Information Notice 1996-06, Design & Testing Deficiencies of Tornado Dampers at Nuclear Power Plants
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 January 25, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-06: DESIGN AND TESTING DEFICIENCIES OF TORNADO
DAMPERS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees to the potential for inoperability of tornado
dampers because of either inadequacies in damper testing or deficiencies in
damper design. It is expected that recipients will review the information for
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to
avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information
notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.
Description of Circumstances
On March 2, 1994, the licensee for South Texas Project, Unit 1, reported a
condition to the NRC that could result in the rapid depressurization of
heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems and buildings in the
event of a tornado (Licensee Event Report No.94-003). The licensee
discovered an interference between the plant exhaust vent tornado damper and a
gusset (duct work stru,..turdi stiffener). The gusset limited the closing
travel of the damper linkage in one damper section to 40 percent of full
stroke, thus preventing the damper from closing completely. The interference
was discovered during stroke testing in response to an NRC inspector
observation that there was no testing evidence to show that tornado dampers
would actuate as required. In response to that observation, the licensee
initiated changes to existing preventive maintenance work instructions for all
tornado dampers (15 per unit) to include manual stroking on a periodic basis.
Only one of the 30 dampers subsequently tested was found to be inoperable.
The originally planned periodic maintenance of tornado dampers at 10-year
intervals did not include any stroke or motion testing.
South Texas stated that rapid depressurization could result in the collapse of
the HVAC duct work and could prevent cooling of safety-related equipment. The
rapid depressurization could also cause unanalyzed internal pressure
differential conditions that might result in damage to safety-related
structures, systems, or components.
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IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 The licensee revised the preventive maintenance program to require preventive
maintenance on the tornado dampers every 2 years or at each refueling outage, depending on the specific damper function. The 2 year or refueling outage
check includes inspection, cleaning, lubricating, and stroking of the damper
while taking dynamometer measurements of the spring forces.
On October 22, 1993, the licensee for the River Bend Station reported a design
condition to the NRC (Licensee Event Report No.93-020) that could result in
loss of ventilation to several buildings after passage of a tornado. The
licensee determined through static pressure testing, that the air-exhaust
dampers for several buildings would not reopen after passage of a tornado.
The failure to reopen results from inadequate spring force on dampers to
overcome exhaust fan shutoff pressure. This condition was applicable to the
diesel generator building, the auxiliary building, the control building, the
fuel building, and the standby cooling tower.
The licensee evaluation at the River Bend Station revealed that the postulated
tornado event could cause loss of offsite power and could prevent the
air-intake dampers for the diesel generator from reopening. Other plant areas
were less susceptible to damage because of design features and/or alarms, followed by operator actions that could mitigate the consequences. The
air-exhaust tornado dampers in the diesel generator building were modified by
blocking them open. The licensee evaluated the equipment in the diesel
generator building and concluded that it would not be affected by
depressurization resulting from the tornado.
The licensee purchase specification for dampers required the dampers to be
capable of automatically returning to their normal operating position (open)
after the tornado passed. However, the specification did not specify the
design-bases conditions on the inlet side of the exhaust tornado dampers. The
static pressure that the damper counterweights would have to overcome was not
specified.
Discussion
Equipment such as tornado dampers may have been overlooked in development of
surveillance testing programs as tornado dampers are not generally considered
part of the HVAC system in which they are required to function. Tornado
dampers are more likely to be considered part of the structure in which they
are installed. Surveillance tests in the technical specifications may involve
damper operations during HVAC systems testing. However, specific NRC
requirements or guidelines for damper testing in general are limited and do
not extend to tornado dampers. Likewise, industry standards and guidelines
for testing of tornado dampers are also limited. Unlike other active safety- related dampers that are generally tested along with the HVAC system in which
they function, the licensees considered tornado dampers as passive devices
until they were called upon to perform their function.
'wO IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 When called on, certain dampers must close to prevent rapid depressurization
within the structures and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado a
passes. In cases for which no redundancy exists, a single failure of of safety
tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss
for
system function. Therclore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing
tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.
If
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. contact
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please of
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
4ennr . CrutCoto d rector
Division of Reactor rogram Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR
(301) 415-3285 Internet:wtllenrc.gov
(301) 415-1176 Internet:txk@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
tr -;1
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Attachment
IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
96-05 Partial Bypass of Shutdown 01/18/96 All holders of OLs or LPs
Cooling Flow from the for boiling water reactors
Reactor Vessel
96-04 Incident Reporting Require- 01/10/96 All radiography licensees
ments for Radiography and manufacturers of radio- Licensees graphy equipment
96-03 Main Steam Safety Valve 01/05/96 All holders of OLs or CPs
Setpoint Variation as a for nuclear power reactors
Result of Thermal Effects
96-02 Inoperability of Power- 01/05/96 All holders of OLs or CPs
Operated Relief Valves for PWRs
Masked by Downstream
Indications During Testing
96-01 Potential for High Post- 01/03/96 All holders of OLs or CPs
Accident Closed-Cycle for PWRs
Cooling Water Temperatures
to Disable Equipment
Important to Safety
95-58 10 CFR 34.20; Final 12/18/95 Industrial Radiography
Effective Date Licensees
95-57 Risk Impact Study Regarding 12/18/95 All holders of OLs or CPs
Maintenance During Low-Power for nuclear power reactors.
Operation and Shutdown
OL - Operating License
CP - Construction Permit
IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 When called on, certain dampers must close to prevent rapid depressurization
within the structures and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado
passes. In cases for which no redundancy exists, a single failure of a
tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of safety
system function. Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing for
tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
original signed by
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR
(301) 415-3285 Internet:wtl1@nrc.gov
(301) 415-1176 Internet:txk@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Tech Editor Reviewed 10/05/95 DOCUMENT NAME: 96-06.IN *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
To receive a copy of this document, hIdicate In the box: wC" - Copy without enclosures 'E' - Copy with enclosures "N" - No copy
OFFICE SPLB/DSSA PECB/DRPM C/PECB:DRPM
INAME WTLeFave* ITKoshy* AChaffee* Dtfkidhfield I
DATE 10/11/95 01/04/96 01/17/96 01/9/96 01/ /96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 96-xx
January xx, 1996 They must then close to prevent rapid depressurization within the structures
and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for
which no redundancy exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform
its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.
Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing for tornado dampers
could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR
(301) 415-3285 Internet: wtl1@nrc.gov
(301) 415-1176 Internet: txk@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP
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DATE 101/A/96 01/5 /96 e 01/17 /96 e 01/ /96
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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IN 96-xx
January xx, 1996 They must then close to prevent rapid depressurization within the structures
and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for
which no redundancy exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform
its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.
Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing for tornado dampe
could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.
This information notice requires no specific action or written r onse. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, p ase contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropria Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Dennis M. Cr chfield, Director
Division of eactor Program Management
Office of uclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, RR
(301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, R
(301) 415-117 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Info ation Notices
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NAME WTLeFave* GHubbardJ TECH ED/BCalure CMcCracken * l
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 95-xx
December xx, 1995 They must then close to prevent rapid depressurization within the structures
and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for
which no redundancy exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform
its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.
Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing for tornado dampers
could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR
(301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, NRR
(301)415-1176 Attachments:
1. Referenced Codes and Standards2
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP
OFFICE SPLB/DSSA l E SC:SPLB/DSSA N )ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA I C IRIV/DRS I N
NAME WTLeFave* GHubbard * TECH ED/BCalure CMcCracken *
DATE 10/11/95 110/11/95 10/05/95 10/12/95 / /95 OFFICE .EBDRML SOCB/OPSIE CB/DOP I lIC/EBDOS I l P I
NAME TKoshy* EGoodwin* Rbe ssel AChaffee DCrutchfield
DATE 11/29/95 ' 10/12/95 / 1 / /95 / /95
- See previous Concurrence I
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY zmy-
2 See Exhibit 24 for the format to be used when codes or standards are
referenced in the information notice.
IN 95-xx
December xx, 1995 depressurization within the structures and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after
the tornado passes. In cases which no redundancy exists, a single failure of
a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of
safety system function. Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance
testing for tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR
(301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, NRR
(301)415-1176 Attachments:
1. Referenced Codes and Standards2
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP
OFFICE jSPLB/DSSA I E SC:SPLB/DSSA I N ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA I C RIV/DRS I N
NAME WTLeFave* GHubbard * TECH ED/BCalure CMcCracken *
DATE 10/11/95 10/11/95 10/05/95 10/12/95 I /95
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DATE 11/29/95 I10/12/95 / /95 \ / /95 5 I / /95_
- See previous Concurrence
C)FFICIAL RECORD COPY
2 See Exhibit 24 for the format to be used when codes or standards are
referenced in the information notice.
I . .i -A -a -. 1- IN 95-xx
October xx, 1995 depressurization within the structures and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after
the tornado passes. In cases which no redundancy exists, a single failure of
a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of
safety system function. Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance
testing for tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR
(301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, NRR
(301)415-1176 Attachments:
1. Referenced Codes and Standards2
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
OFFICE SPLB/DSSA E SC:SPLB/DSSA I N ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA I C RIV/DRS I N
NAME jWTLeFave* GHubbard * TECH ED/BCalure CMcCracken *
DATE 110/11/95 10/11/95 10/05/95 10/12/95 I /95I_
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11 OFFICE PECB/DRPM-I E ISC:OECB/DOPS I E I1ECB/DOPS I N IC/OECB:DOPS I ID/DRPM I I
NAME TKoshy dtL l EGoodwin* . I RKWib!el IAChaffee lDCrutchfield l
DATE nI29i 95 10/12/95 11&& L /91S I / /95 4%, I / /95
- See previous Concurrence
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
2 See Exhibit 24 for the format to be used when codes or standards are
referenced in the information notice.