ML20082E312

Proposed Tech Specs,Deleting TS 3.9.7, Crane Travel-Spent Fuel Pit Area, & Associated Surveillances

ML20082E312
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	04/06/1995
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20082E311	List: ML20082E305 ML20082E312
References
NUDOCS 9504110189
Download: ML20082E312 (18)

Text

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_3 ENCLOSURE 1 .

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(  ; PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE - j SEQUOVAH NU' CLEAR PLANT (SON)_ UNITS '1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

,.- (TVA-SON-TS-95-06) 1 i

LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES Unit 1 Index X "

. Index XIV 3/4 9-7' 3/4 9-7a [

B 3/4 9 Unit 2.

Index X Index XIV 3/4 9 ,

3/4 9-8a B 3/4 9-2 3 t

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PDR.. ADOCK- 05000327 g  ;

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INDEX-LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS tSECTION PAGE Motor Operated Valves Thermal Overload Protection.. .. . . ... 3/4 8-34 R65 s

Isolation Devices......................................... 3/4 8 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION....................................... 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION........................................... 3/4 9-2

' <~s i

O. I 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME................................................ 3/4 9-3

.Ye ) 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS......................... 3/4 9-4

.p d 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS............................................ 3/4 9-5 3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE......................................... 3/4 9-6 3/4.9.7 CRANETRAVEL-SPENTFUELPITAREA...hf.................. 3/4 9-7 >

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION All Water Leve1s.......................................... 3/4 9-8.

Low Water Level.......................................... 3/4 9-8a <

3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 9-9

}

3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL................................ 3/4 9-10

. 3/4.9.11 SPENT FUEL PIT WATER LEVEL................................ 3/4 9-11 4

1 3/4 9.12 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM................... 3/4 9-12 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 SHUTOOWN MARGIN........................................... 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS..... 3/4 10-2' .

3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS............................................. 3/4 10-3 3/4.10.4 R E ACTO R COO LANT L00 PS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 10-4 3/4.10.5 POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM .SHUTD0WN..................... 3/4 10-S' 1

i

'l October 22, 1987

.SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 X Amendment No. 61

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7.

INDEX BASES SECTION -

'PAGE 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM ........................B 3/4 7 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE ~ HEAT SINK......................................... B 3/4'7-4' 3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION........................................... B 3/4.7-4 1

3/4.7.7 CONTROLROOMEMERGENCYVENTILATIONS[ STEM...........'....... B 3/4 7-4

~

3/4.7.8 AUXILIARY DJILDING GAS TREAT, MENT SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B . . 3/4

. 7-5 rP 3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS.................................................... B 3/4 7-5 3/4. 7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8. 3/4 . . . 7-6 yp 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS................................... B 3/4 7 3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS.................................. B 3/4 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C.

50VRCES............................................... B 3/4 8-l' 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS.......................... B 3/4 8-1 3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE j

m -< '

DEVICES.................... B 3/4 8-1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 1

3/4.9.1 BORON 'f CONCENTRATION........................................ B 3/4 9-1 f 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION............................................ B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME.................................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS.......................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS..........................

.................. B 3/4 9-1 (3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE...............................'........... B 3/4 9-2 3/4,9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL PIT AREA. .) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J 3/4 9-2

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+p p 3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION..............

g ek B 3/4 9-2 4

3/4.9.9 , CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM...."............... B 3/4 9-2 I SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 XIV September 17, 1980 SEP 171986

REFUELING CPERATf0NS 37.7 TFH 5 SP4ci A cmW

/5 Oc t. s 'rM.o o 3 /4. 9. '7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL PIT AREA.

A LIMITING CONDITION FOR'0PERATION

.7 Loads tr eling over fu assemblies in- e spent fuel p area shall 3 R171

,- estricted follows: .

a. Spent fuel s rage pool: ,

travel over Loads i ' excess of 2100 ounds* shall bge rohibited pool.

f fuel ssemblies in th spent fuel st

b. sk loading.ar of the cask p .

ich meet the . ght, cross- tional impa area, and' ,

1. Loads Figure 3.9- may be carr all able travel he ht criteria e cask load g area of t cask r fuel assemb es stored i pit if the i t shield is place over e cask loa g area.

Loads wh do not mee e weight, ss-section impact area,

2. .9-1 shall be and al wable travel eight criter of Figure rea of the cask [

pro ited from t vel over the ask loadin when fuel stored in i .

APplICABILI .: With-fue assemblies i the spent f storage pool or i ' he ,

N he cask pi e

fd cask ding area o

[ .i ACT  :

/3 rane ith the re rements of e above spe fication not satis ed,-place th afe conditi The prov ons of Specificat 3.0.3 are load in . -

applic e.

URVEILLANC EOUIREMENT ops which pr nt crane hook r el 4.9.7. Crane inter eks and physical trated OPERA within 7 days, or to 9a ove he storage el shall be d during crane paration.# l ne use and least once per days thereaf n fuel is stor e in the cask- area, verify inistrative R171 4.9.7.2 impact shi d are met prior o moving load n requir ents concernin pit area.

exc of 2100 poun across the e R95 l

I *The ent fuel pool ransfer canal g [andthespent1.ual pool div er gate ,

el assemblies i e spent fuel '

l travel over ,

R19) eated for a vities associ .ed g fThe cra..e i erlocks and phys al stops may be i with th pent fuel pit r ackproject.

Amendment No.' 91, 167, 194 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 9-7 January 24, 1995 9

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Allo ble Heio t Above hield Surf e. in, f m F URE 3.9- RELATION HIP BETWEEN AD. ALLOWABLE IGHT AND IMPACT f3 TE i

' AREA FOR BJECTS TO BE RRIED OVER TH IMPACT SHIELD

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. i REFUELING OPERATIONS  :

1 BASES

'3/4.9.6 ~ MANIPULATOR CRANE The OPERABILITY requirements for the manipulator cranes. ensure that:

1) manipulator cranes will be used-for movement of drive rods and fuel assem-blies, 2) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a drive rod or. fuel assembly, and 3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during '

lifting operati _

Tuls S/'tcsA c 4 T7 & IC l 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL PIT AREA ~0Eurm e trict on mo nt of s in fess of t nominal ight of contr rod as bly and- sociat handlin ol over her fuel as lies the s age poo nsures at in the ent thi oad is d ped: i the ivity ease wi e. lim d to that ontained a sing 1 uel ass y, an any po ble di rtion of el_in th torage r s will ,

F ult in critica rray. s assumpt n is_ con stent wit . he acti y R171  !

te releas ssumed the acc nt analy . Assur ce agains oad dro over s fu stored he cask oading ar of the c pit is ieved b observa ,

(3 the ca ated lo criteria ich will revent p ration the i et shiel n the eve of a loa rop.  :

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3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION r

The reqW : ment that at least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop be in operation en:;ures that; 1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140*F as  ;

required during the REFUELING MODE, and 2) sufficient coolant circulation is >

maintained through the reactor-core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution

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gi38 incident and prevent boron stratification. The minimum required flow rate of  ;

2000 gpm ensures decay heat removal, minimizes the probability of losing an RHR pump by air-entrainment from pump vortexing, and minimizes the potential for -

valve damage due to cavitation or chatter. _ Losing an RHR pump is a particular i concern during reduced RCS inventory operation. The 2000 gpm value is limited I by the potential for cavitation in the control valve and chattering in the 10- ,

inch check valve. .

The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of. resid- ,

ual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is avail -  ;

able for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR '

loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the Core.

i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-2 Amendment No. 134, ,

167 April 28, 1993-

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,  ; INDEX

-LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE r

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

• Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective, Devices................................................. ^3/4 8-16 Motor Operated Valves Thermal Overload Protection......... 3/4 8-33 Isolation Devices......................................... 3/4 8-36 R53.

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION....................................... 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION........................................... 3/4 9-3 3/4.9.3- DECAY TIME.....................-........................... 3/4 9-4 '

3 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS......................... 3/4 9

J 3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE......................................... 3/4 9-7 W

f,# 3/4.9.7 CRANETRAVEL-SPENTFUELPITAREA...):.................. 3/4 9-8 ,

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL-HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION All Water Levels.......................................... '3/4 9-9 Low Water Level........................................... '

3/4 9-10 3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4.9-11 3/4.9.10 WATER LEVE L - REACTOR . VESSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 9-12 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVE L - SPENT FUEL PIT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 9-13 >

3/4 9.12 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM................... 3/4 9-14 L 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 SHUTOOWN MARGIN................................... ....... 3/4.10-1 3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS..... 3/4 10-2 3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS............................................. 3/4 10-3 i L SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 X Amendment No. 53 -

October 22, 1987

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! 3/4. 7. 4 . ESSENTI AL RAW' COOLING WATER SYSTEM '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-. : B _ 3/4 ;7-3

% 3 /4. 7'. 5 U LT I MAT E H E AT ' S I NK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . B L 3 /4 7- 4 E 3/4. 7. 6' ' F LOOO PROTECTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . ' B 3/4 : 7-4 --

3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY: VENTILATION SYSTEM.................. 'B~3/4.7_4:

'3'/4.7.8- AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS; TREATMENT SYSTEM.................... B 3/4'.7.-5 1

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3/4.7.9- SNUBBERS................................................... :B 3/4 7-5 H l

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3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION................................ B'3/4 7-6a 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION-SYSTEMS.... .............................. B:3/4 7-7' 3/4.7.12' FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS................................... 'B'3/4.7-7 D 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER-SYSTEMS -

3/4.8.1 and 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES and CNSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION 2 SYSTEMS............................................................. B 3/4 8 -

3/428.3-ELECTRICALEQUIPMENTPROTECTIVEDEVICES.................... B 3/4.8-2 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

' 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION........................................ B 3/4 9-1.

k. 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION............................................ - B L 3/4 ' 9-1!-

3/4.9.3 D EC AY T I ME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ B 3 /4 9- 1 1 PENETRATIONS.......................... B13/4l9-l' v 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS............................................. .B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE..........................................

B 3/4:9-2

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3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT ' FUEL PIT AREA. . 3. . . . . . . . .'. . . . . . . . . . B 'L3/4 9-2

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3/4.9.8 ' RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND C00LANT' CIRCULATION.............. B 3/4 9-25 u

<3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM................... B 3/4 9-2

.SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 XIV 4

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, l E 9* 7 TH3S SPEC l A C4TNJ

' REFUELING OPERATIONS /3 . "D tic 4.JC7x o .

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL PIT AREA

. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION s in the sp fuel pit are all be.

. 7 Loads veling overiuel assemb s follows: R157 restricte

. Spent f el storage  :

• shall be pro ited from tra over tends in exce of 2100 pou t fuel storage col.

fuel asse es in the s

b. Cask ding area o e cask piti meet the we , cross-secti 1 impact area,

. Loads w criteria of F re 3.9-1 may be rried allo e travel hei the cask o fuel assemb1 stored in the sk loading area oading area.

it if the imp shield is in ce over the cas tonal impact area,

2. Loads wh do not meet t weight, cross-s and a able travel h ht criteria of ding ure 3.9-1 shall be ited from tra over the cask area of.the ca pr t when fuel is ored in it.

i nt fuel storage p or in the-APPLICARI Y: With fuel ssemblies in the .

cask 1 ing area of the ask pit, KTION:

g t satisfied, pla the crane With the r irements of t he provisions we specification e not load in safe condition of cification 3.0.3  ;

appl ble.

SURVEILLANCEA DUIREMENTS ich prevent crane h travel 4.9.7 Crane interlocks d physical stop s prior to R18 the storage pool all be demonstra OPERABLE within 7 ov t once per 7 da hereafter during er operation.f ane use and at 1 uel is stored he cask pit area, ve y administrative R157 4.9.7.2 Wh nor to moving loads requi s concerning th spact shield are met >

f 2100 pounds a ss the cask pit are exces

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R81 nt fuel pool divid gate pent fuel pool trans canal gate and the

• Th pool.

y travel over fuel emblies in the spent R $

be defeated for ac ities associated

1. The crane inter s and physical stops l with the sp fuel pit rerack pro .

Amendment No. ' 81,157,185 3/4 9-8 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 January 24, 1995

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1 Iowable He ht Above 1 10*

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FIGURE .9-1 RELAT SHIP BETWEEN AD ALLOWABLE HEIC AND IMPACT AREA OBJECTS Td BF. RRIED OVER THE~IMF SHIELD g

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j REFUELING OPERATIONS

' BASES 3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE The OPERABILITY requirements for the manipulator cranes ensure that:

1) manipulator cranes will be used for movement of drive rods and fuel assem-blies, 2) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a drive rod or fuel assembly, and 3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during

' lifting operations.- '&

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7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL PfT AREA e res iction movement f loads i / excess o the nomi al weight fa fue and c trol r'o assembly d associa handli tool ov other fu a embli in the orage po t in th event th load is opped g ) the ctivity lease wil beensures limite_pfto that ontained n a sing 1 uel

. asser .y, and any poss le distor fon of fu in the orage rac will not re t in a itical ar y. This sumption s consis nt with t activity R15/

l  : r ease as med in th accident a lyses. ssurance gainst loa drops ove

! uel stor d in the sk loading rea of t e cask pi .is achiev by obser nce

!: of the alculated oad criter which w 1 preven' penetrati of the.1 act shiel in the ev t of a lo drop.

l.

! 3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIR'CULATION The requirement that at least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop be in l

operation ensures that; 1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140 F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and 2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained thru the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution R121 incident and prevent boron stratification. The minimum required flow rate of 2000 gpm ensures decay heat removal, minimizes the probability of losing an RHR pump by air-entrainment from pump vortexing, and minimizes the potential for valve damage due to cavitation or chatter. -Losing an RHR pump is a particular concern during reduced RCS inventory operation. The 2000 gpm value is limited

. by the potential for cavitation in the control valve and chattering in the 10-inch check valve.

The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above'the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operat-ing RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-2 Amendment No. 121, 157 April 28, 1993

m....

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7 4

ENCLOSURE 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328' _

(TVA-SON-TS-95-06 )

DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR DELETING TS 3.9.7,.

" CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL PIT AREA" l

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,TVA'proposee to' modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SON) Units;1 and 2i

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(technical specifications (TSs) by deleting TS 3/4.9.7,:" Crane Travel - Spent

? Fuel Pit' Area," and its associated Bases. The following. changes are being

" submitted.

Pages kand XIV, Section 3/4;9.7 will read as follow: " CRANE TRAVEL -

h SPENT FUEL PIT AREA (DELETED)."

T13.9.7 limiting ccndition for operation will be deleted along'with its.

C associated surveillance requirements (SRs) and figure'.' The wording "3.9.7L M ' This specification is deleted." has been added.

The Bases paragraph 3/4.9.7 will be deleted'and the' sentence "This specification is deleted." added.

p l-Reason for Chanae

- During the implementation of TS Change 92-01, Spent Fuel Storage Pool -

Capacity increase (TAC Nos.- 83068 and 83069), an inconsistency was.

identified by NRC within TS 3.9.7. Specifically, TS 3.9.7 is written to prevent heavy loads (except as spe'cifically annotated in'the TS) from travelling over!

spent fuel assemblies. However, SR'4.9.7.1l requires the crane interlocks and

-physical stops to be operable. With the interlocks and physical stops functioning, all loads are prevented from traveling over the spent fuel pit (SFP),

regardless of weight. Thus, a literal application of SR 4.0.1 would prevent the use of the auxiliary building crane over the'SFP. Note SR 4.0.1' states that -

" Surveillance Requirements shall be met during the OPERATIONAL MODES or' other conditions specified for individual Limiting Conditions for Operation unless otherwise stated in an individual Surveillance Requirement."

The auxiliary building crane is designed to serve the needs of both Units 1 and 2 reactors. These needs consist of handling fuel casks, the placement of new -

fuel in the new fuel storage vault, and the movement of the new fuel from the new fuel storage. vault to the fuel elevator. The auxiliary building crane is also-

~

used to remove the shield plugs'at the equipment access doors of'the reactor

-building and any large pieces of equipment going into or out of the actor building by way of the auxiliary building. Currently, equipment must be -

maneuvered within the SFP boundary by means of the auxiliary building crane to allow for fuel inspection, gate relocation,'and miscellaneous lifts during the I: .SFP rerack project. The area controlled by the interlocks and physical stops is shown in Update'd Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Figure 9.1.1-1.

Implementation'of this TS change is therefore needed to allow resolution of this inconsistency prior to the next refueling outage.

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- The relocation of TS 3.9.7 is consistent with' NUREG-1431 and the NRC policy -

% statement on TS improvements (58 FR 39132, dated July'22,1993).

- Justification' for Chanaes -

4 A' potential release of radioactive material from fuel may occur during the .

L - refueling process as a result of fuel-cladding failures,' mechanical damage L

caused by the dropping of fuel assemblies, or the dropping of objects onto fuel

- assemblies. The restriction of. movement of loads in excess of 2100 pounds over other fuel assemblies ensures that, in the event the load is dropped, the.

potential activity released.will be limited to that contained in a single fuel g assembly and that any distortion of fuel,in the SFP racks will not result in a critical configuration.' This TS applies to the prevention of a heavy-load-drop

- accident and assures that the damage caused by the load is limited to the equivalent of one fuel assembly. This assumption is consistent with the -

- activity release assumed in the design basis accident analysis for a fuel handling accident. Note that the load-drop event is not a design basis -

accident.

Based on the final policy statement on TS improvements (58 FR 39132, dated l July 22,1993), there are four criteria that must not apply in order to allow a.

' TS to be relocated to administratively controlled documents. The following:

discussions pertains to each of the four criteria.

Criteria 1: " Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indic' ate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor-coolant pressure boundary."

Response: Crane travel does not apply to instrumentation used to detect a significant degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.-

Criteria 2: "A' process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident or' Transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier."

g Response

The SFP crane travel TS applies to an operating restriction for a  ;

heavy-load-drop event. This TS does not' apply to a process i variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial  !

condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either  ;

assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a -

fissi(n product barrier. l 1

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,;.g  ; Criteria.3:'= "A structure, system, or component that is part of.the primary)  !

success path and which functions or. actuates to mitigate a' Design . ;j f Basis Accident or Transient that either ' assumes the failure of or M

presents a ch'allenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier'." ~

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> Response: 'The TS for crane travel does not apply to a structure,' system, or=

l component that is"part of the primary success path and does noti '

l L function'or actuate to mitigate.a design basis accident or transienti d

. that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge in the '

1 integrity'of a fission product barner.'  ;

Criteria 4: '"A structure,' system,' or component which operating experience or- j probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to "

public health and safety." '

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Response:- The auxiliary building crane and associated equipment were not  ;

included in the SON Individual Plant Evaluation, nor is it known to '

be significant based on any other individual plant evaluations or- g operating experience. j

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Since the response to each criteria was negative, TVA requests that the TS be . ,

relocated to. administratively controlled procedures as permitted by the' q

-previously discussed NRC policy. Presently, the' administrative ' controls  !

discussed are contained in Administrative Instruction (AI)-41, Auxiliary Building . .

- Crane Travel loterlocks, that governs th'e by-passing of the interlocks that.  ;

prevents the crane bridge from traveling over the SFP wh'en the hook is aligned 1 to travel over the SFP. This procedure provides that documentation of the  :;

description of the work to be performed,'a certified crane operator / relief

' operator be provided, 'and permission from the' shift operations supervisor 1 supplied. Al-41 and subsequent site standard practices are governed by the requirements of TS 6.5.1 A.

Further, SON has addressed the requirements of NUREG-0612 that prevents the movement of heavy loads over fuel assemblies in the SFP. The' control of 1 heavy loads is described in the UFSAR Section 9.1.2, " Spent Fuel Storage." i Therefore, it can be concluded that for auxiliary building crane mov'ement over -l the SFP will only occur when proper administrative controls are in place to control the by-passing of the interlocks and ph'ysical stops.  :

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The proposed change does not involve an unreviewed environmental qu'estion j because operation of SON Units 1 and 2 in accordance with this change would  ;

. not:

li 41 1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmental impact  ;

previously. evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) as >

modified by NRC's testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Bo'ard,~  :

supplements to the FES, environmental impact appraisals, or decisions of  ;

l.? the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels.

3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for SON '!

that may have a significant environmental impact.

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ENCLOSURE 3 '

PROPOSED. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE =

F SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) UNITS 1 AND 2--

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SON-TS-95-06)

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION ,

FOR DELETING TS 3.9.7, CRANE TRAVEL

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. Significant Hazards Evaluation ; j d

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LTVA has evaluated the proposed technical spe'cification (TS) change' and has .

' determined that it'do'es not represent a significant hazards consideration based '  ;

on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). : Operation of Sequoyah Nucleari j Plant (SON) in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:-  ;

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'1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of'an '

accident previously evaluated.

The proposed TS change involves the relocation'of a requirement that does~

not pertain to limitations or conditions of reactor operation or to equipment ,

to mitigate design basis accidents or transients. SON is proposing to. ]

relocate'this TS based on NRC's final policy statement on TS improvement (58 FR 39132, dated July 22, 1993). Based on this criteria, the spent fuel i pit (SFP) crane travel is not important to operational safety and may be relocated to administratively controlled procedures. -'By pla'cing the crane 1  :

travel requirements in administratively controlled procedures, adequate  :

controls will remain in place to prevent heavy loads from traveling over j fuel assemblies in the SFP. The administratively controlled procedure.that

- controls the by-passing of the interlocks and physical stops is subject to -

j the requirements of.TS 6.5.1 A. Therefore, the relocation of this TS will . -

not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident . j

_previously evaluated.  ;

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any ,

previously analyzed. =;

The proposed change involves relocating TS requirements to another administratively controlled document. No modifications to the plant are  :!

involved.~ Additionally, there are no changes to the operation of the plant ,

or equipment proposed.' Based on this,- the relocation'of this TS will not i create the possibility of a new or different' kind of accident from any. j previously analyzed. j j

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. j The proposed change involves the relocation of TS requirements to r administratively controlled procedures. The relocation of this requirement l is based on the criteria ~ endorsed in the Commission's Policy Statement on >

L TS improvements as it pertains to 10 CFR 50.36. Additionally, this'  !

change does not alter the basic design and safety analysis requirements, j as discussed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, the j deletion of this TS will not involve a reduction in the margin of safety.  :

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