ML19331A173

NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station -Consult with Commonwealth - Amendment Regarding Cyber Security Plan

ML19331A173
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	11/12/2019
From:	Scott Wall NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL3
To:	Phillips S Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office of Health and Human Services
Wall S
References
L-2019-LLA-0098
Download: ML19331A173 (17)

Text

From:

Wall, Scott Sent:

Tuesday, November 12, 2019 12:54 PM To:

Phillips, Samantha (CDA)

Cc:

Tifft, Doug

Subject:

For Your Comments - Commonwealth of Massachusetts - Pilgrim License Amendment Request Attachments:

Pilgrim_E190425t010414_Letter 2.19.022 Final-PF.pdf

Dear Ms. Phillips:

By application dated April 25, 2019 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19115A225), Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENOI), requested changes to the Renewed Facility License for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim). The proposed change would remove reference to the Cyber Security Plan (CSP) and update the associated License Condition 3.G.

By Order dated August 22, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19170A265), the NRC staff approved, in part, the direct transfer of the Pilgrim Renewed Facility Operating License (RFOL)

No. DPR-35 to Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI, or the licensee). Additionally, on August 22, 2019, HDI informed the NRC (ADAMS Accession No. ML19234A357) that:

HDI will assume responsibility for all ongoing NRC regulatory actions and reviews currently underway for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. HDI respectfully requests NRC continuation of these regulatory actions and reviews.

On August 26, 2019, ENOI informed the NRC that the transaction closed on August 26, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19239A037). On August 27, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19235A050), the NRC staff issued Amendment No. 249 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-35 for Pilgrim. Accordingly, HDI is now the licensee for decommissioning operations at Pilgrim.

If the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has comments on this license amendment request, please e-mail me your comments by the close of business on November 26, 2019, to support potential issuance after the 26th.

Thank you Scott P. Wall, LSS BB, BSP Senior Project Manager Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 301.415.2855 Scott.Wall@nrc.gov

Hearing Identifier:

NRR_DRMA Email Number:

322 Mail Envelope Properties (MN2PR09MB34543FD0F9FCD721CEA2451E92770)

Subject:

For Your Comments - Commonwealth of Massachusetts - Pilgrim License Amendment Request Sent Date:

11/12/2019 12:54:29 PM Received Date:

11/12/2019 12:54:33 PM From:

Wall, Scott Created By:

Scott.Wall@nrc.gov Recipients:

"Tifft, Doug" <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "Phillips, Samantha (CDA)" <samantha.phillips@state.ma.us>

Tracking Status: None Post Office:

MN2PR09MB3454.namprd09.prod.outlook.com Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 1823 11/12/2019 12:54:33 PM Pilgrim_E190425t010414_Letter 2.19.022 Final-PF.pdf 440547 Options Priority:

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Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

1340 Echelon Parkway Jackson, MS 39213 Tel 601-368-5138 Ron Gaston Director, Nuclear Licensing 10 CFR 50.90 10 CFR 50.54(p) 2.19.022 April 25, 2019 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

License Amendment Request - License Condition Revision for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station NRC Docket No. 50-293 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-35 In accordance with the provisions of Title10 Code of Federal Regulators (CFR) 50.90, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), is submitting a request for an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). Specifically, this license amendment request (LAR) is for the removal of the existing Cyber Security Plan (CSP) requirements contained in License Condition 3.G of the PNPS license and removal of the commitment to fully implement the CSP by the Milestone 8 (MS8) commitment date of December 31, 2020 (Reference 1).

In a letter dated November 10, 2015 (Reference 2), Entergy notified the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power operations at PNPS no later than June 1, 2019.

In accordance with10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.4(b)(9), Entergy will provide certification to the NRC in June, 2019 that all fuel has been permanently removed from the PNPS reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP). As stated in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2),

upon docketing the certifications for permanent cessation of power operations (Reference 2) and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, the 10 CFR Part 50 license for PNPS will no longer authorize operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel. With the fuel permanently removed from the reactor vessel, spent fuel will be stored onsite in the SFP and/or in an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

The NRC staff has determined that 10 CFR 73.54, Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks, does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1), and whose certifications have been docketed by the NRC, once sufficient

2.19.022 Page 2 of 3 time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> (Reference 3).

The regulatory and technical evaluations included in this LAR are consistent with recent NRC guidance on cyber security requirements for decommissioning facilities (Reference 3). In addition, the NRC staff has recently approved similar amendment requests to delete the cyber security license condition from the Crystal River Unit 3 and the Vermont Yankee facility operating licenses (References 4 and 5). The Enclosure provides an analysis, including the regulatory and technical evaluations, of the proposed change. The Attachment to the Enclosure contains the marked-up PNPS license page for the proposed change to license condition 3.G.

Entergy has performed an analysis which shows that, 10 months after shutdown, the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool will have decayed to the extent that the requested change may be safely implemented at PNPS. The analysis demonstrates that 10 months after shutdown, there is sufficient time to mitigate events that could lead to a zirconium fire. Following the PNPS shutdown, which is expected to occur no later than June 1, 2019, 10 months after shutdown would be April 1, 2020. This analysis was included in Attachment 2 of Reference 6.

Entergy requests approval of the proposed license amendment by April 1, 2020. The requested LAR approval date is prior to the anticipated completion of the transfer of all spent fuel to dry storage within the ISFSI, and after the appropriate cooling period for spent fuel in the SFP after the PNPS reactor has been permanently shut down. Once approved, the license amendment will be implemented within 30 days of the later of either the date of the license amendment or the date when all the spent fuel has decayed beyond the minimum cooling time that would allow sufficient time (10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />) to mitigate a SFP drain down in the adiabatic case.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this information, please contact Mr. Peter J. Miner at 508-830-7127.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this license amendment request has been provided to the designated Commonwealth of Massachusetts official.

I declare under penalty of perjury, the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on April 25, 2019.

Respectfully, Ron Gaston RWG/rb

2.19.022 Page 3 of 3

Enclosure:

Evaluation of Proposed Change Attachments to

Enclosure:

Renewed Facility Operating License Change (Mark-up) and Clean Page for Revision

References:

1) NRC Letter to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Issuance of Amendment Regarding Request to Revise Cyber Security Plan Milestone 8 Completion Date (CAC No.

MF9587; EPID L-2017-LLA-0194), (ADAMS Accession No. ML17290A487), dated December 15, 2017

2) Entergy, letter to NRC, Notification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations, (ADAMS Accession No. ML15328A053), dated November 10, 2015

3) NRC Memorandum, Executive Director for Operations to NRC Commissioners, Cyber Security Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, (ADAMS Accession No. ML16172A284), dated December 5, 2016

4) NRC Letter to Crystal River Nuclear Plant, "Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant - Issuance of Amendment Approving Removal of the Existing Cyber Security License Condition from the Facility Operating License (TAC No. L53155)," (ADAMS Accession No. ML17096A280),

dated June 22, 2017

5) NRC Letter to Entergy, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station -

Issuance of Amendment for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18145A208), dated June 27, 2017

6) Entergy, letter to NRC Response to Request for Additional Information

- Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, (ADAMS Accession No. ML19056A190), dated February 18, 2019 cc: NRC Region I, Regional Administrator NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Pilgrim NRC NRR Project Manager - Pilgrim Mr. John Giarrusso, Jr. - Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Mr. John Priest - Massachusetts Department of Public Health

Enclosure 2.19.022 Evaluation of Proposed Change

2.19.022 Enclosure Page 1 of 8 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGE 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) is submitting a request for an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-35 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS).

Specifically, this license amendment request (LAR) is for the removal of the existing Cyber Security Plan (CSP) requirements contained in license condition 3.G of the PNPS license and removal of the commitment to fully implement the CSP by the Milestone 8 (MS8) commitment date of December 30, 2020 (Reference 1). This change is requested to support the decommissioning of PNPS. Attachment 2 contains the existing Renewed Facility Operating License marked up to show the proposed change.

2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION The PNPS CSP and implementation schedule, as required by Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 73.54, Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks, consists of eight Milestones. Interim Milestones 1 through 7 were completed by December 31, 2012 and continue to be maintained. As approved by Reference 1, CSP Milestone 8 implementation (full implementation of the CSP) is required to be completed by December 30, 2020. Cyber security requirements are described in the second paragraph of license condition 3.G, which states:

"The license shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The licenses CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 236, as supplemented by changes approved by Amendment Nos. 238, 241, 244, and 247."

In a letter dated November 10, 2015 (Reference 2), Entergy notified the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power operations at PNPS no later than June 1, 2019. When Entergy permanently ceases power operations at PNPS and pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.4(b)(9), Entergy will provided certification to the NRC that all fuel has been permanently removed from the PNPS reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP). As stated in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), upon docketing the certifications for permanent cessation of power operations (Reference 2) and subsequent permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel in June 2019, the 10 CFR Part 50 license for PNPS will no longer authorize operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel.

With the fuel permanently removed from the reactor vessel, spent fuel will be stored onsite in the SFP and/or in an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

The NRC staff has determined that 10 CFR 73.54 does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1), and whose certifications have been docketed by the NRC, once sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> (Reference 3).

By letter dated July 3, 2018 (Reference 4), Entergy provided the NRC with a PNPS site-specific analysis (Calculation No. PNPS-EC-73355-M1418, Adiabatic Heatup Analysis for Drained Spent

2.19.022 Enclosure Page 2 of 8 Fuel Pool) (PNPS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis) supporting the time period when sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> (Zirconium-Fire Window) for specific exemptions from specific Emergency Planning (EP) requirements. The PNPS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis submitted with Reference 4 determined the minimum cooling time (Zirconium-Fire Window) to be 10 months after permanent cessation from power operation.

To support the decommissioning of PNPS, this LAR is being submitted to remove the existing cyber security requirements from license condition 3.G, prior to the completion of the transfer of spent fuel from the SFP to dry storage within the ISFSI. This request considers the cooling period for spent fuel stored in the SFP after the PNPS reactor has been permanently shut down.

The evaluations included in this LAR are consistent with recent NRC guidance on cyber security requirements for decommissioning facilities (Reference 3).

Accordingly, per the provisions of 10 CFR 50.4 and 10 CFR 50.90, Entergy is submitting this request to amend the PNPS Renewed Facility Operating License to remove the existing cyber security requirements from license condition 3.G.

The proposed change has been evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1) using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and it has been determined that the proposed change involves no significant hazards consideration, as discussed in Section 4.3 below. Enclosure 2 contains the marked-up PNPS Renewed Facility Operating License page for the proposed change to license condition 3.G.

Based on the Zirconium-Fire Analysis provided in support of the EP Exemption Request submitted to NRC (Reference 5), the anticipated date when all the spent fuel will have decayed beyond the minimum cooling time that would allow sufficient time (10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />) to mitigate a SFP drain down in the adiabatic case will occur prior to the current PNPS MS8 implementation date.

Subsequent to the Zirconium-Fire Window, the Cyber Security regulation, 10 CFR 73.54, would no longer apply to PNPS and the MS8 CSP implementation commitment would no longer be needed and, as such, Entergy is requesting withdrawal of this commitment concurrent with approval of this LAR.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION The proposed license amendment to remove the CSP requirements from license condition 3.G is based on the significantly reduced risks for a nuclear power facility that has permanently ceased operations, has removed all fuel from the reactor vessel, and where the spent fuel has had sufficient time to cool down such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Compared to an operating nuclear power reactor, for a decommissioning facility with a permanently defueled reactor, the spectrum of possible accidents is significantly reduced, and the risk of an offsite radiological release is significantly lower. Correspondingly, cyber security risk is reduced due, in part, to the fact that there are significantly fewer critical digital assets (CDAs) needed to protect against and assess radiological events at a decommissioning facility than in comparison to the number at an operating reactor.

PNPS will permanently cease power operation no later than June 1, 2019 and all fuel will be removed from the reactor vessel in June 2019. The digital computer and communication systems, and networks that require cyber protection are primarily those associated with security and

2.19.022 Enclosure Page 3 of 8 emergency preparedness functions, and the functioning of safety systems that support operation of the SFP. However, once the recently irradiated spent fuel that is stored in the SFP has sufficiently decayed, the potential consequences of a cyber-attack are significantly reduced.

PNPS FSAR Section 14.5 incorporated the GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Report, Fuel Handling Accident in the Spent Fuel Pool Generic Dose Assessment for the fuel handling accident involving an unchanneled fuel assembly in the SFP. The assessment concluded that for the consequences of the design basis Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) to remain bounding, an unchanneled fuel assembly must be allowed to decay for a minimum of 45 days from the time of reactor shutdown in which the assembly in question was part of the critical reactor core. The 45-day decay period ensures the radiological source term is sufficiently reduced so that the consequences of the design basis FHA remain bounding. The PNPS design basis FHA assumes the source term in an irradiated fuel assembly has been reduced by 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (1 day) of decay since the time of reactor shutdown. To ensure the consequences of postulated drop of an unchanneled fuel assembly in the SFP are bounded by the PNPS design basis FHA, an additional 45 days of decay is required. Therefore, PNPS maintains a procedurally enforced administrative restriction prohibiting the handling of unchanneled assemblies unless they have decayed for a minimum of 46 days following reactor shutdown to ensure the consequences of the design basis FHA remains bounding for the drop of an unchanneled irradiated fuel assembly in the SFP.

As documented in Reference 5, with PNPS permanently shut down, the only design basis accident that could potentially result in a radiological release at PNPS is the FHA. This analysis shows that 46 days after shutdown, the radiological consequence of the FHA would not exceed the limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary. PNPS will have been permanently shut down for greater than 46 days, therefore, the possibility of an offsite radiological release from a design basis accident that could exceed the EPA PAGs is significantly reduced. With the significant reduction in radiological risk for PNPS, the consequences of a cyber-attack will be significantly reduced.

The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might occur involves the very unlikely (beyond-design-basis) event where the SFP drains in such a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be unavailable, which is postulated to result in an adiabatic heat-up of the spent fuel. The analysis for this event, the Zirconium Fire Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool for the PNPS (Zirconium-Fire Analysis), was previously submitted to the NRC staff in support of requested exemptions from specific requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 for certain emergency planning requirements as appropriate for a decommissioning facility (Reference 4). The exemption requests associated with this analysis is in the NRC approval cycle and is expected to be completed by September 2019. This PNPS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis determined that 10 months after shutdown, the spent fuel stored in the SFP will have decayed to a point where a fire in the zirconium fuel cladding following a postulated beyond-design-basis event involving the loss of SFP water inventory is unlikely prior to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> (Zirconium-Fire Window); where 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> provides sufficient time for mitigative actions to be taken to prevent spent fuel heat-up damage.

The rationale to remove the cyber security requirements after the Zirconium-Fire Window is similar to the rationale used to justify a reduction of emergency preparedness requirements during decommissioning, as documented in the PNPS submittal associated with decommissioning plant emergency preparedness exemption requests.

2.19.022 Enclosure Page 4 of 8 A summary of the Zirconium-Fire Analysis and conclusions is as follows:

1.

The analysis conservatively assumes that there is no radiative or air cooling of the assemblies (adiabatic heat-up); the flow paths that would provide natural circulation cooling are assumed to be blocked.

2.

The analysis conservatively assumes that the heat-up time starts when the SFP has been completely drained. This is conservative as it does not include the period of time from the postulated initiating event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all cooling means are lost, and it is likely that site personnel will start to respond to an incident when drain-down starts.

3.

Due to the slow rate of SFP water boil-off, adequate time will be available to restore cooling or makeup, either through restoration of normal systems or through readily available mitigation measures, without significant radiological consequences for plant workers in the reactor building.

4.

Furthermore, because of the slow rate of the event scenario and because the duties of the on-shift personnel at a decommissioning reactor facility are not as complicated and diverse as those for an operating reactor, significant time is available to complete actions necessary to mitigate the event.

5.

A temperature of 900°C is the temperature associated with rapid fuel cladding oxidation used to assess the potential onset of fission product release.

6.

Adiabatic heat-up analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat shows that, after 10 months following shutdown, the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900°C is 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after the assemblies have been uncovered.

7.

Therefore, due to the length of time it would take for the adiabatic heat-up to occur, once all the spent fuel has decayed for at least 10 months following shutdown, there is ample time to respond to any drain down event that might cause such an occurrence by restoring cooling or makeup or providing spray. As a result, the likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is not deemed credible.

Therefore, based on there being (1) no design basis events i.e. FHA that could result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAG limits and consequently a significant reduction in radiological risk including consequences of a potential cyber-attack, and (2) sufficient time (at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />) to take prompt mitigative actions in response to a postulated zirconium fire accident scenario in the SFP, the elimination of the cyber security requirements from license condition 3.G is appropriate for PNPS. This rationale is similar to that used to justify a reduction in emergency preparedness requirements during decommissioning, that has been submitted to the NRC in a License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme to Address the Permanently Defueled Condition (Reference 5).

2.19.022 Enclosure Page 5 of 8

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 10 CFR 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks,"

establishes the requirements for licensees to maintain and implement a Cyber Security Program (CSP). This regulation at paragraph 73.54(a) specifically states "... each licensee currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant under part 50 of this chapter shall submit, as specified in § 50.4 and § 50.90 of this chapter, a cyber security plan that satisfies the requirements of this section for Commission review and approval." In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54, "Conditions of licenses,"

upon approval, the CSP becomes a condition in the operating license. PNPS has an approved CSP as described in the PNPS Renewed Facility Operating License condition 3.G.

License condition 3.G requires PNPS to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved CSP, including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The CSP provisions contained in this license condition continues to apply to PNPS until the license condition is removed pursuant to a 10 CFR 50.90 license amendment request.

Entergy will permanently cease power operations at PNPS no later than June 1, 2019 and will submit to the NRC the certification of permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel at PNPS pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii) and 50.4(b)(9). As stated in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2) upon docketing the certifications for permanent cessation of power operations (Reference 2) and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, the PNPS 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer authorize operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel.

When the final rule for 10 CFR 73.54 was issued in March 2009, neither ISFSl-only facilities nor other facilities that were in the process of decommissioning were required to comply with the cyber security requirements. The NRC specifically limited cyber security requirements to a "licensee currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant under part 50. Additionally, the NRC staff has previously concluded in a December 5, 2016 NRC Memorandum, "Cyber Security Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants" (Reference 3), that 10 CFR 73.54 does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 ), and whose certifications have been docketed by the NRC, once sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

4.2 Precedent The NRC staff has recently approved similar license amendment requests to delete the cyber security license condition from the Crystal River Unit 3 operating license and the Vermont Yankee operating license, respectively References 6 and 7.

4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration Entergy is requesting a license amendment to the PNPS Renewed Facility Operating License to remove license condition 3.G as it relates to the CSP. This license condition requires PNPS to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved CSP, including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). Specifically, the proposed change is to amend license condition 3.G to remove the cyber security requirements.

2.19.022 Enclosure Page 6 of 8 Entergy has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed license amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1.

Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No Following cessation of power operations and removal of all spent fuel from the reactor, spent fuel at PNPS will be stored in the SFP and in the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). In this configuration, the spectrum of possible transients and accidents is significantly reduced compared to an operating nuclear power reactor. The only design basis accident that could potentially result in an offsite radiological release at PNPS is the FHA, which is predicated on spent fuel being stored in the SFP. An analysis has been performed that concludes that once PNPS has been permanently shut down for 46 days, there is no longer any possibility of an offsite radiological release from a design basis accident that could exceed the EPA's PAGs. The results of this analysis have been previously submitted to the NRC (ADAMS Accession No. ML18186A635)

(Reference 4). With the significant reduction in radiological risk based on PNPS being shut down for more than 46 days, the consequences of a cyber-attack are also significantly reduced.

This proposed change does not alter previously evaluated accident analysis assumptions, introduce or alter any initiators, or affect the function of facility structures, systems, and components (SSCs) relied upon to prevent or mitigate any previously evaluated accident or the manner in which these SSCs are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not involve any facility modifications which affect the performance capability of any SSCs relied upon to prevent or mitigate the consequences of any previously evaluated accidents.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2.

Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No This proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, introduce or alter any initiators, or affect the function of facility SSCs relied upon to prevent or mitigate any previously evaluated accident, or the manner in which these SSCs are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not involve any facility modifications which affect the performance capability of any SSCs relied upon to mitigate the consequences of previously evaluated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Additionally, per an NRC Memorandum, Cyber Security Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 3), the NRC staff has determined that 10 CFR 73.54 does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1), and whose certifications

2.19.022 Enclosure Page 7 of 8 have been docketed by the NRC 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). PNPS will permanently remove all fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) in June 2019 and submit the required documentation stating so. Entergy has provided a site-specific analysis (Calculation No. PNPS-EC-73355-M1418, Adiabatic Heatup Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool) (PNPS site-specific Zirconium-Fire Analysis) that provides the determination that sufficient time will have passed prior to the requested implementation date such that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3.

Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation and design features specified in the PNPS Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications that were submitted to the NRC on September 13, 2018 (Reference 8). The NRC anticipates approval of the submittal in July 2019. The proposed change does not involve any changes to the initial conditions that establish safety margins and does not involve modifications to any SSCs which are relied upon to provide a margin of safety. Because there is no change to established safety margins as a result of this proposed change, no significant reduction in a margin of safety is involved.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, Entergy concludes that the proposed license amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of no significant hazards consideration is justified.

4.4 Conclusion In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above: 1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; 2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and 3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The proposed change removes the existing cyber security license condition from the Renewed Facility Operating License. The proposed change is confined to safeguards matters and does not involve any significant construction impacts. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(12). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

2.19.022 Enclosure Page 8 of 8

6.0 REFERENCES

1)

NRC Letter to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

- Issuance of Amendment Regarding Request to Revise Cyber Security Plan Milestone 8 Completion Date (CAC No. MF9587; EPID L-2017-LLA-0194) (ADAMS Accession No. ML17290A487), dated December 15, 2017

2)

Entergy, letter to NRC, Notification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations, (ADAMS Accession No. ML15328A053), dated November 10, 2015

3)

NRC Memorandum, Executive Director for Operations to NRC Commissioners, Cyber Security Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, (ADAMS Accession No. ML16172A284), dated December 5, 2016

4)

Entergy, letter to NRC Response to Request for Additional Information - Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, (ADAMS Accession No. ML19056A190), dated February 18, 2019

5)

Entergy, letter to NRC, License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme to Address the Permanently Defueled Condition, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18218A173), dated August 1, 2018

6)

NRC Letter to Crystal River Nuclear Plant, "Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant -

Issuance of Amendment Approving Removal of the Existing Cyber Security License Condition from the Facility Operating License (TAC No. L53155)," (ADAMS Accession No. ML17096A280), dated June 22, 2017

7)

NRC Letter to Entergy, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station - Issuance of Amendment for Removal of Cyber Security Plan Requirements, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18145A208), dated June 27, 2017

8)

Entergy, letter to NRC, Technical Specifications Proposed Change - Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18260A085), dated September 13, 2018

Attachment to Enclosure 2.19.022 Renewed Facility Operating License Change (Mark-Up) and Clean Page for Revision

2.19.022 Attachment to Enclosure Page 2 of 2 provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified below:

A.

Maximum Power Level ENO is authorized to operate the facility at steady state power levels not to exceed 2028 megawatts thermal.

B.

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. are hereby incorporated in the renewed operating license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

C.

Records ENO shall keep facility operating records in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

D.

Equalizer Valve Restriction - DELETED E.

Recirculation Loop Inoperable - DELETED F.

Fire Protection ENO shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the SER dated December 21, 1978 as supplemented subject to the following provision:

ENO may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

G.

Physical Protection The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (50 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Physical Security, Training and Qualification, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 0 submitted by letter dated October 13, 2004, as supplemented by letter dated May 15, 2006.

Amendment ______

Renewed License No. DPR-35