05000387/FIN-2015004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | An NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated violations of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, TS 5.5.11, Safety Function Determination, and TS 3.7.3, Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System was identified when Susquehanna performed maintenance on redundant trains of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system and control room emergency outside air supply system (CREOASS) concurrently. When performing these actions, operators did not apply NDAP-QA-0312, Control of LCOs, technical requirement for operations (TROs) and Safety Function Determination Program, correctly which resulted in the unrecognized loss of safety function of SBGT and CREOASS. Susquehanna entered the issue into the CAP as CR-2015-26475 and restored one of the subsystems to service, restoring the safety function. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Human Performance (Routine OPS/Maintenance Performance) attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (Secondary Containment and Control Room Ventilation) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, allowing work to be performed on redundant trains of SBGT and CREOASS concurrently, while not applying plant TSs correctly, resulted in a loss of safety function of both systems. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 3 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The SDP for Findings At-Power, both dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was only associated with the radiological barrier function of the Control Room and Secondary Containment. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Avoid Complacency because Susquehanna did not recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent problems, or inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, Susquehanna did not perform a thorough review of the planned activities every time work was performed to ensure compliance with plant TSs, rather than relying on past successes and assumed conditions [H12]. |
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000387/2015004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Graves D Schroeder E Gray J Deboer J Grieves N Embert S Barr T Daun T Fish P Meier |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2015004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2015Q4
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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