ML19340C480
| ML19340C480 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1980 |
| From: | Jeffrey Riley CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340C481 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8011170472 | |
| Download: ML19340C480 (17) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A% //gp MRc ,
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SA$ETY AND LICENSING SOARD (g A# )
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In the Matter of DUKE PGWER COMPANY Docket Nos. 50-369 *I
) 50-370 (William B. McGuire Nuclear i Station, Units 1 and 2) )
CESG'S RSPLY TO APPLICANT'S MOT.10N FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION REGARDING AFFLICATION FOR LICENSE AUTHORIZ1NG FUEL LOADING, ETC.;
MOTION TO CONSULlDATE NEAR TERM OPERATING LICENSE AND OPERATING LICENSE PROCEEDINGS; AND FURTRER CONTENTIONS The Applicant has filed a motion for summary disposition of.
~ its application for authorization to load fuel, etc., a statement of material facts, and several supporting affidavits (September 30, 1900). The NEC staff counsel has approached CESG in regard to a stipulation which, if CESG's pending motion to reopen the operating license proceeding is granted, would have CESG withdraw its opposition to the authorization of fuel loading, low power testing, etc. The Staff proposed to stipulate that CESG's filing of August 13th met the requirements for reopening the proceeding. It did not find acceptable CESG's further requirement that the Staff waive it's right to file for summary disposition in the event that the Board ordered reopening cf the record. In the course of these discussions, and the time required for NRC computer studies in regard.to hydrogen release by a core only irradiated at low power, ,
the tsoard approved several extensions of tima. The final filing
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date is November 7th. In a telephone confere ce on November 4th CESG and the Staff informed the Roard and the parties that they 3
wcre unable to agree en a stipulation. .--
l0 CESG holds tihat the public interest will best be served by a
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reopened hearing. Facts in regard to the issues that CESG would
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^ ~2-raise, which are.TMI related, are not part of the record. An adversary proceeding in which an opportunity is provided for the
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Board to examine witnesses, and in which there is cross-examination by the parties, is more likely to produce a sound record in this matter of great safety significance. CESG could not support a stipulation which would tend away from a hearing of the issues.
The Applicant in the instant motion requests expedited consideration. Applicant offers no good cause, alleging only that " . . . fuel loading is presently scheduled to commence on or about December 1, 1900",(p. 2) and "In light of the length of time already involved and in light of the fact that only one contest-ed issue would remain if the hearing were reopened," (p. 3).
Applicant does not indicate that construction has been drawn out because the capacity of McGuire has not been needed. In the FE1S Applic at anticipated a peak load of 10,157 MW in 1975 (Table n-c).
This .'.svel of peak load was not reached until tne summer of 19c0.
The L]plicant then had an indicated reserve of about 20 percent.
The p.?oviding or power is the sole benefit the plant offers (FEIS
- p. 13-1). With the greatly reduced growth in denand growth since the construction permit stage, and Applicant's-20% reserve, there is nothing in the public interest requiring an unduly hurrie-proceeding. As to the "one contested issue remaining", there is no nore impo_. nt and significant public issue--whetner a hydrogen explosion and reactor breach can occur and whether the public will _
be acequately safeguarded in that event. Applicant's plea for expedited consideration carries no promise of public benefit.
l lt is clearly in the public interest that this matter of substantial concern,.as evidenced by the number of letters sent by members of the public to the Board in regard to reopeneing, be given informed
and deliberate consideration.
Applicant' seeks, in acc~ord with NUREG-0694, Part 1, a license for operation at substantially less than full power. The only reason for obtaining such a license is that it is a step toward obtaining a .ull power license lid. Part 2). Under the present special circumstances involving a PWR in a low pressure containment, l sited near a center of population, obtaining'the low power license is a camel's-nose-in-the-tent approach to obtaining a full power license. All other factors being the same,-it is obvious that low power operation for two weeks poses less hazard than full power operation for thirty to forty years. The threshold for approval of a near term operating license will presumably be lower than for an operating license. If the NTOL stage passes without incicent a climate will have been generated which facilitates taking the next, connected step, issuing an operating license, however clear it may ,
be that the cumulative risk at thirty times the power level, in a system experiencing wear and fatigue, for one hundred times as long is very substantially greater.
Accordingly, CESG moves that the matter of licensing McGuire operation be treated as a whole and that NTub and OL matters be consolidated for hearing. If such a consolidated proceeding leads to a record supporting the decision that a license should not be granted the fuel will not have been irrr.diated, the reactor and fuel pool will nct have become contam'.nated, costly decommissioning procedures will not be required. .4s there is no need for the capacity of McGuire unit 1 if the Applicant continues to operate its syatem competently, there is good cause for consolidating the STOL and OL proceedings although it may,re.sult in a later date for
-y-license issuance than Applicant seeks.
if the Applicant's moti6n for summary disposition succeeds, licensing acti'on will devolve on NRC staff. Staff actions are not necessarily confirmed by hearing boards. Applicant's request for auF orization to ship 300 Oconee spent fuel assemblies to McGuire for interim storage was supported by Staff but denied by a Board, Initial Decis' ion, Docket 70-2623, October 31, 19eO.
APPLICANT'S STATEMENT OF MATEHlAL FACTS CESG does not dispute certain of the sixteen " facts" alleged by Applicant. Some of the purported facts require amplification or amendment. CESG disputes others of the more consequential " facts" and notes the omission of still other relevart and material facts.
Not in dispute are the following of Applicant's numbered b paragraphs in the Statement: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, and 16.
Fact #4 alleges that CESG's contentions in the initial OL proceeding have no bearin5 on Applicant's current application.
There is a nexus in the need-for-power matter. As stated foreSoing, Applicant greatly overforecast demand and growth.in demand. Need-for-power is not a factor in the instant licensing. The Applicant's request for expeditious consideration rests on an undisclosed g rounds.
If the hearing is reopened, Applicant may argue that, denial of an OL will render it unable to meet customar requirements'for electricity. Cos t-b enefi t stateme7ts on such alternatives as.
cogeneration, load management, conservation, renewable resources, and solar power are relevant to such an argument and are, indeed, i under mutual consideration by Applicant, North Carolina Utilities Commission, and.the recently established North Carolina Corporation for Alternative Energy Sources.
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Fact #5 alleges CESG's sole concern in its filing of June 9, 1980, was "the possibility of excessive hydrogen generation ,
resulting _from a TMI-type accident." This incorrectly states our cencern. CESG's primary concern is with the consequences of the ignition of the hydrogen .thus released, cf. .CESG's Motion, p.1, ii2, and contentions 1, 4, 5, and 6 which concern erposure of the puklic to " unacceptable risks or health, sarety and property"; with
" Consideration [which] has not b.een given to the environmental and safety and health consequences . .. "; with " emergency evacuation
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planning" for "a containment burst accident"; and with the absence of" crisis relocation planning in the event of an accident involving containment burst . . .
Fact #8 states that the ," possibility" is " extremely remote" "that' hydrogen in excess of design quantities could be generated during low power (up.to Si& full power) testing." Nothing could be farther from the results of NRC staff studies involving Robert l Tedesco, Norman Laubman, and Sandia Laboratories, and communicated to CESG's representative during discussions related to a possible stipulation (Affidavit of Jesse L. Hiley, attached). Absent the operation of the ECCS pumps or other coolant supply pumps, hydrogen would be evolved from the fuel pin sheaths and bring the containment air to a combustible level eignteen hours arter accident initiation.
The generation of " excessive nydrogen" is clearly shown by the Staff studies to be possible.
Fact #9 recapitulates the regulatory requirements for ECUS design. These requirements, including " . . . (3) clad metal-water reaction is limited to negligible amounts" were observed in the breach at 121-2. Staff has the authority to impose " requirements".
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.The implementation of " requirements" by a licensee is anothe,r matter. . CESG in its, filing of August 15, p. 10, notes, in quoting
} the TM1 Lessons 1 Learned reports (NUREG-0576,.2.2 3, p. 14) " . . ,
'(the requirements-have existed, but the implementation has been unsatisfactory) .. .-
and (NUREG-o365, pp. 1-2) "What we have i
found -is that prescriptive ano --ow licensing requirements only add to the quiltwork of regulatory practice and do little to directly. address-the nation's heightened concern for-the safety of nuclear power plants." '
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Applicant's reliance on the fact of the existence of these t
ECCS requirements is not an adequate basis from which to infer that the-requirements will be met, which is the only fact of
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functional significance.
4 Even if the Applicant meets all ECCS requirements, the absence or electrical power for pump operation during an 10 hour-LUCA (see Affidavit) would result in a combustible level of hydrogen in the
- q. containment. Windstorms regularly damage transmission lines, i
- The'-industry has had~ problems with Diesel generator starts. A 4
no-power scenario during a LOCA, whatever the probability, is possible and would result'in extreme hazard.
Fact # 13 declares that cue to training programs, etc..lef.
Fact #12)."in the event of.a loss of coolant accident, there will not be.a. premature operator termination or the ECCS." The' Applicant has chosen a weak reed to support this " fact". . The Staff finds i
- tnat the major lesson learned from TMI vas.that "inproved operation.
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reliability'is;the most.important lesson'1 earned from the accident at TMI-2", (NUREG-0578,'2.2.1, p. 12).
The great; reliance.placed by Applicant.on improved operation !
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l certainly is not indicative of an intrinsically safe system.
CESG does not question that Applicant has made changes at McGuire in response to the TMI experience. CESG does question Applicant's assertion that "there will not be" [enphasis supplied] a premature operator termination of ECCS operation for the simple reason that it is not within the Applicant's power to determine this possible future event, only to seek to influence it.
Fact #14 states that hydrogen evolution in the low power testing situation will begin one hour and five minutes (3900 seconds)
, after a postulated LOCA absent ECCS operation. An inflow to the coolant system of 15 gallons per mir.ute of water will be, it is stated, sufficient to prevent core exposure and hydrogen gener-ation. Any one of five pumps, it is further stated, can supply greater then 15 gallons per minute. CESG notes that the pumps will have to be energized. The redundant power sources are the transmission system interconnecting Applicant's generating units, and Diesel-electric generators. These will not necessarily be available, see foregoing (p. 6).
Fact #15, citing the NRC Commissioners, states that "the TM1-related operating license requirements list (IiUREG-0694) . . . must be the principal basis for consideration'of TMI-related issues and thus adjudicatory process." " Principal basis" does not denote sole basis. The hearing board remains the means by which the singular features of specific applications can be.taken into account.
As to Fact #16, which CESG does not dispute, the issuance of the three low power licenses should be related to the specific cases.
Only Sequoyah is a low pressure, ice condenser containment similar to McGuire. The Sequoyah application was not contested.
A number of material facts essential to summary deposition have been omitted by Applicant. The significantly changed circumstances may unsettle the CP decision and the stayed OL decision. A reopened OL proceeding provides a means for examining such changed circumstances.
- 17. (Continuing with Applicant's numberinE system) "The NRC is revising its policy for considering the more severe kinds of-very
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low probability accidents that are physically possible in environ .-
mental impact assessments required by the NEFA," Interin Policy 1
Statement of June 9, 1960. 'ihis Statement announces the withdrawal of the ' proposed Annex to Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 50. It is now the Commission's position that the EIS include consideration of 4
site specific environmental impacts including accident sequences that can result in inadequate cooling of reactor fuel and melting of the reactor core. In summary the McGuire FZiS requireareconsid-eration in regard to Class 9 accidents, a matter to which the FEIS did not speak.
- 18. The emergency plan which was appropriate for the design basis accident is not appropriate for a core meltdown or containment breach accident. The McGuire plant is about 10 miles from the Charlotte city limit. Charlotte continues its demographic and areal growth.
- 19. A core melt accident would deliver impermissible doses of radioactivity-to the public at distances greater than 10 miles (NUREG-0396; EPA 520/1-7e-016, Fig. 1-11, I-12, and I-13). The low probability of such an accident asserted at.the time of publication
-(1976) was based on NUREG-1400 -This low probability is no longer I asserted, in the light of the Risk Assessment Review Group Report (NUREG-Oh00), the Proposed NRC Statement on Risk Assessment and the i
Reactor 3afety Study [ Report (WASH-1400) (SEGY-7e-637), and the TM1
experience. A current appraisal of the environmental consequences or containment burst fera 1000-1200 MW reactor does not appear to 1 have been published.
- 20. The LRC has upgraded emergency planning regulations (Fed.
Reg./vol. h5, No. 162/ Tuesday, Aug. 19, 1960) to be . effective November 3, 1900. In consideration of the large population at risk, a special circumstance, the emergency planning zone radius of 10 miles is too-small.- An increase in this radius would make some provision for i
the evacuation of Charlotte in the event of a class 9 accident. The plan currently under consideration makes no reference to Charlotte.
- 21. The *2M1 accident introduced the NRC and the industry to an unanticipated type of incident in which there were a sequence of functional difficulties (obstructed flow of feedwater due to faulty deionizer operation), improper operations (isolation of the auxiliary reed water ~ supply loop), equipment failure (failure of the power operated relief valve to reseat), instrument reading misinterpretation (disregard of the high temperature of the press-urizer relief line) and accident mismanagement (premature reduction of ECCS flow for fear the primary loop would go " solid"), (NUREG-0570, NUREG-0505, HUREG-0600, the Eemeny Repor:, and the Rogovin Report).
There is really no assurance that present protective provisions will prove effective for some as yet unencountered accident sequence.
The pre-TMI assurances as to the adequacy or analysis and computer codes as means of characterizing accident sequences and evaluating risks have been supplanted by the realization that it is improbable that all accident sequences have been discovered. The requirement Lof shift technical advisors'(NUREG-069h, 1.A.1.1, p. 10) is an attempt to deal with this reality. l
'10-The accidents at Fermi, Browns Ferry, and Three Mile island work out_to three totally unanticipated major accidents in about 450 reactor years, i.e. 150 reactor years per major accident.
This actual probability does not provide reassuring odds for Charlotte which, if present plans are actualized, will have four nearoy reactors with a projected operation of about 150 reactor years.
ARGUMENT In response to Applicant's Memorandum, the omission of a number of material facts and the flaws in a number of those iterated show that th.ere is a genuine issue as to material fact (p. 5). Applicant is not entitled to summary disposition on the basis of the facts alleged.
In that a loi: power license is an unavoidable way-stage in the pursuit of a full power license, changes in circumstances in '
regard to a full power license are material to a low power license application. She circumstances in regard to need for power have changed greatly since the CP stage. Actual peak denand is but -
two thirds what Applicant forecast it would be. The rate in growth of dem:'d.is a small fraction of the rate forecast.
Alternative energy _ sources are no longer a subject for speculation.
Wood stoves are in widespread and growing use in Applicant's service area. The North Carolina legislature has taken a leading role in matters of energy conservation, load managemer.t, and the development of alternative energy sources. It is now credible that Applicant's peak demand will become level in several years and fall well within
. Applicant 's. present -reserve. Cogeneration will adc to this reserve.
-The change in circumstances require a reexamination of the cost-benefit weighing. (id. p.7, B.1) .
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. Applicant's' assertion that "the ECCS will'not fail" and.that the EC T "will not be prematurely terminated by operator action" are wortawhile goals. It is simply a matter of common sense to recognize.that good management level intentions are not sufficient to guaratee subsequent accions and events in operation (id. p. 10).
The Staff approvals on which Applicant relies to validate ECCS design all predate the learning period subsequent to TM1--
NUREG-Ok22, March, 197c;. Suppl. 2, March 1979. Similarly the CP stage testimony was proferred in the dark ages as concerns LWR
- , accident experience. The conclusions of that period which have a significant bearing on the present and the future require sempulous reexamination--best provided in an adversarial context.
All that is needed to collapse Applicant's house of ECCS cards is a substantial electrical failure.
The Rasin affidavit also manifests an incautious, possibly
. desperate, prophetic certainty, "short term operation at power levels of no more than 5% presents no risk to the health and safety of the public due to hydrogen generation," (p.2).- ,
"[1]nconceivable" is the term Applicant uses to describe an inability to provide coolant water at a rate of 13-15 gallons per minute. . Only a few years ago Applicant lost steam Marshall for a long period because a high voltage transformer went out. Reference i
has been made foregoing to the poor record in nuclear industry of Diesel. generator starts. A McGuire plant power blackout, although it may.be ofilow probability, is certainly conceivable. A mindset
- which cannot consider thelpossible does not augur.well for safety.
' Applicant puts the time to begin hydrogen evolution in a LOCA with an inoperative ECCS at 3900 seconds.(p. 13). This l' hour and
'5. minutes.
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Applicant concluces that the coard snould rule, "basec on irrefutable facts notec herein", tnat " excessive amounts of hydrogen" will not be generated (pp. 13, 14). OESG believes that the facts are more correctly interpreted as signifying that ir a LUCA occurs and the active part of the ECCS remains inoperable, snd due to power loss other pumps will not operate, that an explosive concen-tration of hydrogen will develop (in about 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />, Riley Affidavit).
ADDITIONAL CONTENTIONS CESG contends, in addition to its Revised Contentions of August 15, 1960:
5 Under current practice the NRC is required to issue an environmental impact statement.as to the' consequences of, Class.
9 accidents. Such an' environmental impact statement is required for'McGuire.
- 6. The emergency plan for McGuire must, due to the special circumstance of close proximity to a large population center, be revised to provide an emergency response for the city of Charlotte
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i in the event of a Class 9 accident.
COMMISSION ACTION ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER CLI-80-16 The Commission ruled against UCS's motion for reconsideration of hydrogen questions in the TM1-1 restart proceeding (September 26, 1960). .The basis for the ruling was that UCS had not shown special circumstances. In the present matter special circumstances exist, particularly the low pressure containment, the pre-TMI approval of siting, and the proximity of a_ population center.
They'wefe opposed
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-Only two commissioners joined in this ruling.
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by the other two. The appointment of a fifth member as cha.trman is pending and will result in rulings supported by a clear majority.
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CONCLUSiUNS
,i The facts alleged by Applicant in support of a motio. for summary dispositiot. requesting the authorization to grant a license for low power op eration and testing cre in part inaccurate and, additionally, incomplete.
There is an abundance of NRC documentation to indicate that a hydrogen explosion in a McGuire low pressure containment would be the cause of sericus consequences to public health and safety
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(SECY-60-107, 107A, 107B).
It is a physical possibility, attested by NRC staff, that a core used at no more than 5 percent power can, in a LOCA absent the active ECCS components, generate sufficient heat to boil off 4
I coolant thereby exposing the core, and to raise the core temperature sufficiently to initiate the production of hydrogen. The amount of i
hydrogen produced can bring the hydrogen content of the containment to reach and exceed the lower explosive limit for hydrogon.
McGuire is close to charlotte. Emergency planning for Charlotte does not exist. A Class 9 accident such as containment rupture by a hydrogen explosion could cause grave injury to health and property in that population center.
The hazards of a Class 9 accident are likely to be far greater for full power operation for thirty to forty years than for a few weeks of low power testing. As low power testing is only needed if full power operation is: sought, a reopened hearing should consolidate consideration of the applications for both low and full power licenses.
The Board should deny Applicant's instant motion for summary disposition and hold a-consolidated hearing regarding licensing.
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14 Respectfully submitted, i
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!^ i llM1-b T- {. [
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j Jefse L. Riley, Presi ont
- Carolina Environmenta Study Group
! d54 Henicy Place
- , Charlotte, N. C. 26207 At Charlotte, N. C.
j November 7, 1900
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