ML18095A675

From kanterella
Revision as of 06:53, 3 February 2020 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Special Rept 90-7:on 901210,switchgear Rooms & Electrical Penetration Area CO2 Fire Protection Sys Inoperable for More than 14 Days to Support Design Change Work on 901126. Adequate Precautions Taken to Ensure Design Capability
ML18095A675
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 12/26/1990
From: Labruna S
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
90-7, NUDOCS 9101100396
Download: ML18095A675 (3)


Text

v I I

( "'~i'*

_\,.. PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas _Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station December 26, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SPECIAL REPORT 90-7 This Special Report addresses inoperability of C02 Fire Protection Systems for greater than fourteen (14) days. This report has been prepared in accordance with the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action statement 3.7.10.3.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.

Sincerely yours,

/})7Jf3/~d---

S. LaBruna General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution 1/i I l 1c, i._.I iVl 9101100396 901226

~ )' t**;,,:,..J;..11 1::. /69 9 : i (10M) 12-89 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR

uNIT 1 _SPECIAL-REPORT 90~7

\~I - -- PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 Public Service Electric & _Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

64' and 84' Elevation Switchgear Rooms and 78' Elevation Electrical Penetration Area C02 Fire Protection Systems Inoperable For Greater Than Fourteen Days Event Date(s): 12/10/90 Report Date: 12/26/90 The original event is identified by In-cident Report No.90-901.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1: Rx Power 100% Unit Load 1155 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

This special report describes the inoperability of the actuation capability of the 64' and 84' Elevation Switchgear Rooms and the 78' Ele6trical Penetration Area C02 Fire Protection Systems fo~ greater than fourteen (14) days. This report is submitted for informational purposes in accordance with Technical Specif:lcation 3.7.10.3 Action Statement "a" which states:

"With one or more of -the above required* C02. systems inoperable, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipJ'!lent for those areas _in which redundant systems or components* could be damaged; f6r other areas, establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special-Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification

~-9~2 within th~ next 30 days outlinin~ ihe actiori tak~n. the cause of the inoperability and the plans arid schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status".

On November 26, 1990, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.3c.a was entered when the C02 Fire Protection System was made inoperable in support of design change work (i.e., DCP lSC-2160 and lSC-2161). This design change is modifying the C02 Sys-t;:em,for the 84' Elevation Switchgear Room and the 78' Elevation Electrical Penetration Area, by incorporation of an automatic actuation feature for these areas. This system modification is in response to conditions_ contained in the NRC approval of exemptions from the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R. This is identified in NRC letter dated July 26, 1989.

Consistent with the design change *implementation plans, the 64' and the 84' Elevation Switch~ear Roofu an~ the 78' Elevation Electrical Penetration Area C02 Fire Protection Systems remain inoperable as of the issue of this report. The required fire watch remains in affect as per th~ Technical Specification Action Statement.

UNIT 1 SPECIAL RE~T 90-7

_APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the C02 systems' inoperability, for greater than fourteen (14) days, is to support required design change work.

Prior to initiation of the design change work, Operations Department, Engineering & Plant Betterment, Project Installation, and Nuclear Fire & Safety Department personnel met to clearly establish the plan of action. Upon completion of plan preparation, the NRC Resident Inspector was provided its details. Also, Operating Shift and Fire Brigade personnel were provided details of the plan schedule and the availability of detection and backup fire suppression equipment.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The 64' and 84' Elevation Switchgear Rooms and the 78' Elevation Electrical Penetration Area C02 Fire Protection Systems are designed to mitigate the consequences of a fire in their respective areas. They are currently manually initiated systems. Upon making the systems inoperable, a continuous fire watch was implemented per Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.3c.a. The assigned fire watch provides early fire warning such that compensatory actions can be implemented; therefore, this situation does not affect the health or safety of the public. This event is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.3c.a pursuant to T~chnical Specification 6.9.2.

In support of the design change work, the Diesel Generator Areas and the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Area C02 Fire Protection Systems were also made inoperable on November 26, 1990~ A continuous fire watch was put in place for these areas at that time. These areas' C02 Fire Protection Systems were returned to operable on December 6, 1990 (i.e., within fourteen days).

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

No corrective action is required as the system inoperability is necessary to support design change work. Adequate precautions have been taken to ensure. that design basis capability is not compromised relative to fire protection capability during the interval of the change.

A schedule is in place for the C02 System design change work. Per the schedule the system will be returned to operable status upon completion of functional testing on or about December 30, 1990. The fire watch will remain in affect until completion of the design change work.

  1. ~rx-c-,---'

General Manager -

Salem Operations HJF;pc SORC Mtg.90-162