05000261/FIN-2010004-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Deficiencies in Non Safety-Related Cable Installation Result in Fire and Reactor Trip |
| Description | A self-revealing Green finding was identified for the licensees failure to adequately follow guidance in a design change package for the installation of non safetyrelated 4kV cables. This resulted in cables with design features inappropriate for the application being installed and eventually led to a fire and a reactor trip. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow the cable vendor recommendations and a self-imposed administrative requirement/standard for cable installation contained in cable specification L2-E-035, Specification for 5,000 Volt Power Cable. The licensee entered this into the CAP as NCR 390095. As corrective actions, the licensee replaced the cable, conduit and other damaged equipment, including evaluation on damage to cables in overhead, and the feeder cables to station service transformer (SST) 2E and 4kV bus 5. The failure to follow the guidance in the design change package to install non safetyrelated cables between Bus 4 and Bus 5 in accordance with their design change program and vendor and cable installation specifications was a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective of limiting events that upset plant stability, and was related to the attribute of Design Control (i.e., Plant Modifications). Specifically, the inadequate cable modification was determined to be the root cause of the reactor trip that occurred on March 28, 2010. This deficiency also paralleled Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Example 2.e, as the licensee did not follow their own administrative requirements and vendor recommendations for cable installation. The performance deficiency was screened using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, which determined that because the finding increases the likelihood of a fire, a Phase 3 SDP analysis was required. A phase 3 SDP risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0609 Appendix F utilizing the NRCs Robinson SPAR model. The Phase 3 analysis determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the core damage frequency increase was less than 1E-6. There is not a crosscutting aspect associated with the finding because the performance deficiency involving the cable installation occurred greater than 20 years ago and does not reflect current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Robinson  |
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| Report | IR 05000261/2010004 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen C Kontz D Bollock D Mills G Laska G Skinner J Beavers J Brady J Hickey J Worosilo M Bates P Braxton R Musser |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Robinson - IR 05000261/2010004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Robinson) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Robinson)
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