05000388/FIN-2015004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with an Inoperable Primary Containment Isolation Valve |
| Description | A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated violations of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs), was identified when Susquehanna did not take adequate corrective action to address the inoperability of the reactor recirculation sample line outboard PCIV when it failed during surveillance testing on July 1, 2015. The valve failed its subsequent surveillance test on September 30, 2015 due to the same degraded condition, which rendered the valve inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time specified in TS 3.6.1.3. The repeat failure was entered into the CAP as CR-2015-26590 and restored the valve to an operable condition by replacing its associated solenoid valve. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the structure, system and component (SSC) and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to correct the degraded condition of solenoid valve sticking resulted in a PCIV being rendered inoperable for longer than the TS allowed outage time. Inspector evaluated the finding In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The SDP for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, and determined it is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency did not result in an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, because the inboard valve remained operable for the duration of the inoperability, and it did not involve the hydrogen recombiners. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Challenge the Unknown, because Susquehanna did not stop when faced with uncertain conditions and ensure the risks were evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, Susquehanna did not challenge the unanticipated test results and did not ensure that the condition adverse to quality, associated with the faulty solenoid valve, was resolved prior to considering the valve operable [H.11]. |
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000388/2015004 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Graves D Schroeder E Gray J Deboer J Grieves N Embert S Barr T Daun T Fish P Meier |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.11, Challenge the Unknown |
| INPO aspect | QA.2 |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000388/2015004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2015Q4
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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