IR 05000317/2006003
Download: ML062060024
Text
July 21, 2006
Mr. James A. Spina, Vice PresidentCalvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.
Constellation Generation Group, LLC 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657-4702
SUBJECT: CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATEDINSPECTION REPORT 05000317/2006003 AND 05000318/2006003
Dear Mr. Spina:
On June 30, 2006, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection atyour Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 12, 2006, with you and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.This report documents two NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green) thatwere determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because these issues were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with SectionVI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of 2NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website athttp://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA Samuel L. Hansell For/ Brian McDermott, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.50-317, 50-318License Nos. DPR-53, DPR-69
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000317/2006003 and 05000318/2006003
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information 3cc w/encl:M. J. Wallace, President, Constellation Generation J. M. Heffley, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer President, Calvert County Board of Commissioners C. W. Fleming, Senior Counsel, Constellation Generation Group, LLC Director, Nuclear Regulatory Matters R. McLean, Manager, Nuclear Programs K. Burger, Esquire, Maryland People's Counsel State of Maryland (2)
4Distribution w/encl:S. Collins, RA M. Dapas, DRA B. Sosa, RI OEDO R. Laufer, NRR P. Milano, PM, NRR R. Guzman, PM, NRR (Backup)
B. McDermott, DRP A. Burritt, DRP J. Giessner, DRP, Senior Resident Inspector (Acting)
M. Davis, Resident Inspector C. Newgent - Resident OA ROP Reports Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)SUNSI Review Complete: SLH (Reviewer's Initials)DOCUMENT NAME: C:\MyFiles\Copies\CC IR 2006-003.wpdAfter declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copyOFFICERI/DRPRI/DRPRI/DRPNAMEABurrittMDavis/SLH FORBMcDermott/SLHFORDATE07/21 /0607/21/0607/ 21 /06OFFICIAL RECORD COPY EnclosureU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION I Docket Nos.50-317, 50-318License Nos.DPR-53, DPR-69 Report Nos.05000317/2006003 and 05000318/2006003 Licensee:Constellation Generation Group, LLC Facility:Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:Lusby, MD Dates:April 1, 2006 through June 30, 2006 Inspectors:Mark A. Giles, Senior Resident InspectorMarlone Davis, Resident Inspector John R. McFadden, Health Physicist Nancy T. McNamara, EP Inspector Anne DeFrancisco, Reactor Inspector Jennifer Bobiak, Reactor InspectorApproved by:Brian McDermott, ChiefProjects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects iiEnclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
.....................................................iii
REPORT DETAILS
...........................................................1
REACTOR SAFETY
.........................................................11R04Equipment Alignment .............................................1
1R05 Fire Protection ..................................................2
1R06 Flood Protection .................................................21R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program ...........................31R12Maintenance Effectiveness ........................................31R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .............41R14Operator Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events .....51R15Operability Evaluations ...........................................61R19Post-Maintenance Testing .........................................61R22Surveillance Testing ..............................................7
1EP4Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan (E-Plan) Changes ..........91EP6Drill Evaluation
RADIATION SAFETY
........................................................102OS1Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas .....................10 2OS2As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls .......112OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
....................................................1340A1Performance Indicator Verification ..................................13 4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems.............................144OA3Event Followup.................................................19 4OA5Other Activities.................................................19 4OA6Meetings, Including Exit..........................................21ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
.................................................A-1
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED............................A-2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
...........................................A-2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
......................................................A-9
iiiEnclosureSUMMARY
- OF [[]]
FINDINGSIR 05000317/2006-003, 05000318/2006-003; 04/01/06 - 06/30/06; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear PowerPlant, Units 1 and 2; Surveillance Testing, Public Radiation Safety.The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections performed by reactor and emergency preparedness inspectors and a health
physicist. The inspection identified two Green findings which were determined to be non-cited
violations (NCVs). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,
Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination
Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a
severity level after
NRC's program for overseeing the safe
operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
- NUR [[]]
EG-1649, "Reactor
Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July
- 2000.A.N [[]]
RC-Identified and Self-Revealing FindingsCornerstone:Mitigating System
- Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codesand Standards, because Constellation did not establish new reference values or
reconfirm the previous reference values following maintenance that affected
hydraulic or mechanical parameters on the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) andemergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps as required by the AmericanSociety of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM)
Code for inservice testing. Constellation entered this issue into their corrective
action program as IRE-014-764. The planned corrective action include a review
of maintenance and IST data to determine whether new reference values are
needed or reconfirm existing reference values for the
ECCS pumps. This finding is more than minor because the same issue affected a number ofsafety-related pumps tested, the issue was repetitive and if left uncorrected the
finding could become a more significant safety concern. The finding has a very
low safety significance because the condition did not result in an actual failure of
the
ECCS pumps or result in systems being declared inoperable for
greater than their allowed Technical Specification outage time. A contributing
cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem
identification and resolution (PI&R) because Constellation did not periodically
trend and assess information to identify programmatic and common cause
problems. (Section 1R22) Cornerstone:Public Radiation Safety
- Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501 forfailure to make surveys of the radioactivity in a "sink hole" to assure compliance
with 10 CFR 20.1301(a)(1) regarding the total effective dose equivalent limit for
individual members of the public from licensed operations, specifically regarding
assessing dose for batch releases of liquid radioactive waste and assessing
ivEnclosureannual dose. Constellation entered this issue into their corrective action programas IRE-010-005. Constellation created a detailed action plan for this issue to find
the leaking component, fix the leaking component, determine the extent of
contamination, map the plume, and evaluate the need for remediation.This violation is more than minor because it is associated with the cornerstoneattribute of maintaining a program and process to estimate offsite dose due to
abnormal releases and to record and report on such releases and because it
affected the Radiation Safety/Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone's objective to
ensure the adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to
radioactive materials released into the public domain. The violation is of very low
significance because, while it did impair Constellation's ability to assess the
timing of dose consequence and the accuracy of the batch and annual effluent
release dose records and reports due to the large difference in transit times for
the permitted and non-permitted discharge pathways to the bay, Constellation did
account for all released radioactivity and did assess the cumulative doses from
their effluent releases. Additionally, the unanalyzed non-permitted pathway (i.e.,
via groundwater to the bay) did not impact private property, and the assessed
doses did not exceed the dose values in Appendix I to 10 CFR 50. (Section
4OA2.4) B.Licensee-Identified ViolationsNone
EnclosureREPORT
- DETAIL [[]]
SSummary of Plant StatusUnit 1 began the inspection period in a refueling outage. On April 14, 2006, the unit returned tofull power operation (100 percent) and remained unchanged throughout the inspection period. Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power and remained unchanged untilMay 20 when power was reduced to 85 percent for main turbine control valve testing. Following
the completion of the test the unit was restored to 100 percent power and remained there the
rest of the inspection period.1.REACTOR
- SAFE [[]]
TY Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity1R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04Q - 5 samples)Partial Walkdown a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors verified that selected equipment trains of safety-related and risksignificant systems were properly aligned. The inspectors reviewed plant documents to
determine the correct system and power alignments, as well as the required positions of
critical valves and breakers. The inspectors verified that Constellation had properly
identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating eventsor potentially impact the availability of associated mitigating systems. The applicable
documents used for this inspection are located in the Attachment. The inspectors
performed a partial walkdown for the following activities.*13.8kV during internal inspection and testing of the 2H2103 voltage regulator*1B emergency diesel generator (EDG) walkdown during maintenance on the
- 1AEDG *4.16kV service transformers during the transfer of the 4kV unit busses from theirnormal to alternate supply*Unit 1 service water (
SRW) system equipment alignment walkdown duringmaintenance on the13 SRW pump breaker*21 vital 125 Vdc bus being attached and removed from the 125 Vdc reservebattery b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
2Enclosure1R05Fire Protection (71111.05Q - 10 samples)Fire Protection - Tours a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors conducted a tour of accessible portions of the ten areas listed below toassess Constellation's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire
detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and related compensatory
measures when required. The inspectors assessed the material condition of fire
protection suppression and detection equipment to determine whether any conditions or
deficiencies existed which could impair the availability of that equipment. The inspectors
also reviewed administrative procedure SA-1-100, Fire Fighting, and the Fire Fighting
Strategies Manual were referenced for this inspection activity. The ten areas are as
follows:*Unit 1 main steam isolation valve room*Unit 2 main steam isolation valve room
- Unit 1 cable spreading room
- Unit 2 cable spreading room
- Unit 1 4 kV service transformers
- Unit 2 4 kV service transformers
- Unit 1 turbine building basement
- Unit 2 turbine building basement
- Unit 1 intake structure (inside)
- Unit 2 intake structure (inside) b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R06Flood Protection (71111.06 - 2 internal flooding samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed flood protection measures associated with internal flood events. These events were described in the Calvert Cliffs' Engineering Standard on flooding, the
Individual Plant Examination (IPE) report and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR). The inspectors performed a walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 service water
pumps rooms (rooms 226 and 205) which contain risk significant systems andcomponents. The inspectors observed the condition of watertight doors, drain systems
and sumps, penetrations in floors and walls, and safety related instrumentation located
in these areas. In addition, the inspector reviewed operating procedures and related
internal flooding industry operating experience (OE).
3Enclosure b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 1 sample) a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed a licensed operator simulator training scenario conducted onMay 18, 2006, in order to assess operator performance and the adequacy of licensed
operators training program. The training scenario involved a condensate header rupture
that resulted in a loss of main feed event causing the operators to perform a manual reactor trip. Following the trip, equipment failures occurred ultimately resulting in a loss
of all feedwater. During this inspection, the inspectors focused on high-risk operator
actions performed during implementation of the abnormal and emergency operating
procedures, emergency plan (EP) implementation, and classification of the event.
The inspectors evaluated the clarity and formality of communications, the
implementation of appropriate actions in response to alarms, the performance of timely
control board operations and manipulations, and the oversight and direction provided by
the shift supervisor. The inspectors also reviewed simulator fidelity to evaluate the
degree of similarity to the actual control room, especially regarding recent control board
modifications. b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R12Maintenance Effectiveness Quarterly Review (71111.12Q - 2 samples) a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed Constellation effectiveness in performing routine maintenanceactivities. This review included an assessment of Constellation's practices pertaining to
the identification, scoping, and handling of degraded equipment conditions, as well as
common cause failure evaluations, and the resolution of historical equipment problems.
For those systems, structures, and components (SSC) scoped in the maintenance rule
per 10 CFR 50.65, the inspectors verified that reliability and unavailability were properly
monitored and that 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications were justified in light of
the reviewed degraded equipment condition. The inspectors conducted this inspection
for the following equipment issues:*Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater isolation control valves
CV-4512*11 condensate storage tank (CST) rupture valve
4Enclosure b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 8 samples) a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed Constellation's assessments concerning the risk impact ofremoving from service those components associated with the work items listed below.
This review primarily focused on activities determined to be risk significant within the
maintenance rule. The inspectors compared the risk assessments and risk
management actions performed by station procedure NO-1-117, "Integrated Risk
Management," to the requirements of
- NUMA [[]]
RC 93-01, Revision 2, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," and approved station procedures.
The inspectors compared the assessed risk configuration to actual plant conditions to
evaluate whether the assessment was accurate and comprehensive. In addition, the
inspectors assessed the adequacy of Constellation's identification and resolution of
problems associated with maintenance risk assessments and emergent work activities.
The inspectors reviewed the following selected work activities:*11A service water basket strainer cleaning*12 containment air cooler repair (reverse flow in fast speed)
- 21 vital 125 Vdc bus being attached and removed from the 125 Vdc reservebattery*13.8kV during internal inspection and testing of the 2H2103 voltage regulator
- 1A emergency diesel generator for planned maintenance
- 22 switchgear Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) inspection andlubrication*23 auxiliary feedwater pump maintenance to replace the breaker hand switch
- 11 and 14 4kV busses during maintenance on the 14 4kV bus normal feederbreaker b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
5Enclosure1R14Operator Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events (71111.14 - 2 samples) a. Inspection ScopeUntrippable Control Element AssemblyThe inspectors assessed operator performance associated with a Unit 1 event thatinvolved a misaligned control element assembly (CEA) while performing low power
physics testing. On April 8, 2006, at approximately 6:35 p.m., control room operators(CRO) began to insert regulating group 2 after testing groups 5, 4 and 3 with no position
anomalies. When regulating group 2 was inserted, the operators received a deviation
alarm in the control room. The alarm was due to regulating group 2, CEA #21, stopping
and being misaligned with the other CEA's in that group, which was greater than the
allowable technical specification deviation. At approximately 6:45 p.m., the Unit
CEA Malfunction, to establish
group realignment and maintain reactivity control. A troubleshooting plan was
developed and further reactivity controls were performed through dilution and boration of
the reactor coolant while the investigation of the misaligned CEA continued. However,
the CEA did not respond to initial insertion signal and the electrical traces taken on the
drive mechanism during insertion attempts indicated abnormal responses to the lower
and upper gripper coil. This prompted the operators to declare CEA #21 untrippable.
At 10:45 p.m., the operators exited low power physics testing and then manually trippedthe reactor. Although CEA #21 did not insert, the rest of the rods did insert to provide
adequate shutdown margin. On April 09, 2006, at approximately 1:20 a.m., Unit 1 was
in Mode 3 and the operators had exited AOP-1B.The inspectors assessed the plant response and conditions specific to the event andevaluated the performance of licensed operators. The inspectors also reviewed control
room procedures and operator logs to determine if operators performed the appropriate
actions in accordance with their training and established station procedures.Unit 1 Main Turbine Control Valve OscillationsThe inspectors assessed operator performance associated with a Unit 1 main turbinestartup after the installation of a new turbine control system. On April 11, 2006, at 2:30
a.m., Unit 1 main turbine control valves experienced high frequency valve oscillations
when the turbine reached 1800 revolutions per minute. The rapid cycling of the control
valves created excessive vibrations in the Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC) piping
system. This excessive vibration was reported to the control room and the operators
immediately tripped and secured the main turbine. When the main turbine was tripped,
the vibration of the EHC piping stopped.The inspectors assessed the plant response and conditions specific to the event, andevaluated the performance of licensed operators. The inspectors also reviewed control
room procedures and operator logs to determine if operators performed the appropriate
actions in accordance with their training and established station procedures.
6Enclosure b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R15Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 6 samples) a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed six operability determinations to verify that the operability ofsystems important to safety were properly established and that affected components orsystems remained capable of performing their intended safety function. The inspectors
reviewed the selected operability determinations to verify they were performed in
accordance with NO-1-106, "Functional Evaluation - Operability Determination," and
QL-2-100, "Issue Reporting and Assessment." The following operability evaluations were
reviewed:*12 containment air cooler repair (reverse flow in fast speed)*11, 12, and 13 high pressure safety injection pumps
- 12 containment spray pump overhaul following pump bearing failure
- 21 control element assembly testing
- 8 control element assembly testing
- 12 component cooling water heat exchanger due to saltwater pin hole leak ontemperature probe b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified1R19Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 9 samples) a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed and/or reviewed post-maintenance tests associated with thefollowing nine work activities to verify that equipment was properly returned to service
and that appropriate testing was specified and conducted to ensure that the equipment
was operable and could perform its intended safety function following the completion of
maintenance. Post-maintenance testing activities were conducted as specified in station
procedure MN-1-101, "Control Of Maintenance Activities." Post-maintenance test results
associated with the maintenance activities listed below were reviewed.*12 containment air cooler repair (reverse flow in fast speed)*12 auxiliary feedwater pump
- 21 control element assembly testing
- Unit 2 main steam safety valve lift settings test
- 13.8kV during internal inspection and testing of the 2H2103 voltage regulator
7Enclosure*1A emergency diesel generator for after planned maintenance*Unit 2 containment isolation valves
- 22 switchgear hvac inspection and lubrication
- 23 auxiliary feedwater pump
b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified. 1R22Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 9 samples) a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed and/or reviewed the nine surveillance tests listed belowassociated with selected risk-significant
TS compliance and that test
acceptance criteria was properly specified. The inspectors also verified that proper test
conditions were established as specified in the procedures, no equipment
preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been satisfied.*STP O-8A-1, Test Of 1A
- HP [[]]
SI Pump Large Flow Test
- STP O-073L-1,
- LP [[]]
SI Pump Large Flow Test
- STP O-073M-1, Containment Spray Flow Test
- STP O-029-1, Monthly CEA Partial Movement
- STP -662-1, Integrated Leak Rate Test Unit 1 Containment
- STP O-5A-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System Quarterly Surveillance Test*STP O-035-2, Safety Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Test
- STP M-3A-0, On line main steam safety valve testing b. FindingsIntroduction. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codesand Standards, because Constellation did not establish new reference values or
reconfirm the previous reference values following maintenance that affected hydraulic or
mechanical parameters on the
ECCS pumps in accordance with the 1995
Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code through the
1996 Addenda of the
- ASME [[]]
- IS [[]]
TB, requires, in part, that when a reference value or set of reference
values that may have been affected by repair, replacement, or routine servicing of a
pump, a new reference value or set of values shall be determined or previous values
reconfirmed by an inservice test run before declaring the pump operable.
8EnclosureThe inspectors identified maintenance activities that would have affected the hydraulic ormechanical characteristics of the
ECCS pumps. However, no new reference
values were established or the previous values reconfirmed before declaring the pumps
operable. For example, the 12 containment spray (CS) pump was overhauled in May of
2002 and March of 2006 with maintenance activities that affected the hydraulic (larger
impeller) and mechanical (thrust bearing) parameters respectively. Subsequent testing
performed for the 12 CS pump did not establish new reference values or validate
existing values; therefore, Constellation could not demonstrate that the pump
performance curve or the mechanical parameters did not change following maintenance
activities. Furthermore, a number of the
IST) acceptance criteria for their surveillance test procedure. This could be contributed
to the fact that new reference values were not established or the existing values
reconfirmed after maintenance that affected the hydraulic or mechanical parameters for
their
IRE-014-764. Additionally, to assess the extent of condition, Constellation conducted a more detailed
review of the maintenance performed prior to May 2002 on all the
pumps. This review will determine whether or not the maintenance activities performed
required a new reference value to be developed or if the existing values were valid. Analysis. The inspectors concluded that a performance deficiency existed becauseConstellation did not establish new reference values or reconfirm the previous reference
values following maintenance that affected hydraulic or mechanical parameters on the
ECCS pumps. The finding is more than minor because the same issue
affected a number of pumps tested, the issue was repetitive and if left uncorrected thefinding could become a more significant safety concern due to the potential to not detectpump degradation which could impact pump operability. This finding has a very lowsafety significance because the conditions did not result in an actual failure of the
- EC [[]]
CS pumps or result in systems being declared inoperable for greater than their
allowed Technical Specification outage time. The planned corrective actions included a
review of maintenance and IST data to determine whether new reference values are
needed or if there is a need to reconfirm existing reference values for the
- EC [[]]
CS pumps. The inspectors identified that a contributing cause of this finding was
related to the cross-cutting aspect of PI&R because Constellation did not periodically
trend and assess information to identify programmatic and common cause problems.Enforcement. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.55a,Codes and Standards, requires, in part, that testing of safety related pumps meet the
requirements of the
- ASME [[]]
ISTB, states that
when a reference value or set of reference values that may have been affected by
repair, replacement, or routine servicing of a pump, a new reference value or set of
values shall be determined or previous values reconfirmed by an inservice test run
before declaring the pump operable. Contrary to the above, Constellation did not
establish new vibration or hydraulic reference values or reconfirm the previous values
were acceptable following maintenance that affected the reference values of the
- EC [[]]
CS pumps. This violation is documented in Constellation's corrective action
9Enclosureprogram as
- NCV 05000317 and 318/2006003-01,Failure to establish appropriate reference values or reconfirm previous values forAFW and
- EP )1EP4Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan (E-Plan) Changes (71114.04 - 1 sample) a. Inspection ScopeDuring the period of September 2005 - February 2006, the
CFR 50.54(q). Constellation
Nuclear determined the changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the E-Plan and
also that the E-Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. A selected sample of E-Plan changes were reviewed in-
office by the inspector. This review does not constitute approval of the changes and, as
such, the changes and the associated
NRC Inspection
Procedure 71114, Attachment 4. b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified. 1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample )Simulator Exercises a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed control room simulator training exercises conducted on May 18, 2006, to assess licensed operators' performance in the area of emergency
preparedness. This training exercise focused on equipment failures and operator
challenges that would typically exist during an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) and total loss of feedwater event. The required procedural transitions and
associated event classification was observed and evaluated by the inspectors. b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
10Enclosure2.RADIATION
OS)2OS1Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01 - 7 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed radiological work activities and practices and proceduralimplementation during observations and tours of the facilities and inspected procedures,
records, and other program documents to evaluate the effectiveness of Constellation'saccess controls to radiologically significant areas. This inspection activity represents the
completion of seven (7) samples relative to this inspection area
(i.e., inspection procedure sections 02.02.d thru f, 02.03.a, and 02.05.a thru c) and
partially fulfills the annual inspection requirements.Plant Walk Downs and
- RWP Reviews (02.02.d, e, and f)During this inspection and the previous 2006 inspection during the Unit 1 refuelingoutage the inspector reviewed radiation work permits (
RWPs) for airborne radioactivity
areas with the potential for individual worker internal exposures of greater than
millirems Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE). For these selected
airborne radioactive material areas the inspector examined the performance of controls,
such as use of containments, ventilation systems, and procedural processes. Also, the inspector discussed with radiation protection personnel their experience with uptakes of
radioactive material since the last inspection. The inspector reviewed and assessed the
adequacy of Constellation's internal dose assessment for the highest actual internal
exposure which was less than 50 millirems
- CE [[]]
DE. The inspection also examined Constellation's physical and programmatic controls for highly activated or contaminated
materials (non-fuel) stored within spent fuel and other storage pools.PI&R (02.03.a)The inspector discussed with Constellation their schedule for self-assessments andaudits. The inspector reviewed one recent self-assessment on shutdown source term
management. The inspector also examined the plan for a corporate radiological release
audit which was scheduled for Calvert Cliffs in the near future. The inspector's review of
condition reports in the corrective action program indicated that problems in the
occupational radiation safety area were being identified. High Risk Significant, High Dose Area and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls(02.05.a, b, and c)The inspector met with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) and discussed high-dose-rate (HDR) high radiation areas and
- VH [[]]
RA's and the procedures and controls for
these areas. The inspector did not identify any significant procedural changes since the
11Enclosurelast inspection which would substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of workerprotection. The inspector discussed with several first-line Health Physics (HP)
supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become
- VH [[]]
RA's during certain plant operations. Also, during tours inside the radiologically
controlled area during this and the previous inspection, the inspector verified adequate
posting and locking of selected entrances to
- VHRA 's.Related ActivitiesThe inspector performed a selective examination of documents (as listed in the List ofDocuments Reviewed section) to evaluate the adequacy of radiological controls.The review in this area was against criteria contained in
- CFR [[20(Subparts D, F, G, H, I, and J), Technical Specifications, and procedures. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2OS2As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (71121.02 - 6 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed the effectiveness of Constellation's program to maintainoccupational radiation exposure]]
- ALA [[]]
RA. This inspection activity represents the
completion of six (6) samples relative to this inspection area (i.e., inspection procedure
sections 02.01.a, c, and d, 02.02.c, and 02.03.a and b) and partially fulfills the biennial
inspection requirements.Inspection Planning (02.01.a, c, and d)The inspector reviewed pertinent information regarding plant collective exposure history,current exposure trends, and ongoing or planned activities in order to assess current
performance and exposure challenges. The inspector determined the plant's current
3-year rolling average collective exposure. The inspector examined the source term measurements which Constellation had collected for trending purposes. Additionally,
the inspector reviewed the site specific procedures associated with maintaining
occupational exposures
- ALA [[]]
RA. These procedures covered the processes used to
estimate and track work activity specific exposures.Radiological Work Planning (02.02.c)The inspector compared selected person-rem results achieved during the recent Unit 1refueling outage with the estimated doses established in Constellation's
- ALA [[]]
planning for these work activities. The inspector selected the refueling outage tasks with
the highest person-rem results and/or with the largest inconsistencies between intended
2Enclosureand actual work activity doses. For the selected jobs the inspector revieweddocumentation and discussed the results with
- ALA [[]]
RA personnel to determine the
reasons for the inconsistencies.Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems (02.03.a and b)The inspector reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collectiveexposure estimate. Also, the inspector discussed Constellation's methodology for
estimating work-activity-specific exposures and the intended dose outcomes with
- ALA [[]]
RA personnel. The inspector evaluated both the dose rate and man-hour estimates
for reasonable accuracy. The inspector also reviewed Constellation's method for
adjusting exposure estimates, or re-planning work, when unexpected changes in scope
or emergent work are encountered in order to determine if adjustments to estimated
exposure (intended dose) were based on sound radiation protection and
- ALA [[]]
principles.Related ActivitiesThe inspector performed a selective examination of documents (as listed in the List ofDocuments Reviewed section) for regulatory compliance and for adequacy of control of
radiation exposure.The review was against criteria contained in
CFR 20.1701 (Use of process or other engineering
controls) and procedures. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03 - 3 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed the program for health physics instrumentation and protectiveequipment to determine the accuracy and operability of the instrumentation and
equipment. This inspection activity represents the completion of three (3) samples
relative to this inspection area
(i.e., inspection procedure sections 02.04.a and 02.06.a and b) and partially fulfills the
biennial inspection requirements.
13EnclosurePI&R (02.04.a)The review of internal exposures was accomplished during the inspection activitydocumented in Section
- SCBA ) Maintenance and User Training (02.06.a and b)The inspector reviewed the status and surveillance records of
- SC [[]]
BA staged and readyfor use in the plant. Also, the inspector examined Constellation's capability for refilling
and transporting
- SC [[]]
BA air bottles to and from the control room and operations support
center during emergency conditions. The inspector conducted an examination of records
and had discussions with cognizant personnel to determine that control room operators
and other emergency response and radiation protection personnel
(assigned in-plant search and rescue duties or as required by Emergency Operating
Procedures (EOP) or the
(including air bottle change-out). The inspector also determined that personnel assigned
to refill bottles were trained and qualified for that task. The inspector determined that
only personnel who possessed manufacturer-certified training/qualifications were
allowed to perform maintenance and repairs on
- SC [[]]
BA components vital to the unit's
function. The inspector reviewed selected records for the testing and maintenance of
these
- SC [[]]
BA components and checked for the required, periodic hydrostatic testing and
marking for a number of air bottles.Related ActivitiesThe inspector performed a selective examination of documents (as listed in the List ofDocuments Reviewed section) for regulatory compliance and adequacy.The review was against criteria contained in
- CFR 20 Subpart H, Technical Specifications (TS), and procedures. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER
- ACTIVI [[]]
TIES (OA)40A1Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 8 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed Constellation's program to gather, evaluate and reportinformation on the following four performance indicators (PIs). The inspectors used the
guidance provided in NEI 99-02, Revision 3, "Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline" to assess the accuracy of Constellation's collection and reporting of
PI data for the period April 2005 through March 2006. The inspectors reviewed licensee
14Enclosureevent reports (LERs), monthly operating reports, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant(CCNPP) power history charts,
- NRC [[inspection reports, and operator narrative logs. Unit 1 and 2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical HoursUnit 1 and 2 Unplanned Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat RemovalUnit 1 and 2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical HoursUnit 1 and 2 Safety System Functional Failures b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4]]
OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems.1Corrective Action Review by Resident Inspectors a.Inspection ScopeContinuous ReviewThe inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Constellation'scorrective action program as required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and
Resolution of Problems." The review facilitated the identification of potentially repetitive
equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up inspection. It was
accomplished by reviewing each issue report and attending screening meetings, and
accessing Constellation's computerized database. .2Semi-Annual
PI&R review of Constellationdocuments written from January 2006 through June 2006 to verify that Constellation is
identifying issues at the appropriate threshold, entering them into the corrective action
program, and ensuring that there are no significant adverse trends outside of the
corrective action program which would indicate the existence of a more significant safety
issue. The inspectors reviewed Constellation PIs, self-assessment reports, quality assuranceaudit/surveillance reports, corrective action reports, and system health reports and
compared the results of the review with results reported in the NRC baseline inspection
program. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the reports against the requirements ofthe Constellation Nuclear's
QL-2, "Self-Assessment/Corrective
Action Program."
15Enclosure b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..3Identification and Resolution of Problems - Occupational Radiation Safety (71121.01, .02, and .03) a. Inspection ScopeThe inspector selected three issues identified in the
IR) Nos. IRE-012-638, -012-716, and -013-639). The issues were
associated with radiography boundaries, intermittent tele-dosimetry contact, and the
year-end collective radiation exposure goal, respectively. The documented reports for the issues were reviewed to determine whether the full extent of the issues was
identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions
were specified and prioritized. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified. .4Annual sample review - Elevated Levels of Tritium Found in #11 Piezometer Tube a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors selected the issue of elevated levels of tritium found in a groundwatersample collected on Calvert Cliffs site property for a detailed review. Routine annual
groundwater samples from four piezometer tubes (40 to 50 feet deep) were collected on
December 3, 2005. Three of the four samples did not indicate any radioactivity.
Samples from #11 piezometer tube, however, indicated 1800 picocuries per liter (pCi/l)
of tritium in the groundwater. No gamma-emitting radioactivity was detected in any
samples. The previous annual samples for these four tubes did not identify any plant-
related radioactivity. Issue Report (IR) IRE-010-005 was written to identify this issue,
and the
IR was categorized as requiring an apparent causal
evaluation. The last sample for #11 piezometer tube, which measured positive for
tritium, was taken on December 21, 2005. Monthly samples since then have not
indicated any plant-related radioactivity. During this inspection, the inspectors discussed this issue with cognizant personnel andreviewed the following:-the Action Plan for Tritium in Groundwater (Updated as of April 17, 2006), -the positive sample results for #11 piezometer tube,
-the negative sample results from the thirteen onsite deep wells (approximately
-460 feet) available for supplying site drinking water and makeup water, from theonsite storm drains, from the onsite subsurface drains (SSDs), and from the
piezometer tubes (other than #11),
16Enclosure-the input to the
OE21958 - low levels of tritium found in groundwater at Calvert Cliffs,
-the Tritium and Generic Implications Presentation prepared for the site's Nuclear
-Safety Review Board, and
-the Corporate Radiological Release Audit Project Plan. b.FindingsIntroduction. A Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for failure to makesurveys of the radioactivity in a large "sink hole" in order to make an evaluation in
accordance with
CFR 20.1301(a)(1)
regarding the total effective dose equivalent limit for individual members of the public
from the licensed operations.Description. Routine annual liquid samples from four piezometer tubes (40 to 50 feetdeep) were collected on December 3, 2005. These piezometer tubes were installed
during the site hydrology study prior to plant construction. Their purpose was for
measurement of ground water depth at the site. A piezometer consists of a small-
diameter steel pipe equipped with a well point or perforated PVC pipe. Three of the four
liquid samples indicated no activity. Multiple samples from #11 piezometer tube,
however, indicated 1800 picocuries per liter (pCi/l) of tritium in the groundwater. For
comparison, these sample results are below the Environmental Protection Agency's
drinking water standard for tritium which is 20,000 pCi/l. No gamma-emitting
radioactivity was detected in any samples. The previous annual samples for these four
tubes did not identify any plant-related radioactivity.
- IR [[]]
IRE-010-005 was written to
identify this issue and the
IR was categorized as requiring an
apparent causal evaluation. The last sample for #11 piezometer tube, which measured
positive for tritium, was taken on December 21, 2005. Monthly samples since then have
not indicated any plant-related radioactivity. Upon identification of this issue Constellation recognized the need to investigate thesource of the tritium and effect corrective actions. Their documented action plan for this
issue (updated as of April 17, 2006) included multiple stages, including finding the
leaking component, fixing the leaking component, determining the extent of
contamination, mapping the plume, and evaluating the need for remediation. The plan
included 36 action items, each with an assigned responsible individual and with an
estimated completion date. Action items which have been initiated included increasing
the number of sampling points and sampling frequencies for groundwater monitoring,
contracting for the services of an experienced hydrologist/geologist for consultation,
attempting to "age" the tritium samples, and obtaining site drawings showing the location
and arrangement of building foundations, tanks, pools, and underground piping to
evaluate systems as potential sources of the tritium. As of January 3, 2006, the investigation indicated that a previously-ruptured,underground pipe, plugged in 2001, was partially or wholly responsible for the tritium
contamination. By design, the circulating water discharge conduits (CWDCs) accept
normal, permitted, liquid radioactive waste discharges and dilute the liquid waste prior to
17Enclosuredischarges to the Chesapeake Bay. At a point downstream of the liquid radioactivewaste connection to the
- CW [[]]
DC #22, this conduit, by design, was connected to a
subsurface drain (SSD) system by a section of underground piping. This piping
connection allowed circulating water (containing tritium) to enter the SSD system
(essentially a large, industrial French drain) and the circulating water (saltwater)
corroded the metal piping connection to the French drain. The corroded section of
underground piping to the French drain allowed a pathway for circulating water to leak to
the soil approximately 50 feet from # 11 piezometer tube. The circulating water leakage
washed out soil in that area which eventually resulted in a large "sink hole" that opened
and revealed itself on February 26, 2001. This "sink hole" was oval-shaped, measured
approximately 6 feet by 4 feet in cross-section and approximately 11 feet deep, and
required 800 cubic feet of dirt to fill. To stop the circulating water from entering the
corroded section of underground piping to the French drain, the connection to the
- CW [[]]
DC #22 was plugged in April of 2001.As of April 20, 2006, the station is still continuing actions to verify that there are noadditional sources contributing to this contamination to determine the extent of
contamination and to map the plume. Also, the station is currently evaluating the need
to drill additional monitoring wells. The investigation is ongoing. Based on the above and only assessing the time period from December 3, 2005, to thepresent time the station's problem identification, classification, and prioritization of this
issue and the identification of needed corrective actions appear timely and adequate for
this point in their investigation. Constellation's action plan acknowledged that there were
further evaluations and actions which still needed to be completed. However, during the time period from the appearance of the "sink hole" to the pluggingof the underground pipe connection to
- CW [[]]
DC #22 and the backfill of the "sink hole," no
radiation surveys of the contents of the "sink hole" were performed to ascertain the
nature and extent of radioactive contamination or the possibility of a ground water
plume. This was the case even though the "sink hole" was created by the action of
circulating water containing radioactive material from routine, permitted, plant discharges
of liquid radioactive waste. Thus, such a survey would have been reasonable and
appropriate under the circumstances. Thus, for an unknown period of time, some
portions of routine permitted liquid radioactive waste discharges to
- CW [[]]
DC #22 were
inadvertently released on site into the ground instead of being released as planned and
permitted into the Chesapeake Bay. Based on information in Section 2.5, Hydrology, of
the site's Undated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), these portions would flow to
the bay via shallow groundwater flow (i.e., a non-permitted pathway) within the site's
boundaries; the transit time for groundwater flow to the bay is much longer than that for
permitted discharges via the
- CWDC which transit time is a matter of seconds or minutes.Analysis. The performance deficiency was that no radiation surveys of the contents ofthe "sink hole" were performed. This was a violation of 10
CFR 20.1501 and is more
than minor because it is associated with the cornerstone attribute of maintaining a
program and process to estimate offsite dose due to abnormal releases and to properly
report such releases, and because it affected the Radiation Safety/Public Radiation
18EnclosureSafety Cornerstone's objective to ensure the adequate protection of public health andsafety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain. This
finding did not meet the criteria for traditional enforcement. Using Manual Chapter 0609,
Appendix D, the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process (SDP), it
was determined that this violation did not involve the radioactive material control or
environmental monitoring program branches but did involve the SDP's radioactiveeffluent release program branch. Further, it was determined that this violation was of
very low significance based on the fact that while it did impair Constellation's ability to
assess the timing of dose consequence and the accuracy of the batch and annual
effluent release dose records and reports due to the large difference in transit times for
the permitted and non-permitted discharge pathways to the bay, Constellation did
account for all released radioactivity and did assess the cumulative doses from their
effluent releases. Additionally, the violation is of very low significance because the
involved radioactivity had been addressed in Constellation permits prior to release, the
unanalyzed non-permitted pathway (i.e., via groundwater to the bay) did not impact
private property, and the dose consequences would not differ significantly from thosecalculated in Constellation's release permits, and the assessed doses did not exceed
the dose values in Appendix I to
CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee make or cause to be madesurveys that may be necessary for Constellation to comply with the regulations in Part
and that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation
levels, concentrations or quantities of radioactive materials, and the potential radiological
hazards that could be present. Contrary to the above, as of February 26, 2001,
Constellation did not make surveys to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1301(a)(1)
regarding the dose limit for individual members of the public from licensed operations.
Specifically, for an unknown period of time, some portions, of routine permitted liquid
radioactive waste discharges to
- CW [[]]
DC #22, were inadvertently released into the ground
instead of being released as planned and permitted into the Chesapeake Bay. Based on
information in Section 2.5, Hydrology, of the site's
- UFS [[]]
AR, these portions would flow to
the bay via shallow groundwater flow (i.e., a non-permitted pathway) within the site's
boundaries. The transit time for groundwater flow to the bay is much longer than that for
permitted discharges via the
- CW [[]]
DC's which transit time is a matter of seconds or
minutes and Constellation did not accurately assess, record, and report the annual dose
to individual members of the public during that time period. Because this failure to meet
a survey requirement is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the
corrective action program (CAP) Condition Report (CR) IRE-014-244, this violation is
being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section
NRCEnforcement Policy: NCV 05000317,05000318/2006003-02, Failure to perform anadequate survey for radioactivity.
19Enclosure4OA3Event Followup(Closed)
- LER 05000317/2006-002 Control Element Assembly Determined to beUntrippableOn April 8, 2006, while performing low power physic testing,
CEA 21 stopped inserting atapproximately 134 inches. Upon further attempts to troubleshoot the situation, CEA 21
was determined to be untrippable. Operators then commenced a shutdown and placed
the unit in Mode 3 in accordance with station procedures and TS Limiting Condition for
Operation (LCO) 3.1.4.F. Following the shutdown, testing was performed on CEA 21
and all other
LER was reviewed by the inspectors and no findings of
significance were identified, and no violation of NRC requirements occurred.
Constellation documented the event in their corrective actions program as
LER is closed.4OA5Other ActivitiesImplementation of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/165 - Operational Readiness of Offsite Power and Impact on Plant Risk a.Inspection ScopeThe objective of TI 2515/165, "Operational Readiness of Offsite Power and Impact onPlant Risk," was to gather information to support the assessment of nuclear power plant
operational readiness of offsite power systems and impact on plant risk. The inspectors
evaluated Constellation procedures against the specific offsite power, risk assessment
and system grid reliability requirements of TI 2515/165. They also discussed the
attributes with Constellation personnel. The information gathered while completing this TI was forwarded to the Office of NuclearReactor Regulation for further review and evaluation. bFindingsNo findings of significance were identified..24R01Reactor Vessel Head Replacement Inspection (71007 - 1 sample) a. Inspection Scope The scope covers onsite and in-office review of post-installation, testing and storageactivities that occurred during the refueling outage.
20EnclosurePost-Installation TestingPost-installation verification and testing inspections were reviewed in the followingareas:-Constellation's post-installation inspections and verifications program and itsimplementation.-The conduct of reactor coolant system leakage testing and review the testresults.-The procedures for equipment performance testing required to confirm thedesign and to establish baseline measurements and the conduct of testing.-Compliance with regulatory requirements including the incorporation of inserviceinspection requirements of
- 10 CFR 50.55a (g).-Adherence to and reconciliation of code requirements.Specifically, the inspector reviewed Constellation's inspection results for componentalignment, cleanliness, foreign material exclusion (
FME) and parts inventory for the new
reactor head and enhanced service structure, as documented in the "Post Construction
Record of Walkdown," and discussed the walkdown with knowledgeable members of
plant staff. In addition, the results of several types of tests conducted at the conclusion
of the outage were reviewed by the inspector, including: the polar crane post
maintenance testing (mechanical and non-destructive examination (NDE), control rod
drop time tests, and visual testing (VT-2) performed on the reactor coolant system (RCS)
to confirm no leakage was observed.StorageThe inspector directly observed the storage package on the old head and the securitybarriers present at the storage location. The radiological surveys taken for contact and
general area dose rates were reviewed. The inspector verified that access to the
storage area was properly controlled and did not create the potential for an unmonitored
effluent release pathway and that external radiation levels at the perimeter would be
below applicable limits, and dose rates at the perimeter were below applicable limits.TSP ModificationsThe last report referenced Constellation's efforts to align the new thimble support plate(TSP) onto the upper guide structure in the vessel. Constellation documented a
condition report on the installation process in their corrective action program
(IRE-012-607). During the third phase of onsite inspection the inspector reviewed an
independent assessment of whether the modifications to the TSP could affect design
basis structural analysis and loading conditions. The inspector also reviewed FME
controls implemented during the outage while the TSP was being modified, as well as
the operational decision making checklist. At the time of the inspection exit,
Constellation was compiling design and condition report information to incorporate into a
root cause report and determine the applicability of these issues to the upcoming TSP
replacement planned for Unit 2.
21Enclosure b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryOn July 12, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to yourselfand other members of your staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked
Constellation whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be
considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.ATTACHMENT:
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
TSP Engineering/Installation
R. Conatser, Chemist
B. Dansberger, Health Physics Work Leader (Materials Processing Facility)
S. Etnoyer, Plant Health Physicist
H. Evans, Health Physics Work Leader (Dosimetry)
J. Johnson, Engineering Analyst
G. Khouri, Component Replacement Engr
PM/Project Engineer
W. Lankford, Operations, Fire Brigade
J. Lenhart, Health Physics Work Leader (Operations)
P. Lombardi, Maintenance
ESS Task Manager/P.E., PMP
I. Rice, Health Physics Technician
TM
J. Branyan, Functional Surveillance Test Coordinator
M. Flaherty, Engineering Services Manager
L. Larragoite, Constellation Licensing Director
D. Bauder, Operations Manager
A. Simpson, Sr. Licensing Engineer
M. Stanley, Operations, Fire Brigade
RVH Projet
L. Williams, System Manager
M. Yox, Engineering Analyst
A-2AttachmentLIST
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- CLOSED [[]]
- AND [[]]
DISCUSSEDOpened and Closed05000317-318/2006003-01NCVFailure to establish appropriate referencevalues or reconfirm previous values
reference values for the
- ECCS pumps (Section 1R22)05000317-318/2006003-02NCVFailure to perform an adequate survey forradioactivity (Section
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
EDSection 1R04: Equipment Alignment13.8kV during internal inspection and testing of the 2H2103 voltage regulatorMaintenance Order (MO) 2200401489Operating Instruction (OI) 27B, 13.8 kV System
Drawing 61001SH001
Clearance Order 2200500173
Clearance Order 22005006021B emergency diesel generator (EDG) walkdown during maintenance on the 1A
- OI ) 21B-1, 1B Diesel Generator4.16kV service transformersMaintenance Order (MO) 1200503371Operating Instruction (OI) 27C, 4.16 kV System13
OI) 15-1, Service Water SystemMaintenance Order (MO) 1200501844
Drawing
- 61080SH 000321 vital 125 Vdc bus being attached and removed from the 125 Vdc reserve batteryOperating Instruction (
OI) 26A, 125 Volt Vital DC System
A-3AttachmentMaintenance Order (MO) 2200502563Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionIRE-013-795Calvert Cliffs
ES-001, Flooding, Rev. 2Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment Individual Plant Examination
Summary Report, dated December 1993
AOP-7A, Unit 1 Loss of Saltwater Cooling, Rev. 14
AOP-7A, Unit 2 Loss of Saltwater Cooling, Rev. 12
OI-29, Unit 2 Saltwater System, Rev. 52
OI-45, Unit 2 Service Water System, Rev. 44
Information Notice No. 83-44, Supplement 1: Potential Damage to Redundant Safety Equipmentas a Result of Backflow Through the Equipment and Floor Drain System, dated 8/30/90
Information Notice No. 83-44: Potential Damage to Redundant Safety Equipment as a Result of
Backflow Through the Equipment and Floor Drain System, dated 7/1/83Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program ManualOP-24, Simulator Operating Examination for the Licensed Operator Training Program at the
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power PlantSection 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessUnit 1 auxiliary feedwater isolation control valves
- STP O-5A-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System Quarterly Surveillance Test11 condensate storage tank rupture valve
IRE-009-227Maintenance Order (MO) 1200504137
A-4AttachmentSection 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control11A service water basket strainer cleaning:Maintenance Order (MO) 1200504373Maintenance Order (MO) 1200504765
Maintenance Order (MO) 1200503808
Maintenance Order (MO) 1200603151
IRE-014-186, U1 containment temperature is relatively high for this time of year10CFR50.59/10CFR72.48 screening form, dated 8/15/2001
Drawing
- 61076SH 0011D, Schematic Diagram Containment Cooling Fan 12Containment temperature profile graphs (4/28/06 - 5/4/06)
- MN -1-110, Troubleshooting control form, dated 5/10/0621 vital 125 Vdc bus being attached and removed from the 125 Vdc reserve batteryMaintenance Order (
- 2200502563STP M 552-2, 21 Station Battery Service Test 13.8kV internal inspection and testing of the 2H2103 voltage regulatorMaintenance Order (
MO) 2200401489Operating Instruction (OI) 27B, 13.8 kV System
Drawing 61001SH001
Clearance Order 2200500173
Clearance Order 22005006021A emergency diesel generator for planned maintenanceIRE-014-223Maintenance Order (MO) 1200602153
Maintenance Order (MO) 1200500480
Maintenance Order (MO) 1200504037
Maintenance Order (MO) 1200504044
Maintenance Order (MO) 120050409322 switchgear hvac inspection and lubricationPerformance Evaluation (PE) 2-023-02-0-MMaintenance Order (MO) 2200504655
A-5AttachmentMaintenance Order (MO) 2200504679Maintenance Order (MO) 220050166823 auxiliary feedwater pump maintenance to replace the breaker hand switchMaintenance Order (MO) 220043186Clearance Order 2200600130
Drawing
- 61087SH 0010A11 and 14 4kV busses during maintenance on the 14 4kV bus normal feeder breakerMaintenance Order (
MO) 1200503371Operating Instruction (OI) 27C, 4.16 kV System
Drawing
- 61052SH 0004Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations12 containment air cooler repair (reverse flow in fast speed):
IRE-014-18610CFR50.59/10CFR72.48 screening form, dated 8/15/2001
Drawing
- 61076SH 0011D, Schematic Diagram Containment Cooling Fan 12Containment temperature profile graphs (4/28/06 - 5/4/06)
- MN -1-110, Troubleshooting control form, dated 5/10/06#21 control element assembly testingOperability Determination (
- PS [[]]
CEA) Malfunctions, Rev.
Maintenance Order (MO) 1200601808
- IRE -013-755Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing12 containment air cooler repair (reverse flow in fast speed):
IRE-014-186, U1 containment temperature is relatively high for this time of year10CFR50.59/10CFR72.48 screening form, dated 8/15/2001
Drawing 61076SH0011D, Schematic Diagram Containment Cooling Fan 12Containment temperature profile graphs (4/28/06 - 5/4/06)
MN-1-110, Troubleshooting control form, dated 5/10/06
A-6AttachmentSection 1R22: Surveillance TestingHPSI Pump Large Flow TestIRE-011-980IRE-011-986
IRE-011-991
(ES) 2004000048-000LPSI Pump Large Flow TestIRE-014-764
Containment Spray Flow TestIRE-014-764
Monthly
- IRE [[-013-755Tech Spec 3.1.4Integrated Leak Rate Test Unit 1 ContainmentMaintenance Order (MO) 1200404741Integrated Leak Rate Outage Plan 2006Auxiliary Feedwater System Quarterly Surveillance TestIRE-015-024Maintenance Order (MO) 1200602819Safety Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve TestIRE-014-969Maintenance Order (MO) - 2200602819Section]]
- EP 4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan (E-Plan) Changes Calvert Cliffs Emergency Plan and Implementing ProceduresSection 2
RSP-1-106, Rev. 10, Special work permit administration
Procedure RSP-1-117, Rev. 11, Issuance and wearing of respiratory protection
A-7Attachmentdevices used to protect against airborne radioactivityProcedure RSP-1-132, Rev. 9, Job coverage in radiologically controlled areas
Focused self-assessment on shutdown source term management at Calvert CliffsSection
SWPs
20061351, Rev. 2, Demolish thimble support pate/guide tubes
20061358, Rev. 0, Surface destruction activities to remove interference
from new TSP
20061373, Rev. 0, Remove TSP cut up station
20061420, Rev. 2, Half nozzle replacements on the reactor coolant
system hot legs
20061423, Rev. 2, Mechanical stress improvement processSection
RSP-2-301, Rev. 14, Respiratory protection device maintenanceProcedure RSP-2-304, Rev. 0, Operation of the Bauer breathing air compressor
Procedure OI-20A, Rev. 12, Fire protection performance evaluations and fire
system inspectionsSection
- 4OA 2: Identification and Resolution of Problems (paragraph 02.02 - SelectedIssue Follow-up Inspection)Action Plan for Tritium in Groundwater (Updated as of April 17, 2006),
OE21958 - Low Levels of Tritium Found in Groundwater at Calvert Cliffs,
Tritium and Generic Implications Presentation prepared for the site's Nuclear
Safety Review Board, and
Corporate Radiological Release Audit Project Plan.
Procedure CP-224, Rev. 13, Monitoring radioactivity in systems normally
uncontaminated
Procedure CP-501, Rev. 10, Liquid and steam sampling techniques
Procedure
OA5: Other ActivitiesImplementation of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/165 - Operational Readiness of OffsitePower and Impact on Plant RiskAOP-7M, "Major Grid Disturbances", Rev 1 OAP 91-09, "Communications for Load Reduction or Outage"
OAP 94-5, "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Operations Support for Electric System Operation andPlanning Department", Rev 10
OCP--3, "Planning and Scheduling", Rev 0
A-8AttachmentOperations Coordination and Interconnection Agreement between Baltimore Gas and ElectricCompany and Constellation Power Source Generation,
- NO -1-117, "Integraded Risk Management", Rev 154R01Reactor Vessel Head Replacement InspectionPost-Installation Testing:
HE-55
Visual Examination for Leakage(VT-2), Report No.
- ES 200300312, various supplements, Form 4, Record of WalkdownStorage:Storage of U-1 Old Reactor Vessel Head (ORVH), Map Rev. 0
- RV [[]]
RFO Modification SummaryMPR Associates Inc., April 4, 2006 letter to Constellation Energy Group, Calvert Cliffs Unit 1
Closeout Letter for Independent Review of Thimble Support Plate Modifications
Constellation letter, 3/31/2006, Exemption of Class B Requirements for the
- RFO [[]]
IRT Issues/Hot Particles and FME
Procedure Field Change Request, Field Change No. FCR-013, Traveler for Installation of the
Replacement
IRE-012-607IRE-012-644
IRE-012-737
IRE-013-293
UFSAR, Table 4-2, Reactor Vessel ParametersAREVA Letter of Qualification Waiver, 3/10/2006
A-9AttachmentLIST
- OF [[]]
- ACRONY MSADAMSAgencywide Documents Access and Management SystemASMEAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers
- AF [[]]
- ALAR [[]]
- AO [[]]
- ATW [[]]
- CA [[]]
- CCNP [[]]
- CE [[]]
- CED [[]]
- CED [[]]
- CF [[]]
RCode of Federal Regulations
- CR [[]]
OControl Room
- CWD [[]]
- ECC [[]]
- ED [[]]
- EH [[]]
- EO [[]]
PEmergency Operating Procedure
EPEmergency Preparedness
EPEmergency Plan
E-PlanEmergency Plan
- FM [[]]
- HD [[]]
RHigh Dose Rate
- HVA [[]]
- IM [[]]
- IP [[]]
EIndividual Plant Examination
- IS [[]]
- LE [[]]
- LC [[]]
- NC [[]]
VNon-Cited Violation
- NR [[]]
CNuclear Regulatory Commission
OAOther Activities
- OR [[]]
VH Old Reactor Vessel Head
- PAR [[]]
SPublicly Available Records
- PI& [[]]
RProblem Identification & Resolution
pCi/lPico-curies per Liter
A-10AttachmentRCS Reactor Coolant SystemRPMRadiation Protection Manager
- RW [[]]
- SCB [[]]
- SD [[]]
- SR [[]]
- SS [[]]
- SS [[]]
DSub-Surface Drain
TITemporary Instruction
TSP Thimble Support Plate
- UFSA [[]]
- VHR [[]]