ML20009E364

Transcript of Rc Iotti Testimony on Behalf of Util on Bishop Contention 17 Re Tnt Detonation

ML20009E364
Person / Time
Site:	Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png
Issue date:	07/24/1981
From:	Iotti R EBASCO SERVICES, INC., HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8107280082
Download: ML20009E364 (5)

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0FFICE OF WM A ', NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION \A UA B l

a liEPORTS Ef7EskN-THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD by . y, pW j 4 m w In the Matter of 5 5

5 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY 5 Docket No. 50-7 (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating 5 $.\ ' 1 T Station, Unit No. 1) 5 N ' '

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8- .. n TESTIMONY OF ROBERT C. IOTTI, ONBEHALFQF SL " q 19@ C",, -

9 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY.ON a.s.TM N.

BISHOP CONTENTION 17/ TNT DETONATION , ' , .

11 Q. Dr. Iotti, pleasestateyournameandbusiness'q%Q 12 address and describe your educational and professional experience.

13 A. My name is Robert C. Iotti and my business address is Ebasco Services, Inc., 2 World Trade Center, 15 New York, N. Y. I have previously describcd my position 16 and background in connection with my testimony on Doherty 17 Contention 47.

18 Q. Dr. Iotti, what is the purpose of your testimony?

19 A. The purpose of my testimony is to address 20 l Intervenor Bishop's Contention 17 regarding detonation i

21 of hazardous 4aaterials. The contention stat =3:

( 22 The Applicant has estimated the effect on the plant of rupture and/or detonation to train 3 23 24 car loads of TNT.

are underestimated.

I contend that these estimates I also contend that these [9 Ib i

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1 2 estimates are not accurate for all cases and that the Applicant should provide more design 3 protection. I further contend that the Applicant has not fully considered the effects on the 4 plant of other hazardous materials that could be carried by rail car.

5 Q. What criteria are used to determine that plant 6 structures are adequately protected from a TNT detonation?

7 A. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.91 indicates that plant 8 structures are adequately protected if they are at a 9 " safe" distance such that the peak positive incident 10 overpressure does not exceed 1 psi. The safe distance 11 is defined by the relationship 12 R = KW /3 13 where R = distance in feet from blast g W = pounds of TNT K = 45 15 As specified in the Regulatory Guide, the maximum explosive cargo in a single railroad box car is 132,000 pounds.

17 For this quantity, R must be greater than or equal to 18 2291 feet.

19 Q. What is the distance from the Atchison, Topeka 20 and Santa Fe (AT&SF) Railroad to the nearest Category I 21 plant structure?

22 A. The nearest Category I plant structure is 23 approxinctely 4230 feet from the AT&SF Railroad.

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1 2 C. Have any analyses been performed by the Applicant 3 with respect to the hazards to the plant from a postulated 4

TNT detonation?

A. Yes. As stated in PSAR Section 2.2.3.3.1, an 5

analysis which postulated the complete and instantaneous detonation of 200,000 pounds of TNT was performed to determine the blast loadings on critical plant structures.

8 Tha maximum loads on Category I structures was determined 9

to be on the order of 0.55 psi which is well below the 10 acceptance criteria stated in Regulatory Guide 1.91.

11 Q. The intervenor also contends that the effects 12 of a TNT detonation are underestimated. Is this possible?

13 A. No. The safety-related plant structures are 14 designed to withstand loads which are significantly 15 higher than the 1 psi criteria in Regulatory Guide 1.91.

16 Therefore, the effects of a detonation are not underestimated.

17 Q. Have the effects of a detonation of other 18 hazardous materials been considered?

19 A. Yes. The effective yields of high explosives as 20 listed in Table 2 of the Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology 21 have been considered. The yields in some cases could be greater than that associated with TNT. However, the detona-2 tion of these higher yield explosives has been considered and results in overpressures well within the acceptance criteria.

1 2 Q. During the special pre-hearing conference, the 3 intervenor expressed concern that the analysis in the 4 PSAR considered the detonation of only one (1) box car 5 f explosives. Has the Applicant analyzed the detonation f multiple cars?

6 A. Yes. Such an analysis has been performed and 7

it has been determined that a maximum of three cars 8

could be successively detonated so that sequential detonation would appear at a distance to be instantaneous.

10 Using the relationship in the referenced Regulatory 11 Guide, at a distance of 4230 feet, the plant is protected 12 against the complete and instantaneous detonation of 13 830,584 pounds of TNT which not only is equivalent to 14 six (6) carloads but also far exceeds the capacity of 15 any single box car used by the railroad.

16 Q. In your opinion, is the simultaneous detona-17 tion of more than one box car a plausible event?

18 A. No. In the various documented cases I have 19 examined, no simultaneous detonation of more than one 20 carload has been recorded. In all such incidents the 21 explosion was either contained to one single car, or at 22 worst resulted in a chain reaction among multiple cars n the train. In either case, such a detonation would 23 ,

n t result in a single peak overpressure but rather a 24

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2 series of overpressures which would be well below the 3 design parameters previously stated. For these reasons 4 the effects of a detonation are adequately accounted for in the ACNGS design thereby assuring that plant structures 5

are protected.

Q. What are your conclusions?

A. The effects of a TNT detonation have been 8

evaluated and found to be well within the acceptance 9

criteria set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.91.

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