ML18096A743

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Special Rept 92-4:on 920430 & 0514,fire Pumps 1 & 2, Respectively,Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Caused by Sheared Cam Follower Pin & Severe Oil Leak.Fire Protection Sys cross-tie Valve Opened to Provide Backup Protection
ML18096A743
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 05/22/1992
From: Vondra C
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
92-4, NUDOCS 9206020048
Download: ML18096A743 (4)


Text

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PS~G*

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station May 22, 1992 U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SPECIAL REPORT 92-4 This Special Report addresses the inoperability of both Salem Fire Pumps for greater than 7 days. This report is submitted for informational purposes in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10.1 Actions "a" and b.2.c pursuant to Specification 6.9.2.

Sincerely yours,

c. A. Vondra General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution

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\1 1-uNIT !'SPECIAL REPORT I -4 I~.

'.t PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating station - Unit 1

  • public Service Electric &*Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Nos. 1 and 2 Fire Pumps Inoperable Event Date(s): 4/30/92 and 5/14/92

  • Report Date: 5/28/92
  • The original events are documented in Incident Report Nos.92-269, 92-282 and 92-320.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit 1: Reactor defueled ~ 10th Refueling Outage in progress Unit 2: Mode f~ Reactor Startup in progress following completion of the 6 refueling outage

  • DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

This report addresses the inoperability of the two (2) Salem Station Fire Pumps for greater than seven (7) days. This report is submitted for informational purposes in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10.1 Action "a" and "b.2.c":

on April 23, 1992, at 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br />, the No. 1 Fire Pump became inoperable during the biweekly surveillance. Its diesel engine started knocking approximately ten minutes into the half hour run.

Investigation revealed the cam follower guide pin had sheared causing the valve lifter to rotate and score the cam shaft.

On May 14, 1992, at 2250 hours0.026 days <br />0.625 hours <br />0.00372 weeks <br />8.56125e-4 months <br />, No.* 2 Fire Pump .was declared inoperable due to an observed severe oil leak during a surveillance test run. No. 1 Fire Pump had not been returned to service at this time; therefore, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was notified of the inoperability of both Fire Pumps. in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10.1 Actions "b.2.a" and "b.2.b".

The written notification required by Action b.2.b incorrectly identified No. 1 Fire Pump as having a failed crankshaft (instead of a failed cam shaft). Investigation of the oil leak revealed that the No. 2 Fire Pump diesel engine No. 3 right piston failed contacting the cylinder head. Fuel oil contamination of the lubricating oil was also found.

Technical Specification 3.7.10.1 Actibn "a" states:

With one pump and/or one water supply inoperable, restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the

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e UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 92-4 J DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont Id) plans and procedures to be used to provide for the loss of redundancy in this system. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable."

Technical Specification 3.7.10.1 Action "b" states:

"With both fire suppression water systems inoperable:

1. Establish a backup fire suppres*sion water system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and
2. Submit a Special Report in accordance with Specification 6.9.2; a) By telephone within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, b) Confirmed by telegraph, mailgram or facsimile transmission no later than the first working day following the event, and c) In writing within 14 days following the event, out-lining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status."

The Technical Specifications and Action Statements are identical for both Salem Units.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of both. of the Nos. 1 and 2 diesel engine failures is equipment failure. Neither pump was returned to service within seven days due to the extent of damage. Both pump engines were sent off-site to factory authorized facilities for repair.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Operability of the Fire Suppression Systems ensures adequate fire suppression capability to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located in either Unit 1 or Unit 2. /The Fire Suppression System consists of a water distributi~n systfam, spray and/or sprinklers, co 2 , Halon and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the Fire Suppression Systems minimizes potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program. With both Fire Pumps inoperable, the station fire protection system was d~graded.

When the No .. 2 Fire Pump was declared inoperable, the Hope Creek fire protection system cross-tie valve was opened in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10.1 Action b.1. The cross-tie is a backup fire suppression water system for Salem Station.

Additionally, temporary diesel driven pumping capacity was made available on site. *Therefore, thi's occurrence involved no undue risk

e UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 92-4 ANALYSIS.OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) to the health and safety of the general public. This report satisfies Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.1.b Section 2.c requiremen~s and 3.7.10.1.a Special Report requirements for both fire pumps.

  • CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Both fire pump diesel engines were sent out for repairs. The No. 1 engine was returned to PSE&G on May 27, 1992 and is in the process of being installed. Upon successful completion of testing it will be returned to service. The No. 2 engine will be installed upon completion of its repair *

. The Hope Creek fire protection system cross-tie valve was.opened to provide_ bac~up fire protection suppression water capacity.

Investigation as to the root cause(s) for the engine failures is continuing~ Appropriate actions will be taken as necessary.

General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg.92-063