05000388/FIN-2016002-07
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Finding | |
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| Description | An NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of TS 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified when Susquehanna failed to implement procedures for controlling the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. Specifically, operators overrode automatic initiation of the system prior to inserting a manual scram, contrary to the requirements of OP-252-001, HPCI System, and OP-AD-300, Administration of Operations. This was entered into the CAP as CRs 2016-12854 and 2016-13118 and 2016-13136, the operators involved in the event were remediated, and lessons learned communicated to other station personnel. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, overriding the HPCI system prior to initiating a plant scram rendered the system unavailable to respond to a level transient or failure of the non-safety related feedwater system. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The SDP for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012 and determined that it required a detailed risk assessment because it represented a loss of the single train systems function. The Region 1 SRA performed a detailed risk evaluation using the Susquehanna Unit 2 standardized plant analysis risk (SPAR) Model, version 8.23. The issue was conservatively modeled with a HPCI failure to start due to the system automatic start signal being overridden. The change in core damage frequency per year was determined to be in the E-10 range due to the very short duration the system auto start feature was defeated. Therefore the issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, Procedure Adherence because Susquehanna did not follow processes, procedures and work instructions. Specifically, operators did not ensure that their actions were appropriately authorized by procedures when taking action to override a key safety system prior to a plant transient. |
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
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| Report | IR 05000388/2016002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Graves D Schroeder E Gray J Grieves L Dumont N Embert P Meier T Daun |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000388/2016002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2016Q2
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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