ML19343A177
| ML19343A177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1980 |
| From: | Brand W BRAND & HALL |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8009160337 | |
| Download: ML19343A177 (20) | |
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, )
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SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY. )
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Defendants. )
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OPPOSITION OF NCEMC. ET AL., TO SCE&G'S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER INTRODUCTION In the period 1976-77 Mr. Wallace E. Brand was retained by the plaintiffs herein and by the Central Electric Power Coopera-tive, Inc. to make a f actual and legal investigation to determine whether there were good grounds for their seeking relief under the antitrust laws. (Aff. t 3) In August, 1977 the plaintiffs herein filed suit. (Aff. % 4) Central was still negotiating with a power supplier in its area. When it apeared that further negotiations would be fruitless, Central learned that it could assert its rights under the Atomic Energy Act and filed a petition with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (Aff. 5 5)
In June, 1979 and agal1 in May, 1980, SCE&G prcduced to plaintiffs thousands of documents pursuant to Rule 34, F.R.Civ.P.
(Aff. 5 12) These were documents which were sought by the bS o'S s
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! plaintiffs under Rule 34 because they were relevant to the Instant proceeding. No documents were requested simply because they would be useful in some other proceeding. (Aff. $ 6)
There was no stipulation or understanding among counsel that these documents be kept confidential. Indeed, SCE&G had never even made a request that they be kept confidential. (Aff! 1 12)
Whatever SCE&G meant when it made its cryptic statement to the Court on October 18, 1979 (SCE&G Memo, pp. 1-2) ,1' / it never even bothered to request an informal agreement on confidentiality.
4 On Aug u s t 6,1980, bef ore Central had any knowledge of SCE&C's filing of a motion for a protective order, Central sent copies of several hundred of these docu=ents to the Department of ,
Justice. These were documents that Central had intended to use I in a pleading to be submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Ccamis-sion but which it has not used because of the pendency of this motion. (Aff. 5 14) Justice's attorneys have returned the doccments to counsel for Central pending the dispositicn of this motion. (Aff. 1 14)
SUMMARY
OF ARCUMENT The proposed order would constitute an unlawf ul prior res-traint on Central's First Amendment right to use said informa-
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tion in litigation and would be presur.pt'ively invalid. In offering solely the unsupported contentions and conclusions of counsel, SCE&G has not met the heavy burden of showing good vs 1/ The "pretection" referred to implied a suit ne; yet filed Eut by Cantral. to be filed in the federal or state courts in South Carolina No reference was made to Central's action before the Nuclear ?.agulatory Comaission, which as of October 18, 1979, had been underway some eleven scaths.
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cause for the order. There is no merit to the contention that the fruits of discovery in a case must be used in that case only.
SCE&G has not offered any facts which would fit this case into the category of the abuse of this Court's process. Public p licy favors free use of the informaticn in antitrust enforce-ment. SCE6G's 15-month delay in moving for a protective order may work the harsh and unfair result of depriving Central of effective counsel. This is coji a case in which discovery was cade pursuant to an understanding or stipulatiua on confiden-tiality and hence would work an unfair result.
SCE&G has not drawn as narrow and precise a protective order as would be required even if the other standards for such an order were satisfied. Consequently, enforcement of the order would be difficult both for counsel to carry out conscientiously and for the Court to enforce equitably. The information for which protection is sought here is not within the scope of matters specifically entitled to prctection under Rule 25(c)(7) and its release would not result in unf airly aiding SCE&G's competition.
ARGUMENT I. The Proposed Order Would Be a Prior Restraint Cn Expression In Violation of the First Ar.e nd me n t To the Constitution.
The question of whether a protective order should issue to prevent discovery materials from being used for purposes other
,than the purpose of the litigation in which they were obtained is frequently addressed in pretrial motion practice by the District Courts where the time for analysis is relatively brief.
In a few instances, the question has been addressed by the Courts of Appeal with opportunity for a more extended analysis.
The mest recent of these cases is a decision of the United
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' Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (1979). This was a ruling on a petition
. for mandamus to vacate an order of the District Court which had entered a protective order prohibiting plaintiff from' disclosing documents or information except in the proceeding in the Dis-trict Court. The proceeding was identical to this one in two respects. First, there was no stipulation amorig, counsel that documents or information obtained in the course of the proceed-ing would be held as confidential, nor any express or {mplied agreement regarding their use. 598 F.2d at 180. Secondly, Defendant's motion was not accompanied by any affidavits, nor was any other evidence adduced in its support. 598 F.2d at 182.
The plaintiffs in Halkin argued that while the district court's order was not unconstitutional per set as a prior restraint on expression, nonetheless it bore a heavy presumption against its validity. The court held that the right to disse =inate such information and documents was protected by the First Amendment and noted that " Litigation itself is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment." 598 F.2d at 187.
Under Halkin, the movant for a protective order must meet three criteria. The harm posed by dissemination must be substan-tial and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there must be no other means of protecting the public interest which intrudes less directly on expression.
SCE&G's showing meets none of these criteria. We show below, citing a number of cases st arting with Williams v.
,ohnson & Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), that collabora-tive arrangements for discovery in related cases has not been held to be the type of disccvery justifying protection, and that aven if such collabcration >:ere proved here rather than simply
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w surmised, there would still not be good cause for a protective
, order. The requested restraining order in the instant case is not narrowly drawn and precise.2/ It requests protection for all discovery obtained frcm SCE&G in this proceeding., Lastly, it would be impossible for SCE&G to show alternative means for protecting the public interest which are less intrusive .than the method chosen, since as we show below, public policy favors enforcement of the antitrust laws and free use of discovery materials from civil litigation for that purpose.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have taken generaliy the same approach as the D.C. Circuit in Halkin. In CBS v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975), the Sixth Circuit held that First Amend =ent rights even of a non-party c.ould and must be protected and "[t]o justify the i= position of a prior restraint, the activity restrained must pose a clear and present danger, or a serious or imminent threat to a protected competing interest." The Court also held that the restraint must be narrowly drawn and cannot be upheld if reasonable alternatives are available having a lesser impact on First Amendment freedcas.
A similar result was reached in Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir., 1970).
In one similar case, a protective order against two attorneys for the plaintif f was upheld by the 10th Circuit, but only after evidence that one of them was inciting to riot with a speech end ing in " burn, burn, burn" and that the other openly boasted that he told the witnesses what to say. See United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 900 (1969).
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Nor has SCE6G shown a " concrete threat to an impo r t an t ccuntervailing interest" as required by Halkins.
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One early case in the Second Circuit, International Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 409 (2d Cir., 19637. can be read as holding that when taking part in discovery, the parties and counsel waive their First Amendment rights. In Rodgers v.
United States Steel Corp., 536 F.21 10r)0 (3d Cir. 1976), when asked to rule on that claim, the Court assumed the proposition to be correct because it was not necessary to decide the question before it, which involved documents obtained without resort to discovery and hence no waiver could have taken place. !!c ever ,
the Halkin court read the Koons opinion only as holding that a properly drawn order under Rule 26(c) can be compatible with the First Amendment. 598 F.2d at 189. The Halkin court went on to say that if Koons does stand for the proposition that parties in a civil action waive their First Amendment rights, it is wrong.
II. The Burden Is On the Movant To Show " Good Cause" By Appro-priate Testimony and That Burden May Not Be Met By the Unsuocorted Alleaations and Conclusions of Counsel.
The allegation of harm here is simply the unsupported allegation that SCE&C will incur harm (with the implicaticn that it is of the kind which the law protects it against) unless the broadly drawn protective order is grcnted, and the instant documents are proscribed frca use in a Nuclear Regulatory Commission proceeding under Section 105(c) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 2135(c).
In Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Sales Co. Inc., 48 F.R.D.
308, 312 (E.D.Pa. 1969), it was held that in any attempt to keep pre-trial proceedings secret:
It becomes incumbent ucon the defendants to show " good cause" why this information should not be made public [ citations omitted). Moreover as a general proposition, i
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. trial and pre-trial proceedings of the Federal judicial system are ordinarily conducted in public. Fed .R.Civ.P. 43 (a)
Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 1964) [ cert, denied, 379 U.S.
900]pthCir. ,
In Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337 (E.D.Pa. 1972), the court, citing Apco Oil Coro, v. Certified Transoortation Company, 46 R.R.D. 428 (W.D.Mo. 1969), characterized this burden as follows:
It is not necessary to add that the burden of proof will rest upon (party seeking the .
Protective Order) and that determination of whether good cause does or does not exist ,
N must be based upon appropriate testi=ony and other factual data, not the unsupported contentions and conclusions of counsel.
In at least one case, the court held that a motion under Rule 26 is a " disfavored motion," Kiblen v. Retail Credit Company,
- 76. F.R.D. 402, 404 (E.D. Wash. 1977), and in requiring the covant l to show some " plainly adequate reason" for the order , " insisted on a particular and specific de=onstration of fact, as distin-guished from concluaory statements in order to show good cause,"
citing Essex Wire, supra.
III. Public Policy on Antitrust Enforcement Justifies Free Use of the Information In an Action Under 42 U.S.C. 2135(c).
In pursuing rights under the antitrust laws, plaintiffs in this action, are acting as " private attorneys general." Bruces Juices Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-752 (1974);
Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Creat Altantic & Pacific Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 1973). Central, in pursuing its rights under the Atomic Energy Act, is performing a similar U The Seventh Circuit has also held that "As a general pro-position, pretrial discovery cust take place in public unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public access to the proceeding. Ar.erican Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (1978).
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1 w n .n l function. One commentator has suggested that public policy requires a free dissemination of information gathered in private antitrust actions. Dore, Confidentiality Orders -- The Procer Role of Courts in Providing Confidential Treatment for Informa-tion Disclosed Throuch the Pre-Trial Discovery Process, 14 New England Law Review I at 15, 16: .
Private treble damage antitrust actions, for example, were established by Congress to multiply the means of enforcing the antitrust laws. The optimal enforcement potential of -
such private actions cannot be achieved if litigants are permitted to prevent or post pone 4 disclosure of important enforcement information obtained through the pre-trial discovery process. A characteristic of " private attorney general" litigations, is that non-parties have a specia interest in the conduct of pre-trial discovery and, as a result, the courts should not leave the manage =ent of this area exclusively in the hands of the particular litigants in the individual case.
In such actions, the rights of non-parties may not be adequately protected by the party prosecuting the individual action. The prosecuting party may realize that pre-trial discovery could disclose information which would be useful or vital in the prosecution of similar actions by similarly situated ind i f id uals . The individual litigant, however, may be willing to permit this information to remain confidential during the course of pre-trial discovery because such confidentiality, while not having any adverse impact upon this individual litigant, may =ake the prospect of an impending public trial all the more eminous to a defendant, and thus nake settlement "on the courthouse steps" more likely.
The court should carefully evaluate stipulated confidentiality orders in such cases and should refuse to permit the order if it believes the stipulation is being used to frustrate the ef fective enforcement of the law. The cour t should engage in a careful and presise analysis of the nature of the litigation and the information subject to the stipulation before issuing any confiden-tiality order. The court should carefully balance the interests not merely of the parties before it, but also the public interest which would be served by disclosure of the purportedly confidential material.
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1 m c w y e ? .' c,. c . .. M = E In A.verican Tel. & Tel., sutra, the Court was impressed by t'he wastefulness of requiring duralicative discovery by the federal government. 549 F.2d at 597.
The Cengress has recognized the policy against restricting antitrust pretrial discovery information in enacting the Publicity in Taking Evidence Act, 37 Stat. 731 (1913) 15' U.S.C. 30, which prohibits outright any protection of deposition testimony in antitrust suits brought by the U.S. government.,
This enactment reversed the result in United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 198 F. 870, 871 (1912). While this statute does not expressly apply to discovery in private civil actions, the policy behind its enactment applies equally to broader areas of discovery. See Olymole Refining Co. v. Carter, 232 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir. 1964).
Some courts have not permitted this public policy to pre-vail when there was at the time of the disclosure a stipulation in effect among the parties that the information disclosed would be kept confidential.5/ As previously noted, these cases are inapplicable here where disclosure was made without any stipulation, understanding or agreement long before any request for protection was made.
IV. SCE&G's Abuse of Process Allegation is Unsupported; NCEMU's Sharing of Discovery Materials With Central is Lawful and Even Con endable.
The main thrust of SCE&G's motion is the entirely unsup-ported allegation that plaintiffs' counsel is using this antitrust b/ See, e.g., GAF Corp. v Eastman ro d s k, 415 F. Supp 129, 130 (IT76)T" contra Olymote Refinine Co. v. Carter, supra:
American Tel. & Tel v. Grady, 59 F.;a 594 (itn Cir. 1979),
cert, deniec 99 S.Ct. 1533.
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action solely for the purpose of obtaining information for use
~ in the NRC p,roceeding.
Several of the precedents cited by movant support only the proposition that the foregoing alleged identical claim was unsuccessfully conduct is unlawful. An asserted in the case of Essex Wire Coro. v. Eastern Electric Sales Coro., 48 F.R.D. 308, 312 (E.D.Pa.1969) , in which the court held:
Defendants which standhave submitted for the proposition casesthat to the Court discovery the proceedings may not be had solely for in purpose of obtaining information for use another proceeding. While the Court agrees "
with this proposition, the Court does not 7
find it helpful to the defendants in the l instant case. Since the Court finds this and does not have any reason I
matter to doubtrelevant the good faith of the plaintiff, t
i the Court holds that the plaintiff may make !
any lawful use of the information which comes to light during this
[ Emphasis supplied in text) proceeding.
l Defendant's sole contention here is the implication !
i that Central and NCEMC are collaborating in their discovery counsel.
in some sinister way since they employ the same 15 8, 9 and 10, there As shown in the annexed af fidavit, is no such sinister collaboration, no such hidden " forces at conceal-behind this lawsuit" as SCE&G warns, or attempt ment as it suggests,
- 16. Moreover, even if such col-laboration existed, several courts have refused to enter protective orders which prevent disclosure to others liti-the Federal Rules gating similar issues on the grounds that do not prohibit collaboration in discovery where there was no showing the moving party was exploiting one case solely Williams v. John-to assist in the litigation of another.
sor. & Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Johnson Foils Inc . v . Huvck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1973)
Am. Tel., suora, 594 F.2d at 597. In Johnson Foils, the court specifically declined a protective order which would l
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limit the use of e.he information in foreign litigation of a, closely related nature. In Williams, it was held that "there fruits of is no merit to the all-encompassing contention that case onl'y." 50 discovery in one case are to be used in that Anderson, 442 F.2d 1113, 1124 F.R.D. at 32. See also F.T.C. v.
Ford Motor Co., S5 F.R.D. 15'2, 154 (D.D.C. 1977); Patterson v.
Indeed, one court has even commended the shared (D.D.C. 1980).
federal use of discovery in furtherance of the purposes of the
'ohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Products, 81 F.R.D.
rules. In Re s 482, 484-485 (E.7.Mich. 1979). .
Of the Proposed Broadly V. Compliance With and Enforcementand Unduly Burdensome.
Drawn Order Would Be Dif ficult Lastly, if any protective order should be granted, unless drawn f ar more narrowly and precisely than the proposed order, it would be almost impossible for tha best-intentioned counsel to comply with it and nearly as impossible to enforce it equitably. Impossibility of enforcement has been found by at least one court to be a powerful argument against a protective order, Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barrens, 428 F. Sucp. 200, 205 In addition, it would create great burdens on (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
It would apply to both the court and on counsel for Central.
all the deposition testimony henceforth, requiring sealing of it from public each deposition and special care to insulate disclosure.
on cach fact in Each time counsel for Central wishes to act the SRC proceeding, counsel would be required to ponder whether 5 of discovery in has that piece of informaticn solely as a result the Greensbore proceeding. This task may be so difficult to carr out con:.cientiously that Central's counsel may have to disqualify himself from Jurther proceedings before the NRC.
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- .s Even if this result were tolerable as a general matter, it would be intolerable in this case. SCE&G should have pressed its case for protection at the outset, since it knew in December, 1978 that NCEMC's counsel was also counsel for Central. To require Central to employ new counsel now, in a proceeding more than twenty months old, would inequitably deprive Central of its right to ef fective counsel and would work against the efficient administration of justice. Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See also Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 8!4, 818 (1962). 4 CONCLUSION With very little legal foundation and no factual support whatsoever, SCE&G has blithely impugned the motives and practices of plaintiff's counsel, and has burdened the Court by requesting the Court to order that which had never before been requested of plaintiffs either formally or informally.
The only harm to SCE&G which can be gleaned from a careful rea :ng of the several pages of innuendo in its memorandum, is that it claims it may be injured if the Nuclear Regulatory ;
Cc= mission has SCE&G's internal documents before it to assist the Commission in making its statutory findings under Section 105(c) of the Atomic Energy Act.
The requested order should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
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'iallace i. 67'a nd Sean I. Eeeny BRAND & HALL 1523 L Street, N.W. ;
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Washington, D.C. 20005 !
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Thomas J. Bolch P.O. Box 2211 4 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 John L. Toumaras 403 Blandwood Avenue P.O. Box 1567 Greensboro, North Carolina 27402 4
l DATED: September 4, 1980
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLT' .
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, )
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY, ) ) 4 Defendants. )
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AFFIDAVIT OF WALLACE E. BRAND WALLACE E.
BRAND, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
- 1. I as the principal attorney for the North Carolina in the captioned Electric Mober ship Corpor ation ("NCEMC"),
proceeding and for sixteen of its me:ber distribution cooperatives.
- 2. I am also principal attorney for the Central Electric Power Coo perative , Inc. (" Centr al") in a related the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under proceeding before as amended in 1970, Section 105(c) of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2135(c), in Re South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., el al, Su :::er Nuclear Station, Docket No. 50-395A.
- 3. In and about 1976 and 1977 NCEMC and Central investigation to determine whether asked =e to undertake an laws.
they had a good cause of action under the antitrust 4.
As a result of that investigation, NCEMC and filed this sixteen of its member distribution cooperatives suit in August, 1977.
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- 5. Central initially attempted further negotiation with the electric power systems in its atea but finally deci,ded to assert ri dhts it learned it had under Section 105(c) of the Atomic Energy Act by filing a petition with the Nucle,ar Regula-tory Commission in December, 1978. A courtesy copy of that filing was sent to SCE&G's antitrust counsel in this cas.e (Mr . Medvec ky) .
- 6. In seeking documentary and other discovery in this proceeding it was and is sclely my purpose to obtain documents and other information which is relevant to this proceeding or will lead to relevant evidence. It has never been my purpose or intent to use this proceeding as a device to obtain discovery solely for use in another proceeding.
- 7. However, it is my intoit to use documents lawfully obtained in this proceeding for any other lawful purpose includ-ing an exercise of the First Amendment rights of my client, Central, in a licensing proceeding under Section 105(c) of the Atomic Energy Act to petition the government for a redress of grievances. I anticipate that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would use the documents to assist it in making the statutory finding of whether SCE6G's " activities under the license would create or =aintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws." If it makes an affirmative finding, it can i= pose license conditions to correct the situation.
- 8. NCEMC is making these docu=ents available to Central without charge. Central has not heretofore participated in any financing of this litigatica except for the investigation referred to in 1 4.
- 9. NCEMC has not heretofore participated in the financing of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission litigation by 2_
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N, Central which is merely asserting its own rights before that Ccemission.
- 10. Many of the documents on which our initial investigation was based were received in discovery and =ade public in cases before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. *!e perceive no difference in NCEMC's making these documents, available to Central as a courtesy to its fellow cooperative that is a victim of the same conspiracy and combination.
- 11. It is my opinion, for the reasons explained in the annexed =emorandum of law, that NCEMC's role hece, and Central's role in bringing its action under Section 105(c) are those of " private attorneys general," and that it would be poor public policy and would unduly burden the administration of justice to hide these documents behind a protective order.
- 12. Some of the documents were made available by SCE&G in June, 1979, others in May, 1980. To the best of my recollec-tion, although SCE&G knew of the NRC proceeding in Dece=ber, 1978 -- and its antitrust counsel was fully apprised of the proceeding on that date -- SCE&G never made any attempt to pro-tect the docu=ents, the use of which it now seeks to restrict, prior to filing a motion for a protective order on August 13, 1980. There has been no stipulation among counsel giving these documents confidential status, nor any express or implied agreement regarding their use. And in the fifteen months since we started to receive these documents there has not even been a
, request that they be kept confidential.
- 13. To the best of my knowledge and belief, none of these documents relates to patents, trade secrets, or other proprietary business information that is of such a nature that 3
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its release might harm SCE&G as a result of its competitors obtaining useful business information.
- 14. On August Sch, prior to the time SCE&G filed its motion, and prior to the time that I even knew of its intent to do so, I sent a stack of documents approximately three inches thick to the United States -
Department of Justice for its examination and use in making comments to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ,
These were documents I intended to file with Central's comments requested by the Commission. I did not do so, however,.as a result of the pendency of this motion.
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I provided these to Justice's attorneys as a courtesy so they would be available for the longest possible time before their comments were filed. These documents were returned to me by Justice's attorneys as a result of the filing of this motion, and Justice is awaiting the Court's disposition of the motion.
- 15. If the Court were to enter a broadly drawn protective order in the form requested, it would be difficult for me to continue to function as Central's counsel, since each time I spoke or acted on behalf of Central, I would have to determine whether a piece of information was received by me solely as a result of discovery on behalf of NCEMC et al. in this proceeding.
- 16. SCE&G's attempts in its memorandum to create the impression that Central's participation in financing was concealed from it. This is simply not the case.
Counsel for Central advised Counsel for SCE&G that Central had helned to finance the preliminary investigation and bed not thereafter contributed to the financing.
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v - L<m Wallace E. Brand Subscribed and sworn to before me day thisof[ d September, 1980. .
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1, Wallace E. Brand, hereby certify that on this 4th day of September, 1980, I served a copy of the foregoing Opposition of NCEMC, et al., to SCE&G's Motion for a.
Protective Order on each of the attorneys listed below by hand delivering copies to the offices of Messrs. Medvecky and McCrane and Mrs. Allen, and by serving the remaining persons by first class mail, postage prepaid.
hm N b Wallace E. Brand
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l BRAND & RALL I 1523 L Street, N.W. l Washington, D.C. 20005 l SERVICE LIST:
Thomas J. Bolch, Esquire P.O. Box 2211 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 John L. Toumaras, Esquire P.O. Box 1567 Greensboro, North Carelina 27402 Robert S. Medvecky, Esquire REID & PRIEST 1111 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 John D. McGrane, Esquire REID & PRIEST 1111 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
- James T. Williams, Jr., Esquire Reid L. Phillips 2R001:S , PIERCE, MCLENDON, \"
HUMPHREY AND LEONARD 3 D P.O. Drawer U Creensboro, North Carolina 27402
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- .. O charles E. Robson, Jr. i '. !,***
i I 1930 > rI-Ms. Carolya Parlato pi; h. '*'f ',' T."
CARCLINA POUER & LIGHT COMPANY P.O. Box 1551 \ (^\g :
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, 4 Raleigh, North Carolina 27002 r,,, , , \,4, ,
Mr. Robert C. Howison, Jr.
JOYNER & HONISON Suite 906, P.O. Box 109 Uachovia Bank Building Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
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- .L James H. Burnley, IV, Esquire TURNER, ENOCHS, FOSTER & BURNLEY Suite 700, First Union National Bank Building P.O. Drawer D Greensboro, North Carolina 27402 Toni K. Allen, Esquire WALD, HARKRADER AND ROSS 1300 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 -
Edward C. Roberts, Esquire George H. Fisher South Carolina Electric &
Cas Company
- 320 Main Street Columbia, South Carolina 29211 4 1
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