ML20059P082
| ML20059P082 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1990 |
| From: | ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059N777 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9010250193 | |
| Download: ML20059P082 (35) | |
Text
,
Attachm3nt 1 +
' to U-601733 I Pags 1 of 35' L_
CLINTON POWER STATION 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 90102D0193 900918 PDR ADOCKOD00g1 x
. Attcchinent 1 to U-601733 L Pagi 2 of 35 DEFINITION OF ACRONYNS FOR DOCUMENTS EVALUATED CR - Condition Report EPIP - Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures FA - Field Alteration FECN - Field Engineering Change Notice PDR - Procedure Deviation for Revision TM - Temporary Modification TPD - Temporary Procedure Deviation USAR - Updated Safety Analysis Report l-L l
1 L
l l
. Attachment I to U-601733 Peg 2 3 of 35 t
i i
I CLINTON POWER STATION 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR .;
MODIFICATIONS t
FROM APRIL 1989 THROUGH MRRCH 1990 1
~
?
i l
I I
l 1
r I 1
l l
l-I.
l
. Attcchment 1 to U-601733 Pag: 4 ef 35 ,
-a PAGE 1 NODIFICATIONS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 TRROUGE MARCH 1990 CRANGES TO LEGEND PLATES, ANNUNCIATOR TILES, CAUTION TAGS, ETC.
Docuntui tVALUAftD FA c F033 SUP 1 log MunstR: 89-0075 Several changes were made to the Main Control Room control I panels to: (1) replace legend plates and annunciator tiles, (2) ;
install legend plates in place of caution tags and operator '
aids, (3) correct panel mimic, and (4) revise affected design documents. In the course of preparing these changes, it was j determined that on USAR Figure 5.2-16, which lists recorder ;
points for main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) stem leakage, the recorder point for stem leakage from valve B21-F016 (MSIV j before-seat drain lines inboard containment isolation valve) was shown incorrectly as point 8. It.was corrected in the USAR to g point 5 by this change. These changes only revise wording to l correct the recorder point number in order to reduce the chance' -
for operator error. They do not affect any equipment malfunctions identified in the USAR.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
UPDATE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DRAWINGS TO AS-BUILT CONDITIONS !
DocuntNT tvatuAtto's FA c r039 log wumstR: 89 0068 l
This, field alteration updated design documents for the Fire Protection. (FP) system to show instrumentation and two valves that were part of the original configuration but were not included in all appropriate design documents. The instruments are associated with the two diesel-driven fire pumps, and the valves are provided for system testing. These components do not perform a function essential to the operation of the fire pumps, and therefore, do not adversely affect the ability of the plant to' achieve and maintain a safe shutdown in the event of a fire. -j AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, i
1 i
q
_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . _ . . . _ . . _ . _~ _ .._
3
.- Attcchment I to U-601733 Page 5 of 35
. PAGE 2 NODIFICATIONS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 UPDATE MARE-UP DEMINERALIBER DRAWINGS TO AS-BUILT CONDITIONS DOCUMENT tvatuATED: FA c p039 Loc NunstR: 89 0069 This field alteration updates design documents for the makeup demineralizer (WM) system, which is located in the makeup water pump house (MWPH), to reflect the as-built configuration of the acid tank level instrumentation. This instrumentation does not perform a safety-related function nor would its failure impact safety-related equipment.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
UPDATE INSTRUMENT AIR DRAWINGS TO AS-BUILT CONDITIONS DOCUMENT EVALUAftD FA c F039 LOG NUMBER: 89 0069 This field alteration updates design documents for the instrument air (IA) system in the makeup water pumphouse (MWPH).
This change adds an air compressor pressure switch and isolation valve that were in the original configuration but were not shown on all appropriate documents. The portion of the IA system in the MWPH does not perform or support any safety function.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
is I
1 3' f,3, '
Attechment 1 3,
to U-601733 Pag 2 6 of 35
. PAGE 3 NODIFICATIONS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGN MARCH 1990 UPDATE DRYWELL VENTILATION SYSTEM DRAWINGS TO A8-BUILT CONDITIONS, DOCUMENT EVALUAf tD: FA C F039 LOG WUMBER: 89 0070 This field alteration updates design documents for the drywell ventilation (VQ) system. This change revises piping and instrumentation drawing (P&ID) instrument function symbols to as-built conditions and to the architect / engineer's standard instrument symbols. There are three drywell purge filter trains in parallel. Each train has a demister and a prefilter for the initial treatment of the purge air flow. This change removes the symbol for a single differential pressure indicator across each drywell purge filter train demister and replaces it with a symbol for precuure alarming / indicating / switch function across the demisterfdisplay status prefilter combination. Failure of this instrumentation does not impact filtration capability.
This change does not impact the failure analysis in USAR Table 9.4-24. The VQ filter trains are not intended to operate under
, abnormal plant conditions.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
PLUG 10% OF THE TUBES IN DIVISION I/II DIE 8EL GENERATOR RXs DOCUMENT EVALUATED: FA DCF020 LOG WUMBER: 89 0128 This field alteration increased the percentage of tubes allowed to be plugged in the Division I and II diesel generator jacket water to service water heat exchangers (HXs) from 2% (as stated in CPS USAR 9.5.5.2) to 10%. This action was necessitated by the number of tubes found to be leaking. This field alteration '
also provided for removing portions of the plugged tubes to send them to a laboratory for analysis. Documented discussions with the vendor and calculations by the architect / engineer indicated that this change would not adversely impact the required
[ performance of the heat exchangers.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
.o m
T
. Attcchment 1 i to U 601733 I Page 7 of 35 )
. PAGE 4 MODIFICATIONS 09/14/90- l 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGE MARCH 1990 i PLUG 30% OF THE TUBES IN DIVISION I/II DIESEL GENERATOR XXs i DOCLMENT EVALUATED: FA DGF021 LOG WUMBER: 90 0020 l This field alteration increased the percentage of tubes allowed I to be plugged in the Division I and II diesel generator jacket l water to service water heat exchangers (HXs) from that described ,
in field alteration DGF020. More tubes were found leaking, and the cause was determined to be microbiologically induced )
corrosion (MIC). This field alteration increased the maximum i number of tubes allowed to be plugged to 100 (approximately j 30%). This allowance was conditioned on the remaining tubes i being clean and limited to the time prior to startup from the -
1990 spring outage. The unplugged tubes were cleaned, and during the spring outage the Division I heat exchangers were retubed. The Division II heat exchangers did not require 1 retubing since they still had less than 10% of their tubes plugged. '
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. !
REMOVE UNIT 2 FUEL POOL CONDUCTIVITY METER FROM SERVICE DOCLMENT EVALUATED: FA FCF005 LOG NUMBER: 89 0110 i
Previously the Clinton Unit 2 spent fuel pool demineralizer system influent conductivity cell 2CE-FC009 was removed from service because Unit 2 construction had been cancelled. This i action caused the associated conductivity meter 2CT-FC009 to maintain an alarm condition. Associated annunciator windows in the main control room were constantly on which created a distraction for the operator. This field alteration removed l conductivity meter 2CT-FC009 from service in order to eliminate ;
these nuisance alarms. Also, as part of this field alteration, l the annunciator window tile for "High Conductivity Influent Unit L 2" was replaced with a blank tile. These instruments were L
installed as part of Unit 2 construction which was cancelled, and they did not perform any required function for the control )
of Unit 1. !
l AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
-.-r --. . - - - . - - -
l
.. Attachment 1 i to U-601733 l Pega 8 of 35 l
. PAGE 5 NODIFICATIONS 09/14/90 l 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 TEROUGH MARCH 1990 '
l REMOVE INTERNALS FROM NOISTURE SEPARATOR DRAIN TANK CRECK VALVE !
DOCUMENT EVALUATED: FA NDF015 LOG WUIGER: 89-0092 This. field alteration removed the internals from the turbine 'A' moisture separator drain tank check valve 1HD002A. The valve had stuck closed several times resulting in emergency draining of the 'A' moisture separator drain tank to the main condenser .
and feedwater heater level control problems. An analysis by the I architect / engineer determined that this change would not 1 increase the frequency of turbine trips as analyzed in section I 15.2.3 of the CPS USAR. Their calculations also showed that pipe stresses would be within the limits. allowed by the code.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
ADD AUTOMATIC DRAIN TRAPS TO THE SERVICE AIR SYSTEN DOCUMENT EVALUATED: FA IAF007 LOG WUpeER: 89 0027 This field alteration accomplished two upgrades to the air prefilter drains on the three instrument air (IA). system air ,
dryer skids. The existing time operated solenoid drain valves only drained one side of the filter. These solenoid valves were removed, and drain traps that are automatically controlled on i level were installed on both sides of the prefilters. This was ;
done in order to reduce IA system moisture and particulate values to acceptable levels. Also, sample valves were installed -
on both sides of the after-filter on each of the three air dryer skids to permit particulate sampling. The changes made by this I field alteration are limited to non-safety portions of the system and do not impact the safety portions of the system.
These changes do not alter the design pressure or flow of the instrument air system. The USAR evaluation of a loss of instrument air event (USAR 15.2.10) is not affected by these changes and remains the bounding analysis. There is no impact to any other system or its operation as a result of this field alteration.
AS= A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
1 l
'- Attachment 1 to U-601733 Paga 9 of 35 L. PAGE 6 NODIFICATIONS 09/14/90 l p 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGE MARCH 1990 f i
MATERIALS ALLOWED FOR FIXING INSTRUNENT AIR AND BREATHING AIR LEAR 8 ,
DOCUMEW1 [ VALUATED: FA 1AF011 LOG WUntER: 89 0117 i This. field alteration allows the use of stainless steel flexible l hoses and Belzona Molecular Super Metal sealant, manufactured by Belzona Molecular, Inc., for the repair of leaks in the i instrument air (IA) and breathing air (RA) copper piping. This ,
change does not apply to those safety-related portions which are t designed to ASME Section III requirements. Belzona sealant has been demonstrated to be equivalent to solder in soldered joints. ';
The use of flexible hoses will improve connections where vibration has been found to be a problem.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, REPLACE RELIEF VALVE IN THE AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIEATION SYSTEN <
DOCUMENT EVAluniED: FA IAF012 LOG NUMBER: 90 0029 This field alteration provides for a part substitution and replacement _of relief valve lIA128A on the automatic depressurization system (ADS) backup air bottle manifold. The replacement valve has a stainless steel nozzle and disc and i carbon. steel body while the original valve was all stainless i steel. The replacement valve meets the corrosion resistance requirements for the IA system, and it has the same pressure rating and relief capacity as the original valve.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
L i
4
. - , , -- - _. _ . , , . . . . , . . - r -.
'. Attcchment I to U'601733 ;
Pcg3 10 of 35 PAGE 7 MODIFICATIONS 09/14/90 t
10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGN MARCH 1990 ,
r allow INSTALLATION OF JUMPERS TO BYPASS RADWASTE SAMPLE COOLERS DOCUMENT EVALUAttDa FA P$F019 LOG NUMetR: 89 0127 This field alteration allows the installation of mechanical jumpers to bypass the radwaste sample coolers when the sample temperature is less than or equal to 200 degrees Fahrenheit.
These sample cooler lines clog frequently at the point where they enter the cooler and the lines reduce from 3/8" diameter to 1/4" diameter. This field alteration provides for either configuration (jumper installed or removed) . Plant procedures are being revised to allow for installation and removal of the jumpers depending on sample conditions. No failures of this equipment are evaluated in the CPS USAR and no new failure modes are introduced by this change.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
RELOCATE AREA COOLER SHUTDOWN SERVICE WATER RETURN LINE DOCUMENT EVALUAff0: FA $xF012 LOG NUMBER: 90 0035 This field alteration relocated the point at which the shutdown i service. water (SX) return line from the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger room 1A cooling coil cabinet ties into the main SX return line. The tie-in was moved from upstream of a L flow balancing orifice in the main SX return line to downstream of the orifice. This action was taken in response to system flow balancing which identified inadequate flow through the cooling coil cabinet. Moving the cooler return line tie-in to downstream of the orifice increased the pressure differential across the cooler which in turn caused the flow through the cooler to increase to an acceptable flow rate. The field alteration was installed in conformance with the required codes and standards. This change provides for adequate cooling water flow to the area cooler and does not adversely impact flow to the RHR heat exchanger.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
L :
i
.. : Attachment 1 f to U-601733 P9ge 11 of 35
,. .PAGE 8 MODIFICATIONS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGR MARCH 1990 FUEL POOL COOLING NEAT RECKANGER OUTLET VALVE POSITION DOCUMENT [VALUAftDa FA $xf014 LOG Numatt: 90 0037 This field alteration changed the position of the fuel pool
, cooling (FC) heat exchanger return butterfly valve 1SXO62A from full open to throttl(J open.- The normal cooling water supply to this heat exchanger is from the component cooling water (CC) system. The shutdowr, service water (SX) system provides a backup source of cooling water should the CC system become inoperable; thereforte, valve ISXO62A is normally closed. When SX is needed to provide cooling to the FC heat exchangers,' valve ISXO62A opens. It was determined that this valve should be i opened to a throttled position in order to balance SX system flows. Calculations were performed which show that this change does not reduce the heat removal capability of the FC heat exchanger below the level required to perform its safety function.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
')
PROVIDE FOR REROUTING HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY SAMPLE COOLER RETURN DOCUMENT EVALUAf tDa FA WOF012 tog NUMcER: 90 0031 A sample cooler had been installed under temporary modification 88-073 to support the hydrogen water chemistry test in the reactor water clean up (RT) system 'A' pump room. Cooling water i was provided to the sample cooler by tapping into the plant '
chilled water (WO) system supply and return lines to the area cooler through the existing vent and drain valves. Problems arose because the return from the sample cooler was upstream of ;
temperature differential sensors located in the area cooler 1
-return line. The sensors provide input to the leak detection (LD) system. This field alteration provided a welded connection downstream of the temperature sensors. This change did not affect the safety-related portion of the WO system, and it
=!
removed a possible source of spurious challenges to the LD system.
AS A RESULT OF.THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
o i
ll 4 Attcch:2nt 1 to U-601733 Pag 12 of 35 j . PAGE 9 MODIFICATIONS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 REMOVE INTERNALS OF REMEATER DRAIN TANK OUTLET CHECK VALVE 8
. DOCUMENT tvALUAftD ftCN 25289 LOG NUM8tR: 89 0111 This FECH removed the internals of check valves 1HD010A and B <
which are located between the A and B moisture separator reheater drain tanks and the 6A and 6B feedwater heaters respectively. Problems were experienced with the valves sticking closed and then opening causing system transients.
Also, steam flow through the valves was insufficient to maintain the valve discs fully open during normal full power operation.
The discs would flutter and induce pressure surges which had the potential for damaging downstream valves and fittings due to the effects of steam flashing and water hammer. The effects of the change on the analysis of the Loss of Feedwater Heating event were considered. The change would not affect normal full power operation since the check valve should be full open during normal full power operation. The impacts on low power operation were judged to be minimal and could be compensated by isolating the normal drain line and using emergency drain valves until adequate power levels are reached.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
REMOVE UNUSED HIGH POINT VENT VALVE FROM RADWASTE LINE !
DOCUMENT EVALUAff0 FECN 25342 LOG NUMBER: 90 0017 This FECN temoves high point vent valve 2WF212, which is in the floor drains processing (WF) system, and replaces it with a seal welded screwad cap. This action was taken to correct a condition in .<hich the vent line cracked where it was welded to a radwaste transfer line. This valve was only used as a vent :
for hydrostatic pressure tests during construction; it was not used for normal operation. The new piping is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.143. The postulated failure of the concentrate waste tank is analyzed in USAR section 15.7.3 as a bounding event for the liquid radwaste system. This change does not adversely impact that analysis nor create a credible accident with consequences which exceed the postulated event.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
J
ii. i .
Attcchment 1 I to U-601733 Pogs 13 of 35 i
I I
i
.[
t i
!! CLINTON POWER STATION !
I I
, 10CFR50.59 REPORT J
< l FOR ,
I TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 l
1 l
i I..
1,
.?
l lt ,t L
h b _
h b
I 4
l
Attcchment I to U-601733 Pcgs 14 of 35
,,. PAGE. 1 TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT POR APRIL 1989 TEROUGK MARCH 1990 CROSS CONNECT SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON MONITORING CIRCUITRY / DETECTORS DOCUMENT tvAtuAftD: TM 89 011 Loc NUMBER: 89 0025 This temporary modification addressed the potential for inoperable source range-monitor (SRM) channels in the neutron monitoring (NR) system during refueling activities. The SRMs measure neutron flux in the reactor core at very low reactor power. There are four SRM channels, one for.each quadrant of the core. Technical Specification 3.9.2 requires that at least two SRM channels be operable during refueling, one in the quadrant where fuel is being moved and the other in an adjacent quadrant. Each SRM channel consists of three major subsystems:
detector, cable, and circuitry. This temporary modification provided that if an SRM had been declared inoperable due to problems with its cable or circuitry, the detector could be connected to cable and/or circuitry for one of the other SRM channels not required to be operable. Modified SRM channels were tested and verified operable prior to being placed in service. Divisional separation was maintained by utilizing flex conduit for the jumpers. Because the reactor protection system had its shorting links installed while this temporary modification was open, no scram signal could have been introduced by the SRMs. This temporary modification did not affect the capability of the SRMs to supply control rod block signals to the rod control and information system (RCIS).
Caution tagging and other controls were used to ensure that operators would be aware of the changes and their impact on main control room displays.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
LOCATION OF DEMINERALIBER IN THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM DOCUMENT EVALUATED: IM 89 03? LOG NUMBER: 89 0080 A temporary demineralizer had been previously installed in the component cooling water (CC) system such that flow to the demineralizer was from the discharge header for the CC pumps.
This temporary modification moved the inlet source of the demineralizer from the CC pumps discharge header to the shell side drain valves of the two CC heat exchangers. Performance of the heat exchangers was not significantly degraded since approximately 1% of the flow through the heat exchangers was diverted to the demineralizer. Also, no new mechanical loading of the heat exchangers was introduced since the connection was made with flexible hoses.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
Attcch:3nt 1 L* to U-601733 Pege 15 of 35
.- PAGE 2 TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGM MARCH 1990 REVISE MAKEUP CONDENSATE SYSTEM LINEUP TO STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL DOCUMENT EVAtuAf tD: TM 89 033 LOG WUMBER: 89 0082 This temporary modification revised the normal position of the makeup condensate (MC) system valve from open to closed. This valve is used to provide makeup water to the standby liquid control (SC) system. This action was taken.because MC water had been leaking past the SC tank isolation valves which would dilute the borated water out of specification and raise tank level above the allowable level. A pressure gauge was also installed on a low point drain in the SC system to provide for periodically monitoring the pressure in the SC system piping to verify that the SC pumps were adequately primed with the MC valve closed. The pressure gauge did not significantly affect the integrity of the SC system piping as the drain valves located between the gauge and the piping were only opened while the pressure was being checked. Sampling of the water in the SC system piping was also performed to ensure that sodium pentaborate solution in the SC tank did not leak past the tank's isolation valves without being detected.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
GAG RELIEF VALVE AT THE MAIN STEAM - AUXILIARY STEAM INTERFACE DOCUMENT EVALUATED: TM 89 036 LOG NUMBER: 89 0085
.This temporary modification installed a mechanical blocking device on relief valve 1B21-F408 to prevent it from opening.
This valve is located at a point where main steam and auxiliary steam:(AS) join together. The relief valve had been chattering due to an improper setpoint. The main steam system and the piping connecting to As were not affected by this temporary modification since they were isolated from the relief valve.
The auxiliary steam system would not overpressurize since the relief valves on the reboilers would prevent this. There was no impact to any other system.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
, Attcchment 1 to U-601733
- l. Pegs 16 of 35 L ' .- PAGE 3 TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGR MARCH 1990 BYPASS BATTERY ROOM EKHAUST FAN DIFFERENTIAL PRES 8URE SWITCHES DOCUMENT tvALUATED: TM 89-038 LOG NUMBER: 89 0087 The Switchgear Heat Removal (VX) system fans IVX11CA and CB exhaust the balance of plant (BOP) and Division IV battery rooms. These fans are equipped with differential pressure switches (lPDS-VXO66 and 068) which were not functioning properly and would not permit the exhaust fans to operate as required. This temporary modification lifted the leads on the differential pressure switches permitting the exhaust fans to operate. Any trouble with the operating fan would have been indicated in the main control room where the standby fan can be started manually.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
L INSTALL BLOCKING DEVICE IN REACTOR WATER CLEANUP RELIEF VALVE DOCUM(NT EVALUATED: TM 89 047 LOG WUMBER: 89 0093 This temporary modification installed a mechanical blocking device in the reactor water cleanup (RT) system relief valve 1G33-F036. This relief valve is located on a branch off of the RT drain line to radwaste. The relief valve's discharge is piped to the main condenser. The blocking device was installed to protect personnel while they were working on the main condenser.
L This piping is non-safety, non-ASME, class D line designed to ANSI B31.1, and it is not used nor required for a safety-related function. An engineering evaluation indicated that the pipe can withstand pressures up to 750 psig while the maximum expected pressure during the time the blocking device was installed was 355 psig.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
e v 3 4r; , AttachmInt 1
^ '
to U-601733 i Pegs 17.of 35
, .j 45 4 PAGE 4 -TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS- 09/14/90 )
'l gf 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 l LIMIT OPENING OF DRAIN VALVE 8 ON MOISTURE /8EPARATOR DRAIN TANK l w D0cuMENT EVALUATED: TM 89 050 LOG NUMBER: 89 0096 This temporary modification installed travel stops on the
, -reheater drain tank drain control valves, 1HD012A and B, s '
limiting them to half of their normal movement; that is, the i valve could close-fully but only open half way. These valves
- F function to control level in the reheater drain tanks of the moisture separator / reheaters and to pass steam / condensate to.the
"" #6 feedwater heaters. This modification limited steam flow to the #6 feedwater heaters. This was done because high steam pressure had damaged the bellows on the relief valves for the #6
. heaters when the relief valves opened. The damaged bellows allowed air to-flow into the main condenser after the relief valves shut causing a loss of condenser vacuum and a subsequent plant trip. This change limited the pressure to which the bellows would be subjected, should the relief valves open, until
-the bellows could be upgraded. In the event of high steam flow, the emergency drain valves would still provide backup level control for1the reheater drain tanks.
AS A RESULT 0F THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS !
ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. l CHANGE SETPOINT ON FEEDWATER HEATER 3A 8 HELL-SIDE RELIEF VALVE l
DOCUMENT EVALUATED: TM 89 051 LOG NUMBER: 89 0097 i l
, This temporary modification lowered the lift setpoint of relief valve'1DV042A and added a. check valve to the relief valve's bonnet vent. This relief valve is en the shell side of feedwater heater 3A and discharges to the main condenser. These actions i were.taken because the relief valve's bellows had cracked. The 1 L , Jbellows' function is to isolate the discharge of the relief 4 -valve-from the bonnet area.1The cracked bellows had two l
deleterious effects on valve operation. 1).With the valve shut, Lw air could be drawn through the bonnet vent then through the
, cracked bellows and into the condenser. The check valve was i f' < i added to prevent this. 2) When-the valve opens, the cracked
. bellows would allow steam pressure,to act on the backside of the !
valve disk preventing it from opening fully and causing it to i y shut prematurely. The valve's setpoint was lowered to compensate J,, 4 for this effect.
l-L AS'A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS
- 4P. ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
- gj w
6 4
b)
'. k
'b II
?; - .
,1 4
'Attochmsnt 1
, DJ to U-601733 Pags 18 of;35 )
. PAGE 5' TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT.FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990-p 'i INSTALL HELIUM MASS SPECTROMETER IN OFF-GAS SYSTEM il DOCUMENT EVALUAffDs TM 89 053 LOG NUMBER: 89 0102 This temporary modification provided for installation of a helium mass spectrometer.and associated equipment in the off-Gas (OG) system to aid in locating points where air was leaking into the main condenser. Two flow indicators-normally used for '
' measuring purge air flow during maintenance were removed to
. provide sample and return connections for the spectrometer. The existing isolation valves for the flow indicators were left in .
I
+ place and used in-conjunction with operation of the spectrometer. The valves were normally left closed and only -
opened during the time that the spectrometer was being used.
V The spectrometer was physically located in_the turbine building
~
hallway outside the dessicant dryer room. Temporary tubing was routed from the connections in the dessicant dryer room to the spectrometer in the hallway. Administrative controls were ;
m provided such that the isolation valves would be closed if
'(
~
either the radiation levels increased due to leakage or 1f hydrogen-concentration levels exceeded-4% in the OG system.
I AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS la' ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
INSTALL PRESSURE INDICATORS IN OFF-GAS SYSTEM l - DOCUMENT EVALUATED: TM 89-055 LOG NUMBER: 89 0101 lThis temporary modification removed four flow indicators from the off-gas (OG) system and installed pressure indicators in their place. The. flow indicators are normally isolated from the
, offgas stream. They are-only used to monitor purge air added to '
o the OG system during system maintenance. The temporary b modification provided two alternative installation options. The
, primary option required installation of the instruments, tubing, and' fittings to meet the design requirements of the OG system.
.With this option, the isolation valves ~could be left open. If f the material did not' meet the OG system design requirements, then the isolation valves were required to be shut and opened
[f only when the indicator was being read.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. l L
Lh ll i
-* Attachm2nt'l-to U-601733
. Pags 19 of 35 '
1 PAGE 6 TEMPORARY' MODIFICATION 8 09/14/90 i
10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR' APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 1
REMOVE CONDENSATE PUMP!'A8-FROM SERVICE, INSTALL BLIND FLANGES .;
DOCUMENT EVALUATED: TM 89 060 LOG NUMBER: 89 0119 l t
~
This temporary' modification removed condensate pump 'A' from
- I service to perform maintenance. The suction and discharge lines
.were isolated _with blind flanges. This did not affect plant :
operation since full power. operation could be supported by the .$
three remaining pumps. Installation of the flanges met '.
, applicable codes. ,
x !
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT- INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
i REMOVE. REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM PUMP FROM SERVICE DOCUMENT EVALUA1ED: TM 90 01 LOG NUMBER: 90 0001 This temporary modification removed reactor water clean up
. system (RT) pump 'C'(one of three) from service. The pump had developed ~a seal leak that could not be isolated because its i isolation valves' leaked past'the valve seat. Therefore, the a
pump was disconnected and' blind flanges were installed on the suction'and discharge' piping to compensate for the faulty isolation valves.
! AS A RESULT'OF'THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS L ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE-AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
L I
l' s
I p4 l Lr i
l l
lt i
i-l 1
sp
'4 x o Attachm3nt 1 lC to U-601733-
/[Pf Pags 20 of 35 7 f.M PAGE .7 TEMPORARY MODIFICATION 8 09/14/90 u'
u
. 10CFR50.59-REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 REMOVE PIPING USED FOR STEAM CONDENSING MODE
' DOCUMENT EVALUATED: TM 90 04 LOG NUMBER: 90 0026 4
or This-temporary modification removed the piping spool between the . ,
reactor core isolation cooling (RI) system piping and the l e residual heat removal (RH)Jheat exchangers. The spool was l intended to provide a path for main steam (MS) to the RH heat exchangers in the steam condensing mode. This was removed since it had been decided previously that the steam condensing mode would not be used at CPS. Blind flanges were installed in !
place of the spool piece in accordance with applicable code. l h . i AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS l l ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, l
g INSTALL PROTOTYPE IN SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON MONITORING CHANNEL F '
DOCUMENT EVALUATED: TM 90 08 LOG NUMBER: 90 0025 y Field alteration NRF007 provided for replacement of the neutron !
U monitoring (NR) source range monitor (SRM) circuitry with a new design equipped to better filter. noise. . Delays in delivery of production equipment delayed implementation of the field i alteration. _This temporary modification provided for i l installation of-the prototype replacement drawer in the SRM D l Channel. This would provide verification of field operability i of the production equipment = prior to' installation so that the i b- new equipment could be declared operable and used to. support the I j refueling outage planned for the fall of 1990. Since this j B temporary modificatien utilized.annon-safety related power ,
_suppl y and the prototype was not procured based on the same !
L requirements as the original, SRM Channel D was declared L inoperable while the prototype was installed. CPS Technical ,
i Specifications allow operation with two channels inoperable in operating conditions 3 and 4. -Operation is also. allowed with L one channel inoperable in plant condition 2 with the 3 L intermediate range monitors (IRMs) on range 2 or below. If 5 L another channel becomes inoperable, the temporary modification L can be removed and the original configuration restored. Also, if afproblem occurs in which-the-temporary modification causes.a rod block, the channel can be bypassed.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT= INVOLVE-AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
w-- -
---_m
_ _ - - ~ _ . - _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - " - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
, n.
Attachment 1
- i. q/ , 14 -
D:.i ,' to U-601733 1 .-
Page 21 of 35 ii;': ,' .
n
- L 1
a;--
t, f
- h1
.i ; ;
.g; ,
E i
CLINTON POWER STATION 10CFR50.59 REPORT t .,;
FOR PROCEDURES, TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS,.AND OTHER DOCUMENTS FROM APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 e.
f h< , L
(-
' i
y
+ Attachunt 1
, to U-601733
+ Page 22 of 35-
-,- PAGE 1- PROCEDURES AND DOCUNENTS- 09/14/90 s
10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 RADIATION PROTECTION DEPARTMENT ORGANIEATION AND FUNCTIONS DOCUMENT EVALUATED: 1901.10 R 3 LOG NUMBER: 89 0130 V CPS' Procedure'1901.10' Revision 3 changed the organization of-the Radiation Protection Department as it was described in the USAR.
The position of Supervisor - Plant Radiation ~ Protection was i eliminated and the responsibilities were reassigned. I AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT' INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. !
h !
APPROVAL OF RADIATION WORK PERMITS i DOCUMENT EVALUATED: 1905.10 R8 LOG NUMBER: 89 0105 -!
L CPS Procedure 1905.10 Revision 8 deleted the requirement for the '
L ~ Operations Shift Supervisor or Assistant Shift Supervisor to l l' approve = Radiation Work Permits. This was done to remove l redundancy since the Shift Supervisor or Assistant Shift !
F Supervisor must also sign the Maintenance Work Request. This-h change does not affect the operation of any systems or i components. Adequate controls are retained over radiological L
work, i
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS
.- ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE.AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. -l l
i t
5 i}$
g-Attechmnnt'l to U-601733 Pcg3 23 of 35
- p. ,
'PAGE 2' ,
PROCEDURES AND. DOCUMENTS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR- APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990
~
' TEST l RESPONSE >TO TURBINE VALVE TESTING ABOVE 80% REACTOR POWER DOCUMENT EVALUATED: 2800.18 R0 LOG NUMBER: 88 0177 i
CPS Procedure 2800.18 Revision 0 provided for performance of a ;
test to document plant response to main turbine valve' testing at l reactor power levels'above 80%. The turbine main stop valves (MSVs) and the combined intermediate valves (CIVs) were each-cycled:at increasing reactor power levels. Each MSV and CIV was cycled individually and critical plant parameters were recorded and evaluated prior to cycling the next valve or increasing to a now: testing power level.- The transients produced would affect i reactor: pressure, power, and steam-flow; therefore,-the- j '
following critical parameters were monitored: . pre-conditioning l interim operating management recommendations (PCIOMRs); reactor pressure scram; main steam line flow isolation.' APRM scram ,
(fixed)'; and APRM scram (flow biased). There was no increase in the probability of an accident since these parameters were monitored and' compared with acceptance-limits provided in the -j procedure.- The-PCIOMR limit was set at 0.2 kilowatts per foot above:the pre-conditioned envelope which complies with the j
i General, Electric ~ requirement. The acceptance limits stated in
-the procedure forathe scram and main steam line isolation -l parameters:were chosen to provide margins between the
- procedure's acceptance limits and the existing scram cn isolation,setpoints. The margins are in compliance with the Level 12' Acceptance Criteria specified in USAR Section 14'2.12.2.21. The transients which could occur were expected to be .less : severe. than those analyzed in USAR Sections 15.2.2 and 15.2.3 1 The turbine journal bearing vibration was also smonitored during the CIV testing, q 1
AS A RESULT OF, THIS EVALUATION, IT- WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. j
{ N l
{
D l l 1
(
s . Attachmsnt 1 to U-601733 Page 24 of 35 q; . PAGE 3 PROCRDURES AND DOCUMENT 8 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990
[ BYPASSING REACTOR WATER CLEANUP-LEAR DETECTION DOCUMENT EVALUATED: 3303.01 R 13 LOG NUMBER: 89 0122 CPS Procedure 3303.01, Revision 3 changed the operation of the reactor water cleanup (RT) portion of the leak detection (LD)
, system as described in the USAR. This change allows bypassing both divisions of the 100 LD system for up to one hour (as allowed by Technical Specification 3.3.2) during normal operation. This change was made in order to prevent spurious RT isolations-during system startup, system mode changes, or while o operating in the blowdown mode. The USAR had indicated that this action would only be used to support testing, maintenance, and calibration. A limitation was stipulated in the procedure revision that this bypass action would only be allowed if the reactor coolant Iodine 131. equivalent activity is less than or equal to 1.82 x 10*8 microcuries per gram. An analysis was performed based on the following assumptions: 1) Reactor
- coolant Iodine 131 activity is a factor of 10 greater than the limit set in the procedure. 2) The RT line break (external to contairment) goes undetected by-the operator and is not isolated until the operator restores the RT LD system. Therefore, the break is not isolated for one hour. The analysis showed that the dose consequences to the public at the site boundary would not exceed those for a main steam line break external to the containment which is the bounding design basis accident for this type of event. The consequences of the postulated accident were shown.to be a small-fraction of the 10CFR100 limits. The operating limit is a factor of.10 less than the activity level used in the analysis. Several LD inputs provide annunciation in the main control room even when'the automatic isolation is bypassed.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
j 9
O
Attachmsnt 1 I to U-601733, Pege 25 of 35 j PAGE 4 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 ALTERNATE SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING USING FUEL POOL HXs DOCUMENT EVALUATED: 3318.02 R0 . LOG WUMBER: 90 0023
-CPS Procedure 3318.02 Revision 0 provides a method of alternate decay heat removal to meet the Technical Specification requirement of having two demonstrated methods of decay heat
. removal-operable. This procedure provides for an abnormal suppression pool cooling configuration in which suppression pool water is pumped through the fuel pool cooling (FC) heat exchangers (1FC01AA/AB). in series. This constitutes a change from the system configuration and operation as described'in the USAR. Normal suppression pool cooling is through the residual
, heat removal system (RH) heat exchangers. The prerequisites / limitations of this procedure provide for an analysis of decay heat levels, the expected heatup rate of the
-spent fuel pools, and the time required to restore the systems to their normal, configuration. Conservative limits are provided to assure safe operation.
AS A RESULT'OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY. QUESTION.
LINCREASED FIRE LOAD IN AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE ZONE DOCUMENT EVALUATED: CR 1 88 10 060 LOG NUMBER: 89 0078 A' table was installed in Fire Zone A-le for control rod drive maintenance. This raised the fire load in this zone from negligible to 2000 BTUs per square foot. This fire zone is s _
located.in the auxiliary building at elevation 737'-0" adjacent to the'(plant)-northwest quadrant of the containment building.
-Valve 1E12-F042C11s located in this zone. Failure of this= valve to open when needed would result in loss of low pressure core injection.(LPCI) flow for the respective division. Although the
. fire load is increased, it is still judged to be low. The safe shutdown analysis shows that if the valve fails, the redundant or backup. component could be used to achieve safe shutdown and this is still valid. No new failure modes are introduced.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
i Attachm3nt 1 5 to U-601733 Page 26 of 35 l
- s. PAGE l5 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENT 8 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 : REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 REVISE FIRE. LOADING VALUE-IN THE NAIN CONTROL ROOM ,
DOCUMENT EVALUATED: CR.1 88 11 033 LOG WUMBER: 89 0083 This condition report concerned the effect of the installation of rubber. floor-mahs in the main control room on the fire loading values. The reso',ution of this condition report was to revise-the fire loading salue for.the main control room. Rubber floor 1 mats were installed ever the uneven' surface of the floor ,
tiles'to provide a; smooth talking surface in traffic areas' I within the control ronm. The increased fire load is enveloped-within the current fire protection (FP) design.- Thus, there is L no impact on the safe shutdown analysis as presented in USAR L Appendix F Section 3.3.6.2.
b
- AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT.WAS DETERMINED'THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
SAFETY CLASS FOR INSTRUMENT AIR TANK FARM AND CONTROL PANEL DOCUMENT EVALUATED: CR 1 89 01 041 LOG NUMBER: 89-0094 The safety class requirement stated in USAR Table 3.2-1 for the compressed' air tank farm and instrument air (IA) control panel a was changed from "3" to "other", This change resolves design l
classification discrepancies identified in the condition report, i .This change does not affect the-equipment but only changes the l safety. class to clarify the originalfdesign. requirement. The IA i
tank farm bottles and control panels were.not available as ASME Class ~III. However,.this equipment is designed for seismic
. conditions, and the bottles were hydrostatically tested in accordance with-ASME Code Section VIII. . Samples of.the tank material were tensile tested and magnaflux tested.- Quality Assurance will still be involved when work is performed on this equipment under theirevised classification.
.AS'A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY'DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED. SAFETY QUESTION.
L 1
i
(
l
-C . Attachm nt.1 f/ to U-601733 Page 27 of'35 c1 PAGE. 6- PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR-APRIL 1989-THROUGH MARCH 1990 i
. MAIN STEAM CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE POSITION INDICATION LIGHTS DOCUMENT EVALUATED: CR 1 89 05 096- LOG NUMBER: 89 0081 This condition report identified that the position indicating lights in the main control room (MCR) for the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) are not powered from a safety-related electrical power supply. The resolution of this condition report was to accept the condition as-is for the. reasons discussed below. The requirement to have a safety-related power. supply-is basedJon CPS's position on Regulatory Guide 1.97 as stated in USAR Section 1.8. The intent of the requirement for a safety-related electrical power supply is to ensure.that plant u operators can verify that the containment isolation valves'have l>- properly isolated after an accident.. Indication that the valves had not closed would prompt the operator to restroke the isolation valve. However, since the power supply for the MSIVs
.is also not.a safety-related power supply, restroking of the MSIV.that had failed to close would not be possible if failure of the power supply was the cause of the position indication p . lights being; inoperable. The main control room position ,
p Lindication would not allow-the operator to take meaningful o action in response.to an MSIV that failed to close due to failure of the power supply. Therefore, the, lack of a safety-related power supply to the main control room position indication lights has no impact on the performance of the MSIVs.
.AS A RESULT.0F THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS L ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE'AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
CORRECTED HIGE POINT VENTS ON RADWASTE SYSTEM'P&ID DOCUMENT EVALUATED: CR 1 89-11 054 LOG NUMBER: 90 0005 This condition report identified'that two high point vents which L were shown on the piping and instrumentation' diagrams (P& ids) for the solid radwaste (WX) system could not be found where the drawing indicated them to be. The vents are actually-located on abandoned portions.of:the WX system. Since alternate means are
- l. available for venting, the resolution of this condition report
[ was to leave the equipment as-is and correct the P& ids.-
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS l ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
?
i I
i
,7 .Attacha nt 1 to U-601733
' y/ ' Page 28 of 35
. PAGE .7 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 09/14/90 e 7 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 ;
LOW SHUTDOWN SERVICE WATER FLOW IN DIVISION I HEAT EXCHANGERS DOCLMENT EVALUATED: CR 1 90 03-071 LOG NUMBER: 90 0038 q
- Post maintenance testing performed during the spring maintenance outage (PO-3) revealed inadequate flow of shutdown service water (SX) in several components. Following flow balancing, full design flow could not be achieved in.seven Division I heat' exchangers_(HXs)-. supplied by SX. These HXs were the reactor core isolation cooling. system room cooler, the main steam m isolation valve inboard room cooler, the combustible gas control- I system 'A' cubicle. cooler, the standby gas treatment system exhaust' radiation monitor cooler, a fuel pool cooling and cleanup (FC) HX, an FC motor cooler, and a' residual heat removal HX. Calculations by the architect / engineer indicate that the l components can provide adequate heat removal at the reduced flow rates.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ,
ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. !
l INCREASE TIME TO SUBMIT WRITTEN SUMMARIES OF EMERGENCIES DOCUMENT EVALUATED: EPIP AP 03 R2 LOG NUMBER: 89 0099 .
This revision ~to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure AP-03 L
changed the time allowed for submitting written summaries of j
'- i emergencies to-the State and the NRC from within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of l terminating a Notification of Unusual Event and 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of terminating an' Alert or higher.to five working days from closecut or reduction in emergency classification. This change a was made in accordance with discussions with the NRC and has no l effect on the design =or operation of plant equipment.
1 L
l AS.A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS l ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. 1 t
i 1
4.
' Attachment 1' to U-601733 Paga 29 of'35
-. PAGE' 8 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS- 09/14/90
$ 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR' APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990-l CHANGES.TO CPS EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIEATION AND STAFFING DOCUMENT EVALUATED: EPIP EC 01 R 3 LOG NUMBER: 89 0129 l
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EC-01 was revised such 1 E
that the. Emergency' Response Organization (ERO) as described in the Emergency Plan (USAR Chapter 13.3) was changed. Several l
- positions were eliminated, however, the responsibilities and.
duties have been reassigned. Those positions are the TSC -
i s Emergency Advisor, EOF Decontamination Coordinator, Shift Relief- l Coordinator, NETWORK Coordinator, EOF Chemistry Specialist, EOF 1 Operation Engineer, & Facsimile Operator. Dose Assessor -
" Computer and Dose Assessor - Manual were combined. The following positions have been added: Station Emergency Director j (SED) Administrative Support, Public Information Administrative :
o Support, Warehouseman, & EOF Access Control Coordinator. Also, i the activation level for the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) was changed from Site Area Emergency to Alert.
Also, responsibilities associated with the fitness for duty program were added.
, AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. i CLARIFY DEFINITION OF ' ALERT' 30U) '8ITE AREA EMERGENCY' i DOCUMENT EVALUATED: EPIP EC 02 R2 LOG NUMBER: 89 0095 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure.EC-02 was changed to :
clarify the distinction between an Alert and a Site Area Emergency. The change requires that an Alert be declared when a scram does'not lead to a reactor shutdown. A Site-Area .
Emergency is to be declared if-the reactor remains operating in the power range (>3% on the Average Power Range Monitors) following a scram.
l AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
i
E L 1 ills .
- Attachtsnt'l i to U-601733 Paga 30 of 35 '
)c PAGE- . 9= PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 09/14/90- ,
v o 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 l
- REVISE-FUNCTIONAL TEST OF MAIN CONDEN8ER-PIT LEVEL DETECTORS DOCUMENT EVALUATED: POR 89 0460 LOG NUMBER: 89-0073 This procedure deviation for revision (PDR) revised the functional test of the condenser pit level detectors to allow-the. test to be performed while the circulating water pumps are running. :Previously the test was only to be performed with the circulating water. pumps off. During normal operation the condenser. pit level detectors trip the circulating water pumps if flooding of the condenser pit occurs. This change allows the-test to be performed while the pumps are running with the condenser pit level trip relays disabled. As compensatory action for disabling the automatic trip, an operator is to be L stationed in the area of the condenser pit during the test with h continuous communications with the main control room. It was determined that sufficient time is available to manually trip the pumps should flooding of the condenser pit occur during the test.
p' AS A RESULT.0F THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED-THAT THIS ACTIVITY'DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
ALLOW'USE-OF PUMP PRESSURE TO UNCLOG LINE l' DOCUMENT EVALUATED: TPD 88 0465 LOG NUMBER: 88 0298 [
This temporary procedure deviation (TPD) to the operating
, procedure of the waste sludge system allowed isolating L ,
instrument air to the air operated recirculation valve of waste sludge' tank 'A' in order to cause the valve to' remain closed.
The TPD also.provided for repositioning the limit switches on this valve'to prevent operation of an interlock with another
, valve. This allowed the recirculation valve to remain in the closed position while the waste sludge tank 'A' sludge pump was started and flow was directed to a clogged line. Normally, the recirculation valve would have opened and the clogged line would have been bypassed. -The purpose of this change was to allow the clogged-line to be cleared by the pump pressure. The pump's discharge pressure is less than the system's design pressure; therefore, failure to clear the line would not have damaged the system's piping.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATIOh, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
p q Attachment-1 19 " to U-601733 ;
Pags 31:of 35 1
, :PAGE PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 09/14/90 10CFR50.59: REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 DELETE CP8 EXCEPTION TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.58 DOCUMENT EVALUATED: USAR 1.8 LOG NUMBER: 89 0103 CPS's compliance with Regulatory Guides is delineated in USAR Section 1.8. . This USAR change deletes an exception that was
, taken to Regulatory Guide 1.58, Revision 1. The exception provided that personnel performing VT-2, VT-3 and VT-4 visual inspections would be qualified in accordance with the 1973 <
edition of ANSI N45.2.6 instead of the 1978 edition as required ~ <
-in the Regulatory Guide. This change _ deletes this exception and does not affect the design or operation of plant equipment.
Personnel performing VT-2,-VT-3,.and VT-4 inspections will now p -be qualified _to the later edition of ANSI N45.2.6.
a AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE.AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
LICENSED OPERATOR CONTINUING TRAINING PROGRAM DOCUMENT EVALUATED: USAR 13.2.2 LOG NUMBER: 90 0028 This USAR revision' contained several changes to the requalification training program for licensed operators. These changes were-reported to the NRC in IP letters U-601290 and '
U-601524 dated December 6, 1988 and September 20, 1989, L respectively. :
L.. '
l AS A RESULT OF.THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETEPMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
4:
I L
i I
i
.Attachm2nt 1- ,j N to U-601733; 1 Paga 32 of 35
~
U
.. ; PAGE 11 PROCEDURES.AND DOCUMENTS 09/14/90 1 10CFR50.59. REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 L - POST. ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM 8TARTUP TESTING ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA j DOCUMENT EVALUATED: USAR 14.2.12.2. LOG NUMBER: 89 0089 This USAR change revises the startup testing level two acceptance criteria for the post accident sampling system'(PASS) sample temperature exiting the sample cooler to be per design requirements. Originally, acceptance testing of the PASS was ;
scheduled for the preoperational testing period. However, since-
-it was not possible to-get a hot sample prior to startup, this L
testing was moved to the startup testing phase. The FSAR change 1 which accomplished this also revised'the acceptance criteria !
from " Sample panels shall condition samples per design '
requirements" to "The. sample temperature exiting the cooler is k between-77 to 120*F".-This change reverses the change to the
', - acceptance criteria. The PASS serves no safety function and-failures of the PASS are not evaluated in the USAR. .
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID-NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
L REVISE THYROID DOSE LIMIT TO MAIN CONTROL ~ ROOM PERSONNEL DOCUMENT EVALUATED: USAR 15.6.5.5.3 LOG NUMBER: 89 0104 E This USAR change revises the thyroid dose limit for main control L room (MCR)' personnel due to a loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
- inside the containment building from 4.3 to 27 REM. This change
- arose over the issue of the use of silicone sealant on the MCR ventilation ductwork. The use of silicone sealant was accepted 1 by the NRC based on IP's commitment to leak test portions of.the MCR ventilation.ductwork every 18 months. The limit for inloakage was set at 650 cubic feet per minute. The thyroid dose was calculated based on the allowed inleakage. This issue was
!. resolved with the NRC in 1986; however, revision of the USAR at that' time to show the increased operator dose was overlooked.
i AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT. INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
i i.
f
,en ,
AmO s .
Attechmsnt 1 9L to U-601733 j[ < 1 Pags 33 of-35
[jj '
.PAGE: 12 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS. 09/14/90.
E 10CFR50.59; REPORT'FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 MONITORING CONTAINMENT ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS DOCUMENT EVALUATED: USAR 6.2.6.2.D LOG NUMBER: 89 0108 !
This change to-the USAR removes the commitment for continuous
- monitoring of the primary containment electrical penetrations for leakage. The original design provided for the electrical
-penetration assemblies to be charged with nitrogen and equipped with pressure switches. Each pressure switch would provide a low pressure alarm should the assembly develop a leak and lose its nitrogen charge. This would have provided a continuous leak ;
monitoring capability. However, due to improper installation, the penetration assemblies are not capable of maintaining a continuous leak monitoring pressure. Loss of the nitrogen charge does not affect the. sealing capability of the penetration. The ability of the electrical penetration assemblies to maintain the pressure boundary is not affected by this change. The frequency of local' leak rate testing-is being increased to once every two years as required by Technical Specifications.
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
I CLASSIFICATION OF BREATHING AIR AND POST ACCIDENT BAMPLING SYSTEMS DOCUMENT EVALUATED: USAR 9.3.1.1.1' LOG NUMBER: 89 0100
(- This change revises the Quality Assurance requirements for the main control room emergency breathing air bottles, filters, and bottle piping as' stated in USAR Table 3.2-1 from "B" to "N/A".
Also, the seismic category of these items is being changed from "I" to "N/A". This does not include the bottle racks which are
, still seismically qualified. In addition, the quality group .
p classification for these items and the-associated pressure !
L regulators is~being changed from "C"1to "D". This change also L
revises USAR Table 3.2-1 to change the quality assurance requirements for the-Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) from p "B" to "N/A" except for the PASS containment isolation valves and the piping between them. The safety-related portion of the ,
PASS is not affected by this change. The requirements retained <
l
'in the'USAR-are in accordance with the governing code and p regulatory requirements.
AS.A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
l
o- - -- - -
y Attachmsnt:1
[ h/lG$' '
to U-601733 Q[h 4
Q - Page 34 of 35 hk.hi. lc,l - PAGE -13 . PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 09/14/90 g u .
h6, v cp, 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990 g
,.;"., y M8- ' - ' MOVE SUPERVISOR - NUCLEAR FROM PLANT STAFF TO ENGINEERING w
.h. .
DOCUMENT EVALUATED: USAR CH 13 LOG NLHBER: 90 0010 hhh *(" . . This change to USAR Chapter 13 moves the position of Supervisor i
' Nuclear from Plant Staff to the Nuclear Station Engineering W@.,
l Department. Also, this change-provides that members of the
%;f "
Facility Review Group (FRG) may be selected from other nuclear C% >
program organizations as well as from Plant Staff. Moving the
%f position of Supervisor-Nuclear also constituted a change to the organization chart shown in Figure 6.2.2-1 of Clinton's a4 1: 4 Technical Specifications. A change to the Technical gh,g; ,
Specifications has been submitted to the NRC which would delete OM ' this chart. The-NRC's project manager for Clinton was informed j% of this change. . He recognized that.this change was acceptable N ,i and that it was consistent with Clinton's submittal of December p
h
[,' 21, 1988 and the NRC's position as outlined in Generic Letter i 88-06 (Removal of Organizational Charts).
3 g.y
[M h%
AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID'NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
H,gy W
[ - ,
- d. '
'e' REVISED EMERGENCY DIESEL-GENERATOR MAXIMUM COINCIDENTAL LOADS M.y DOCUMENT EVALUATED: USAR FIG 8.3 3 LOG NUMBER: 89 0115 dN As a result of a diesel-generator load monitoring study
]y' '
' conducted by the architect / engineer,-the values for the maximum expected coincidental loads for each'of the three CPS
'e;
~
diesel-generator.' sets which are given in USAR Figure:8.3-3 have been-revised. Also the description of CPS's-fulfillment of h(W t
- 1. position C.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.9 in USAR section 8.3.1.2.2 y' - has'been revised to reflect the~new maximum coincidental load-1 values. The new values are still within the existing P diesel-generator load capacities.
m 9
< AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS
[
ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.
l 9.
L
({ hq;I i
h n
l'
> l 4 j
,' f
- Y, l
- 9 Attechm
- nt 1 to U-601733 Page 35 of 35-PAdEj 14 PROCEDURE 8 AND DOCUMEUTS 09/14/90-10CFR50.59 REPORT'FOR APRIL 1989 THROUGH MARCH 1990
'8IMPLIFY USAR FIGURES FOR MAKEUP WATER-AND DEMINERALIEER SYSTEMS DOCUMEliT EVALUATED: USAR FIG 9.2-4, LOG NUMBER: 89 0090 This change replaces the makeup water pump house (WM) and makeup condensate (MC) systems piping and instrumentation drawings (P& ids)-(USAR Figures 9.2-4 and 9.2-5, respecti aly) with simplified. flow diagrams. This change istonly to the level of detail shown in the USAR and does'not change any equipment. The !
Elevel of detail provided by the simplified diagrams supports the- -i evaluation of the system stated in Clinton's Safety Evaluation-Report (SER). j i
AS A-RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY-QUESTION. q i
'l i
i
'l l
[
i i
l' e
l I 1
I
,