Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics FP-60 Fire Barrier MaterialML031080040 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ![Entergy icon.png](/w/images/7/79/Entergy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
05/26/1993 |
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From: |
Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
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References |
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IN-93-040, NUDOCS 9305260385 |
Download: ML031080040 (14) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 26, 1993 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE 93-40: FIRE ENDURANCE
TEST RESULTS FOR THERMAL CERAMICS FP-60 FIRE BARRIER MATERIAL
Addressees
All holders of operating
licenses or construction
permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees
to results of fire endurance
and ampacity derating test reports submitted
by Thermal Ceramics on the FireMaster
FP-60 fire barrier system and the results of NRC staff reviews. It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider actions as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions
contained
in this information
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Descriotion
of Circumstances
In Generic Letter (GL) 92-08, wThermo-Lag
330-1 Fire Barriers," the staff stated it would evaluate other known fire barrier materials
and systems that are used by licensees
to fulfill NRC fire protection
requirements.
The staff is now evaluating
fire barriers manufactured
by other vendors to verify the ability of the barriers to adequately
perform their 1-hour or 3-hour fire resistive
functions
and to meet stated ampacity derating values. Thermal Ceramics, Inc., formerly the Insulating
Products Division of Babcock and Wilcox, Inc., of Augusta, Georgia, manufactures
the FP-60 fire barrier system and submitted
reports on two fire endurance
tests and one ampacity derating test to the NRC in a letter of February 23, 1993.Discussion
In its review of the Thermal Ceramics reports, the staff identified
the following
information.
In its product literature, Thermal Ceramics states that the FP-60 product is manufactured
for use on cable trays, conduits, junction boxes, and other cable raceways.
The primary component, the FireMaster
FP-60 blanket, is a ceramic fiber blanket with thicknesses
varying from 2.5 cm [1 inch] to 7.6 cm[3 inches]. Optional aluminum or stainless
steel foil, Kao-Tex (woven cloth), or other cloth facings are provided for physical protection
of the blanket.The vendor claims that the material, when installed
according
to the instructions, is qualified
for up to a 13/4-hour fire rating using the American 9305260385
' P I)oktce. 93-o POR %'K P~ktcL93sI4 IN 93-40 May 26, 1993 Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard E-119, "Standard
Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction
and Materials." FIRE ENDURANCE
TESTS According
to one report submitted
by Thermal Ceramics, a. 1-hour fire endurance test of the FP-60 fire barrier in various configurations
was performed
at Underwriters
Laboratories, Inc. (UL File R11044-1, Project 84NK8356, March 22, 1985). The test followed UL Subject 1724, "Outline of Investigation, Fire Tests for Electrical
Circuit Protective
Systems," May 1984. According
to the report, the furnace temperatures
followed the ASTM E-119 standard time-temperature
curve for fire exposure, and the barriers were subjected
to a solid hose stream test. The report also states that circuit integrity
was monitored.
Documented
test configurations
included 91.4 cm [36 inch] wide open-ladder
and solid-back
steel cable trays, an air drop assembly, 12.7 cm [5 inch] diameter steel conduits, and a 30.5x15.2 cm (12x6 inch] steel Junction box. All configurations
contained
cables. Two hundred fifty thermocouples
were reportedly
used to measure temperatures
of cables, cable trays, Junction* boxes, conduits and electrical
circuit protective
systdms on the unexposed 1 side of the assembly.x According
to the report, within 30 seconds of the start of the test, the j filament tape around the blanket wrap ignited. At 5 minutes, flames# reportedly
issued from seams and butt joints. The report also states that at 20 minutes, some of the wrap slipped out of position resulting
in an opening^ in the barrier, and at 60 minutes, there was a 8.9 cm [3X inch] opening in the barrier. Some thermocouple
measurements
reportedly
ranged from 204 'C[400 OF] to 260 eC [500 OF] at the end of the fire test.After the test, some cables were documented
to be fused together, and cable jackets were melted and blistered.
The hose stream eroded the bottom surface of the cable tray barrier so that the tray was exposed.The UL report concluded
that the tested fire barrier had a 1-hour fire rating because circuit integrity
was maintained
during the fire exposure and hose stream test. However, it appears that the UL approval is limited to minimum 91.4 cm [36 inch] wide cable trays and 12.7 cm [5 inch] or larger-diameter
conduits with minimum No. 16 AWG jacketed multi-conductor
cables or minimum No. 300 MCM jacketed copper single conductor
power cables with polyvinyl chloride jackets.The second fire endurance
test report submitted
by Thermal Ceramics documented
a Southwest
Research Institute
small-scale
test, "One Hour Fire Qualification
Test of a Protective
Envelope for Class 1E Electrical
Conduit Circuits," (SwRI Project 01-8305-053, February 1986). According
to this report, the test employed the ASTM E-119 standard time-temperature
curve for fire exposure and a subsequent
solid hose stream test. The report also states that circuit integrity
was monitored.
SwRI documented
the use of a small-scale
furnace (maximum test specimen of 425.8 square cm (66 square inches]) to test a 2.5 cm [1 inch] diameter conduit with a pull box, a 5.1 cm [2 inch] diameter conduit with a junction box, and an air drop. According
to the report,. these
IN 93-40 May 26, 1993 test assemblies
each contained
a single-conductor
power cable and two control cables, all with PVC jackets.Recorded cable temperatures (measured
at the cable jackets) at the end of the fire exposure ranged from 146.5 'C (296 *F] to 164 C (327 OF]. According
to the report, circuit integrity
was maintained
during the fire exposure and hose stream tests.The barrier and cable conditions
after the fire exposure were not reported.The test report suggests that the hose stream test caused some barrier damage, although the test report did not clearly report the extent of damage. SwRI did not report a conclusion
as to the acceptability
of the fire barrier system.In a letter of April 27, 1993 to Thermal Ceramics, Inc., the staff expressed concerns regarding
the ability of the FP-60 system to meet existing NRC fire barrier acceptance
criteria.AMPACITY DERATING TEST The ampacity derating test report submitted
by Thermal Ceramics was SwRI Project 01-8818-210, "Ampacity
Derating of Fire-Protected
Cables in Conduit and Cable Trays Using Babcock & Wilcox, Incorporated's
Passive Fire Protection
System," issued by SwRI on July 8, 1986. According
to the report, a 1-hour fire barrier was used in the test. Three-conductor
XLPE-insulated
6 AWG cables with Hypalon protective
wraps were reportedly
installed
in a 61 cm (24 inch] wide by 10.2 cm [4 inch] deep cable tray, and 3-conductor
XLPE-insulated
3 AWG cables with Hypalon protective
wraps were installed
in a 10.2 cm [4 inch] diameter conduit. Both assemblies
were reported to be 3.7 m [12 feet] long and completely
filled. The report stated that thermocouples
were installed
in slits' in the cable insulation.
According
to the report, a steady-state
temperature
of 90 eC (194 *F) at the hottest single thermocouple
was monitored.
Equilibrium
temperature
was reportedly
established
when a steady-state
condition
(+/-1 eC per hour (+/-1.8 OF per hour]) was achieved for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> without any perturbation
to the system.The ampacity derating for the cable tray and conduit was estimated
to be 62.4 and 41.4 percent, respectively, based on the test results.Some licensees
use the FP-60 fire barrier system to achieve physical independence
of electrical
systems in accordance
with Regulatory
Guide 1.75, Physical Independence
of Electrical
Systems." Ampacity derating in fire barrier systems installed
to achieve physical independence
of electric systems is a consideration
in the design of such systems as well as in those installed to protect safe shutdown capability
from a fire.Cables enclosed in electrical
raceways protected
with fire barrier materials are derated to ensure that systems have sufficient
capacity and capability
to perform their intended safety functions.
These cables are derated because of the insulating
effect of the fire barrier material.
Other factors that affect ampacity derating include cable fill, cable loading, cable type, raceway construction, and ambient temperature.
IN 93-40 May 26, 1993 Cable derating calculations
that are based on inaccurate
or nonconservative
derating factors could result in installation
of undersized
cables or raceway overfilling.
This could cause operating
temperatures
to exceed design limits within the raceways thereby reducing the expected design life of the cables.In the letter to Thermal Ceramics, Inc., of April 27, 1993, the staff requested
additional
information
on ampacity derating.The National Electrical
Code, Insulated
Cable Engineers
Association (ICEA)publications, and other industry standards
provide general ampacity derating factors for open-air installations
but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. The Insulated
Conductors
Committee
of the IEEE Power Engineering
Society, Task Force 12-45, has been developing
IEEE Standard Procedure
P848, "Procedure
for the Determination
of the Ampacity Derating of Fire Protected
Cables," for use as an industry standard.
The industry consensus
standard development
process may formulate
an appropriate
technical approach to the determination
of ampacity derating factors for cables enclosed by fire barrier systems.The staff is continuing
to review this product for its ability to perform its fire resistive
function and will evaluate whether further generic communications
are needed to address the issues discussed
above.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Isabel M. Miller, NRR (301) 504-2852 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued Information
Notices
- 2 IN 93-40 May 26, 1993 Cable derating calculations
that are based on inaccurate
or nonconservative
derating factors could result in installation
of undersized
cables or raceway overfilling.
This could cause operating
temperatures
to exceed design limits within the raceways thereby reducing the expected design life of the cables.In the letter to Thermal Ceramics, Inc., of April 27, 1993, the staff requested
additional
information
on ampacity derating.The National Electrical
Code, Insulated
Cable Engineers
Association (ICEA)publications, and other industry standards
provide general ampacity derating factors for open-air installations
but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. The Insulated
Conductors
Committee
of the IEEE Power Engineering
Society, Task Force 12-45, has been developing
IEEE Standard Procedure
P848, "Procedure
for the Determination
of the Ampacity Derating of Fire Protected
Cables,' for use as an industry standard.
The industry consensus
standard development
process may formulate
an appropriate
technical approach to the determination
of ampacity derating factors for cables enclosed by fire barrier systems.The staff is continuing
to review this product for its ability to perform its fire resistive
function and will evaluate whether further generic communications
are needed to address the issues discussed
above.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. Orginal ignd y Brian K. Grimes Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Isabel M. Miller, NRR (301) 504-2852 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued Information
Notices*See previous concurrence
- TechEd IMiller SWest DGable 05/06/93 , 05/06/93 05/10/93*SPLB:DSSA
JGoldberg
CBerlinger
5/20/93 5/20/93 05/25/93*DD:DSSA *D:DSSA *OGCB:DORS
MVirgilio
AThadani GMarcus Grimes 05/25/93 05/25/93 05/25/93 S g&493 DOCUMENT NAME: 93-40.IN
IN 93-XX May xx, 1993 Cable derating calculations
that are based on inaccurate
or nonconservative
derating factors could result in installation
of undersized
cables or raceway overfilling.
This could cause operating
temperatures
to exceed design limits within the raceways thereby reducing the expected design life of the cables.In the letter to thermal ceramics of April 27, 1993, the staff requested additional
information
on ampacity derating.The National Electrical
Code, Insulated
Cable Engineers
Association (ICEA)publications, and other industry standards
provide general ampacity derating factors for open-air installations
but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. The Insulated
Conductors
Committee
of the IEEE Power Engineering
Society, Task Force 12-45, has been developing
IEEE Standard Procedure
P848, "Procedure
for the Determination
of the Ampacity Derating of Fire Protected
Cables," for use as an industry standard.
The industry consensus
standard development
process may formulate
an appropriate
technical approach to the determination
of ampacity derating factors for cables enclosed by fire barrier systems.The staff is continuing
to review this product for its ability to perform its fire resistive
function and will evaluate whether further generic communications
are needed to address the issues discussed
above.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Isabel M. Miller, NRR (301) 504-2852 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued Information
Notices*See previous concurrence
SPLB:DSSA
SPLB:DSSA
TechEd*IMiller *SWest *DGable 05/06/93 05/06/93 05/10/93 SPLB:DSSA
OGC *DE:EELB CMcCracken*
JGoldberg*
CBerlinger
5/20/93 5/20/93 05/25/93*DD:DSSA *D:DSSA *OGCB:DORS
D:DORS MVirgilio
AThadani GMarcus BGrimes 05/25/93 05/25/93 05/25/93 / /93 DOCUMENT NAME: INPSB.1
-- -------------
4 factors for open-air installations
but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. The Insulated
Conductors
Committee
of the IEEE Power Engineering
Society, Task Force 12-45, has been developing
IEEE Standard Procedure
P848, Procedure
for the Determination
of the Ampacity Derating of Fire Protected
Cables,' for use as an industry standard.
The staff encourages
licensees
to participate
in the industry consensus
standard development
process to formulate
an appropriate
technical
approach to the determination
of ampacity derating factors for cables enclosed by fire barrier systems.The staff is continuing
to review this product for its ability to perform its fire resistive
function and will take further action if appropriate.
This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Isabel M. Miller, NRR (301) 504-2852 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued Information
Notices*See previous concurrence
SPLB:DSSA*IMiller 05/06/93 SPLB:DSSA*SWest 05/06/93 TechEd*DGable 05/10/93 SPLB:DSSA CMcCracken*
5/20/93 DD:DSSA MVirgilio*
/ /93 OGC JGoldberg*
5/20/93/D :DSSA M AThadani 5 f1;93 DE:EELB CBerlinger*
/ /93 OGCBD;ORS&M GMar~1-/ (/93 AlS D: DORS BGrimes/ /93[G:\THERMOLA\OTHERVEN\IN
FP60.R3]Originator:
Isabel Miller
_L factors for open-air installations
but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. The Insulated
Conductors
Committee
of the IEEE Power Engineering
Society, Task Force 12-45, has been developing
IEEE Standard Procedure
P848, "Procedure
for the Determination
of the Ampacity Derating of Fire Protected
Cables," for use as an industry standard.
The staff encourages
licensees
to participate
in the industry consensus
standard development
process to formulate
an appropriate
technical
approach to the determination
of ampacity derating factors for cables enclosed by fire barrier systems.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.The staff is continuing
to review this product for its ability to perform its fire resistive
function and will take further action if appropriate.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Isabel M. Miller, NRR (301) 504-2852 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued Information
Notices*See previous concurrence
SPLB:DSSA*IMiller 05/06/93 SPLB:DSSA CMcCracken*
5/20/93 DD:DSSA,~M9irgil 9 SPLB:DSSA*SWest 05/06/93 OGC JGoldberg*
5/20/93 TechEd*DGable 05/10/93 DE:EE CBerltTrg
r-jstk093 D:DSSA AThadani/ /93 OGCB:DORS GMarcus/ /93 D:DORS BGrimes/ /93[G:\THERMOLA\OTHERVEN\IN
FP60.R3]Originator:
Isabel Miller
.'\1 factors for open-air installations
but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. The Insulated
Conductors
Committee
of the IEEE Power Engineering
Society, Task Force 12-45, has been developing
IEEE Standard Procedure
P848, "Procedure
for the Determination
of the Ampacity Derating of Fire Protected
Cables," for use as an industry standard.
The staff encourages
licensees
to participate
in the industry consensus
standard development
process to formulate
an appropriate
technical
approach to the determination
of ampacity derating factors for cables enclosed by fire barrier systems.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
The staff is continuing
to review this product for its ability to perform its fire resistive
function and will take further action if appropriate.
Licensees
are advised to consider this information
when contemplating
any changes to their current fire protection
program. If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Isabel M. Miller, NRR (301) 504-2852 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued Information
Notices*See previous concurrence
SPLB:DSSA*IMiller 05/06/93 SPLB:DSSP( ' L CMcCrackelr
_.5/P/93 DD:DSSA MVirgilio/ /93 SPLB:DSSA*SWest 05/06/v D:DSSA AThadani/ /93 TechEd*DGabl e 05/10/93 DE:EELB CBerlinger
/ /93 OGCB:DORS GMarcus/ /93 D: DORS BGrimes/ /93[G:\THERMOLA\OTHERVEN\IN
FP60.R2]Originator:
Isabel Miller
This information
notice required no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
K. Steven West, NRR (301) 504-1220 Technical
contact: Attachment:
List of Recently Issued Information
Notices SPLB:DSSA IMiller/ /93 OGC JGoldberg/ /93 DD:DSSA GHolahan 04/ /93 SPLB:DSSA SWest/ /93 SPLB:DSSA CMcCracken
/ /93 D:DSSA AThadani 04/ /93 6:7/0/93 DE:EELB CBerlinger
/ /93 OGCB:DORS GMarcus 04/ /93 D: DORS BGrimes/ /93
., --.1; l *consider actions as appropriate.
This information
notice required no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contai Attachment:
List of Recentl2 SPLB:DSSA,.
IMilletgfYL
5f/6 /93 K. Steven West, NRR (301) 504-1220 ssued Information
Notices SIest t576 /93 TechEd RiStnde-e/ /93 OGC JGoldberg/ /93 SPLB:DSSA CMcCracken
/ /93 DE: EELB CBerlinger
/ /93 DD: DSSA GHolahan 04/ /93 D: DSSA AThadani 04/ /93 OGCB:DORS GMarcus 04/ /93 D: DORS BGrimes/ /93[G:\THERMOLA\FP-60
IN.R1]Originator:
IsabeT Miller
I -1 Attachment
IN 93-40 May 26, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-39 93-38 Radiation
Beams from Power Reactor Biolog-ical Shields Inadequate
Testing of Engineered
Safety Features Actuation System 05/25/93 05/24/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.93-37 Eyebolts with Indeter-minate Properties
In-stalled in Limitorque
Valve Operator Housing Covers 05/19/93 All holders for nuclear of OLs or CPs power reactors.93-36 Notifications, Reports, and Records of Misadmin-istrations
05/07/93 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
medical licensees.
93-35 Insights from Common-Cause Failure Events 05/12/93 All holders for nuclear (NPPs).of OLs or CPs power plants 93-34, Supp. 1 93-34 Potential
for Loss of Emergency
Cooling Function Due to A Combination
of Operational
and Post-Loca Debris in Contain-ment Potential
for Loss of Emergency
Cooling Function Due to A Combination
of Operational
and Post-Loca Debris in Contain-ment 05/06/93 04/26/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit
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|
list | - Information Notice 1993-01, Accuracy of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment Manufactured by Liberty Technologies (4 January 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-02, Malfunction of a Pressurizer Code Safety Valve (4 January 1993, Topic: Loop seal)
- Information Notice 1993-04, Investigation and Reporting of Misadministrations by the Radiation Safety Officer (7 January 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-05, Locking of Radiography Exposure Devices (14 January 1993, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1993-06, Potential Bypass Leakage Paths Around Filters Installed in Ventilation Systems (22 January 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-07, Classification of Transportation Emergencies (1 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-08, Failure of Residual Heat Removal Pump Bearings Due to High Thrust Loading (1 February 1993, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment)
- Information Notice 1993-09, Failure of Undervoltage Trip Attachment on Westinghouse Model DB-50 Reactor Trip Breaker (2 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-10, Dose Calibrator Quality Control (2 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-11, Single Failure Vulnerability of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems (4 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-12, Off-Gassing in Auxiliary Feedwater System Raw Water Sources (11 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-13, Undetected Modification of Flow Characteristics in High Pressure Safety Injection System (16 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-14, Clarification of 10 CFR 40.22, Small Quantities of Source Material (18 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-15, Failure to Verify the Continuity of Shunt Trip Attachment Contacts in Manual Safety Injection and Reactor Trip Switches (18 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-16, Failures of Not-Locking Devices in Check Valves (19 February 1993, Topic: Anchor Darling, Flow Induced Vibration)
- Information Notice 1993-17, Safety Systems Response to Loss of Coolant and Loss of Offsite Power (25 March 1994, Topic: Fire Barrier, Backfit)
- Information Notice 1993-18, Portable Moisture-Density Gauge User Responsibilities During Field Operations (10 March 1993, Topic: Moisture Density Gauge, Moisture-Density Gauge, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1993-19, Slab Hopper Bulging (17 March 1993, Topic: Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1993-20, Thermal Fatigue Cracking of Feedwater Piping to Steam Generators (24 March 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-21, Summary of NRC Staff Observations Compiled During Engineering Audits or Inspections of Licensee Erosion/Corrosion Programs (25 March 1993, Topic: Weld Overlay)
- Information Notice 1993-22, Tripping of Klockner-Moeller Molded-Case Circuit Breakers Due to Support Lever Failure (26 March 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-23, Weschler Instruments Model 252 Switchboard Meters (31 March 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-24, Distribution of Revision 7 of NUREG-1021, Operation Licensing Examiner Standards (31 March 1993, Topic: Job Performance Measure)
- Information Notice 1993-25, Electrical Penetration Assembly Degradation (1 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-26, Grease Soldification Causes Molded-Case Circuit Breaker Failure to Close (31 January 1994)
- Information Notice 1993-27, Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Observed During Normal Plant Depressurization (8 April 1993, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1993-28, Failure to Consider Loss of DC Bus in the Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation May Lead to Nonconservative Analysis (9 April 1993, Topic: Fuel cladding)
- Information Notice 1993-29, Problems with the Use of Unshielded Test Leads in Reactor Protection System Circuitry (12 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-30, NRC Requirements for Evaluation of Wipe Test Results; Calibration of Count Rate Survey Instruments (12 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-31, Training of Nurses Responsible for the Care of Patients with Brachytherapy Implants (13 April 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-32, Nonconservative Inputs for Boron Dilution Events Analysis (21 April 1993, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1993-33, Potential Deficiency of Certain Class Ie Instrumental and Control Cables (28 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-33, Potential Deficiency of Certain Class IE Instrumental and Control Cables (28 April 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-34, Potential for Loss of Emergency Cooling Function Due to a Combination of Operational and Post-LOCA Debris in Containment (6 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-35, Insights from Common-Cause Failure Events (12 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-36, Notifications, Reports, and Records of Misadministrations (7 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-37, Eyebolts with Indeterminate Properties Installed in Limitorque Valve Operator Housing Covers (19 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-38, Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems (24 May 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-39, Radiation Beams From Power Reactor Biological Shields (25 May 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-39, Radiation Beams from Power Reactor Biological Shields (25 May 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-40, Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics FP-60 Fire Barrier Material (26 May 1993, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier, Fire Protection Program)
- Information Notice 1993-41, One Hour Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics Kaowool, 3M Company FS-195 and 3M Company Interam E-50 Fire Barrier Systems (28 May 1993, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1993-42, Failure of Anti-Rotation Keys in Motor-Operated Valves Manufactured by Yelan (9 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-43, Use of Inappropriate Lubrication Oils in Satety-Related Applications (10 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-44, Operational Challenges During a Dual-Unit Transient (15 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-45, Degradation of Shutdown Cooling System Performance (16 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-46, Potential Problem with Westinghouse Rod Control System and Inadvertent Withdrawal of Single Rod Control Cluster Assembly (10 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-47, Unrecognized Loss of Control Room Annunciators (18 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-48, Failure of Turbine-Driven Main Feedwater Pump to Trip Because of Contaminated Oil (6 July 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-49, Improper Integration of Software Into Operating Practices (8 July 1993)
... further results |
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