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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML20217F9701999-10-14014 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating ARC for Axial Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking at Dented Tube Support Plate Intersections ML20217E4301999-10-12012 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements for Containment Penetrations During Refueling Operations ML20211M7341999-08-30030 August 1999 Marked-up & Revised TS Pages,Providing Alternative to Requirement of Actually Measuring Response Times ML20211K1721999-08-30030 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Clarification to Current TS Requirements for Containment Isolation Valves ML20209B7731999-06-30030 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Updating Requirmements for RCS Leakage Detection & RCS Operational Leakage Specifications to Be Consistent with NUREG-1431 ML20196F2211999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Amend to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,allowing Use of Fully Qualified & Tested Spare Inverter in Place of Any of Eight Required Inverters ML20196G4701999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Amends to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,revising TS to Be Consistent with Rev to ISTS Presently Submitted to NEI TSTF for Submittal as Rev to NUREG-1431 ML20196G7961999-06-22022 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases,Clarifying Proper Application of TS Requirements for Power Distribution Systems & Functions That Inverters Provide to Maintain Operability & Providing Updated Info on Cold Leg Injection Accumulators ML20195E9841999-06-0707 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Max Allowed Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 0.35 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 to 1.0 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 for Plant Cycle 10 (U2C10) Core ML20206E1391999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-03, Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys Versus Radiation Monitors. Changes Add LCOs 3.3.3.1 & 3.7.7 to Address Inoperability of Radiation Monitoring CREVS & NUREG-1431 Recommendations ML20206E1611999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-04, Auxiliary Suction Pressure Low Surveillance Frequency Rev. Change Deletes Surveillance ML20204H4081999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating TS 3.8.3.1,3.8.3.2,3.8.3.3 & Associated Bases Associated with Electrical Equipment Protective Devices to Technical Requirements Manual ML20207D6011999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating TS 3.7.6, Flood Protection Plan & Associated Bases from TS to Plant TRM ML20207D6331999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Consistency When Exiting Action Statements Associated with EDG Sets ML20206S0131999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3.3.3.3, Seismic Instrumentation & Associated Bases,Relocated to Plant Technical Requirements Manual ML20199K6001999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New Action Statement to 3.1.3.2 That Would Eliminate Need to Enter TS 3.0.3 Whenever Two or More Individual RPIs Per Bank May Be Inoperable,While Maintaining Appropriate Overall Level of Protection ML20195H6111998-11-16016 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising EDG SRs by Adding Note That Allows SR to Be Performed in Modes 1,2,3 or 4 If Associated Components Are Already OOS for Testing or Maint & Removing SR Verifying Certain Lockout Features Prevent EDG Starting ML20154H7251998-10-0808 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Supplementing Proposed TS Change 96-08,rev 1 to Add CRMP to Administrative Controls Section & Bases of TS ML20238F1091998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Insertion of Limited Number of Lead Test Assemblies,Beginning W/Unit 2 Operating Cycle 10 Core ML20238F3001998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Replacing 72 H AOT of TS 3.8.1.1,Action b,w/7 Day AOT Requirement for Inoperability of One EDG or One Train of EDGs ML20236G5961998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Typed Pages for TS Change 95-19, Section 6 - Administrative Controls Deletions ML20249C6371998-06-26026 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Lowering Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 1.0 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131 to 0.35 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131,as Provided in GL 95-05 ML20248F0051998-05-28028 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs for Section 6, Administrative Controls Deletions ML20217N3511998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Modifying Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Change Mode Requirement to Allow PORV Stroke Testing in Modes 3,4 & 5 W/Steam Bubble in Pressurizer Rather than Only in Mode 4 ML20203J1681998-02-25025 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising EDG Surveillance Requirements to Delete Requirement for 18-month Insp IAW Procedures Prepared in Conjunction W/Vendor Recommendations & Modify SRs Associated W/Verifying Capability of DGs ML20202J7601998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.7.9 Re Relocation of Snubber Requirements ML20202J7141998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New LCO That Addresses Requirements for Main Feedwater Isolation,Regulating & Bypass Valves ML20202J6961998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating MSIV Requirements to Be Consistent W/Std TS (NUREG-1431) ML20198T4311998-01-21021 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re New Position Title & Update of Description of Nuclear Organization ML20199K4571997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Adding one-time Allowance Through Operating Cycle 9 to Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Perform Stroke Testing of PORVs in Mode 5 Rather than Mode 4,as Currently Required ML20211A3191997-09-17017 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Pressure Differential Surveillance Requirements for Containment Spray Pumps ML20137T0871997-04-0909 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Elimination of Cycle 8 Limitation for SG Alternate Plugging Criteria ML20137M8581997-04-0101 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1 Re Safety Limits & TS 3/4.2 Re Power Distribution Limits ML20137C8421997-03-19019 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Conversion from Westinghouse Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel ML20136J0381997-03-13013 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Section 5.6.1.2,revising Enrichment of Fuel for New Fuel Pit Storage Racks ML20134P8631997-02-14014 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Discretionary Enforcement for 48 Hours Which Is in Addition to 72 Hours Allowed Outage Time Provided by TS Action 3.8.1.1.b ML20134K9981997-02-0707 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS Change Request 96-01, Conversion from W Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel (MARK-BW-17), to Ensure That Core Analysis Computer Code Output Actions Are Consistent W/Hot Channel Factor SRs ML20134L9261996-11-0808 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Placing of Channel in Trip for Reactor Trip & Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation Sys Solely to Perform Testing as Not Requiring Channel to Be Declared Inoperable ML20129D2661996-10-18018 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Removing Existing Footnotes That Limit Application of Apc for Plant S/G Tubes to Cycle 8 Operation for Both Units ML20129G7301996-09-26026 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.3 Re Fire Detection instrumentation,3/4.7.11 Re Fire Suppression Systems & 3/4.7.12 Re Fire Protection Penetrations ML20113G2691996-09-20020 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Change 96-09, Clarification of Work Shift Durations for Overtime Limits ML20117J3391996-08-28028 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Psv & MSSV Setpoint Tolerance from Plus or Minus 1% to Plus or Minus 3% ML20117D1651996-08-22022 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs of SQN Units 1 & 2,deleting Table 4.8.1, DG Reliability, & Revising Section 3.8.1 to Allow Once Per 18 month,7 Day AOT for EDGs ML20117D3121996-08-22022 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Lowering Minimum TS ice-basket Weight of 1,155 Lbs to 1,071 Lbs.Reduced Overall Ice Weight from 2,245,320 Lbs to 2,082,024 Lbs ML20117D3141996-08-21021 August 1996 Proposed TS 3.7.1.3 Re Condensate Storage Tank ML20117D3341996-08-21021 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Deletion of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.b ML20112H0431996-06-0707 June 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Section 6, Administrative Controls, to Be More Closely Aligned W/Requirements of STSs ML20101N7071996-04-0404 April 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Conversion from Westinghouse Fuel to Fuel Provided by Framatome Cogema Fuels ML20096B3761996-01-0404 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Extending Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Period Per GL 93-05 ML20096C2481996-01-0303 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Bases Section 3/4.7.1.2 to Indicate Current Operational Functions of turbine-driven AFW Level Control Valves Modified During Unit 1 Cycle 7 Refueling Outage 1999-08-30
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20217F9701999-10-14014 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating ARC for Axial Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking at Dented Tube Support Plate Intersections ML20217E4301999-10-12012 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements for Containment Penetrations During Refueling Operations ML20211M7341999-08-30030 August 1999 Marked-up & Revised TS Pages,Providing Alternative to Requirement of Actually Measuring Response Times ML20211K1721999-08-30030 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Clarification to Current TS Requirements for Containment Isolation Valves ML20209B7731999-06-30030 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Updating Requirmements for RCS Leakage Detection & RCS Operational Leakage Specifications to Be Consistent with NUREG-1431 ML20196F2211999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Amend to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,allowing Use of Fully Qualified & Tested Spare Inverter in Place of Any of Eight Required Inverters ML20196G4701999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Amends to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,revising TS to Be Consistent with Rev to ISTS Presently Submitted to NEI TSTF for Submittal as Rev to NUREG-1431 ML20196G7961999-06-22022 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases,Clarifying Proper Application of TS Requirements for Power Distribution Systems & Functions That Inverters Provide to Maintain Operability & Providing Updated Info on Cold Leg Injection Accumulators ML20196G8071999-06-22022 June 1999 Revs to Technical Requirements Manual ML20195E9841999-06-0707 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Max Allowed Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 0.35 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 to 1.0 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 for Plant Cycle 10 (U2C10) Core ML20206E1611999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-04, Auxiliary Suction Pressure Low Surveillance Frequency Rev. Change Deletes Surveillance ML20206E1391999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-03, Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys Versus Radiation Monitors. Changes Add LCOs 3.3.3.1 & 3.7.7 to Address Inoperability of Radiation Monitoring CREVS & NUREG-1431 Recommendations ML20204E8501999-03-21021 March 1999 Plant,Four Yr Simulator Test Rept for Period Ending 990321 ML20204H4081999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating TS 3.8.3.1,3.8.3.2,3.8.3.3 & Associated Bases Associated with Electrical Equipment Protective Devices to Technical Requirements Manual ML20207D6331999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Consistency When Exiting Action Statements Associated with EDG Sets ML20207D6011999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating TS 3.7.6, Flood Protection Plan & Associated Bases from TS to Plant TRM ML20206S0131999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3.3.3.3, Seismic Instrumentation & Associated Bases,Relocated to Plant Technical Requirements Manual ML20199K6001999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New Action Statement to 3.1.3.2 That Would Eliminate Need to Enter TS 3.0.3 Whenever Two or More Individual RPIs Per Bank May Be Inoperable,While Maintaining Appropriate Overall Level of Protection ML20195H6111998-11-16016 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising EDG SRs by Adding Note That Allows SR to Be Performed in Modes 1,2,3 or 4 If Associated Components Are Already OOS for Testing or Maint & Removing SR Verifying Certain Lockout Features Prevent EDG Starting ML20154H7251998-10-0808 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Supplementing Proposed TS Change 96-08,rev 1 to Add CRMP to Administrative Controls Section & Bases of TS ML20238F1091998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Insertion of Limited Number of Lead Test Assemblies,Beginning W/Unit 2 Operating Cycle 10 Core ML20238F3001998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Replacing 72 H AOT of TS 3.8.1.1,Action b,w/7 Day AOT Requirement for Inoperability of One EDG or One Train of EDGs ML20209J1631998-08-0707 August 1998 Rev 41 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Odcm ML20236G5961998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Typed Pages for TS Change 95-19, Section 6 - Administrative Controls Deletions ML20249C6371998-06-26026 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Lowering Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 1.0 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131 to 0.35 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131,as Provided in GL 95-05 ML20248F0051998-05-28028 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs for Section 6, Administrative Controls Deletions ML20217N3511998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Modifying Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Change Mode Requirement to Allow PORV Stroke Testing in Modes 3,4 & 5 W/Steam Bubble in Pressurizer Rather than Only in Mode 4 ML20203J1681998-02-25025 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising EDG Surveillance Requirements to Delete Requirement for 18-month Insp IAW Procedures Prepared in Conjunction W/Vendor Recommendations & Modify SRs Associated W/Verifying Capability of DGs ML20202J7651998-02-13013 February 1998 Technical Requirements Manual ML20202J7141998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New LCO That Addresses Requirements for Main Feedwater Isolation,Regulating & Bypass Valves ML20202J6961998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating MSIV Requirements to Be Consistent W/Std TS (NUREG-1431) ML20202J7601998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.7.9 Re Relocation of Snubber Requirements ML20198T4311998-01-21021 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re New Position Title & Update of Description of Nuclear Organization ML20199F8231997-11-30030 November 1997 Cycle 9 Restart Physics Test Summary, for 971011-971130 ML20199K4571997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Adding one-time Allowance Through Operating Cycle 9 to Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Perform Stroke Testing of PORVs in Mode 5 Rather than Mode 4,as Currently Required ML20211A3191997-09-17017 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Pressure Differential Surveillance Requirements for Containment Spray Pumps ML20203B9731997-08-0505 August 1997 Rev 1 to RD-466, Test & Calculated Results Pressure Locking ML20217J5581997-07-31031 July 1997 Cycle Restart Physics Test Summary, for Jul 1997 ML20210J1671997-04-30030 April 1997 Snp Unit 1 Cycle 8 Refueling Outage Mar-Apr 1997,Results of SG Tube ISI as Required by TS Section 4.4.5.5.b & Results of Alternate Plugging Criteria Implementation as Required by Commitment from TS License Condition 2C(9)(d) ML20137T0871997-04-0909 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Elimination of Cycle 8 Limitation for SG Alternate Plugging Criteria ML20137M8581997-04-0101 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1 Re Safety Limits & TS 3/4.2 Re Power Distribution Limits ML20137C8421997-03-19019 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Conversion from Westinghouse Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel ML20136J0381997-03-13013 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Section 5.6.1.2,revising Enrichment of Fuel for New Fuel Pit Storage Racks ML20134P8631997-02-14014 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Discretionary Enforcement for 48 Hours Which Is in Addition to 72 Hours Allowed Outage Time Provided by TS Action 3.8.1.1.b ML20134K9981997-02-0707 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS Change Request 96-01, Conversion from W Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel (MARK-BW-17), to Ensure That Core Analysis Computer Code Output Actions Are Consistent W/Hot Channel Factor SRs ML20138F2581997-01-17017 January 1997 Rev 39 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Odcm ML20134L9261996-11-0808 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Placing of Channel in Trip for Reactor Trip & Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation Sys Solely to Perform Testing as Not Requiring Channel to Be Declared Inoperable ML20129D2661996-10-18018 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Removing Existing Footnotes That Limit Application of Apc for Plant S/G Tubes to Cycle 8 Operation for Both Units ML20129G7301996-09-26026 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.3 Re Fire Detection instrumentation,3/4.7.11 Re Fire Suppression Systems & 3/4.7.12 Re Fire Protection Penetrations ML20134J9991996-09-23023 September 1996 Fuel Assembly Insp Program 1999-08-30
[Table view] |
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i ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) UNIT 2 DOCKET NO 50-328 (TVA-SON-TS-95-13)
LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES Unit 2 Operating License Page 11 i
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9505260222 950519 PDR ADOCK 05000328 P PDR ,
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- s. Primary Coolant Outside Containment (Section 22.2. III.D.1.1)
Prior to exceeding 5 percent power Level, TVA is required to complete the leak tests on Unit 2,.and results are to be i
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submitted within 30 days from the completion of the testing.
Y W- y (17) Surveillance Interval Extension gg i /f a ce n r 1 o o ure(1 e rq r s
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D. Exemptions from certain requirements of Appendices G and J to 10 CFR Part 50 are described In the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Safety Evaluation Report, Supplements No. I and No. 5. These exemptions are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, ,
these exemptions are hereby granted. The facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission.
1 A temporary exemption from General Design Criterion 57 found in Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50 is described in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement No. 5, Section 6.2.4.
This exemption is authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and is otherwise in the public interest.
The exemption, therefore, is hereby granted and shall remain in effect through the first refueling outage as discussed in Section 6.2.4 of Supplement 5 to the Safety Evaluation Report. The granting of the exemption is authorized with the issuance of the Facility Operating License. The facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in .
conformity with the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission. Additional exemptions are listed in a attachment 2.
E. Physical Protection l
The Licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of R65 the Consission-approved physical security, guard training and qualifica- .
tion, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant i to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revision to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Safeguards Contingency Plan is incorporated into the Physical Security Plan. The plans, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled:
"Sequoyah Physical Security Plan," with revisions submitted through November 23, 1987; and "Sequoyah Security Personnel Training and Qualification Plan," with revisions submitted through April 16, 1987.
Changes made in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 shall be implemented in accordance with the schedule set forth therein.
Amendment No. 65, 162, 170 March 31, 1994
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(17) Surveillance Interval Extension The performance interval for the 36-month surveillance requirements in TS 4.3.2.1.3 shall be extended to May 4,1996,to coincide with the Cycle 7 refueling outage. The extended interval shall not exceed a total of 49.5 months for the 36-month surveillances.
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l ENCLOSURE 2 ,
I PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) UNIT 2 ,
DOCKET NO 50-328 l
(TVA-SON-TS 95-13) i DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR i-EXTENSION OF RESPONSE TIME SURVEILLANCES ;
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Descriotion of Chanae TVA proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Unit 2 technical specifications (TSs) by revising the expired License Condition 2.C.(17). The proposed revision will extend the required surveillance interval to May 4,1996, for Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.3.2.1.3 for engineered safety features response time. This SR extension request involves 36-month response time verifications for safety injection, feedwater isolation, containment isolation Phase A, auxiliary feedwater pump, essential raw cooling water system, emergency gas treatment system, containment spray, containment isolation Phase B, turbine trip,6.9-kilovolt shutdown board. degraded voltage or loss of voltage, and automatic switchover to containment i sump actuations. The proposed extension willlimit the interval past the allowable j extension provided by TS 4.0.2 to 4.5 months for the 36-month surveillances.
Reason for Chanae SON's Unit 2 experienced an extended forced outage during Cycle 6 operation. This forced outage resulted in a delay between Cycle 6 and 7 operation and has created ,
difficulty in meeting the required surveillance interval for many surveillances performed during refueling outages. As a result, TVA requested and received NRC approval to extend several surveillances for the Unit 2 Cycle 6 refueling outage. During this outage, TVA intended to return all affected surveillances to a schedule that would !
eliminate the need to process additional extension requests. However, 24 response-time surveillance procedures associated with TS 4.3.2.1.3, that will expire before the Cycle 7 refueling outage, were overlooked. TVA performed 20 of the 24 procedures during a Mode 5 forced outage in April 1995 to maintain the ;
required surveillance frequency. The 4 remaining surveillance procedures could not be .
performed without significantly extending the duration of the forced outage. The first !
of the remaining 4 procedures will exceed the 36-month surveillance interval, plus the :
25 percent extension provided by TS 4.0.2, on December 20,1995, and the last will !
occur on February 8,1996.
These surveillance procedures cannot be performed during power operation without risking a unit transient. Therefore, performance of these SRs under the existing TS requirements would require testing at power or an unnecessary plant shutdown before December 20,1995. The Cycle 7 refueling outage for Unit 2 is currently scheduled ,
for April 19,1996. To allow for unforeseen impacts to the operating capacity factor, i TVA is asking to extend the proposed surveillances to May 4,1996. 1 Justification for Chanaes The proposed change is temporary and allows a 1-t?me extension of a 36-month surveillance requirement for Cycle 7 to allow surveillance testing to coincide with the i seventh refueling outage. The maximum surveillance intervalincrease during which !
the plant is operating at power will be less than four and one-half months, and will not affect the reliability established by surveillance testing performed at normalintervals.
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TS 4.0.2 is an administrative control that ensures surveillance tests are performed periodically and defines a reasonable extension period for such testing. The basis for this specification describes the SRs as " sufficient to ensure that the reliability associated with the surveillance activity is not significantly degraded beyond that j obtained from the nominal specified interval." TVA has concluded that the reliability defined by the normal surveillance intervals (e.g., daily, weekly, monthly) will not be j significantly reduced by the extension. This conclusion is based on the following considerations for extending surveillances.
Response time tests are performed on instrumentation loops from the sensor to the ,
final actuating device. These tests involve timing of the sensor, Eagle 21 ;
components, solid state protection system (SSPS) logic and relays, and the final actuating device to determine an overallinstrumentationloop response time. For the Eagle 21 components, the major contributor to response time is loop cycle time, which is verified by each quarterly functional test performed within that rack. The ,
SSPS logic is tested on a bi-monthly interval to verify functionality and supports acceptable response time capability. The required response time intervals for the Eagle 21 and SSPS logic are 309 and 6 milliseconds, respectively, and are not a significant contributor to overallioop response time. The sensors, SSPS relays, and final actuating devices are tested at refueling outages to assess the acceptability of their response times.
The sensors involved in the response time tests include pressure transmitters and differential pressure transmitters. A review of the past three surveillance performances for these devices did not indicate time-based trends that would result in exceeding response time requirements considering the proposed extension, industry
- positions support the consideration of eliminating response time testing for transmitters and switches. This consideration is based on extensive evidence that these devices do not exhibit response time drift over a period of time in general, the testing for response times of these devices in the industry has not detected response time failures that would not be identified by calibrations, functional testing, or channel checks. Therefore, channel checks, that will continue to be perforrned during the remainder of the fuel cycle, will provide reasonavle confidence that the sensors are functional and that expected response times will remain within acceptable response time limits.
The SSPS relays that would require the proposed extension for response time considerations have not exhibited response time drift. Review of past response time tests have verified this position and do not indicate changes in tested values as a result of test intervals. The repeatability of response times associated with the operation of relays and the historical data supports the proposed change to extend the response time surveillances.
o The majority of the final actuation devices for response time testing are valves. The affected valves for the proposed extension primarily involve those that are also tested by the Section XI Program. Of the valves not in the Section XI Program, a review of recent tests did not indicate a failure to meet the response time requirements. Recent response time tests for the other final actuation devices, which includes pumps and breakers, wers also reviewed and no adverse trends were identified. The historical results of past response time tests, along with most valves also being tested in the Section XI Program, provide adequate confidence that response times will remain within acceptable values for the proposed extension interval.
Environmentalimpact Evaluation The proposed change does not involve an unreviewed environmental question because operation of SON Unit 2 in accordance with this change would not:
l 1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmentalimpact previously evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) as modified by NRC's testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, supplements to the FES, environmentalimpact appraisals, or decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
- 2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels.
- 3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for SON that may have a significant environmentalimpact.
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I ENCLOSURE 3 ,
PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE .
i SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) UNIT 2 DOCKET NO 50-328 (TVA-SON-TS-95-13)
DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION :
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Significant Hazards Evaluation TVA has evaluated the proposed technical specification (TS) change and has determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SON) in acc.ordance with the proposed amendment will not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change is temporary and allows a one-time extension of Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.3 for Cycle 7 to allow surveillance testing to coincide with the seventh refueling outage. The proposed surveillance interval extension will not cause a significant reduction in system reliability nor affect the ability of the systems to perform their design function. Current monitoring of plant conditions and continuation of the surveillance testing required during normal plant operation will continue to be performed to ensure conformance with TS operability requirements. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.
Extending the surveillance interval for the performance of specific testing will not create the possibility of any new or different kind of accidents. No changes are required to any system configurations, plant equipment, or analyses. Therefore, this change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Surveillance interval extensions will not impact any plant safety analyses since the assumptions used will remain unchanged. The safety limits assumed in the accident analyses and the design function of the equipment required to mitigate the consequences of any postulated accidents will not be changed since only the surveillance test intervalis being extended. Historical performance generally indicates a high degree of reliability, and surveillance testing performed during normal plant operation will continue to be performed to verify proper performance.
Therefore, the plant will be maintained within the analyzed limits, and the proposed extension will not significantly reduce the margin of safety.
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