Information Notice 1992-17, NRC Inspections of Programs Being Developed at Nuclear Power Plants in Response to Generic Letter 89-10
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 26, 1992 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE 92-17: NRC INSPECTIONS
OF PROGRAMS BEING DEVELOPED AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 89-10
Addressees
All holders of operating
licenses or construction
permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees
to the general conclusions
derived from the NRC inspections
of the programs being developed
at nuclear power plants in response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety-Related
Motor-Operated
Valve Testing and Surveillance." It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions
contained
in this information
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Background
In GL 89-10 (June 28, 1989), the NRC staff requested
that holders of nuclear power plant operating
licenses and construction
permits ensure the capability
of motor-operated
valves (MOVs) in safety-related
systems by reviewing
MOV design bases, verifying
MOV switch settings initially
and periodically, testing MOYs under design basis conditions
where practicable, improving
evaluations
of MOV failures and necessary
corrective
action, and determining
trends of MOV problems.
The NRC staff requested
that licensees
complete the GL 89-10 program by the end of the third refueling
outage or 5 years from the issuance of the generic letter, whichever
is later. On June 13, 1990, the NRC staff issued Supplement
1 to GL 89-10 to provide detailed information
on the results of public workshops
held to discuss the generic letter. On August 3, 1990, the NRC staff issued Supplement
2 to GL 89-10 to allow licensees
additional
time to review and to incorporate
the information
provided in Supplement
1 into their programs in response to the generic letter. Upon reviewing
the results of NRC-sponsored
MOV tests, the NRC staff issued Supplement
3 to GL 89-10 on October 25, 1990, which requested
licensees
of boiling water reactor (BWR)nuclear plants to take action in advance of the GL 89-10 schedule to resolve concerns about the capability
of MOYs used for containment
isolation
in the steam supply line of the high pressure coolant injection
and reactor core isolation
cooling systems, in the supply line of the reactor water cleanup system, and in other systems directly connected
to the 'reactor vessel. In ek219371 4 t= v dsO]- qWog Xe
IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 Supplement
4 to GL 89-10, the NRC staff indicated
that BWR licensees
need not address inadvertent
MOY operation
in their GL 89-10 programs.
The NRC staff is considering
whether or not similar actions should be taken regarding
the need for licensees
of pressurized-water
reactor (PWR) nuclear plants to address the inadvertent
operation
of MOVs in their programs to respond to GL 89-10.Description
of Circumstances
The NRC staff has conducted
inspections
at more than 30 nuclear power plant sites of programs being developed
by, licensees
in response to GL 89-10. The reports of those inspections
are available
in the NRC Public Document Room. In performing
the inspections, the NRC staff has followed Temporary
Instruction (TI) 2515/109 of January 14, 1991, Inspection
Requirements
for Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-Related
Motor-Operated
Valve Testing and Sur-veillance.'
Part 1 of TI 2515/109 provides guidance for reviewing
the program being established.by
theLlicensee.
in response to GL 89-10, and.Part 2 provides guidance for reviewing
program implementation.
The NRC has focused these inspections
on reviewing
the GL 89-10 programs (Part 1 of TI 2515/109).
The staff is issuing this information
notice to provide the more significant
results of those NRC inspections.
In GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested
that licensees
prepare descriptions
of their programs established
in response to GL 89-10 within 1 year after the generic letter was issued or by the first refueling
outage after December 28, 1989, whichever
was later. The NRC staff's response to Question 44 in Supplement
1 to GL 89-10 provided guidance on information
expected in the program descriptions.
The NRC inspectors
found-some
licensees to have program descriptions
that are thorough while other licensees
did not.Attachment
1 Is a discussion
of the inspection
findings pertaining
to the recommendations
of GL 89-10.Related Generic Communications
In addition to NRC Generic Letter 89-10, "Safety-Related
Motor-Operated
Valve Testing and Surveillance," and its supplements, the NRC has addressed.this
and related topics in NRC Information
Notices.89-88, "Recent NRC-Sponsored
Testing of Motor-Operated
Valves;" 90-40,."Results
of NRC-Sponsored
Testing of Motor-Operated
Valves;" 90-72, "Testing of Parallel Disc Gate Valves in Europe;" and 91-61, "Preliminary
Results of Validation
Testing of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic
Equipment.".
IN 92X17 February 26, 1992 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the Information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.arIes E. Ross D rec o Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR (301) 504-2794 Attachments:
1. Inspection
Findings Pertaining
to the Recommendations
Contained
In Generic Letter 89-10 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices
Attachment
1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 INSPECTION
FINDINGS PERTAINING
TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTAINED
IN GENERIC LETTER 89-10 Administration
Some licensees
have not ensured adequate management
oversight
and direction
for the motor-operated
valve (MOY) program. One licensee had contracted
an internal audit that revealed problems with the MOY program similar to those found subsequently
during the NRC inspection, but the licensee had not taken action to correct the deficiencies.
The safety significance
of the MOV program and the extensive
resources
needed to develop and implement
the program make it imperative
that licensee's
management
closely monitor its staff's activities.
Scope In issuirng Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, the NRC staff intended that the scope include all safety-related
MOVs and other MOVs in safety-related
systems. In Supplement
1 to GL 89-10, the NRC staff limited the scope of GL 89-10 to safety-related
MOYs and other MOVs that are position-changeable
in safety-related piping systems, as well as safety-related
MOVs that might be in nonsafety-related
piping systems. The NRC staff's response to Questions
3-13 in Supplement
1 to GL 89-10 provided further guidance on the scope of GL 89-10.For example, in the NRC staff's response to Question 4 in Supplement
1, the staff defined "position-changeable" as any MOV in a safety-related
piping system that is not blocked from inadvertent
operation
from the control room.In Supplement
4 to GL 89-10, the NRC staff indicated
that licensees
for boiling water reactor (BWR) plants need not address inadvertent
MOV operation
in their GL 89-10 programs.
The NRC staff is considering
whether or not similar actions should be taken regarding
the need for the licensees
of pressurized-water
reactor (PWR) plants to address inadvertent
MOV operation
in their programs to respond to GL 89-10.The NRC inspectors
found most licensees
to be establishing
the scope of their GL 89-10 programs consistent
with the recommendations
of the generic letter.However, some licensees
needed to improve the documentation
of their justifi-cation for excluding
particular
MOVs from the GL 89-10 program.Design-Basis
Reviews In recommended
action "a" of GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested
the licensees
to review and document the design basis for operating
each MOV within the generic letter program to determine
the maximum differential
pressure and flow (and other factors) expected for both normal operations
and abnormal conditions.
The NRC staff's response to Questions
14 to 18 and 36 in Supplement
1 to GL 89-10 provides guidance on performing
design-basis
reviews under GL 89-10.Many licensees
are appropriately
reviewing
plant documentation
such as the final safety analysis report and the technical
specifications
as part of their design-basis
reviews. However, some licensees
had failed to identify worst-case
conditions
for various design-basis
scenarios.
Some licensees
have
's.- Attachment
1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 assumed nominal reactor pressure for differential
pressure across MOVs in lines directly connected
to the reactor vessel without evaluating
whether this differential
pressure bounds the worst-case
MOV design-basis
differential
pressure.
At certain facilities, the licensee found errors in the previous design basis determinations
for many MOVs that would have affected the cap-ability of the MOVs to perform their safety function if called upon under design-basis
conditions.
Some licensees
focused on differential
pressure and had not adequately
ad-dressed other design-basis
parameters
such as flow, fluid temperature, ambient temperature, and the effects of seismic and dynamic events. Although differen-tial pressure is the primary design-basis
parameter
used to predict the thrust requirements
in the industry's
equations, the other design-basis
parameters
are needed to ensure that the test results demonstrate
that the MOV would operate under design-basis
conditions.
Some licensees
have not ensured that generic studies of design-basis
differential
pressure apply to specific plants.MOY Sizing and Switch Settings In recommended
action "b" of GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested
licensees
to review and revise, as necessary, the methods for selecting
and setting all MOV switches.
The NRC staff's response to Questions
19-21 in Supplement
1 to GL 89-10 provides guidance on selecting
and setting MOV switches.The recommendations
of GL 89-10 for selecting
and setting MOV switches apply to switches for torque, torque bypass, limit, and thermal overload.
The licensees are using various methods to determine
the proper size of MOVs and their appropriate
torque switch settings.
Some licensees
have increased
the valve factors assumed in the industry's
equations
used to predict the thrust required to operate the valves to reflect experience
throughout
the industry and at their specific plant. However, other licensees
continue to use old guidance from valve vendors and manufacturers
in estimating
the thrust requirements
that may be found inadequate
during design-basis
tests.The NRC inspectors
found that licensees
for various facilities
had not done the following
when establishing
methods to size MOVs and set their switches: (1) Provide justification
for assumptions
regarding
stem friction coefficients
and changes in stem friction over the lubrication
interval (2) Consider effects that can reduce the thrust delivered
by the motor opera-tor under high differential
pressure and flow conditions
in relation to the thrust delivered
under no-load conditions
(3) Consider the effects of ambient temperature
on motor output and thermal overload sizing (4) Demonstrate
applicability
of industry's
databases
in predicting
thrust requirements
(5) Consider inertia in establishing
the maximum settings for torque switches
Attachment
1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 (6) Demonstrate
applicability
of contractors'
studies of actuator capability
(7) Demonstrate
applicability
of generic motor curves for specific motors (8) Provide justification
for removing conservatisms (such as the application
factor) from the industry's
standard sizing calculations
(9) Consider torque switch repeatability
(10) Consider uncertainties
regarding
the accuracy of MOV diagnostic
equipment.
Some licensees
have had problems in performing
MOV sizing and switch setting calculations
because of (1) incorrect
spring packs installed
in MOVs, (2) incorrect
MOV data on the motor or actuator nameplates
and in the procure-ment documents
from the vendor, and (3) spring packs with different
performance
characteristics
from different
manufacturers, but with the same part number.One licensee determined
that the MOV sizing and switch setting activities
to establish
motor operator capability
had not adequately
addressed
the effect of those activities
on other MOY safety functions.
These activities
had hindered the ability of the clutch of certain MOYs to be released to enable the MOV to be manually operated in the event of an evacuation
of the control room.Many licensees
are updating their degraded voltage studies to ensure that the worst-case
minimum voltage available
at the motor has been determined
for each MOV. Some licensees
had not ensured that their assumptions
of minimum voltage available
at the MOYs were consistent
with their licensing
commitments
in safety analyses.
Some licensees
did not justify the assumptions
for the starting point for the degraded voltage calculations, current used to calculate cable losses, losses caused by the resistance
of thermal overload devices in the circuit, or the effects on MOV stroke time under degraded voltage condi-tions. Of particular
significance, the inspectors
found one licensee to be assuming an excessively
small locked-rotor
power factor (0.2) in the motor for use in the calculation
of voltage drop from the motor control center to the MOV. The licensee's
selection
of this power factor was based on guidance in an Institute
of Electrical
and Electronics
Engineers'
standard that was not applicable
to the size of motors typically
used to operate valves in nuclear power plants. The assumption
of an excessively
small power factor causes an underestimation
of the cable voltage drop and may result in the overestimation
of MOV capability
under design-basis
conditions.
Licensees
are improving
their documentation
of current and required MOV switch settings, but some weaknesses
remain. For example, one licensee had simplified
its control over changes to torque switch settings to expedite the process but, In so doing, caused the concern that the quality assurance
department
may not participate
adequately
in accepting
those changes. Some of the weakness in documenting
torque switch settings appears to result from the difficulty
in reading the switches.
Some licensees
have raised torque switch settings for MOVs above the manufacturer's
maximum specified
value without performing
an adequate safety analysis in accordance
with the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.59.
-'- Attachment
1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 Design-Basis
Differential
Pressure and Flow Testing In recommended
action "c" of GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested
licensees
to test MOVs within the generic letter program in situ under their design-basis
differential
pressure and flow conditions.
The NRC staff allows alternate methods to be used to demonstrate
the capability
of the MOV if testing in situ under those conditions
is not practicable.
The NRC staff suggested
that the licensees
follow a two-stage
approach for a situation
in which design-basis
testing in situ is not practicable
and the licensees
could not justify an alternate
method of demonstrating
MOV capability.
In performing
the two-stage approach, a licensee would evaluate the capability
of the MOV using the best data available
and then would obtain applicable
test data within the schedule of the generic letter. The NRC staff's response to Questions
22-32 and 37 in Supplement
1 to GL 89-10 provides guidance on design-basis
testing and the two-stage
approach.Many licensees
have committed
to test MOVs within the scope of their GL 89-10 program under design-basis
conditions, where practicable.
Some licensees
have indicated
that most MOVs can be tested at or near design-basis
conditions.
Other licensees (primarily
those of BWR plants) estimate that a much smaller percentage
of MOVs can be tested at or near design-basis
conditions.
These licensees
have not thoroughly
evaluated
the dbility to conduct MOV tests under design-basis
or maximum achievable
conditions.
Licensees
who have begun differential
pressure and flow testing have found some MOYs to require more thrust to operate than predicted
by the industry's
stan-dard equation with typical valve factors (such as 0.3 for flexible wedge gate valves) assumed in the pdst. For example, the Alabama Power Company, the licensee of the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, found less than half of the 55 flexible wedge gate valves tested under differential
pressure and flow conditions
to have their thrust requirements
bounded by the industry's
standard equation with a 0.3 valve factor. The industry's
test results confirm the conclusions
of NRC-sponsored
MOV research that the industry's
past methods of determining
the size of MOYs and setting their torque switches were inadequate
for some MOVs.The NRC staff has found weaknesses
in the licensees'
procedures
for conducting
the differential
pressure and flow tests, the acceptance
criteria for the tests in evaluating
the capability
of the MOV to perform its safety function under design-basis
conditions, and the process for incorporating
the test results into the methodology
used by the licensee in predicting
MOY thrust require-ments. The NRC regulations
and the plant's technical
specifications (TS)establish
requirements
for licensees'
actions and reporting
when safety-related
equipment
is determined
to be, or has been, unable to perform its safety functions.
Some licensees
did not appear aware of their obligations
to address MOV operability
following
testing performed
under their programs established
in response to GL 89-10. For example, some licensees
have not been evaluating
the results of MOV tests to verify the capability
of the tested MOYs to perform their safety functions
under design-basis
conditions
and to evaluate the adequacy of their methodology
to size and set other MOYs. Some licensees appeared to discard test data as suspect without careful evaluation.
The NRC
Attachment
1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 staff has also found a lack of coordination
among licensees
in disseminating
and using MOV test data. For example, some licensees
are not considering
tests conducted
by other licensees
which might reflect on the adequacy of their assumptions
in predicting
thrust requirements.
For MOVs that cannot be tested under design-basis
differential
pressure and flow conditions, the NRC inspectors
have found that some licensees
are not following
their commitments
to the two-stage
approach (discussed
in Supplement
1 to GL 89-10) to test those MOVs at the maximum differential
pressure and flow achievable.
If the test pressure and flow are near to the design-basis
conditions, the licensee may be able to Justify extrapolating
from the test results to demonstrate
the capability
of the MOY to perform its safety function under design-basis
conditions.
Where the MOV cannot be tested near design-basis
conditions, the licensee can use the results of the test at maximum achievable
conditions
to help confirm valve factor assumptions
in its sizing and switch setting methodology
and to set the MOV using the best avail-able data. The licensee may also find TS actions and reporting
requirements
that take effect as a result of tests of MOVs at less than full design-basis
differential
pressure and flow conditions
if those tests reveal that the MOYs could not perform their safety functions
under design-basis
conditions.
Testing MOVs at maximum achievable
conditions
is especially
helpful in estab-lishing a plant-specific
database if the licensee estimates
that only a small percentage
of 14OVs can be tested at or near design-basis
conditions.
Some licensees
who, in their initial response to GL 89-10, committed
to imple-ment the recommendations
of GL 89-10 to test MOYs where practicable
have indicated
an interest in grouping certain MOVs to reduce the amount of testing (although
testing of those MOVs would be practicable).
Item 1. of GL 89-10 states that licensees
shall submit any changes to scheduled
commitments, and that revised schedules
or alternative
actions may be implemented
without NRC approval with justification
retained on site.In their initial responses
to GL 89-10, some licensees
stated that they would attempt to group MOVs to limit the extent of design-basis
testing. The prelim-inary results of design-basis
tests at several plants (for example, Catawba, Farley, Oconee and Surry) Indicated
that apparently
identical
MOYs performed significantly
different
uider high differential
pressure and flow conditions.
This could cause difficulty
in grouping MOVs in such a manner that a small sample of MOV tests can be used to demonstrate
that all MOVs can perform their safety functions
under design-basis
conditions.
The motor operators
for most gate valves are set to close on torque to provide adequate leakage control. Licensees
are attempting
to develop a method to ensure that MOVs closed using the limit switch meet the requisite
leakage limitations
in safety analyses without causing an MOV overstress
condition.
Periodic Verification
of MOV Capability
In recommended
action 'Id" of GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested
that licensees prepare or revise procedures
to ensure that adequate MOV switch settings are
Attachment
1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 determined
and maintained
throughout
the life of the plant. In paragraph "ij of GL 89-10, the NRC staff recommended
that the surveillance
interval be based on (1) the safety importance
and (2) the maintenance
and performance
history of the MOV, but that the interval not exceed 5 years or 3 refueling
outages, whichever
is later. Further, the staff stated that the capability
of the MOY should be verified if the MOV Is replaced, modified, or overhauled
to an extent that the existing test results do not represent
the MOV. The NRC staff's response to Questions
33-35 and 38 in Supplement
1 to GL 89-10 provides guidance on periodically
verifying
MOY switches and performing
tests after completing
maintenance.
The recommendation
of GL 89-10 for verifying
periodically
the adequacy of MOV switch settings includes torque, torque bypass, limit, and thermal overloads.
Many licensees
have stdted that they will attempt to use tests of MOVs with diagnostic
equipment
under zero differential
pressure and flow conditions (static conditions)
to demonstrate
the adequacy of torque switch settings and the continued
capability
of MOYs to perform their safety functions
under design-basis
conditions.
However, to date, none of those licensees
have pro-vided justification
for applying the results of tests conducted
under static conditions
to demonstrate
design-basis
capability.
These licensees
appear to be waiting on yet to be developed
generic justification
for static or low differential
pressure and flow testing.At least one licensee indicated
an intent to clean and lubricate
the valve stem before performing
periodic verification
testing. This would be inconsistent
with demonstrating
that the MOV had been set adequately
and was capable of performing
its function at the end of the test interval.In GL 89-10, the NRC staff stated that testing at design-basis
conditions
need not be repeated unless the MOV is replaced, modified, or overhauled
to the extent that the licensee considers
that the existing test results are not representative
of the MOV in its modified configuration.
Many licensees
are improving
their methods to demonstrate
that the MOVs are capable of performing
their safety functions
under design-basis
conditions
following
maintenance.
MOV Failures, Corrective
Actions, and Trending In recommended
action "h" of GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested
that licensees analyze or justify each MOV failure and corrective
action. The staff also requested
that the documentation
include the results and history of each as-found deteriorated
condition, malfunction, test, inspection, analysis, repair, or alteration.
The staff noted that the licensee must retain and report all documentation
in accordance
with the plant's requirements.
The staff also suggested
that the material be examined every 2 years or after each refueling
outage after the program is Implemented
as part of the monitoring
and feedback effort to establish
trends of MOV operability.
These trends could provide the basis on which the licensee can revise the testing frequency established
to verify periodically
that the MOV has adequate capability.
The NRC staff indicated
that the system should be well-structured
and should track, capture, and share history datd on individual
components.
The NRC staff's response to Questions
39 and 40 in Supplement
1 to GL 89-10 provides guidance on identifying
trends of MOV problems.
Attachment
1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 The NRC inspectors
have found some licensees
to have weaknesses
in evaluating
MOV failures and deficiencies (such as the operability
effects of spring pack relaxation).
Some licensees
have not been thorough in performing
root cause analyses of MOY problems.
Most licensees
are attempting
to improve their methods for identifying
trends in MOY problems.Schedule In GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested
that, by June 28, 1994, or by the third refueling
outage after December 28, 1989, whichever
is later, licensees
com-plete all design-basis
reviews, analyses, verifications, tests, and inspections
that were initiated
in order to satisfy the actions recommended
in the generic letter. The NRC staff's response to Question 41 in Supplement
1 to GL 89-10 provides guidance on the schedule for implementing
these actions specified
in GL 89-10.Some licensees
have not made adequate progress for resolving
the MOV issue for their facilities
within the recommended
schedule of GL 89-10. The findings of licensees
as they begin to initiate their programs in response to GL 89-10 and the results of the NRC inspections
of GL 89-10 programs reinforce
the impor-tance of promptly resolving
this safety-significant
issue. The NRC staff has accepted limited extensions
of the GL 89-10 schedule for particular
licensees who have provided Justification.
I emnt2 February 26. 1992 Pap 1 of I LIST OF RECEITLY ISSUED NRC IIIFORITION
NOTICES Information
notice No.. Subject 92-16 Loss of Flow from the Residual Heat Removal Pump during Refueling Cavity Dr"indown 92-15 Failure of Primary System Compression
Fitting 92-14 Uranium Oxide Fires at Fuel Cycle Facilities
92-02. RelapS/Hod3 Computer Code Supp. I Error Associated
with the Conservation
of Energy Equation 92-13 Inadequate
Control Over Vehicular
Traffic at'Nuclear Power Plant Sites 92-12 Effects of Cable Leakage Currents on Instrument
Settings and Indications
92-11 Soll and hater Contamina- tion at Fuel Cycle Facil-ities 92-10 8rachytherapy
Incidents Involving
Irdium-192 Wire -Used i Endobronchisl
Treatments
Date of Issuance 02/25192 Issued to All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.02/24/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.02/21/92 All fuel cycle and uranium fuel research and development
licensees.
02/19/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.02/18/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.02/10/92.
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.02/05/92 All uranium fuel fabrica-tion and conversion
facil-ities.01/31/92 AlI luclear Regulatory
Com-mission (NRC) licensees authorized
to use iridium-192 for brachy-therapyi manufacturers
and distributors
of iridiu-I92 wire for use in brachy-therapy.OL
- Operating
License CP
- Construction
Permit UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300 POSTAGE FEES PAID UMNO nIEM No. 0J
IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR (301) 504-2794 Attachments:
1. Inspection
Findings Pertaining
to the Recommendations
Contained
In Generic Letter 89-10 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices Document Name: GL 89-10*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
INSPECTION
RESULTS IN*C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CHBerlinger
02/11/92'*RPB:ADM TechEd 01/14/92*OGCB:DOEA:NRR
RJKiessel 01/14/92*EMEB:DET:NRR
TGScarbrough
01/09/92*C/EMEB:DET:NRR*D/DET:NRR
JANorberg
JERlchardson
01/13/92 01/29/92 IN 92-XX February xx, 1992 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR (301) 504-2794 Attachments:
1. Inspection
Findings Pertaining
to the Recommendations
Contained
In Generic Letter 89-10 2. Inspection
Findings Pertaining
to Other MOY Areas 3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices Document Name: GL 89-10 INSPECTION
RESULTS IN*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
D/DOEA:NRR
CERossi 02/ /92*C/EMEB:DET:NRR*D/DET:NRR
JANorberg
JERichardson
01/13/92 01/29/92*C/OGCB:DOEA:NR
11! -CHBerlinger
-0 01/31/92 A*RPB:ADM TechEd 01/14/92*OGCB:DOEA:NRR
RJKiessel 01/14/92*EMEB:DET:NRR
TGScarbrough
01/09/92 IN 92-XX January xx, 1992 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR (301) 504-2794 Attachments:
1. Inspection
Findings Pertaining
to the Recommendations
Contained
In Generic Letter 89-10 2. Inspection
Findings Pertaining
to Other MOV Areas 3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices Document Name: GL 89-10 INSPECTION
RESULTS IN*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
-'11/*OGCB:DOEA:NRR
RJKiessel 01/14/92*EMEB:DET:NRR
TGScarbrough
01/09/92 D/DOEA:NRR
C/OGCB:DOEA:N
Zg;CERossi HBerlinger
to 01/ /92 / 0lL1/92*C/EMEB:DET:NRR
D/DE tAJg *RPF.ADM JANorberg
JER i d d q TechEd 01/13/92 Ad 0 1// 01/14/92 Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR (301) 504-2794 Attachments:
1. Inspection
Findings Pertaining
to the Recommendations
Contained
In Generic Letter 89-10 2. Inspection
Findings Pertaining
to Other MOV Areas 3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices Document Name: GL 89-10 INSPECTION
RESULTS IN D/DOEA:NRR
CERossi Ol/ /92 D/DET: NRR JERichardson
01/ /92 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CHBerlinger
01/ /92 RPB:ADM TechEd 1Miain 91 01/jq/92 OGCB:DOEA:NRR
RJKiessel 01/ /92 EMEB:DET:NRR
TGScarbrough
01/ /92 C/EMEB:DET:NRR
JANorberg 01/ /92 Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR (301) 504-2794 Attachments:
1. Inspection
Findings Pertaining
to the Recommendations
Contained
In Generic Letter 89-10 2. Inspection
Findings Pertaining
to Other MOV Areas 3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices Document Name: GL 89-10 INSPECTION
RESULTS IN D/DOEA:NRR
CERossi 01/ /92 D/DET:NRR JERicharoson
01/ /92 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CHBerlinger
01/ /92 RPB:ADM TechEd JIMahl97 01//q/92 OGCB:DOEA:NRR
RJKiessel
L 01/fl/9 2 EMEB:DET:NRR
TGScarbrough
01/ /92 C/EMEB:DET:NRR
JANorberg 01/ /92