ML20004D423

Request for Stay of Initial & Supplemental Initial Decisions.Aslb Lacks Basis for Finding Operation Would Not Expose Public to Undue Risk Since Board Did Not Determine Consequences of Shell Rupture.Affirmation of Svc Encl

ML20004D423
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	06/05/1981
From:	Jeffrey Riley CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP
To:	NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8106090380
Download: ML20004D423 (8)

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9$....,f)SfEFDRETHEATOMICSAFETfANDLICENSINGAPPEALB Q i fie!V In the Matter of )

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DUKE POWER COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-369-OL

) , 50-370-OL p dam B. McGuire Nuclear )

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CESG8S RECUEST FOR STAY OF INITIAL DECISION 6 yJtt 0 3 19B F T3 4

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% I[f coordance with 10 CFR 52.788, intervenor, Carolina Y nmental Study Group (CESG), hereby requests a stay of the

"" Initial and Supplemental Initial Decisions in the instant matter.

(1) Initial and Supplemental Initial Decisions (IE and SID) have been issued in the subject matter. The SID was se red MaJ 27, 1981. The SID was the result of reopening the heering to consider matters related to hydrogen generation and combustion (ASLB Order, Nov. 25, 1980). Four CESG contentions were admitted for hearing (SID 112). Contentions 1 and 2, concerned with hydrogen generation, combustion, and containment breach as a result of a loss-of-coolant accident were heard and provide the record on which the SID is based (SID 117 and 8). Contentions 3 and h. in regard to the health, safety, and environmental consequences of containment breach were not heard, the ASLB having reached the conclusion before the hearing adjourned that CESG had not " succeeded" in regard to Contention 1 (SID 1i8).

(2) The SID concludes that 1) there is reasonable assurance that substantial quantities of hydrogen will not be generated, i.e.

quantities in ex6ess of the design' basis of 10 CFR 550.141.;

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2) that Duke Power Company (DPC) has taken actions and adopted procedures which provide reasonable assuranco that ECCS operation will not be prematurely terminated in a TMI-2 type accident, or, if it is, will be reinstated to prevent hydrogen generation in -

excess of 10 CFR 550 44; and 3) that McGuire can be operated without undue risk to the public health and safety with respect to hydrogen generation accidents (SID 1132 and 33) [ emphasis supplied]. .

(3) The SID also concludes tlat the premise for Contenti"ns 3 and 4 had not been established, removing the need to make specific findings (SID H58(3)).

(k) The ASLB also concluded that Supplement 3 to the McGuire Safety Evaluation Report provided a reasonable foundation for Staff conclusions regarding certain generic matters (SID ii38(k)) .

(5) CESG is taking exception to both the ID and the SID.

. The SID removed the stay placed on the ID at the time of its issuance, April 18, 1979, and thereby authorized the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to proceed in the matter of an' operating license (SID p. 32).

(6) A stay is requested because, among other things, the hearing did not provide a basis for the finding that the McGuire facility "an be operated without undue risk to the public health and safety with regard to the possible generation of hydrogen resulting from accidents of the type which occurred at TMI-2"

[ emphasis supplied].

(7) The NRC Staff, because the question of risk is a central one, has developed an operating definition of risk

(Draft Environmental Statement related to the operation of r

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit No. 1, NUREG-0534 Supplement, 6.1.k.6). Staff recognizes, as does CESG, that consideration of I likelihood and consequences enters into an estimation of the level of risk. The ASLB in the instant matter concerned itself only with the likelihood. The ASLB finds that sp'ecified changes "have substantially reduced the likelihood of recurrence of an event  :

at McGuire such as TMI-2" (SID H32). The ASLB also finds that

" die likelihood of ECCS operations being prematurely terminated

by the control room staff is so remote that such an accident is not credible" (SID H33). A reduced likelihood is not zero prob-ability. A "not credible" finding is not equivalent to zero l probability. Before the accidents at Fermi, Browns Ferry, and TMI-2 occurred they were, depending on the mindset of the individ-ual, "not credible". The searching examination of NRC and nuclear l.

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. .; industry practices and attitudes by the Lessons Le rned Task l Force raised serious doubts about the safe regulation of nuclear generation (NUREG-05?8 and NUREG-0585 as cited in CESG's Revised Motion to Reopen, Etc., of ugust 15, 1980, pp. 9-11).

Operations personnel in particular must not have a mindset that future accidents are impossible. The exper19nce of

. -. _. .Three Mile Island has not been sufficient to eradicate that mindset in all quarters and the effects of that experience will fade with time. This in probably the single most important human factor with which this industry and NRC has to contend. (NUREG-0585, p. 2-7)

These considerations appear equally applicable to decision makers.

(8) CESG has raised the matter of the factors in risk (CESG's Motion to Permit Appeal of ASLB Order, May 15, 1981, pp. 2-4) in this context.

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(9) The consequences of containment breach due to.a hydrogen deflagration or detonation were not considered in the proceeding. The ASLB did not admit CESG's Contention 6, which maintained that a supplemental Environmental Impact Statenent considering the consequences of very severe accidents, including containment breach be required. It is Commission policy to require such consideration in the EIS as of June 13, 1980.

CESG has unsuccessfully sought to convince the ASLB that a ,

special circumstance exists which requires preparation of such a supplement for McGuire; namely high population density and

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the close proximity of four thin-shell ice condenser containments to Charlotte, NC, the McGuire Nuclear Station at 17: miles from the center, Catawba at 18 miles. A supplemental EIS concerned with the offsite releases and consequences under severe accident condi-  !

tions has been issued for the nearby Virgil C Summer plant which has a lower power level and a stronger containment than McGuire (Virgil C. Summer Draft Environmental Statement, NUREG-0534 supplement, November, 1980). l (10) The ASLB's findings are confined to hydrogen generation resulting from " accidents of the type which occurred at TMI-2" ,

_ LSID_t58(R)(c)). CESG's Contention 1 in no way limited consider- ,

ation to one class of accident.

The licensee has not demonstrated that, in the e" ant of a losc-of-coolant accident at McGt. ire: [Empta is supplied.]

(11) CESG holds that the ignoring by the ASLB of the L spectrum of severe accidents now considered in licensing proceed-I .

ings in arriving at its findings, and its failure to consider the

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3 consequences of such severe accidents in finding that operation of the plant posed no undue risk to the health and safety of the public constitutes grave legal and factual error. (cf. 10 CFR 2.788(e)(1))

(12) The operation of McGuire with si nificant safety issues-unresolved should not be permitted. :A Staff witness regarded the operation of the hydrogen mitigation system as

" fraught with danger" (SID Staff Exhibit E, p. 5; also CESG Exhibit 40). The SID unless stayed has the potential for doing irreparable harm to CESG's members and to the general public.

(cf. 10 CFR 2 788(e)(2)

(13) The granting of a stay will harm neither Duke Power ,

Company nor Staff. Indeed a more adequate and appropriate decisional process will be a beneficial-example to Staff and j

the industry. DPC will, at worst, fail to gain some anticipated .

increase in earnings through a favorable rate action. (cf 10 CFR 2 788(e)(3))

(14) The public interest lies in being pro;ected from the consequences of extremely severe accidents. Not only is McGuire 17 miles from the center of Charlotte, it is in line with a prevailing.. wind direction which carries over the " golden crescent",

l Concord, Kannapolis, Salisbury, Lexington, Thomasville, Winston-Salem, Greensboro and Burlington, all uithin 100 miles. There l 1s no indication in the record that a Pw?-l event could not take 1

L place in which significant damage could occur at very-substantial i

distances. The public interest will be prctooted-by staying the effectiveness of the ID and SID. (cf. 10 CFR 2.788(e)(h)

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(15) It may be argued that the public interest would be better served by making available the generating capacity of McGuire unit 1 in time for 1981 summer peak. Based on the j experience within the NRC as to the time required for low power f

testing and for power escalation, it is unlikely that if a licen;e were to issue ten days after Commission review, on or about July 6, McGuire unit 1 could be put on line during the period of probable summer peak demcnd. -It is further unliksly ,

that this generating capacity would be required. DPC may be j oxpected to have a nominal reserve of 1000 to 1500 MW. If, as it has indicated, it shuts down Oconee unit 1 for. refueling, and  ;

maintenance, at the start of the summer peak period, there will ,

still remain a reserve of 500 MW. With SERC interconnections to

, Georgia Power and Light, TVA, CP&L, and-SCE&G, all of which have substantial reserves, it is unlikely that'DPC's customera will - ;

, be exposed to any inconvenience.

CONCLUSION Because the ASLB did not determine the consequences of the rupture of the thin shell McGuire containment by hydrogen deflag-ration or detonation it lacks the basis for a finding that operation

- would not expose the public health and safety to undue risk.

The ASLB by confining its consideration to a TMI-2 type LOCA as the cause of hydrogen generation has erred. There is a spectrum  :

4 of accidents as severe'or more severe for which Duke Power Ccmpany l

made no provision. Nor did the Supplemental Initial Decision  !

take into account Staff's witness' opinion that operation of the l

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mitigation system could be dangerous.

The authorization of an operating license relies on erroneous findings. In the public interest these defects should be remed5.ed.

The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal.3 card is requested to stay the Initial and Supplemental Initial Decisions until adequate I

consideration is given these matters. ,

i Respectfully submitted, L AA/s I J (j-hh)

Jdsse L.'Riley [

85h Henley Place Charlotte, NC 26207 (704) 375-4342 Of Counsel Shelley Blum 1402 Vickers Avenue Durham, NC 27707 (919) 11.93-2238

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 'N 4... . Q.' '

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL \60ARD - ,k.

In the Matter of NA .

) 'g i DUKE POWER COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-369-OL t '-

50-370-OL (William B. McGuire Nuclear )

Station, Units 1 and 2) )

AFFIRMATION OF SERVICE I hereby affirm that copies of "CESG's Request for Stay of Initial Decision", dated June 5, 1981, have been served on the Appeal Board and other NRC persons listed this % , f day of June, 1981, by deposit in U.S. Express Mail and aerved to other parties listed by deposit in the U.S. Mail:

Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Edward G. Ke:chen, Esq.

Appeal Board Panel-4 copies Counsel for NRv Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Washington, D.C. 20535 office of the' Executive Legal Director Samuel Chilk, Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulator 7 Conmission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 William L. Porter, Esq. -

Robert M. Lazo, Esq.

Chairman, Atomic. Safety and Associate General Counsel Duk'e Power Company Licensing Board Post Office Box 2178 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Charlotte, North Carolina 23242 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. John barry 1200 Blythe blv:. i Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Charlotte, NC 20207 '

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Diane B. Cohn, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulator / ~

William 5. Schultz, Esq.

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. .. C o m m i s s-i o n Public Citizen Litigation Grcup l Washing:en, O.C. 20535 Ouite 700 l l 2000 ? Street, X . VI .

Jr. nichard F. Cole WFshing;cn, D.C. ~20C36 Atomic Safety and Licensing boarc daellc. Slum, acq.

U.S. I.uclear Regulatory 1EC2 Vickers ave.

Commission Durham .

Washin6 ton, D.C. 20555 N.C. 27707 i

1

y. .-:ichaci ::cCai r/, 111, Esq. U.S. Nuclea" Regulatory Co=ission

.,cbevo.se and Liocrmen ATTN

Chief, Docketin & Service Sr.

1200 Coventeenth Stecct, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D~.C.' 20036 l.

L P00R ORIGINAL .

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