ML18093A855

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Special Rept 88-2:on 880506,Tech Specs Violated.Caused by Fire Barrier Impairments Lasting Greater than 7 Days for 52 Degraded Electrical & Mechanical Penetrations Discovered on 880429.Fire Watch Will Continue Until All Concerns Resolved
ML18093A855
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 05/25/1988
From: ZUPKO J M
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
88-2, NUDOCS 8806010190
Download: ML18093A855 (5)


Text

.... e . *.' *, ... . . . . *. . . . .. . .* ' -.. . Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station u. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-2 May 25, 1988 This Special Report addresses fire barrier penetration impairments which have not been restored to functional status within seven (7} days. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2. It is being submitted within thirty (30) days as per the Action Statement.

MJP:pc Distribution 8806010190 880525 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S DCD The Energy People Sincerely yours, J. M. Zupko, Jr. General Salem Operations 95-2189 111

.
.-*., .* SPECIAL REPORT NUMBER-8-2 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.7.11 Non-Compliance; Fire Barriers Impairee For Greater Than Seven (7) Days Event Date: 05/06/88 Report Date: 05/25/88 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.88-161. CONDIT-IONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit 1: Unit 2: Mode 1 Mode 1 Reactor Power 100% -Unit Load 1165 MWe Reactor Power 100% -Unit Load 1155 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On April 29, 1988 fifty-two (52) fire barrier electrical and mechanical penetrations were found degraded by Nuclear Fire & Safety Department personnel.

They were found as part of the Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.11 which requires fire barrier penetrations be visually inspected every 18 months to ensure continued operability of the penetration seals. The penetrations either had no seal or a damaged seal which was inadequate.

The areas of the plant where these penetrations are located are: Primary Chem. Lab -(113' Elevation)

Twenty 1.5" conduit penetrations considered unsealed until a configuration review is complete; These conduits travel, within the ceiling slab, from the Sampling Room to the Unit 2 113' Elevation HVAC Room. Fire Area lFA-AB-lOOC, Unit 1 100' Elevation Auxiliary Building:

Unit 1 Hallway To the Elevator Lobby -One 1.5" conduit has a missing conduit cover without an internal seal "Deroin Alley" -One 32" x 20" unsealed ceiling penetration and 11 unsealed floor penetrations.

The floor penetrations consist of: One 2' x 1' cable tray penetration Two 6" core bores containing 4" spare conduits with metal covers Four 1' x 1' penetrations Two 4" core bores containing 3" pipes

.\ . ". -* . . * ..... : UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-2 DESCRIPTION OF One x 12" penetration containing two 4" pipes One 1' x 3.5' blockout containing three 4" pipes Waste Evaporator Room -One damaged 8" diameter sleeved floor core bore penetration (containing 1" pipe) seal and one damaged 14" x 215" cable tray penetration seal Boric Acid Evap. Room -One damaged 3.5" south wall penetration seal Chemistry Lab -Three 3.5" damaged east wall cable penetration seals and one 2" damaged floor cable penetration seal Chem. Sampling Area -One 3.5" damaged east wall cable penetration seal Boric Acid Transfer Pump Area -One west wall 13" x 14" penetration (containing cable and pipe) with a damaged seal; One 4" sleeved floor core bore (containing a 1" diameter pipe) seal found damaged; and One west wall 4" diameter penetration (containing a l" diameter pipe) unsealed Fire Area 1FA-AB-84B, Unit 1 84' Elevation Auxiliary Building:

Cont. Spray Pump Area -One 26" x 26" cable tray floor penetration found damaged Fire Area 2FA-AB-64B, Unit 2 64' Elevation Auxiliary Building:

Recirc. Pump Area -One 4" diameter core bore penetration unsealed; one 2" diameter sleeved penetration unsealed, and one damaged 2" sleeved penetration all on the south wall Fire Area 2FA-AB-ST1, Unit 2 Auxiliary Building East Stairwell:

Three 2" diameter sleeved penetrations unsealed (one contains cable and the other two are spare penetrations)

Fire Area 2FA-AB-ST2, Unit 2 Auxiliary Building West Stairwell:

One 2" diameter cable penetration unsealed An hourly roving fire watch had been established for these areas previously due to other fire protection concerns.

Therefore, the

  • ,.* * .. :. *.*.*. ***"** . *.* .. ' .. 'UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-2 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, were met. Technical Specification 3.7.11 states: "All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional." Action Statement 3.7.11.a states: "With one (1) or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one (1) hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least (1) side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one (1} side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s}

to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification

6.9.2 within

the next (30) days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s}

to functional status." Note -Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 differs from Unit 2. The Unit 1 words "functional" and "non-functional" are replaced by the words "OPERABLE" and "inoperable".

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the degraded fire barrier penetrations could not be positively determined.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.

This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility.

The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.

This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 (both Units) since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairments is greater than seven (7) days. Appropriate actions were already in place in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a (both Units) to establish a one hour roving fire watch for the impaired fire barriers once the impairments were identified.

The subject fire areas contain detection in addition to the roving fire watch patrol. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in either area would be detected before it could involve an adjacent area. This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

.J UNI.T .1 SPECIAL REPORT-*-2 CORRECTIVE ACTION: The one hour roving fire watch, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with this area are resolved.

The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7} days due to the additional review being conducted by the Penetration Seal Task Force. Upon completion of this review the penetrations will be sealed. This review and corrective action will be completed in accordance with PSE&G letter NLR-N88037, dated March 4, 1988, to the NRC which discusses the Penetration Seal Review Program schedule.

MJP:pc SORC Mtg.88-048 Manager -Salem Operations