ML18102A661

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LER 96-011-00:on 960620,pressurizer Safety Relief Valves Were Found Outside of TS Tolerance.Caused by Minor Testing Instrument Error.Valves Were Refurbished & Successfully Retested to within TS tolerance.W/960719 Ltr
ML18102A661
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 07/19/1996
From: Garchow D, Hassler D
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-96-011-02, LER-96-11-2, LR-N96206, NUDOCS 9612130194
Download: ML18102A661 (4)


Text

. S,t:.~T !3Y: PSE&G OPS~G*

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit JUL 191996 LR-N96206

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

I.ER 272/96-0.11-00 SA1£M GENERATING STATION - UNIT l FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 This Licensee Event Report entitled "Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves Found Outside of Technical Specifications limith is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (ii).

Sincerely,

~f~4J General Manager- -

Salem Operations Attachment SORC Mtg.96-096 JMO/tcp c Distribution LER File 3 .:7 9612130194 960719 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR The power is in )OUr hands.

ss-21d8 nev. 619'1

11-15-96 :12:21PM l'llCLE..\R SER\! ICES-+ 208 526 2930;; 4r 6 HRC FORM .,58 U.S. N  !!EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OVEO BY OMB NO. 3*150-0104 (4-651 EXPIRES 041341198 ESTll4ATED BlJRoeN PER RESPONSI!: TO COMPl.Y WITH nilS MANDATORY INFORMATION COUECTIOH Rf'!ClJEST: 50.0 HRS..

RU'ORT~D l..ESSON8 u:AAN£0 ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) LICENSING PROCESS ANO FED 8ACJ< TO IHOUSTRY. f'ORW.Allil COMMCH1'8 REGARDING BUROEN ESTIMATE TO THl! INFORMATION ANO ReCOROa MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-4 F33}, U.S. NUC~R (See reverse for required number of ~GlJL.ATORY CCMMISSION, WAStttNQTON. DC 206&6-0o01 ANO TO THC! PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (315G-0104). oFFict: OF digits/characters for each block) ~ANO BUDGET, WAS41NGTON.. DC 2060&.

FACILITY NAIUO (1) DOCKET NUMst;R (2) f'AOE ISi SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 05000272 1 OF3 TITl.£(-4)

Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves Found Outside of Technical Specifications Tolerance.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER {8) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

YEAR I seQUENTI~ I NUMSEA ReV1s1cN NUMeeA llllCIMTH OA't Te'IA IFACIUTTNAME Salem Unil2 DOCiu.1 HUMl:leR 06000311 fACIUlY NAME CCCIUff NUMBER 06 20 96 96 011 00 07 19 96 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 1 Q CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE(9) 20.2201lDJ 20.2203 a)(2)(v) X 50,7S(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(*)(3)(i) S0.73(a){2)(JI) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 20.220S(a)(2)(1) 20.2203(11)(3)(11) 50.73(11)(2)(ili) 73.71 20.220S(a)(2)(1l) 20.2203(a)(4) 50, 73(a)(2)(1v) OTHER w.22u3 a)(2)(ill) ~.36(c)(1) S0.7S(a)(2)(v) Speelfvln Abstractbalow

-"t";;'.,.....~==nr--r---1--T.~M>i:=ln"------t--t:;;~;::-;-=::':":""~-----1 or In ~c Fonn306A 20.2203(a)(2)(*v) 50.36(cX:L} 50. 73(a}(2)(vil)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

I HiUilG Teu:l'HONE HUMSER (lncilbda .Ate& Coda)

Dennis V.Hassler, LER Coordinator 609-339-1989 COMPLETE ONE LINE F()R EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRJBEO IN THIS REPORT (13)

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANIJFACTIJRER REPORl'ABl.E CAU8'1 SVST~ COMPONliNT REPORTABLi TONPROS TONPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR Ix INO

! YES (ff yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE}.

ABSTRACT (Umlt to 1400 isp11c**. i.e ** approximately 15 *ingle-apac:Od typewritten lines) (16)

SUBMISSION CATE ( 15)

On June 20 1 1996 as found test results were received by PSE&G that identified one Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve test result was outside of the +/- one percent Technical Specifications allowable tolerance. Subsequent testing identified two additional valves were also outside of the one percent tolerance.

The cause of the setpoint drift is the ability of the valves to consistently

maintain+/- one percent tolerance during testing .following an operating cycle,

'and minor testing instrument inaccuracies (+/- 0.1 percent). The valves were refurbished and successfully retested to within the Technical Specifications +/-

one percent tolerance.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 73(a) (2) (i) (B), any condition

'prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

SE~iT *BY: PSE&G NLCLEAR SERVICES~ 208 526 2930;~ 5! 6


~-- -----*------------~

NRC FORM J66A-

  • U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

. (A-96)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER 12-l LER NUMBER 16) PAGE Cl)

Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 96 - 011 - 00 TEXT (tf more space la required, UH additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Reactor Coolant System - Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves {AB/RV}*

  • Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as (SS/CCC)

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of identification, Salem Units 1 and 2 were shutdown and defueled.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE on June 20, 1996 as found test results were received by PSE&G that identified one Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve test result was outside of the +/- one percent Technical specifications allowable tolerance. Subsequent testing

~dentified two additional valves were also outside of the one percent tolerance.

..

Unit PSV Serial # Location As-Found Setpoint Deviation 1 RV-466-PSE lPRS Plus J - 28 percent 1 RV-2-8010C-PNJ 1PR4 Plus 3.90 percent 2 RV-468-PSE 2PR4 Plus 1. 32 percent CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The c~use of the setpoint drift is a combination of contributing factors:

The ability of the valves to consistently maintain +/- one percent tolerance during testing following an operating cycle.

Minor Testing Instrument inaccuracies (+/- 0.1 percent)

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES In the past two years1 two LERs have addressed safety relief valves found outside of the Technical Specifications tolerance. LER 272/95-005-01 addressed

  • eight _occurrences of pressurizer relief valves found outside tolerance. The

~ause of this occurrence was minor testing instrument error, valve design limitations, and applied loads from the discharge piping.

1\LLLt..-\K ~t.KY !Lt~_,

l NRC FOR~ 366.A- .' .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMJ41SSION c~ LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKETNUMBERl2) LERNUMBER(S) PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAA I llE~J~AL I~ 3 OF 3 Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 96 - 01*1 00 TEXT (If more spac:a is required, use sddltlonal copies cf NRC Form 360A) (17)

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES (cont'd)

LER 272/95-026-01 addressed occurrences where Main Steam Safety Relief Valves were found outside of the TS tolerance. The cause for this occurrence was ring setting adjustments without post adjustment setpoint testing and use of test equipment that was inaccurate.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS Previous analysis of the thermal hydraulic effects resulting from an increase in the setpoint tolerance of the Pressurizer Safety Valves from +/- one percent to

+/- three percent is acceptable. This analysis bounds two of the three failures identified in this LER. Preliminary analysis indicates a setpoint of plus four percent is acceptable. If the final analysis fer the plus four percent tolerance results in a different conc~usion, a supplement to this LER will be issued.

Based on these analyses, there were no safety consequences or implications involved as a result, of these valves exceeding the allowable tolerance.

~herefore the public health and safety was not ~ffected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The valves were refurbished and successfully retested to within the Technical Specifications +/- one percent tolerance.
2. The vendor procedure used to test the Salem Onits 1 and 2 pressurizer safety relief valves was revised in August 1994 to address industry concerns relative to setpoint drift.
3. A formal root cause evaluation is being completed. The corrective actions identified in the root cause evaluation will be tracked in the Corrective Action Program. The effectiveness of the corrective actions will be established by the trending of future setpoint testing*performance.

NRC FORM 388A (4-95}