IR 05000390/2007008

IR 05000390-07-008, 05000391-07-008, on 8/27/07 - 09/14/07, Watts Bar Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution

ML072960640
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	10/23/2007
From:	O'Connor S C Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6
To:	Campbell W R Tennessee Valley Authority
References
IR-07-008
Download: ML072960640 (23)

Text

October 23, 2007

Tennessee Valley AuthorityATTN:Mr. William R. CampbellChief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President6A Lookout Place1101 Market StreetChattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTIONINSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000390/2007008 AND 05000391/2007008

Dear Mr. Campbell:

On September 14, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The enclosed inspection report documents theinspection results which were discussed on September 14, 2007, with Ms. K. Lovell and othermembers of your staff. The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate tothe identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules andregulations and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas the inspectioninvolved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations ofactivities, and interviews with personnel.On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that problems weregenerally being properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The NRC's overall assessment is that the Corrective Action Program is working well. NRC identified a few isolated instances of less than optimum performance but none were of more than minor safety significance.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letterand its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC PublicDocument Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's documentsystem (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/Stephen C. O'Connor, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos. 50-390, 50-391License No. NPF-90 and ConstructionPermit No. CPPR-92

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000390/2007008, 05000391/2007008

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/encl: (See page 2)

_________________________OFFICERII:DRPRII:DRPRII:DRPRII:DRPRII:DRPRII:DRSSIGNATURETXN /RA/RCH /via email/MEP /via email/MES /via email/HJG /via email/RPC /via email/NAMETNazarioRHagarMPribishMSpeckHGepfordRCarrionDATE10/12/200710/05/200710/18/200710/16/200710/23/200710/12/2007 E-MAIL COPY? YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO TVA2cc w/encl:Ashok S. BhatnagarSenior Vice PresidentNuclear Generation Development and ConstructionTennessee Valley AuthorityElectronic Mail DistributionJames R. DouetVice PresidentNuclear SupportTennessee Valley Authority3R Lookout Place1101 Market StreetChattanooga, TN 37402-2801H. Rick Rogers, VIce PresidentNuclear Engineering & Technical ServicesTennessee Valley AuthorityElectronic Mail DistributionMichael D. SkaggsSite Vice PresidentWatts Bar Nuclear PlantTennessee Valley AuthorityElectronic Mail DistributionGeneral CounselTennessee Valley AuthorityElectronic Mail DistributionJohn C. Fornicola, General ManagerNuclear AssuranceTennessee Valley AuthorityElectronic Mail DistributionLarry E. Nicholson, General ManagerLicensing & Industry AffairsTennessee Valley AuthorityElectronic Mail DistributionBeth A. Wetzel, ManagerCorporate Nuclear Licensing and Industry AffairsTennessee Valley Authority4X Blue Ridge1101 Market StreetChattanooga, TN 37402-2801James D. Smith, Acting ManagerLicensing and Industry AffairsWatts Bar Nuclear PlantTennessee Valley AuthorityElectronic Mail DistributionMichael J. Lorek, Plant ManagerWatts Bar Nuclear PlantTennessee Valley AuthorityElectronic Mail DistributionCounty ExecutiveRhea County Courthouse375 Church Street, Suite 215Dayton, TN 37321County MayorP. O. Box 156Decatur, TN 37322Lawrence E. Nanney, DirectorTN Dept. of Environment & ConservationDivision of Radiological HealthElectronic Mail DistributionMasoud BajestaniVice PresidentWatts Bar Unit 2Watts Bar Nuclear PlantTennessee Valley AuthorityP.O. Box 2000Spring City, TN 37381Ann Harris341 Swing LoopRockwood, TN 37854James H. Bassham, DirectorTennessee Emergency Management AgencyElectronic Mail Distribution TVA3Letter to William R. Ca mpbell Stephen C. O'Connor dated Oct ober 23, 2007

SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTIONINSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000390/2007008 AND 05000391/2007008Distribution w/encl

B. Moroney, NRRC. Evans, RIIL. Slack, RIIRIDSNRRDIRSOE MailPUBLIC EnclosureU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IIDocket Nos:50-390, 50-391License Nos:NPF-90 and Construction Permit CPPR-92Report No:05000390/2007008, 05000391/2007008Licensee:Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)Facility:Watts Bar Nucl ear Plant, Units 1 and 2Location:1260 Nuclear Plant RoadSpring City TN 37381Dates:August 27 - 30, 2007September 10 - 14, 2007Inspectors:R. Hagar, Team Lead & Senior Resident Inspector (Robinson)M. Pribish, Resident Inspector (Watts Bar)M. Speck, Resident Inspector (Sequoyah)H. Gepford, Senior Health Physicist, Region II (Aug. 27-30 only)R. Carrion, Senior Reactor Inspector, Region II (Sept. 10-14 only)Approved by:S. O'Connor, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY OF FINDINGSIR 05000390/2007008, 05000391/2007008, 8/27/07 - 9/14/07, Watts Bar Units 1 and 2;Biennial Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspection was conducted by a senior resident inspector, two Region II residentinspectors, a Region II senior health physicist, and a Region II senior reactor inspector. No findings were identified during this inspection. The NRC's program for overseeingthe safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649,"Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.A.Identification and Resolution of ProblemsThe team determined that the licensee was identifying plant deficiencies at anappropriately low level and effectively entering them into their corrective action program.The team also determined that the licensee was prioritizing and evaluating issuesproperly. Overall, the licensee was generally providing effective corrective actions.On the basis of interviews conducted during this inspection, the team determined thatworkers at the site felt free to enter safety concerns into the corrective action program. The inspectors concluded that the employee Concerns Resolution program wasfunctioning as intended.B.Licensee-Identified Findings None.

Report Details4.OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems a.Effectiveness of Identifying, Evaluating, and Correcting Problems (1)Inspection ScopeTo determine whether problems were being properly identified, characterized, andentered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution, and todetermine the licensee's threshold for identifying problems, the team reviewed 153selected Problem Evaluation Reports (PERs). The selected PERs included:*conditions investigated through root-cause analyses,*conditions investigated through apparent-cause analyses, *issues associated with cited or noncited violations of regulatory requirements orwith other documented findings,*issues identified through licensee review of NRC and industry operatingexperience, *issues identified through completion of licensee audits, assesments (includingself-assessments) and trend reviews, and*nuclear safety issues identified through the licensee's employee concernsprogram.In each of these groupings and to the extent possible, the team selected conditions andissues that were associated with the systems and/or components identified in thelicensee's risk assessment as most-risk-significant.For the selected PERs, the team determined whether the licensee had completedevaluations and developed and implemented appropriate corrective actions inaccordance with procedures SPP-3.1, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 12, and businesspractice BP-250, Corrective Action Program Handbook, Rev. 12. In addition, the teamdetermined whether the licensee had also completed reviews for generic implications,reviews for repetitive conditions, and common-cause failure-mode determinations andevaluated the effectiveness of the actions taken when warranted and in accordance withthe subject procedures.For selected components associated with the selected PERs, the team conductedwalkdowns to verify that observed problems had been or were being properly identified. Team members also attended selected meetings of the licensee's Supervisory ReviewCommittee and Management Review Committee and interviewed selected managers todetermine how site management participated in and monitored performance of thecorrective action program.

4 (2)AssessmentGenerally, the team determined that:*The licensee effectively identified problems at an appropriately low level andentered those problems into the corrective action program in accordance withprogram procedures.*The licensee's corrective actions were generally effective at correcting thecorresponding problems. In particular, corrective actions associated withpreviously identified non-cited violations appeared to be adequate.*When warranted, the licensee's evaluations appropriately considered extent-of-condition and generic implications, and appropriately evaluated and resolvedoperability and reportability concerns. The lic ensee completed root-causeanalyses when required by their program procedures.*In observed management meetings, specific issues identified in PERs receiveddiscussion commensurate with their safety significance.However, in some PERs the team noted examples of weaknesses in aligning correctiveactions with causes, identifying and appropriately focusing corrective actions, completingadequate evaluations, and/or properly documenting evaluations and corrective actions. The most significant weakness are illustrated below by specific examples.Root and contributing causes were not identified

• PER 62418 was initiated to address a self-assessment finding that applicableoperating experience was not always included in work packages. This was a C-level PER with an assigned apparent cause evaluation. However, in the"Cause Information" section of the PER, where the apparent cause should havebeen identified was the text "None required."*PER 79240 addressed an uncontrolled high-radiation area that was created bythe unmonitored movement of trash that contained radioactive materials. Theteam determined that the licensee's investigation of this incident using the why-staircase technique did not fully develop the cause(s) of the event in that it didnot consider several factors that could have caused or contributed to the event. As part of the root cause evaluation for PER 92759, the licensee re-evaluated theincident identified in PER 79240 using elemental and causal factors analysis.*PER 91648 addressed ineffective radiological work planning and control for high-dose evolutions. The team determined that the logic in the elemental and causalfactors evaluation was unclear and the root cause analysis report did not identifythe contributing causes of schedule pressures, failure to follow procedures, andinsufficient attention to radiological safety.

5Corrective actions were not appropriately focused to correct the problem

• In PER 80838, the corrective actions to prevent recurrence focused onprocedures that control activities performed by a vendor, but did not addressprocedures that control similar activities performed by site personnel.*PER 86704 addressed shortfalls in certain documentation associated with thelicensee work process. This PER identified three apparent causes: duplication ofdocumentation in several areas of work orders, requirements for signatures thatadd no value, and lack of self-checking and inattention to detail by certainworking-level and supervisory personnel. Corrective actions were identified toaddress the first two apparent causes, but no corrective actions were identified toaddress the third apparent cause (failure to self-check and inattention to detail). *PER 96865 identified the apparent cause as a failure to apply self-checking andfailure to follow procedure TI-12.07, "Containment Access". However, nocorrective action addressed that cause; instead, the only corrective action was torevise procedure RCI-100, "Control of Radiological Work", to enhanceadministrative controls for padlocked high-radiation, locked high-radiation, andvery-high-radiation areas.*PER 91647 addressed a failure to follow the requirements of RCI-100 and theidentified root cause was perceived pressure by management to stay onschedule. However, the corrective action to prevent recurrence was to reviseRCI-100 to provide clear guidance with respect to the use of flashing lights tocontrol locked high-radiation areas and the requirement for the RadiationProtection Manager to approve the use of flashing lights; no corrective actionaddressed the identified root cause.*PER 92759 was written to evaluate weaknesses with radiation protectiondecision making and breakdowns in administrative barriers. One of the identifiedroot causes was a lack of self-critical attitude in supervisory oversight. However,no corrective action directly addressed this cause.*PER 91648 was written to evaluate why radiological work planning and controlsfor high dose evolutions were not always effective at implementing As Low AsReasonably Achievable (ALARA) radiation dose principles. The identified rootcause was that individuals were unaware of the administrative requirementsassociated with revising radiation work permits and ALARA planning reports. However, rather than focusing on making involved individuals more aware ofthose requirements, the corrective actions to prevent recurrence were to makeinvolved personnel more aware of the specific circumstances associated with thisPER, and the other corrective actions focused on revising procedures; nocorrective action directly addressed the root cause.*PER 91644 addressed deficiencies in the prompt identification, evaluation, andcorrection of adverse conditions which resulted in unplanned dose, personnelcontamination events (PCEs), and untimely development of corrective actions. In this PER, the root causes were determined to be inadequate sensitivity by site 6management to minimizing PCEs and radiation exposures and management'sfailure to properly use the corrective action program. Although a correctiveaction to prevent recurrence addressed the sensitivity of site management withrespect to minimizing PCEs and radiation exposures, no corrective action wasidentified to address management's failure to use the corrective action program.*In PER 103965, the completed corrective action to prevent recurrence involvedtraining operations personnel on the proper use of procedure SPP-2.2. However,the root cause identified in the PER was that procedure SPP-2.2 lacks sufficientbarriers to prevent deviations from procedures, and SPP-2.2 applies not only tooperations personnel, but also to other personnel outside of operations.Documentation of corrective actions was incomplete

• Team discussions with involved licensee personnel revealed that, for PER96865, corrective actions had included coaching the individuals, discussing theevent in the morning meeting with radiation protection staff members, anddiscussing the event during cycle training. However, these corrective actionswere not documented in the PER.*Team discussions with involved licensee personnel revealed that, for PERs91647, 92759 and 91644, some corrective actions to address root causesinvolved personnel reassignments and were addressed outside of the correctiveaction program. The team considered that although the corrective actionprogram need not include specific details associated with personnel changes, itshould include more-general statements to show that corrective actions had beentaken to address the root causes. Issues were addressed outside of the corrective action program:*PER 91647 did not describe a corrective action to address the apparent cause ofthe issue. The team learned that corrective action had been taken to addressthat cause, but had not been documented in the PER.*PER 110032 determined that the cause of a condition was insufficient training,but was closed without completing additional training.*After the 2006 Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment identified some areas whichplant management determined needed improvement, the licensee did not initiatea PER, but developed an action plan and implemented several corrective actionsthat were tracked only in an action tracking system called "OnTrack." The teamnoted that OnTrack was not recognized in procedure SPP-3.1 as anadministrative control program considered to be part of the licensee's CorrectiveAction Program.None of the weaknesses noted by the team were identified as more than minorviolations of regulatory requirements.

7The weaknesses noted by the team are consistent with weaknesses that had beenidentified by licensee self-assessments and Nuclear Assurance reviews. In particular,the team noted that to address continuing issues concerning PER documentation,quality, and timeliness, the licensee had initiated and evaluated PER 122852 in March2007, and had begun implementing extensive associated corrective actions only arelatively short time before this inspection began.Specific items reviewed are listed in the attachment. b.Effective Use of Operating Experience Information (1)Inspection ScopeTo assess the licensee's use of operating experience (OE) information, the teamreviewed 15 selected OE reports that had been received and processed by the licensee. For the selected items, the team reviewed the evaluation records to verify that the itemshad been screened and evaluated in accordance with procedure NADP-3, "Managingthe Operating Experience Program," Rev. 3, and that PERs had been initiated forapplicable OE items when appropriate. Specific items reviewed are listed in the attachment. (2)AssessmentThe team determined that the licensee's screening of OE items was generally effective,and that the licensee consistently initiated PERs to further evaluate and developcorrective actions for applicable OE items. The team also observed that the licenseeroutinely evaluated whether new PERs initiated at the site should be shared with otherTVA sites and/or the nuclear power industry at large.The team noted that several of the licensee's assessment reports had identified aweakness in using relevant OE in pre-job briefs, and that the licensee took correctiveaction under PER 93011 to address that weakness. The team also noted that the most-recent mid-cycle self-assessment suggested a continuing weakness in using relevantinternal OE, and that the licensee took additional corrective actions under PER 118956to address that weakness.The team observed that during this inspection, the licensee replaced procedure NADP-3with procedure SPP-3.9, "Operating Experience Program," Rev. 0. c.Effectiveness of Self-Assessments (1)Inspection ScopeTo assess the licensee's use of self-assessments, the team reviewed 39 reports ofcompleted audits or assessments, specifically including those which focused on thecorrective action program and/or the OE review program. To verify that the licensee wascorrecting problems identified by these audits and assessments, the team noted theissues identified during those audits and assessments and the PERs that were initiated 8as a result of those audits and assessments. The team also reviewed the selectedreports with respect to the requirements described in procedures NADP-1, "Conduct ofQuality Assessment & Inspection," Rev. 13, and SPP-1.6, "[Tennessee Valley AuthorityNuclear] Self-Assessment Program," Rev. 13.Specific items reviewed are listed in the attachment. (2)AssessmentThe team determined that licensee audits and assessments were thorough and self-critical, that all assessments identified issues to be addressed, and that the licenseeconsistently initiated PERs to address the identified issues.The team noted that although the licensee had completed self-assessments of the OEprogram in 2000, 2002 and 2004, in accordance with the requirement in procedureNADP-3 for completing biennial self-assessments, the licensee had not completed aself-assessment of the OE program after the first quarter of 2004. The team learned thata self-assessment that had been scheduled to be completed in 2006 had beenpostponed after PER 111324 had been initiated to address a backlog of OE items, andafter the evaluation of that PER determined that procedure NADP-3 should be replacedby procedure SPP-3.9. In fact, the licensee deferred that scheduled self-assessmentuntil January 2008, approximately six months after SPP-3.9 was issued. d.Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (1)Inspection ScopeThe team informally interviewed licensee personnel to develop a general view of thesafety-conscious work environment and to determine if any conditions existed that wouldcause workers to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The team also reviewed thelicensee's employee concerns program (ECP) records and discussed the program withthe implementer to determine if issues affecting nuclear safety were being appropriatelyaddressed. (2)AssessmentThe team found no indication that workers at the site did not feel free to raise safetyconcerns, or that personnel were in any way inhibited from identifying problems usingthe corrective action process. The team determined that licensee management focused on fostering a safety-consciouswork environment by emphasizing safe operations and encouraging problem reporting byeither initiating PERs or filing reports through the ECP. The team determined that theECP adequately reviewed concerns and entered technical concerns into the correctiveaction program when appropriate.

94OA6Management MeetingsThe team presented the inspection results to Ms. K. Lovell (the acting Plant GeneralManager) and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of theinspection on September 14, 2007. The licensee acknowledged the results presented.During this meeting, the licensee confirmed that none of the material examined duringthe inspection should be considered proprietary.ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION AttachmentSUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATIONPARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTEDLicensee personnelB. Alsup, Corporate Licensing EngineerM. Blevins, Modifications ManagerJ. Bushnell, Licensing EngineerP. Candage, Maintenance PER CoordinatorT. Carter, Design Engineering ManagerW. Clothier Jr., Site Procurement Manager D. Collins, Engi neering Pr ogramsT. Cosby, TVA Nuclear Organizational & Cultural Initiatives ManagerW. Delk, Reactor Engineering SupervisorB. Eiford-Lee, Chemistry and Environmental ManagerJ. Ferguson, System EngineerS. Ferrell, Performance Analysis EngineerN. Glasser, System EngineerE. Hall, Instruments and Controls EngineerD. Heidrich, System EngineerR. Higginbotham, Human Resources ManagerJ. Hinman, Site Support ManagerS. Hudson, Industry Affairs EngineerM. King, Nuclear Assurance EngineerS. Krupski, System Engineering ManagerD. LeGrand, Operations Training InstructorT. McCollom, Electrical, Instrumentation, and Controls SupervisorS. Nelson, System EngineerC. Ottenfeld, Operations PER CoordinatorP. Sawyer, Radiation Control ManagerP. Schwartz, Operations Training InstructorA. Shirley, Corporate Methods Change & Analysis ManagerM. Similey, Operations Training ManagerR. Stockton, Licensing EngineerJ. Swanson, Maintenance Training InstructorJ. Tortora, Performance Improvement ManagerT. Walker, System EngineerN. Wamack, Mechanical Design EngineerT. Wilkerson, Performance Improvement EngineerJ. S. Woods, System EngineerC. Woolson, Equipment Reliability ManagerG. Yelliott, Concerns Resolution ManagerNRC personnelR. Monk, Senior Resident InspectorS. Vias, Branch Chief, Region IIITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED None AttachmentPARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDProblem Evaluation Reports (PERs)08309, Discussion of [Operating Experience] not directly applicable to pending job60202, Use of [Operating Experience] in corrective action program (SA CRP-LIA-04-001)60215, Use of [Operating Experience] in pre-job briefings (SA CRP-LIA-04-001)62418, SA WBN-SCH-04-003, AFI-12, applicable [Operating Experience] not always included62418, INPO Assist Visit - WBN Self Assessment WBN-SCH-04-003 AFI 1271210, Management expectations for [Operating Experience] in WOs71211, [Operating Experience] not in work packages72326, Self-Assessment Program Problem Identification 72620, Mud in Backup Cooling Line to 1A CCP 73110, Auxiliary Building vent monitor sample line T-connection 74824, Documentation of a Corrective Action Inadequate 75328, PERs Do Not Have Clear Documentation of Extension/Review History75953, Station Air Exceeded Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria 76175, Security Not Attaching Supporting Close-out Documents in ECAP System76643, The timeliness of MRC reviews of PER initiations may be impacted by inadequatepreparation for MRC that results in some PERs having to be brought back for a subsequentMRC review76827, Unanticipated LCO Entry Due to Placement of Hold Order on DG 1A-A 76878, Solder Slag Found in #2 RCP Lower Oil Cooler Return Line76912, NA Identified Three PERs That Should Have Outage Milestone Codes76980, Safeguards Information76982, Physical Security/Contingency Plan and Procedure Compliance 76999, Weapon Unaccounted For77115, Ineffective Oversight of Security 77122, Containment Effects from Unisolating PZR PORV Not Properly Evaluated77176, Pressurizer PORV Cycled During Transition to Solid Water Operations 77281, Carpenter Not Wearing Hearing Protection When Required77395, Compressed Gas Cylinders Not Stored as Required77452, Inadvertent Dump of CLA Into RCS77534, Documents Not Latest Revision Specified in the TVA Safety Manual77673, Safety Plan Did Not Identify Orange Risk Condition for Electrical Power77699, Loosened Mounting Studs on Pzr PORVs While Still In LCO 3.4.12 77744, Work Order on PORV Studs Did Not Clearly State Sequence of Work77900, Engineer Not Wearing Gloves When Required78205, PMT Failure on 1A-A and 2A-A ERCW Strainers Casing Flange78261, Deficiencies in Controlling Foreign Material in Cooling Water Systems 78378, Inadequate Corrective Action Regarding Silt Blockage of 1A CCP Cooler78407, Compressed Gas Cylinders Not Stored as Required78414, Irradiated Fuel Moved When ABGTS Was Inoperable78628, Officer Discovered Inattentive on Post78637, Flammable Item Left Unattended in a Work Area Overnight78779, Confined Entry Permit Not Transferred to Safety Engineer when Required78875, RHR Pump PMT Signed Off With Required Conditions Not Met 79240, Unposted high radiation area 79295, Pressure Spike Occurred on RCP #2 Restart79310, Qualification of Temporary Containment Penetration Barriers. 79412, 1A RHR Pump Seal Leak 3Attachment79738, IRNI Fail Maximum Channel Deviation Requirement79910, Solid Water Operations 80773, PER Not Rerouted as Directed by MRC80838, Crane Counterweights 80898, Improperly Documented Overtime Restriction Violations80916, PER Cancelled in Error81073, WBN-OSG4-031 T=0 Issue81107, Nuclear Assurance Audit SSA0501 Finding81126, SSA0501 Manual Action Clarification 81409, NA Identified a Misclassification of PER 6894181410, Effectiveness Review Lacked Documentation81151, AOI-30.02 Challenges81200, SSPS Tin Whiskers (Millstone OE20450)81436, Missed Security Report 81677, Test Equipment Out-of-Calibration82125, Cracked Fuse Ferrules 82628, Electrical Jumper Not Removed as Required83248, Air leak identified on 2A2 DG Air Compressor Unloader83912, Valve Misposition Trend84169, Actions Ineffective in Resolving Operations Performance Weaknesses84173, Self-Assessments Not Critical 85177, ERCW Telltale Drain Valve Found Out of Position85574, Corrective Maintenance Work Order Review86081, Adverse trend of RP PIs for HRA posting and access and ED alarms 86178, CAP Indicators Below Target More Than Six Times in Year86192, Untimely Notification of PER Grading Failures Not Documented86283, INPO Assist Visit Recommendations for Improving eCAP86423, Acceptance Criteria Not Met - Identified During SRO Review86704, Maint/Mods Integrated Analysis report (COG) for Jan-Jun 05 indicated shortfalls indocumentation for MSA [Mechanical Maintenance89025, Functional Failure of ABSCE Damper89967, Failed Capacitor in Auxiliary Control Air Dryer Tower Inlet Valve Actuator 90112, MCR Chillers F unctional Failures90519, PER response timeliness90520, Incomplete documentation in PERs90521, Ineffective benchmarking of CAP program90522, CAP management and leadership90523, Training and proficiency of root cause analysts90524, Quality of effectiveness reviews in CAP90525, Inefficient electronic processes in eCAP 90814, During movement of reactor head, three individuals received ED alarms 91644, Corrective action program use issues91647, LHRA challenges91648, ALARA planning92594, INPO 2005 Evaluation - Self-assessments92759, Weaknesses with RP decision making and breakdown in administrative barrierscontribute to unplanned dose93102, Worker Practices 93389, Training Required for SER 4-05 4Attachment93559, NEDP-12 CM WO PER Checklist for WO 05-810008-00093795, NEDP-12 CM WO PER Checklist Not Performed for CM WO PER94817, Repeat Maintenance Training94818, Repeat Maintenance Indicator 95189, PER/WO Not Initiated to Document Water Leak at TDAFWP Jet Plug96002, ERCW Discharge Header Not Full During Troubleshooting96145, LER 2005-002-00 - Beaver Valley CCP Suction Temp Increase During App R Fire96293, Unsupported design input96327, Valve Found Closed and Tagged96865, Individual locked in containment97173, PER to address TVA's corrective actions for PER 92730 involving FME practices97383, Seven PERs did not adequately address the apparent cause of the stated problemdescription 97423, 480 V Breaker Would Not Fully Charge Springs97647, PER 81649 inadvertently closed without attaching Why staircase97708, Snapshot SA: two PERs closed without required apparent cause evaluation performed97710, Snapshot SA: two PERS closed with apparent cause evaluations that did not meetexpectations97803, PER quality self-assessment - PER 9457598791, Snapshot Self-Assessment 98951, Design Sequencing Issue in EDC 51723 98952, Setpoint and Scaling Document for DCN Contain Incorrect Values99683, 2A-A 480v Board Rm A/C Unit Freon Connection Damaged99826, No Hold Order Obtained For Pump Rotation100095, High range rad monitor thermal induced current100440, DG 1B-B Room Air Intake Actuator100664, SCBA grade D air certification102975, Admin Weakness in Cont rolling Engineering Training102976, Duplication of Effort in Processing Engineering Training Records102979, Engineering Record Storage Vault Monitoring Deficiencies102980, Engineering Record Vault Industrial Safety Deficiencies102986, Configuration Control - Engineering Drawing Management Deficiencies102987, Engineering BSL training Needed102988, Engineering Vendor Documents Deficiencies103502, TI-12.07103965, Operations Procedure Adherence103966, Training Weaknesses103967, Clearance Program Deficiencies104097, Manual Reactor Trip May 30, 2006104803, Security104993, Misposition of Handswitch105343, Self-Assessment Quality105343, Self-assessment quality105344, Self-Assessment Topic Selection105344, Self-assessment topic selection105450, 0-FCV-26-167 Found Isolated105598, Work Performed Without Worksteps 106252, Licensed Operator Reactivation Process Deficiencies106523, Snapshot SA WBN-SIT-06-005: failure of PER closure review for 95402 5Attachment106525, Snapshot SA WBN-SIT-06-005: failure of PER closure review for 96211106922, 1A FW Pump Oil Leak And Resulting Power Reduction107084, Reach Rod Valve Failures SYS 62107282, High range containment radiation monitors inoperable107544, PED Correction107664, REP Van Dispatch 107686, EPIP-9 Form Error107697, Inadequate apparent cause evaluations for PERs 102958 and 102303107793, CM WO PER107805, 7/31/06 Trip108051, Vendor Advisory Letter108115, Incorrect Verification Practices Used During Si Performance108188, Procedure Use And Adherence Issue108844, Inappropriate Risk Assessment For Schedule Changes108886, Risk Reduction Actions of TI-124 Improperly Applied by Operations Crew108957, NRC Medical Exams109952, System Engineer Practice Improvements110032, WBN-0-TCV -067-1050-A Diaphragm Installed Incorrectly110159, Maintenance Work Type Classification Process110215, U2 PM Tracking110636, Poor control of rigging110770, Noncompliance with LCO 3.3.2 Function 6.E110988, Snapshot SA On JSAs, AFI111128, 1-FCV-72-45, Containment Sump Valve Failed to Stroke111173, Preliminary ILT Exam Results Indicate 7 of 11 Individuals Failed Written Exam111324, [Operating Experience] program has not been implemented with the intent of NADP-3111342, Steam generator pipe cut - operations issue111347, CTC Quarterly Inspections111710, CCP seal PMT failure113656, Polar Crane Tolley Moved113723, 1B-B CS pump run without CCS to oil cooler113743, Need for improvement in PER Environmental Review Process113757, CM WO PER - heat trace circuits 358, 359, and 361114984, Response to SER 5-06 "Flow Accelerated Corrosion"115184, Potential RCS Leak 116938, Reactor Reassembly Schedule Sequence Error 116459, SGR calculation review process116872, 1B CCP inboard seal leakage 117968, SEN 263, Forsmark Unit 1 Event118066, No Storage Code Labels on Chemicals118079, Insulation Missing on B-Train Fire Pump Header118129, Revise SPP-9.6118151, Clearance Log Documentation Inconsistent118193, Minor Errors in DCN 51940118197, Revise SPP-9.5118200, General and Flammable Chemicals in Wrong Cabinets118301, Revise NEDP-16118386, SPP-9.3 Block 15 Justification Not Consistently Completed118496, SNM Annual Inventories of 2004 and 2005 6Attachment118524, Administrative Errors in EDC 51723-A118531, EQ Reporting Not Timely118533, MR Cause Determinations Not Completed Timely118776, Midcycle [Self-Assessment] Corrective Action Program118780, Chemicals With Incorrect Storage Code 118867, TRN-11.4 Does Not Provide The Necessary Rigor During Just In Time Training118956, [Operating Experience] Mid-Cycle [Area For Improvement]118964, Main Feed Pump Oil Leaks119061, Generic review of BFN AFI PER 116666 119444, RCS Lithium Above Limit Twice and Not Documented in CAP 119729, FRSB Documented Location Incorrect120005, DGB Ventilation During Tornado Warning120977, WBN Chemistry Self Assessment Recommendations121118, Caution Orders Support Operator Work Arounds121569, APR review issues noted during SA-WBN-RP-07-002121588, SA-WBN-RP-07-002: RP and OPS departmental RFO dose goals exceeded withoutexplanation in a PER121598, Missed Opportunity on 1-FCV-72-45121601, Acceptance Criteria Failure for 1-SI-0-53-B Section 6.59 for 1-FCV-72-45121640, [Nuclear Assurance] Review of B-level PERs121849, CM WO PER Due to Failure of Fuse for Dg Exhaust Fan 1a121905, Fire Protection Report Discrepancies122083, Need for Environmental Staff Training122084, STS Trend PER122243, [Nuclear Safety Review Board] [Management Attention Item] on Corrective ActionProgram Ownership122582, Corrective Action Program Trend PER122911, [Nuclear Assurance] Review of C-level PERs122944, Safeguards Information Audit Issues123228, 1-FCV-67-68, Found Open123521, CVCS Mix Bed Left Out of Service Following RCS Filter Change 123652, PERs Not Initiated When Chemistry Parameters Out-of-Limits123888, Additional Review of Fuses Addressed By NRC IN Notice 2006-05123994, This PER is to track management's corrective actions associated with the 2006Synergy Survey for the Radiation Protection organization124018, This PER is to track management's corrective actions associated with the 2006Synergy Survey for the maintenance planners (in MIG, MSA, and MSB)124019, This PER is to track management's corrective actions associated with the 2006Synergy Survey for the Operations organization124023, This PER is to track management's corrective actions associated with the 2006Synergy Survey for the System Engineering organization124048, This PER is to track management's corrective actions associated with the 2006Synergy Survey for the Instrument Maintenance Organization124269, RHR Pump 1B LCO Duration125257, Missed CM WO Trend Report Frequency126500, Failed Surface Exam127945, LCO Tracking 7Attachment129538 The CM WO report required by NEDP-12 section 3.8 was completed (period between7/05 and 6/07) without reviewing non-critical failures for potential trends and not attaching alist of all CM WOs. 129952, No PER for self-assessment identified issue129998, No PER addressing WBN-SIT-06-001Operating Experience Evaluation/Response05-1263INPO SER 3-05, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals05-1421Westinghouse TB 04-22, RCP Seal Performance - App R Compliance05-1424NSAL-02-14 R2, Steam Line Break During Mode 3 for Westinghouse Plants05-1578INPO SEN 257, Internal Flood Design Deficiencies05-1632SER 4-05 - Errors in Preparation and Implementation of Modifications05-1886NRC IN 2005-30, Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged By Unanalyzed InternalFlooding Events and Inadequate Design 06-0206NSAL-05-3, Centrifugal Charging Pump Runout During Safety Injection06-0209NRC IN 2006-04, Design Deficiency in Pressurizer Heaters for PWRs 06-0315, NRC IN 2006-005, Possible Defect in Bussman KWN-R and KTN-R fuses06-0628, Westinghouse TB-06-5, Barton Differential Pressure Switch Contact Resistance06-0706, INPO SEN 261, Low Head Safety Injection Pumps Inoperable Because of MotorCooler Configuration Problems06-1025, Westinghouse TB-06-10, Binding of Type M34 Mechanical Interlocks 06-1026, NRC RIS 2006-10, Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Par agraph III.G.2Operator Manual Actions06-1166, NRC IN 2006-17, Recent Operating Experience of Service Water Systems due toExternal Conditions06-1246, Westinghouse TB-06-1, Barton Transmitter Bellows Damage06-1550, IN 2006-20: Foreign Material Found in the Emergency Core Cooling System06-1590, SER 7-06, Degradation of Essential Service Water Piping06-1707, IN 2006-24: Recent Operating Experience Associated with Pressurizer and MainSteam Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoints06-1742, SER 5-06, Flow-Accelerated Corrosion06-1818, SEN 263: Loss of 400-kV Switchyard and Two Safety-Related Electrical Trainsbecause of a Common Mode Failure07-0023, NRC IN 2006-31 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers07-0213, W TB-05-4 Rev 2, Potential Tin Whiskers on Printed Circuit Board Components 07-0244, IN 2007-06, Pot ential Common Cause Vulnerabilitie s in Essential Service Water(ESW) SystemsAudits and Self-AssessmentsCRP-LIA-04-001, Operating Experience Program Implementation NA-CH-05-001, Emergency PreparednessNA-CH-06-002, TVAN Procedure ProcessesNA-CH-06-003, Fire ProtectionNA-WB-05-01 - Quarterly Oversight Report, January 1 - March 31, 2005NA-WB-05-02 - Quarterly Oversight Report, April 1 - June 30, 2005NA-WB-05-03 - Quarterly Oversight Report, July 1 - September 30, 2005 NA-WB-05-04 - Quarterly Oversight Report, October 1 - December 31, 2005NA-WB-06-01 - Quarterly Oversight Report, January 1, 2006 - March 31, 2006 NA-WB-06-02, Quarterly Oversight Report, April 1 -June 30, 2006 8AttachmentNA-WB-06-03, Quarterly Oversight Report, July 1 - September 30, 2006NA-WB-06-07, Quarterly Oversight Report, October 1 - December 31, 2006NA-WB-07-001, Assessment of Fuel-Handling ActivitiesNA-WB-07-004, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Nuclear Assurance - Assessment of B-Level PERClosure Quality NA-WB-07-006, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Nuclear Assurance - Assessment of C-Level PERClosure Quality NA-WB-07-05, Quarterly Oversight Report, January 1 - March 31, 2007SSA 0701, Security, Safeguards Information, Access Authorization, Fitness-For-Duty Programs,Behavioral Observation Program and the Personnel Access Data SystemSSA0501, Fire Protection and Loss Prevention ProgramSSA0502, [Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear]-Wide Radiological Protection and Control AuditSSA0603, REP Final Audit RptSSA0605, Fire Protection and Loss PreventionWatts Bar Nuclear Plant Self-Assessment Report 2004 INPO Mid-Cycle AssessmentWBA0601, Operations Functional Area AuditWBA0602, Maintenance & U2 Construction AuditWBA0604, Radiological Protection ProgramWBA0701, Engineering Functional Area AuditWBN-CEM-06-003, Chemistry Contractor Control Self Assessment ReportWBN-CEM-06-004, Air, SARA, & CERCLA Snapshot Self Assessment ReportWBN-CEM-06-005, Chemistry and Environmental Job Safety Analysis Snapshot SelfAssessment ReportWBN-M&M-06-001, Repeat Maintenance Self AssessmentWBN-M&M-06-002, Fabrication or Modification of Tools Snapshot Self AssessmentWBN-M&M-06-003, Use of M&TE & Prevention of Common Mode Common Cause - SnapshotSelf AssessmentWBN-M&M-06-006, MSA JSAs - Snapshot Self AssessmentWBN-CEM-07-001, Chemistry Technician FundamentalsWBN-CEM-07-002, Storm Water Pollution Prevention PlanWBN-CEM-07-003, Chemical Traffic Control and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, andRodenticide Act WBN-CEM-07-007, Environmental Reviews of PERSWBN-CEM-07-008, Regulatory Required Non-Accredited Environmental TrainingWBN-CEM-07-009, Primary Chemistry End of Cycle ReviewWBN-ENG-06-001, Conduct of Engineering SupportWBN-ENG-06-002, CDBI Readiness Self-AssessmentWBN-ENG-06-003, WBN Primary Responsibilities of System EngineersWBN-ENG-07-001, Success of the Training and PMTI Process. WBN-ENG-07-007, Implementation of SOER 90-2 - Nuclear Fuel DefectsWBN-ENG-07-008, Procedure Benchmark of Fuel Failure Mitigation Program of Diablo CanyonNuclear PlantWBN-M&M-07-004, WO Quality - Snapshot Self AssessmentWBN-OPS-07-006, Implementation of the Fourth Revision to SPP-10.4WBN-RP-07-002, Radiation Protection Department AFIs RP 1-1, 1-2, 1-3 from 2005 EvaluationWBN-RP-07-003, Radiation Protection - Radiographic OperationsWBN-SA-SIT-07-002, WBN INPO Mid-Cycle Self-AssessmentWBN-SEC-06-001, Alarm Station / CommunicationWBN-SIT-05-001, Corrective Action Program 9AttachmentWBN-SIT-06-001, PER QualityWBN-SIT-06-002, Quarterly Self-Assessment Quality EvaluationWBN-SIT-06-005, PER QualityWBN-SIT-07-010, PI&R Readiness Snapshot[Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear] Nuclear Safety Cultural Assessment Survey, May 2006ProceduresBP-250, Corrective Action Program Handbook, Rev. 12 BP-253, Human Performance Program, Rev. 2BP-255, Operational Decision-Making Issue Evaluation Process, Rev. 1BP-340, Operating Experience, Rev. 0BP-392, Benchmarking, Rev. 0FHI-7, Fuel Handling and Movement, Rev. 0029GO-1, Unit Startup from Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby, Revision 54GO-3, Unit Startup from Less Than 4% Reactor Power to 30% Reactor Power, Revision 27GO-6, Unit Shutdown from hot standby to cold shutdown, Revision 37MMDP-3, Guidelines for Planning & Execution of Troubleshooting Activities, Rev. 3W1NADP-1, Conduct of Quality Assessment & Inspection, Rev. 13NADP-2, Audits, Rev. 20NADP-3, Managing the Operating Experience Program, Rev. 0007 NADP-3, Managing the Operating Experience Program, Rev. 7NEDP-12, System, Component and Program Health Equipment Failure Trending, Rev. 8NEDP-22, Functional Evaluations, Rev. 2Outage Scheduling Desktop Guide, Revision 1RCI-100, Control of Radiological Work, Revs. 25, 26, 28, and 29RCI-128, ALARA Program Implementation, Rev. 9SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown, Revision 55 SOI-68.02, Reactor Coolant Pumps, Revision 31SPP-1.6, [Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear] Self-assessment Program, Rev. 13SPP-2.2, Administration Of Site Technical Procedures, Revision 14SPP-3.1, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 12SPP-3.9, Operating Experience Program, Rev. 0000SPP-6.5, Foreign Material Control, Rev. 0012SPP-6.6, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting - 10CFR 50.65, Rev. 9Trend ReportsIntegrated Trend Review - Site Report, January through March, 2007Integrated Trend Review - Site Report, January through June, 2005Integrated Trend Review - Site Report, July through December, 2005Integrated Trend Review - Site Report, January through March, 2006 Integrated Trend Review - Site Report, April through June, 2006Integrated Trend Review - Site Report, July through December, 2006Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Corrective Maintenance Work Order (CM WO) Failure Trend Report,July 16, 2007Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Corrective Maintenance Work Order (CM WO) Failure Trend Report,July 29, 2005 10AttachmentTraining Lesson Plans3-OT-SRT-0059A, Refueling Outage Just in Time - Shutdown, Revision 83-OT-TI1240, Risk Management and Ti-124 - Risk Assessment - Equipment to Plant RiskMatrix, Revision 43-OT-SER3-05, Weakness in Operator Fundamentals, Rev. 0Other DocumentsAction Plan, Synergy-Watts Bar Nuclear Plant [Response to the 2006 Nuclear Safety CulturalAssessment Survey]Functional Evaluation High Range Containment Radiation Monitors Thermal Induced Current,4/19/06Multi-Site Programmatic Self-Assessment Schedules, FY07-FY11PPT005.000, Foreign Material Control [SPP-6.5], Rev. 5PPT005.001, Foreign Material Control [SPP-6.5] for Monitors, Rev. 7Site Maintenance and Modifications Management Directive (SMMMD) 022, Planner's Guide,Rev. 25Standing Order 06-008, Containment High Range Radiation Monitors: Additional InformationRelated to REP Classification