ML18102A310

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LER 96-005-04:on 960325,TS Surveillance Requirement Implementation Deficiencies Identified.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls & Understanding of Development Weakness. Procedures revised.W/960812 Ltr
ML18102A310
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 08/09/1996
From: Garchow D, Hassler D
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-96-005-03, LER-96-5-3, LR-N96235, NUDOCS 9608200220
Download: ML18102A310 (10)
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Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit AUG 12 1996 LR-N96235 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

LER 272/96-005-04 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 This Licensee Event Report Supplement entitled "Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement Implementation Deficiencies" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B).

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David F. ~how General Manager -

Salem Operations Attachment SORC Mtg.96-105 DVH/tcp C Distribution LER File 3.7

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  • 9608200220 960809 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR Th~ pcJ1.rc:r is in \Uur h,mlb.

95-2168 REV. 6/94

Document Control Desk LR-N9623"5 Attachment A The following item represents the commitments that Public Service Electric

& Gas (PSE&G) made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) relative to this LER (272/96-005-04). The commitments are as follows:

1. The Charcoal trays and test canisters are being replaced in the Auxiliary Building Ventilation, Control Area Ventilation and the Fuel Handling Ventilation systems. Both the trays and canisters are being sent to a vendor for replacement. This will be completed by Mode 6 for the Control Area and Fuel Handling Ventilation systems, and Mode 4 for the Auxilary Building Ventilation system.
2. A consultant with experience in nuclear ventilation systems design and testing is in the process of conducting.a review to verify that ventilation systems testing is in compliance with the Technical Specifications Surveillance and UFSAR requirements.
3. Ventilation procedures will be revised by Mode 6 for the Control Area and Fuel Handling Ventilation systems, and Mode 4 for the Auxilary Building Ventilation system.

NRCFORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95) EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WfTH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION

-.

AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-41 ~ ~NUCLEAR (See reverse for required number of REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 5 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT &:160-0104), Ol:FiCE OF digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE(8)

SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 05000272 1 OFS TITLE(4)

Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirement Implementation Deficiencies EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I SEQUENTIAL !REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Salem Unlt2 05000311 03 25 96 96 - 005 - 04 08 09 96 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING N THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE(9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73(a)(2)(i) 50. 73(11)(2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(*)(3)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(x) 0 LEVEL{10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71

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20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50. 73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(11)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50. 73(a)(2)(v) Spec~ln Abatnct below or In C Form 388A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Dennis v. Hassler, LER Coordinator 609-339-1989 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPROS TONPROS 1111111111:

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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR IYES XINO SUBMISSION (If yea, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 1p11cea, i.e., 11pproxim11taly 15 iingle-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

In December 1995, a Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) was initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TS SIP program was described previously in LER 311/95-008-00. This project is expected to be completed by December 31, 1997. As a result of this effort, Technical Specifications (TS) non-compliances have been identified by the review team. Most of these non-compliances have been found in the area of surveillance requirement implementation deficiencies and will be (are being) reported as supplements to this LER - 272/96-005.

This supplement LER documents a failure to properly implement Technicai Specification Surveillance for replacing charcoal canisters and refilling canisters did not contain the ANSI N509 requirements for filling, and leak and resistance testing the canisters.

Because these requirements were not performed for the test canisters, this constitutes a missed surveillance.

The apparent cause of this occurrence is attributed to a lack of adequate controls and understanding of the development and maintenance of Technical Specification surveillance procedures. The Corrective action for this occurr.ence is a procedure revision to ensure Technical Specification compliance.

These events are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) ( B)' any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

NRC FORM 388 (4-95)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAR I SE.fill.:':'l~AL I~,:~ 2 OF 8 SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 96 - 005 - 04 TEXT (If more apace la required, use 11ddltion11I copiea of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Tavg Instrumentation (RCP) {AB/-}*

Sustained Degraded Voltage Instrumentation (4KV) {EB/-}

Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (AB) {VF/-}

Fuel Handling Building (FHB) Ventilation System {VG/-}

Containment Fan Coolers {BK/CLR}

Containment Sump {NH/-}

Control Area Ventilation {VI/-}

  • Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear in the text as (SS/CCC).

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of identification, Salem Units 1 and 2 were shutdown and defueled.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE As a Corrective Action from LER 311/95-006 a Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated. Additional deficiencies found during the TSSIP will be documented in supplements to this LER.

LER 272/96-005-00 described an event that occurred due to the identification of a Technical Specification (TS) surveillance test inadequacy. This supplement describes additional occurrences of a Technical Specification surveillance implementation deficiencies identified during the Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) review.

On March 25, 1996, during a review of the implementation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.1, the TSSIP team identified a Technical Specification violation regarding Channel Checks. Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.1 requires a Channel Check on the instrument channels listed in Table 4.3-2. Items 1.f and 4.d of Table 4.3-2 list Engineered Safety Feature Actuations which occur on Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines--

HIGH coincident with Tavg--LOW-LOW or Steam Line Pressure--LOW. The Channel Check requirements apply such that a comparison of the Steam Line Flow {SB/-}indications is to be made once per shift in Modes 1, 2 and 3, as are comparisons of the Tavg instruments, and the Steam Line Pressure instrume,its. A further review determined that Channel Checks were not being performed on the Tavg instruments since at least November 23, 1979 as required in Modes 1, 2 and 3.

On April 3, 1996, during a review of the implementation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.1, the team identified a Technical Specification violation regarding Channel Checks. Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.1 requires a Channel Check on the instrument channels listed in Table 4.3-2. Item 7.b of Table 4.3-2 lists Engineered Safety Feature Actuations which occur upon a Vital Bus Sustained Degraded Voltage. The three (3) Vital Bus Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments on each 4KV bus require Channel Checks once per shift in Modes 1, 2 and 3. The TSSIP determined that the Vital Bus Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments were not adequately Channel Checked in Modes 1, 2 and 3 as required by Technical Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-96)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILfTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE(3) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION MJMBER 3 OF 8 SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 96 - 005 - 04 TEXT (If more apace is required, UH additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd)

The Sustained Degraded Voltage instrumentation was added to Salem Unit 1 and 2 vital 4KV buses in April of 1982 and June of 1983, respectively. The Technical Specifications for both units were revised to reflect the Sustained Degraded Voltage instrumentation effective July 23, 1982 by Amendments 45 (Unit 1) and 10 (Unit 2). A review of historical documentation concluded that the Channel Check requirements specified in the revised Technical Specifications were not implemented.

The review also identified that the Channel Check requirements for 4KV Vital Bus Undervoltage instruments were apparently not satisfied from initial plant operation of either unit until 1989. These checks were required in Modes 1, 2 and 3 by Item 7 of Table 4.3-2 in the original issue of Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications, which became Item 7.a when the Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments were installed. This conclusion is based on the oldest record found which was a Unit 1 log taken for Modes 1 through 4, dated November 23, 1979, and review of subsequent revisions to the same log.

In January of 1988, the Unit 1 Sustained Degraded Voltage instrumentation was changed from a 2 out of 3 bus logic to a 2 out of 3 per bus logic in response to the Salem Unit 2 event of August 26, 1986, which resulted in the Unit 2 vital buses transferring back and forth between Station Power Transformers 21 and 22 until they finally separated from offsite power. Salem Unit 2 was similarly modified in March of 1990. The Technical Specifications for both units were revised by Amendments 102 (Unit 1) and 79 (Unit 2),

effective September 25, 1989, to address the modifications.

The review of available documentation concluded that the Channel Check requirements specified in the revised Technical Specifications were not implemented. As described above, a Channel Check of the 4KV Vital Buses was added to the Operating Logs for Modes 1-4 in 1989.

On May 6, 1996, the TSSIP Team identified an inadequacy in the bypass testing of the Auxiliary Building (AB) {NF} and Fuel Handling Building (FHB) {ND} ventilation systems.

Salem Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification surveillances for the AB exhaust air leakage filtration systems, TS 4.7.7.1.b.1 (TS 4.7.7.b.l) for units 1 and 2 respectively, and FHB area ventilation system (TS 4.9.12.b.l) were not adequately met. Specifically, the surveillance did not demonstrate that the total bypass flow of ventilation system to the facility plant vent, including leakage through the ventilation system diverting valves, is less than or equal to 1% when the system is tested by admitting cold Dioctyl Phthalate (DOP) at the system intake.

During the FHB ventilation testing, the test gas is injected at a common point upstream of the normal and emergency filter units. The downstream sample, however, is only taken inside the emergency filter unit. While this test setup satisfied the requirement for the HEPA filter in-place efficiency test required by TS 4.7.7.1.B.3 (TS 4.7.7.1.B.2), it does not adequately measure the bypass flow leakage through the normal filtration unit as required by TS, which isolates during an accident or a high radiation signal. Similar test setup conditions existed during the AB ventilation system testing.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) *

  • PAGE(3) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 4 OF 8 SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 96 - 005 - 04 TEXT (If more apace ia required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd)

On May 8, 1996, the TSSIP Team also identified a testing inadequacy with respect to maintaining a negative pressure in the spent fuel pool area. TS surveillance 4.9.12.d.4 (4.9.12.d.3) requires that a negative pressure be maintained between the spent fuel pool area and the outside atmosphere during system operations. Procedure SC.RP-TI.ZZ-1140, Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System Negative Pressure Test, which is used to perform this test, does not adequately demonstrate compliance with the TS requirement. The procedure verifies that a negative pressure is maintained using the normal operation (HEPA filter bank only) system lineup. The intent of the surveillance is to demonstrate that a negative pressure can be maintained with the system in its accident mode lineup (HEPA plus Charcoal).

On May 8, 1996, the TSSIP Team also identified a deficiency in the implementation of TS 3.3.2.1, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signal (ESFAS) Table 3.3-5, item 2H.

Specifically, TS 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3-5, item 2H, Containment Fan Coolers {BK}, for both Salem units, requires a total instrument channel response time of less than or equal to 40 seconds in Modes 1 - 3, when the initiation signal is generated by the containment high pressure sensors. Procedure S1(2) .IC-TR.ZZ-0002, Unit 1(2) Master Time Response, calculates the total instrumentation channel response time by adding the inputs from a series of implementing response time procedures. The result for each instrumentation channel is then compared to the TS Table 3.3-5 acceptance criteria. When reviewing the calculation results for Item 2H, it was noted that the response time for_ containment high

- high was utilized instead of containment high. A review and recalculation of past completed surveillances for item 2H indicates that the TS required time response was not exceeded.

On May 22, 1996, the Salem Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) identified that the control and implementation of procedure SC.RP-TI.ZZ-1102, Containment Entries At Power, was not adequate to meet the visual inspection or mode applicability requirements of the Technical Specification Surveillance 4.5.2.c.2.

Surveillance 4.5.2.c.2 requires a daily visual inspection of the areas affected within the containment by containment entry when Containment Integrity is established. The daily visual inspection is only required if Containment entry has occurred since the last visual inspection. Technical Specification 4.5.2 is applicable in Modes 1 through 4, and Containment Integrity is a prerequisite to entry into Mode 4.

Investigation determined that responsibility for Technical Specification Surveillance 4.5.2.c.2 was transferred from the Operations Department to the Radiation Protection Department in late 1983. The transfer of responsibility was not sufficiently controlled to assure compliance with the mode applicability and visual inspection requirements of Technical Specification Surveillance 4.5.2.c.2. Since 1983, the Radiation Protection procedure implementing Technical Specification 4.5.2.c.2 was revised numerous times. This provided opportunities to identify that the mode applicability and visual inspection requirements were not being properly implemented.

On July 11, 1996 a review determined the* testing of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation, Control Area Ventilation and the Fuel Handling Ventilation systems charcoal canisters did not meet the Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications surveillance requirements. The Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications 4.7.6.1.b.2, 4.7.6.1.c, 4.7.7.b.3, 4.7.7.c, 4.9.12.b.3 and 4.9.12.c require analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978. The Regulatory Guide references ANSI N509-1976 which defines the method of filling the test canisters and requirements for leak and resistance testing of the test canisters.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

NRC FORM 386A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME-(1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER 6) PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 5 OF 8 SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 96 - 005 - 04 TEXT (If more apace ia required, use addition*! copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd)

The charcoal trays were sent offsite to a vendor and filled, packed and tested in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. However the test canisters were refilled onsite by the Maintenance Department personnel. The work orders and procedures for replacing the canisters and refilling did not contain the ANSI N509 requirements for filling, and leak and resistance testing the canisters. Because these requirements were not performed for the test canisters, this constitutes a missed surveillance~

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of these occurrences has been attributed to a lack of adequate controls and understanding of the development and maintenance of Technical Specification surveillance procedures. This weakness was previously identified in LER 311/95-008.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 identified four LERs in the last two years related to missed Technical Specification Surveillances due to a procedural deficiency:

LER 272/96-006 "Missed Independent Verification of Release Lineup on Waste Gas Decay Tanks" identified an occurrence where an independent verification of the release lineup if radiation monitor 1(2)R41C is inoperable. This was caused by a procedure that had the verification step removed during a previous procedure revision.

LER 272/96-004 "Technical Specification 4.6.1.1 Incomplete Containment Isolation Valve Position Verification Surveillance" identified an occurrence where Containment Isolation valves were omitted from monthly position verification surveillances due to inadequate imp~ementation of Technical Specification surveillance requirements into procedures.

LER 272/94-008 "Quarterly Channel Functional Testing of Position Indication For Power Operated Relief Valves Missed On Both Units" identified an occurrence where a procedure was revised in response to Generic Letter 90-06 without a revision to Technical Specifications which resulted in missed surveillance testing of Power Operated Relief Valves while in Modes 1 and 2.

LER 311/95-008, "Technical Specification 4.9.9 Missed Isolation Initiation Testing" identified an occurrence where Containment Purge and Pressure-Vacuum Relief system isolation logic was not fully tested prior to and during Core Alterations due to inadequate implementation of Technical Specificatic~ surveillance requirements into procedures.

LER 311/95-006-00 "Missed Surveillance - Charcoal Adsorber Testing Exceeded Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirement Time Limit" identified an occurrence where a charcoal adsorber in the Control Area Ventilation system was not tested after 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of operation as required by the Technical Specifications.

LER 311/96-005-00 "Missed Surveillance of Fuel Handling Building Charcoal Adsorber Test" identified an occurrence where a Salem Unit 2 Fuel Handling Building (FHB) charcoal adsorber sample was tested in October 1995 to Salem Unit 1 acceptance criteria.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

NRC FORM 388A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 11) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) - PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 6 OF 8 SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 96 - 005 - 04 TEXT (If more space i* required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS Tavg Channel Checks:

There were no safety consequences for this occurrence since plant operators monitor Tavg readings for each loop once every eight (8) hours in Modes 1 and 2, and every 30 minutes if the reactor is critical and Tavg is below 551°F with the Tavg-Tref in alarm. In addition, the RC Loops Tavg Deviation alarm provides a continuous monitor of the deviation between all Tavg channels - alarming at a preset value. While not a Technical Specification required function, this alarm would readily alert operators to any significant deviation between Tavg indications. The alarm response requires monitoring Tavg readings and initiating repairs to restore faulty instrumentation. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Undervoltage Instrument Channel Checks:

There were no safety consequences for this occurrence since plant operators monitor the vital 4KV bus voltages and the 13KV bus voltages every shift in Modes 1, 2 and 3 with minimum and maximum acceptable values specified. Channel Functional Tests of the Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments are performed on a monthly basis in Modes 1, 2 and 3 and verify operability of the instruments. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public ~ere not affected.

Filtration systems The operation of the filtration systems has a direct impact on the off-site dose calculation. There were no consequences associated with the deficient implementation of the FHB and AB TS surveillances. The potential consequences of a design basis event, a LOCA with bypass flows in excess of 1% or a fuel handling accident without adequate negative pressure, could have resulted in 10CFRlOO and GDC-19 limits being exceeded.

However, using a more realistic source term value given the present extended shutdown condition of the Salem units, similar potential events would yield acceptable results even without filtration. Therefore, delaying the performance of the surveillances has no impact on the health and safety of the public.

Containment Fan Coolers As demonstrated by the satisfactory results of the recalculation of the TS surveillances, the ability of the Containment Fan Cooler Units to perform their intended safety function was maintained. Therefore, the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Containment Loose Debris Inspection There were no safety consequences for this occurrence. The implications of not performing a visual inspection is loose fibrous material that could become dislodged during an event and be transported to and block the Containment sump. However, housekeeping procedures, routine monitoring of work activities by job supervision and Radiation Protection technicians, and tracking of materials left in Containment provided reasonable assurance that loose material capable of being transported to the Containment sump was not present.

Therefore, the health and safety of the public was not affected by this occurrence.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

.

NRC FORM 386A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-96)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER 6) PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAR I SE.fillJ:J~AL :a~ 7 OF 8 SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 96 - 005 - 04 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS (cont'd)

Charcoal Test Canisters There were no safety consequences associated with the deficient implementation of these surveillances. The charcoal trays which perform the safety function and adsorption were not affected by this occurrence. There is no indication that the charcoal trays would not have performed their function. The health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. A Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was described previously in LER 311/95-008-00. The TSSIP review is expected to be completed by December 31, 1997.
2. Channel Checks of Tavg instruments will be incorporated into the operating logs for Modes 1 through 4 prior to each Unit restart.
3. Channel Checks of the Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments will be incorporated into the operating logs for Modes 1 through 4 prior to each Unit restart.
4. The appropriate procedures were reviewed and the FHB testing procedure was revised to incorporate additional guidance to ensure adequate bypass flow and negative pressure testing.
5. An in-depth review of the Technical Specifications regarding ventilation system testing was performed by Radiation Protection personnel with no additional deficiencies identified.
6. The total bypass flow and negative pressure testing for the Units 1 and 2 FHB will be demonstrated acceptable prior to fuel movement, as appropriate.
7. The total bypass flow for the Units 1 and 2 AB ventilation systems will be demonstrated acceptable prior to the respective Unit entering Mode 4.
8. The CFCU time responses for Units 1 and 2 were recalculated using the appropriate inputs from containment pressure high, with satisfactory results.
9. A station ~mplementing procedure for Salem Units 1 and 2 will be revised and/or developed to assure compliance with Technical Specification 4.5.2.c.2 prior to establishing Containment Integrity for Salem Unit 2.

10.The Charcoal trays and test canisters are being replaced in the Auxiliary Building Ventilation, Control Area Ventilation and the Fuel Handling Ventilation systems. Both the trays and canisters are being sent to a vendor for replacement. This will be completed by Mode 6 for the Control Area and Fuel Handling Ventilation systems, and Mode 4 for the Auxilary Building Ventilation system.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

I t

NRC FORM 366A (4-96)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION

  • U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) " PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUMBER 8 OF 8 SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 96 - 005 - 04 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (cont'd) 11.A consultant with experience in nuclear ventilation systems design and testing is in the process of conducting a review to verify that ventilation systems testing is in compliance with the Technical Specifications Surveillance and UFSAR requirements.

12.Ventilation procedures will be revised by Mode 6 for the Control Area and Fuel Handling Ventilation systems, and Mode 4 for the Auxilary Building Ventilation system.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

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