05000387/FIN-2016002-06
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Finding | |
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Title | Entry into a Locked High Radiation Area without Radiological Briefing |
Description | A Green self-revealing NCV of TS 5.7.2, High Radiation Area Controls, was identified when workers entered the wrong reactor unit condenser bay (Unit 2) that was posted and controlled as a locked high radiation area (LHRA). Specifically, on May 3, 2016, four Susquehanna staff were briefed to enter the Unit 1 condenser bay to check for steam leaks during start up, however the staff entered the Unit 2 condenser bay during full power operations in error and received electronic dosimeter alarms. This was entered into the CAP as CR-2016-11944, the use of master keys for routine entry into LHRA was discontinued, and a radiation safety stand down was conducted. The finding was determined to be more than minor based on a similar example 6.h in IMC 0612, Appendix E, and it is associated with Human Performance attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, Susquehanna staff violated the RWP and briefing requirements designed to protect workers from unnecessary radiation exposure. Using IMC 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, dated, August 19, 2008, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve: (1) ALARA occupational collective exposure planning and controls, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. The finding was self-revealing because Susquehanna was made aware of the situation as a result of an electronic dose rate alarm. The finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, Teamwork because the workers did not conduct peer checking and recognize and communicate that they were in the wrong reactor unit for the work they were conducting. Specifically, four Susquehanna staff were briefed to enter the Unit 1 condenser bay to check for steam leaks during start up, however the staff entered the Unit 2 condenser bay. |
Site: | Susquehanna |
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Report | IR 05000387/2016002 Section 2RS1 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Or Safety, Pr Safety |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71124.01 |
Inspectors (proximate) | C Graves D Schroeder E Gray J Grieves L Dumont N Embert P Meier T Daun |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2016002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2016Q2
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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