ML20080C699
| ML20080C699 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 08/24/1983 |
| From: | Slaten N UNION ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080C696 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8308290164 | |
| Download: ML20080C699 (23) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY
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Docket No. STN 50-483 OL
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(Callaway Plant, Unit 1)
)
APPLICANT'S TESTIMONY OF NEAL G.
SLATEN IN RESPONSE TO REED CONTENTIONS 6 AND 16 (PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AGAINST RADIOIODINES AND MESSAGES WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR LONG-TERM SHELTERING) 8308290164 830824 PDR ADOCK 05000483 Y
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1 Q.1 Please state your name.
2 A.1 Neal G.
Slaten.
3 Q.2 Mr. Slaten, by whom are you employed?
4 A.2 Union Electric Company, St. Louis, Missouri.
5 Q.3 What is your position and what are your current 6
responsibilities?
7 A.3 As the Supervising Engineer - Environmental, my 8
normal responsibility is to direct the corporate Environmental 9
and Health Physics Group, which at present consists of two 10 health physicists and two engineers.
My duties include:
sup-11 porting federal, state and local licensing activities; re-12 viewing radwaste, shielding and radiation monitoring system en-13 gineering design work; establishing and evaluating off-site 14 radiological environmental monitoring programs; establishing 15 corporate ALARA policy; reviewing conformance to radiological 16 technical specifications; and other duties related to health 17 physics and environmental assessment.
18 In the event of a Site or General Emergency at the 19 Callaway Plant, I will serve as the Radiological Assessment 20 Coordinator.
My duties in that position would include:
21 evaluating and relaying radiological information to the Union 22 Electric Recovery Manager concerning the need to make protec-23 tive action reccmmendations to off-site authorities; ensuring 24 the coordination of Union Electric's off-site field monitoring 25 activities with the off-site monitoring conducted by State and
1 Federal officials; and ensuring that the Recovery Manager is 2
kept appraised of field monitoring results and off-site dose 3
assessment.
4 Q.4 Please summarize your professional qualifications 5
and your experience with the Callaway Plant.
6 A.4 I have a Bachelor of Science degree in Aerospace En-7 gineering from St. Louis University, and a Master of Science 8
degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Missouri 9
at Columbia.
I was first employed by Union Electric Company in 10 1972 as an engineer with responsibilities in the areas of li-11 censing and nuclear steam supply system design review for the 12 Callaway Plant.
In 1978 I was appointed as a Nuclear Environ-13 mental Engineer, and in 1980 I attained my present position of 14 Supervising Engineer, Environmental.
A complete statement of 15 my professional qualifications is appended as Attachment 1 to 16 this testimony.
17 Q.5 Mr. Slaten, please describe the purpose of your tes-18 timeny.
19 A.5 I understand Reed Contentions 6 and 16 in part to 20 challenge the effectiveness of sheltering and of ad hoc respi-21 ratory protection as protective actions in the event of a 22 release of radioactive material, including radioiodine, from 23 the Callaway Plant.
The purpose of my testimony is to 24 establish the effectiveness of those protective actions.
In 25 addition, I will show that appropriate inctructions will be 1
provided to the affected public on the implementation of these 2
protective actions.
3 Q.6 If an accident were to occur, what health risks 4
would be posed?
5 A.6 As a result of a reactor accident which results in a 6
significant atmospheric release of radioactive material, the 7
public may receive radiation doses from three exposure modes.
8 These include:
(1) exposure to external radiation as the plume 9
passes; (2) exposure to external radiation from radionuclides 10 deposited on the ground and other surfaces during and after 11 cloud passage; and, (3) internal exposure due to radionuclides 12 inhaled from the passing cloud.
Thus, protective actions to 13 reduce exposure should be considered for the direct external 14 exposure and inhalation exposure pathways during cloud passage, 15 and for external exposure pathways after cloud passage.
Of 16 course, with respect to radioiodines, the inhalation pathway 17 would be most important.
18 Q.7 Please describe the role sheltering might play as a 19 protective action.
20 A.7 Sheltering may be defined as a deliberate action by 21 the public to take advantage of the inherent radiation 22 shielding available in normally inhabited structures by re-23 maining indoors, away from doors and windows, during and after 24 the passage of the cloud of released radioactive material.
In-25 herent structural shielding can afford protection against 1
exposure to external sources.
Furthermore, the exclusion of a 2
significant amount of airborne radioactive material from the 3
interior of a structure, either by natural effects or certain 4
ventilation strategies, can reduce the amount of inhaled 5
radionuclides as well.
Actions taken to effectively shelter 6
would not vary according to the duration of time one expected 7
to stay indoors.
8 Q.8 Under what circumstances would the public in the 9
plume exposure pathway be directed to take shelter?
10 A.8 Pursuant to the State of Missouri Nuclear Accident 11 Plan -- Callaway, the Bureau of Radiological Health ("BRH") has 12 the responsibility to recommend to the other State and local 13 response organizations the initiation of protective actions.
14 Sheltering is simply one of a number of protective actions 15 available to BRH to recommend if conditions warrant such 16 action.
17 The decision to initiate a protective action may be a 18 complex process with the necessity to weigh the benefits of 19 taking such action against the risks.
Because of this, Protec-20 tive Action Guides have been developed to reduce to manageable 21 levels the decisions that must be made to protect the public in 22 the event of a nuclear accident.
One of the available protec-23 tive action options is to advise the public to take shelter.
24 (See State PAG's contained in State Plan, Annex B.)
Such a 25 recommendation would be particularly appropriate where there is -.
1 a low dosage airborne release, or when there is a higher 2
release but evacuation is not immediately possible.
The option 3
of sheltering is not intended to be equivalent to evacuation; 4
rather, it provides another means of achieving the overall 5
objective of emergency response plans:
providing dose savings 6
for a spectrum of accidents that could produce off-site doses 7
in excess of PAG's.
8 Q.9 How effective is sheltering as a protection against 9
radiciodines?
10 A.9 The shielding effectiveness of a structure is 11 expressed in terms of a shielding factor, which is the ratio of 12 the dose received inside the structure to the dose that would 13 be received outside the structure.
Estimates have been made of 14 shielding for several distinct building types using currently 15 available shielding technology.
These include shielding 16 factors for external exposure from cloud passage and external 17 exposure from radionuclides deposited on the ground and other 18 surfaces.
The estimates indicate both that a wide range of 19 potential shielding factors is afforded by normally inhabited 20 structures and that basements of both homes and larger build-21 ings offer very effective shielding against radiation.
In 22 general, shielding factors associated with direct radiation 23 from a passing cloud range from a low of 0.1 for a basement to 24 a high of 0.9 for a wood-frame house with no basement.
For ex-25 ample, a projected dose of 900 mrem would most likely result in 1
a sheltering recommendation.
Sheltering oneself in a wood 2
frame house would reduce this dose to 810 mrem.
By moving to 3
the basement, one could reduce this dose to as low as 90 mrem.
4 Shielding factors for surface deposited radionuclides range 5
from a low of 0.001 for a basement of a large building to 0.5 6
for a wood-frame house with no basement.
The average shielding 7
factors for the midwest region are 0.5 for direct radiation 8
from a passing cloud and 0.09 for direct radiation from surface 9
deposited radionuclides.
(See Aldrich, Ericson & Johnson, 10 Public Protection Strategies for Potential Nuclear Reactor 11 Accidents:
Sheltering Concepts with Existing Public and 12 Private Structures, SAND-77-1725, Feb. 1978).
13 The reduction of inhaled radionuclides also lessens the 14 risk of health effects from a passing radioactive plume.
15 Studies indicate that sheltered individuals receive a reduction 16 of approximately 35% in the dose from inhaled radionuclides.
17 Larger reductions would be possible if the ventilation rate was 18 further reduced by tighter building construction, emergency 19 sealing of openings in the structure or by the use of basements 20 during plume passage.
This reduction in inhalation dose would 21 not change regardless of the time spent in the area after plume 22 passage since the inhalation pathway would be relatively insig-23 nificant following passage of the plume.
(See Aldrich &
24 Ericson, Public Protection Strategies in the Event of a Nuclear 25 Reactor Accident:
Multicompartment Ventilation Model for 26 Shelters, SAND 77-1555, Jan. 1978)..
1 The effectiveness of sheltering as a protective action 2
over time depends on many factors such as meteorological 3
parameters, plume deposition, type of structure, magnitude of 4
release and duration of cloud passage.
The release (or cloud 5
passage) durations associated with release categories investi-6 gated in the Reactor Safety Study ranged between 0.5 to 10 7
hours with most of the release durations falling in the 0.5 to 8
3.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> range.
Any subsequent protective action taken in 9
addition to sheltering, such as evacuation, would not affect 10 the dose received through inhalation (i.e.,
after plume passage 11 there is no longer an inhalation pathway of significance).
12 Past this time, deposited radionuclides continue to expose the 13 sheltered individual, although exposure is reduced through 14 structural shielding.
The administration of KI would not 15 protect individuals from this type of exposure.
Consequently, 16 depending upon the magnitude of the release, the half-lives of 17 released radionuclides, and the plume deposition, the possibil-18 ity cannot be eliminated that evacuation protective action 19 guides could eventually be exceeded at some time after plume 20 passage due to direct exposure from deposited radionuclides.
21 In such a case, evacuation would be accomplished prior to 22 release or, if not possible, sheltering would be recommended 23 until passage of the plume followed by evacuation as soon as 24 possible.
1 In postulating the need for long-term sheltering and KI as 2
an attendant protective action, Mr. Reed appears to have ig-3 nored these facts.
In short, KI is only useful protection 4
against the inhalation pathway during plume passage, which 5
should be from 0.5 to 3.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
Subsequently, KI will be of 6
no assistance in protecting individuals from deposited 7
radionuclides.
8 Q.10 Would you define the role ad hoc respiratory 9
protection might play in increasing respiratory protection in a 10 shelter mode?
11 A.10 Ad hoc respiratory protection from readily available 12 common household materials such as fabrics, towels, sheets, 13 etc., has been shown to be effective for both particles (dusts 14 or aerosols), vapors, and radioactive gases including 15 radiciodine.
Such inhalation protection would be valid for the 16 public remaining indoors (sheltering) or for brief movement 17 outdoors during passage of a radioactive cloud or plume.
In 18 addition, such ad hoc respiratory protection would increase the 19 inherent protection provided by sheltering within a structure.
20 This protection is afforded either by natural sealing of the 21 building or by certain ventilation strategies which inhibit air 22 and dust movement from the exterior of the building into areas 23 occupied by the public during passage of a released radioactive 24 cloud or plume.
1 Q.11 What degree of effectiveness do such measures af-2 ford?
3 A.11 The effectiveness of ad hoc respiratory protection 4
is expressed in terms of filter efficiency or penetration of 5
dusts, aerosols or gases through the ad hoc respirator 6
materials.
Research into the effectiveness of emergency respi-7 ratory protection using common household and personal items has 8
been undertaken for over 20 years, with much of the early work 9
done at the request of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Initial 10 research studied some eighteen variations of eight household 11 and personal items, with military personnel using these 12 materials as respiratory protection expedients in a calibrated 13 atmosphere of particles in an aerosol.
These early tests gave 14 results (see attached Table "A")
indicating that five varia-15 tions involving a man's cotton handkerchief, commercially 16 available toilet paper, and a bath towel, had a filtration ef-17 ficiency greater than 85 percent (meaning that 85% of the par-18 ticles were not inhaled because of the ad hoc respiratory 19 protection).
Resistance to breathing offered by each medium 20 also was evaluated with a few of the variations rejected be-21 cause of excessive breathing resistance.
In general, the 22 medium needs to be damp but not too wet (see footnote A in 23 Table "A"); however, excessive wetting of the initial test 24 material could increase resistance to breathing, indicating 25 that use of very wet items is not generally practical.
In all 1
instances, a good fit on the face, to assure edges were sealed, 2
is essential to obtain maximum effectiveness of the expedient 3
material; however, this is also a limitation applicable to 4
commercially-available respirators.
(See the 1963 American 5
Industrial Hygiene Association Respiratory Protective Devices 6
Manual, " Household Items for Emergency Use in Civilian 7
Defense," pages 123-126; and the A.M.A. Archives of Industrial 8
Health, " Emergency Respiratory Protection Against Radiological 9
and Biological Aerosols," Vol. 20, page 91-95, Aug. 1959).
10 Further research conducted by the Department of Environ-11 mental Health Sciences, Harvard School of Public Health has 12 been published as NUREG/CR-2272, Expedient Methods of Respira-i 13 tory Protection, November 1981, for the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory 14 Commission; and as " Emergency Respiratory Protection with 15 Common Materials," Am. Ind. Hyg, Assoc. Journal 44(1):
1-6 16 (1983) by D. W.
- Cooper, W.
C. Hinds, and J. M. Price.
In "On the Efficacy 'f Ad Hoc Respiratory 17 addition, remarks o
18 Protection During a Radiological Emergency" were presented by 19 James A. Martin, Jr.,
an NRC Staff member, as paper P/50 at the 20 1981 Annual Meeting of the Health Physics Society, based in 21 part on the data by Cooper, et al'. ] Harvard Universi.ty).
The 22 Harvard data were also included in a paper presented;by D. C.
AldrichatanElectricPowerResearchInstituteshm'osiumon 23 p
24 radiological emergency planning held January 12~and 13, 1982 25 and published in NSAC-50, "Are Curreni Emergency Planning
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1 Requirements Justified," NSAC-EPRI, May 1982.
As discussed 2
below, these papers reflect the current state of the art with 3
respect to ad hoc respiratory protection.
4 The reports by Cooper and associates were the result of 5
extensive studies of the ability of readily available fabrics 6
to filter aerosolo, gases and vapors expected to be emitted in 7
the event of a major nuclear reactor accident using calibrated 8
particles.
The results, while somewhat different, were consis-9 tent as to the value of ad hoc material from those obtained 10 earlier.
Decreases in particle concentrations by a factor of 11 ten or more were possible from the fabrics tested, when oper-12 ated at a pressure drop deemed acceptable for breathing 13 comfort.
Protection from Krypton-85 by dry fabrics and from 14 radiciodine using wetted fabrics (with water or a baking coda 15 solution) was appreciable.
Follow-up studies by Harvard Uni-16 versity are continuing.
17 These test results show that readily available materials 18 can provide substantial reductions in concentrations of parti-19 cles and certain water-soluble gases and vapors at pressure 20 drops acceptable for respiratory protection during nuclear 21 power plant accident conditions.
Leakage around the seal to 22 the face could reduce the protection provided, as noted in the 23 earlier studies, but this problem is associated with the use of 24 commercially-available respirators as well.
Table "B" summa-25 rizes the data from these studies.
Of importance was the 1
finding that wetted sheets and towels would provide respiratory 2
protection from iodine vapor, reducing lodine concentrations by 3
a factor of ten.
4 While neither of the studies specifically address the du-5 ration of the protection, the earlier report stated that the 6
dry bath towel and man's handkerchief variations did not appear 7'
to have any serious limitations as to the duration of use.
The 8
Harvard research did not indicate any significant breathing 9
difficulties could be anticipated by the use of towels or hand-10 kerchiefs even when wetted.
Comparing these materials with a 11 3M dust respirator, a half-mask fabric respirator, the authors 12 of the reports felt the masks could be worn for hours without 13 substantial discomfort and the fabrics could be tied cr taped 14 to the face for shorter periods during the passage of a puff or 15 plume, during travel to shelter, or during relocation, 16 indicating suitable du ation of use during nuclear accident 17 scenario conditions.
18 In a qualitative sense, then, these research studies indi-19 cate that it would be advisable to cover the nose and' mouth 20 during possible exposure to airborne radioactive material fol-21 lowing a nuclear reactor accident
.I 21e plume is likely to 22 cause airborne concentrations ti-
- ld result in radiction 7
23 doses to the public in excess 6f protective action guides.
24 Further research is underway to quantify this perhaps 25 self-evident statement.
As stated by Martin in the abstract l
1 for paper P/50, "[t]hese studies demonstrate that application 2
by the public of ad hoc shelter and respiratory protection 3
could provide inhalation pathway protection factors (PFs) of 4
ten or more, with shelter providing a PF of two to ten and ad 5
hoc respiratory protection providing an additional PF of three 6
to twenty, or so."
7 Martin points out that "[t]hese potential PFs are very 8
competitive with that of potassium iodide (KI) for the thyroid, 9
but the former would protect other organs as well." (emphasis 10 added).
Martin further adds that ".
ad hoc shelter and 11 respiratory protection could be used to reduce doses in cases 12 where expeditious evacuation would not be feasible 13 In conclusion, there is no mystery to the concept that ad 14 hoc respiratory protection can be effective in providing 15 inhalation filtering of potentially hazardous airborne 16 material.
It is common knowledge that covering the nose and 17 mouth of family members with damp cloths is an effective ad hoc 18 method of minimizing smoke inhalation during fires.
Common 19 sense as well as scientific research dictates that similar 20 action be taken upon instruction by appropriate authorities 21 following the release of significant quantities of airborne ra-22 dioactive material during a radiological accident at the 23 Callaway Plant.
24 Q.12 Will the public be adequately instructed in the use 25 of such measures?
i l
l 1
A.12 Following an accident at the Callaway Plant, the 2
public would be instructed in appropriate protective action by 3
appropriate authorities, including when to initiate and when to 4
stop the use of ad hoc respiratory protection (if needed at 5
all).
Proper instruction to families as to the use of ad hoc 6
respiratory protection will be done through pre-established 7
public messages over the Emergency Broadcast System ("EBS").
8 Parents would be able to monitor the proper use and comfort of 9
ad hoc respiratory protection by the younger members of the 10 family according to these instructions, with no likelihood that 11 young children could suffocate from the use of ad hoc respira-12 tory protection.
13 Instructions for taking shelter will also be provided 14 through pre-established EBS public messages and public informa-15 tion previously sent to residents.
Residents in designated 16 areas recommended for sheltering will be advised, among other 17 things, to close all windows and doors, turn off fans and air 18 conditioners, and close all other air intakes.
Those who have 19 been outside will be advised to shower and to wash clothing 20 worn outside.
Instructions will be given to cover all open 21 food containers and, at a minimum, to wash hands and faces 22 before handling or eating food.
These instructions would not 23 vary according to the duration of shelter.
24 Q.13 Mr. Slaten, what are your conclusions, then, with 25 respect to the influence of the effectiveness of sheltering and 1
ad hoc respiratory protection on the State's policy decision 2
not to pre-distribute potassium iodide to the general public?
3 A.13
.Cheltering and ad hoc respiratory protection are ef-4 fective protective actions in that they will reduce the radia-5 tion exposure of the general public resulting from a reactor 6
accident with atmospheric release of radioactive material.
The 7
protection factors achievable with these protective actions are 8
comparable to the use of potassium iodide.
These protective 9
actions are not, however, a substitute for evacuation.
10 Mr. Reed appears to postulate a scenario in which the ra-11 dioactive plume arrives off-site quickly, requiring resort to 12 sheltering where evacuation might otherwise have been 13 undertaken, and then remains for an extended period of time --
14 exposing the public who cannot evacuate because the roads are 15 blocked with snow.
This ignores the fact that the meteorologi-16 cal conditions which caused the plume to move off-site quickly 17 would also result in rapid dispersion and/or passage of the 18 plume resulting in a reduced inhalation dose.
After plume 19 passage, evacuation could be accomplished, if desired, after 20 clearing of roads or, if necessary, with the help of National 21 Guard helicopters.
22 It is always possible to postulate a scenario in which 23 long-term sheltering might be required because of the 24 infeasibility of evacuation.
Given our knowledge of how 25 accidents evolve, however, as well as the advance warning which 1
in most cases will be availa.
.e, such a scenario is extremely 2
remote.
Emergency response planning should address a spectrum 3
of accidents, but should not focus upon an isolated, single 4
accident sequence of extremely low likelihood.
In any case, 5
the Missouri National Guard can provide air evacuation by heli-6 copters from Jefferson City if it should become necessary to 7
evacuate isolated residents who cannot evacuate on their own.
8 See Attachment 2 to this Testimony.
TABLE A RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE DEVICES MANUAL 124 TABLE 11.5 RESPIRATORY PROTECTION PROVIDED BY COMMON HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONA AGAINST AEROSO13 OF 1 TO Sg PARTICLE SIZE l
Number Number Geometric 95% Confidence of Resist-of Mean Limits for Obser-Efficiency, Mean,%
Thick-
- ance, Item nesses mm of H,0 vations 3
Lower Upper i
Handkerchief, man's cotton 16 36 32 94.2
.92.6 95.5 Toilet paper 3
13 32 91.4 89.8 92.8 Handkerchief, man's cotton 8
18 32 88.9 85.5 91.6 i
Handkerchief, 32 88.1 85.1 90.5 man's cotton Crumpled Bath towel, turkish 2
11 32 85.1 83.3 86.8 Bath towel, turkish 1
5 30 73.9 70.7 76.8 Bed sheet, muslin 1
22 32 72.0 68.8 74.9 Bath towel, turkish 1 (wet) 3 31 70.2 68.0 72.3 1
15 65.9 57.9 72.3 Shirt, cotton 1 (wet)
>150 Shirt, cotton 2
7 30 65.5 60.8 69.6 Handkerchief, woman's cotton 4 (wet) 84a 32 63.0 57.3 67.9 Handkerchief, man's cotton 1 (wet) 98 30 62.6 57.0 67.5 1
Dress 'naterial, cotton 1 (we')
1801 31 56.3 49.6 62.0 l
Handkerchief, woman's cotton 4
2 32 55.5 52.2 58.7 Slip, rayon 1
6 32 50.0 46.2 53.6 Dress material, cotton 1
5 31 47.6 41.4 53.2
~
Shirt, cottpn 1
3 32 34.6 29.0 39.9 Handkerchief man's cotton 1
2 32 27.5 22.0 32.5
- a. Resistance obtained when checked immediately after hand wringing. This resistance began to decrease i
after about one minute when the material started to dry.
l-l l
t l
l
i i
l TABLE B ESTIMATED PENETRATION THROUGH EXPEDIENT RESPIRATORY PROTECTION MATERIALS AT 50 Pa (0.2 IN H O) PRESSURE 2
DROP AND 1.5 CM/S FACE VELOCITY DRY b
Material No. layers Aerosol particle I
CH I 2
3 diameter ( m) 0.4 1
5 3M resoirator*
2
.03
.004
<.01
= 8710 c
Sheet 20
.66
.64
.020 1.0 0.5 Shirt 15
.54
.59
.070 Lower-quality 20
.53 41
.015 towel c
Higher-;uali ty 6
.24
.13
<.01 0.6 towel Handkerchief 14
.61
.54
.032 WET Material No. layers Aerosol particle I
CH 2
3 diameter (_m) 0.4 1
5 c
Sheet 6
.91
.88
.22
.45
.S
.15 1.0d d
Shirt 6
1.0
.51
<.02 Higher-quality 4
.20
<.01 c.01
.21 1.0 d
towel
.10 Handkerchief 2
.98
.95
.37 Available commercially in single-layer thickness.
a.
b.
Taken from tests at 1.0 cm/s, assuming penetration is the product of single-layer penetrations.
c.
Not shown to be statistically different from 1.00.
d.
Wetted with 5?; by weight baking soda solution.
i i
Taken from NUREG/CR-2272 (Nov. 1981) at 84.
.... _.~ _., _ _.. _
ATTACHMENT 1 m
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS & EXPERIENCE Neal G.
Slaten - Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Envitrnmental Education -
Bachelor of Science, Aerospace Engineering, St. Louis University Master of Science, Nuclear Engineering, University of Missouri - Columbia Related Westinghouse International School Training for Environmental Management Colorado State University, 1973 Westinghouse " Head Start" Program, 1973 Westinghouse " Head Start" Program Simulator, 1973 AIF Seminar, " Preparing Environmental Technical Specifications for Nuclear Power Plants", 1974 Course in " Environmental Analysis and Environmental Monitoring for Nuclear Power Generation" University of California - Berkeley, 1974 Course in " Environmental Radiation Surveillance for Nuclear Power" Harvard School of Public Health, 1976 AIF Seminar, " Current Issues on Environmental Regulation of Nuclear Power Facilities", 1977 Bechtel Auditor Training, 1978 NRC Seminar, Model Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications for Nuclear Power Plants, 1979 ASME/EPRI Radwaste Workshop, 1979 AIF Seminar, Standard Emergency Response Plan, 1979 NRC Seminar, Emergency Planning, 1980 INPO Radiological Protection Seminar, 1982 Hazardous Wasto Management Summcr Institute University of Missouri, Columbia, 1982 Seminar on Medical Management of Radiation Injuries, 1982 Applied Health Physics Course Oak Ridge Associated Universities, 1982 EEI Health Physics Committee Representative, 1977 to present Professional -
Health Physics Society Societies 1972-1978, Engineer.
Responsibilities Experience included Licensing and NSSS design review.
1978-1980, Nuclear Environmentl Engineer.
Responsibilities included Radwaste Systems design review, Environmental Assessment and monitoring programs, Environmental Report &
general Licensing activities.
1980-Present, Supervising Engineer, Environmental.
Responsibilities include:
directing the corporate Environmental and Health Physics Group; Licensing support; reviewing radwaste, shielding and radiation monitoring system engineering design work; evaluating off-site radiological and non-radiological environmental monitoring programs; establishing corporate ALARA policy; reviewing conformance to provisions contained within technical specifications and applicable license provisions pertaining to radiological matters; providing technical expertise to QA audit teams; reviewing design modifications to assure compliance with ALARA philosophy; acting as Radiological Assessment Coordinator during a site or General I
Emergency at Callaway Plant.
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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY e
<D, HEADQUARTERS MISSOURI NATIONAL GUARD SY;.
Office of the Adjutant General
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1717 Industrial Drive i
Jefferson City, Missouri 65101 2
Phone 314 - 7512321 T
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January 6, 1983 a
D Union Electric Company Attention:
Mr. M. A. Stiller Post Office Sox 620 Fulton, Missouri 65251 Dent Sir:
This correspondence is in regard to your letter, dated November 10, 1982, and in accordance with the Missouri Nuclear Accident Plan, dated June 1982.
Assumptions in the use of the Missouri National Guard are:
a.
Missouri National Guard personnel will not be assigned missions in areas where the possibility of dangerous levels of radiation exists, b.
The Missouri National Guard will respond to a nuclear power plant emergency as declared by the Governor with available personnel and resources.
c.
That a civilian authority is designated as a point of contact prior to the National Guard being assigned a mission.
d.
That missions be assigned by civil authorities, but the cxecution to include the number of personnel and equipment to be used, will be determined by the Missouri N'acional Guard.
The Missouri National Guard will provide support as follows:
a.
One hundred twenty Guardpersons will be a,vailable for traffic l
control and assist in local radiation survey.
Personnel will be furnished from the following units:
Headquarters, Missouri Army National Guard (Jef ferson City) ll75th Military Police Company (Boonville and Moberly)
Headquarters and Headquarters Bactery, 1st Battalion, 128th Field Artillery (Columbia) 1035th Maintenance Company (Jef ferson City)
Service Battery, 1st Battalion, 128th Field Artillery (Mexico) 735th Maintenance Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Battalion (Jefferson City)
The expected response time for the designated units is six b.
hours after the initial notification.
Guardpersons that would be used for surveying personnel and c.for radioactive contamination to include themse,1ves will receive equipment initial training and annual refresher training.
Air Evacuation would be performed by helicopters from Jefferson d.
Normally, during working hours reaction time to Readsville and Mineola City.
would be two hours.
During non-duty hours, response could be up to four hours.
The Missouri National Guard has been called to State Emergency Duty 22 times in the past five years.
The response time was between four and six hours, primarily dependent on unit members traveling to Armories and preparing vehicles for Operations under adverse weather conditions.
Sincerely, e
t_& L 7 -
'd-4 CHARLES M. KIEFNER Major General, MOARNG The Adjutant General e
%