ML19347F522

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Testimony of MD Weingart & F Barbieri Re Tx Pirg Addl Contention 10 & Mccorkle Contention 30,charcoal Adsorber Fires.Prof Qualifications Encl.Related Correspondence
ML19347F522
Person / Time
Site: Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png
Issue date: 05/11/1981
From: Barbieri F, Weingart M
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19347F516 List:
References
NUDOCS 8105190519
Download: ML19347F522 (11)


Text

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NM RORRESPOND UNITED STATES OF AMERCIA //

~

1 . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

Ch MM i 3 I901 d BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING EOARD ,

2l omesof tMSec.

3.

, gege &w. 3 In the Matter of ) G i 4- ) r N.

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-46 5 )

(Allens Creek Nuclear Generating )

6- Station, Unit No. 1) )

7 8 DIRECT TESTIMONY OF MELVYN D. WEINGART &

FRED BARBIERI ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.

9 ON TEXPIRG ADDITIONAL CONTENTION 30 - McCORKLE f CONTENTION 17/ CHARCOAL ADSORBER FIRES 10 11 Q. Please state your names, business position and pro-12 fessional qualifications.

l 13 A. My name is Melvyn D. Weingart. My business address 14 is 160 Chubb Avenue, Lyndhurst, New Jersey. I am the 15 Lead Chemical Engineer for the Allens Creek Project. A 16 statement of my background and qualifications is provided l 17 in Exhibit MDW-1 to this testimony.

18 My name is Fred Barbieri. My business address is 160 19 Chubb Avenue, Lyndhurst, New Jersey. I am the Lead Fire 20 Protection Engineer for the Allens Creek Project. A 21 statement of my background and qualifications is provided in 22 Exhibit FB-1 to this testimony.

23 Q. Mr. Weingart, what is the purpose of this testimony?

24 A. This testimony is addressed to the consolidated cor.-

25 tentions of Intervenors TexPirg and McCorkle which question 26 the method selected for extinguishing a fire in the charcoal 27 adsorber beds of the Condenser Offgas System. The con-28 tention implies that the system design should be modified l

l 8203290 gig

e 1 2 to incorporate a water spray capability within the charcoal 3 adsorber beds as a fire protection measure.

4 Q. Would you briefly describe the design features now 5 incorporated in the offgas system?

6 A. The Offgas System is described in PSAR SS 11.3.2, 7 11.3.3, and 11.3.4 and is designed to the requirements 8 of Regulatory Guide 1.143, " Design Guidance for Radioactive 9 waste Management Systems, Structures and components i

10 Installed in Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."

11 Briefly stated, the system uses the adsorption properties 12 of charcoal, operating at 40'F, to selectively adsorb 13 and delay the xenon and krypton isotopes from the carrier 14 gas stream (air). There are a total of four charcoal 15 adsorber vessels each containing approximately seven tons 16 of charcoal. The vessels r.ormally operate at a pressure 17 of 0.7 psig and 40 F but are designed for a pressure of 18 350 psig and 150'F. The operating temperature is well 19 below 640 F which is the ignition temperature of charcoal.

l 20 The operating temperature is maintained by glycol l 21 cooled coils that are external to the vessel and by cooling l

22 the influent stream in the gas cooler located upstream l 23 of the vessels. Should a failure in the refrigeration 24 system occur, it will be annunciated on the system control 25 panel and in the main control room to allow timely corrective 26 action. A redundant refrigeration system and coils are 27 supplied for extended refrigeration equipment outages.

28 0. Mr. Barbieri, how is a fire in a charcoal adsorber

1 2 detected and extinguished?

3 A. In the unlikely event that an ignition occurred in 4 a charcoal adsorber vessel, an increase in bed temperature 5 which could be indicative of a fire would be detected 6 by temperature elements locate d in each bed. These 7l sensors alarm if temperatures in the bed rise above a 8- predetermined set point. A total of three elements per 9 bed are provided: one element is located toward the upper 10 portion of the bed, one element is located near the middle 11 of the bed, and one element is located toward the bottom 12 of the bed. The various temperature element locations 13 help identify the general area of the fire by relaying 14 the rate of temperature rise at different locales.

15 Should a fire take place within a charcoal vessel, 16 it would most likely occur in isolated regions of the bed 17 that could contain charcoal fines. In order to maintain 18 combustion, a source of oxidant (air) must be available.

19 When the oxidant is removed, the fire will be extinguished.

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! 20 This simple principle is the design basis for fire protection 21 in the ACNGS charcoal adsorbers. When a high temperature 22 is indicated in the beds, they are isolated and the vessels 23 purged with nitrogen which displaces the air in the vessels, 24 thereby extinguishing the fire.

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! 25 The addition of water spray would not accelerate 26 extinguishing of a fire in these charcoal beds. As a 27 matter of fact, the use of water would be iletrimental 28 because of the extended time required to subsequently dry

i 1 2 out the bed. This lost time is unsatisfactory if caused by 3 Spurious signals or inadvertent operation.

4 Q. Is there any operational history to support your 5 conclusions about charcoal adsorber fire protection?

6 A. Yes. An incident of the type in question was 7 experienced at the Browns Ferry Plant in 1977. NUREG-g 0442, entitled " Technical Report on Operation Experience g with BWR Offgas Systems," reports the following:

10i Since the offgas systems are designed to with-stand internal explosions, the only concern 11 results from ignitions which result in sustained burning of any combustible material within the 12 system. Such was the case at Browns Ferry in 1977, when a deflagration wave apparently 13 caused isolated local regions of the charcoal adsorber beds to burn. Upon detection of the 14 combustion, the offgas flow was diverted to bypass the adsorber beds. Lacking oxygen 15 supply from the offgas, the combustion was extinguished, consuming only a small fraction 16 of the charcoal.

1 17 A Paper prepared by Dan L. Paul, entitled "Investiga-18 tion of Carbon Adsorber Temperature Excursion - Browns Ferry 1

19 Nuclear Plant - July 17, 1977," provided further detail of 20 the incident and states:

21 The beds were subsequently isolated from the offgas flow and purged with nitrogen to stifle 22 combustion and restore temperature. There was no notable increase in stack gas activity at 23 any time during or following the incident.

24 Thus, in this actual instance the use of a nitrogen purge 25 provided an effective means for extinguishing a fire in 26 an offgas system charcoal adsorber.

27 Q. Please state your conclusions as to this contention.

28 A. The use of water sprays as a means of fire protection

l l 2 for the ACNGS Offgas System charcoal adsorbers is un-8' necessary. The capability to detect an ignition, isolate 4 the beds and displace the oxygen via a nitrogen purge provides an adequate, dependable and proven method for 5l 6 extinguishing fires in the charcoal adsorbers.

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26 27

1 Exhibit MDU-l 2 EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 8 Melvyn D. Weingart 4

SUMMARY

OF EXPERIENCE 6 Principal Engineer with over fifteen years experience 6 of increasing responsibility covering engineering management 7 and design engineering for major fossil and nuclear electric 8 generating projects and research projects.

9 EBASCO EXPERIENCE 10 Principal Chemical Engineer (6 years) 11 As a Lead Discipline Engineer for Nuclear Power Projects, 12 responsible for technical direction of all radwaste systems 18 and miscellaneous clean-up systems, engineering and design 14 including preparaticn of engineering and design criteria, 15 system conceptual design, PSAR/FSAR preparation, equipment 16 specification and procurement, associated follow-up activities, 17 and interdisciplinary interfacing; all in accordance with 1

18 project schedule and manpower allocations.

19 As a Lead Engineer on the TFTR Project, responsible for 20 the design, specification and procurement of " state-of-the-art" 21 Tritium Clcan-Up Systems.

22 PRIOR EXPERIENCE (9 years)

United Engineers and Constructors, Inc.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

  • g Nuclear Staff Engineer 25 Served as a radwaste system consultant on the staff of the Chief Nuclear Engineer. Responsible for radwaste system U design review, 10 CFR 50 Appendix I cost benefit analysis, 28 radwaste system design consultation and NSSS bid evaluations.

1 2 Assigned projects included Seabrook Nuclear Plant, San Joaquin 3 Nuclear Plant, WPPSS Unit Nos. 3 and 5, and Summit Unit 4 Nos. 1 and 2 (HTGR).

5 Served as Lead Radwaste System Engineer far the conceptual 6 design of a two (2) Unit HTGR plant for Louisiana Power &

7 Light Company. Responsibilities included establishment of 8 design criteria, system design and PSAR preparation.

9 American Electric Power Service Corporation New York, New York 10 Associate Engineer 11 Responsible for tha design, equipment specification, bid 12 evaluation, procurement and start-up cf water / waste treatment 13 and sampling equipment for both nuclear and fossil (coal-fired-14 supercritical units) units. Additional responsibilities 15 included the planning and field supervision of chanical cleaning 16 operations for several supercritical fossil generating units.

17 EDUCATION IC Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn - MSOR (Operati,;ns Research)

  • 19 - 1971 20 Drexel Institute of Technology - BSME - 1966 21 REGISTRATIONS 22 Professional Licenses - Pennsylvania (PE-023405-E) - California 23 (NU-637) 24 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS 25 Member - American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 26 Charter Member of the Radwaste Systems Committee (Nuclear 27 Engineering Division) 28

1 PUBLICATIONS 2 Weingart, Stockinger, Rossmassler," Waste Tritium Clean-Up 3 for the Tokomak Fusion Test T.cactor (TFTR) " ASME , 1978.

4 Weingart, Carrol, Paine," Economic Considerations for Radwaste 5 Management Systems," published in " Nuclear Power Waste 6 Technology" ASME, 1978 7 Weingart, 'Cang," Radiation Transport, Gas Waste Management 8 and Containment Accessibility in HTGR's," ANS Winter Meeting 1975.

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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1 Exhibit FPB-1 0' EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 0 Fred P. Barbieri .

4 SUICARY OF EXPERIENCE 5 Professional Affiliations - Member - Society of Fire 6 Protection Engineers 7 Member - National Fire Pro-O tection Association 9 Education - Manhattan College, Bachelor of 10 Engineering (Chemical)-1973 11 EBASCO EXPERIENCE (Since 1978) 12 Ebasco Services Incorporated, Lyndhurst Office: Senior 13 Mechanical Nuclear Engineer assigned to the Allons Creek 14 Nuglear Project. Responsible for the preparation and maintenance of the Plant Fire Hazards Analysis Report to IO be submitted as part of the FSAR to the NRC. Responsible for generating Fire Protection Design Criteria for ACNGS Unit 10 No. 1 and preparation of the Fire Protection System Description.

10 Responsible for all fire protection baseline engineering 20 (flow diagrams, specifications, calculations, piping layouts).

21 Responsible for review of all other baseline engineering 22 associated with fire protecticn measures to insure consistency 1

i 23 with fire protection criteria. Also responsible for the 24 design and layout of the Early Warning Fire Detection Systems.

25 PRIOR EXPERIENCE 26 Burns and Roe, Inc., Paramus, New Jersey, Building 27 Services Department for three (3) years: Cognizant Engineer 28 on Forked River Nuclear Station, Lacey Township, New Jersey 1

I 1 2 for Jersey Central Power & Light Company. Responsible for the 3 design of the fire protection systems including yard system 4 and internal fire suppression systems. This included pre-5 paration of system calculations, system flow diagrams, system d valve lists, piping line lists, equipment 6li esign descriptions, 7 lists, equipment and construction specifications and bid 8 evaluations of said specifications. Responsible for coordinating 9l project effort to produce plant fire hazards analysis, and 10 preparation of final fire hazards analysis report to be sub-11 mitted to NRC. Responsible for design and layout of early 12 warning fire detection systems. Responsible for layout 13 (General Arrangement Drawing) of Fire Protection Pumphouse as 14 well as coordinating design effort to produce fire protection 15 system piping layouts. Responsible for submitting all fire 16 protection related baseline documents, specifications and 17 physical layouts to NELPIA for approval.

18 Also responsible for the baseline engineering design of 19 heating and ventilating systems for the Fire Protection Pump 20 House, Circulating Water Pump House and Turbine Buildings.

21 This included system calculations, system flow diagrams and 22 system design descriptions.

N Cognizant Engineer on Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, 24 Unit II, Royalton Township, Pennsylvania for Jersey Central 25 Power & Light Company. Responsible for the design of the 26 fire protection and detection systems. This included pre-l l

E paration of system flow diagrams, system design descriptions, 28 valve instrument list and specifications. Responsible for

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3-2 coordinating contre.: tor construction effort for installation 3 l of fire protection and detection systems, review and approval 4

4 of vendor drawings and calculations.

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