ML19347F520

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Testimony of DC Papone Re Board Question 6,ability of Applicant to Demonstrate Compliance w/10CFR50,App A.Prof Qualifications Encl.Related Correspondence
ML19347F520
Person / Time
Site: Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png
Issue date: 05/11/1981
From: Papone D
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19347F516 List:
References
NUDOCS 8105190512
Download: ML19347F520 (4)
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5-5-11-81 si qf RELATED. CORRESPONDENCE /

/f cocketed g x' UNITED STATES OF AMERCIA ,,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7{ 3gy 2

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ' officeof theSec.

3 6, og;gysse. 3 4 In the Matter of ) b N

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5 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-466

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6 (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

7 )

8 TESTIMONY OF DANIEL C. PAPONE ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY 9 ON BOARD QUESTION 6 10 Q. Please state your name and place of employment.

11 A. My name is Daniel C. Papone and I am employed by General 12 Electric as an Engineer in the ECCS Engineering Unit.

13 Q. Mr. Papone, please state your educational background, 14 work experience and professional qualifications.

15 A. A statement of my qualifications is attached as Exhibit i 16 DCP-1 to this testimony.

17 Q. What is your understanding of Board Question 6?

18 A. Board Question 6 is a restatement of Intervenor Schreffler's 19 Contention 3 which was admitted by the Board in its order 20 dated February 9, 1979. When Mr. Schreffler withdrew as an 21 intervuor , the Board adopted this contention as a Board 22 question. This question requests the Applicant to demonstrate 23 compliance with current NRC requirements with respect to 10 CFR 24 Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 50 -

25 Containment Design Basis (43 Fed. Reg. 50162, October 27, 1978).

20 Q. Has Applicant committed to meet GDC 50 in the Allens E Creek PSAR?

A. Applicant has committed to meet GDC 50 in Section 8105190 5l@

r 1 2 3.1.2.5.1.1 of the PSAR. However, the revision of GDC 50 3 cited in 43 Fed. T.eg. 50162, October 27, 1978, is a later 4 revision than referenced in the ACNGS PSAR. The difference 5 between the two revisions is the new requirement to comply 6 with 10 CFR Section 50.44. Applicant's compliance with 7 Section 50.44 will be provided in testimony presented in 8: response to Board Question 5.

9 Q. Since Applicant's compliance with GDC 50 will be addressed 10 by a combination of current PSAR commitments and the testimony 11 on Board Question 5, what is the purpose of your tentimony?

12 A. The purpose of my testimony is not to duplicate the 13 testimony which will be given in response to Board Question 14 5, but to address Intervenor Schreffler's original concern 15 in his Contention 3. This concern, as reflected in the 16 Board's Order dated February 9, 1979, is as follows:

17 Petitioner asserts that, in the event of a small-pipe break in the ECCS, the reactor could heat 18 up to dangerous levels and could result in the l

possible release of excess radioactivity.

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20 Q. Is a small break in an ECCS line one of the postulated 21 pipe break cases for which General Electric evaluates ECCS

! 22 capability to keep the reactor core within 10 CFR Part 50, 23 Appendix K limits?

24 A. Yes. We consider all possible break sizes in all types 25 of lines in combination with the worst single active failure.

l 26 Q. Is a break in an ECCS line in combination with the l

l 27 worst single active failure the most severe break in terms 28 of meeting Appendix K limits?

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.1 ,3-2 A. No. This case is less severe than the design basis 3 accident. The design basis accident is a double ended 4 guillotine break of the recirculation suction line combined 5 with a failure of the diesel generator which powers two of 6 the low pressure ECCS pumps. Section 6.3.3 of the PSAR 7 shows the design basis accident to be the most severe case 8 and shows the results to meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K 9 limits.

10 Q. What are your conclusions?

11 A. Since a break in an ECCS line is less severe than the 12 design basis accident, the fuel failure and radioactive 13 release analyses presented in Section 15 of the PSAR for the 14 design basis accident will be bounding for the ECCS line 15 break case.

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i Exhibit DCP-1

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2) EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 3- Mr. Daniel C. Pappone 4 Mr. Pappone is an engineer in the ECCS Engineering Unit 5 working for the General Electric Company Nuclear Power 6lSystemsEngineeringDepartmentinSanJose, California. His 7 employment with General Electric began in 1978 as an engineer 8 ! on rotating assignment with the ECCS Engineering Unit, 9 performing loss of coolant analyses using developmental 10' computer programs. Following a brief assignment with the 11 Nuclear Operations Engineering Unit, where he worked on fuel 12 conditioning procedures, Mr. Pappone joined the ECCS Engineering 13 Unit in December, 1978. His responsibilities there are 14 performing and defending plant specific LOCA analyses for 15 FSARs. In the past year, his responsibilities have expcnded 16 to include developing guidelines for emergency operating 17 procedures, performing degraded core cooling analyses in 18 support of those procedures and developing ECC system modifica-19 tions, resulting from post-TMI assessment of the GE BWR 20 design.

21 Mr. Pappone is a 1977 graduate of the University of j 22 California, Los Angeles with a BS degree in engineering 23 specializing in nuclear engineering.

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