ML20083G277

Proposed Tech Spec Changes Re Fire Protection

ML20083G277
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	12/28/1983
From:	BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20083G269	List: BECO-83-300, Application for Amend to License DPR-35,consisting of Proposed Change 83-14 to Tech Specs Re Fire Protection. Change Represents Final Component of Changes Committed to in ML20083G277
References
NUDOCS 8401040181
Download: ML20083G277 (6)

Text

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Proposed Change to Fire Protection Technical Specification Proposed Chance The proposed change involves Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications (T.S.), Appendix A, Section 4.12, Fire Protection, Table 3.12-1, " Fire Detection Instruments", and the Bases for 3/4.12A.

The changes are described in the narrative below and are contained in the amended T.S. pages attached to this submittal.

4.12A.1 This section currently references NFPA Code 72A. The proposed change substitutes NFPA Code 72D. This change reflects the more conservative requirements of NFPA Code 72D which are to be applied to Pilgrim's fire detection instrumentation.

4.12A.2 This section currently discusses surveillance requirements for fire detection instrumentation supervised circuitry associated with detector alarms. The proposed change substitutes . . ."non-supervised circuitry". . . This reflects the fact that section 4.12A.1 addresses supervised circuitry, and the change imposes a shorter surveillance period for non-supervised circuitry than that imposed in 4.12A.1 for supervised circuitry.

Table 3.12-1 This change reflects .the addition of fire detection instrumentation at Pilgrim, and places such instrumentation under the purview of applicable T.S.

Limiting Condition of Operation and Surveillance requirements.

Bases Currently, the second paragraph of the Bases for 3/412A states:

In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the establishment of continuous fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is returned to operability.

The revision shall state:

In the event..., increasing the frequency of fire watch patrols in the affected areas...

This change is consistent with Standard Technical Specifications and conforms to Pilgrim Station procedures and definitions.

8401040181 831228 PDR ADOCK 05000293 P PDR

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Reason for Change These technical specification changes are being proposed to address plant design changes made to address Amendment 35 to Pilgrim's Operating License.

Safety Considerations These changes do not present an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59. They have been reviewed and approved by the Operations Review Committee and reviewed by the Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee.

Significant Hazards Considerations It has been determined that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the NRC's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or conscauences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC has provided guidance concerning the application of standards for determining whether license amendments involve significant hazards considerations by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870). One example of an amendment that is considered not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration is "...(ii) A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specifications: for example a more stringent surveillance requirement..."

Proposed technical specifications of this type are those described above that add restrictions to address plant design changes or conformance to NFPA standards .

Schedule of Change As stated in our letter of May 13, 1983, we expect the NRC to issue the proposed fire protection technical specification changes as a single amendment. This amendment will be effective upon our receipt of approval from the NRC.

Fee Determination Pursuant to 10 CFR 170.12, the Boston Edison Company proposes these changes as one segment of the fire protection submittal, which, when taken as a whole will be classified as a Class III amendment. The appropriate fee of $4,000 will be provided as part of a number of fees under a separate cover. That cover will be identified with our final fire protection submittal, the consolidation package.

( 12 'FIRI PROTECTION 4.12 FIRE PROTECTION c

A. Fira Dataction Instrustntation A. , Fire Detection Instrumentation The fire detection instrumentation 1. Each of the fire detection for each fire detection zone shown instru=ents noted in Table in Table 3.12-1 shall be OPERABLE. 3.12-1 including the NFPA Code 72Dsupervisedcircuitry!$h APPLICA3ILITY: shall he demonstrated OPERA 3LE by a functional test at least At all times when equipment in that once per 6 months.

fire detection zone is required to ,

be OPERABLE. 2. The fire detection instrumenta-tionnonsupervisedcircuitryghh associated with detector alarms, ACTION:

shall be demonstrated OPERABLE With the number of OPERA 3LE fire at least once per 2 months.

detection instruments less than required by Table 3.12.1;

s. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone with the inoperable instrument (s) at least once per hour; and

b. Restore the inoperable instru-ment (s) to OPERA 3LE status within 14 days, or prepare and submit a report to the Commission within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the mal-function and the plans for restor-ing the instrument (s) to OPERA 3LE status.

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• BASES:

3/4.1 A FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that ad2quate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages. Prompt detecuion of the fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable.

increasing the frequency of fire watch patrols in the affected areas in required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is returned to operability.

3/4.123, C, D, E FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppres-sion capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. The fire suppression system consists of the water systam, spray and/or sprinklers, CO2 and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.

In the event that portions of the fire suppression system are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected*

areas until the affected equipment can be restored to service.

In the event that portions of the fire suppression water system become inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the affected equipment can be restored to service.

In the event that the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant. The requirement for a twenty-four hour report to the Commission provides for prompt evaluation of the acceptability of the corrective measures to provide adequate fire suppression capability for the con-tinued protection of the nuclear plant.

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Amsndment 29 2061

1 Table 3.I2 -i F1 RE DETECTION INS I RUilLN l'S ,

local Panel No. Total No. Plinimum Building / Fire Area Elevation _ Zone No. Detectors Detectors Operable In Zone In Zone 3

Reactor Building (-)17'6" C224/4A 3 RilR - Core Spray "A" Reactor Builtling 3

RilR - Core Spray "B" (-)17'6" C223/3C 3 Reactor Building (-)17'6" C223/3D 2 1 HPCi C223/3E 2 1 Reactor Building (-)17'6" C223/3A 2 1 RCIC C223/31; 2 1 Reactor Building 23' C224/4E 12 10 C224 /41' 7 6 CRD - East C224 /4C 9 8 C224 /4D 9 8 C224 /40 8 7 Reactor Building 23' C223/3F 1(J 16 CRD - West 10 8 C223 /3c 11 9 C223 311 2 2 C223 /3 i Reactor Building 51' C225/ SA1 18 16 C225/ SA2 6 5 C225/ SA3 2 2 C225/ 5A4 4 3 Reactor Building 74'3" C225/ SB2 8 7 Fuel Pool lleat Exchanger Area Reactor Building 74'3" C225/ SBl 18 16 C225/ SB3 2 2 North Side 91'3" C225/ SC3 6 5 Reactor' Building Standby 1.iquid Control System Tank Area Reactor Building 91'3" C225/5CI 25 22 North Side

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s t TABI.E 3.12-1 ,

FIRE DETI:CTION INSTRl'?!ENTS Total No.  !!i n f inum 1.ocal l'a ne l the. Detectors Zone No. ' l ' ' ' ' L " '

llullding/ F1 re Area Elevation In Zone Operable In Zone Reactor Building 91'3" C225/ 5 C-2 2 2 l Clothes Change Area I

Reactor Building 3'0" . C222/ 2A 11 9 RBCCW "A" f Reactor Building 3'0" C222/li 13 11

• RBCCW "B" 8 7 i Reactor Building 51'0" C96 /A/ B Recirc. l'emp M.G. Set Room Turbine Building 37' C94/3 11 9 Switchgear Room "A" Turbine Building 23' C221/lB 7 6 2

Swi tchgear Itoom "B" C94/2 9 8 Turbine Building 37' C94/7 2 2 j Battery Room "A" (

1 23' C94/8 Turbine Building 2 2 llattery Room "B" Off Cas Retention 23' C113/1 4 4 Iluilding Control Room Cabinets 37' C221/3 3 3 C221/4 3 3 C221/5 3 3 C221/6 3 3 1 C221/7 3 3 i C221/8 3 3  !

Vital M.G. Set Room 23' C221/1 5 4

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