Information Notice 1996-15, Unexpected Plant Performance During Performance of New Surveillance

Unexpected Plant Performance During Performance of New Surveillance

ML031060222
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	03/08/1996
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-96-015, NUDOCS 9603040234
Download: ML031060222 (9)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March 8, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-15: UNEXPECTED PLANT PERFORMANCE DURING PERFORMANCE

OF NEW SURVEILLANCE TESTS

Addressees

power

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees to the potential for unexpected plant performance of

during new surveillance tests performed in accordance with implementation

improved Standardized Technical Specifications. It is expected that

recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

In November 1995, Unit 2 of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant was in its

twelfth refueling outage in the cold shutdown mode; the "A" loop of the

residual heat removal system was in the shutdown cooling mode. In accordance

with the recent licensee implementation of improved Standardized Technical

Specifications, component operation from the remote shutdown panel was being

tested for the first time. When maintenance and operations personnel during

performed activities to determine the cause of deficiencies identified reactor

the testing, approximately 12,000 gallons of water drained out of the

vessel in less than 1 minute. The low level of water in the reactor vesselthe

triggered automatic isolation of the shutdown cooling system, terminating a

event. Further investigation revealed that an interlock designed to prevent the

draindown had been set improperly, actually causing the event. Although

event was compounded by personnel, procedural, and maintenance errors, NRC

inspectors attributed the root cause to inadequate modification, maintenance, and testing control with respect to the remote shutdown panel and related

equipment.

Over several years, various modifications were made to components which Post- operate from both the main control room and the remote shutdown panel.

modification testing of the components had not included operation from the on

remote shutdown panel, nor were any periodic surveillance tests performed

the remote shutdown panel. The new surveillance test, when completed, revealed that five valves, two valve position indications, one pump

indication, and one annunciator were inoperable when control was transferred

9603040234 tACI O1 PP X i- a041%C& 96-or 46iD Og

IN 96-15 March 8, 1996 to the remote shutdown panel. Prior to the performance of the valve

operations from the remote shutdown panel, the facility did not adequately

ensure that the new surveillance tests included sufficient operational and

procedural controls to minimize the potential for a draindown path.

Discussion

The recent implementation of improved Standardized Technical Specifications

may result in surveillance tests using circuitry that previously went

unchallenged. Over time, these circuits may have degraded or been modifiedbe

and cause unexpected performance. The normal plant configuration may notnormal

the most desirable configuration for these new tests. For example, the

control switch lineup on the remote shutdown panel may be an appropriate

lineup for mitigating a control room fire, but may be less appropriate for

testing individual components. The licensee operational experience described

in this information notice highlights the importance of plant configuration

control when implementing new surveillance tests.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

4 .Cru

of Reactor

Direc t or

Program Management

Division

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

References

1. Licensee Event Report 50-366/95-008, 'Reactor Vessel Inventory Loss

Results in Unplanned Engineered Safety Feature System Actuation,"

(Accession No. 9512050133).

2. NRC Inspection Report 50-366/95-26 (Accession No. 9512270044).

3. NRC Inspection Report 50-366/95-23 (Accession No. 9512190043).

Technical contacts: Paul M. Steiner, RII

(404) 331-4187 Internet: pmsl@nrc.gov

Neal K. Hunemuller, NRR

(301) 415-1152 Internet:nkg~nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

K)

Attachment

IN 96-15 March 8, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

96-14 Degradation of Radwaste 03/01/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

Facility Equipment at for nuclear power reactors

Millstone Nuclear Power

Station, Unit 1

96-13 Potential Containment 02/26/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

Leak Paths Through for nuclear power reactors

Hydrogen Analyzers

96-12 Control Rod Insertion 02/15/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

Problems for nuclear power reactors

96-11 Ingress of Demineralizer 02/14/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

Resins Increases Potential for pressurized water

Stress Corrosion Cracking nuclear power reactors

of Control Rod Drive

Mechanism Penetrations

96-10 Potential Blockage by 02/13/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

Debris of Safety System for nuclear power reactors

Piping Which is Not Used

During Normal Operation

or Tested During Surveil- lances

96-09 Damage in Foreign Steam 02/12/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

Generator Internals for pressurized water

reactors

96-08 Thermally Induced Pres- 02/05/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

sure Locking of a High for nuclear power reactors

Pressure Coolant Injec- tion Gate Valve

96-07 Slow Five Percent Scram 01/26/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

Insertion Times Caused for boiling water reactors

By Viton Diaphragms in

Scram Solenoid Pilot

Valves

0 Operating License

OL

CP = Construction Permit

IN 96-15 March 8, 1996 to the remote shutdown panel. Prior to the performance of the valve

operations from the remote shutdown panel, the facility did not adequately

ensure that the new surveillance tests included sufficient operational and

procedural controls to minimize the potential for a draindown path.

Discussion

The recent implementation of improved Standardized Technical Specifications

may result in surveillance tests using circuitry that previously went

unchallenged. Over time, these circuits may have degraded or been modified

and cause unexpected performance. The normal plant configuration may not be

the most desirable configuration for these new tests. For example, the normal

control switch lineup on the remote shutdown panel may be an appropriate

lineup for mitigating a control room fire, but may be less appropriate for

testing individual components. The licensee operational experience described

in this information notice highlights the importance of plant configuration

control when implementing new surveillance tests.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

original signed by

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

References

1. Licensee Event Report 50-366/95-008, 'Reactor Vessel Inventory Loss

Results in Unplanned Engineered Safety Feature System Actuation,"

(Accession No. 9512050133).

2. NRC Inspection Report 50-366/95-26 (Accession No. 9512270044).

3. NRC Inspection Report 50-366/95-23 (Accession No. 9512190043).

Technical contacts: Paul M. Steiner, RII

(404) 331-4187 Internet: pmslnrc.gov

Neal K. Hunemuller, NRR

(301) 415-1152 Internet:nkg~nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 02/16/96 DOCUMENT NAME: 96-15.IN *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

To receive a copy of this document indicate In the box: 'C' - Copy without enclosures

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NAME

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DATE 02/09/96 02/22/96 /96 l 02/22/96 --

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

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IN 96-xx

March xx, 1996 adequately ensure that the new surveillance tests Included sufficient

operational and procedural controls to minimize the potential for a draindown

path.

Discussion

The recent implementation of Standardized Technical Specifications may require

licensees to perform surveillance testing on components using circuitry that

previously went unchallenged. Over time, these circuits may have degraded or

changed to the point at which unexpected performance may occur. The normal

plant configuration may not be the most desirable configuration for these new

tests. For example, the normal control switch lineup on the remote shutdown

panel may be an appropriate lineup for mitigating a control room fire, but may

be inappropriate for testing individual components. The licensee's

operational experience described in this information notice highlights the

importance of plant configuration control when implementing new surveillance

tests.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

References

1. Licensee Event Report 50-366/95-008, "Reactor Vessel Inventory Loss

Results in Unplanned Engineered Safety Feature System Actuation,"

(Accession No. 9512050133).

2. NRC Inspection Report 50-366/95-26 (Accession No. 9512270044).

3. NRC Inspection Report 50-366/95-23 (Accession No. 9512190043).

Technical contacts: Paul M. Steiner, RII Neal K. Hunemuller, NRR

(404) 331-4187 (301) 415-1152 Internet: pmsl@nrc.gov Internet: nkh~nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUtIENT NAME: $:XNKHIN. HATCH

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

To receive a copy of thts document, Indicate in the box C=Copy w/o attachment/enclosure E=Copy with attachment/enclosure M

• No copy

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.,e recent implepientation.of Standardized Technical Sp ifications may require

licensees to perform surye'illance testing on componen s using circuitry that

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I was previously unchallenged. Over a period of time ese circuits may have -

degraded Lo the doit whereinexpected performance ay occur. The.normal

plant configurationm ay¶ortTbe the most desirable, onfiguration for these new

tests. For example, the_~Ormal control switch line-up on the Remote Shutdown

Panel mayke an appropr-4dte lilne-up for mitigating'a control room fire,Ibut

may not-be appropriate for individual component tes t q. Prior to I

implementing a new surfp lance test, careful/'consideritAn should be given to

plant configuratlo!y -we  ;-/ -

This informationrnotlce requires'rno specŽ 443tion or written response. If

you have any questions about the informa itoFl his notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the-dppropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactot Regulation (NRR) projet,/manaqer.

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

Division of Reactgr Program Management

Office 'of.Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Reference

1. Licensee Event Report 0-366/95-008, "Reactor Vessel Inventory Loss

Results in Unplanned gineered Safety Feature tystem Actuation,"

(Accession No. 95120 133).

Technical contacts: P ul M. Steiner, RII

.404) 331-4187 Internet: pmsltnrc.gov

Neal K. Hunemuller, NRR

(301) 415-1152 Internet: nkh~nrc.gov'

Attachment:

List of Recently ssued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\

OFFICE ECB/ M E C/TSB E C/PECB:DOPS

NAME Nhunemuller -; /AgibsonCg rimes . Tech Ed. Achaffee

DATE .0/ /96  ?/96 0 1/ /96 1 /_/96 OFFICE _D/ORPM A r I

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TOTAL P.01 o I o q9 96 C4, N: , O; _

IN 96-xx

March xx, 1996 Discussion

The recent implementation of Standardized Technical Specifications may require

licensees to perform new surveillance testing such as operability testing of

components from the Remote Shutdown Panel. The normal plant configuration

may not be the most desirable configuration for these new tests. For example, the normal control switch line-up on the Remote Shutdown Panel may be an

appropriate line-up for mitigating a control room fire, but may not be

appropriate for individual component testing.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.,

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Reference

1. Licensee Event Report 50-366/95-008, 'Reactor Vessel Inventory Loss

Results in Unplanned Engineered Safety Feature System Actuation,"

(Accession No. 9512050133).

Technical contacts: Paul M. Steiner, RII

(404) 331-4187 Internet: pmsl~nrc.gov

Neal K. Hunemuller, NRk

(301) 415-1152 Internet: nkh@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\NKH\IN HATCH

OFFICE PECB/DRPMJE DRSR CTSB E C/PECB:DOPS

NAME NHunemuller AGibson CGrimes jTech Ed. AChaffee

DATE JOz/96 0 / /96 t /96 1 / /96 0/ /96 OFFICE D/DRPM 1 NAME DCrutchfield

DATE 1 / /96 10/ /96 1 / /96 1 / /96 1 / /96

• See previous Concurrence

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY