE and surf ace defects existed in certain areas of the l walls of Area #5 of the auxiliary building between elevations 2000' and
,2,026 ' .
Some of these defects were significant enough to requ Fe~eiigi-neering approval of the repair methods. Upon the team's return to the i Callaway site during the period 12/6/82 - 12/8/82, it was found that _ repairs had been made in g of these areas. Certainportionsofthesedefectsweretrackedto(an_NCRl(Reference 's 4.120), which was mi inated w on 7/27/82 on concrete repairs in seven rooms. Concrete was placed in this area in the 1977-1978_ time frame with one of
~ 4-19
O O g the specific placements involved being made on 7/12/77. The cause noted on the NCR and the action to prevent recurrence states: " Craft error; Construction notified of this NCR; No further Daniel action necessary." It was noted within the descriptive text of the NCR that the "Loids/ o
- => honeycombs, after chipping, require prior approval per Bechtel Specifi-cation C-103. Section 15.2 before repairing." Ot.her observed defects were repairable-without approval. Daniel's proposed corrective action was to ,
use non-shrink arout, stating that it should satisfy design requirements. However, several of the defects Daniel had identified as fequiring repair were required under Section 15.3.2.b.4 to be repaired using replacement concrete. Because of the timing of the repair, Daniel had proposed using non-shrink grout, citing economic considerations and physical location. The best. (Bechtel repair met subsequently approved _h_od in the opinion of the the teamusewasofreplacement non-shrink grout. but the concrete, grouted repair was determined to be acceptable. This is an instance in ' which the enaineering personnel were not promptly made aware of the field hp
/ construction problem ca 'hmt the best solution could be obtaineu. never N theless, the team cq.nsiderea tne approved repair methods adequate. #
6 , gd f.r The Bechtel shicif.ication C-103 states that " imperfections in' formed con-r crete requiring r,epair shall be repaired as soon as practicable after t10 i h,iJ,removalofformsandshallbecompletedwithoutdelay,exceptincases (,/, dj V where approval is required." Concrete in Placement 2C135W01 was made on
'7/12/77 ana T.ne Aet.iciencies noted by an NCR on 7/27/82. This appeared h
2 , j ,,,, g,to be contrary to Cie s cificatio;). (Finding No. 4-7)
. gf % g w 7.
y 'I . . (The delay in initiating CR meant thsthe information was not avail-W able in a timely manner for trendina_and analyses _ conducted by the
/ Jh-]
3 construction quality g'roup. "Resolutien of the above findihg should addrtss the significance and Textent of such delavs as well as Wnether The(proper quality control measures were in placeYuring the concrete 1 placw ent in this par ?icular area (a j n .=- -
. u=- a- ic q ea 5 of the Auxiliary BuiicingT ')
yLgQpg In addition to the.previously mentioned NCR, four other NCR's (References 4.121 to 4.124) were reviewed based on a selection of examples from the
- e NCR log < maintained by the Bec5tel Site Liaison Group. All were gener'ated in the last half of 1982. One involved a pipe whip restraint member being located out of tolerance and Lret related to_ damage.d reinforcing steel as
<aresultcfcorinaordrillinainreinforcedconcretewalls.All four of these cases were resolved by the Bechtel site liaison engineering group in coordination with the project engineering office of Bechtel in Gaithersburg.
The personnel involved in the coordination and the date of the contact were noted on the NCR. The team's review of the resolution of these items and of the controls in effect resulted in no concerns. The procedure controlling the disposition of MTON's (middle third deviation notices) which is contained in Section 5.0 of EDPI 4.62-01 (Reference 4.47) was reviewed. We determined the controls to be adequate. As a result of the , g g r of MTDN's to be processed, the Bechtel site liaison engineering l A t0 Q Y Y? OA M' e-mht? ' _( t M O J s.R YLc 4-20 e-TQi h-
\
O O ) T group forwards all of them to Bechtel project: engineering in Gaitharsburg for review. The team's observation and review of this effort by the Civil-Structural Group in Gaithersburg is included in Section 4.5. In summary, the single finding in this s'rea concerned failure to document _a_
, construction deficiency rather than weakness in the process for controlling design documents. Based on the review of do:uments, interviews and obser-vations the team concluded that the design comitments were being met and there was adequate control over the design process. I
- 4.7 Bechtel Site Liaison Enoineering wee The objective of this_ portion of the inspection was ,to review the involve-ment by the Bechtel Site Liaison Engineering Group fbr the civil-structural
- discipline in the, design process as related to
- 1. t,he interface between the Site Liaison Group and the constructor,
- e. ,
...,. 2. the actions taken by the Site Liaison Group, and . .
- 3. the interface with the Civil-Structural Group in project engineeringin[G.aithersburg.
The entire Site Lia.ison Group was under the direction of the lead site liaison engineer and the four engineers reported to the civil-structural leader. This group was one of the five discipline groups that make up the site liaison engineering. The groups were crganized by discipline and function parallel to the project engineering activities.in,the.Gaithersburg office. The team noted that nearly all of the civil-structural personnel had design experience in the project engineering design functions on the SNUPPS project or others, so that they had a good working knowledge of
-_ .the design proce.ss _and the general.. considerations made .for.a par.ticulhr item w' th respect to assumptions, simplifications, aralysis, design, fabrication and construction.
The fo1 Towing a're "the principe tasks of the Site liaison Group:
- 1. Maintain field engineering log for all ';CR's, FCp's and MTON's.
- 2. Review submittals from the constructor to determine if disposition can be made in the field or must be forwarded to project engineering.
Guidelines of what can be dispositioned in the field are provided in the governing procedure / instruction.
- 3. Disposition those items meeting the criteria for field disposition and indicate any drawings needing revision.
- 4. Forward completed items to the constructor and distribute copies to groups such as project engineering.
The team concluded, on the basis of field observations, that the Site Liaison Group in the civil-structural discipline was performing in accord-ance with the procedures and that the procecures were adequate to control
', the group's efforts.
- - 4-21 i -
O O
. u p 4.8 _-Built As
- Programs for Reinforced Concrete and(Structural Steel The objective of this portion of the inspection was to ascertain:
- 1. How the final loads resulting from the location of 'and addition of
' pipe supports, electrical cable trays and ventilating systems.ngt
_specifically considered in the original desian were checked, ant
- 2. How the deficiencies found to be acceptable on an individual basis by engineering would be integrated into an overall as-built review to assess the acceptability of the as-built structures in the civil-structural discipline.
The Civil-Structural Group for the project had prepared two documents, known as civil design guidelines, for the purpose of reviewing and assessing final as-built structural adequacy. CDG-1 addressed the structural steel i framina system (Reference 4.11) and CDG-2 addressed the reinforced concrale structural elements Seference 4.12). At the time of the inspection the x concrete progrmb had not started a'pd the structural steel program was just / p beginning. -
\, g ,ngt For those stee.1 st'r'uc,tures or portions of structures which were framed with structural steel th'e guidelines prescribed that a sample of 60 beam-type elements in each'of.:.the five powerblock structures wouid be randomly selected for review and evaluation. Several levels of analysis would be conducted if warranted on each beam element reviewed. The first level analysis made very conservative assumptions and provided a simple check procedure. If a particular. beam element using this approach was found to be ov.gr-stressed then a more refined. set of a'ssumptions was used. If overstressing remained, there were provisions for physical modifications to the beam element. This could result in such actions as addir.o cover plates _or_s_tiffener.s. Provisions
- . . . .in the procedur.es_ addressed , con-composite and composite design a.nd con-sidered moments and forces in three directions. The team noted that, if either cf the first'two level of reviews resulted in acceptance, signi-
,, ficant margins wou.ld exist in Jhe design. ,, .
'Ee_tecommtnd that consideration be given to selecting the sample on some basis otherlhan randomly and that more than the scale model, or composite drawings for unmodeled areas, should be used to identify the friditional
, loading points. After the above have been studied and a tentative selec-
" tion of the sample made, JLf.idcLwalkdown should be performed to ascertain whether other elements are more heavily ~ loaded or loaded in a manner not considered. We would also recommend that during a field walkdrwn all i structural steel columns should be checked to verify that no loadings from attachments introduce moments into the columns as the columns were designed
-9_on the basis pf_only vertical loads. These econnendations are neither findings nor unresolved items but rgamendations for licensee consider-ation as the program is implemented. (Observation No. 4-3)
For the reinforced concrete structures or portions of structures the elements would be reviewed by reviewing each fabrication drawing and calculations made on a " worst case" basis to address the effects of cut reinf-orcing steel. The elements would also be reviewed for the effects 4-22
l O O !
. .. l
- of lead concentrations from closely spaced pipe supports, cable tray and
'. duct supports. This guideline was in the development process and was released as Rev. O during our inspection. Our review of the draft, which was undergoing internal Bechtel technical review, resulted in_t F significant coment reaardina the load combinations which would be con-sidered in the as-built worst case studies. As the Bechtel review evolved and the document was revised and issued it was apparent that the internal Bechtel review had identified the same item. The cuidelines were revis_ed to reflect the loads and loadina combinations specified in the FSAR and the civil-s'tructural design criteria for the project.
A control system had been set up so that each niece of reinforcing _S. teel
. 7 -'
. tut in the field adurin JodngJ _co,nc,re,te f t for penetrations or drillins of concrete for anchor bo'lts would be documented. This information was transferred to the specific fabrication drawing which detailed the location and the cut reinforcing. These as-built drawings were being assembled by the Civil-Structural Group as they were transferred in from the field in preparation for,the is-built review. ,
. . :. -N -
The review would us'e these ' marked up detail drawings, the original calculations and the analyses for the various defined " worst case" situa-tionsuntilal.1 cut:r.einforcingsteelhadbeencheckedforitsparticular effect on the structu're as well as cur: ulative effects of other cut
- reinforcirg or additional loads. The Suidelines allowed for the use of simplifying assumptions when a very conservative analysis was made.
Other more refined analyses could be performed when the overly c6nserva-tive analyses indicated the criteria were exceeded. We had no specific comments on the guidelines which reflettec a good method of assessing the as-built conditions of loading and reinforcing steel. The effort on the part of Bechtel to analyze for as-built conditions re- .
-- flected a good . program for arssuring. that reported field conditions which modified loading and load resistance parts were studied for their-individ-ual and cummulative~ effects. We noted that this program can be _no betten in addressing as-built conditions than the field input data. Efforts.by.
Region III JiRC_jnspectors had previously identified. problems in.the field with the((c. cur _achf the field _ data re, carding cut reinforcing steel'. We would recommend that care be taken in conducting this program to assure that the field data have been made accurate. This is neither a finding nor an unresolved item frem our inspection but a recomendation for licensee l . consideration. The appropriate findincs have been made previously in an NRC Region III inspection report, Report f;o. 50-483/82-09.
~
(Observation i l No. 4-4) 4.9 Conc 1psion Based on the results of this integrated design inspection telative to selected portions of the auxiliary feetwater system and other features reviewed in the civil-structural discipline, we concluded that the design and engineering aspects were cQntrolled and the design function was being completed in conformance with the commitments of the FSAR. Areas for improvement have been identified as well as some findings but, as dis-l. cussed in the preceeding sections, an evaluation of the design and 4-23
O O engineering process for the sample areas we riviewed in the civil-structural area indicate: that the project is under control from the standpoint bf design and engineering. It is our opinion that for the numbers of personnel involved in this project in the civil-structural area for Union Electric and NPI the control of the design and engineering effort by Bechtel has been effective. This appears to have been possible because of the aand capability and execution by the le Q1e LCiyjil-Structura QGrou 1 __assemblad__ for the SNUPPS prnject. In M s regard, it appeareT that the SNUPPS concept, which integrated the. staffs of several utilitie.s into the review and control process of criteria and design documents, played an important role.
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--- =3, 5.0 Electrical Power The objectives of this portion of the inspection were to evaluate the electrical power portion of the design with respect to standards, guides, criteria, assumptions and calculational methods with emphasis on the handling and control of interface information. Usually, the electrical power aspects of the design did not consist of separate work packages for the auxiliary feedwater system. For instance, the voltage drop calculations dealing with the station distribution systems include the auxiliary feed-water system as well as other systems. Accordingly,*the team's review included a range of design features, technical issues lind information systems that of ten related to other plant systems.
5.1 Auxiliary Feedwater Components , The cbjective 5f' this portion of the inspection was to ' determine the adequacy and consistency of-basic desian documents.
~ '
The team reviewed the' auxiliary feedwater system description, the motor driven pump circ 0it.treaker, the motor driven pump and valve logic, the motor driven pump, discharge valve operator schematic, and pump motive power ar.d cable routing. The recently revised system description wa's an accurate scurce of guidelines for the system design. The logic diagram prepared by the Centrol Systems Grou; for the motor driven pump operati.on was found to be ccrrectly transferred into the circuit breaker schamatic diagram by the Electrical Group. The team checked the control and motive' power to the recircant motor driven pumps and the turbine control system for the turti .e criven purpAnd .the design.was found to follow appropriate cri:eria for separation, adequacy and redundancy. In general, we fcund tMs area to be in good order with reference to critaria, star.dards and infomation interfaces. . 5.2 (1 css IE Motor Control Centers
~5e tear reviewed the design files for a typical Motor Control Center (Vg). 4-The objectives of this review were.to:
- 1. Evaluate how equipment electrical data was transmitted to and used by the electrical group, and
- 1. Evaluate the design calculations and selection and application of MCC components MCC load data were transmitted between engineering disciplines in the marr.er prescribed by Bechtel Procedure EDPI 5.16-01 (Reference 5.58).
Electrical loads for assignment to the motor control centers were obtained f rer review of the supplier's. electrical equipment data sheets and entered into a computerized data base. A. software routine prepared by the Elec-trical Group used the information stored in the data base to gener Icad summary for each MCC. 5-1
O O monitoring of the loading as a function of bus capacity. The software usage procedures were documented in a users manual. It thus appeared that the MCC loads were being monitored in an adequate manner.
' In accordance with the SNUPPS electrical design criteria the MCCs generally had the following ratings: 480V, 600A, 25,000 A RMS symmetrical short circuit current bracing. The configurations used standard factory com-ponents. In each motor starier cubicle power was fed from.the bus work to a molded case circuit breaker, then to a motor starter and then to the motor branch circuit. Where circuits entered the containrent structure, current limiting fuses were to be applied in order to meet the NRC staff's Regulatory guidance for additional protection'of the penetration assemblies.
The interrupting ratings of a typical molded case branch circuit breaker were 14,000 A RMS symmetrical. The vendor (Gould) had provided Bechtel with a copy of a. form letter from one of its subsidiaries (Rowan Controls) which summarized the results of a short circuit test conducted on a MCC i of siri.ilar configuration to the SNUPPS design and indicated a maximum let
.-... through curren.tl.for the circuit breaker duty to be approximately 10,000 A.
,,,, , , We had no further questions about the breaker application.
We found that .the 'clipability of motor controllers to withstand fault currents had not been addres' sed or assur.ed in the design process. The best infor-
. mation available duning our inspection was from the Gould environmental qualification report which indicated that the controllers could withstand
., 5000 A fault currents with a limited degree of damage. However, the po-tential fault current in this application was 10.000 A or more. This i' appeared to be contrary to Bechtel Design Criteria Document .E 0 (Reference 1.7) which stated that "shor~t-circuit protection of combination motor starters will be provided by circuit breakers ...." The calculations reviewed were intended to be typical fer all Class IE MCC assemblies
~_ controlling loaAs Qt.up .to fiQ horse, power. Thus, the. oversight applied to essentially all Class 1E motor control centers. (Finding No. 5-1)
In suma,ry, our re. view in this_ area indicated one finding concerning the. fault current clipabilities of motor controllers. Tnis represented an instance of improper detailed design. In other aspects, the samples reviewed indicated controlled transmittal and use of data. 5.3 Eauipment Qualification Reports The team reviewed three equipment qualification reports to evaluate the methods used to review and process the data. In response to NRC guidance contained in NUREG-0588 (Reference 5.78), Bechtel had been reviewing and compiling qualification reports on all Class IE electrical equipment for about 1 year. The electrical group had established a subgroup of specialists who compared qualification reports submitted by the suppliers of electrical equipment with checklists prepared in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0588. Unresolved items on 5-2
- - -, , .- ...-....w..-,.-.w- - - -
~ ~' ~
t the checklist were transmitted to the equipment supplier and resolved before the report was finalized. When this process was completed the
- overall results would be submitted for fiRC review.
All reports, including any that might'have been previously reviewed and approved, were to be reviewed in this canner. For a sample the team selected one report that was being reviewed for the first time by the specialists group and two reports that had previously been approved but had not yet been reviewed by the specialists group. In the first category, the team examined the Bechtel review of the environ-
. mental qualification report for the motor driven discharge valve actuator (Reference 5.41). The generic checklist being used was comprehensive and this review appeared to be proceeding well.
In the second category, the team reviewed the seismic qualification report for Motor Control Centers (Reference 5.42) which had been approved by , Bechtel 'in June.1978.~- The report referred to the required response spectra
--.. that had been provided to the vendor (Gould) as an attachment to Bechtel Specification E-018'(Refere'nce 5.79). The supplier performed seismic capability testing 4nd the report indicated that the test response spectra enveloped the require.d response spectra for all SNUPPS sites. We found two revised spectra .(U.E. Site Ultimate Heat Sink Cooling Tower, Mass Point 1) which ha'd Mgher peaks than the required response spectra thct had been provided.to the vendor. These revised spectra had been forwarded
) - from the Civil-Group to the Electrical Group in a memorandum dated Sep-tember 1,1978 (Reference 5.38) with a request that their impact on equipment qualification be evaluated. 'However, no indication could be found that the Electrical Group had evaluated their effect on motor control center qualifi-cation. During'our inspection, Bechtel personnel evaluated the revised spectra and found them to be less severe than the test response spectra
--- that the vendor 4edeused to qualify-the tnotor control centers and, therefore, this specific oversight had no adverse effect on the design. The same rev; sed spectra had been sent to General Electric, the supplier of the only other
- equipment affected at that par-ticular location, within 2 months after. receipt from the Civil Group. However, we four.d no systematic tracking in place in the electrical group to assure that such revised spectra were addre'ssed.
-> (Finding No. 5-2)
Generally, the Civil Group notified other groups of revised spectra but did not receive responses or track the completion of required actions. As indicated above, we found a problem with this area in the Electrical l r' Group. We did not check in other groups to determine whether or not the L problem might apply more widely. Accordingly, this question should also be addressed in resolving the above finding. Also in the second category, we reviewed the environmental qualification report for Motor Control Centers (Reference 5.57). This report had been resubmitted six times and the latest revision had been approved by Bechtel in May 1981. The short circuit tests of the motor control center and of the components were selected for review. This report summarized test results for an MCC which had a configuration different from that specified for use on the SNUPPS project. The tests had been conducted with current 5-3 T
1 l O O limiting fuses. The SNUPPS application used non-current limiting circuit breakers instead of current limiting fuses. It appeared that this discrep-l ancy had not been noted during Bechtel's review of the report. Because the ! test conditions were not representative of the application conditions, the approved report did not provide assurance that the motor control centers ; were qualified for the short circuit conditions that could be encountered on the SNUPPS project. (Finding No. 5-3) l The two findings concerning reports that had been previously approved appeared to indicate that there had been a weakness in the review and approval of environmental qualification reports. However, a program was in place to review all reports, including rereview of any that had been approved earlier in the project, in preparation for submittals to the NRC required by recent regulatory guidance. Since the rereview program was already in place, the overall program appeared to be adequate at the time of uur inspection. j 5.4 Cable Sizing and Voltage Drop The design methods for selecting cable sizes were reviewed to evaluate the l l methods and assumptions used. The team reviewed cables for the auxiliary feedwater pumps (Cables 15NB0205 and 15NB0105). The cable sizing calculations considered the feeder load characteristics, with derating factors applied to account for such factors as ambient temperatures, raceway and penetration characteristics. Sepa ra te l, calculations were made regarding minimum cable size selection and voltage I drop requirements for various systems. The parameters derived from these l calculations were imposed on the final cable selection. In general, feeder j l cables had been sized to withstand a fault current equal to the feeder circuit breaker rating for a period of 7 cycles without causing an insu-lation temperature rise that exceeded the manufacturer's reconinendations. We found the methods of sizing feeder cables for both Class 1E and nonsafety related equipment technically adequate. ! A review was made of the methodology used in making the voltage drop calculations. Calculation B-3 (Reference 5.80) had been completed and approved. This calculation did not reflect the Callaway Plant configuration, l nor did it reflect the configuration of any SNUPPS plant. It was intended to establish an envelope which considered the worst conditions of all of the SNUPPS plant sites simultaneously. Thus, it was conservative with respect to predicting voltage drops at Callaway, assuring the selection of adequate cable sizes. We found no problems in this area. 5.5 Battery Ventilation A review was made of the hydrogen generation rates and HVAC system design ; to verify the assumptions that justified application of nonexplosion proof ' electrical equipment within the battery room environment. This review also examined the transfer of des.ign information between the Electrical Group and the Mechanical Group.
. 5-4
O O The Electrical Group sized the battery banks, then provided this infor-mation to the Mechanical Group. Hydrogen generation rates for the worst case and nominal operating conditions were obtained from the battery vendor. Under worst case conditions the hydrogen concentrations were determined not to produce a hazardous environment. In addition, hydrogen concentration monitors had been installed with remote readouts to monitor the battery room environments. In this area it appeared that the design assumptions were valid and the information regarding design parameters was properly transmitted and documented. 5.6 Circuit Breaker Study An examination was made of the methods that had been used to resolve circuit breaker failures which had occurred in the 13.8 kV distribution systems at the Callaway Site, the Wolf Creek site and a fossil fueled plant. The purpose of this review was to evaluate the effectiveness of the participants' organizations in achieving resolution to such a problem. Upon recognition of the problem NPI had assumed an active leadership role in assembling a technical team, resolving minor organizational conflicts, identifying the failure modes, and developing a technical resolution. Each of the organizations involved had transmitted information, and docu-mented their actions, in accordance with the project documentation control procedures established for the SNUPPS project administration. Two circuit breaker problems had been identified - a manufacturing defect, and appli-cation of a breaker in a circuit whose transient response parameters exceeded the breaker's capabilities. Following the identification of each problem, an investigation had been made of similar breakers in the Class IE distribution systems to determine if a generic failure mode existed. . The manufacturing defect had been resolved by a vendor recall. The transient response parameter problem had been resolved by the addition of capacitor banks. This delayed the rise rate of transient voltages to fit within the circuit breakers' operating capabilities. A paper had been prepared for publication to inform the technical community of the pitfalls encountered in this particular circuit breaker application, to recommend analysis of the transient recovery voltage (TRV) phenomenon , when designing an air circuit breaker installation, and to suggest minimum l TRV criteria which the equipment vendor must meet. In general, the par-l ticipating organizations appeared to function well in their respective roles on the technical team. The failure modes had been identified and corrected and no similar vulnerabilities had been found elsewhere in the 13.8 kV systems. The resolutions appeared adequate in that the circuit breakers should be capable of interrupting faults in the modified system. l Although surge capacitors had been added to slow the voltage rise so that the breaker could interrupt a fault current, the ultimate voltage peak on i the primary side of the breaker could still be high. The capability of l system components to withstand this voltage peak had not been considered ! or assured. Consideration of suc'h switching voltage transients was recom-l mended as normal design practice in IEEE Std 399 (Reference 5.81) and in 5-5 _ ,, . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _.,r-- . __.
1 I (h
- d. V IEEE Std 141 (Reference 5.82). However, based on power plant design experience, we found no nuclear safety implications and no regulatory basis indicating that such consideration was required. Accordingly, we had no further questions in this area. This is mentioned as an item recommended for licensee consideration. (Observation No. 5-1)
Generally, we found that the circuit breaker operating problems had been effectively addressed. 5.7 Relay Coordination The team reviewed the electrical relay coordination for the 13.8 kV feeders from the power block (Bechtel design scope) to the site distribution system (Sverdrup and Parcel design scope) in order to examine the methods for passing information between these two organizations. Design criteria had been issued by Bechtel to S&P through the appropriate information channels. The S&P power distribution designs had been trans-mitted to Bechtel, but were not being reviewed since they were outside the Bechtel design scope. Those items that were required to be considered in the Bechtel power system design, such as relay settings for the four site power feeder breakers, had been transmitted to Bechtel from S&P via Union Electric and NPI. Bechtel then incorporated the reconsnended settings in the relay coordination studies to assure coordination with the upstream breakers. We found no problems in this area. 5.8 Change and Deviation Documents Some key documents that affect and/or relate to design are Field Change Requests (FCR), Drawing Change Notices (DCN), Requests for Clarification of Information (RCI), Non-Conformance Report (NCR) and Supplier Deviation Disposition Reauests (SDDR). The team checked a sample FCR in the area of cable routing that required a cable to be deleted after being pulled. This particular cable could not be physically pulled out because it was at the bottom of the tray. Accordingly, Bechtel had reviewed the changes and issued a DCN, changing the design to reflect the actual condition. When changes required an FSAR or system design concept review or change, then designMrawing review notices (DRN) were issued and sent to the Chief Electrical Engineer for review. The documents were listed in the Electrical Group's design control checklist for the followup. We checked SDDR's for two different items requiring changes to the auxiliary shutdown panel specification. The specification had r.orrectly implemented the changes. One NCR raised a question. The auxiliary feedwater pump turbine trip and throttle valve hf.d been removed and returned to the vendor for replacement. The NCR (Reference 5.83) indicated that the valve had originally not been specified as safety grade and that the vendor had erred in shipping an un-qualified vahi a. Other documents were reviewed (Reference 5.84 and 5.90) 5-6
O~ O but the team was unable to develop a clear picture during the inspection. Because it appeared that there might be a generic problem with_the valve. the team asked NPI personnel to investigate further. After the inspection, NPI personnel informed us of the following results: (1) The valve had always been correctly specified to be safety grade. (2) The pump vendor had requested and received permission to ship the pump pr_iotto.. completing enviror. mental qualification of the valve actuator. The matter had been documented by exchanges of correspon-dance. The open item regarding qualification of the valve actuator had been tracked on a SDDR. (3) r 1 Eventually, it had been decided to replace the valve actuator with one of a different (qualified) model ratter than qualifying the original model. The valve had been returned for this purpose. The teani found, this fesponse adequate. ,
.; .. -+ .
. . In general, the samples rev'iewed in this area indicated a contro11'ed process. ~\
5.9 Test Procedures ,
. w.-
The team reviewed. test procsdures for a sample (13.8 kV switchgear) at the
.. job site. Union Electric has developed a system of generic te'st' procedures to perform tests in Union Electi c plar.ts before start-up tests are carried i
out. After the completion and re.*ase of a system by the constructor (Daniel) the' Union Electric staff performs ti.c generic test and writes data sheets (Startup Field Reports). These data sheets are transmitted to Bechtel along with any observed deficiency in the drawing or design. These data sheets
- - - are logged agains-t.the drawings and-the items are closed out when the drawings are changed. -
. With respect to.startup tests,_Bechtel submits start-up procedures to the utility on each system. Bechtel also writes procedures for hydrostatic test, energization and flushing that are used by the constructors and the utilities. Bechtel written start-up (acceptance) test procedures are re-written by the utility and assigned a new document number. This is the final test procedure which is used by the utility for the start-up/ pre-operational testing.
No problems were found in this area. 5.10 Tracking NRC Generic Comunictions Implementation of NRC bulletins, circulars and information notices in the design and installation process was examined by the team at Union Electric, Bechtel and NPI to assess the control and tracking systems. At Union Electric the Nuclear Group tracked actions in imnlementing these documents. As a sample, the team checked ,the followup and response for NRC Bulletins 82-02, 79-25 and 81-02 (References 5.85, 5.86, and 5.87). At NPI, such documents were logged and co-ordinated with Bechtel for review and response 5-7
- i h r 5 Y is
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o i O 5$12StorageofClassIEEquipmenj The team reviewed the on-site storage of class IE equipment to determine We checked various compliance with ANSI Standard N45.2.2 (Reference 5.89). environmental control and protective features provided in the storage area. Level B storage is maintained at 72*F. Overhead smoke detectorsWeeklyand inspectionwater sprinkler mesh are provided throughout the storage area. of water pressure and temperature records is required by Daniel procedures. The records for Level A storage area air conditioning systems, fire protection systems and temperature are inspected and checked 4 times in a week. Automatically initiated Halon Systems are employed as fire extin-guishers. Smoke detectors, provided in this area, automatically shut the doors and actuate the..Halon system. A sign-in and s.ign-out procedure is The team also Yeviewed the Daniel used to control access to this area. warehouse procedures and material control functions. These procedures A Material contained material receiving, storage and handling instructions. Receiving Report was written by Daniel and the Overage, Storage or Deferral (OSD Sheet) was signed by Bechtel Site Liaison. .The equipment or material was stored in Jspecified level of storage with thi OSD tag signed by the Quality Control Organization. The site storage a'i(d handling of class IE material appeared to follow the ANSI Standard. a. 5.13 Conclusion In the electrihal power area our review included a range of design features, technical . issues and infonnation systers related to various plant syste along with the Auxiliary Feedwater System.line and control and' equipment suppliers to be controlled.and the other SNUPP. Bechtel, as the architect-engineer, the design and procurement process. had implemented procedures to provide reasonable assurance of t of the design and procurement Jctivities. followed and interface information was controlled. Findincs 5-1 and 5-3 concerned improper application of motor controllers
- M an oversight in review of the qualification report for the same con-Finding 5-2 concerned the handling of revised seismic response trollers. However, spectra. most of the information reviewed was adequate and
'o '
' consistent and our review did not indicate significant breakdowns in the design process or control of interface information.
i l i 5-9
O O f m 6. Ins _trumentation and C_ontrol w ww w w ..-... The objective of this portion of the inspection was to review the instru-mentation and control (I&C) aspects of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system design. In gen 3ral, the I&C aspects of the design did not consist of separate work packages for the AFW system. For example, purchase speci-fications for control valves, flow orifice elements and control panels included equipment for several plant systens. However, the team's detailed review was devoted to the AFW system with specific emphasis placed upon the control of design interface informatier.. Selected simples of field instal-lation and the reactor vendor's design input were also reviewed. 6.1 Desien Information This s$ction su=arizes basic information reviewed conc.erning the flow of design inforr.ation.' - The team conducted 'a review at Union Electric Company and at tiuclear Projects Inc. (tipi)' t'o determine the Union Electric and NPI involvement in the design proces.s. All utility coments (from Union Electric and other project participants) relating to the design are coordinated through the tipi office.and a utility comittee process is used to determine which cocents will be forwarded to Bechtel for incorporation into the desien. The design documents that required tipi and/or util.ity. review ' and comment prior to Bechtel issue were identified early in the design process and coment categories were established to ir.dicate to Bechtel which corrents were required to be inccrporated into the design. Bechtel _.. .- is responsible .te. assure.that the initia.1 issue of all required documents are routed through NPI for review and that all commints received are resolved in accordance with establishec procedures prior to document issue. Revisions to design documents after the initial issue do not require an NPI
~
review p'rior to is' sue, but the revisions are distributed to NPI for irifor-national purposes concurrent with the ocurent issue. Review and comments by NFI and tFe utilities are not intented to take the place of the required inde;encent cesicn reviews, but are mor: .: the nature of a broad overview < of the desicn and a operabil".y/maintair. ability review. The review of design products is described in the following sections. 6.2 Auxiliary FeeSater System Desian [ The objective of this portion of the ir.spection was to evaluate the adequacy and control of a sample of detailed design information. The team reviewed the applicable Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) sections that described the design and operational requirements of the auxiliary feedwater system in order to establish the base instrumentation and control design requirements. The r.otor driven pump B, the turbine t driven pump discharge valve (AL-HV12), the automatic switchover of the 6-1
O O
- suction supply, and the system discharge flow' elements were selected for a detailed design review to assure that applicable design inputs were incorporated in the instrumentation and control design and that the design !
interface requirements were properly censidered. The results of these reviews are discussed below. The team reviewed the motor driven pump B control logics, schematic diagram, vendor submittals and the initiating signals for automatic. start of the motor driven pumps. Bechtel was reviewing vendor submittals in accordance with established procedures and the process appeared to be controlled. One discrepancy was noted in that Logic Diagrams, 02ALOS, 02ALO6, and 02ALO7, (References 6.50, 6.51, and 6.52) had not been submitted by Bechtel to NPI for review prior to initial issuance. This was a violation of section 4.2.1
- of Bechtel procedure EDPI 4.41-01 (Reference 6.53). Although a procedural violation did occur, the nature of this item was such that we did not con-sider it' indicative bT any systematic weakness,in the control of desicn information and~it had no adverse effect on design. (FindingNo.6-1}
During our review'hf Logic Diagram J.02ALO1 (Reference 6.25), it was noted that the ingic. diagram.was incorrect. The logic diagram indicated that f the pump would start. given a coincidence of several signals whereas FSAR section 10.4.9.2.3 and the schematic diagram (Reference 6.24) correctly indicated that the pump would start given'any of the signals. This error
- ( should have been detected in the design review of the schematic diagram.
However, the actual equipment design, as represented by the schematic diagram was correct and consistent with the FSAR. Although we found no similar control. logic errors in the AFW system, the sample reviewed was not large enouch to make a firm determination as to whether this was a systematic error which might indicate some weakness in the design process for developmentand Vse of controllogic~ diagrams. This should be addressed in resolving the item. Du_rinaJur__ inspection, the control logic diagram was
. corrected while being revised to. enter fire p_rotection changes. (Finding Ho. 6-2).- ,
- : n The team reviewed the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge valve ( AL-HV12) purchase specification, control logic, enercency cperation recuirerents, incorporation of design basis, and the interface with the supplier in the area of seismic testing and the required Bechtel review of certain vendor document submittals. The purchase specification in-cluded the applicable design basis and established recuirements for vender document submittals to provide assurance that the specification require-ments were implemented by the supplier. The Bechtel design process required an engineering review and approval of the vendor submitted documents and, within. the scope of this inspection, these requirements were being implemented in this area. The purchase specification also included requirements for seismic and environmental qualification of the control valves and the specification / procedural requirements were being implemented in this area. It w&s noted that during the initial seismic testing of these air operated valves, certain modifications to the valve design were required to assure proper function during seismic events. The areas noted were additional bracing and support for the lower limit switch 6-2
O O and a change to a bolted bonnet design. These design changes were selected for checking at the site where it was found that the changes had been implemented for the installed valves. The team's review of the control logic indicated that remote flow control and isolation from the control room and from the auxiliary shutdown panel was provided as described in the FSAR. We noted a discrepancy during our review of the emergency backup nitrogen accumulator system which provided a safety grade backup nitrogen supply for operation of the pump discharge valves upon loss of the non-safety grade nonnal air supply. Single check valves had been provided to prevent bleeding pressure from the safety grade accumulator in the event of a pressure loss in the non safety grade control air system (Reference 6.47) instead of double check valves as described in FSAR Section 9.3.1.2.2. However, it did not appear that there was any regulatory requirement for double check valves because the system requirements could be met even with the loss of one accumulator system. This was one of three examples .of failure to meet FSAR comitments. Findings 2-1 and 2-7 provide discussions of the other examples. (Finding 6-3) The team reviewed the design of the automatic feature for switchover from the normal (non safety grade) condensate storage tank supply to the emer-gency (safety grade) service water supply. This switchover would occur upon detection of low suction pressure at the comon suction line for all three pumps. The team attempted to review the pressure setpoint for this switchover, but it was found that the design process had not been completed to the point of providing a required setpoint. This setpoint was to be provided by the instrumentation and control design group at a later date. Our review of the area indicated that the applicable design bases were being implemented as described in the FSAR. The team examined the process by which actuation setpoints were determined at Bechtel and at Union Electric. Setpoint determination was a multipart process consisting of assessment of physical system requirements, measure-ment uncertainty and construction variability. Bechtel Procedure J1 GEN (Reference 6.54) for determination of safety related setpoints was reviewed along with several setpoint calculations. No setpoints had been determined at the time of the inspection. The preliminary calculations appeared to be satisf actory. The team reviewed the calculations and the purchase specification for the sizing and purchese of the AFW system discharge flow elements. These elements were designed for both flow indication and automatic flow control of the motor driven AFW pump discharge valves. Bechtel had developed a computer program for the sizing of flow elements and this program was used for the calculation / sizing of the AFW flow elements. This program had been verified and approved as required. A discrepancy was noted in that Calculation J-435. (Reference 6.41) had not been checked (computer input check) and approved prior to issuing the purchase specification as required by section 3.4 of Bechtel procedure EDPI 4.17-01 (Reference 1.16). Although a procedure violation had occurred, a i 6-3
O O review of the latest calculations indicated that the flow elements identi-fied in the purchase specification were correct and the discrepancy noted had no apparent effect on the final design. This was one of two examples of releasing design infonnation prior to approval of calculations. Finding 4-4 provides a discussion of the other example. (Finding No. 6-4) As discussed above four findings resulted from the inspection in this s a rea. Two (6-1 and 6-4) involved procedural violations and two (6-2 and 6-3) involved errors. None of these individual items was found to have an adverse effect on design or to indicate a systematic weakness. In other respects, the design information we reviewed was adequate and consistent, indicating that the significant design bases were being considered and correctly implemented. 6.3 Auxiliary Feedwater System Installation The team conducted a system installation review at the Callaway site with the results as discussed below. The team examined the turbine driven pump discharge valve to assure that i the design modifications identified during seismic testing had been com-pleted. The lower limit, switch bracing and the bolted bonnet design were. implemented on the installed valve at the site. The team reviewed the layout of the AFW system controls on the main control board and on the remote shutdown panel. It was noted during this review that the remote shutdown panel was to be modified due to the recent design changes to incorporate the logic for control room isolation for fire pro-tection purposes. This design change was in process and modifications were to be completed at a later date. The installation review at the site did not reveal any discrepancies and within the area reviewed, the installed system implemented the design. 6.4 Westinghouse Information This area of review included a review of the initiating logic for the auxiliary feedwater system from Westinghouse designed systems (e.g. , Safety Injection Actuation and Lo-Lo Steam Generator Level Actuation). Westinghouse had provided for the necessary initiating signals as de-scribed in the FSAR. We noted that a recent logic change had been made l to close the main feedwater isolation valves from a 10-10 steam generator level signal on any one steam generator. This had been a project specific change for SNUPPS that was required because of a Bechtel design change that relocated the main feedwater check valves downstream of the auxiliary l feedwater system injection point. Bechtel had made this design decision in order to mitigate water hammer effects under certain transient / accident conditions. The Westinghouse standard design recommendation called for the main feedwater check valves to be upstream of the auxiliary feedwater injection. The system implications of this change had been correctly recognized and appropriate changes made to the initiating logic. Westing-house personnel stated that they were not aware of any other project that had addressed the main feedwater system water hammer effects by placing 6-4
O O
- the check valve downstream of the auxiliary feedwater tie in. Although
. Westinghouse normal design scope did net include the main feedwater piping analysis, Westinghouse had issued a " Technical Bulletin" in 1979 to inform operating reactor customers of the need to evaluate water hamrer effects 4 upon fast closure of the main feedwater check valve during certain tran-sient/ accident conditions. Westinghouse had also informed the SNUPPS Fconstruction project by a memorandum in 1979. Documentation was not l available during this inspection to show that Westinghouse,had transmitted Lthisinformationtootherconstructionprojects. Although this area of review revealed no discrepancies, the discussion on water hamer effects is provided for informational purposes and for potential URC inspection followup at Westinghouse to determine which construction projects were issued the technical bulletin infonnation. (Observa, tion No. 6-1) 6.5 Pre-Operational Testing Program The team reviewed the auxiliary feedwater preoperational testing program at Bechtel. The following start-up test procedures were reviewed:
. ..: .. . ~
.,,, (1). " Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine-Driven Pump and Valve Pre-Operational Test S-03ALO2";
(2) " Auxiliary Fe'e'dwater Motor-Driven Pump and Valve Pre-Operational Test S-03ALO1"; and (3) " Auxiliary Turbine Pre-Operational Test S-04FLO1". l These test proceddres were used by the Union Electric start-up group as the core of the actual tests to be run in the field. At Union Electric the team reviewed the start-up testing schedule and test agenda,. par.ticularly the test sequence and event timing since some tests are interdependent and others depend on construction scheduling and loop turnover. We concluded that the procedures were thorough and complete, the test sc'hedule was well coordinated withsonstruction events, and adequate time was allocated for preliminary preparations and systems checkout. I Conclusion .. 6,.E , The four findings from our inspection in this area did not indicate adverse effects on the actual design or systematic weaknesses. In general, the information reviewed was adequate and consistent, indicating a controlled design process. 6-5 s .
'. 7. 2- = sydm .p.1-9 7.I =- G A 7?= *-
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a 7.0 Reference Material 7,q ;;w g A .,, g ;7-35 7.1 General 7.1.1 - Background Documents Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 1.1 NPI letter- SLNRC 81-39, letter to NRC (Denton) 6/3/81 reviewing AFS vs. SRP, Action Plan I,tems, staff questions, etc.
-1. 2 NPI letteil SLNRC 81-44, letter to NRC'(Denton)- -
6/8/81
'on AFS ' reliability analysis 1.3 Organization , Charts for NPI, Bechtel, and Union Charts , .. Electric
. ?:
1.4 Magazine . Article in Nuclear Engineering , 11/75 Article ' International, "SNUPPS- the Multiple Utility Standardization Project," by N. 'A. Petrick - '- 1.5 Bechtel 10466-A-000, " Architectural Design 3 8/11/80 Design Criteria for SNUPPS" Criteria :== :S - 3: " - 1.6 Bechtel 'iO466-C-0, " Civil and Structural 10 6/9/82 Design . Design Criteria for SNUPPS" . - Criteria 1.7 Bechtel 10466-E-0, " Electrical Design Criteria 11 6/25/81 i Design for SNUPPS" Criteria 1.8 Eechtel 10466-J-000, " Control Systems Design 9 9/30/80 Design Criteria for SNUPPS" Criteria 1.9 Bechtel 10466-M-000, " Mechanical / Nuclear Design 6 8/30/77 Design Criteria for SNUPPS" Criteria 1.10 Bechtel Project Engineering Procedures Manual 52 Procedure Index for Job 10466 1.11 Bechtel Engineering Departr.ent Project Instruction 5 5/12/80 Procedure (EDPI) 4.1-01, " Design Criteria" 7-1
O O
'. 5 Document Ref. Ne Type Description / Title Rev. Date 1.12 Bechtel EDPI 4.22-01, " Preparation and Control of Procedure 7 5/8/81 SAR" 1.13 Bechtel EDPI 4.23-01, "SAR Change Control" 9 8/25/80 Procedure 1.14 Bechtel EDPI 4.25-01, " Design Interface Control" 1 5/9/78 Procedure
--l .15 Bechtel 1 - EDPI 4.34-01, "Off Project' Design Review" 4 1/15/79
. . . . Procedure 1.16 Bechtel EDPI 4.37-01, " Design Calculations" 8 1/19/81 Procedure ,.
1.17 Bechtel EDPI 4.46-01, " Project Engineering 17 7/30/82 Procedure. Drawings" ~
- 1.18 Bechtel EDPI 4.47-01, " Drawing Change Notice" . - 12 9/18/81 Procedure -
1.19 Bechtel EDPI 4.49-01, " Project Specifications" 11 9/18/81
~~ -
Procedure av .- =: < ' 1.20 Bechtel 'EDPI 4.61-01., "Nonconformance Reports" 14 7/30/824
. u- Procedure . = u .
( 1.21 Bechtel EDPI 4.62-01, " Field Change R0 guest, 13' 7/30/82 Procedure Cor.struction Variar:e Request and Middle Third Deviation Notice" 1.22 Eechtel EDFI 5.30-01, " Project Release I rocedure 2 12/10/79 Procedure and Docurent Release Log" 1.23 Bechtel MS-1, " Piping Class sumary for the 14 12/29/81 Drawing SNUPPS" 1.24 Bechtel 10466-M-204(Q), " Field Fabrication and 33 7/20/82 Specifi- Installation of Piping and Pipe Supports cation to ASME Section III" 7-2 l
O
.I -
()- U i l l l Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 1.25 Bechtel 10466-M-216(Q), " Fabrication of Non- 16 5/12/81
,' Specifi- Catalog Pipe Supports" cation 1.26 Bechtel 10466-M-217(Q),"DesignSpecificationfor 6 2/26/80 Specifi- Pipe Supports to AS':E Section III, Sub-cation section NF 8 Nes~tinghouse 1.27 SG 689, Steam Systens Design Manual, Sub- 2 8/73
~ --
Specifi - - - section,7 AFS
.- cation _
1.28 Bechtel - M-00AL(Q), "AFS Description SNUPPS" 3 12/15/77 Drawing ,, 1.29 Bechtel . M-02ALO1(Q). " Piping a~nd Instrumentation ,11 9/21/82
-' Drawing -
Diagram AFS" 1.30 Bechtel M-03ALO1(Q), " Piping Isometric A'exiliary'
- 9 Drawing 'Feedwater Pumps Suction Piping" 1.31 Bechtel M-03ALO2(Q), " Piping Isometric Motor 10
; ~ " " -
Drawing "~*D~ riven Auxiliart Fee ~dwater Pump tA'- - Discharge Piping" - 142 Bechtel . M-03ALO3(Q:), " Piping Isonetric Motor 8 - l' Drawing Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 'B' l Discharge Piping" 1.33 Bechtel M-03ALO4(Q), " Piping Isometric Turbine 7 Drawing Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Piping" 1.34 Bechtel M-03ALO5(Q), " Piping Isometric Auxiliary 9
-- Drawing Feedwater Pumps Recirculation Piping 1.35 NPI Letter SLNRC 81-010. "SNUFPS AFS Meeting" 2/19/81 1.36 Bechtel BLSE 9344, " Response to Action Items 4/3/81 Letter Resulting from 2/12/81 meeting with NRC" se ;
7-3
. O O I Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 1.37 PSAR SNUPPS Project QA Programs for Design 4 12/81 Extract and Construction 1.38 NPI SNUPPS Staff Administrative Control 58 10/1/82 Procedure Procedures Manual 1.39 Bechtel E-012.2(Q), " Technical Specification for Specifi-2 3/18/77 Purchase of Large Induction Motors 250 cat' ion ._ Rp and Larger for SNUPPS" ,-
. .1.40 Bechtel ~E-091(Q), " Technical Specification for 4 5/25/76 Specifi- 7 Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equip-cation .
- nent for SNUPPS" 1.41 Bechtel #M-021(Q), " Design Specification for 13 5/28/81 Specifi- . Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and Turbine cation Drive for SNUPPS" 1.42 Bechtel M-900(Q), " Technical Specification for' ' " 2 7/9/76 Specifi- , ~ Qualification of Seismic Category 1 cation Mechanical Systems and Equipment for SNUPPS"
~ i.43 Bechtel =# e*J-820(QTi " Technical: Specification for ~- 1 5/27/75 Specifi- Seismic Qualification Requirements for -
cation Class IE Control and Instrumentation
;r .
. - Devices for SNUPPS" -
1.44 Bechtel J-601(Q), " Design Specification for 13' 10/17/80 Specifi- Nuclear Service Cor, rol Valves for cation SNUPPS" 1.45. Bechtel E-025(Q), " Technical Specificatier for Specifi- Valve Electric Motor Actuators for SNUPPS" cation 1.46 Bechtel 10466-MS-6, "End Preparation Data" 5 2/3/77 Specifi-cation 7-4 l _-. - _ _ . . _ _ _ .
O O l l Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 1.47 Bechtel 10466-J4-102, " Instructions for Typical 1 11/14/74 Specifi- Instrument Tagging" cation 1.48 Bechtel 10466-MS-7, "End Transition Detail" 2 2/2/76 Specifi-cation 1.49 dechtel .. T0466-C-04A035, " Floor Response Spectra 0 11/1/76 Design - -
- for SNUPPS"
~ ~ '
.--. Criteria 1.50 Bechtel - 10466-C-04A03E, " Floor Response Spectra 0 1D1/76 Design .
,for SNUPPS" ,
Criteria- *
' ~
> 1.51 Bechtel - 10466-C-04A045, " Floor Response Spectra 'O 11/1/76 Design for SNUPPS"
~--
Criteria
- 1.52 Bechtel 10466-C-04A04B, " Floor Response Spectra 0 11/1/76 Design for SNUPPS" Criteria "" ="' .
1.53 Bechtel 'iO466-M-01ALO1(Q), " System Flow Diagram D a Drawing . AFS" =- 1.54 Bechtel Six Composite Photographs of SNUPPS Model Photographs of AFS 1.55 HUREG NUREG/CR-2458, "Sandia Comments on SNUPPS AFS Reliability Analyses 1.56 NRC Paper SECY 82-352, " Assurance of Quality," page 8/10/82 5 and Enclosure 1, pages 6 and 7 ' 1.57 Magazine Article in Nuclear Engineering International, 9/77 Article "A Progress Report on the SNUPPS Nuclear Stations," by N. A. Petrick 1.58 Magazine Article in Pcwer, " Standardization of 11/77 Article Nuclear Plants Offers Better Designs, Faster Construction" ? 7-5
O O 7.1 = Ge~ d 7.1.2 - Meeting Attendance ! Name Organization Title Meeting Attended EEEEEEEEEE 32ksssssss
~
EtttttRRRR
;;;;;;2222 D.P. Allison NRC Team Leader XXXXXXXXXX D.P. Norkin NRC Team Member, Mechanical Sys. XXXXXXXXXX J.R. Fair NRC Team Member, Mechanical Comp. XXXXXXXXX D.K. Morton- + EG&G ~ Team Member, Achanical-Comp. XXXXXXX
~1t.E. Shewmaker " NRC _ Te,am Member, Civil / Structural - X X X X X X X X X
--- -J.S. Ma NRC Team Member, Civil / Structural X XXXX I. Ahmed NR C"- Team Member, Electrical Power XXXXXXXXXX R.L. Sprague --+ E G & G- Team Member, Electrical Power XXXXXX XX D.D. Chamberlain NP4 , Team Member, I&C XXXXXXX XX
- R.O. Karsch NRC ~~ Team Member, I&C . XXXXXXXXXX J. Neisler NRC Resident Inspector XX . XX G.E. Edison -14RC Licensing Project Manager XXX E.L. Jordan NRC Director, DEQA, IE X T.L. Harpster NRC Chief, QAB, DEQA, IE '
'"-XXX H.M. Wescott .NRC - RIII Project Inspector X J.E. Konklin NRC RIII Project Section C1ief X R. Stright NPI Licensing Manager XX
-" 5.J. Seiken NPI - ' 'QA tanager -
XXXXXXX X N.A. Petrick NPI Executive Director ~X F. Schwoerer NPI Technical Director X
& C. Cermak . NPI- Manager, Nuclear Safety X :
J.H. Riley NPI Staff Engineer X D.J. Klein NPI Staff Engineer X R.P. White NPI Nuclear Engineer X W.W. Baldwin NPI Administrative Manager X E. Dille UE Executive Vice President X D.F..Schnell UE VP, Nuclear XXX J.F. McLaughlin UE Assistant to VP Nuclear XX D. Capone UE Manager, Nuclear Eng. XXX X R.J. Schukai UE General Manager, Eng. XXX W.H. Weber UE Mgr., Nuclear Construction XX F.D. Field UE Manager,QA XXX A.C. Passwater UE Licensing Manager X H.G. Slayten UE X W.H. Zvanut UE Supervising Engr., Nuclear X W.B. Bobner UE . X T.H. McFarland UF Superintendent, Site Liaison X XX R.P. Wendling UE Supervising Engr., Nuclear X J.E. Kaelin UE X 1 l ,
O O
- 7. t - G A led.
l .. Name Organization Title Meeting Attended NNNNNNNNNN RRRRRRRRRR 2;$$$28888
>>>>>>ssss K.W. Kuechenmeister UE Supv. Engr., UE Construction X XX D.J. Maxwell UE Construction Engineer X XX W.H. Mawyer UE Consulting Engineer X XX R.K. Cothren UE Consulting Engineer X F.E. Maddy. UE Consulting Engineer X
~
W. Steinberg .UE Construction Engineer , XX
- -4.R. Veatch - UE -
Supervising Engineer ' , XX
.,...J.A. McGraw UE ' Su~pervising Engineer XX R.L. Powers UE ';. Superintendent Sits QA X C.J. Plows UE .. Consulting Engineer, Quality X J.V. Laux UE Supervising Engineer X
- D.E. Shafer Uf A- Nuclear Engineer, Licensing
~
X i C.C. Wagoner Daniel Project Manager X X
-. M.K. Smith -Daniel Audit Response Coordinator X Project Administrator XX G.M. Warblin Daniel D.C. King -
Daniel - Construction Manager - --- XX W.A. Poppe Bechtel Group Leader, Mech / Nuclear X R.C. Boles Bechtel Site Liaison Eng (Mech.) X XX G.P. Schwartz Bechtel Control Sys. Site Liaison X X
- - 4. Kroehler Bechtel Praj QA Manager, SNUPPS .- XXX D.R. Quattrociocchi Bechtel Proj. Engineer, SNUPPS X-X X J.A. Chlapowski Bechtel Proj. Engineer, SNUPPS X X J.,. Mil os . Sechtel Project Quality Engineer XXX.
J.H. Smith Bechtel Project Engineering Manager XXX L.F. Rotondo Bechtel Project Engineer, Facilities XX D.C. Kansal Bechtel Division QA Manager XX
-* B . L . Mey e rs Bechtel-4roject Manager, SNUPPS XX N.P. Gc:1 Bechtel Project Engineer, Mechanical XX L.E. Ruhland Bechtel X J.S. Prebula Bechtel Group Leader, Mech / Nuclear X R.W. Bradford Bechtel Site Lead Liaison Engineer X P.T. McManus W* Mgr., Design Assurance Sys.
& Quality Engineer X J.B. Stearns W SNUPPS QA Engineer X l W.R. Spezialetti W -
Mgr., Plant Licensing X ! D.L. Cecchett W License Engineering SNUPPS X M.H. Shannon W Senior Quality Engineer X l S.T. Maher W Engineer, Nuclear Safety X
*W - Westinghouse l
, 7-7
O O
?.I-Ge,+4(M.} .
Name Organization Title Meeting Attended
= =========
s>sissAsss ttttttRRRR J.S. Schlonski W Engineer, Fluid Sys. Design. X N.I. Beck W Engineer, Fluid Sys. Design X R.A. Loose W Balance of Plants System Design X J.W. Swogger W ~ SNUPPS Project Engineer X P.A. Barilla .W Engr., Chemical & Waste-Process Sys. - X
....C.A. Vitalbo W Se'nior Engineer X T. Kitchen W '.~. Process Control Technician X J. Cunningham W - Nuclear Safety Engineer X R. Tuley W Nuclear Safety Engineer X
. _- w . ; :: > ,
.s . .
= - -
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~ 7.2 Fkchanical Systems 7.2.1 - Documents t
Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 2.1 Westinghouse SSE-SF-37, Secondary Systems Parar.eters 1 9/81 Procedure Required for FSAR Accident Analyses 2.2 Bechtel File 0332, Mechanical / Nuclear Group 13 8/25/82 Internal Organization and Responsibilities
~
Memo ,
. ... 2. 3 Bechtel AL-21, Motor Drive Auxiliary Feedwater 0 12/1/81 Calculation 7. Pumps; Determine Total Head 2.4 Bechtel .
AL-20 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater 0 11/20/81 Calculation . -Pump; Determine Total Head 2.5 Westinghouse SIP /10-1, Section 4-4 Steam System Design '3 3/78 Specifi- Manual (10-1) cation ' ' - - - - 2.6 Westinghou'se SIP /10-1, Section 5-4 Steam System Design 3 3/78 Specifi- Manual (10-1)
- cation #= ' n " .' s
. 2.7 Westinghouse 'SNP-2256, SNUPPS Projects Steam System 1/17/79 e Letter . - Design Manual (10-1) -
2.8 Westinghouse SNP-2342, SNUPPS Projects Areas of Signifi- 3/6/79 Letter cant Change in Rev. 3 of Steam System Design Manual 2.9 Bechtel BLWE-1082, Westinghouse PIP Volume 10-1, 10/2/79 Letter Steam System Design Manual, Rev. 3 2.10 Westinghouse SNP-3121, Revised Steam Systems Design 2/5/S0 Letter Manual 2.11 Bechtel AL-26 Aux. Feedwater Pumps; Verify 0 12/17/79 Calculation Turbine Driven Pump Performance Through-out the Feedline Break Transient Provided by Westinghouse in SNP 2243 t 7-9 G 1
, O O Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 2.12 Westinghouse SNP-1857, Impact of New Steam Break Pro- 6/8/78 Letter tection System on Design of AFS Relative to Secondary Pipe Rupture 2.13 Bechtel BLWE-916, AFS Secondary Pipe Rupture 8/3/78 Letter Accidents 2.14 Westinghouse 5,NP-2243, Auxiliarry Feedwater System 1/10/79 Letter .
2.15 Bechtel BLWE-1155, AFS; Purp Runout During 1/30/80 Letter 'l-Steam Generator Pressure Transients 2.16 Bechtel . ..BLWE-1345, AFS; Design Information on 12/8/80 Letter ' Delivery Times and Flo,wrates , 2.17 Westinghouse SNP-1054, AFS; Turbine Driven Pump Flow 1/22/76 Letter Rate
. . a e 2.18 -
Bechtel 'BLWE-380, Feedwater Isolation; Deletion 1/22/76 Letter of Check Valve
' f.19 Bechtel ## 'TL-16, AFS; Dettrmirle Available NPSH for 20 10/20[81 Calculation . Aux Feedwater Pumps 247 0 Ingersoll . 10466-M-024-118-01, Characteristic Curve, :1/31/78 Rand-Curve Motor Driven Pump (AFS) ,
2.21 Ingersoll- 10466-M-021-096-01 Characteristic Curve, 10/18/77 Rand-Curve Turbine Driven Pump (AFS) 2.22 Eechtel AL-22, AFS; Revise Flow Diagram Data 0 12/2/81 Calculation 2.23 Bechtel M-01 ALO1(Q), System Flow Diagram, AFS D 12/15/77 Drawing 2.24 Bechtel M-01ALO1(Q), System Flow Diagram, AFS E 11/15/82 Drawing h 7-10
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. 8 Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 2.25 Westinghouse SNP-384 Revised Reconnended AFS 2/5/75 Letter 2.26 Westinghouse SG-689, Steam Systems Design Manual, 2 8/83 Specifi- III-5 and V-7 cation 2.27 Bechtel
~
M-00AL(Q),SystemDescription,AFS
~
4 11/15/82 Specifi .. , cation - - 2.28 Bechtel "J. FSAR Fig. 3.6-1, SH 49. High Energy Pipe 9 5/82 Drawing .
- Break Isometric Main Steam Supply to
, , Turbine AFP Outside Containment 2.29 Bechtel . PBFC01, " Pipe Break An'alysis" 1 B/31/78 Calculation 2.30 Bechtel PBFC01, Pipe Break Analysis -'-
2 11/10/82 Calculation ' 2.31 Bechtel SNUPPS High Energy Line Break Analyses 8/19/80
^- - -
Internal ==wiask Force Reorganization - Memo : 2 32 Bechtel . Break By Break Dynamic Effects Analyses Undated Analyses for Main Steam Branch Line to AFS Turbine Driven Pump 2.33 Bechtel 10465-It-021(Q), Design Spec For Aux FW 13 5/2E/81 Specifi- Pumps and Turbine Drive cation 2.34 Bechtel FL-13, Aux Building Area 5 Flooding 0 10/28/82 Calculation 2.35 Bechtel FL-01, Flooding of the Aux Building 0 10/4/82 Calculation 7-11
Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date ._ 2.36 Bechtel M-02ALO1(Q), Piping and Instrumentation 11 9/21/82 Drawing Drawing Auxiliary Feedwater System 2.37 NPI Letter SLNRC 81-44, Reliability Analysis of the 6/8/81 SNUPPS Auxiliary Feedwater System 2.38 NPI Letter SLNRC 81-010, SNUPPS Auxiliary Feedwater 2/19/81
., System Meeting
- -2. 39 . Bechtel !1 GF 175, Miscellaneous Buililing, HVAC
~
10/15/75
, Calculation ,'
2.40 Bechtel . ~$RV319 3/6/81 Calculation ,.. 2.41 NPI Letter . Letter to NRC Enclosin'g Page Changes for 12/9/77 PSAR 2.42 Bechtel MOP 1451, " Drainage System Auxiliary 4 7/14/80 Drawing Building 2.43 Bechtel MOP 1902, " Drainage System Auxiliary 4 8/19/77 Drawing .r3 e$uilding': n 3
- 2.44 NRC SER 'NUREG-0830, . Safety Evaluation Report
.- 10/81
.- . Related to:the Operation of Callaway Plant, Unit No. 1 2.45 NRC SER NUREG-0830 Supplement !!c. 1, " Safety 1/82 Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Callaway Plant Unit No.1 t .
I 7-12 f . - - - . l - - . - . _ _ _ - - . . _ _-- ._ -_ _
l l
. O O l
- 1. 2 - W' a.L 9strms l 7.2.2 - Personnel Interviewed Name Title Organization J. D. Hurd Group Supervisor, SNUPPS Bechtel Mechanical / Nuclear Group J. S. Prebula Deputy Group Supervisor, SNUPPS Bechtel Mechanical / Nuclear Group K. Miller Hazards Task Force Coordinator, Bechtel SNUPPS Mechanical / Nuclear Group A. Woolard - .Enginier,SNUPPS . Bechtel
- Mechanical /N,uclear Group W. A. Poppe PoJ6r Conversion Group Leader, Bechtel
- SNUPPS Hechanical/ Nuclear Group J. Canale En'girieer, SNUPPS Bechtel Mechanical / Nuclear Group ,
B. C. Seam Facilities / Site Group Leader Bechtel
~- '
, SNUPfS Mechanical / Nuclear Group D. L. Herrich Ingineer,SNUPPS Bechtel Mechanical / Nuclear Group a .- . . .:=:: ::::: u :: = . ..
B. Spezialetti SNUPPS Licensing Manager Westinghouse - Jr Swogger . Project Engineer, SNUPPS Project Westinghouse - N. Beck Engineer Westinghouse S. Maher Engineer Westinghouse l l l . l 1 l 7-13
~__ . _ - .
0 o O i
% 7.3 Mechanical Components l 7.3.1 - Documents Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 3.1 Bechtel EDPI 4.37-01, Design Calculations 8 1/9/81 Procedure ,
3.2 Bechtel EDPI 4.1-01, Design Criteria 5 5/12/80 Procedure 3.3 Bechtel TD466-M-200(Q), Design Specification for 5 10/17/80 Specification - ASME Section III Piping Systems for. the .
'Standar~dized Nuclear Unit Power Plant
'_' System (SNUPPS) 3.4 Bechtel BP-TOP-1, Seismic Analysis of Piping 2 1/75 Design ,,,, Systems Criteria .-
- 3.5 Bechtel BP-TOP-1, Seismic Analysis of Piping 3 1/76 Design Systems - .--
Criteria - 3.6 Bechtel Stress Analysis Newsletter File - Loose
- ~ - Design teaf- Binder Containing Stress Analysis . .
Criteria ..Newslette rs - JJ Bechtel .. . SNUPPS Stress Analysis Problem No. 60 4 ,10/16/81 Analysis File 3.8 Bechtel SNUPPS Stress Analysis Problem No. 44A 1 6/28/78 Analysis File 3.9 Bechtel SNUPPS Stress Analysis Problem No. 70 File 4 3/11/81 Analysis 3.10 Bechtel Memo from R. Lee to F. Banes 5/11/82 Internal Memo 3.11 Bechtel Memo from R. Lee to F. Banes 10/15/81 Internal Memo 3.12 Bechtel Memo from I. Shiudansani to B. Shah 6/2/78 Internal Memo - 3.13 Bechtel Memo from R. Lee to E. Thomas 11/10/81 Internal Memo 7-14
^'-
s l
., o -
O -
~
> Occument Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 3.14 Bechtel Memo from J. Hurd to B. Shah , 9/23/82 l Internal Memo 3.14
~
Bechtel Memo from C. Herbst to C. Barbier 6/12/79 Int'ernal Memo 3.16 Bechtel Ib466-M-217(Q) " Design Specification for Pipe ' 6 2/26/80 Specification Supports to ASME Section III, Subsection NF for the Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant system (SNUPPS)'."
~ -
- -3.17 Bechtel --
, Plant D,esign Hanger Engineering Standards - 12 8/20/82
- .. .- Design Criteria "'
3.18 - Bechtel , . Pipe Support Calculation No. ALO1-22 2 6/23/78 Calculation "
~
3.19 Bechtel - Pipe Support Calculation No. FC01-28 "O 1/27/82 Calculation , , 3.20 - Bechtel ' Pipe Support Calculation No. ALO2-34 0 7/8/81 Calculatio'n
-3. 21 ' Bechtel " ^Proceduft No. TB-011' , I 1/4/78 Procedure .
3f22 Bechtel . Memo from 4. Shiudasani to E. Thomas 9/7/79 Internal Memo , 3.23 Bechtel Pipe Support Calculation No. ALO1-27 2 11/23/82
, Calculation
'~
3.24 . Field Change FCR No. 2FC-1191-MH 6/22/82 Report 3.25 Field Change FCR No. 2FC-1284-MH 6/25/82 Report
- 3.26. Bechtel ME 909 Computer Program 3.27 Bechtel ME 101 User's Manual G-1/1 11/16/79 Computer Program ;
7-15 7 ___I
~~
O O Document Ref. flo. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 3.28 Bechtel ME 210 Computer Program 3.29 Bechtel M-03AB01(Q), Main Steam System Reactor 12 Drawing Building and Auxiliary Building r Area 5 3.30 Dravo Pc. 2AB01 5032/145 5A 5/2/79 Drawing 3.31 dra~vo , Fc. 2AB01 5032/145 ' 5 8/5/78 Drawing - - ,- , , 3.32 NRC MEB 7. Interim Technical Position - Functional 7/19/78 Position .. Capability of Passive Piping Components for
,ASME Class 2 and 3 Piping Systems 3.33 Bechtel . SNUPPS Stress Analysis' Problem No.12 File 3' 5/4/82 Analysis -
3.34 Ingersoll- EAS-TR-7:707-ASR, " Structural Integrity and- 2 11/15/77 Rand Report ' Operability Analysis of 6HMTA-6 Pump for Bechtel (SNUPPS)" . l ' - f.35 Terry Corpr 24, '9ualification Report forsIngersoll- s1 8/18/78 Report ,. Rand-Cameron F-40176-40180" - 3.-36 Masoneilan. Seismic Quel'ification of Masoneilan Control v. Report Valves for Bechtel Purchase Order Number 10466-J 601A-1 through -5 Specification Numbers 10466-J-601A and 601B Masoneilan Order Nu.7.bers N-00172-176 and N-00198-202 Te ,t Valve Nutt.ber 803 3.37 Bechtel M-04ALO4(Q) 6 9/1/81 Drawing 3.38 Daniel AP-IV-04, " Field Change Requests" 13 10/6/82 Procedure 3.39 Bechtel Memo from J. Hurd to B. Shah 9/23/82 Internal Memo
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l 3.40 Bechtel Pipe Support Calculation ALO1-13 2 6/22/78 Calculation l 7-16 -
(3 O v/ U l 3 = theknied 9.%edt 7.3.2 - Personnel Interviewed Narne Title Orcanization Plant Design Group Supervisor Bechtel B. Shah Pipe Support Group Leader Bechtel L. DiGiacomo Pipe Stress Group Leader Bechtel R. Lee N. Kalyanain Engineer Plant Design Staff Bechtel Ingineer Plant Design Staff - Bechtel I. Shivdasami~ , . -
' Enginee'r Mech / Nuclear Group Bechtel
. - J. Canale ,,
. Mech / Nuclear Group Leader Bechtel J. Prebula -
$iping&ValveGroupLeader Bechtel
- B. Lulla
..: a
=
- . :. .- . ::: ::: : u a : .
. = .
--* 7.4 Civil and Strut. sural _ Engineer 19 7.4.1 - Documents Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 4.1 SNUPPS FSAR Section3.7.1(B)-3.7.3(B) 10 9/30/82 Seismic Design ,-
! . - 4. 2 SNUPPS FSAR Section'3.8.4 10 9/30/82
.-~.0ther Category I Structures 4.3 SNUPPS FSAR Figure 13.1-2 5 1982
~~ W E Organization Chart ,
4.4
..- Union Electric Procedure Status Index -
QA Procedures Sections QS, QA, QE - 11/8/82 Section QAC . .- - 10/13/82 Section QP - 6/2/82 4.5 Union Electric QE-303, Design Docu ent 0 3/25/74 QA Procedure Review and Design Interface Control . 4.6 Union Electric'QE-303, Desi.gn Document 9 10/13/81
#- QA . Procedure . Review and: Design Interface Control u
, 4.7 SNUPPS (NPI) 1.1, SNUPPS/NPI Staff Administrative Control 4 3/1/81 ! Procedure Procedures, Figure 1.1-1: Organization 4.8 SNUPPS (NFI) Standard Power Block - SNUPPS Document - 10/25/82 Log Release Log, pp. 752-754, 819, 882 4.9 Bechtel A-0, Architectural Design Criteria for 3 8/11/80 Criteria SNUPPS 4.10 Bechtel C-0, Civil and Structural Design Criteria 10 6/9/82 l Criteria for SNUPPS l 4.11 Bechtel Civil CDG-1, Structural Adequacy Review of 0 9/29/82 Design Structural Steel Framing for SNUPPS Guideline l 7-18
1 O o Document Rev. Date i Ref. No. Type Description / Title 1 l Bechtel Civil CDG-2 Structural Adequacy Review of : 2 12/6/82* 4.12 Design RgorSed_Conctele_ Element,s for SNUPPS Guideline C-103, Technical Specification for Forming, 0 2/21/75 4.13 Bechtel i Specification Placing, Finishing and Curing of Concrete for SNUPPS Bechtel C-103, Technical Specification for Forminh 21 9/8/82 ' 4.14 # 4 Specification Placing, Finishing and Curing of Concrete-': .
'for SNUPPS ,
,s. s.
C-103A,' Technical Specificatien for 5 5/27/80
... 4.15 Bechtel Specification', Installation of Concrete Expansion Anchor i . Bolts for SNUPPS
' 3 -103B, Technical Specification for Core 0 9/20/78 4.16 Bechtel .
Specification Drilling of Concrete Structures for SNUPPS. , C-121, Technical Specification for 13 10/28/80 4.17 Bechtel Specification Furnishing Structural Steel for SNUPPS - --
~
C-122, Technical Specification for the 11 5/2c/79 4.18 Bechtel Specification Erection of ,. Structural Steel for SNUPPS
~ _ -
.C-131 Technical Specification for the 7 14 10/25/82
- 4.19 Bechtel Specification Purchase of Itiscellaneous Metal for SNUPPSJ
- C-132, Technical Specification for Erecting 6 3/31/82 4.20 Bechtel 1
Specification Miscc11aneous Metal for SNUPPS C-134, Technical Specification for the 9 12/4/80 4.21 Eechtel Specification Purchase of Steel Anchor Bolts for SNUPPS C-202, Technical Specification for the 8 10/4/78 4.22 Bechtel
# Specification Purchase of Pipe Whip Restraints and Embedded Supports for SNUPPS C-202B, Technical Specification for Purchase 6 10/25/82 4.23 Bechtel Specification of Pipe Whip Restraints for SNUPPS MED-78-01, Manager of Engineering Directive,15 6/25/82 4.24 Bechtel Directive EDP Manual Applicability Index 52 7/30/82 Bechtel Project Engineering Procedures Manual 4.25 Index, SNUPPS pp. 7-12 a Manual Index EDP-1.1, Introduction to the EDP System 1 3/31/78 4.26 Bechtel Procedure 7-19 L . - _ _ - _ - _ _ . - - _ - . _. .. - _ - . - _ _ _ . - - _ _ - - _
O O i Document Date Description / Title Rev. Ref. No. Type Bechtel EDP-1.7, Engineering Department Procedares 2 3/31/78 4.27 Procedure Bechtel EDP-1.8, Engineering Department Procedures 0 1/20/78 4.28
. Procedure Manual Bechtel EDP-1.10. Engineering Department Project 2 3/31/78 4.29 Procedure Instructions EDPI-1.11-01, Project Engineering Procedures 1 1/15/79 4.30 Bechtel Procedure.., .
Manual .. ,
' EDP -1.1'3, Manager of Engineering Directives 2 3/31/78
.. 4.31 Bechtel
*/,
Procedure DPI-2.13-01, SNUPPS Project Organization 8 12/23/81 4.32 Bechtel ,
- Procedure
' EDPI-4.1-01, Design Criteria '5 5/12/80
. 4.33 Bechtel -
Procedure . . .._
-EDPI-4.22-01, Preparation and Control of 7 5/8/81 4.34 -
Bechtel ~ Procedure SAR
--fDPI-4.?3-01, SAR Change Control - -
9 8/25/80
- - +. 3 5 - Bechtel Procedure ..
EDPI-4.25-41, Design Interface Control 1 3/9/78 4.46 Bechtel . Procedure EDPI-4.34-01, Off-Project Design Review 4 1/15/79 4.37 Bechtel Procedure EDP-4.36, Standard Computer Programs 1 9/26/80 4.38 Bechtel Procedure EDPI-4.37-01, Design Calculations 8 1/9/,81 4.39 Bechtel Procedure E'DPI-4.41-01, Base Design Document Review, 1 5/8/78 4.40 Bechtel Procedure Approval, and Release Requirements EDPI-4.46-01, Project Engineering Drawings 17 7/30/82 4.41 Bechtel Procedure EDPI-4.47-01, Drawing Change Notice 12 9/18/81 4.42 Bechtel Procedure 7-20 1 : - _ .
O O Document Ref. No. Type Descriptio~n/ Title Rev. Date 4.43 Bechtel EDPI-4.49-01, Project Specificatiens . 11 9/18/81 Procedure 4.44 Bechtel EDPI-4.58-01, Specifying and Reviewing 4 9/18/81 Procedure Supplier Engineering and Quality Verification Documentation 4.45 Bechtel EDP-4.60, Processirg Corrective Action 3 5/31/78 Procedure Reports 4.46 5echtel' ,, EPDI-4.61-01, Nonconformance Reperts (NCR's) 14 7/30/82 Procedure . ;- ,
~
4.47 Bechtel 't.EDPI-4.62-01, Field Change Request, 13 7/3'0/82 Procedure. . Construction Variance Request, and Middle
, Third Deviation Notice 4.48 Bechtel . EDPI-4.65-01, Design Deficiency Processing' ~
4' 9/18/81
.. Procedure.
4.49 Bechtel EDPI 5.1.-01, Communications Control- .-- 6 1/9/81 Procedure , - 4.50 Bechtel EDPI 5.7-01, Project Filing System 6 5/12/80 Procedure ~ - - *. .- .- - - 4.51 Bechtel 'tDPI 5.30-01, Project Release Procedure 2 12/10/79
.- Procedure . . and Documemt Release Log -
4.52 Bechtel EDP 5.34, Project QJality Program 2 12/8/75 Procedure Indoctrination and Training 4.53 Bechtel Final Calculation 13-08-F, Auxiliary 0 8/24/81 Comp Calculation Building Floor Response Spectra 8/26/81 Ckd. 3/1/82 App. 4.54 Bechtel Final Calculation 03-53.4-F, Capacities 0 2/14/79 Comp Calculation of Embedded Plate Type EP 912A 8/17/79 Ckd. 8/17/79 App. Bechtel Final Calculation 03-107-F, Formulation of 0 7/30/81 Comp 4.55 Calculation Load Capacity Coefficients of Embedded and 7/30/81 Ckd. Replaceme.nt Plates 11/2/p App. Bechtel Final Calculation 03-109-F, Load ~ 1 1/29/82 Comp 4.56 Calculation Nomographs for Embedded and Replacement 1/29/82 Ckd. Plates 2/6/82 App. 7-21
1 O O Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date. 4.57 Bechtel Final Calculation 03-411-F, Isolation 0 12/1/81 Comp. Calculation Restraint FC-02 4.58 Bechtel a Final Calcula_ tion 03-411-F, 1sulation g- 0 11/17/82 Comp. Calculation Restraint FC-02 11/18/82 Ckd. 4.59 Bechtel Fin 4]_DJcylatj o.n 03-90.25-F, + 1 9/29/82 App, Calculation Pipe Anchor No. 0-FB01-A002/135 2 _12/14/82 App. 4.60 Bechtel C-0003, Structural Steel and Concrete 6/22/82 Dra' wing . . , General Notes ,
. +J2
.. 4.61 Bechtel C-0010,' Standard Details, Sheet No. 7 7 7/9/80 Drawing ._
4.62 Bechtel , _C-0011, Standard Details, Sheet No. 8 13 7/14/81 Drawing -
.- 4.63 Bechtel -
C-0012, Standard Details, Sheet No. 9 *13 9/18/80 Drawing 4.64 - Bechtel C-0016, Standard Details, Sheet No. 15 11 9/18/80 Drawing
- 4. 65 - Bechtel C-0017, Standard Details, Sheet.No. 21 - 11 11/6/78 Drawing ,
4.46 Bechtel . C-0018, Stan'dard Details, Sheet No. 31 9 s2/14/78 Drawing 4.67 BechtEl C-0019, Standard Details, Sheet No. 29 14 7/12/82 Drawing 4.68. Bechtel C-0020, Standard Ar.chor Bolt Details 9 4/9/82 Drawing 4.69 Bechtel C-0029, Standard Details, Sheet lio. 33 7 9/8/82 Drawing 4.70 Bechtel C-0030, Standard Details, Sheet No. 35 12 7/12/82 Drawing 4.71 Bechtel C-0033, Standard Anchor Bolts Schedule 12 1/21/82 Drawing 4.72 Bechtel C-0035, Standard Details, Sheet No. 24 15 2/23/81 Drawing 7-22
. '. 0 0 Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 4.73 Bechtel C-0037, Standard Details, Sheet No. 34, 16 11/12/82 Drawing 4.74 Bechtel C-0C0241, Condenser Storage and Deminer- 9 6/22/82 Drawing alized Water Tanks, Concrete Neat Line and Reinforcing 4.75 Bechtel C-0408, Cable Tray Supports Typical 11 10/17/82 Drawing Details, Sheet 8 4.76 5echtel ,,
t'-0418, Cable Tray Supports, Typical 9 10/18/82
- --- Drawing -
.; Details,, Sheet 18 4.77 Bechtel */. C-0419, Cable Tray Supports Typical 7 6/14/82 Drawing . . Details, Sheet 19 4.78 Bechtel ' 3-0C1113, Auxiliary Building Concrete, 6 4/21/80 Drawing . Plan-Floor El 1974'-0" ,,
4.79 Bechtel C-OR1151, Auxiliary Building Area 5 6 1/29/82 Drawing Reinforcing, Plan at Elev. 1974', 19890 - and 2000' 4.80 Bechtel C-001151, Auxiliary Building Area 5, 19 1/12/82
~- ' Drawing Concrete Neat Lines,' Plan at Elev.1974', -
.1989' and 2000' 4 ,81 Bechtel .
C-0C1352, Auxiliary Building Area 5, 16 8/24/82 Drawing Concrete Neat Lines, Plan at Elev. 2013'-6", 2026' and 2090' 4.82 Bechtel C-051352, Auxiliary Building, Area 5, 5 8/3/82 Drawing Structural Steel Framing Plans, Elev. 1989', 2000', 2013'-6" and 2C26' 4.83 Bechtel C-0C1353, Auxiliary Building, Area 5 8 9/1/82 Drawing Concrete fleat Line, Plan of Embeds, Underside of Slab at Elev. 2026' 4.84 Bechtel C-051452, Auxiliary Building, Area 5, 5 8/26/82 Drawing Structural Steel Framing Plans, Elev. 2037'-7-i", 2042', 2055'-6" and 2090' Bechtel C-0R1905, Auxiliary Building Reinforcing 6 12/28/80 4.85 Drawing Sections and Details, Sheet 4 Bechtel C-0R1906, Auxiliary Building Reinforcing, 4 3/20/80 4.86 Drawing Sections and Details, Sheet 6
- 7-23
O O Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 4.101 Bechtel M-06ALO3, Hanger No. 0-ALO3-C009/135Q 2 9/1/81 Drawing 4.102 Bechtel M-06ALO3, Hanger No. 0-ALO3-C010/135Q 0 9/1/81 Drawing 4.103 Bechtel Embedded Plate Location.R.equest - Plate 0 11/21/81 Drawing ho. 14807 4.104 Bechtel M-06ALO3, Hanger No. 0-ALO3-C011/135Q 0 9/1/81 Dra' wing , ,
.,.. 4.105 Bechtel 'Embedde'd P. late. Location Request - Plate
~ ~ ~
0 11/21/81 Drawing ;,No. 14808
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4.106 Bechtel ' 'alculation C ALO3-15, Hanger 0-ALO3-C003/ 4 6/29/81
. Calculation435Q
.. 4.107 Bechtel - ' Calculation ALO3-26 Hanger 0-ALO3-C010/ ^ 'O 7/2/81 Calculation 135Q 4.108 . Bechtel -M-06FB01, Anchor No. 0-FB01-A002/135Q 1 10/9/79 Drawing 2 (inprocess)
--- 4.10 9 - Bechtel --44-26ALOh Anchor No.- 2ALO1-A002/1250 0 7/20/82 Drawing ,,
4 110 SNllPPS ,
. SLNRC 79-1.1, Response to IEB 79-02, Rev.1 7/5/79 Letter ,
4.111 Bechtel DCN No. C-0003-8-5 8/10/77 C awing (nange Notice 4.112 Bechtel DCN No. C-0003-26-1 8/?3/82 Drawing Change Notice 4.113 Bechtel DCN No. C-0003-26-2 9/2/82 Drawing Change Notice 4.114 Bechtel DCN No. C-0003-26-3 10/18/82 Drawing Change Notice 7-25
O O Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 4.87 Bechtel C-0C1924, Auxiliary Building Concrete 17 7/16/82 Drawing Neat Lines and Reinforcing, Wall Elevations, Sheet 24
. 4.88 Bechtel C-0C1928, Auxiliary Building, Concrete 10 7/16/82 Drawing Neat Lines and Reinforcing, Wall.
Elevations, Sheet 28 4.89 Bechtel C-0C1931, Auxiliary Building, Concrete 14 11/1/82 Drawing Neat Lines and Reinforcing, Wall Elevations, Sheet 6 ,
.. 4.90 Bechtel 'C-0C193'2, Auxiliary Building, Concrete 13 7/16/82 Drawing 'l, Neat Lines and Reinforcing, Wall
. Elevations, Sheet 5
- 4.91 Bechtel ' 3-0C1942, Auxiliary Building, Concrete 5 12/3/79 Drawing .
Neat Lines and Reinforcing, Equipment ~
- Pads, Sheet 2 4.92 Bechtel C-054481, Turbine Building, Area 8 -- -- 7 8/14/80 Drawing -Structural Steel Framing Plan at Elevation 2035' and 2017'-9"
-- +.93 Bechtel --1-03FC02; Isolation festraints,. - -
0 1/26/82 Drawing . Auxiliary Turbine System, Auxiliary i 7/22/E2 Building . 2 11/5/82 4.94 Bechtel M-03ALO1, Piping Isometric, Auxiliary 9 Drawing Feedwater Pumps, Suction Piping 4.95 Bechtei M-03ALO4, Piping Isometric, Turbine Driven 7 Drawing Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Piping l
- 4.96 Bechtel M-03ALO5, Piping Isometric, Auxiliary 9 Drawing Feedwater Pumps Retirculation Piping M-06ALO4, Hanger No. 0- ALO4-C009/1350 4 6/29/81 4.97 Bechtel Drawing M-06ALO1, Hanger No. 0-ALO1-R005/135Q 2 9/21/78
- 4.98 Bechtel l Drawing M-06ALOI, Hanger No. 0-AL01-H001/135Q 3 9/20/78 l
4.99 Bechtel a Drawing M-06ALO3, Hanger No. 0-ALO3-C004/135Q 2 9/1/81. l , 4.100 Bechtel l Drawing 7-24
Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 4.115 Bechtel DCN No. C-0003-26-4 11/8/82 Drawing Change Notice 4.116 Field Change FCR No. 2FC-1098-C 10/18/82 Request . 4.117 Field Change FCR No. 2FC-1110-C 10/18/82
' Request 4.118 Nie~1dChange FCR No. 2FC-1121-CX ,- 11/5/82 Request -- - . -
4.119 Field Change .' FCR No. 2FC-1152-C 11/5/82 Request . . 4.120 fientonformance NCR No. 25N-6306-C 7/27/82 Report , 4.121 Nonconformance NCR No. 25N-6360-CX 8/11/82 Report - 4.122 Nonconformance NCR No. 25N-6594-C 10/29/82 Report
- - - - = . . ;: :: : ,
4.123 t'onconformance,NCR No. 25N-6737-C 10/28/82 Report
- - = u l 4.124 Nor.conformance NCR No. 25N-6847-C 11/5/82 l Report f 1974 i .H5 A';51 ANSI N45.2.11 S m. card 4.126 NRC RG 1.64 2 June 1976 l Re;ulatory Guic's l
4.127 Bechtel R. L. Burris to L. Rotondo on seismic 5/4/82 Internal calculations for the as-built power Memo block structures I 7-26 L
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- 7. Y = 0v;I 4 .,shird .a,-j .
7.4.2 - Personnel Interviewed Title Organizatien Name Union Electric Company William H. Zvanut Supervising Engineer Union Electric Company Don B. Stecko Engineer Union Electric Company Supervising Engineer / Ken W. Kuechenneister Construction Union Electric Company Supervising Engineer Union Electric Company J. R. Veatch Construction Engineer Wayne Steinberg Consultant to Union Cliff J. Plows Quality Engineer Electric Company Nuclear Projects, Inc. Eugene F. Beckett Panager, Technical Services Bechtel (Gaithersburg)
, D ief, Civil-Structural ,
Ken Y. Lee - ..
-- .. Engineer Bechtel (Gaithersburg)
.--.. Eugene W. Thomas
' Group S'upervisor, Civil-
. Structural Staff Bechtel (Gaithersburg)
James A. Ivany Civil-Structural Group
, ., Supervisor Bechtel (Gaithersburg) divil-Structural Group
- Peter A. Labarta Leader - Special Prob'lems Bechtel (Gaithersburg)
Dwight M. Cornell - Civil-Structural Group Leader - Special Problems Bechtel (Gaithersburg) Civil-Structural Group Gerald D. Brown
' Leader - Auxiliary Building Bechtel (Gaithersburg)
Civil-Structural Graup Robert L. Burris Leader - Seismic Bechtel (Gaithersburg) tarry Nagielski *' dCivil-Sttucturai Er.gineer -
. Auxiliary Building Bechtel (Gaithersburg)
Plant Design Group Bhupesh G. Shah
. Supervisor. Bechtel (Gaithersburg)
William A. Poppe Mechanical-Nuclear Group Leader - Power Cor. version Bechtel Site Liaison Assistant Project Lead Nick Cherish Site Liaison Engir.eer Engineering Bechtel Site Liaison Andy S. Wilkin Lead Civil-Structural Site Engineering Liaison Engineer l M 7-27 mm
O o
-- e 7. 5 Electrical Power 1.5.1 - Documents Document Date Type Description / Title Rev.
Ref. No. Bechtel Test S-04PA01,13.8KV Systems Pre-Op Test 1 3/28/80 5.1 Procedure Procedure , L'nion Electric CS-04PA01,13.8KV Systems Pre-Op Test 0 7/21/82 5.2 Test Procedure Procedure , 5aniel AP-IV/AP.1, 9, Material Control Function / 5/24/82 5.3 . . , International- Warehouse Procedures '
.,. Procedure [
Union ElectriAComputer Listing of all IE Bulletins, 11/82 5.4 Computer , Circulars and Infomation Notices with
- Listing
, follow-up Information , ,
Union Electric Request for Clarification of Infomation 12/8/82
-- 5.5 RCI . ...
-Memo from J. H. Smith " Procedure for RCI" 11/5/82 5.6 -
Bechtel . Internal Memo- .
- BLWE-810. " Safe Shutdown Design Criteria and- 1/26/78 t.7 - Bechtel -
Letter .HRC Fire Protection Questions"
~
SNP-1722,l' Safe Shutdown" s3/15/78 SA Westinghouse Letter i 10/3/78 5.9 L'estinghouse SNP-2027, " Safe Shutdown Letter BLSE-7110. " Safe Shutdown" Meeting Notes of 4/18/79 5.10 Bechtel Letter 4/10/79 BLWP-514, " Safe Shutdown Modifications" 8/10/79 5.11 Bechtel Letter BLWE-1061, " Safe Shutdown Modifications 8/20/79 5.12 Bechtel Letter BLWE-1081, " Order Confirmation for Item 5" 9/27/79 5.13 Bechtel Letter ia CN-9415, Change Control f9415 for Item 5 10/3/79 l 5.14 Westinghouse Internal Memo 1 7-28
, 1 Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 5.15 Westinghouse SNP-3360, " Drawing Change Notice to : 5/21/80 Letter Bechtel" l 5.16 Bechtel BLWP-534, Order fcr "Q" PORVs 1/9/80 Letter 5.17 Bechtel BLWE-1555, List of Outstanding Items 12/8/81 Letter 5.18 Westinghouse .DWG #7250D64 SH. 17 and 18 Drawing . , . .
=
* =:.
...5.19
. Westinghouse DWG #87'56D37, SH. 12 Drawing '.%
- s 5.20 NPI Letter , . .SLBE 79-853, Regarding BFD Relays (IE 11/8/79 1ulletin 79-25) 5.21 Bechtel -
BLSE 79-57, No BFD Relay Used in SNUPPS 1/17/80 Letter Design a - v 5.22 - NPI Letter, 'SLBE-887, Failure of Gate Type VV. to 8/25/81 Close Against Differential Pressure (IEBulletin81-02) 5.23 Bechtel .BLSE-10, 014, Based on Westinghouse ~ - 11/13/81 Letter Letter SNP(s)-675 Dated 10-27-81 on
. IE Bullette.81-02 -
5.24 NPI Letter SLT 7-236, File-J-201, Cold Shutdown from 11/7/77 Outside the Control Room 5.25 NPI Letter SLT 81-182, Agreement Between Bechtel, 11/30/81 NPI, W on Auxiliary Shutdown Panel, Instriimentation and Control Isolation 5.26 NPI File 02-78-10 Master File, Bulletin and Ir.fomation Notice List and Follow-up Record 5.27 Bechtel J-201-2-3, Supplier Deviation Disposition 10/27/79 Standard Fom Request (SDDR) for specification change 5.28 Bechtel J-201-2-11,' SDDR for specification change 1/22/80 Standard Form 5.29 Bechtel Log Book for All SCDRs with Follow-up List Record
- c. 7-29
6 o o Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 5.30 Bechtel BLSE-10849, Checklist Summarizing 8/03/82 Letter NUREG-0588 Requirerents 5.31 Bechtel Letter to Anchor / Darling Forwarding 11/15/82
. Letter Open Items on Qualification of Valve Operators ,
5.32 Bechtel FCR - Field Change Request 10/27/82 Standard Form 5.33 dechtel .. IICN #E-OR2421(Q)-13-2 and DWG #E-OR2421(Q)
~ Design Change Incorporating FCR of reference 5.32 -
. . . . Notice 5.34 Bechtel . Ra ceway Schedule E-25000, E-05000, E-25000 11/82 Ccmputer , ,_
- Printout - --
.- 5.35 Bechtel -
BLSE-8561, Relay Setting for Site Feeders 3/5/80 Letter .. 5.36 - KG&E Letter -KNLS-099, Relay Setting for Site Feeders 10/15/80 5.37 Bechtel Floor Response Spectra (FRS), ESWS Pump 6/15/79 Internal Memo ftouse WMf Creek Site (KG&E/XCPL) 5.38 Bechtel 'FRS, UHS Cooling Tower Callaway Site (U.E.) 9/1/78 n
.- Internal Memo- :.
i 5.39 Bechtel E-025, Valve Actuater Specification, Specification Attachment Specification to M223-0051 (Check and Gate VV. Spec.) 5.40. Bechtel BLWE-1560, FILE 10,581, Isolation of 12/28/81 Letter Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Instrumentation - Westinghouse Instrumentation 5.41 Limitorque M-223A-0051-01, Environmental Qualification 12/10/76 Report Report on Limitorque Valve Operator 5.42 Gould E-018-0043-04, Seismic Qualification 6/2/78 Report Report for the Motor Control Centers Union Electric E09 (4, Preliminary Report Callaway 13.8 kV 10/26/81 5.43 Letter Fault 5.44 Union Electric ULS-3901 Site Feeder Parameters 12/8/81 Letter Callaway Plant NPI Letter . SLO 81-211, File 0491.102/E-009 12/9/81 5.45 , 7-30
. O O Document Description / Title Rev. Date Ref. No. Type Bechtel Trip Report, W. Heinmiller .
12/10/81 5.46 Trip Report 5.47 Bechtel F2, Sizing of Cable Calculation 5.48 Bechtel F3, Cable Derating Calculation 5.49 Bechtel F7, Minimum Cable Size for Fault Current Galculation Withstand ,
. , ~ . .-- ..
.,. 5.50 Corponent ~' 0konite' Cable Data Book Data Book *:.
A7, Fault Current Calculations 0 S.51 Bechtel
- Calculation 47-
~-
.. 5.52 Bechtel - ' A3, Fault Current Calculations Calculation .
B5, Power System Voltage Drops 0 In 5.53 Bechtel Process Calculatio'n
-,66, Conttol System Voltage Drops. A In
~ -fr. 5 4 - Bechtel -
Process Calculation ,.
. F9, Fault Lurrent Calculation Motor Control 1 ~10/22/82
.5 55 Bechtel .
, Calculation Centers J-201, Shutdown Panel Specification 7 5.56 Bechtel Specification 5.57 Gould/ CC-323.74-1/#E/018/0189, Gould Qualification Summary Report for Class 1E Equipment 6 5/24/81
- Bechtel i Qualification Report EDPI-5.16-01, Supplier Document Control 8 5.58 Bechtel Procedure EDPI-4.58-01, Vendor Data Review Procedures 4 9/27/81 5.59 Bechtel Procedure E-091.0 (Q), Seismic Testing Criteria 4 5/25/76 5.60 Bechtel Test Criteria 5.61 Underwriters UL508, Industrial Control Equipment Magnetic Laboratories (NLDX2) 7-31
o O
?
s Document Ref. No. 'lype Description /Titi, Rev. Date 5.62 Underwriters Laboratories General Information From Electrical 5/78 Construction Materials Directory 5.63 Bechtel Drawing E-03ALO5A (Q), Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 0 Air Operated Discharge Control 7/7/82 5.64 Bechtel ' Curves E-01021, Time-Current Characteristic Curves 5.65 Bechtel Gur'ves _ Sheet 5. Time-Current Characteristic rurves 2
.-- 5.66 Bechtel Curves * ' Sheet 6 Time-Current Characteristic
.. Curves 4
' .~
5.67 Bechtel
, ,. Sheet 7, Time-Current Characteristic 5 Curves -Curves 5.68 Bechtel -
Curves Sheet 8 Time-Current Characteristic Curves '5 a 5.69 - Bechtel s ,. v. Sheet 9, Time-Current Characteristic 4 Curves Curves
- J.r. 70 ' Bechtel Curves .u x -/,.Cu Sheet rve s 10ri Time-Current Characteristic :4 5e71 Daniels .
MN21-B03802, Shipping Request International 10/22/82 Shipping Request ' 5.72 Bechtel Letter Bechtel to Daniels (Pam Nelson to 9/7/82 Joe Candrel) 5.73 Westinghouse 8756037 Sheets 6, 11, 34, SNUPPS Process 8 Diagrams Control Diagrams 10/26/82 5.74 Westinghouse 7246D92, Sheet 17, SNUPPS Process Control Diagrams External 1 5.75 Westinghouse 7246D92 Sheet 3, Wiring Diagrams 10 Diagrams 10/26/82 5.76 Westinghouse SNP-4981, PIP' Transmittal Letter Letter 11/11/82 7-32 l t
O O Document _Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 5.77 Westinghouse WRM-ADM-210.6, Task Status System : 0 7/1/80 Status Report 5.78 NUREG NUREG-0588, Interim Staff Position on 7/31/81 Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment 5.79 Bechtel E-018 for Motor Control Center Specification 5.80 Bechtel .. lf-3, Voltage Drops . 1 7/17/81
-:. Calculation ~ , , ,
5.81 IEEE 'l,IEEE Std 399, Recomended Practice for Power Standard , , System Analysis 5.82 IEEE - 'MIEEE Std 141, Recomended Practice for 1976 Standard . Electrical Power Distr;ibution in Industrial Plants 5.83 Union 2SN-6678-M, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - - - 10/8/82 Electric Non Turbine Trip and Throttle Valve Conformanc'e Report 5.84 Return ,from P. Nelson to J. Candrel, P.O. - 9/7/82 Material Form 10466-M-021-2, Limitorque Trip and
- . . Throttle Valves- --
~
5.85 NRC 82-02 Bulletin 5.86 NRC 79-25 Bulletin 5.87 NRC 81-02 Bulletin 5.88 Regulatory 1.139, " Design Requirements of the Residual Guide Heat Removal System 5.89 ANSI N45.2.2, " Packaging, Shipping, Receiving 1972 Standard Storage and Handling of Items for Nuclear Power Plants 5.90 Union MN21 B03802 10/8/82 Electric Material Shipping Report 7-33
m _. _ m 1_.i - _
. . O O
- 7. 5 = al s ;<.1 po m 7.5.2 - Persohnel Interviewed Name _ Title Organization D. Schnell Vice President Union Electric Compar.y D. Capone Manager, Nelear Engineering Union Electric Company W. Katterhenry Power Systems Engineer Union Electric Company S. Hillman I&C Engineer Union Electric Company W. Weber Site Superintendent Union Electric Company Al Passwater Supt. Licensing Union Electric Company W. H. Maryer Elect. Consultant Union Electric Company D. Pruitt Site Staff Union Electric, Company K. Kuechenneister QA Union Electr
.-Westinghouse)< Company P. Burre110- . . . .
-C.'Vitalbo ~
Westinghouse-
.- -Jim Swogger Project' Engineer, SNUPPS Westinghouse Phil Barilla Shiftdown Panel In Charge Westinghouse Tim Kitchen Process Rack In Charge (18C) Westinghouse Phil Marasco Process Rack In Charge (I&C) Westinghouse D. Schwartz CablerTerminations Engineer.
R. Moreno Lead EE Liaison Bechtel Site. . P. Schwartz I&C Systems Engineer Bechtel Site D. Quattrociocchi PE-Electrics 1/CS Bechtel Gaithersburg M. Tantawi - Supervisor-Electrical Group Bechtel Gaithersburg W. Heinmiller .Supefvisor-Power Systems Bechtel Gaithersburg D. Doan Electrical Engineer Bechtel Gaithersburg - J. Kohler Deputy Supervisor-Electrical Bechtel Gaithersburg Gfbuf' J. Hurd Supervisor-Mechanical Group Bechtel Gaithersburg J. Prebula Deputy Supervisor.-Mechanical / e - Nuclear Group :- Bechtel Gaithersburg: B. Seam Facilitics/ Site Group Leader, SNUPPS Mechanical / Nuclear Group Bechtel Gaithersb'urg P. Burris Civil-Structural Group Leader-Seismic Bechtel Gaithersburg A. Hassan Group Leader Electrical Group Bechtel Gaithersburg D. Abel Engineer Bechtel Gaithersburg P. Ward Licensing Bechtel Gaithersburg Marco Hechavarria Quality Engineer Bechtel Gaithersburg Anthony Diperna Supervisor, Control System Bechtel Gaithersburg Stan J. Seiken Manager, Quality Assurance NPI Dr. J. Cermak Manager, Nuclear Safety NPI F.Schwoerer Technical Director NPI M. Fennetau Sales Engineer Gould C&S Division 7-34
1
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- \
i
% 7.6 Instrumentation and Centrol 7.6.1 Documents
, Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title _ Rev. Date 6.1 Bechtel 10466-J-601A(Q) Design Specification fer 13 10/17/80 Design Nuclear Service Control Valves Specification 6.2 ESA.R S.ection 9.3 Process Auxiliaries
, 7 9/81
-4.3 FSAR --
Section 7.4 Systems Required' for Safe 3hutdowri 1 9/80 6.4 Bechtel : 10466-J-601A-099-01HV-12ControlValve 8/19/77 Vendor Data. Vendor Data 6.5 IEEE . 1EEE STD 323-1974 Qualffying Class IE 1974 Standard - Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Statiens 6.6 Bechtel 10466-J-601A-0102-04 Environmental Test Plan , C 1/21/80
' Qualification Test Plan
~ f. 7 -
Bechtel -" *10466-J-067-05 Seismfc Qualification Test Test Plan E 3/29/78 Plan - 6,4 IEEE . IEEE Std 344 Seismic Qualification of Class .1975 Standard IE Equipment 6.9 Bechtel 10466-J-601A-0148-03 Seismic Qualification Test Report C 3/3/82 Test Report , 6.10 Bechtcl 10466-J-601A-0163-01 Supplementary Seismic 8/23/82 Qualification 6.11 Bechtel 10466-J-601A-0158-01 Environmental Test 4/9/82 6.12 Bechtel 10466-SK-J-103(Q)Modificationsand N 3/31/82 Additions to the Ir.strument Loops 6.13 Bechtel 10466-J-000 Control Systems Design Criteria 8 1/26/78 Design Criteria
- 6.14 Bechtel 10466-QA-1 Specification of General 4 10/15/75 Specification Requirements for Supplier QA Progras 7-35
,, -----v--.- " ~ - ~ " "
O O Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title , Rev. Date 6.15 Westinghouse V-7 Subsection 7 - Auxiliary Feedwater 2 ./73 8 Specification System 6.16 Bechtel M-02ALO1(Q) Piping and Instrument Diagram 11 9/21/82 Drawing Auxiliary Feedwater System . 6.17 Bechtel 10466-J-110-0350-03 Auxiliary Feedwater 3 2/15/79 Drawing Flow Control - Turbine Driven AFP to S. team Generator D .
--6.18 Bechtel - -E-03ALOS.A(Q) Auxiliary Feed?later Pumps. 0 7/7/82
.-- Drawing ,, Discharge Control Air Oper. Valves
'~
6.19 Bechtel - -10466-J-110-0356-03 Auxiliary Feedwater 3 2/19/79 Drawing . . Flow Control - Motor Driven AFP B to Steam (Tenerator C 6.20 Bechtel J-02ALO1A(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System 'O 11/11/82 Drawing Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pumps , ,, 6.21 - Bechtel . E-03ALO1B(Q) Motor Driven Aux Feedwater 0 7/7/82 Drawing ' Pump B
-" 6.22 ' Bechtel "" 'EOPI 4.46201 Project Tngineering Drawings $17 5/21/82 Procedure .
6(23 Bechtel . E-02NF01(Q): Load Shedding and Emergency Load 2 12/7/77 Dri. wing Sequencing Logic , 6.24 Buchtel E-03ALO1B(Q) Motor Driven Auxiliary 0 7/7/82 Drawing Feedwater Pump B 6.25 Bechtel J-02ALO1(Q) Auxiliary Feedwater System Motor 3 1/27/82 Drawing Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 6.26 Bechtel J-02FC19(Q) Auxiliary Turbines SGFP Turbines 0 2/16/82 Drawing ESFAS Block Control Logic Diagram 6.27 Bechtel E-03FC27(Q) SGFP Turbines A&B Isolation 2 5/5/82 Drawing Input To ESFAS 6.28 Bechtel E-03ALO4A(Q) Supply from ESS Service Water 0 7/7/82 Drawing System 6.29 Bechtel E-03ALO4B(Q) Supply from ESS Service Water 0 7/7/82 Drawing System 7-36 t -
l O O Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date 6.30 Bechtel E-03ALO2A(Q) Motor Operated Valves 0 Drawing 7/7/82 6.31 Bechtel E-03ALO2B(Q) Potor Operated Valves 0 Drawing 7/7/82 6.32 Bechtel J104(Q) Technical S;ecification for 12 8/11/82 Specification Cngineered Safety Features Actuation Sy, stem
-6.33 Bechtel '- '
1 5 4/19/82
. . . Specification ,J110(Q) Major and Controls Electronic Instrumentation Package 6.34 Bechtel i J-301(Q) Electronic Pressure and 11 9/30/82 Specificatiqn.Qifferential Pressure Transmitters 6.35 Bechtel . J-104-0147-08 LSELS IE ' Relay Allocation , 4/11/78 Drawing -
6.36 Bechtel J-104-0042-12 Actuation Outputs - Channel 10/26/82 Crawing , 6.37 Bechtel J-104-0034-12 Actuation Outputs - Channel 1
-- 8/4/82 Drawing 6.38 Bechtel 5bPI-4.37-01DesignCalculations 8 1/7/81
- Procedure . -
6.39 Bechtel J-435(Q) Orifice Plates for Nuclear Class 2 13' 7/15/82 Specification and 3 Piping Systems 6.40 Bechtel ME-223-001 Calculation Verification of 0 11/4/80 Calculation Computer Program ME 223 Thin Edge Orifice Plates 6.41 Bechtel J-435 Calculation Orifice Type Flow Elements 0 11/29/82 Calculation 6.42 Bechtel 7250D64 Sheet 15 - SNUPPS Projects Functional 3 Drawing Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Startup 6.43 Bechtel 7250D64 Sheet 7 2 Drawing 6.44 Bechtel 7250D64 Sheet 15 4 Drawing 7-37 L
O O t Document Ref. No. Type Description / Title Rev. Date i 6.45 B?.chtel 7250064 Sheet 8 3 Drawing ] 6.46 Bechtel' 7243D59 Sheet 1 Solid State Protection 7 Drawing System SNUPPS Projects Interconnection Diagram 6.47 Bechtel M-23rA47 Small Piping Isometric N2 1 J/10/82 Drawing Be,ck-up Gas Supply Auxiliary Building
-6.48 Technical -.. Technica,1 Bulletin - '
.. Bu11etii ,,
6.49 Westinghouse $lestinghouse Letter to SNUPPS Letter ., 6.50 Bechtel . 02ALOS , ,0' Log 1c - Diagram
. ~ . .. .
6.51 - Bechtel 02ALO6 0 Logic Diagram 6.52 Bechtel 02ALO7 0 Logic .
.- Diagram .- - - - -
l 6.53 Bechtel EDPI'4.41-01, " Base Design Document Review, 1' Procedure Approval, and Release Requirements l 6.54 Bechtel JIGEN Procedure 6.55 Union QS-14, " Preparation, Review and Document 2 9/23/82 Electric Control of Safety Analysis Reports and Procedure Subsequent Changes" i l l 7-38
. O O ,
- 7. 6 : L,sfrm, 46 + CenYr= /- ,
7.6.2 Personnel Interviewed Name Title Organization . Tony Diperna CS Group Supervisor Bechtel D. R. Quattrociocchi Project Engineer Bechtel A. Hassan Electrical Engir:eer Bechtel W. A. Poppe Group Leader, Mech / Nuclear Bechtel G. P. Schwartz Control Sys. Site Liaison Bechtel P. Trimbach Bechtel
- 1. Tessier Startup Testing Bechtel B. Vich . Group Leader, Control Sys. Group Bechtel D. Grove s s , Grdup Leader, Control sys. Group -
Bechtel
-4. J. Milos -
Project Quality Engineer Bechtel'
. , . . . R. P. Wendling Silpervisfng Engineer, Nuclear Union Electric Company T. H. McFarland ' Superintendent, Site Liaison
. Union Electric Company R. J. Schukai :. General Manager, Engineering Union. Electric Company K. W. Kuechenneister , Su,pv. Engr., UE Construction Union Electric Company D. MacIsaac Startup Engineer ~
Union Electric Company S. Hogan. .QA Engineer Union Electric Company
- D. Brady -
Startup Program Coordinator Union Electric Company R. Cothren Consulting Engineer Union Electric Company R. Huston - Startup Test Coordinator tinion Electric Company R. Veatch , Supervising Engineer Union Electric Company A. Sassani Consulting Engineer Union Electric Company R. Trimbach Supervisor, Metrology Union Electric Company
-- P. Maddy -
-Gensulting' Engineer -
- Union Electric Company W. Minerich . ,.
Union Electric Company W. Spezialetti Manager, Plant Licensing Westinghouse
. J< Swogger . . SNUPPS Project Engineer Westinghouse - . . .
P. Barilla Eng... Chem. & Waste Process Sys. Westinghouse N. Beck Engineer, Fluid System Design Westinghouse' Steven T. Maher Systems Engineer Westinghouse Frank Thomson Engineer Westinghouse
- S. J. Seiken QA Manager w Nuclear Projects, Inc.
I 7-39
O O l s 7.7 Other Information
" 7.7.1 - Chronoloov '
10/20/82 Team memters be5an study of background information and preparation of inspection plans. 10/22/82 Team meeting . 11/4/82 Team' meeting , ! 11/10/82 Entranc6'seeting at Union Electric Inspection at Union Electric
~
- 11/11/82 Entrance ieeting at construction site Inspection at construction site ,,
11/12/82 Inspection at Union Electric - Exitmeetjng' 11/15/82 Entrance meeting at Nuclear Projects, Inc. . Inspection at Nuclear Projects, : Inc.
;,- - .- . .v::. e : . a: :: . .
11/16/82 Inspection;at Nuclear Projects, Inc. Entrance meeting at Bechtel Fower Corporation .
..~- '
11/17/82 Inspeetion at.Bechtei Power Corporation to 11/19/82 Exit meeting (11/19/82) 11/29/82 Inspection at Bechtel Power Corporation to 12/3/82 Exit meeting (12/3/82) 12/6/82 Inspection at constracilon_ sit _e to 12/8/82 Exitmeeting(12/8/82) , 12/9/82 Entrance meeting at Westingheuse Electric Inspection at Westinghouse Electric (some team members at Union Electric) e 7-40 L
\*
o . o R 12/10/E2 Inspection at Westinghouse Electric Exit meeting (someteammembersatBechtel) 12/13/82 Inspection at Bechtel Power Corporation to g 12/14/82 (someteammembersonly) 1/20/82 Team neeting
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the nw engineer is assiv.ed typical erk. When osked if' .the t.raininj. class . i.- n:tes could be . reviewed l P. 4.aMM[oT the Bechtel staf f indicated that no . :i. ' . .
- tom:1 Soments,Jexisted.]t should be noted that tMs training prcqra: has- . 'm : .
. 6aly recer.tly~ (vithin.the.past two or three. years) been tvailableD, fio. :- ' - - . ---.y t
,_ind _ icstica of the effectiveness of this program was presented. Also.a.note .
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