ML20127G426
| ML20127G426 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1985 |
| From: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127G396 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-84-130, NUDOCS 8506250439 | |
| Download: ML20127G426 (7) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
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DUKE POWER COMPANY
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Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 (McGuire Units 1 and 2)
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EA 84-130 ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY I
Duke Power Company (the " licensee") is the holder of Operating License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17 (the " licenses") issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the "Conni ssion"). The licenses authorize the licensee to operate McGuire Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the conditions specified therein. The licenses were issued on January 23, 1981 and March 3,1983, respectively.
II A special inspection of the licensee's activities was conducted on November 2-3, 1984. The results of this inspection indicated that the licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty was served upon the licensee by letter dated February 20, 1985. The Notice states the nature of the violations, the requirements of the Commission that were violated, and the amount of the civil penalty proposed for the applicable violations.
The licensee responded to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty with a letter dated March 22, 1985.
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2 III Upon consideration of Duke Power Company's response (March 22,1985) and the statements of fact, explanation, and argument regarding mitigation contained therein, the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the penalty proposed for the violations designated in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty should be imposed.
IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C 2282, PL 96-295, and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars
($50,000) within thirty days of the date of this Order by check, draft, or money order payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555.
V The license may, within thirty days of the date of this Order, request a hearing.
A request for a hearing shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555.
3 A copy of the hearing request shall also be sent to the Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of hearing.
If the licensee fails to request a hearing within thirty days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be effective without further proceedings and, if payment has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shall be:
(a) whether the licensee was in violation of the Commission's requirements as set forth in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty referenced in Section II above, and (b) whether on the basis of such violations this Order should be sustained.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
/_
/Of, ice of Insp([ction and Enforce J
s M. Taylor Director
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Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this)/5' day of June 1985
e APPENDIX EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS The licensee's March 22, 1985 response to the February 20, 1985 Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty for the Duke Power Company's McGuire Units 1 and 2 admits that the violations occurred as stated in the Notice and that the violations were properly categorized at Severity Level III.
The violations involved the failure of the Upper Head Injection (UHI) accumulator system isolation valves to close at the required UHI accumulator water level.
The licensee requests mitigation of the proposed civil penalty.
Licensee Response and NRC Evaluation Although the licensee admits that the violations occurred and were appropriately categorized as a Severity Level III problem, the licensee believes that factors exist which support a reduction of the proposed civil penalty as allowed by the Enforcement Policy. The licensee's argument on each of these factors and the NRC's response is as follows:
1.
Prompt Identification and Reporting Licensee Response: The licensee contends that the event was identified by technicians following a routine boron sample of the UHI system, that reasonably prompt actions were taken to confirm the presence of nitrogen saturated water on Unit 1, and that similar efforts were then taken for Unit 2.
Unit I was shut down and Unit 2 was reduced in power to below 46 percent of full power in accordance with Technical Specifications. Once the units were in these modes, and the additional level instrumentation errors identified, prompt actions were taken to correct the errors and to report the events.
NRC Evaluation: The NRC agrees that reasonably prompt actions were taken to confirm the presence of nitrogen saturated water. However, the isolation valve closure setpoint for the UHI system was set in such a way that it would not have met the safety analysis for low pressure safety injection. This condition existed for eighteen months and post-installation testing and reviews failed to identify the error.
In addition, the installation of the pressure transmitters backwards would have caused the UHI system for Unit 1 to inject the contents of the accumulator completely, including nitrogen gas. This condition was not detected during post-installation testing and went undetected for six months.
As the UHI systems for both units were inoperable for eighteen months while the plants were in modes that required their operability in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1.2., the staff does not consider mitigation of the civil penalty for prompt identification appropriate.
2.
Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence Licensee Response: The licensee contends that the UHI system is unique at McGuire in its design and consideration of operational requirements.
It was designed as a static system yet it operates as a quasi-static system. The problems that have occurred appear to have been unique to the UHI system.
Nevertheless, as detailed in Attachment 3 of the licensee's response, a review of other differential pressure transmitter installations has identified no other installation errors.
0 Appendix 2
To provide assurance that future modifications of differential transmitters will not result in crossed impulse lines or improper setpoints, several procedural changes have been implemented. These were also detailed in to the March 22, 1985 letter.
NRC Evaluation: Although the NRC staff finds the licensee's corrective actions to be adequate for these particular violations, the staff does not find that the corrective actions were unusually prompt or extensive. The licensee's actions were focused on the specific violation rather than more broadly on the general area of concern relating to the licensee's surveillance testing program. The NRC staff believes that a proper functional post-modification testing program which is capable of detecting installation errors in conjunction with a more thorough engineering review would have precluded these events. Actions regarding these causes were not addressed as part of the licensee's corrective actions. Therefore, the staff does not consider mitigation of the proposed civil penalty appropriate for unusually prompt and extensive corrective actions.
3.
Past Performance Licensee Response:
In this general area of concern, the licensee contends there has been no previous history. Modifications and setpoints have been, in general, properly implemented. The licensee believes this particular event was created by the unique design of the UHI system.
t NRC Evaluation: The licensee's previous performance in this general area of concern is not particularly bad nor is it good enough to warrant mitigation.
Violations involving reactor operations have occurred, but were not specifically caused by deficiencies in surveillance or post-modification testing. The NRC staff does not see the design of the UHI system as unique.
Although special circumstances arose in connection with the system as they sometimes do with any system, the licensee's control systems are expected to deal with such circumstances.
In this case, the licensee's control systems did not ensure that the operability requirements of the Technical Specifications were satisfied.
In sum, the staff does not agree that there is good prior performance such that mitigation of the civil penalty is appropriate, nor did the staff believe escalation for poor performance was appropriate.
4.
Prior Notice of Similar Event Licensee Response: The licensee contends that it has no prior knowledge of any event directly related to this particular situation.
NRC Evaluation: The NRC staff concurs.
However, under the Enforcement Policy, this factor may result in escalation of a civil penalty. It is not applied to mitigate a civil penalty tnd was not applied in this case.
5.
Multiple Occurrences Licensee Response: The licensee contends that this factor does not appear to be applicable in this instance.
NRC Evaluation:
The NRC staff did not apply this factor in this case.
Appendix 3
NRC Conclusions Based on our evaluation, as indicated above, inadequate calibration, improper instrument installation, and inadequate post-modification testing procedures allowed the UHI system to be rendered inoperable and the inoperability remained undetected for an eighteen month period.
In particular, we note that the violations resulted from errors committed by Duke Power Company personnel:
an engineering error in the calibration of the setpoint and improper installation of the transmitter.
In the case of the incorrect setpoint, improper data was used in calculating the set point and the second review of this set point determination was not of adequate depth to detect this error.
In the case of the improperly installed differential pressure transmitters, the installation procedures and drawings did not contain sufficient detail to ensure that the proper impulse line was connected to the proper instrument port, and post-modification testing did not detect the error.
In neither case does the NRC consider that the problems were promptly identified since discovery of the problems occurred approximately eighteen months and six months, respectively, after the errors occurred.
Therefore, the staff concludes that the violations of NRC requirements have been properly categorized as a Severity Level III problem. Although recognizing that Duke Power Company identified the:e violations, the extended time period during which the violations existed and the opportunities to identify the violations must also be considered.
In fact, the civil penalty could have been increased in accordance with the Enforcement Policy to reflect the added significance resulting from the duration of the violation. The staff did not apply this factor as the licensee did promptly report this problem to the NRC when it became aware of the problem. At the same time, the staff could not reasonably consider any mitigation of the penalty for prompt identification because of the lengthy duration of the violation.
For all these reasons the NRC staff concludes that mitigation of the civil penalty would not be warranted in this case.
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