IR 05000390/2007008

IR 05000390-07-008, 05000391-07-008, on 8/27/07 - 09/14/07, Watts Bar Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution

ML072960640
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	10/23/2007
From:	O'Connor S Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6
To:	Campbell W Tennessee Valley Authority
References
IR-07-008
Download: ML072960640 (23)

Text

ber 23, 2007

SUBJECT:

WATTS BAR NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000390/2007008 AND 05000391/2007008

Dear Mr. Campbell:

On September 14, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on September 14, 2007, with Ms. K. Lovell and other members of your staff.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that problems were generally being properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The NRCs overall assessment is that the Corrective Action Program is working well. NRC identified a few isolated instances of less than optimum performance but none were of more than minor safety significance.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen C. OConnor, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-390, 50-391 License No. NPF-90 and Construction Permit No. CPPR-92

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000390/2007008, 05000391/2007008 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos: 50-390, 50-391 License Nos: NPF-90 and Construction Permit CPPR-92 Report No: 05000390/2007008, 05000391/2007008 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City TN 37381 Dates: August 27 - 30, 2007 September 10 - 14, 2007 Inspectors: R. Hagar, Team Lead & Senior Resident Inspector (Robinson)

M. Pribish, Resident Inspector (Watts Bar)

M. Speck, Resident Inspector (Sequoyah)

H. Gepford, Senior Health Physicist, Region II (Aug. 27-30 only)

R. Carrion, Senior Reactor Inspector, Region II (Sept. 10-14 only)

Approved by: S. OConnor, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000390/2007008, 05000391/2007008, 8/27/07 - 9/14/07, Watts Bar Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution.

The inspection was conducted by a senior resident inspector, two Region II resident inspectors, a Region II senior health physicist, and a Region II senior reactor inspector.

No findings were identified during this inspection. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. Identification and Resolution of Problems The team determined that the licensee was identifying plant deficiencies at an appropriately low level and effectively entering them into their corrective action program.

The team also determined that the licensee was prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. Overall, the licensee was generally providing effective corrective actions.

On the basis of interviews conducted during this inspection, the team determined that workers at the site felt free to enter safety concerns into the corrective action program.

The inspectors concluded that the employee Concerns Resolution program was functioning as intended.

B. Licensee-Identified Findings None.

Report Details 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems a. Effectiveness of Identifying, Evaluating, and Correcting Problems (1) Inspection Scope To determine whether problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution, and to determine the licensees threshold for identifying problems, the team reviewed 153 selected Problem Evaluation Reports (PERs). The selected PERs included:

• conditions investigated through root-cause analyses,

• conditions investigated through apparent-cause analyses,

• issues associated with cited or noncited violations of regulatory requirements or with other documented findings,

• issues identified through licensee review of NRC and industry operating experience,

• issues identified through completion of licensee audits, assesments (including self-assessments) and trend reviews, and

• nuclear safety issues identified through the licensees employee concerns program.

In each of these groupings and to the extent possible, the team selected conditions and issues that were associated with the systems and/or components identified in the licensees risk assessment as most-risk-significant.

For the selected PERs, the team determined whether the licensee had completed evaluations and developed and implemented appropriate corrective actions in accordance with procedures SPP-3.1, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 12, and business practice BP-250, Corrective Action Program Handbook, Rev. 12. In addition, the team determined whether the licensee had also completed reviews for generic implications, reviews for repetitive conditions, and common-cause failure-mode determinations and evaluated the effectiveness of the actions taken when warranted and in accordance with the subject procedures.

For selected components associated with the selected PERs, the team conducted walkdowns to verify that observed problems had been or were being properly identified.

Team members also attended selected meetings of the licensees Supervisory Review Committee and Management Review Committee and interviewed selected managers to determine how site management participated in and monitored performance of the corrective action program.

(2) Assessment Generally, the team determined that:

• The licensee effectively identified problems at an appropriately low level and entered those problems into the corrective action program in accordance with program procedures.

• The licensees corrective actions were generally effective at correcting the corresponding problems. In particular, corrective actions associated with previously identified non-cited violations appeared to be adequate.

• When warranted, the licensees evaluations appropriately considered extent-of-condition and generic implications, and appropriately evaluated and resolved operability and reportability concerns. The licensee completed root-cause analyses when required by their program procedures.

• In observed management meetings, specific issues identified in PERs received discussion commensurate with their safety significance.

However, in some PERs the team noted examples of weaknesses in aligning corrective actions with causes, identifying and appropriately focusing corrective actions, completing adequate evaluations, and/or properly documenting evaluations and corrective actions.

The most significant weakness are illustrated below by specific examples.

Root and contributing causes were not identified:

• PER 62418 was initiated to address a self-assessment finding that applicable operating experience was not always included in work packages. This was a C-level PER with an assigned apparent cause evaluation. However, in the Cause Information section of the PER, where the apparent cause should have been identified was the text None required.

• PER 79240 addressed an uncontrolled high-radiation area that was created by the unmonitored movement of trash that contained radioactive materials. The team determined that the licensees investigation of this incident using the why-staircase technique did not fully develop the cause(s) of the event in that it did not consider several factors that could have caused or contributed to the event.

As part of the root cause evaluation for PER 92759, the licensee re-evaluated the incident identified in PER 79240 using elemental and causal factors analysis.

• PER 91648 addressed ineffective radiological work planning and control for high-dose evolutions. The team determined that the logic in the elemental and causal factors evaluation was unclear and the root cause analysis report did not identify the contributing causes of schedule pressures, failure to follow procedures, and insufficient attention to radiological safety.

Corrective actions were not appropriately focused to correct the problem:

• In PER 80838, the corrective actions to prevent recurrence focused on procedures that control activities performed by a vendor, but did not address procedures that control similar activities performed by site personnel.

• PER 86704 addressed shortfalls in certain documentation associated with the licensee work process. This PER identified three apparent causes: duplication of documentation in several areas of work orders, requirements for signatures that add no value, and lack of self-checking and inattention to detail by certain working-level and supervisory personnel. Corrective actions were identified to address the first two apparent causes, but no corrective actions were identified to address the third apparent cause (failure to self-check and inattention to detail).

• PER 96865 identified the apparent cause as a failure to apply self-checking and failure to follow procedure TI-12.07, Containment Access. However, no corrective action addressed that cause; instead, the only corrective action was to revise procedure RCI-100, Control of Radiological Work, to enhance administrative controls for padlocked high-radiation, locked high-radiation, and very-high-radiation areas.

• PER 91647 addressed a failure to follow the requirements of RCI-100 and the identified root cause was perceived pressure by management to stay on schedule. However, the corrective action to prevent recurrence was to revise RCI-100 to provide clear guidance with respect to the use of flashing lights to control locked high-radiation areas and the requirement for the Radiation Protection Manager to approve the use of flashing lights; no corrective action addressed the identified root cause.

• PER 92759 was written to evaluate weaknesses with radiation protection decision making and breakdowns in administrative barriers. One of the identified root causes was a lack of self-critical attitude in supervisory oversight. However, no corrective action directly addressed this cause.

• PER 91648 was written to evaluate why radiological work planning and controls for high dose evolutions were not always effective at implementing As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) radiation dose principles. The identified root cause was that individuals were unaware of the administrative requirements associated with revising radiation work permits and ALARA planning reports.

However, rather than focusing on making involved individuals more aware of those requirements, the corrective actions to prevent recurrence were to make involved personnel more aware of the specific circumstances associated with this PER, and the other corrective actions focused on revising procedures; no corrective action directly addressed the root cause.

• PER 91644 addressed deficiencies in the prompt identification, evaluation, and correction of adverse conditions which resulted in unplanned dose, personnel contamination events (PCEs), and untimely development of corrective actions.

In this PER, the root causes were determined to be inadequate sensitivity by site

management to minimizing PCEs and radiation exposures and managements failure to properly use the corrective action program. Although a corrective action to prevent recurrence addressed the sensitivity of site management with respect to minimizing PCEs and radiation exposures, no corrective action was identified to address managements failure to use the corrective action program.

• In PER 103965, the completed corrective action to prevent recurrence involved training operations personnel on the proper use of procedure SPP-2.2. However, the root cause identified in the PER was that procedure SPP-2.2 lacks sufficient barriers to prevent deviations from procedures, and SPP-2.2 applies not only to operations personnel, but also to other personnel outside of operations.

Documentation of corrective actions was incomplete:

• Team discussions with involved licensee personnel revealed that, for PER 96865, corrective actions had included coaching the individuals, discussing the event in the morning meeting with radiation protection staff members, and discussing the event during cycle training. However, these corrective actions were not documented in the PER.

• Team discussions with involved licensee personnel revealed that, for PERs 91647, 92759 and 91644, some corrective actions to address root causes involved personnel reassignments and were addressed outside of the corrective action program. The team considered that although the corrective action program need not include specific details associated with personnel changes, it should include more-general statements to show that corrective actions had been taken to address the root causes.

Issues were addressed outside of the corrective action program:

• PER 91647 did not describe a corrective action to address the apparent cause of the issue. The team learned that corrective action had been taken to address that cause, but had not been documented in the PER.

• PER 110032 determined that the cause of a condition was insufficient training, but was closed without completing additional training.

• After the 2006 Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment identified some areas which plant management determined needed improvement, the licensee did not initiate a PER, but developed an action plan and implemented several corrective actions that were tracked only in an action tracking system called OnTrack. The team noted that OnTrack was not recognized in procedure SPP-3.1 as an administrative control program considered to be part of the licensees Corrective Action Program.

None of the weaknesses noted by the team were identified as more than minor violations of regulatory requirements.

The weaknesses noted by the team are consistent with weaknesses that had been identified by licensee self-assessments and Nuclear Assurance reviews. In particular, the team noted that to address continuing issues concerning PER documentation, quality, and timeliness, the licensee had initiated and evaluated PER 122852 in March 2007, and had begun implementing extensive associated corrective actions only a relatively short time before this inspection began.

Specific items reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Effective Use of Operating Experience Information (1) Inspection Scope To assess the licensees use of operating experience (OE) information, the team reviewed 15 selected OE reports that had been received and processed by the licensee.

For the selected items, the team reviewed the evaluation records to verify that the items had been screened and evaluated in accordance with procedure NADP-3, Managing the Operating Experience Program, Rev. 3, and that PERs had been initiated for applicable OE items when appropriate.

Specific items reviewed are listed in the attachment.

(2) Assessment The team determined that the licensees screening of OE items was generally effective, and that the licensee consistently initiated PERs to further evaluate and develop corrective actions for applicable OE items. The team also observed that the licensee routinely evaluated whether new PERs initiated at the site should be shared with other TVA sites and/or the nuclear power industry at large.

The team noted that several of the licensees assessment reports had identified a weakness in using relevant OE in pre-job briefs, and that the licensee took corrective action under PER 93011 to address that weakness. The team also noted that the most-recent mid-cycle self-assessment suggested a continuing weakness in using relevant internal OE, and that the licensee took additional corrective actions under PER 118956 to address that weakness.

The team observed that during this inspection, the licensee replaced procedure NADP-3 with procedure SPP-3.9, Operating Experience Program, Rev. 0.

c. Effectiveness of Self-Assessments (1) Inspection Scope To assess the licensees use of self-assessments, the team reviewed 39 reports of completed audits or assessments, specifically including those which focused on the corrective action program and/or the OE review program. To verify that the licensee was correcting problems identified by these audits and assessments, the team noted the issues identified during those audits and assessments and the PERs that were initiated

as a result of those audits and assessments. The team also reviewed the selected reports with respect to the requirements described in procedures NADP-1, Conduct of Quality Assessment & Inspection, Rev. 13, and SPP-1.6, [Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear] Self-Assessment Program, Rev. 13.

Specific items reviewed are listed in the attachment.

(2) Assessment The team determined that licensee audits and assessments were thorough and self-critical, that all assessments identified issues to be addressed, and that the licensee consistently initiated PERs to address the identified issues.

The team noted that although the licensee had completed self-assessments of the OE program in 2000, 2002 and 2004, in accordance with the requirement in procedure NADP-3 for completing biennial self-assessments, the licensee had not completed a self-assessment of the OE program after the first quarter of 2004. The team learned that a self-assessment that had been scheduled to be completed in 2006 had been postponed after PER 111324 had been initiated to address a backlog of OE items, and after the evaluation of that PER determined that procedure NADP-3 should be replaced by procedure SPP-3.9. In fact, the licensee deferred that scheduled self-assessment until January 2008, approximately six months after SPP-3.9 was issued.

d. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (1) Inspection Scope The team informally interviewed licensee personnel to develop a general view of the safety-conscious work environment and to determine if any conditions existed that would cause workers to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The team also reviewed the licensees employee concerns program (ECP) records and discussed the program with the implementer to determine if issues affecting nuclear safety were being appropriately addressed.

(2) Assessment The team found no indication that workers at the site did not feel free to raise safety concerns, or that personnel were in any way inhibited from identifying problems using the corrective action process.

The team determined that licensee management focused on fostering a safety-conscious work environment by emphasizing safe operations and encouraging problem reporting by either initiating PERs or filing reports through the ECP. The team determined that the ECP adequately reviewed concerns and entered technical concerns into the corrective action program when appropriate.

4OA6 Management Meetings The team presented the inspection results to Ms. K. Lovell (the acting Plant General Manager) and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 14, 2007. The licensee acknowledged the results presented.

During this meeting, the licensee confirmed that none of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee personnel B. Alsup, Corporate Licensing Engineer M. Blevins, Modifications Manager J. Bushnell, Licensing Engineer P. Candage, Maintenance PER Coordinator T. Carter, Design Engineering Manager W. Clothier Jr., Site Procurement Manager D. Collins, Engineering Programs T. Cosby, TVA Nuclear Organizational & Cultural Initiatives Manager W. Delk, Reactor Engineering Supervisor B. Eiford-Lee, Chemistry and Environmental Manager J. Ferguson, System Engineer S. Ferrell, Performance Analysis Engineer N. Glasser, System Engineer E. Hall, Instruments and Controls Engineer D. Heidrich, System Engineer R. Higginbotham, Human Resources Manager J. Hinman, Site Support Manager S. Hudson, Industry Affairs Engineer M. King, Nuclear Assurance Engineer S. Krupski, System Engineering Manager D. LeGrand, Operations Training Instructor T. McCollom, Electrical, Instrumentation, and Controls Supervisor S. Nelson, System Engineer C. Ottenfeld, Operations PER Coordinator P. Sawyer, Radiation Control Manager P. Schwartz, Operations Training Instructor A. Shirley, Corporate Methods Change & Analysis Manager M. Similey, Operations Training Manager R. Stockton, Licensing Engineer J. Swanson, Maintenance Training Instructor J. Tortora, Performance Improvement Manager T. Walker, System Engineer N. Wamack, Mechanical Design Engineer T. Wilkerson, Performance Improvement Engineer J. S. Woods, System Engineer C. Woolson, Equipment Reliability Manager G. Yelliott, Concerns Resolution Manager NRC personnel R. Monk, Senior Resident Inspector S. Vias, Branch Chief, Region II ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED None Attachment

PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Problem Evaluation Reports (PERs)

08309, Discussion of [Operating Experience] not directly applicable to pending job 60202, Use of [Operating Experience] in corrective action program (SA CRP-LIA-04-001)

60215, Use of [Operating Experience] in pre-job briefings (SA CRP-LIA-04-001)

62418, SA WBN-SCH-04-003, AFI-12, applicable [Operating Experience] not always included 62418, INPO Assist Visit - WBN Self Assessment WBN-SCH-04-003 AFI 12 71210, Management expectations for [Operating Experience] in WOs 71211, [Operating Experience] not in work packages 72326, Self-Assessment Program Problem Identification 72620, Mud in Backup Cooling Line to 1A CCP 73110, Auxiliary Building vent monitor sample line T-connection 74824, Documentation of a Corrective Action Inadequate 75328, PERs Do Not Have Clear Documentation of Extension/Review History 75953, Station Air Exceeded Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria 76175, Security Not Attaching Supporting Close-out Documents in ECAP System 76643, The timeliness of MRC reviews of PER initiations may be impacted by inadequate preparation for MRC that results in some PERs having to be brought back for a subsequent MRC review 76827, Unanticipated LCO Entry Due to Placement of Hold Order on DG 1A-A 76878, Solder Slag Found in #2 RCP Lower Oil Cooler Return Line 76912, NA Identified Three PERs That Should Have Outage Milestone Codes 76980, Safeguards Information 76982, Physical Security/Contingency Plan and Procedure Compliance 76999, Weapon Unaccounted For 77115, Ineffective Oversight of Security 77122, Containment Effects from Unisolating PZR PORV Not Properly Evaluated 77176, Pressurizer PORV Cycled During Transition to Solid Water Operations 77281, Carpenter Not Wearing Hearing Protection When Required 77395, Compressed Gas Cylinders Not Stored as Required 77452, Inadvertent Dump of CLA Into RCS 77534, Documents Not Latest Revision Specified in the TVA Safety Manual 77673, Safety Plan Did Not Identify Orange Risk Condition for Electrical Power 77699, Loosened Mounting Studs on Pzr PORVs While Still In LCO 3.4.12 77744, Work Order on PORV Studs Did Not Clearly State Sequence of Work 77900, Engineer Not Wearing Gloves When Required 78205, PMT Failure on 1A-A and 2A-A ERCW Strainers Casing Flange 78261, Deficiencies in Controlling Foreign Material in Cooling Water Systems 78378, Inadequate Corrective Action Regarding Silt Blockage of 1A CCP Cooler 78407, Compressed Gas Cylinders Not Stored as Required 78414, Irradiated Fuel Moved When ABGTS Was Inoperable 78628, Officer Discovered Inattentive on Post 78637, Flammable Item Left Unattended in a Work Area Overnight 78779, Confined Entry Permit Not Transferred to Safety Engineer when Required 78875, RHR Pump PMT Signed Off With Required Conditions Not Met 79240, Unposted high radiation area 79295, Pressure Spike Occurred on RCP #2 Restart 79310, Qualification of Temporary Containment Penetration Barriers.

79412, 1A RHR Pump Seal Leak Attachment

79738, IRNI Fail Maximum Channel Deviation Requirement 79910, Solid Water Operations 80773, PER Not Rerouted as Directed by MRC 80838, Crane Counterweights 80898, Improperly Documented Overtime Restriction Violations 80916, PER Cancelled in Error 81073, WBN-OSG4-031 T=0 Issue 81107, Nuclear Assurance Audit SSA0501 Finding 81126, SSA0501 Manual Action Clarification 81409, NA Identified a Misclassification of PER 68941 81410, Effectiveness Review Lacked Documentation 81151, AOI-30.02 Challenges 81200, SSPS Tin Whiskers (Millstone OE20450)

81436, Missed Security Report 81677, Test Equipment Out-of-Calibration 82125, Cracked Fuse Ferrules 82628, Electrical Jumper Not Removed as Required 83248, Air leak identified on 2A2 DG Air Compressor Unloader 83912, Valve Misposition Trend 84169, Actions Ineffective in Resolving Operations Performance Weaknesses 84173, Self-Assessments Not Critical 85177, ERCW Telltale Drain Valve Found Out of Position 85574, Corrective Maintenance Work Order Review 86081, Adverse trend of RP PIs for HRA posting and access and ED alarms 86178, CAP Indicators Below Target More Than Six Times in Year 86192, Untimely Notification of PER Grading Failures Not Documented 86283, INPO Assist Visit Recommendations for Improving eCAP 86423, Acceptance Criteria Not Met - Identified During SRO Review 86704, Maint/Mods Integrated Analysis report (COG) for Jan-Jun 05 indicated shortfalls in documentation for MSA [Mechanical Maintenance 89025, Functional Failure of ABSCE Damper 89967, Failed Capacitor in Auxiliary Control Air Dryer Tower Inlet Valve Actuator 90112, MCR Chillers Functional Failures 90519, PER response timeliness 90520, Incomplete documentation in PERs 90521, Ineffective benchmarking of CAP program 90522, CAP management and leadership 90523, Training and proficiency of root cause analysts 90524, Quality of effectiveness reviews in CAP 90525, Inefficient electronic processes in eCAP 90814, During movement of reactor head, three individuals received ED alarms 91644, Corrective action program use issues 91647, LHRA challenges 91648, ALARA planning 92594, INPO 2005 Evaluation - Self-assessments 92759, Weaknesses with RP decision making and breakdown in administrative barriers contribute to unplanned dose 93102, Worker Practices 93389, Training Required for SER 4-05 Attachment

93559, NEDP-12 CM WO PER Checklist for WO 05-810008-000 93795, NEDP-12 CM WO PER Checklist Not Performed for CM WO PER 94817, Repeat Maintenance Training 94818, Repeat Maintenance Indicator 95189, PER/WO Not Initiated to Document Water Leak at TDAFWP Jet Plug 96002, ERCW Discharge Header Not Full During Troubleshooting 96145, LER 2005-002-00 - Beaver Valley CCP Suction Temp Increase During App R Fire 96293, Unsupported design input 96327, Valve Found Closed and Tagged 96865, Individual locked in containment 97173, PER to address TVAs corrective actions for PER 92730 involving FME practices 97383, Seven PERs did not adequately address the apparent cause of the stated problem description 97423, 480 V Breaker Would Not Fully Charge Springs 97647, PER 81649 inadvertently closed without attaching Why staircase 97708, Snapshot SA: two PERs closed without required apparent cause evaluation performed 97710, Snapshot SA: two PERS closed with apparent cause evaluations that did not meet expectations 97803, PER quality self-assessment - PER 94575 98791, Snapshot Self-Assessment 98951, Design Sequencing Issue in EDC 51723 98952, Setpoint and Scaling Document for DCN Contain Incorrect Values 99683, 2A-A 480v Board Rm A/C Unit Freon Connection Damaged 99826, No Hold Order Obtained For Pump Rotation 100095, High range rad monitor thermal induced current 100440, DG 1B-B Room Air Intake Actuator 100664, SCBA grade D air certification 102975, Admin Weakness in Controlling Engineering Training 102976, Duplication of Effort in Processing Engineering Training Records 102979, Engineering Record Storage Vault Monitoring Deficiencies 102980, Engineering Record Vault Industrial Safety Deficiencies 102986, Configuration Control - Engineering Drawing Management Deficiencies 102987, Engineering BSL training Needed 102988, Engineering Vendor Documents Deficiencies 103502, TI-12.07 103965, Operations Procedure Adherence 103966, Training Weaknesses 103967, Clearance Program Deficiencies 104097, Manual Reactor Trip May 30, 2006 104803, Security 104993, Misposition of Handswitch 105343, Self-Assessment Quality 105343, Self-assessment quality 105344, Self-Assessment Topic Selection 105344, Self-assessment topic selection 105450, 0-FCV-26-167 Found Isolated 105598, Work Performed Without Worksteps 106252, Licensed Operator Reactivation Process Deficiencies 106523, Snapshot SA WBN-SIT-06-005: failure of PER closure review for 95402 Attachment

106525, Snapshot SA WBN-SIT-06-005: failure of PER closure review for 96211 106922, 1A FW Pump Oil Leak And Resulting Power Reduction 107084, Reach Rod Valve Failures SYS 62 107282, High range containment radiation monitors inoperable 107544, PED Correction 107664, REP Van Dispatch 107686, EPIP-9 Form Error 107697, Inadequate apparent cause evaluations for PERs 102958 and 102303 107793, CM WO PER 107805, 7/31/06 Trip 108051, Vendor Advisory Letter 108115, Incorrect Verification Practices Used During Si Performance 108188, Procedure Use And Adherence Issue 108844, Inappropriate Risk Assessment For Schedule Changes 108886, Risk Reduction Actions of TI-124 Improperly Applied by Operations Crew 108957, NRC Medical Exams 109952, System Engineer Practice Improvements 110032, WBN-0-TCV -067-1050-A Diaphragm Installed Incorrectly 110159, Maintenance Work Type Classification Process 110215, U2 PM Tracking 110636, Poor control of rigging 110770, Noncompliance with LCO 3.3.2 Function 6.E 110988, Snapshot SA On JSAs, AFI 111128, 1-FCV-72-45, Containment Sump Valve Failed to Stroke 111173, Preliminary ILT Exam Results Indicate 7 of 11 Individuals Failed Written Exam 111324, [Operating Experience] program has not been implemented with the intent of NADP-3 111342, Steam generator pipe cut - operations issue 111347, CTC Quarterly Inspections 111710, CCP seal PMT failure 113656, Polar Crane Tolley Moved 113723, 1B-B CS pump run without CCS to oil cooler 113743, Need for improvement in PER Environmental Review Process 113757, CM WO PER - heat trace circuits 358, 359, and 361 114984, Response to SER 5-06 Flow Accelerated Corrosion 115184, Potential RCS Leak 116938, Reactor Reassembly Schedule Sequence Error 116459, SGR calculation review process 116872, 1B CCP inboard seal leakage 117968, SEN 263, Forsmark Unit 1 Event 118066, No Storage Code Labels on Chemicals 118079, Insulation Missing on B-Train Fire Pump Header 118129, Revise SPP-9.6 118151, Clearance Log Documentation Inconsistent 118193, Minor Errors in DCN 51940 118197, Revise SPP-9.5 118200, General and Flammable Chemicals in Wrong Cabinets 118301, Revise NEDP-16 118386, SPP-9.3 Block 15 Justification Not Consistently Completed 118496, SNM Annual Inventories of 2004 and 2005 Attachment

118524, Administrative Errors in EDC 51723-A 118531, EQ Reporting Not Timely 118533, MR Cause Determinations Not Completed Timely 118776, Midcycle [Self-Assessment] Corrective Action Program 118780, Chemicals With Incorrect Storage Code 118867, TRN-11.4 Does Not Provide The Necessary Rigor During Just In Time Training 118956, [Operating Experience] Mid-Cycle [Area For Improvement]

118964, Main Feed Pump Oil Leaks 119061, Generic review of BFN AFI PER 116666 119444, RCS Lithium Above Limit Twice and Not Documented in CAP 119729, FRSB Documented Location Incorrect 120005, DGB Ventilation During Tornado Warning 120977, WBN Chemistry Self Assessment Recommendations 121118, Caution Orders Support Operator Work Arounds 121569, APR review issues noted during SA-WBN-RP-07-002 121588, SA-WBN-RP-07-002: RP and OPS departmental RFO dose goals exceeded without explanation in a PER 121598, Missed Opportunity on 1-FCV-72-45 121601, Acceptance Criteria Failure for 1-SI-0-53-B Section 6.59 for 1-FCV-72-45 121640, [Nuclear Assurance] Review of B-level PERs 121849, CM WO PER Due to Failure of Fuse for Dg Exhaust Fan 1a 121905, Fire Protection Report Discrepancies 122083, Need for Environmental Staff Training 122084, STS Trend PER 122243, [Nuclear Safety Review Board] [Management Attention Item] on Corrective Action Program Ownership 122582, Corrective Action Program Trend PER 122911, [Nuclear Assurance] Review of C-level PERs 122944, Safeguards Information Audit Issues 123228, 1-FCV-67-68, Found Open 123521, CVCS Mix Bed Left Out of Service Following RCS Filter Change 123652, PERs Not Initiated When Chemistry Parameters Out-of-Limits 123888, Additional Review of Fuses Addressed By NRC IN Notice 2006-05 123994, This PER is to track management's corrective actions associated with the 2006 Synergy Survey for the Radiation Protection organization 124018, This PER is to track management's corrective actions associated with the 2006 Synergy Survey for the maintenance planners (in MIG, MSA, and MSB)

124019, This PER is to track management's corrective actions associated with the 2006 Synergy Survey for the Operations organization 124023, This PER is to track management's corrective actions associated with the 2006 Synergy Survey for the System Engineering organization 124048, This PER is to track management's corrective actions associated with the 2006 Synergy Survey for the Instrument Maintenance Organization 124269, RHR Pump 1B LCO Duration 125257, Missed CM WO Trend Report Frequency 126500, Failed Surface Exam 127945, LCO Tracking Attachment

129538 The CM WO report required by NEDP-12 section 3.8 was completed (period between 7/05 and 6/07) without reviewing non-critical failures for potential trends and not attaching a list of all CM WOs.

129952, No PER for self-assessment identified issue 129998, No PER addressing WBN-SIT-06-001 Operating Experience Evaluation/Response 05-1263 INPO SER 3-05, Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals 05-1421 Westinghouse TB 04-22, RCP Seal Performance - App R Compliance 05-1424 NSAL-02-14 R2, Steam Line Break During Mode 3 for Westinghouse Plants 05-1578 INPO SEN 257, Internal Flood Design Deficiencies 05-1632 SER 4-05 - Errors in Preparation and Implementation of Modifications 05-1886 NRC IN 2005-30, Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged By Unanalyzed Internal Flooding Events and Inadequate Design 06-0206 NSAL-05-3, Centrifugal Charging Pump Runout During Safety Injection 06-0209 NRC IN 2006-04, Design Deficiency in Pressurizer Heaters for PWRs 06-0315, NRC IN 2006-005, Possible Defect in Bussman KWN-R and KTN-R fuses 06-0628, Westinghouse TB-06-5, Barton Differential Pressure Switch Contact Resistance 06-0706, INPO SEN 261, Low Head Safety Injection Pumps Inoperable Because of Motor Cooler Configuration Problems 06-1025, Westinghouse TB-06-10, Binding of Type M34 Mechanical Interlocks 06-1026, NRC RIS 2006-10, Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Paragraph III.G.2 Operator Manual Actions 06-1166, NRC IN 2006-17, Recent Operating Experience of Service Water Systems due to External Conditions 06-1246, Westinghouse TB-06-1, Barton Transmitter Bellows Damage 06-1550, IN 2006-20: Foreign Material Found in the Emergency Core Cooling System 06-1590, SER 7-06, Degradation of Essential Service Water Piping 06-1707, IN 2006-24: Recent Operating Experience Associated with Pressurizer and Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoints 06-1742, SER 5-06, Flow-Accelerated Corrosion 06-1818, SEN 263: Loss of 400-kV Switchyard and Two Safety-Related Electrical Trains because of a Common Mode Failure 07-0023, NRC IN 2006-31 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers 07-0213, W TB-05-4 Rev 2, Potential Tin Whiskers on Printed Circuit Board Components 07-0244, IN 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water (ESW) Systems Audits and Self-Assessments CRP-LIA-04-001, Operating Experience Program Implementation NA-CH-05-001, Emergency Preparedness NA-CH-06-002, TVAN Procedure Processes NA-CH-06-003, Fire Protection NA-WB-05-01 - Quarterly Oversight Report, January 1 - March 31, 2005 NA-WB-05-02 - Quarterly Oversight Report, April 1 - June 30, 2005 NA-WB-05-03 - Quarterly Oversight Report, July 1 - September 30, 2005 NA-WB-05-04 - Quarterly Oversight Report, October 1 - December 31, 2005 NA-WB-06-01 - Quarterly Oversight Report, January 1, 2006 - March 31, 2006 NA-WB-06-02, Quarterly Oversight Report, April 1 -June 30, 2006 Attachment

NA-WB-06-03, Quarterly Oversight Report, July 1 - September 30, 2006 NA-WB-06-07, Quarterly Oversight Report, October 1 - December 31, 2006 NA-WB-07-001, Assessment of Fuel-Handling Activities NA-WB-07-004, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Nuclear Assurance - Assessment of B-Level PER Closure Quality NA-WB-07-006, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Nuclear Assurance - Assessment of C-Level PER Closure Quality NA-WB-07-05, Quarterly Oversight Report, January 1 - March 31, 2007 SSA 0701, Security, Safeguards Information, Access Authorization, Fitness-For-Duty Programs, Behavioral Observation Program and the Personnel Access Data System SSA0501, Fire Protection and Loss Prevention Program SSA0502, [Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear]-Wide Radiological Protection and Control Audit SSA0603, REP Final Audit Rpt SSA0605, Fire Protection and Loss Prevention Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Self-Assessment Report 2004 INPO Mid-Cycle Assessment WBA0601, Operations Functional Area Audit WBA0602, Maintenance & U2 Construction Audit WBA0604, Radiological Protection Program WBA0701, Engineering Functional Area Audit WBN-CEM-06-003, Chemistry Contractor Control Self Assessment Report WBN-CEM-06-004, Air, SARA, & CERCLA Snapshot Self Assessment Report WBN-CEM-06-005, Chemistry and Environmental Job Safety Analysis Snapshot Self Assessment Report WBN-M&M-06-001, Repeat Maintenance Self Assessment WBN-M&M-06-002, Fabrication or Modification of Tools Snapshot Self Assessment WBN-M&M-06-003, Use of M&TE & Prevention of Common Mode Common Cause - Snapshot Self Assessment WBN-M&M-06-006, MSA JSAs - Snapshot Self Assessment WBN-CEM-07-001, Chemistry Technician Fundamentals WBN-CEM-07-002, Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan WBN-CEM-07-003, Chemical Traffic Control and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act WBN-CEM-07-007, Environmental Reviews of PERS WBN-CEM-07-008, Regulatory Required Non-Accredited Environmental Training WBN-CEM-07-009, Primary Chemistry End of Cycle Review WBN-ENG-06-001, Conduct of Engineering Support WBN-ENG-06-002, CDBI Readiness Self-Assessment WBN-ENG-06-003, WBN Primary Responsibilities of System Engineers WBN-ENG-07-001, Success of the Training and PMTI Process.

WBN-ENG-07-007, Implementation of SOER 90-2 - Nuclear Fuel Defects WBN-ENG-07-008, Procedure Benchmark of Fuel Failure Mitigation Program of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant WBN-M&M-07-004, WO Quality - Snapshot Self Assessment WBN-OPS-07-006, Implementation of the Fourth Revision to SPP-10.4 WBN-RP-07-002, Radiation Protection Department AFIs RP 1-1, 1-2, 1-3 from 2005 Evaluation WBN-RP-07-003, Radiation Protection - Radiographic Operations WBN-SA-SIT-07-002, WBN INPO Mid-Cycle Self-Assessment WBN-SEC-06-001, Alarm Station / Communication WBN-SIT-05-001, Corrective Action Program Attachment

WBN-SIT-06-001, PER Quality WBN-SIT-06-002, Quarterly Self-Assessment Quality Evaluation WBN-SIT-06-005, PER Quality WBN-SIT-07-010, PI&R Readiness Snapshot

[Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear] Nuclear Safety Cultural Assessment Survey, May 2006 Procedures BP-250, Corrective Action Program Handbook, Rev. 12 BP-253, Human Performance Program, Rev. 2 BP-255, Operational Decision-Making Issue Evaluation Process, Rev. 1 BP-340, Operating Experience, Rev. 0 BP-392, Benchmarking, Rev. 0 FHI-7, Fuel Handling and Movement, Rev. 0029 GO-1, Unit Startup from Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby, Revision 54 GO-3, Unit Startup from Less Than 4% Reactor Power to 30% Reactor Power, Revision 27 GO-6, Unit Shutdown from hot standby to cold shutdown, Revision 37 MMDP-3, Guidelines for Planning & Execution of Troubleshooting Activities, Rev. 3W1 NADP-1, Conduct of Quality Assessment & Inspection, Rev. 13 NADP-2, Audits, Rev. 20 NADP-3, Managing the Operating Experience Program, Rev. 0007 NADP-3, Managing the Operating Experience Program, Rev. 7 NEDP-12, System, Component and Program Health Equipment Failure Trending, Rev. 8 NEDP-22, Functional Evaluations, Rev. 2 Outage Scheduling Desktop Guide, Revision 1 RCI-100, Control of Radiological Work, Revs. 25, 26, 28, and 29 RCI-128, ALARA Program Implementation, Rev. 9 SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown, Revision 55 SOI-68.02, Reactor Coolant Pumps, Revision 31 SPP-1.6, [Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear] Self-assessment Program, Rev. 13 SPP-2.2, Administration Of Site Technical Procedures, Revision 14 SPP-3.1, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 12 SPP-3.9, Operating Experience Program, Rev. 0000 SPP-6.5, Foreign Material Control, Rev. 0012 SPP-6.6, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting - 10 CFR 50.65, Rev. 9 Trend Reports Integrated Trend Review - Site Report, January through March, 2007 Integrated Trend Review - Site Report, January through June, 2005 Integrated Trend Review - Site Report, July through December, 2005 Integrated Trend Review - Site Report, January through March, 2006 Integrated Trend Review - Site Report, April through June, 2006 Integrated Trend Review - Site Report, July through December, 2006 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Corrective Maintenance Work Order (CM WO) Failure Trend Report, July 16, 2007 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Corrective Maintenance Work Order (CM WO) Failure Trend Report, July 29, 2005 Attachment

Training Lesson Plans 3-OT-SRT-0059A, Refueling Outage Just in Time - Shutdown, Revision 8 3-OT-TI1240, Risk Management and Ti-124 - Risk Assessment - Equipment to Plant Risk Matrix, Revision 4 3-OT-SER3-05, Weakness in Operator Fundamentals, Rev. 0 Other Documents Action Plan, Synergy-Watts Bar Nuclear Plant [Response to the 2006 Nuclear Safety Cultural Assessment Survey]

Functional Evaluation High Range Containment Radiation Monitors Thermal Induced Current, 4/19/06 Multi-Site Programmatic Self-Assessment Schedules, FY07-FY11 PPT005.000, Foreign Material Control [SPP-6.5], Rev. 5 PPT005.001, Foreign Material Control [SPP-6.5] for Monitors, Rev. 7 Site Maintenance and Modifications Management Directive (SMMMD) 022, Planners Guide, Rev. 25 Standing Order 06-008, Containment High Range Radiation Monitors: Additional Information Related to REP Classification Attachment