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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML22335A2802022-11-0404 November 2022 11-4-2022 Email Transmitting Draft Questions Pertaining to Pilgrim ISFSI Exemption Request ML22270A0422022-09-26026 September 2022 Acknowledgement Email for Holtec'S Request for Reporting Exemption with Regards to the Pilgrim ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (Docket No. 05000293) ML22154A1622022-05-26026 May 2022 Letter and Email from Save Our Bay/Diane Turco Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim ML22007A2602021-12-0606 December 2021 E-mail from P. O'Brien, Holtec, to A. Snyder, NRC, on Pilgrim Effluent Discharge ML21287A6192021-10-14014 October 2021 E-mail from S. Phillips, MEMA, to A. Snyder, NRC, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Consultation Response to Amendment Review for Emergency Preparedness ML21266A2512021-09-23023 September 2021 Consultation with Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Amendment Application for Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Levels ML21266A2772021-09-23023 September 2021 HDI Clarification of Exemption Requested from 10 CFR 20, Appendix G, Section Iii.E ML21267A0012021-09-23023 September 2021 E-mail from A. Snyder, NRC, to A. Sterdis, Holtec, - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 20, Appendix G, Section Iii.E Acceptance Review ML21257A3832021-09-15015 September 2021 E-mail from A. Snyder, NRC, to A. Sterdis, Holtec, - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Follow-on Request Re Request for Additional Information 2 Pilgrim - License Amendment Request Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Only Emergency Pl ML21211A5912021-07-22022 July 2021 Consultation Response from Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Pilgrim ISFSI Only Technical Specifications ML21211A5162021-07-22022 July 2021 Consultation Response from Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Pilgrim ISFSI Only Physical Security Plan ML21200A2352021-07-13013 July 2021 Consultation Request to Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Pilgrim ISFSI Only Technical Specifications ML21200A1522021-07-13013 July 2021 Consultation Request to Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Pilgrim Isfi Only Physical Security Plan ML21176A1842021-06-25025 June 2021 Email from HDI Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Training ML21180A0582021-06-17017 June 2021 Email from Region I Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Inspection - EA-13-132 ML21097A0402021-04-0606 April 2021 E-Mail Consult with Commonwealth of Mass Re - Amendment Application - Physical Security Plan for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station L-20-092, Email Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station-Exemption from Annual Force-On-Force Exercise Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B,2020-12-10010 December 2020 Email Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station-Exemption from Annual Force-On-Force Exercise Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, L-20-096, Supplemental Information to Support Physical Security Plan Revision and License Amendment Request to Incorporate Alternate Measures - Holtec Email Dated December 10, 20102020-12-10010 December 2020 Supplemental Information to Support Physical Security Plan Revision and License Amendment Request to Incorporate Alternate Measures - Holtec Email Dated December 10, 2010 ML20328A2982020-11-16016 November 2020 Response from Commonwealth of Massachusetts on No Significant Hazard for Pilgrim ISFSI Amendment to Address ISFSI II Dated November 16, 2020 ML20297A2372020-10-22022 October 2020 Request for Additional Information - HDI Fleet Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program ML20266G4032020-09-22022 September 2020 Acceptance Review Email - Request for Approval of HDI Fleet Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program, Revision 0 ML20163A6802020-06-11011 June 2020 Confirmation of the Scope of the Requested Regulatory Relief for Pilgrim Security Qualifications ML20280A1912020-04-17017 April 2020 Request for Additional Information- Clarifying Information for Pilgrim ISFSI Physical Security Amendment Application ML20269A3542020-03-0505 March 2020 CFR 26.717 Reports 2019 Transmittal Email ML19336A0302019-11-27027 November 2019 OEDO-15-00479 - Re 2.206 Petition Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station'S Current Licensing Basis for Flooding ML19336A0332019-11-26026 November 2019 OEDO-15-00479 - E-mail to Petitioner - 2.206 Petition Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station'S Current Licensing Basis for Flooding (CAC No. MF6460; EPID L-2015-CRS-0002)- Issuance of Final Director'S Decision ML19331A1952019-11-21021 November 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Commonwealth Consultation Response - Amendment Regarding Site Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme ML19331A1732019-11-12012 November 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station -Consult with Commonwealth - Amendment Regarding Cyber Security Plan ML19331A1642019-11-0505 November 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station -Consult with Commonwealth - Amendment Regarding Site Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme ML19331A1792019-11-0505 November 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - EA and Fonsi for Pilgrim Emergency Planning Exemption CY-19-007, LTR-19-0441 Henrietta Cosentino, E-mail SECY-19-0078 Request by Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station2019-11-0404 November 2019 LTR-19-0441 Henrietta Cosentino, E-mail SECY-19-0078 Request by Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML19275H1962019-09-24024 September 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Consult with Commonwealth - Amendment Regarding Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications (PDTS) ML19239A0372019-08-26026 August 2019 E-mail from Entergy Dated August 26, 2019, Notification of Pilgrim License Transfer ML19239A0262019-08-23023 August 2019 LTR-19-0330 Janet Azarovitz, E-mail a Plea for More Time and Reasonable Discussion Including the Citizens of the Commonwealth in the Sale of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML19234A2072019-08-20020 August 2019 LTR-19-0328 Lawrence Delafield, President, Six Ponds Improv Assoc., Plymouth, Ma, Ltr Requests NRC to Postpone Consideration of Transferring the Licenses for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Until the NRC Has Answered Concerns by Pilgrim Watch, Se ML19232A4032019-08-20020 August 2019 LTR-19-0322 Diane Turco, Director, Cape Downwinders, Massachusetts, Letter/E-mail Requests Suspension of the Pilgrim License Transfer from Entergy to Holtec Until the Adjudicatory Hearing Is Held and Raised Contentions Are Resolved ML19308A9942019-08-19019 August 2019 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Confirmatory Order Rescission Supplemental Information ML19226A3912019-08-14014 August 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - EA and Fonsi for Pilgrim Decommissioning Trust Fund Exemption (Holtec) ML19226A3962019-08-14014 August 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station -Consult with Commonwealth - Conforming Amendment in Support of Pilgrim License Transfer Application ML19226A1212019-08-13013 August 2019 OEDO-15-00479-2.206 Petition Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station'S Current Licensing Basis for Flooding - Status (CAC No. MF6460; EPID L-2015-CRS-0002) ML19227A1032019-08-0707 August 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Draft Wording for Potential Condition of License Transfer Order ML19207B3662019-07-26026 July 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim - RAI Direct and Indirect Transfer of Lic.; Conforming Lic. Amend.; Req. for Exemption 10 CFR 50.82(A)(8)(I)(A) for Holtec Decom. International, Llc ML19176A3452019-06-25025 June 2019 2.206 Petition Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station'S Current Licensing Basis for Flooding - Information (OEDO-15-00479) (CAC No. MF6460; EPID L-2015-CRS-0002) ML19154A0652019-06-0303 June 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim - Permanent Cessation of Power Operations ML19154A5242019-06-0303 June 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - RAI - Pilgrim Post-Decommissioning Technical Specifications (PDTS) License Amendment Request (LAR) ML19161A2122019-05-20020 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Acceptance of License Amendment Request to Remove Cyber Security Plan Requirements ML19123A0332019-05-0101 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Logbook Entry: 05/01/2019 Endangered Species Report Regarding a Confirmed Sighting of North Atlantic Right Whale(S) (Balaena Glacialis) ML19122A4912019-04-29029 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Logbook Entry: 04/29/2019 Regarding the Confirmed Sighting of Ten North Atlantic Right Whales (Balaena Glacialis) ML19108A2372019-04-18018 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action, Proposed Exemptions from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) - On-Site Property Damage Insurance ML19108A2362019-04-18018 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action, Proposed Exemptions from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) - Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance 2022-09-26
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From: Mary Lampert <mary.lampert@comcast.net> Sent: Monday, August 24, 2015 3:13 PM To: McKinley, Raymond
Subject:
[External_Sender] Re: Pilgrim Scram - MSIV
Thank you for your quick and full response.
Mary Sent from my iPhone
On Aug 24, 2015, at 2:08 PM, "McKinley, Raymond" <Raymond.McKinley@nrc.gov> wrote: Good Afternoon Mary, The licensee is still in the process of performing their post trip review, and our inspectors are performing follow-up inspections as well.
When one MSIV goes closed at 100% power, reactor pressure rises which in turn causes reactor power to rise. Eventually, power and pressure reach their associated reactor protection system setpoints and cause an automatic scram. It is usually a relay race as to which signal is received first, but reactor power is usually the first parameter to trigger the scram.
Based on our initial review, it appears that the reactor scrammed on Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) High Neutron Flux. The Reactor High Pressure scram signal was also received, but it occurred just after the APRM High Flux was received.
The Reactor Protection Scram setpoints are set low enough to prevent fuel damage for postulated transients such as the one experienced on Saturday. The case of one MSIV closing at full power is less severe than some other transients since the other 3 steam lines remained in service thus suppressing the peak reactor pressure and power rise. There was no indication of a fuel problem during or after the transient, nor would we expect to see a fuel problem following such a transient given that the reactor protection system functioned as designed. Licensee's routinely monitor for fuel leaks by measuring and trending plant offgas and reactor coolant chemistry and radioactivity, and there are activity limits as governed by the plant's operating license. If a fuel leak were to develop for any reason, then it would be detected, and the licensee would need to comply with the conditions of their license. Our NRC inspectors also perform control room walkdowns on a daily basis and they look at parameters such as offgas activity, so a fuel leak would not go unnoticed. We will also take a look at activity levels before the scram and after the plant starts up and reaches 100% steady state.
At this point, the need for fuel sipping is not indicated.
The licensee is required to submit a Lic ensee Event Report (LER) for this scram within 60 days which will provide the details of the event and the results of the licensee's investigation. In addition, NRC will discuss this event and any findings
in our 3 rd Quarter Inspection Report which will be issued in November.
Sincerely, Ray McKinley Chief, Division of Reactor Projects Branch 5 U.S. NRC Region I From: Mary Lampert [mailto:mary.lampert@comcast.net
] Sent: Sunday, August 23, 2015 4:12 PM To: Dean, Bill <Bill.Dean@nrc.gov>; McKinley, Raymond <Raymond.McKinley@nrc.gov
> Cc: Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum@ucsusa.org
>; weavenel@gmail.com; Becky Chin
<rebeccajchin@hotmail.com>; James lampert <james.lampert@comcast.net
>; marischka dopp <marischka@comcast.net>; Nancy Nowak <nowakdux@gmail.com
>; Pat Gagnon <bceagles@gmail.com
>
Subject:
[External_Sender] Pilgrim Scram - MSIV Hello: I'm confused about the scram Saturday at Pilgrim. Closure of 1 MSIV at 100% power should not scram the reactor. I understand that the logic about MSIV
closings at full power is: 1 never - 2 maybe (if they were in the same steam line no, if in 2 different stea m lines yes) - 3 MSIV's clos ed will always scram the plant. When 1 MSIV closes at 100% power the steam flow from that steam line
will be diverted to the other 3 steam lines and the high flow in each of those
other 3 steam lines will not cause a trip on Main Steam line High Flow (MSLHF).
Potential causes: MSLHF trip devices are set too low then a full scram will occur.
Another possible cause of the scram could be that the MSIV closed too fast and caused a pressure spike on the reactor. That potential pressure spike is usually not high enough to cause the reactor to scram on high pressure (around 1085 PSIG). Q.1. What was the cause(s)?
What that pressure spike can do is cause the reactor flux (neutron population which equals power) to increase rapidl y and cause a sudden over powering of the reactor. That sudden over powering would be detected by the Average Power Range Monitors (APRMS) and that wo uld scram the reactor. That type of event also has the potential to cause fuel damage.
Q.2. We want to know if NRC is requiring an investigation to determine if there was damage and if there was an investigation the result.
Fuel damage shows up in 2 ways.
The first indication would be in the plant off gas release. An increase can be determined by a comparison of the off gas release rate before the scram with the off gas release rate after the scram.
Any prolonged increase would indicate fuel damage, this is best measured after the plant is at full power for a few days and monitored for a month or so to determine if the increased off gas level stays up or returns to the previous level.
Q.3. Please provide report.
The second way to determine fuel damage is to Sip the used fuel after it is removed from the reactor during a refuel outage. This would only be done if there is an indication of an increase in the off gas release rate as determined by the first indication. All this data (excep t for Sipping) is continually recorded in the control room.
Please provide report if sippi ng was required and the result.
Thank you, Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch/Town of Duxbury Nuclear Advisory Committee