ML19347F539
| ML19347F539 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1981 |
| From: | Meyer F HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347F516 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105190568 | |
| Download: ML19347F539 (15) | |
Text
lll 5-11-81 e
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 4
In the Matter of S
S 5
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY S
Docket No. 50-466 5
6 inlisns Creek Nuclear Generating S
Station, Unit 1)
S 9
8 DIRECT TESTIMONY OF F.
J. MEYER, JR.
ON DOHERTY CONTENTION 30 9
ON INTERCONNECTION / GRID STABILITY 10 g,
please state your name, your employer and your 11 position.
12 A.
My name is F.
John Meyer, Jr.
I am employed by 13 Houston Lighting & Power Company as Principal Engineer and 14 Division Head, Electrical Systems Engineering.
15 Q.
Please state your educational background and work 16 experience.
17 A.
I received a Bachelor of Science degree from Lamar 18 University in Electrical Engineering in 1970, and in 1980 I 19 received a Masters of Science degree in Electrical Engineer-20 ing from the University of Houston.
The topic of my Master's 21 thesis was " Dynamic Load Modeling for Power Systems Stability 22 Studies".
When I graduated from Lamar University in 1970, I 1
23 went to work for Houston Lighting E Power Company as an 24 electrical engineer and have continued to work in that 0105190 hY$f(
I f
1 capacity as I have advanced within the Company.
In my 2
present capacity as Principal Engineer and Division Hea6 of 3
the Electri e d System Engineering Divir, f on, 1 am in charge 4
of approximately 20 engineers with responsibility for such 5
things as specification and procurement of major transmissiea 6
and distribution equipment, design and procurement of pro-7 tective relay systems for the transmission and distribution 8
system, and performance of system operating and interconnec-9 tion studien.
In this latter capacity I am fully familiar 10 with HL&P's transmission system and the studies that are 11 done to test the reliability of that system.
Since my 12 employment with HL&P, I have also been involved in the 13 planning studies done with other members of the Texas Inter-14 connected Systems (" TIS").
From 1973 through 1980 I was an 15 alternace member on the TIS Planning Subcommittee and in i
16 1980 I became a member of the TIS Planning Subcommittea.
It 17 is the responsibility of the TIS Planning Subcommittee to undertake continuous studies of the reliability and adequacy 18 l
19 of the TIS transmission grid.
In this capacity I am fully familiar with the TIS transmission grid and HL&P's inter-20 connections to the TIS grid.
21 22 0
What is the purpose of your testimony?
A.
This testimony responds to Doherty Contention 30 23 which alleges that ACNGS safety systems are more vulnerable
(
24 l
1 to a failuro of offsite power systems during severe weather 2
conditions or other disturbances because HL&P is not inter-3 connected with any elcc-tric utility which is outside the 4
State of Tex 0s.
5 Q.
Please describe the HL&P transmission network.
6 A.
The Houston Lighting & Power Company transmission 7
network is ahown in Figure 8.2-1 of the Allens Creek PSAR.
8 This network consists of interconnected fossil fuel plants 9
serving 5600 cquare miles of area with an overlayed 345/138/69 10 KV trar.smission system.
li Houston Lighting & Power Company is a mcmber of 12 the South Texas Interconnected System (STIS), which in addi-13 tion t0 the North Texas Interconnected System (NTIS) co'.nprise 14 the Texas Interconncated Systems.
The TIS operates as an 15 independent grid inside the State of Texas, and the HL&P 16 grid is integrated into the TIS grid.
The STIS is made up 17 of the following members:
Central Power & Light Company 18 (CPL) ; City of Austin (COA,. Lower Colorado River Authority 19 (LCRA); San Antonio City ?ublic Service Board (SACPSB) ;
20 South Texas Electric Cooperative (STEC); Medina Electric 21 ccoperative (MEC); and Houston Lighting & Power Company 22 (HL&P).
The NTIS is made up of the following members:
23 Texas Power and Light Company (TPL); Texas Electric Service 24 Company (TESCO) ; Dallas Power & Light Company (DPL) ; West..
l ow 1
Texas titilities (WTU); and Texas Municipal Power Pool (TMPP).
2 The TIS systems together with many smaller utility and 3
municipal systems form the Electric Reliability Council of 4
5 Houston Lighting & Pcwer Company presently has in 6
existence the following transmission interconnections:
7 1.
One 138 IV tie bus connecting the HL&P South Lane 9
City 138 KV Substation with the CP&L Sou?.h Lane 9
City 138 KV Substar:sn, 10 2.
One 138 EV tie bus connecting the HL&P Peters 138 11 KV Substation with the LCRA Peters 138 KV Substa-12
- tion, 13 3.
One 345 IV transmission line connecting the HL&P 14 W. A. Parish 345 KV Substation with the South 15 Texas Project 345 KV Substenion (a joint venture 16 facility with COA, SACPSB, CP&L and HL&P),
17 4.
One 345 KV transmission line connecting the HL&P 18 O'Brien 345 KV Substation with the TP&L Jewett 345 19 KV Substation, 7.nd 20 5.
One 345 KV transmission line connecting the HL&P 21 T. H. Wharton 345 KV Substation with the TP&L Jewett 345 KV Substation.
22 23 By the end of this year (1981) two 345 KV transmission liaes connecting the HL&P Dow-Velssco 345 KV Substation with the 24
~.-.
i
i e
I South Texas Project 345 KV Substation will be completed.
In 2
addition the existing O'Brien to Jev'ett 345 KV transmission 3
line will be " looped through" the Texas Municipal Powel u
4 ll Agency (TMPA) Gibbons Creek 345 KV Substation.
5 Additional transmission interconnections planned 6
for service within the next 10 years are as follows:
7 1.
One 345 KV transmission line co:+ acting the HL&P 8
Tomball 345 KV Substation (future) with the TP&L 9
Jewett 345 KV Substation, 10 2.
One 345 KV transmission line connecting the HL&P 11 King 345 KV Substation (future) with the TMPA 12 Gibbons Creek 345 KV Substation,
'. 3 3.
One 345 KV transmissien line connecting the HL&P 14 Zenith 343 KV Substation (future) with the TPtn, 15 Twin Oak 345 KV Substation (future), and 16 4.
One 345 KV transmission line connecting the HL&P 17 Crosby 345 KV Substation (future) with the TP&L 18 Lufkin 345 KV Substation.
19 In all, HL&P presently has two 138 KV transmission 20 interconnections and three 345 KV transmission interconnec-21 tions.
By the end of this year (1981) two additional 345 KV 22 transmission interconnections will be accomplished.
Pre-23 sently, four more 345 KV transmission interconnections are P anned for service within the next ten years.
Thus, by the l
24 J
1 t ime Allens Creek is in operation we will have 11 interconnec-2 tions with other utilities.
I 3
Q.
Please describe how the HL&P transmission network 4
will be connected to the Allens Creek Nuclear Generating 5
Station onsite electric distribution system.
6 A.
As described in Chapter 8 of the PSAR, the connec-7 tion of the HL&P transmission network to the Allens Creek 8
Nuclear Generating Station onsite electric distribution 9
system will consist of:
(a) two 345 KV standby transformers, 10 (b) a 138 KV standby transformer, (c) the main generator 11 unit, (d) two 345 KV main power transformers, (e) the 345 KV 12 lines connecting the main power transformers and the standby 13 transformers to the substation, (f) the Allens Creek 345 KV 14 Substation, (g) the three 345 KV circuits from the Allens 15 Creek 345 KV Substation to the HL&P 345 K5 transmission 16 network and (b) the 138 KV tap line from the 138 KV standby 17 transformer to the HL&P 138 KV transmission network.
18 The three 345 KV circuits will commence from two 19 points in the HL&P system.
They will commence from O'Brien 20 345 KV Substation and from W. A. Parish.345 KV Substation.
21 These three 345 KV circuits will be on two double circuit 22 tower lines, with eac't. tower line being on independent and 23 physically separate rights-of-way.
One double circuit tower 24 line will be on a right-of-way north of the plant, and in-._.
I cludes the O'Brien-Allens Creek circuit.
The other double 2
circuit tower line will be on a right-of -way south of the 3
plant; it includes the two W. A.
Parish-Allens Creek circuits.
4 The tap line connection to the 138 KV transmission 5
network will commence from a point on the existing 138 KV 6
East Bernard-Peters circuit.
7 The three 345 KV transmission lines constitute 8
three circuits which are available as a supply of offsite 9
power to the two 345 KV standby transformers for accomplish-10 ing two physically independent circuits to the onsite elec-11 trical distribution system.
12 The 138 KV transmission line, although not physically 13 independent of the 345 KV circuits, constitutes a fourth 14 circuit, from a diverse transmission system, which could 15 supply offsite power to the onsite electrical distribution 16 system if necessary.
17 Q.
What reliability criteria are required to be met 13 for an offsite power system supplying a nuclear power plant?
19 A.
The reliability criteria for the offsite power 20 system supplying a nuclear power plant are found in General 21 Design Criteria (GDC) 17 (10 CFR 50, Appendix A).
GDC 17 22 states:
23
" Electrical power from the transmission network to the onsite electric distribution system shall be sup-24 plied by two physically independent circuits (not a sw mee i
1 i necessarily on separate rights of way) designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the 2
likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operat-ing and postulated accident and environmental condi-3 tions.
A switchyard common to both circuits is ac-ceptable.
Each of these circuits shall be designed to 4
be available in sufficient time follcwing a loss of all onsite alternating current power supplies and the other 5
effsite electric power circuit, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design lin.its and design conditions of 6
the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not e..ceeded.
One of these circuits shall be designed to be available
~
7 within a few seconds following a loss-of-coolant ac-cident to assure that core cooling, containment in--
8 tegrity, and other vital safety functions are main-tained.
S Provisions shall be included to minimize the 10 probability of losing. electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of or coincident with, 11 the loss of powcr ur.it, the loss of power from the tronsmission network, or the loss of power from the 12 onsite electric power supplies."
13 Q.
You have already described how Allens Creek wi.11 14 have at least two physically independent circuits from the 15 transmission grid.
What other steps does HL&P take to 16 assure that provisions have been made to minimize the prob-17 ability of losing a supply of offsite electric power to 18 Allens Creek?
19 A.
HL&P has made detailed steady state (load flow) and transient stability analyses of the transmission grid 20 21 system, the results of which provide assurance that should 22 outages of critical transmission lines and/or generators occur on the HL&P system, offsite electric power to Allens l
23 Creek will not be lost.
24 1
I
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t
45 -p-1 Q.
How are steady state and transient stability 2
analyses performed?
3 A.
The stendu state analysis consists of the calcula-4 tion of power flows and voltages of a network for a specified 3
generation schedule and/or set system contingencies.
A 6
mathematical model which describes the characteristics of 7
the individual network components as well as the relations 8
that govern the interconnections of these elements is formu-9 lated.
The informa uon required for a steady state analysis 10 solution includes transmission line and transformer im-11 pedances, generation, loads, transformer taps, static 12 capacitors and shunt reactors as well as voltage regulating 13 capability of the system.
A program for the volta'e and g
14 power flow calculation performs the iterative calculation to 15 obtain bus voltages and then uses these voltages to compute 16 line and transformer loadings.
The program output includes 17 tic line flows, transformer tap settings, voltage data and 18 Jine flows.
Representative results of these studies are 19 shown on PSAR Figures 8.2-3 through 8.2-6.
20 Transient stability studies provide information 21 related to the capability of a power system to remain in 22 synchronism during major disturbances resulting from either 23 the loss of generating or transmission facilities, sudden or 24 sustained load changes, or momentary faults.
In transient I
1 stability studies a steady state analysis calculation is 2
made first to obtain system conditions pri~r to the dis-3 turbance.
The network representation for transient stability 4
'ctudies includc;, in addition to the steady state model 5
components, equivalent circuita for generators.
The transient 6
calculations includa the numerical solution of the differ-7 ential equations describing machine behavior (as well as its 8
associated component systems such as the exciter, voltage 9
regulator and speed governor) and the iterative solution of 10 the network equations to determine the performance of the 11 transmission system.
The program output includes generator 12 internal voltages and angles, current, speed and mechanical 13 torque as well as network power flows and bus voltages.
14 Representative results of these studies are shown on PSAR 15 Figures 8.2-7 through 8.2-9a.
16 Q.
What types of contingencies were simulated in the 17 steady state and transient stability analyses for Allens 18 Creek to provide assurance that provisions have been in-19 cluded to minimize the probability of losing electric power 20 as required by GDC 17?
21 A.
Outages of critical transmission lines and/or generators were selected to simulate any one but not simul-22 taneous o',currence, of the following criteria:
23 a.
loss of any two transmission lines-24.. - -
1 b.
loss of any.one transmission line and any one 2
generator 3
c.
loss of any two generators.
4 It is irrelevant for the purpose cf the study state and 5
transient stability analyses as to the cause (e.g., weather 6
disturbances, accidents, mechanical failures, etc.) of each 7
of the contingencies simulated.
8 Q.
Are you saying that the transmission grid is 9
analyzed for the type of severe weather conditions discussed 10 in Doherty Contention 30?
11 A.
Yes.
We assume that these contingencies could be 12 due to weather or any other cause.
This analysis of the 13 grid system is important because of the overall philosophy 14 of design and operation TIS has built its performance on 15 over the years; that basic philosophy being that no inter-16 connections will be opened and areas thereby isolated for 17 large losses of generation or other similar disturbances in 18 that area.
The TIS philosophy is in contrast to the other 19 areas of the U.S. where systems conventionally open their 20 interconnections to achieve stability following severe l
21 system disturbances.
22 0
How do the steady state and transient stability 23 analyses show the dependability of the offsite power for 24 Allens Creek?
l, _ _.
1 A.
The steady state analysis studies demonstrate that 2
no inoperable voltage levels or' overloaded transmission 3
lines which would hinder the e.ailability of the offsite 4
power supply to Allens Creek result for the contingencies 5
tosced.
The transient stability results demonstrate that no 6
system separation and subsequent power loss in the HL&P and 7
other interconnected systems will occur for the contin-8 gencies considered.
9 Q.
Does the absence of interties between out of state 10 utilities and the HL&P grid affect the question of whether 11 ACNGS can comply with GDC 17?
'. 2 A.
No.
The detailed steady-state and transient 13 stability analyses performed for Allens Creek as previously 14 discussed, provides assurance that HL&P has complied with 15 the NRC requirements of General Design Criteria 17.
Not 16 only has HL&P performed its own internal steady state and 17 transient stability studies, but har also participated, with 18 other TIS members, in jointly conducted interconnected 19 system studies to evaluate the transient response of both 20 the existing and planned ERCOT system to simulated disturb-21 ances.
These studies include the investigation of the 22 performance as well as the requirements of the intercon-23 nected system for the operation of large nuclear and coal 24 generating units scheduled to be in operation in the 1980's.
E
=
1 The intent of these studies is to ensure the system is 2
adequately designed such that disturbances, while possibly 3
revere to the local area, will not propogate on the bulk 4
transmission system and cause cascading breakup and collapse 5
to the TIS.
6 0
What are your conclusions?
7 A.
Doherty Contention 30 is not foundm1 on actual 8
studies or utility experience.
HL&P has performed the 9
necessary engineering studie, to ensure compliance with NRC 10 requirements as they apply to ACNGS.
Moreover, the TIS grid 11 has been shown to be stable when analyzed under the condi-12 tions described on page 10.
The simple fact is that we have 13 more than enough existing and planned interconnections with 14 electric utilities in the State of Texas.
We just do not 15 need to interconnect with electric systems outside Texas to 16 have a reliable electric system.
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 l. - - -..-.
O A
b M 401UIESPONDENCF
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Q*1 g
MAY I b 190I >
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD e
Q*g & Ser.
d.
In the Matter of
)
)
0 m
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-466 N
(Allens Creek Nuclear Generating
)
(/
Station,': nit 1)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE k
0 h
0 g.
- S I hereby certify that copies of Applicant's testi y
s s
on Intervenor Doherty's contentions 30 (Interconnection stability), 10 (Diesel generator reliability), 47 (Turbine a
Missiles), 48 (CRD return line), 6 (Recirculation pump over-speed), 50 (Jet pump beam), 14,25 (Fuel failure /MSLRM); Tex-Pirg's contentions 12 (Cable fires), 39 (Fracture toughness),
AC 21 (occupational exposure), 30 (Charcoal adsorber); and Board questions 6 (Compliance with General Design Criteria 50), and 8 (Sejamic Category - control rods, control rod drives and control unics), in the anove-captioned proceeding were served on the following persons by deposit in the United States mail postage prepaid or hand delivery, this lith day of May, 1981:
Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Susan Plettman, Esq.
Dr.
E. Leonard Cheatum David Preister, Esq.
Route 3, Box 350A Texas Attorney General's Office Watkinsville, Georgia 30677 P.
O.
Box 12548 Capitol Station Mr. Gustave A.
Linenberger Austin, Texas 78711 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Hon. Cnarles J. Dusek U.S. Nuclear Regultory Commission Mayor, City of Wallis Washington, DC 20555 P. O. Box 312 Wallis, Texas 77485 Chase R. Stephens Docketing and Service Section Hon. Leroy H. Grebe Office of the Secretary of County Judge, Austin County the Commission P.
O.
Box 99 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bellville, Texas 77418 Washington, DC 20555 03 5
1/
J ames M. Scott, Jr.
Atomic Safety and Licensing 13935 Ivy Mount Board Panel Sugar Land, Texas-77478 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission William Schuessler Washington, DC 20555 5010 Darnell Houston, Texas 77074 Richard Black, Esq.
U.S. Suc1 car Regulatory Stephen A. Doggett, Esq.
Corrission Washington, DC 20555 P.O. Box 592 Rosenberg, Texas 77471 Jchn F. Doherty 4327 Alconbury Street Bryan L. Baker Houston, Texas 77021 1923 Hawthorne Houston, Texas 77098 J. Morgan Bishop TexPirg Att:
Clarence Johnson Margaret Bishop 11418 Oak Spring Executive Director Houston, Texas 77043 Bcx 237 U.S.
Universit'f of Houston W. Matthew Perrenod Ecuston, Texas 7704 4070 Merrick Houston, Texas 77024 Carro Hinderstein 609 Fannin Street i
Suite 521 Houston, Texas 77002 D. Marrack 420 Mulberry Lane Bellaire, Texas 77401 Brenda McCorkle 6140 Darnell Houston, Texas 77074 Wayne E.
Rentfro P. O. Box 1335 Rosenberg, Texas 77471 N.(
L