U-601386, Annual Operating Rept,1988

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Annual Operating Rept,1988
ML20246D906
Person / Time
Site: Clinton Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1988
From: Holtzscher D
ILLINOIS POWER CO.
To: Bradley Davis
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
U-601386, NUDOCS 8903160025
Download: ML20246D906 (60)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:m M eY v-t 4 s l CLINTON POWER STATION CLINTON, ILLINOIS l 1 l l l ANNUAL OPERATING REPORT JANUARY 1, 1988 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1988 I USNRC DOCKET 50-461

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              .                                                            U-601386
                .                                                          LO2-89( - )-LP 1A.120 ATTACHMENTS                              l l

i Page l l I .. PERSONNEL AND MAN-REM BY WORK AND JOB FUNCTION 1 j II. PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS AND TEST 3 Safety Valve and Safety / Relief Valve Challenges Primary Coolant Specific Activity Analyses III. FACILITY CHANGES REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR50.59 4 i l Plant Modifications for 1988 I j l Teaporary Modifications for 1988 27 j

                             ' Procedures, Tests, Experiments, and Other                      i Doct ments for 1988                                      37  J s

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y. f .9 e a ATTACHMENT 1 The work job function tabulation reflect the numberLof personnel who received greater than 100 mrem in.any of the six identified categories. The t o t a l:: section at the bottom of the report reflects all work and job functions where personnel received exposures which added up to greater than 100 rRem. Due to job rotations during the y e. a r , there is'not a direct correlation between the individual dose tabulation and the'totala  ; summary.  ; 1 l l l l I 1 1 1 I f 1 MISCM1 1

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MON,', 20 LFEB.', v 1989l ~IPCLCLINTON POUER'GTATION PAGE 1' r *. ,., O t- ______________._____________________________________- ILLIHOIS POWER COMPANY' CLINTON POWER STATION -

                                                           .RR 3, P,0, BOX-220                                                                                    l CLINTOH.IL 61727                                                                                   :!

^ LICENSES HPF-62 REGULATORY UG'IDE'.1.16 INFORMATION 'l END OF YEAREREPORTc 1988 hi

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                                                                                     # PERSOHHEL '( >100 MREN )             TOTAL MAH-REM                   Hi UORK & JOB FUNCTION                            UTILITY STATION COHTRCT UTILITY STATION COHTRCT                       '

l ________________________________________________________________________________; o R i k~ EACTOR MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS & SURVEILLANCE 0

                                                        & CONSTRUCTION.                                   0     0   0.000-       .079        ,233       ,
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4 OPERATIONS 0 33 1- 0,000 10.344- 1,692 ' 1 HEALTH PHYSICS & LAB 36 1 0 24 ,046 23,229 .12. 4 04 J J SUPERVI50RY t OFFICE STAFF 0 7 0 ,007 1;934 ,268' l ENGINEERING STAFF 0 3 0,000 1, 046 .374 _________-_-__________________'___________________________________ 1 j z ROUTINE PLANT MAINTENANCE ' NAINTEHANCE & CONSTRUCTION 0 SS 122 0,000 ~24,057 40,544 OPEkcT10NS 0 0 .0 0,000- 0,000 .017: y HEALTH PHYSICS & LAB 0 0: 1 0.000 .004 ,490- 1 g" SUPERVI50RY & OFFICE STAFF 0 0 0 0,000- ,012 0,000 1 ENGINEERING STAFF 0 3 1 0,000 ,938 .253 i 1 INSPECTION 1 LlIHSERV1CE ' MAINTENANCE & CONSTRUCTION O O O 0,000- .003 .038 OPERATIONS 0 0 0 0,000 . 0,000 2029-HEALTH FHYSICS & LAB 0 0 0 0.000 .004- .007 SUPERVI50RY L OFFICE STAFF 0 0 0 ,007 ,002 .021 , ENGINEERING STAFF 0 0 0 0,000 .012- -0,000 i a 4 SPECIAL PLANT MAINTENANCE  ; MAINTENANCE & CONSTRUCTION 0 O O 0,000 '0,000 .097  : OPERATIONS 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 ,010 J

HEALTH PHYSICS & LAB 0 0 0 0,000 .004- .007. j SUPERVI50RY & OFFICE STAFF 0 0 0 .0,000- .002 0,000
 ,           ENGINEERING STAFF                                                              0             0     0   0,000      0,000. 0

____________________________-______-_______________________________________,000 _____. WASTE PROCESSING-  : MAINTENANCE & CONSTRUCTION O 24 11 0,000 9,294. '12,6431 ' OPERATIONS 0 0 0 .0.000 0,000 .010 HEALTH FHYSICS & LAB 0 0 0 0.000' .097 .007 ' SUPERVI50RY & OFFICE STAFF 0 0 0 0.000 .002 0,000 ENGINEERING STAFF 0 0 0 0,000 0,000 0 __________________-__________-________________-____________________________.000 _____ REFUELING MAINTENANCE & CONSTRUCTION 0 0 0 0,000 0.000 .011 OPERATICHS HEALTH FHYSICS & LAB 0 0 0 0.000 0,000' 01 0-0 0 0 0.000- ,004 .007 1 SUPERVISORY & OFFICE STAFF 0 0 0 0.,000 .002 .049

            -EHOINEERING STAFF                                                              0             0     0   0,000      0,000     ~0

______________________________-__-___________-_____________________________,000 _____ TOTALS MAINTENANCE & CONSTRUCTION O 97 149 0.000 33,434 53,566 OPERATIOHS 0 38 5 0,000 10,344 1,769

    ,        HEALTH FHYSICS & LAB                                                           1           38    26      .046   23,340     12,923 SUPERVI50RY & OFFICE STAFF                                                     0            7      0     .013     1,953-        ,338 ENGINEERING STAFF                                                              0            9     2    0,000      1,997       -

___________________________________________________________________________,627._ _ _ _ . GRAHD' TOTALS 1 189 182 ,059 71,068L.69,223 2 C__ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _

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                                                  <                                                       -l ATTACHMENT-II
                                             ' PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS AND TEST 5'
                                                 . SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE. CHALLENGES
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There were;seven. valves challenged on March 18, 1988 during performance. of surveillance procedure'9056.02 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE ACTUATION; Valve actuations were satisfactory.. Twelve valves were challenged on Julyf12, 1988, due'.to an unplanned Reactor Scram. .These valves were cycled forfapproy.imately two. hours to relieve reactor pressure.- Valve actuationsfwere satisfactory.

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                                          . Primary Coolant Specific Activity Analyses                   ')

l All analyses for Specific activity of primary ~ cc, . ant were within the limits of Technical Specification 3.4.5. i l lj q l i l l

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II ATTACHMENT III FACILITY CHANCES REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR50.59 1 r I . l . l l 1 1 1 1 l l 1 l l . r I l;- l

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CLINTON POWER STATION 10CFR50.59 REPORT

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                                                                                    'FOR                                                                  .l i-MODIFICATIONS                                                                        l 1

FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER  ! 1988

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( 'l \  ; r s . . PAG 8 NO. D 'l' MODIFICATIONS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LOG DOCUMENT, NUMBE2 EVALUATED TITLE g j 88 0163 FA APF005 REPLACE WATT TRANSDUCER WITH-EQUIVALENT MODEL This field alteration replaces' watt trabsducer 1JY-AP773 with a currently.available,model. LThis; watt transducer provides input to the performance monitoring system to indicate the power flowing between the'4.16 KV bus 1Bl.and 1 the 4.16 KV bus 1ET4. Unlike the original'model, the new I model is not 1E. qualified. This watt transducer.does not; 1 perform a safety function. .It is: seismically mounted in control room panel '1H13-P851. Also, electrical failure of the watt transducer will not affect the 1E. bus to which it is connected, l AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN j UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. ) 87 2671 FA CF006 REPLACE AND ADD GAUGES FOR ISI TEST 7NG REQUIREMENTS This field alteration replaces existing gauges with gauges I that have a different range, and adds new gauges to satisfy 1' inservice inspection (ISI) testing requirements.- These gauges will be installed on the residual heat removal l system, the high pressure core spray system, and the diesel l oil systems. The gauges will'not affect the; operation or l seismic qualification of the systems involved, and will be l installed per the original installation specifications- . l l Also, the gauges will be isolated during normal system i operation. I AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l l l 1 6

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    ,' . PACE NO.                 2             MODIFICATIONS.                02/23/89' 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH. DECEMBER 1988 LC3          DOGMEhT NUMBER       EVALUATED                            TITLE                                                                                   j l

G8 02F0 FA CF017 REPLACE INOPERABLE DISSOLVED OXYGEN MONITORS This field alteration replaces inoperable dissolved. oxygen monitors.with dissolved oxygen monitors from~a'different , manufacturer. These instruments monitor the dissolved j oxygen concentration in the reactor recirculation system,  ; the reactor water cleanup system,1and the control rod drive system. The range, power requirements, and sensitivity of l the new instruments.are comparable to that of the i instruments being replaced. These instruments are not 'I I safety related, but are seismically mounted due to their locationfin the containment building.

                                         .                ,                                                                                       1 AS A RESULT OF THE. EVALUATION, IT'WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY, QUESTION DID-NOT EXIST.

88 0301 FA CPF002 REMOVE CP SYSTEM CONDUCTIVITY MONITORS FROM SERVICE This field alteration removes' conductivity elements in the i condensate polishing (CP) system from service. These elements provided input to a local recorder, a local panel annunciator, and a main control room status annunciator. Subsequent conductivity monitoring of_the CP system will be performed by the process sampling (PS) system. The PS system's conductivity annunciating. functions are similar to those being removed from the CP system. However, so:that j the PS system will provide the same conductivity recording function as the CP system did before this. change, this field alteration connects the PS system conductivity,y elements to a local PS system recorder. This change will not effect the operation of the PS system and will provide a more reliable method of monitoring the conductivity in the CP system. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION', IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. t 7 c l:

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             .PAdE NO.              3                MODIFICATIONS               '02/23/89                l 10CFR50,59 REPORT FROM J.PRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LOG              DOCWINT NUMBER           EVAWATED                           TITLE 89-0201 PM FC 12             REPLACE FC SYSTUJ PUMP MOTOR 8 This plant modification' replaces the existing fuel pool cooling and cleanup (FC): system pump motors which are not environmentally qualified, with motors that are environmentally qualified. The new motors have greater power requirements, and therefore, their' power cables, control cables, and diesel fuel oil reserve requirements have been revised. The new motors will.also require cooling water. This cooling water will be provided by the component cooling water (CC) system. Instrumentation has been                      j provided to trip the FC pump motors if cooling water to them               !

is lost because of a failure in the non-safety related CC system. i AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS. DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. i 88-0238 FM Fc-17 REVISE SUPPLY PIPING ,TN THE FC SYSTEM i This plant' modification revises the supply. piping.between the fuel pool cooling und cleanup (FC) system heat-exchangers and the containment and fuel building fuel pools. . Specifically, this plant modification revises the point j where the containment fuel pool supply line branches off 1 from the fuel building pool supply line, replaces two  ? temporary globe valves with a single globe valve, revises the size of two orifices, adds a flow element and local flow indication to the containment fuel pool supply line, and adds local pressure gauges to the suction side of the FC pumps. These modifications will allow more accurate control l of the FC system and will maintain the original. flow j requirements. The revised piping and components are j seismically designed and meet the requirements of the ASME -l Code. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 1 1 i

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         .PAUE NO.        4'              MODIFICATIONS               02/23/89-               l 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LC3        DOCUMENT NUMBER     EVALUATED                         TITLE 88 0080 FA FCF003       REVISE FC SYSTEM VALVE LINEUP This field' alteration changes the valve lincup on the1 fuel pool cooling and cleanup (FC)1 system piping and instrumentation diagram to-show valve 1FC012A as normally                i open and valve 1FC012B as normally closed. This lineup will direct flow from the upper. containment pools to the fuel pool cooling surge tank instead of to the' spent fuel storage pool. This. change;does'not affect the FC system's ability to. provide.c'oling flow to the spent fuel storage pool.

USAR section 9.1.3.2 allows flow from the upper containment pools to be directed to either the surge tank or to the. i spent fuel storage' pool. Directing the flow to theLspent fuel storage pool provides the pool.with.an additional source of. cooling, and valve 1FC012B can lua opened if:it is I determined that additional cooling of the spent fuel storage pool is necessary. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l 88-0194 PM FP-32 PROVIDE FIRE PROTECTION TO OUTSIDE OIL FILLED TRANSFORMERS j This plant modification will improve the fire protection provided to the outside oil-filled transformers by ' installing a new deluge sprinkler system, by expanding the i coverage of existing deluge-sprinkler systems, by installing L oil containment' berms, and by installing heat shield walls. In addition, several security lighting fixtures will be installed to illuminate the new berms and heat shield walls. The sprinkler system modifications are in accordance with the original design requirements of the' fire protection (FP) system and therefore, the FP system's functional l requirements and the design basis have bo , maintained. < ll I Also, the installation of the berms and heat shield walls  ! will not interfere with any plant systems as they are  ; passive fire protection features. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 1 , 9

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     ".PAdE NO!            5                       MODIFICATIONS                02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LOG         DOCUMENT NUMBER      EVALUATED                                 TITLE 80 0204 'PM FP 78                PROVIDE SPRINKLER PROTECTION IN THE TURBINE BUILDING This plant modificat' ion adds automatic sprinkler protection to the turbine-generator bearings, the turbine underskirt,
the turbine and motor driven' reactor feedwater' pump rooms, L
                      .and the mezzanine areas beneath the main generator.

Concrete curbs will also be installed at three locations in the turbine building to control the spread of potential O turbine lube oil spills'and.thus allow for_ effective fire .j l suppression. Finally, this' plant modification. deletes two 1 I smoke detectors from the control room ventilation' system air intake area in the control building. The.new sprinkler systems have been designed in accordance with the original design requirements of the fireLprotection (FP) system and . therafore,'the FP system's functional requirements and the j 1 design basis have been maintained. Malfunctions of these 4 } systems will not increase the probability or consequence of , any accident. The smoke detectors being deleted from the j air intake area of the cor. trol room' ventilation system are i not required because of the lack of combustible material in I the area. AG A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN 1 I UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l 88 0234 fA FPF011 PROVIDE FIRE PROTECTION WATER TO PLANT ~ SUPPORT' BUILDING- ) l The plant support building was used as a temporary office space during plant construction, and is now being renovated to provide a permanent office space. This field alteration provides an underground water supply connection from the ., fire protection system to the new wet pipe sprinkler system in the plant support building.. The water supply connection was designed in accordance with the requirements for l underground fire protection piping. Also, the additional .t water demand from the wet pipe sprinkler system will not impact the capability of the existing sprinkler systems to suppress fires, in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix R reg".irements. l l AS A.' RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN l UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l 10

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                                                                                                              'ii L(M            DMUMENT NUMBER         EVALUATED                        TITLE 00 0342 (A rwro11          REVISE FEEDWATER SYSTEM PUMP TRIP LOGIC This field alteration changes the low feedwater suction header pressure annunciator setpoint from a temperature / pressure dependent value to 400~psig and' changes the low feedwater suction pressure feedwater pump trip logic from one-out-of-one to two-out-of-three with a time delay.                     !

These changes provide a trip logic which'is.not susceptible -l to single failure and which reduces:feedwater: pump trips.due to short fluctuations in feedwater suction header pressure.3 , This field alteration also eliminates the automatic starting-( of the spare condensate and' condensate'bcoster-pumps cn low L feedwater suction header pressure. This change may increase the number of feedwater pump trips, but this increase'is adequately compensated by the logic changes which reduce'the - p number of feedwater pump trips. l l AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN l UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUEST.l'ON DID NOT: EXIST. 88 0311 FA HPF004 MODIFY AND ADD ORIFICES TO MP SYETEM TEST RETJJRN LINE This field alteration modifies au existing orifice and adds three new orifices in the high pressure core spray'-(HP) system test return line. This modificationLwill eliminate the cavitation which is present at tho. orifice to be modified. The new orifice plates are'being'added at existing flanges and, in combination with the modified existing orifice, will provide the same overall pressure drop and system flow rate as the existing orifice. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. i 11

v-PAGE NO. 7 MODIFICATIONS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LCM DOCUMENT , NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE G8-0129 FA IAF003 REVIBE INSTRUMENT AIR SOURCE FOR WE BYSTEM VALVES l This field alteration revises a piping and instrumentation I diagram (P&ID) to show the as-built locations of the  ! instrument air source for radwasto reprocessing and disposal l equipment drain (WE) system valves 0WE069, OWE 070, 0WE071, I OWE 056C, and 0WE162. The revised P&ID will show that the instrument air supply for these valves comes from panel 0WE02JB instead of panels 0WE02JA and OWE 02JC. The functions of the instrument air system and the WE system are j not affected by this change. This change does not alter the j l source of the instrument air, only its point of control. - l AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l l 68 0307 FA 1AF009 REVISE INSTRUMENT AIR BYSTEM DESIGN DRAWINGS This field alteration revises instrument air (IA) system design drawings to show the as-built configuration of the instrument air supply to plant chilled water (WO) system valves 1WO204 and 1WO236. Valves 1WO204 and 1WO236 control the flow of chilled water to area coolers in the essential switchgear heat removal (VX) system. Thi-. instrument air l supply to these valves is provided by temperature transmitter units in the VX system rather than by IA system valves 3IS852 and lIS851. The temperature transmitter units provide the necessary control of valves 1WO204 and 1WO236. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 12

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 ,     ..                                                                                           L PAGE NO.         8                MODIFICATIONS                02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LOG         DOCUMENT NUMBER      EVALUATED                          llTLi G7 2661 PM LD 23          INCREASE MAIN STEAM LIKE ISOLATION SETPOZNTS This. modification increases the setpoints for the' turbine building high temperature. main steam line isolation instruments. These instruments isolate'the. main steam lines             ',

upon the det'ection of'a steam line leak in the.' turbine'.  ; building. .The higher ~setpoints. result.in higher localized-. ] temperatures; however, these higher temperatures will cause ;i no adverse environmental impact on systems, structures, ' j components, or cables.. Also, these instruments are.noto 9 required to monitor the reactor' coolant pressure boundary'or ' '

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limit radioactive releases below 10CFR100 limits. j ! l L AS'A' RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT.AN j UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EX75T., . 1 88 0156 FA LDF010 ELIMINATE NUISANCE ALARM IN THE MAIN CONTROL, ROOM' Bubbles and turbulence in the flow through the containment- I an~1 drywell sump weir boxes'cause nuisance alarms of the j "High Change Flow Containment /Drywell Equipment / Floor Drain" annunciator in the main control room. .The ennunciatorLis l l intended to alarm when the rate of change of flow to'the- I l containment and.drywell sump weir, boxes is greater than 1 l gpm/hr. This field' alteration disables.the annunciator by I disconnecting a cable. The flow rate -to the containment and 1 drywell sump 'wf ul boxes is still monitored by existing l instrumentation and high flow rates are annunciated in the main control room. This design. meets the. requirements.of Regulatory Guide 1.45. a  ; 1 AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN j UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. i I 13 .)

PAGNNO. 9 MODIFICATIONS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT PROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LOG DMLMNT NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE 88 M49 FA LMr001 REMOVE LM SYSTEM PARTS LOCATOR PRINTER FP.OM SERVICE This field alteration ramoves the loose parts monitoring (LM) syatem printer from service. The printer does not operate properly.due to excessive. channel noise. .This

                    ' printer was intended to list-the order in which channel accelerometers detect loose parts, the impact energy of the loose part, and the loose part's location. Romoving the printer from service will not adversely affedt the I@ system or equipment opuration. ..The LM system will still-have indication of all channels that detect a loosa part.and indication of'which channel detects the loose parts first.

l AS A RESULT OF'THE EVALUATION,:IT WAS DETERMINED THATfAN. UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88 d202 PM M-53 INSTALL SOD 7UM UYPOCHLORITE BASED WATER CHLORINATION SYSTEM l l This plant modification installs a sodium hypochlorite based' i jputer chlorination system to replace the chlorine gas based ' system presently in use. This new system will provide chlorination to the circulating water system, the plant y service water system, the fire protection system, the potable water system, and the demineralized water makeup system. This modifiention involves the installation of. bulk storage and day tanks, piping, valves, instruments, pumps, and structures at the circulating water screen house and at the makeup water pump hcuse. The new chlorination system will perform all of the functions of the present system. i Accidental spills of sodium hypochlorite.will not create a i toxic environment. All piping and supports are-designed to seismic standards when-appropriate, and' core holes _ drilled in the circulating water screen house will not affect the screen house's seismic qualification. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED'THAT AN ' UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DlD NOT EXIST. j l l i { 14

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                    .PAbE'NO.         .10              MODIFICATIONS               02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988                        l
l LOG DOCUMENT NtMBER' EVALUMtD TITLE G8 0172 FA Mr005 REPLACE DEFECTIVE ROSEMOUNT TRANSMITTERS As a result of an investigation of potentially defective 1 Rosemount transmitters, several' defective Rosemount model i 1152 transmitters-are,being replaced with Rosemount model 1153 transmitters. Also, several of the replaced transmitters.are being revised from an electrical classification of 1E to non-1E because an electrical failure )

of these transmitters would.not add a significant load to j their respective.powerLsupplies. The new model 1153 1 transmitters have the same. form, fit, and' function.and are I qualified for the same environment as the model 1152 transmitters. Also, there is no safety impact from'

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downgrading the transmitters from an electrical classification of 1E to non-1E because they only function to provide alarm inputs while other transmitters exist to i provide the necessary indications. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88 0152 FA MF013 CHANGE COOLING WATER TRANSFER FOR RR SYSTEM PUMP' This field alteration revises the component cooling water  ; (CC) system and the shutdown service. water (SX) system such 1 that thc transfer of the source of cooling water for the f reactor recirculation (RR) system pumps from the CC system i to the SX system is initiated by a remote manual operation rather than by automatic controls. .The automatic protection i deleted by this modification is not necessary to meet the requirements of the Standard Review Plan. The plant L operator will be able to initiate manual cooling prior to RR I pump seal damage. j AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. j l 1 I I I l l l l I i 15 l 1

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PAIGE'NO. 11 ' MODIFICATIONS 02/23/89 1 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988

    . UM                                               DMWEN T '    ,                                                                                U KIMBER                                          EVALUATED                                        TITLE 83 0d87 FA N/015                                             REVISE GATE VALVES TO BE MANUAL FLOW CONIROL VALVES This field alteration revises piping and instrumentation diagrams, physical piping layout drawings, and valve lists to show that valves 1FC040 and OWE 095 are manual' flow control-valves rather than gate valves. . These changes will reconcile the affected documents with the actu'la field configuration and with the vendor. piping and instrumentation                              )

Grawings. The installed flow control valves are properly J sized and provide the appropriate shutoff capability. AS A RESULT'OF THE EVALUATION 3 IT WAS. DETERMINED THAT-AN l UNREVIEWED. SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. ] l I 88 0293 FA MF025 REVISE DESIGN DOCUMENTS'TO BHOW AS-BUILT CONFIGURATION This field alteration revises design documents for the l breathing air (RA) system, the gland seal steam (GS) system, the instrument air (IA) system,tand the service air (SA) system to assign equipment numbers to components in the systems and to reflect piping and valves.which are currently i installed in the. plant. These changes provide a more j accurate representation of the. field configurations.of the i RA, GS, IA, and SA systems. Also, the additional valves and l piping being shown are not safety related and are installed  ! in non-safety portions of the systemc. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED.THAT AN l UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l r 1 I i 16 = _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ - . _ - _ - - . _ _ - -

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  • PA'G E' NO . ' 12 -MODIFICATION 8 02/23/89 1 10CFR50.59 EPORT PROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMDER 1988 LOG DOCUMENT l NUMBE3 EVALUATED TITLE' i

N 0361 FA MF030 REVIJE DUPLICATE EQUIPMENT NUMBERS OF VALVES IN SA SYSTEM l

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This field alteration revises duplicate equipment numbers of l valves in the service. air'(SA) system. The' physical j configuration of the SA system is not'being changed. This change will eliminate the potential confusion resulting from3 duplicate valve numbars. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETEPMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88 0282.FA MSF008 MODIFICATION'OF.MF.IV LEAKOFF LINES This field alteration replaces the existing socket ucided q l couplings on the leak off lines'of the inboard main steam- -j isolation valves (MSIV) with threaded union joints. This I modification will make it easier to remove and' replace the'  ! MSIV valve bonnets when maintenance work is required on the MSIVs. The replacement unions meet the originally specified code and design requirements. l AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. i l i

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       *PA*GE NO.              13                  ' MODIFICATIONS-                    02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPGRT FROM APhIL THROUGH'OECEMBER 3988 LOG             DOCUMENT NUMBER          EVALUATED                                 flTLE W 02M PM NS 18                 REPLACE REACTOR WATER.LE7EL IFETRUMENTATION' This plant modification'n upgrades the design'and                                                i qualification of the reactor water lovel fuel zone range'                                    '!

instrumentation from nea-safety-related to safety related.by  ; replacing the exist).ng reactor water le"el measuring > i instruments with instrtwents that are Seismically and

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environmentally' qualified and whichtreet electrical. class IF requirements. Also, level indicaters'that'aro seismically  ! qualified and which meet electrical. class lE. requirements 3

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will be provided in the main control room,. The eyisting  ?! power supply is adequate to support the additicual 1 electrical loads in the main controh room. The seismic, qualification of the main: control room panels will not be~ l l affected by the.new indicating instruments. i 1 AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, .(T WAS DETERMINED THAT AN 'l UNREVIEWED SAFETi* QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.' ;l 88 0371 PM N8 27 INCORPORATE MEOD, FWHOS, AND PROCESS COMPUTER CHhWGES l l This plant modification revises the core power / flow map and various instrument setpoints to incorporate the maximum , extended operating domain (MEOD) analyses, and to allow the , plant to operate at all power levels with one.feedwater j heater out of service (FWHOS). This modification also i revises the process computer software to'be compatible with i the cycle 2 reload. The MEOU and FWHOS changes have been  ! analyzed to ensure that the core thermal limits, the j containment design parameters, and'the accident analyses 1; were not adversely affected. Also, calculations performed l l by the pPocess computer with the revised software will.be ' independently verified. prior to using the process computer i for performing surveillance required by the' Technical i specifications. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN. .)' UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 1 l 18

P 'GE'NO. 14 MODIFICATIONS 02/23/89 l 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER.1988'

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       , LCS              DOCUMENT WH8ER           EVALUATED                                TITLE 8d 02% Fr. ocro10                 REVIfrE ANNUNCI?. TOR WINDOW AND DESIGN DOCUMENTS During startup testing, it-was discovered hat:the. flow insticument originally specified to provide input to ' the off gas system high' flow annunciator did not have sufficient range to indicate a high flow condition. Wiring changes were maJe at that. time.to obtain a high flow input signal-E                                    from a flow instrument that had sufficient' range. This-field alteretion revises an' inscription on-'an annunciator window and revises design documents-to indicate the correct
                                    -instrument that provides the high flow' signal.

AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS-DETERMINED THAT AN-I UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT-EXIST. 88 0147 PM PR 28 ADD MASD FLOW MEASUREMENT DSVICES TO PR, SYSTEM MONITORS This plant modification adds mass flow measurement devices to process radiation (PR) system monitors CRIX-PR001, ORIX-PR002, and ORIX-PR004. This modification will increase the accuracy of these monitors and will not have an affect on the availability of the PR system or its alarm functions.- AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWEP SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.

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PA'GE' NO. 15l MODIFICATIONS 02/23/89. 1

                      -10CFR50.59 REPORT FROMLAPRIL THROUGH DECEMBER-1988                                           l
          ; LOG               DOCUMENT NUMBER        M8AlmTED                             TITLE l
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88 0128~ FA t'stoor REROUTE SAMPLE LINE WITHIN FEEDWATER' PROCESS SAMPLE l PANEL;3 l This field alteration revises the' routing,of.a' grab.samplef p line within feedwater process sample panel 1PL88JA. The ' 2 greb' sample line presently obtains aufeedwater sampleefrom a" i point .between? two coolers within ,the - sample panel. : The' , l routing of the grab sample linenwill be'revisedJso that the:  ; feedwater sample is taken after 'the second cooler.: . Thi.s . modification will allow cooler samplesLto be taken;from the-l panel. The panel is.not safety related~and does'not:supporti a safety related? system function. . Also,~the additional flow which vill be periodically directed.through'the second Uooler will not have significant impact on the cooling-capacity'of the cooler. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED.THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETYLQUESTION DID.NOT' EXIST. 88 0189 FA PSF 017 REVISE. VALVE CONTROLS ON PROCESS SAMPLING' SYSTEM PEID This field alteration revises a pipingiand' instrumentation t diagram (PGID) to show the correct. controls.forl component. L cooling water out1.et valve OPS 697 of process. sampling system 1 refrigeration subsystem OPS 01C. This refrigeration l ~ subsystem provides chilled water to cool radwaste building process samples. The as-built configuration of the valve -i controls are consistent with the vendorfdrawing of,the H subsystem, and thus ensures proper operation of thC . 4 subsystem and proper temperature control of chilled' water. J AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED-THATfAN UNREVIEWED SAFFTY QUESTION'DID NOT EXIST. 3 1

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             +PA'GE NO.             16             MODIFICATIONS                   02/23/89 10CFR50.59' REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988'                                      l LOG            DOCUMENT NUMBER       -EVALUATED                            TITLE

(- 88-0107 FA P$F018 REVISE PROCESS SAMPLING 1 SYSTEM VALVE NUMBERS This field alteration rev.ises valve numbers on the process  ; sampling (PS) system' piping.and instrumentation diagram- i (P&ID) 'and adds Evalves to the PS system valve list .which?are j

                              .already shown'on.the P&ID. : These changes reconcile discrepancies between the~as-built. configuration of<the                 d plant and the design. documents and'do notiaffect the PS system design basis.
                            . AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN.                ]
i. UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.

i ) 88 0123 PM RH 32 REPLACE OPERATORS ON RH SYSTEM VALVES < l The Limitorque model SMB-0-25 operators currently installed 1 on the residual heat removal (RH) system suppression pool, return valves have.a thrust rating which isfless than the .l actual' thrust required to close the valves'under system flow -1 conditions, This plant. modification replaces the model  ! SMB-0-25 operators with model SMB-1-25 operators. The new operators are larger and will provide the additional thrust. j required to ensure that the RH system suppression. pool-return valves fully close. The motors are the'same size as i the previous motors, and therefore there is'no change.to the electrical requirements of the operators. The new operators ! are seismically and environmentally qualified and will l improve the valves' stroke times. Also, the.RH system piping is qualified for the larger operator. This modification also replaces the valves' stem, yoke,- and other associated parts to accommodate the new operators. These-parts meet the material requirements of the original parts. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT Jul UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. , l i l 21

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  • PA'GE NO ' . l7 MODIFICATIONS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988
                                                                                                          '5 LOG'       D TUMENT NUMBER      EVALUATED                         TITLE-                                                j i
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M 0215 PH RS 04 ADD BWITCHES-TO REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM Tnis plant modification adds a switch'and: indicating light' to the' division 1 remote shutdown panel to provide control of 4.16 KV breaker 252-AT1AA1.- This plant modification also installs switches and indicating lights in various motor control centers to eliminate the need for electrical jumpers, rewiring, and fuse removal when utilizing the division 2 remote shutdown method. The-new switches are seismically qualified and will not affect the seismic l qualification of the remote shutdown panel or the' motor control centers. The-additional cable runs and wiring installations maintain the electrical separation criteria and do not exceed the allowable cable tray loadings. The existing power supplies are adequate for the new eleccrical: loads. AS A RESULT OF THE' EVALUATION, IT WAS-DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. I 88-0184 FA SXF004 REMOVE ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS FROM SX SYSTEM VALVES l This field alteration removes all-electrical connections ! from the Limitorque operators on shutdown service water'(SX) system valves 2SX073A and 2SXO73B. These valves were intended to provide water to the Unit 1~ standby-gas treatment (VG) system charcoal filter beds.from the Unit 2' , SX pumps. The Unit 2 SX pumps, however, were'never installed and the piping that was to carry water to these valves has been terminated with end caps. Since these valves serve no function, the removal of' power to the valve operators will not impact the SX or VG systems. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN l UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l l 22. i

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                 'PA'GE NO.         18             MODIFICATIONS,               02/23/89        j 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988                         q Loc           DocWENT NUMBER        EVALUATED                         TITLE M 01M FA WF001             ADD RELAYS AND REVISE SETPOINTS IN THE VD SYSTEM-This field alteration adds relays to the trip circuitry of diesel generator room ventilation (VD) system fans 1VD01CA,      1 1VD01CB, and 1VD01CC so'that the circuitt:y will trip the        )

fans upon any initiation of the diesel generator bay carbon 1 dioxide fire suppression system. This field alteration also raises the diesel generator bay low ambient temperature alarm setpoint to 65 degrees fahrenheit. These changes will allow the VD system to operate as described in the USAR. l Also,.the relays added to the trip circuitry have been siesmically and electrically qualified and therefore, I maintain the design basis of the VD system. j l AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN l UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. ! 80-0004 PM VS-07 INSTALL BACKUP COOLII:G SYSTEM IN SERVICE BUILDING  : This plant modification provides a backup. cooling system to l serve the security areas of the service building. This system will ensure that adequateLcooling is provided to the ) security areas if the normal cooling provided by the serrice ' building ventilation system is lost. The backup cooling system is located in the service building and does not interact-with any plant systems. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l l 23

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LM DOCUMENT 1 NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE { l M 01M FA WFOM REVISE VW SYSTEM DESIGN DRAWINGS j q This field alteration revises design drawings'for the i radwaste building ventilation (VW) system'to add instruments and an instiument number not previously shown, and to correct an item number.- These revisions reflect'the as-built and as-tested configuration lof the VW system. The i functions of the system remain as described in the USAR. i i AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN l UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. ] 9 58 0233 FA WF005 REVISE EQUIPMENT NUMBERS OF BALANCING DAMPERS IN VW SYSTEM i l This field alteration revises the equipment numbers of balancing dampers in'the radwaste building ventilation (VW) system to eliminate duplicateiequipment" numbers.- The - renumbering of these dampers.will have no effection the operation of the VW system. W l

                     'AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.

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                   '  PA*GE' NO . -                                 20                    MODIFICATIONS                              02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988                                                                                1
                 - LOG                                     DoctMENT .

NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE 88 0188 FA :mF008 REMOVE WM' SYSTEM SILICA ANALYZERS This field alteration removes the' silica analyzers, the silica recorder, and the silica analyzer failure annunciator-in the demineralized water makeup (WM) system'from service. The silica analyzers are not required for WM system operation The silica content of the demineralized makeup i water will b2 monitored by taking grab samples of the water before it is used in the plant l AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION D1D NOT EXIST. 1 88 0329 FA WSF007 ADD ORIFICE TO PLANT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM This field alteration adds an o,rifice to the plant.netVice water (WS) system generator stator cooler and hydrogen I cooler return' header. This orifice will increase the ) backpressure in the hender and reduce the cavitation across .] the outlet v11ves of the generator stator coolers. The l cooling capability of the generator stator and hydrogen  ! coolers vill not be adversely impacted by tho'instkliatico 1 of the' orifice. The design of-the. orifice meets the l original design requ.t.rements of the WS system piping. 1 AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVICWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 25

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          *PAGE'NO.           21             ' MODIFICATIONS               O2/23/89 l

10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH-DECEMBER 1988 l LOG .' DOCLMENT NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE 86 0318 FA WXF007 REPLACE OU'iDATED CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION CAMERAS This field alteration modifies the radwaste system drum-handling crane closed circuit television system by replacing outdated cameras 0WX37SA, B and C. -Also, the' instrument air i lines which provided air to the cameras are being capped because air is not ' required to lceep dirt off of the lenses - of the new cameras. The cameras are used for crane H operation and for monitoring activities in the truck bay and storage area. This modification will allow the camera y . system to operate as originally intended. l AS'A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT Aft 1 UNREVIEWED SAFETY: QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88 0299 FA WZF001 CORRECT DISCREPANCIES IN WZ SYSTEM PEID This field alteration corrects discrepancies inLthe piping i and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) for the chemical radwaste reprocessing and disposal (WZ) system'to show two local instruments as being panel mounted and to correct the - drawing zone reference on a line continuation flag. These changes do not' affect the design bases or function of the WZ system or any interfacing systems. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN t UNREVIEWED SAFETY. QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 1 e 26

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i i L 1-1 CLINTON POWER STATION  ; 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR l TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS FROM APRIL THROUGH,DNCEMBER j: 1988. l \ l l r 1. l I' l l 27-

v. 1 PAdE NO. 1 TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPOKT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LCG , DOCUMfkT NUMBER EVALUATF.D TITLE 88-0111 TEMP mod 88 028 GAG OPEN RM AND RF SYSTEM CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES This temporary modification gags cpen-the containment and

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drywell isolation valves for the equipment drain (RE) system and' the floor drain (RF) system.during Planned Outage #2 while the plant is in operating mode 4. Since these isolation valves close upon loss of. instrument ali, gagging  : them open vill-allow'the RE and RF systems to remain operable while the instrument air system in taken out of service. Per the Technical Specifications, these isolation valves are not required to be operable while the p) ant is in . operating mode 4.  ! AS h RESULT OF THE EVALUATION,.IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88 0122 TEMP MOD 88-034 INSTALL LARGER OPERATOR ON RH'~ SYSTEM VALVE i The present operator on residual heat removal (RH)l system ' valve lE12-F024A is not capable of closing the valve.under. normal system flow. This temporary modification replaces the current Limitorque.model SMB-0-25 operator with-a- ~ Limitorque model.SMB-1-25 operator, as well as-the valve's l stem and yoke. The new operator is capable of exerting a l larger amount of thrust on the valve stem-and thus, permits' j the valve to close under normal system flow. The new j operator is seismically and environmentally qualified and l will improve the valve's stroke time. The motor is the sameL size as the previous motor, and therefore there is nol change to the electrical requirements of the operator. Also, the l RH system piping is qualified for the larger operator. .This i temporary modification will be in place only while the plant j is in operating mode 4. i AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN l l UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. i l l 'I l l

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         +   PAGE NO.               2          TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS-             02/23/89 10CFR50.59'KEPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 tca        pocuMENT NUMBER     EVALUATED                                 .TlTLE
    '68-0208 TrMP MOD 88 036           MODIFY CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM VALVES AND INTERLOCKS This temporary modification installs electrical jumpers to bypass a circulating water (CW) system pump start interlock, adds. blank' flanges'on cond.enser water box priming.line valves 1CWO18 and 1CW019 and condenser inlet water box priming valves 1CWO1MC and ICWO1MD, and removes the internals from condenser outlet water box priming valves 1CWO1MA and 1CWC1MB. The CW system pump start interlock prevents the starting of the CW pump 3 when the condenser wate' boxes are not full, and thus prevents damage.to the condenser.from waterhammer. This interlock is being.

bypassed to allow the water boxes to'be' filled with the CW pumps instead of with the vacuum priming system. While this interlock is bypassed, the operational methodology of the CW: system will1be revised to minimize'the potential for waterhammer in the water boxes. The modifications to the condenser water box priming valves will prohibit the.use of l the vacuum priming system for filling the condenser water boxes. The priming valves are being. modified.to facilitate testing which will quantify air leakage into the' water j boxes.  ; 1 AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY. QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 1 88 01?7 TEMP MOD 88 038 GAG OPEN INSTRUMENT AIR-SYSTEM VALVES This temporary modification blocks open the instrument air (IA) systen containment inboard isolation' valve l'IA006 and drywell outboard isolation' valve 1IA007 while the plant is  ! in operating mode 4 to allow the instrument air supply to be 1 , maintained in the containment while maintenance is being l l performed on these isolation valves. Blocking the valves i l open will render them inoperable. However, per the Technical Specifications, these valves are not required to be operable while the plant is operating in Mode 4. This l temporary modification will be removed prior to the plant j entering operating modes 1, 2 or 3.  !

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AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN ] UNREVIEWED' SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. j l 1 o i 29 1 _ . _ _ _ _ _

  - g'       03 PAGE NO.         3        TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS              02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 i

LOG DOCUMENT NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE 88 0131 TEMP MOD 88-042 REMOVE LABORATORY VEN!!ILATION SYSTEM COOLING COIL FOR REPAIR The laboratory ventilation (VL) system is equipped with a-cooling coil (0VLO4A) which provides cooling to the laboratory and laundry areas. The cooling coil is not l functioning because of a ruptured tube. This temporary modification permits operation of the VL system with the cooling coil removed for repair. The VL system is not safety related and removal of the cooling coil will not adversely affect the system's operation since the coil is already inoperable. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l 88*0325 TEMP MOD 88-044 GRAVITY FEED SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE TO CW AND WS SYSTEMS This temporary modification provides chlorination for the circulating water (CW) system and the plant service water l (WS) system by gravity feeding sodium hypochlorite near the l pump suctions of these systems. The addition of sodium i hypochlorite will reduce the biofouling and.the intrusion of corbicula into the CW and WS systems. The storage of sodium hypochlorite will not create a chemical hazard and the concentrations used will not have an adverse affect of system piping. ! AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN l UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l l l' 1 i

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            'P5GE'NO.                            4          TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS            02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 1

LG DOCMENT 1 NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE

       .80 01G2 TEMP MOD 88 059                     BYPASS RADWASTE FEED TANK LOW LEVEL PUMP TRIP This temporary modification u; passes'the radwaste feed tank low level pump trip for radwaste floor drain evaporator feed tank pump 1WF03P. This will allow feed tank 1WF03T to be completely pumped dry prior to maintenance being performed in the tank. The function of the low feed tank level; trip is        ,'

to protect the feed tank pump from cavitation. To prevent pump cavitation while this temporary modification is in place, an operator will be stationed at the pump so that it can be immediately shut off at the first sign of cavitation.. This trip function will be restored when maintenance in the feed tank is complete. l AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DIO NOT EXIST. 88-0205 TEMP MOD 88 066 BYPASS REFUELING PLATFORM INTERLOCK This temporary modification bypasses a refueling bridge interlock which prevents the refueling bridge trolley from , entering the fuel transfer tube upender zone. This j interlock ensures that the refueling bridge trolley will not interfere with the fuel transfer tube during refueling activities. Bypassing the interlock will allow'the refueling bridge'and the refueling bridge trolley to be , i positioned for maintenance activities. This temporary l modification will be removed prior to placing the plant in , the refueling mode. , AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. I i

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             *PAGE NO.             5'            TEMPORARY MOD 1YICATIONS            02/23/8'9     [

10CFR50.59' REPORT FROM' APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER.1988

i' LOG D0GJMENT NUMBER. EVALUATED TliLE Ga*D285 ~ TEMP MOD 88-071 INSTALL AIR JUMPE8 AROUND' VALVE i

This~ temporary modification installs an air jumper around; solenoid operated valve 1FSV-VR104'. This solenoid operated valve controls the instrument air supplied to the air operated continuous containment purge supply air fan A isolation damper. This modification will. maintain the

                            ' isolation damper in the open position and allow. continued                 ,

operation of dupply air fan A while the inoperable solenoid valve is repaired. .The isolation damper does not have a containment isolation function, but prevents the backflow of air through the train A fan while the train B fan is ] operating.. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT.AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. ' 88 0296 TrdP MOD 88-072 INSTALL TEMPORARY LIFTING DEVICE ON' FUEL' HANDLING PLATFORM This temporary modification installs a temporary' lifting device to the upper trolley handrail.of the fuel handling platform. This lifting' device will be used toLraise and I lower a test mandrel.while performing a drag test of the spent fuel storage racks. Fuel will not be handled and fuel :i l will not be stored in the' storage' racks while the temporary l lifting device is installed. Also, tlue lifting device' will i

not be used over any other equipment which=may be damaged. by l- its failure. a AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT' EXIST.

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PAGE NO. 6' TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 02/23/89- , 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL CNROUGH-DZCEMBER 1988 3 4 i

       'LC3              DOCUMENT NCBER       .EVALE TED '                                                 TITLE                                         'j 88-0346 TEMP MOD $8 073                           ALLOW HWC' TEST. EQUIPMENT TO REMAIN INSTALLED s

Temporary test' equipment had been installed to allow its , preconditioning prior to its use in the hydrogen. water-l chemistry (HWC) test. The UWC test has been postponed. L This temporary modification will allow the test equipment to1 remain installed until the HWC test is performed. All , isolation valves between the test equipment and the plant:  ; systems will remain closed. Thus, system operability will l not be affected. . ( AS A RESULT OF'THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 08 0368 TEMP MOD 88 080 INSTALL TEMPORARY INSTRUMENTS IN THE FC AND CC SYSTEMS I This temporary modification-installs temporary; instruments in the fuel pool cooling'and cleanup (FC) system and in the component cooling water. (CC)- system until permanent i instruments are obtained. The permanent instruments are required per plant modifications FC-12 and FC-17.- The . l temporary instruments will support. post modification: testing j i and operation of the FC system until the permanent  ; instruments'are available. Failure of the temporaryL . , instruments will not prevent the FC system or other' systems- I from performing their intended functions. ' l f AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN' UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.

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PAGE NO. 7 TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 196G LOG DOCUMENT NUMBE3 EVALUATED TITLE 80 0355 TEMP MOD 88 084 MODIFY FUEL BUILDING WALL PENETRATION SEAL This temporary modification modifies a fuel building wall i penetration seal to allow the: routing of cryogenic _ tubing from liquid nitrogen tanks' located outside of the fuel building to a freeze chamber installed on component cooling water system piping. The integrity of the modified fuel building wall penetration will be verified to ensure that secondary containment integrity is maintained. Also,. the l Placement of liquid nitrogen tanks outside the fuel building . and the routing of liquid nitrogen inside the fuel building I will not create missiles'or impact the function of any plant equipment. a l AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN  !

UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l l 4 I l 88-0389 TE?lP MOD 88 085 PROVIDE TEMPORARY POWER SUPPLY TO FP SYSTEM EQUIPMENT This temporary modification provides.a temporary-power supply to fire protection (FP) system panels and printers, l The power will be supplied from a' regular lighting cabinet. l i

Although the temporary power supply for this modification is l not from a class 1E source, it will maintain the operability of the panels and printers during a planned outage of the normal 1E power supply provided by the Division 1 bus. This modification will be installed just prior to the start of the Division 1 bus outage and will be removed as part of the restoration of the Division 1 bus. AS A RELUGT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l l 34

g *PAGE'NO. 8 TEMPORARY. MODIFICATIONS 02/23/89 1 10CFRSO.59' REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH~ DECEMBER 1988 1

LC4 , DEWENT .

NUMBER -tVALUATED .T!TLE l 88 0360 nMP. MOD 88 086 BYPASS INTERLOCKS ~ON FUEL HANDLING PLATFORM: , 1 This temporary modification bypasses interlocks o'n.the fuel handling platform to allow the. monorail' hoist operator.to control the platform without a;second person present, and to 1 i allow movement-of the ple.tform when the fuel lnandling mast:

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is not centered in the' gate openings :of the' fuel transfer pool.' -The purpose of these interlocks:is to prevent:the... l fuel handling mast from colliding'with poo1~ obstacles during movements of spent fuel. These interlobks willybe bypassed only while. transferring new fuel from.the newsfuel' storage vault to the spent fuel pool using the monorail hoist. During these transfers, the-fuel handling mast.willLbe i positioned such that it will not collide w$th^ pool l ebstacles. Also, the lateral movements of the new fuel.will be made with the. fuel suspended above.the to'ps of the pools.- i l . AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS-DETERMlNED THAT AN' UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST, , 88 0365 TEMP MOD 88 088 BYPASS CYCLED CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM PUMP TRIP During the first refueling-outage, a planned outage of the q auxiliary power (AP) system will deenergize a relay <and . cause a cycled condensate storage (c ) system tank low level trip of the CY system pumps.. The do nergized relay will i also remove a permissive signal'for the CY system pumps to start. This temporary modification will lift the leads on the relays' trip contacts and install jumpers across the relays' permissive contacts to permit operation of the CY system pumps during the AP~ system outage. The CY system tank low level pump trip and pump start permissive, which prevent cavitation damage to the CY.sy2 tem-pumps, are disabled by this modification. However, precautions will require. frequent monitoring of the water level in the CY system tank to preclude a low level condition. ;Also, plant safety would not be' impacted if the CY system pumps.were to become inoperable because of cavitation. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION ~DID NOT EXIST. 35

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  • PAGE NO. 9 TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 02/23/89 l
                                   "10CFR50. 59 REPORT. FROM APRIL 'TAIROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LOG           DOCUMENT g ; NUM9ER                            EVALUATED                         TITLE G8 0369 ' TEMP Moo 88-002  EOUTE'FRF'ZE' SEAL VENT TO SERVICE AIR SYSTEM PIPING.
                                                                                      ,               ..      l This temporary modification routes. rigid piping from the         ,

l vents on:a freazc' seal apparatus to a. flanged connection.on a service air .!SA) system line so'that the nitrogen gas- ' l Vented from the-freeze' seal can be released to the

                                            -atmosphere outside of tne~fuelEbuilding. Failure of the temporary piping will resultiinfa breech of the secondary       u containment boundary. However,.if the operators of the freeze seal. apparatus detect a~ failure of the temporary; piping, an isolation' valve in=the SA system' piping will be closed to restore.the. secondary containment boundary.

AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN j UNREVIEWED' SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l 1. 1 G8 0382 TEMP MOD 88-094 BLOCK OPEN CONTAINMEi4T AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES Thin temporary modification. blocks open containment and drywell isolation valves in the breathing. air system, the containment equipment and floor drain systems, the . instrument air system, and the' service' air system during the-first refueling' outage when the plant'is11a operating modes 4 and 5. Preventive maintenance activities during the first refueling outage will deenergize the solenoids of-these valves, allowing the valves to close. This modification will maintain the valves in the open position and allow their respective systems to function while the prcventive maintenance activities are performed. This modification will also prevent these valves from performing their i automatic containment isolation function. However, per the 1 Technical Specifications, this function is not required while the plant is in operating modes 4,and 5. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED'THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 1< 6

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                                                                                                                                         -l CLINTON POWER STATION                                                '

10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR PROCEDURES, TESTS.AND AND EXPERIMENTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS a j FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988

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             ?AUE NO.           1-          PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENT 9                                   02/23/89                     .
             '10CFR50iS9 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER-1988
                                                                                                                                    .i LOG        .00CUMENT
      .WUMBEA       EVALUATED                           TITLE Ks 0191 0001.01 R6         CPS ORGANIZATION, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUALIFICATIONS This plant administrative procedure defines ~the Clinton Power Station (CPS) organization, division of responsibilities, and minimum' personnel qualifications.- Th5s
                          . procedure'is being revised to reflect-the current management organization of CPS. This, revision is consistent with the-CPS organization as described in the Technical
                         -Specifications..

AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.

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88 0212 2000.19 R0 CONDENBER WATER BOX AIR ACCUMULATION TEST l I l This test procodure determines the amount of air , l accumulation.in the condenser water boxes during plant l operation. The test requires the installation of temporary j gauges, the removal of a loop seal and the internals of two  ! float valves,.and the installation of blind flanges at two j other float valves. Failure of the temporary gauges will j not affect any instrumentation required for safe operation. i , and shutdown of the plant. Removal of the loop seal and L modification of the float valves will not affect other systems because isolation valves in theLeffected piping will be closed, which is their normal position. ] i AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN l UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 1 i 4 i l j

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           *PAGE NO.          2           PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS.             02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LOG        00cVMENT NUMBER     EVALUATED                            TITLE 83 0313 2800.23 R0        PRECONDITIONING FOR THE HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY TEST This test ~ procedure will install. temporary test equipment and tubing to the reactor-water cleanup (RT)' system ^ piping,   i' to process sample lines of the feedwater.(FW) system,'and to the inlet and outlet headers of the condensate-(CD) system.

This test procedure also provides for the installation of a temporary cooler to cool the water'in a portion of the tubing connected to the RT system. ' Reactor coolant flow i Will then be established through the test equipment to j l precondition it prior to performing.the hydrogen water . ! chemistry test. This preconditioning will not impact the l operability of permanent plant equipment or prevent plant j equipment from performing its safety function. Also, j l failure of the test equipment.will not prevent pit.t l equipment from performing its safety function. i AS A' RESULT OF THE EVADUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.DID NOT EXIST. I i 6a 0302 4979.02 R2 cANc CRITICALITY ALARM RESPONSE DilRING' FUEL RECEIPT This plant procedure identifies actions to be taken by  ! personnol in response to criticality mon'itor alarmsEwhich

                         ' occur during fuel receipt. This procedure.is being cancelled because the Clinton Power Station Operating             !

License grante an exemption to the requirements for j providing criticality alarms during fuel receipt. 1 AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION'DID NOT EXIST. j 1 4 I o l i 1 39 j 1

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PkGE'NO. 3 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 01/23/09 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 . i LCG DCC MENT . NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE i 88 0213 9061.12 R23 PROCESS SAMPLING VALVE POSITION VERIFICATION TEST This test procedure provides itistructions for verifying the . position' of. valves in the post ~ accident sampling' system (PASS),'Which is part of the process sampling system, while-the plant is. shut down. This. revision adds the stepn-necessary to allow the test to be performed while the plant is operating. Performing.this position verification test; while the plant is operating.will not affect the operation of any equipment required to safely operate or shut downthe' plant. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT.WAS DETEPMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DIO NOT EXIST. 88 0297 9861.07 R20 DRYWELL BYPASS LEAK RATE TEST I This is a new test procedure which will verify that'the i drywell bypass leak rate is within the design limits. The test will be performed while the plant is shutdown. The test method ensures that the structures and components l critical to drywell integrity are conservatively leak tested j] l by pressurir.ing the drywell with air. Drywell pressure l instrumentation will be isolated to prevent the drywell l pressurization from generating erroneous loss of coolant ! accident signals,. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT. EXIST. i i i f i I i 40 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ .i

         -PAGE'NO.                        4           PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS             02/23/89 10CFR50,59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMSER 1988 LOG         DOCUMENT NUMBER      EVALUATED                                        TITLE 88-0158 CR 1 88 02-054                  AS-BUILT CONFIGURATION OF LIMIT SWITCHES This condition report documents the as-built configuration of the limit switches installed on reactor core isolation cooling (RI) system testable check valve 1E51-F066. The original design specified that the limit switches be installed to provide indication of the disc position of the valve. However, the limit switches have been installed on
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the valve actuator and do not indicate disc position because of a lost motion device between the actuator and the disc. The disc position indication was originally specified as part of the valve's testable feature which allowed the valve to be stroke tested while the plant was operating. Since the current testing program only requires that the valves be stroke tested while the plant is shutdown, the testable feature is not utilized and disc position indication is not required. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 1 88 0157 cR 1-88-03-063 RECLASSIFY RH SYSTEM RADWASTE ISOLATION VALVES This condition report revises the classification of residual heat removal (RH) system radwaste isolation valves 1E12-F040 and 1E12-F043 from passive safety related to active safety related. These valves automatically close upon receiving a signal of low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, RH system heat excho.nger room high area temperature, or RH system heat exchanger room cooler high differential temperature. These valves and their operators are seismically and environmentally qualified. Also, the valve operators are powered from 1E buses. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN-UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.

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5 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 RETORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LOG 00CUMEQT NUMBE4 EVALUATED TITLE

         ~88 0150- ca 1 88 04-036  REVISE, EQUIPMENT NUMBERS ON WX SYSTEM This condition report revises valve and device numbers on piping and instrumentation diagrams, logic diagrams, and electrical schematics of the radwaste sludge processing (WX)_

system. These revisions correct transcription errors, provide clarification, and incorporate changes to equipment identification numbers. These revisions do not change the physical configuration of the WXl system. i AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN , l UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.  ! 88 0133 CR 1-M 04-071 REVISE VALVE 1C41-F336 FROM TESTABLE TO NON-TESTABLE This condition report revises a_ piping and instrumentation  ; diagrcm to show the as-built. configuration of check valve  ; 1C41-F336 as not having a testable feature. The testable , feature is not' required to verify operability.of the check j valve because a flow rate test and leak rate test are l performed instead. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID.NOT EXIST. j I h _i 42

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  • PAGE NO. 6 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 <

i LOG DOCUMENT rJMBER- EVALUATED TITLE 90 0132 CR 1-88 04 139 REVISE PROCESS BAMPLING SYSTEM EQUIPMENT' NUMBERS This condition report revises the' equipment identification numbers assigned to the suction valves of'the' main secondary and alternate secondary cooling pumps (1PS01PA and OPS 01PB) in the process sampling (PS) system. This change will-eliminate duplicate equipment identification numbers. LThere are no changes to plant hardware or equipment parameters. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT-AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88 0384 CR 1 88 11,034 CORRECT COMPUTER INPUTS TO THE DISPLAY COMPUTEP. SYSTEM This condition report revises a piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) to correct the source of'luputs-into the i I display computer (CZ) system. The P&ID incorrectly shows'an , input to the CZ system from the reactor recirculation jet I pump non-calibrated flow transmitters. The correct' input is l from the reactor recirculation jet pump calibrated flow transmitters. The original design intent of this input was to provide calibrated jet pump' flow.

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AS A RESULT OF THE EVALRATION, II WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION'DID NOT EXIST. l 43

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  • PAGE NO. '
                                   -7.           PROC M RES:AND1 DOCUMENTS              02/23/89          .
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               '10CFR50.59 REPORT FROMEAPRIL THROUGH' DECEMBER 1988'                                         q r             ,

sq LOG ._ DOCUMENT 5 1 J NUMBER EVALUATED  : TITLE f 1 88 0117 EPIP EC 09 R2 ' SECURITY DURING EMERGENCIES' .s  :! This: Emergency Plan Implementing - procedure (EPIP) provides-guidance for the security force'in the event that the L .Clinton Power Station-(CPS)xEmergency Plan-is. implemented. This revision deletes unnecessary. definitions and modifies ., I other definitions to be consistent-.with the: CPS. Physical' l l Security Plan,. revises the' organization who is= responsible; I for issuing Emergency Response- Organization access badges,: adds.a requirement for.the posting of security force . personnel at. emergency' response _ facility entrances, adds'U '

                            .information regarding personnel accountability and the.                     4 L                            evacuation'of non-essential ~ personnel, Land updates the .                   i personnel titles in;accordance with'the recent management                        <

reorganization. .The personnel title changes require a i revision to the Emergency Plan,..which is part of'the'USAR. The' rest of the changes are consiste'nt.with the' Emergency. l l Plan. q AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN < l UNREVIEWED SAFETY: QUESTION DID'NOT' EXIST.  ! l 28 0366 EPlP FE 05 R5 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND-SUPPLIES This Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure-(EPIP) provides j instructions for periodically performing ~an inventory of .i emergency equipment and supplies.- This revision' identifies-Decatur Memorial Hospital as a location for a' hospital. kit,

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revises personnel.' titles, adds clarification--for the locking l or sealing lof emergency kits.'and supplies, revises the contents and quantities of items in various' emergency kits, 4 and states that dosimeters and dosimeterichargers'will be  ! stored in the emergency equipment inventories'of the 1 Technical Support Center and the Emergency ~ Operations ] Facility'rather.than in-field or decontamination kits. All R of the above revisions, with the exception of the. storage of dosimeters and dosimeter chargers, comply with;the requirements of the Emergency Plan. Although.the dosimeters and dosimeter chargers will not be in the fi' eld or. decontamination kits,-they will be available for issuance as p appropriate. [, AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETE3 FINED-THAT.AN l UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. a 44 l/ , j i

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        *PAGE NO.           8           PROCEDURES AND' DOCUMENTS             02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER-1988-                               l
   - LOG          DCOMENT                                                                 'l NUMBER       EVALUATED                          TITLE 8a 0276 EPIP MS 04 R0      PROCESSING NRC AND IDNS' PERSONNEL DURING AN EMERGENCY       l This is a new Emergency Plan ~ Implementing. Procedure (EPIP)~

created to provide the administrative' mechanism to process the Nuclear Regulatory' Commission (NRC) Incident Response ] Team and Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) personnel as they report to Clinton Power Station during an emergency. This procedure conforms to-the-requirements of i the Emergency Plant however, the list.of EPIPs in the -{ Emergency. Plan will be revised to reflect this new 'l ! procedure. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l l - i 68 0259 FDDR,FECN,ECN REVISE VALVE STROKE TIMES -] l j l These field deviation disposition requests, field 1 engineering change notice, and engineering change notices ') revise valve stroke times in order to prevent excessive ) inservice inspection surveillance requirements. The revised l valve stroke times will not adversely impact system l performance, core thermal' limits, or radiological l consequences, j 1 AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l l l 45 L--__-__-____-____-_--__________

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          ' PAGE'NO.         9         PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS             '02/23/89               j l

10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUCH DECEMBER 2988 I LCG DOCUMENT NUMBER EVALu4TED 11TLE 8<3 0211 FECN 23954 RECLASSIFY RH SYSTEM VALVES 1E12-F037A AND 1E12-F037D This field engineering chango notice revises'the , classification of residual. heat removal (RE) system i containment fuel pool shutoff valves _1E12-F037A and  ! 1E32-F037B from' passive safety related to active safety related. These valves are contt inment isolation valves. The valves and their operators are seismically and  ; environmentally qualified. Also, the valve operators 6re j powered from 1E buses, j L AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUhTION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAY AN i UNREVIEWED SAFETY' QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88 c210 ricd 23955 RECLASSIFY RESIDUAL HEAT

  • REMOVAL EYSTEM CHECK VALVE This field engineering change notice revises the )

classification of residual heat removal (RH) Dysten shutdown cooling inboard bypass check valve'1E12-F475 fron' passive safety related to active safety related. . This valve must close *o perform a containment isolation function and also must open to provide thermal ralief for the piping between , the inboard and outboard isolation' valves of the RH system 'l shutdown cooling line. This valve is seismically and environmentally qualified. j AS A RESDLT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAG D2 TEM 4INED THAT AN D UNREVIEWED SAFETY OUCSTION D2D NOT EXIST. l 1 l i l I I l 46 q

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               *PAGE1NO.-        10         PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS              02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH. DECEMBER 1988 l      1 4

t03 ' DOCUMENT i' WMBER EVALUATED TITLE

          - G8 0230 FECN 24008      RECLASSIFY RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL-SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES This field engineering change notice revises the classification of residual heat removal (RH) system pump;A/B.

suction relief valves 1E12-F005, 1E12-F017A,. and'1E12-F017B from' passive safety related to active safety.related.. These valves' perform a' containment isolation function'and protect. the RH' suction piping from overpressurization. These valves are seismically and environmentally' qualified. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT'WAS DETERMINED THAT AF UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88 0376 CE 23A5971 R0 SUPPLEMENTAL RELOAN LICENSING BUBMITTAL L This document summarizos the analyces which provide the L licensing basis for the new configuration cf the reactor core a fter the replacement and rearrangement of fuel. bundles during the first r'efueling outage. ' Operation of the plant-l under the provisions of the reload analyses does not, change l any mode of plant operation'or increase the consequences of L accidents as analyzed in USAR. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS' DETERMINED THAT AN l UNREVIEWED' SAFETY QUESTION DID.NOT EXIST.. l 1 1 47

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  • PAGE NO. 11 . PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 02/23/89 1 10CFR50.5) REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988' LM 0% WENT 1 NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE 88 0144 POR 88 0214 3113.01 CIRCULATING WATER This procedure deviation for revision adds a cection to the circulating water (CW) system operating procedure to: allow j 1

the use of the CW pumps fee filling the condeuser water boxes without the use of the vacuum' priming system. This revision provides the operational methodology necessary to .) minimize the potential of waterhammer that may. occur in the j condenser water boxes. q l AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION,.IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN j ' UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 1 58 0310 PEMRDM 249 395 TEMPORARY PLACEMENT OF NITROGEN GAS TUBE TRAILER During the first refueling outage, a nitrogen' gas tube d trailer will be placed between the inner and outer airlock doors of the fuel' building railroad bay. This nitroger, gas j supply is required for the precharging of the hydraulic i control units (HCU) during the outage. Locating the trailer y i in the fuel building railroad. bay and routing'a hose from the trailer to the HCU precharging station in the j l containment will not impact the secondary containment l boundary, create additional fire loading, origenerate o missiles with greater energy than those already evaluated. 3 AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION,'IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN-UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID-NOT EXIST. l l 4 l l h 48 1 L__z___________________

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  • PAGE NO. 12 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS
           '10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRI'L THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LCG '       DOCUMENT NtE3ER '    EVALUATED.                          TITLE 5
      '38 0258 RF 1 Fwp         FACILITY WORK PLAN'FOR THE FIRST REFUELING' OUTAGE The facility work plan'for the first. refueling outage requires that desks, chairs,. work benches, and a staging area for refueling equipment'be set up in the conticl building. Also,.c. snubber test trailer.will be parked in the fuel building. -The above equipment will-not. create any seismic or fire hazards.
                      .AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.                j
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88 0145' TPD 88-0123 3113.01 CIRCULATING WATER , This' temporary-procedure deviation adds'a section to the circulating' water (CW) system operating procedure lto allcw the use of the CW pumps for filling the rondenser water boxers without 'the use of the 'vacaum priming system. ~ This revision provides the operationalimethodology necease.ry to minimize the potentia) of waterhammer that'may occur in tha condenser water boxes. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATIOli, IT WAS DETERMINED'THAT AN .

                                    'UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID:NOT EXIST.                ;

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PAGE tK). 13 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LOG DOCUMENT NUMBER CVALUATED ' TITLE 88 0103 U$AR 1.8 COMPLIANCE TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.64, REVISION 2 USAR Section 1.8 provides the project position on compliance to Regulatory Guides which are applicable to Clinton Power Station. Regulatory Guide 1.64, Revision 2, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants, states that "regardless of their title, individuals performing design verification should not1... have immediate supervisory responsibility for the individual' performing the design". This USAR change will take exception to the above statement by allowing an immediate. supervisor to perform the design verification provided that the supervisor is.the only technically. qualified individual, the<need is individually documented and approved in advance by the supervisor's management, and quality assurance audits xeview the 7

frequency and effectiveness of the use of supervisors as ) q denign verifiers to guard against abuse. This revision is  ; in accordance with Revision 2 of Standard Review Plan section 17.1.II.3.E4. This section of the Standard Review Plan supercedes Regulatory Guide.l.64,. Revision 2. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN l l 1 UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88 0185 USAR 1.8 5 5.2 COMPLIANCE TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.45, REVISION 0 1 i USAR Section 1.8 provides the project position on compliance I to regulatory guides which are applicable to Clinton Power l Station (CPS). Regulatory Guide 1.45, Revision 0, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems, specifies that the leakage detection system in the containment building should be capable of detecting unidentified leakage at a rate of one gallon per minute.in less than one hour by the use of an airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system. This USAR change will take exception to the above requirement and allow the monitoring of sump and condensate flow as the primary means of quantifying unidentified leakage, while airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring will be used as a secondary means. Since the amount of activity that would become airborne following a one gallon per minute leak in the reactor coolant pressure boundary varies depending on the leak-location and coolant temperature, activity, and pressure, accurate correlations between airborne radioactivity and leek rates cannot be made. - i AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS-DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 50

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  • PAGE NO. 14 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LOG DOCUM"lT NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE 88 0272 USAR 13.2 OPERATOR AND SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR TRAINING This USAR change revises the training program descriptions for non-licensed operators, reactor operators, senior reactor operators, and shift technical advisors to reflect the implementation of a systems approach to training. This training approach provides performance based training in an environment that continuously evaluates the training program's effectiveness. Also, the revised training program maintains regulatory commitments and compliance to the al.plicable federal regulations.

AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88 0130 USAR 13.5.1.2 SAFETY REVIEW GROUPS USAR section 13.5.1.2 states that the Facility Review Group (FRG) will approve and that the Nuclear Review and Audit Group (NRAG) will authorize changes to procedures which conflict with the intent of the Operating License or Technical Specifications, or which involve an unreviewed safety question. This USAR section is being revised to correctly describe the FRG and the NRAG as reviewers of the above changes. This revision will make USAR section 13.5.1.2 consistent with sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the Technical Specifications. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS lETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 51

PAGE NO. 15 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LOG DOCUMENT hiHBER EVALUATED TITLE 88 0136 USAR 6.2.7.2 ALLOW REFUELING GATE OPEN DURING POWER OPERATION USAR section 6.2.7.2 is being revised to allow the refueling gate in the upper containment pool to be open, instead of closed, during power operation. This will improve the cleaning of water in the dryer storage / fuel transfer pool by the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system. Operating with the refueling gate open will allow more water to be transferred from the upper containment pool to the suppression pool during an upper pool dump. However, the resultant suppression pool water level is still less than the water level used for the analysis of containment structural integrity. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88 0167 USAR 6.3.2.68 REVISE ECCS PUMP TESTING REQUIREMENTS This USAR change revises the testing frequency of the emergency core cooling cystem (ECCS) pumps from once a month to quarterly and the test duration from one hour to a minimum of five minutes. This change will make the testing requirements specified in the USAR consistent with the testing requirements specified in the edition and addenda of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI currently referenced in 10CFR50.55a. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 52

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  • PAGE NO. 16 PROCEDURES AND DdOJMENTS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 LOG DOCUMENT l

l NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE 37 2561 USAR 7.3.1.1.2 REVISE POWER SUPPLY DESCRIPTION FOR RELAYS IN THE LD SYSTEM This USAR change revises the description of the power supplies for relays 1UAY-LD306A, 1UAY-LD506B, and 1UAY-LD506C in the leak detection system to state that the relays are powered from safety buses 1AL, 1B1, and 1C1 respectively rather than from the nuclear system protection system (NSPS). These relays are part of'the circuitry which isolates the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) when a leak is detected in the turbine building steam tunnel- The effect of having the relays powered from the safety buses instead of from the NSPS will result in the MSIVs closing immediately after a loss of of fsite power (LOOP) accident because of a loss of power to the relays rather than 28 seconds after a LOOP because of insufficient vacuum in the main condenser. The change in the MSIV closure sequence will not affect the ninimum critical power rRtic limit of the reactor core. Also, a single failure of the safety buses will not result in an MSIV closure. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED-THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88-0332 USAR 7.3.1.1.2 MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORING This USAR change revises the number of trip channels for each main steam line radiation monitor from'three channels to two channels and deletes reference to a downscale trip. The main steam line radiation monitors currently initiate a main steam line isolation upon detecting high rarliation in the main steam lines or when the nonitors are inoperable. The two trip channels for each monitor are sufficient to meet the design intent of the main steam line radiation monitoring system. The downscale trip would not ri ide any plant protective function since a downscale readir^ ay a radiation monitor would indicate a decrease in main steam line radiation and would not necessitate isolation of the main steam lines. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVlEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 53

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PAGE NO. 17 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS 02/23/39  ; 10CFR50.S9 REPOR'i' 2 ROM APRIL THROUGE DECEMBER 1988 , j I log DOCWEM NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE l 88 0220 USAR 9.2.5.3 P1 VISE AUXILIARY HEAU If0AD TO THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK lj This USAR change revises the auxiliary heat load,to which the ultimate heat sink is subjected during-a costulated loss. of coolant accident. This heat load is beingsrevised to be consistent.with'the heat load specified in USAR Table 9.2-3. ) The revised auxiliary heat load is still less than the heat 1 load used in the design basis of the ultimate heat sink. j AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN , I UNREVIEWED' SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST.  ;

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l 88-0099 usAR 9.4.6.1.1 DELETE OPTION POR REMOVAL OF TRAVEL STOPS i I Several isolation valves in the containment ventilation (VR) 1 system and the-drywell purge (VQ) system have travel stops I l installed in them which limit their travel to 50 degrees in  ; the open direction. These travel stops were originally 1 intended to be removed during plant operating modes 4 end 5

                .to provide increased containment building ventilation.                 This USAR change deletes an option of removing'the travel stops j                 during plant operating modes 4 and 5. The design flow rates j                 in the VR an.1 VQ system can still be achieved while                                       .

t operating the systems with the travel stops in place. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS-DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION-DID NOT EXIST. l I l l 54

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  • PAGE NO. 18 PROCEDURES AND' DOCUMENTS 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPOET FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1980 LOG DOCUMENT NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE 88 0137 USAR 9.5.2.2.1 REVISE COVERAGE PROVIDED BY PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM This USAR change revises the description of the public address (PA) system tone generator to state that the sound level produced by the tone generator is 75 to 130 decibels at locations'where personnel are assigned work tasks over a period of time exceeding a normal work week. Also, for the remainder of the plant, alarms and emergency messages will be provided by a combination of the existing PA system, alternate communication devices, and general training practices. This change clarifies the extent of coverage intended to be provided by the PA system and maintains the applicable commitments in the Emergency Plan.

AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 88 0275 USAR TnB 3.11-5 REVISION TO ENVIRONMENTAL 2ONE

SUMMARY

This USAR change revises the upper and lower temperature ranges for several of the environmental zones listed in USAR Table 3.11-5. These changes reflect the temperatures which are achievable with the installed plant ventilation equipment. The revised upper temperature range required the revision of environmental qualification packages. The revised lower temperature ranges do not effect equipment qualification. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. 55

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              -PAGE'NO.         19           PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS                        02/23/89-E 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGH DECEMBER 1988 Loc        DocV GNI NUMBER     EVALUATED                          TITLE
         - 88 0141 USAR TAB 3.0*5  REVISIONS TO CONTAINMENT' PENETRATION DESCRIPTION 8'
                           -This USAR change revises tables and figures to. reflect the as-built configuration of mechanical and electrical containment' penetrations. 1These changes correct: items'such' as penetration descriptions, penetration (elevations,-sleeve .                                            ,

sizes, and pipe sizes. The design bases:for theLcontainment' l penetrations are not' changed by these USAR changas. j AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED =THAT AN' UNREVIEWED SAFETY' QUESTION DID-NOT. EXIST. a' ' ' 1 ,

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1 i s .( 88 0292 USAR TAB 3.9 5 REVISE LIST OF AOTIVE VALVES;AND PUMTS j

                                                                                                     ..                              1 This USAR change adds fuel' pool' cooling and cleanup (FC).'                                             j system relief valve 1FC091 to the list of valves and. pumps that are classified ad active safety related.        This' relief                                    ,

valve provides overpressurization protection for piping in ]

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1 the FC system. This valve has been seismical]y and environmentally qualified.  ! { AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS' DETERMINED THAT AN ,

                                                                                                                                  .j UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION;DID NOT EXIST.                                                  ;

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  • PAGE NO.. 4 19 PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTS- 02/23/89 10CFR50.59 REPORT FROM APRIL THROUGE'DUCEMBER 1988
               '0G
                .                                                         DOC'HENT
        ' NUMBER                                                          EVALUATED                 .                TITLE
            '88 d1d1
  • USAR TAB 3.8-5 REVISIONS TO CONTAI'NMENT PENETRATION DESCRIPTIONS 4

This USAR change' revises tables and figures to reflect the 'll. ' as-built configuration'of mechanical and electrical containment: penetrations. These changes correct items such as. penetration descriptions, penetration elevations, sleeve sizes, and pipe sizes.. The design bases for the containment-penet. rations are 'not changed' by these USAR changes.- AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS-DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.DID NOT EXIST. 88 0292 USAR TAB 3,9-5 REVISE LIST OF ACTIVE VALVES AND PUMPS l This USAR change adds fuel pool cooling _and cleanup (FC) I system relief valve 1FC091 to the list of valves and pumps l' that are classified as active safety related. This relief valve provides overpressurization protection for piping in the FC system. This valve has been seismically and environmentally qualified. AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. i 56

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LOG DOCUMENT NUMBER EVALUATED TITLE 88 0114 U$AR TAB 6.2 47 REVISE DESCRIPTION OF RI SYSTEM ISOLATION SIGNAL 1 USAR Table 6.2-47 indicates that the reactor core isolation- s cooling (RI) system suppression pool suction valve ,l (1E51-F031) and the RI system outboard' containment steam  ; supply valve (1E51-F064) receive an isolation signal when i' the water level in the reactor drops below level 2. Per-the I system design, this isolation signal does not isolate-these valves, but provides a sealed-in signal which is used'asja fj permissive to isolate valves 1E51-F031 and 1E51-F064.in ) conjuction with an RI system manual isolation. 'This USAR  ; change adds a note to Table 6.2-47 to explain this feature. The current USAR description of this isolation signal I conflicts with the design intent of the RI system,.which is to automatically' start when the water level in the reactor drops below' level 2. i AS A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DID NOT EXIST. l l l l l l 57 u_______________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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                                                                          -U-601386
    ,e                                                                     LO2-89 (03-02 )-LP 1A.120 l        ILLINDIS POWER COMPANY IP       CLINTON POWEN STATION. P.o. BOX 678 CLINTON. ILLINOIS 61727 March 2, 1989 JRIORITYROUTIllG 10CFR50.36                  gm jgg 10CFR50.59 V

g - db Docket No. 50-461 V W* Mr. A. Bert Davis Ok1M i V h no-i Regional Adm1nistrator FILQ)d,$,, ! Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road 7- Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Subject:

Clinton Power Station Annual Operating Report NRC Docket No. 50-461, NPF-62

Dear Mr. Davis:

In accordance with 10CFR50.36 and paragraph 6.9.1.4 of the Clinton Power Station Technical Specifications, Illinois Power Company submits 1 the Clinton Power Station Annual Operating Report for the period of January 1, 1988, through December 31, 1988. In accordance with 10CFR50.59(b)(2), the summary of Safety Evaluations for 1988 (April to December) is included. The Safety Evaluation summary submittal m

              ',U-6012 79) for the period January 1 to March 31 was previously submitted                                 j vith the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

Should you have any questions or comments regarding this report, please contact me. Sincerely yours, 1 i

                                                                                                                     .mA
                                                                                 / %

d D. L. Holtzse.her Acting Manager - Licensing and Safety SFB /pgc Attachartts

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cc: NRC Clititon Licensin; Project Manager NRC Resident Inspector NRC Document Control Desk Ig > Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety I t MAR 0 999 _}}