ML20009E348

Transcript of G Martin Testimony on Behalf of Util on Mccorkle Contention 9 Re Chlorine Monitoring.Prof Qualifications Encl

ML20009E348
Person / Time
Site:	Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png
Issue date:	07/20/1981
From:	Martin G EBASCO SERVICES, INC., HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8107280069
Download: ML20009E348 (8)

Text

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July 20, 1981

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RECEIV' u a

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3 l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,'

l~j OFFICE OF ."i"J-BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

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5 In the Matter of ) [I 7 6 HCUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY Docket N 0 7 (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating ) ---i JU n 7 gggj

• i Station, Unit No. 1 )

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8 ) 9 5-@Agron e y TESTIMONY OF GUY MARTIN, JR., ON BEHA i HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO., ON h, 10 McCORKLE CCNTENTION 9 RELATING TO 11 CHLORINE MONITORING 12 Please state your name and business address.

Q.

13 A. My name is Guy Martin, Jr., and my business 14 address is Ebasco Services, Inc., 2 World Trade Center, 15 New York, N.Y.

16 Q. What is your position with Ebasco?

17 A. I am presently Supervising Engineer of Enviro-18 Sphere's Radiological Impact Assessment Department.

19 Q. Please describe your education and professional 20 qualifications.

A. A statement of my education and professional 21 qualifications is attached to this testimony as Attachment GM-1.

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8107280069 e10720 PDR ADOCK 05000466 T PDR

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Q. Mr. Martin, what is the purpose of your testimony?

3 A. My testimony will address Intervenor McCorkle's 4

Contention 9 in which it has been alleged that:

5 No plan has been developed to protect the plant operators from the danger of poisoning from 6 gases such as chlorine which could come into the control room in sufficient quantities to 7 force evacuation before the plant was brought down to low power status. Railroed accidents 8 and on-site storage of gases such as chlorine could be sources for such gases.

9 Q. Is the Allens Creek control room designed to 10 protect control room operators from accidents involving 11 releases of toxic gases, including chlorine, which are 12 .

stored on site?

13 A. Yes. In PSAR Appendix C the Applicant has 14 committed to provide protection for control room operators 15 from accidents involving the release of toxic gases.

16 our analysis shows that, of the materials stored on 17 site, only chlorine presents any potential danger to l

18 control room personnel. Therefore, the design of the 19 control room includes detectors located in the fresh air 20 inlets which, upon detection of chlorine, will provide 21 an audible alarm and automatically isolate the control r m. These detectors will also detect chlorine releases 22 which may originate from offsite sources, including the 23 i nearby Atchisen, Topeka and Santa Fe (A'f&SF) railroad.

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In addition, adequate self-contained breathing apparatus 3

will be provided for further protection of control room 4

operators.

5 Q. Are there any offsite sources of potentially 6 toxic gases other than chlorine that could pose a hazard 7 to control room operators?

8 A. Currently there is insufficient data upon l

9 which to base such a determination.

10 Q. Please explain.

11 A. An accident involving a train traveling along 12 the AT&SF railroad 'ine, which is located approximately 4500 feet west of the control room, presents the only 13 possible offsite source of toxic gases of sufficient 4

, quantity to pose a potential threat to control room l 15 operators.

16 The limited data on toxic materials shipments 17 l obtained thus far from AT&SF indicates that the probability

! 18 of accidents on the AT&SF line which might involve 19 materials which could adversely affect control room 20 habitability approaches the NRC acceptance criterion of

-6 10 per year. Neither tae data concerning the frequency 22 of toxic materials shipments provided by AT&SF nor the 23 data I have reviewed concerning railroad accidents are 24 l

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sufficient to support a full and complete evaluation of 3

the risk to the control room operators from toxic gases 4

released as a result of a railroad accident.'

5 Q. What efforts are being made to compile the 6 data necessary to make such a determination?

7 A. Efforts are currently underway to compile more 8 complete data concerning shipments of toxic materials on 9 the AT&SF line. For years after 1980, data concerning 10 the frequency of hazardous materials shipments as well 11 as accidents on the AT&SF line will be systematically collected. In addition, a more in-depth examination of 12 the characteristics of accidents involving release of 3

toxic material will be undertaken. With this additional 14 information, a study to determine whether there is a 15 potential hazard from offsite toxic gases to the control 16 room operators will be completed and submitted in the 17 Final Safety Analysis Report at the Operating License 18 review stage.

19 Q. Does a study of this type need to be completed 0

at this time?

21 A. No. The outcome of a study of this type will 22 have no effect upon the suitability of the ACNGS site.

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Moreover, the large data base which will be obtained 3

during the Operating License review stage wil] allow a 4

more accurate determination of both the need for additional 5 toxic chemical protection and the identification of the 6 specific hazardous materials for which protection may be 7 required.

8 Q. What would have to be done at Allens Creek if 9 this final study were to show that the probability of a 10 toxic gas release hazardous to the control room operators 11 did not meet the NRC acceptance criteria?

12 A. If the data accumulated at the Operating License stage indicate that the probability of accidents 13 which may adversely affect control room habitability 4

does not meet the applicable acceptance criteria, HL&P 13 will provide appropriate means to assure that a higher level of protection is given to the control room operators.

17 Appropriate technical means and engineering designs, 18 including warning systems and toxic chemical detectors, 19 are currently available to insure that toxic chemicals 20 will pose no hazard to control room habitability regard-21 less of the accident prcbability. If necessary, such 22 systems can be installed at Allens Creek with only minor 23 alterations to the control room.

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2 Q. Will such toxic chemical detectors be able to 3

detect the presence of any potentially toxic' gases?

4 Detectors are commercially available A. Yes.

5 which can detect all types of toxic gases including all 6 those gases which are currently carried on the AT&SF 7 railroad.

8 Q. What are your conclusions?

9 A. A final study concerning the effects of the 10 postulated release of toxic gas from an accident on the 11 AT&SF railroad will be performed during the Operating 12 License review stage. If the results of this study 13 indicate a toxic gas hazard does indeed exist to the 14 control room operators, HL&P will provide a higher level f protection in the control room. This higher level of 15 protection may take the form of appropriate engineering 16 .

design changes, such as warning systems or toxic chemical 7

i detectors, which are currently available to the nuclear j 18 industry.

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i Attachment GM-1 Guy Martin, Jr.

I received a ME from the City College of the City of New York in 1974. I received a MS in Nuclear Engineering from Polytechnic Institute of New York in 1976. I have been employed by Ebasco since 1973. I have eight years' experience in preparation of Safety Analysis and Envirionmental Reports sections dealing with the impact analysis of toxic chemicals and radiological releases. Such analyses are performed-for both routine plant operation and accident conditins. In this regard, I conduct reviews of radwaste handling systems, air handling and cleanup systems and estimate radionuclide releases from plant effluents and calculate and calculation of implant dose rates to equipment and personnel from air borne radionuclide exposure and I have performed ALARA of air cleanup systems. I have performed safety reviews of

, engineered safety systems, which included a review of the specifications and operation from the radiation protection viewpoint and have provided design recommendations based on assessed radiological doses and established nuclear safety criteria. I have performed analyses of the transport of toxic chemicals postulated to be released accidentally and calculated the concentration in critical locations of the power plant. I have provided technical feedback to the designers on required protection levels. In this regard I have assisted in making the determination of toxic chemical detector specifications based on worker and equipment protection criteria. -

I have responsibility for the preparation of radiological envirionmental surveillance programs wherein I have prepared detailed surveillance program description based on site specific critical pathways of exposure. I l have established the sampling requirements of the frequency l and types of analyses to be performed.

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! I have also participated in preparation of a study l regarding the establishment of a comprehensive data base regarding high level waste disposal and I have supervised the health physics activities related to decontamination work at the Kellex Laboratory.

I Prior to my employment with basco, I was employed as a cost analyst by Equitable Life Assurance Socity of the US.

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• I am a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, a member of the Health Physics Society, and a member of the American Nuclear Society, and Intern Engineer of New York State. I have written the following publications:

Martin, G. and J. Thomas 1978. Meeting the dose requirements of 10CFR100 for site suitability and general design criteria 19 for control room habitability: a parametric approach.

Transactions of American Nuclear Society 24th Annual Meeting.

Vol. 18.

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Martin, G. D. Michlewicz and J. Thomas 1978. Fission 2120:

i a program for assessing the need for engineered safety feature grade air cleaning systems in post-accident environment.

L Proceedings of 15th DCE Nuclear Air Cleaning Conference.

l Letizia, A. P., G. Martin and J. F. Silvey 1979. - Implications i

for nuclear facilities of changes being initiated in the NRC standard atmospheric diffusion model. Proceeding of the 41st Annual Meeting of the American Power Conference.

Bhatia, R. K., Mauro, J., Martin, G.

- Effections of Containment Purge on the Consequences of a Loss-of-Coolant Accident.

Transactions of the American Nuclear Society 1980 Annual Meeting.

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