ML072970040
| ML072970040 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/2007 |
| From: | - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 0EOP-01-UG, 50-324/07-301, 50-325/07-301 50-324/07-301, 50-325/07-301 | |
| Download: ML072970040 (41) | |
See also: IR 05000325/2007301
Text
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m x<<C.OPERATOR ACTIONS 1.Control Operator Immediate Actions The control operator immediate actions are those actions which may be performed following a reactor scram prior to entering the scram procedure (EOP-01).These actions are not mandatory and shall not conflict with entering the scram procedure.
All the control operator immediate actions are located in the scram procedure flowchart.
There are no control operator immediate actions in EOP-02 through EOP-04.In the event the actions are not performed prior to entering the scram procedure, the scram procedure shall take precedence.
The control operator immediate actions which should be memorized by control operators, are defined as follows: a.Unit 2 Only: After steam flow is less than3x 10 6 lb/hr, PLACE the reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN.Unit 1 Only: PLACE the reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN.b.IF reactor power is below 2%(APRM downscale trip), THEN TRIP the main turbine.c.ENSURE the master reactor level controller
setpoint is+170".d.IF two reactor feed pumps are running, AND reactor vessel level is above+170" AND rising, THEN TRIP one.The EOP actions are those which are contained within EOP-01 through EOP-04.In the event the control operator immediate actions are not performed prior to entering EOP-01, these actions become EOP actions.Since the EOP actions are readily available to the control operator, there is no need to memorize them.The operator is not required to have the Operating Procedures
in hand while executing the EOPs, but may use any other procedure as necessary.
The following guidance applies to referencing
of supporting
material that is not included in the procedure but provides information
required in the performance
of a step (ERFIS, instructional
aids, Users'Guide, etc.).a.If the information
is available from several sources and a specific source is preferred, then that source is explicitly
referenced
at the point it is needed.b.If the information
is provided by a source which is not readily recognized
by the operator, then the source is explicitly
referenced
at the point it is needed.I OEOP-01-UG
Rev.47 Page 21 of 1381
(
SCRAM CARD*f-NSURE SCRAM VALVES ARE OPEN BY MANUAL-.'-SG-R*AM
OR ARI TRI P..,\*CONTROL REACTOR PRESSURE BETWE'EN 800 AND 1000 PSIG*CONTROL REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL BETWEEN+170 ,.AND+200 INCHES*INSERT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION
- PLACE RECrRC PUMP SPEED CONTROLLERS
TO 10%*ENSURE HEATER DRAIN PUMPS ARE TRIPPED*ENSURE TURBINE OIL SYSTEM OPERATING*PLACE SULCV IN SERVICE S/907
(
nvlv vt-'t:KA rlONS FOR EOPs MANUAL RCIC INJECTION (OP-16 SECTION 5.3)1.ENSURE THE F 0 L LOWINGVA LVES ARE 0 PEN:E51-V 8 (V A LV E PO SIT ION>.E51-V8 (ACTU AT 0 R PO SIT ION LAN 0E5 1-V9 2.OPENE5 1-F 04 6 3.START VAC U UM PUMP AND LEAVE SWITCH IN START.4.OPENE5 1-F045__'5.OPEN E51-F013..,'" 6.ENSURE RC I C TURBINE STARTS AND COMES UP TO SPEED AS DIRECTED BY RCIC FLOW CONTROLADJUST RC I C FLOW C ONTRO LLER TO OBTAIN DESIRED FLOW RATE.__:8.ENSUREE5 1-F0 19 IS CLOSED WITH FLOW ABOVE 80 G PM.__!, 9.ENSURE THE FOLLOWING VALVES ARE CLOSED: E51-F025.E51-F026.E51-F004.AND E51-F005'START S BGT (OP-10)1 t:'OPEN THESGT-V 8 ANDSGT-V9.__.l2.ENSURE BAROMETRIC
CNDSR CONDENSATE
PUMP OPERATES RCIC PRESSURE CONTROL (OP-16 SECTION 8.2)1.ENSURE THE F 0 L LOW IN G VA LVES ARE 0 PE N:E5 1-V 8 (VALVE POSITION>.
E51-V8 (ACTUATOR POSITION)AND E51-V9.2.OPENE5 1-F 04 6 3.START VACUUM PUMP AND LEAVE SWITCH IN START.4.ENSUREE5 1-F 013ISC LOS E 0 5.ENSURE E41-FOll IS OPEN 6.THROTTLE OPEN E51-F022 UNTIL DUAL INDICATION
IS OBTAINED 7.OPEN E51-F045 8.THROTTLE OPEN E51-F022 OR ADJUST Re IC FLOW CONTROL.E51-FIC-R600.
TO OBTAIN DESIRED SYSTEM PARAMETERS
AND REACTOR PRESSURE.9.ENSUREE5 1-F 019 IS C LOS ED WIT H FLOW ABOVE 80 G PM.10.ENSURE THE FOLLOWING VALVES ARE CLOSED: E51-F025.E51-F026.E51-F004.AND E51-F005.11.START SBGT (OP-10)12.OPEN THE SGT-V8 AND SGT-Y9 13.ENSURE BAR 0 MET RIC C NOS R CON DEN SATEPUM POP E RATES I=OR
RFI=FR TO OP-1h
(
.-*II"".1I'i'-'Cv I IUN IN EOPs (OP-19 SECTION 5.3)1.ENSURE AUXILIARY OIL PUMP IS NOT RUNNING 2.ENSURE E41-V9 AND E41-V8 ARE CLOSED 3.OPEN E41-F05g-*
4""START VACUUM PUMP AND LEAVE IN START 5.OPEN E41-FOOl 6.START AUXILIARY OIL PUMP AND LEAVE IN START 7.OPEN E41-F006.IMMEDIATELY
AFTER E41-V8 HAS DUAL INDICATION
8.l;NSURE E41-V9 AND E41-V8 ARE OPEN 9.ENSURE HPCI TURBINE COMES UP TO SPEED 10.ADJUST HPCI FLOW CONTROL.E41-FIC-R600
TO OBTAIN DESIRED FLOW RATE 11.ENSURE E41-F012 IS CLOSED WHEN FLOW HAS INCREASED ABOVE 800 GPM 12.ENSURE FOLLOWING E41 DRAIN VALVES ARE CLOSED: F025.AND F026 13.START SBGT (OP-10)AND OPEN SGT-V8 AND SGT-V9 14.ENSURE BAROMETRIC
CNDSR CONDENSATE
PUMP IS OPERATING.
_**_._.....I lVI'll 11'4 I:: V I"'5 TRANSFER TO PRESSURE CONTROL FROM LEVEL CONTROL (OP-19 SECTION 8.3)1.ENSURE H PC IIS NOT NEEDED FOR LEVEL CONTROL 2.ENSURE H PCII NITIAT IONSIGNA LIS RESET 3.ENSUREE51-F 02 2ISC LOS ED....-4.TRANSFER HPCI FLOW CONTROL TO MANUAL (M)5..REDUCE H PC ITU RBI N ESP E EDT 0 BE T WEE N 3000 AND 3300 RPM 6.OPEN E 41-F 011 7.CLOSE E41-F006 8.WHEN E41-F006 IS CLOSED.THEN THROTTLE OPENE4 1-F 008 UN TIL FLO W IS G REA TERT HAN 1000 GPM 9.ENSUREE4 1-F 012ISC LOSED 10.ADJUST SETPOINT AND TRANSFER HPCI FLOW CONTROL TO AUTOMATIC CA}11.MAINTAIN REACTOR PRESSURE BY THROTTLING
E41-F008 OR VARYING HPC I Ft.:OW USING THE FLOW CONTROLLER
TRANSFER TO LEVEL CONTROL FROM PRESSURE CONTROL (OP-19 SECTION 8.4)__.,1.IF NECESSARY.
TRANSFER HPCI FLOW CONTROL TO MANUAL (M)2.REDUCE H PC I TURBI NE SPEED TO BETWEEN 3000 AND 3300 RPM 3.CLOSE E41-F008 4.OPEN E41-F006 5.ADJUST SETPOINT AND TRANSFER HPCI FLOW CONTROL TO AUTOMATIC (A)6.ADJUST HPC I FLOW CONTROL SETPOINT FOR DESIRED FLOW RATE 7.ENSURE E 41-Fa 12 IS CLOSED 8.IF DESIRED.THEN CLOSE E41-F011.---
(,.(
Y::)UPPRESSION
POOL COOLING START AHR SW A LOOP (CONV)RHR SW A LOOP (NUCl: OPEN SW-V101: CLOSE SW-V143: If LOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT PLACE Rffl SW BOOSTER PlM'SA&C LOCA OVERRIDE SWITCH TO MANUAL OVERRIDE_: START Rffl SW PtvP_: ADJUST Ell-POV-F068A
- SUPPLY CLG WTR TO VITAL H)R:OPEN SW-V105:CLOSE SW-V143_:OPEN SW-V102 lOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT.PLACE Rtfl SW BOOSTER PUMPS A&C LOCA OVERRIDE SWITCH TO MANUAL OVERRIDE: START RHR SW PMP: ADJUST ETI-POV-F068A
- SUPPLY CLG WTR TO VITAL HOR START RHA LOOP A: If LOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT.VERIFY SPRAY LOGIC IS MADE UP_:If ETI-F015A IS OPEN.THEN CLOSE ETI-F017 A: START LOOP A RHR PMP: OPEN Ell-F028A: TtflOTTLE Ell-F024A: TfflOTTLEETI-F048A
REFERENCE OP-17 AND OP-43 S/106?
__S.'q--s;i1;
POOL COOLING START RHR SW LOOP (NUC)RHR SW BLOOP (CONV)_: OPEN SW-V105_: ClOSE_;If LOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT PlACE RHR SW BOOSTER PUMPS*B&0 LOCA OVERRIDE SWITCH TO MANUAL OVERRDE*: START RHR SW PMJ: ADJUST Ell:-POV-f0688
- SUPPlY ClG WTR TO VITAL H)R:OPEN SW-V10l._:CLOSE SW-Vl43_:OPEN SW-V102_:IF LOCA*SlGNAL
IS PRESENT PlACE RHR SW BOOSTER PUMPS*B&0 LOCA OVERRDE SWITCH TO MANUAL OVERRDE_: START RHR SW PMP___: ADJUST ETI-POV-f068B_: SUPPLY Cl6 WTR TO VITAL H)R START RHR LOOP B.._: If LOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT.VERIfY...SPRA Y LOGIC IS MADE UP_:If En-F015B.1S
OPEN.THEN CLOSE Ell-f0178_: START lOOP B RHR PMP: OPEN Ell-F0288._": THROTTLE En-f024B_: THROTTLE ETI-f0488 REFERENCE OP-17 AND
5/1064
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___
'.'\., ,t l REACTOR SCRAM PROCEDURE BNP
VI 2EOp*01*RSP REVISION NO;9 UNIT 2 ONLY"/j1[0/',*1,160'00 I 1,100 200 400 600 600 , ,000 REACTOR PRESSURE (PSIG)tLQI!WHfN
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STEP 013 NO 013 STEP BASES: This step requires the operator to evaluate plant conditions
a*nd determine the status of actual reactor water level and its indications.
This critical step will direct the operator to the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure or level/Power
Control should level instrumentation
indicate that vessel level recovery actions are necessary.
1001-37.3 Rev.8 Page 14 of 381
STEP 014 STEP BASES: If reactor water level cannot be maintained
above+170 inches, additional
level control measures must be taken.These additional
measures will be taken once the operator enters the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure or Level/Power
Control procedure.
1001-37.3 Rev.8 Page 15 of 381
STEPS 015 through 017.;.., YES STEP BASES: These steps are used to determine if an entry condition exists for the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure or the Level/Power
Control procedure.
The parameters
selected are RPS Scram setpoints or critical parameters, which indicate that an emergency condition exists which requires the use of the above referenced
procedures.
It also directs entry to the EPG based procedures
if required to scram by Containment
Control procedures
or the Radioactivity
Release Control Procedure.
1001-37.3 Rev.8 Page 16 of 381
STEPS 018 through 021 f'/'f?'" S ft,{J/1/'1/>',7//TABLE 1 YES ARE ALL CONTROL RODS INSERTeD TO OR BEYOND POSITION 00 018 HAS IT BEEN DETERMINED
THAT THE REACTOR WILL REMAIN SHUTDOWN UNDER ALL CONDmONS WITHOUT BORON TABLE 1 019 PERFORM"REACTOR VESSEL CONTROL PROCEDURE" (EOP.01*RVCPI AND EXECUTE IT CONCURRENT\.
Y WITH THIS PROCEDURE 020 NO SHUTDOWN WITHOUT BORON ONLY ONE CONTROL ROD NOT FULLY INSERTED NO MORE THAN 10 CONTROL RODS WITHDRAWN TO POSmON 02 AND NO CONTROl ROO WITHDRAWN BEYOND POSmON 02 AS DETERMINED
BY REACTOR ENGINEERING
Gom"LEVEUPOWER
CONTROL" (EOP*01*LPCI 021 STEP BASES:Thesesteps
determine whether entry to the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure or the Level/Power
Control procedure is required based on whether or not a cold shutdown control rod configuration
exists.If cold shutdown is not assured on control rods alone, then entry to the Level/Power
Control procedure is directed where the required actions to control reactor water level, pressure, and power and to insert control rods are found.If cold shutdown is assured, then entry to the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure, where guidance on the control of reactor water level and pressure are found, is directed.Execution of the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure and the remainder of the Reactor Scram Procedure are then performed concurrently.
Positive confirmation
that the reactor will remain shut down under all conditions
is best obtained by determining
that no control rod is withdrawn beyond the Maximum Subcritical
Bank Withdrawal
Position, of position 00.Table 1 has been added to provide a listing of those conditions
for the reactor being shutdown under all conditions
without boron.This was added specifically
for condition where 10 control rods could be withdrawn to position 02 as long as no control rod is withdrawn beyond position 02.On a loss of UPS or any other condition where control rod position can not be determined, then entry to the Level/Power
Control procedure is required.1001-37.3 Rev.8 Page 17 of 381
(
CONTROL PROCEDURE'liI'
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3.0 STEP BASES STEPS PCCP-1 and PCCP-2 ENTRY CONomONS:*SUPPRESSION
POOL TEMP ABOVE 951'Q.B ABOVE 105'F WHEN DUE TO TESTING*DRYWELLAVERAGE
AIR TEMP ABOVE 15O"F*ORYWELL PRESS ABOVE 1.7PSlG*SUPPRESSION
POOL WATER LEVEL ABOVE*27 INCHES (-2 FEET&3 INCHES)*SUPPRESSION
POOL WATER LEVEL BELOW-31 INCHES (-2 FEET&T INCHES)*PRIMARY eTm H2 CONCENTRATION
ABOVE 1.5°,4 STEP BASES: The conditions
which require entry into the Primary Containment
Control Procedure are symptomatic
of an emergency or conditions
which, if not corrected, could degrade into an emergency.
This set of entry conditions
is sufficient
to assure that procedures
will be entered for transients
and accidents, which are within the design and licensing basis for BWRs and for additional
events which have been evaluated as significant
with respect to emergency response actions.Similar to the rationale which formed the basis for selecting the Reactor Control Guideline entry condition parameters
and setpoints, setpoints for the Primary Containment
Control Procedure entry condition parameters
are simple, unambiguous, operationally
significant, readily identifiable, and familiar to plant operators.
For example, each of the entry conditions
is typically one or more of the following:
a.Scram setpoint b.Annunciator
alarm setpoint 1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 4 of 581
STEPS PCCP-1 and PCCP-2 (continued}
c.Technical specification
limit d.ECCS automatic initiation
logic trip setpoint The entry condition setpoints are specified so as to provide advance warning to operators of potential emergency conditions, allowing action to be taken sufficiently
early to prevent more severe consequences.
1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 5 of 581
STEPS PCCP-5 and PCCP-6 PCCP-6 NO STEP BASES: If performing
the actions specified in the Primary Containment
Control Procedure restores the entry condition(s)
to normal, and this procedure is no longer required to control primary containment
parameters.
then the operator may exit this procedure since primary containment
will no longer be threatened
at this point.EOP-01-SEP-08
is entered to ensure all jumpers and inhibits used during execution of PCCP are restored to normal and all safety systems are returned to normal.1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 7 of 581
STEPS SPIT-01 through SPIT-04 MONITOR AND CONTROL SUPPRESSION
POOL TEMP BELOW 95"F START AVAILABLE IUlR LOOPS IN SUPPRESSION
POOL COOLING MODE AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN TEMP BELOW 95"F IOP*H)SPIT-04 STEP BASES: The initial action taken to control suppression
pool temperature
employs the same method typically used during normal plant operations:
monitoring
its status and placing available suppression
pool cooling in operation, as required, to maintain temperature
within technical specification
limits.These steps thus provide a smooth transition
from general plant procedures
to the Emergency Operating Procedures
and assure that the normal method of suppression
pool temperature
control is attempted in advance of initiating
more complex actions to terminate rising suppression
pool temperature.
As long as suppression
pool temperature
remains below the value of the most limiting suppression
pool temperature
LCO, no further operator action is required in this section of the procedure other than continuing
to monitor and control suppression
pool temperature
using available suppression
pool cooling systems.The NPSH (Net Positive Suction Head)limits are defined to be the highest suppression
pool temperature
which provides adequate net positive suction head for pumps taking suction on the pool.The NPSH Limits are functions of pump flow and suppression
chamber overpressure (airspace pressure plus the hydrostatic
head of water over the pump suction).It is utilized to preclude pump damage from cavitation.
It should be 1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 9 of 581
STEPS SPIT-01 through SPIT-04 (continued)
noted that containment
pressurization
of up to 5 psig is credited for maintaining
NPSH margins for BNP.Therefore, as actions are taken that reduce suppression
chamber pressure (Le.suppression
pool cooling, containment
sprays), pump NPSH requirements
should be considered, and closer attention directed towards observing the performance
of the RHR and Core Spray pumps for signs of NPSH problems.The vortex limits are defined to be the lowest suppression
pool water level above which air entrainment
is not expected to occur in pumps taking suction on the pool.These levels are functions of ECCS flow.Exceeding the limits can lead to air entrainment
at the pump suction strainers.
The NPSH and vortex limits are addressed through a caution for the following reasons: a.It is difficult to define in advance exactly when the limits should be observed and when pumps should be operated irrespective
of the limits.b.Pumps to which the limits apply are used in more than one parameter control path, or in different procedures.
RHR pumps, for example, may be used in the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure, the Level/Power
Control procedure, or the Primary Containment
Control Procedure.
Authorizing
operation of the pumps"irrespective
of NPSH and vortex limits" in one path may conflict with instructions
in another path where flow would normally be controlled
below the limits.The identified
systems should be operated within the NPSH and vortex limits if possible.If the situation warrants, however, the limits may be exceeded.A judgment as to whether a pump should be operated beyond its limits in a particular
event should consider such factors as: a.The availability
of other systems b.The current trend of plant parameters
c.The anticipated
time such operation will be required d.The degree to which the limit will be exceeded e.The sensitivity
of the pump to operation beyond the limit f.The consequences
of not operating the pump beyond the limit Immediate and catastrophic
failure is not expected if a pump is operated beyond the NPSH or vortex limit.1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 10 of 581
STEPS SPIT-05 and SPIT-06 START AU AVAILABlE RHR LOOPS IN SUPPRESSION
POOl COOLING MODE EXCEPT RHR PUMPS REQUIRED FOR ADEQUATE CORE COOLING BY CONTINUOUS
OPERATION IN lPClMODE SPfT*06 STEP BASES: When it is determined
that suppression
pool temperature
cannot be maintained
below the value of the most limiting suppression
pool temperature
lCO, a conclusion
that may be reached in advance of suppression
pool temperature
actually reaching this value, the general direction of Step SPIT-04 is supplemented
with the explicit instruction
to place into operation all available methods by which Suppression
Pool Cooling can be effected.Step SPIT-06 assures adequate core cooling takes precedence
over maintaining
suppression
pool temperature
below the lCO since catastrophic
failure of the primary containment
is not expected to occur at this temperature.
In addition, further action still remains available for reversing a rising suppression
pool temperature
trend.Therefore, only if continuous
operation of a RHR pump in the LPCI mode is not required to assure adequate core cooling is it permissible
to use that pump for Suppression
Pool Cooling.This step, however, does permit alternating
the use of RHR pumps between LPCI injection and Suppression
Pool Cooling as the need for each occurs and so long as adequate core cooling is able to be maintained.
1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 11 of 581
STEPS DWIT-01 through DWIT-03 Dwrr DWIT*01 MONITOR AND CONTROL DRYWELL AVERAGE AIR TEMP BELOW 15O"F STEP BASES: The initial action taken to control drywell temperature
employs the same method typically used during normal plant operations:
monitoring
its status and placing available drywell cooling in operation, as required, to maintain temperature
within specified normal operating limits (below drywell average air temperature
LeO of 150°F).Thesesteps
provide a smooth transition
from general plant procedures
to the Emergency Operating Procedures, and assure that the normal method of drywell temperature
control is attempted in advance of initiating
more complex actions to terminate rising drywell temperature.
As long as drywell temperature
remains below normal operating limits no further operator action is required in this section of the EOP other than continuing
to monitor and control drywell temperature
using available drywell cooling.1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 15 of 581
STEPS o WIT-04 through DWIT-08 START AlL AVAILABLE ORYWEU COOLERS, DEFEATING DRYWELL COOLER INTERLOCKS
IF NECESSARY PER"CIRCUIT ALTERATION
PROCEDURE" (EOP-01-SEP*10)DW/T*08 STEP BASES: When it is determined
that drywell temperature
cannot be maintained
below the drywell average temperature
LCO limit of 150°F, a conclusion
that may be reached prior to drywell temperature
actually reaching this value, the general direction of Step DWIT-03 is supplemented
with the explicit instruction
to place into operation all available methods by which drywell cooling can be effected as indicated in Step DWIT-07.A note is added to inform the operator at Step DWIT-06 that the drywell coolers are tripped and locked out on a LOCA signal.1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 16 of 581
STEPS DWIT-04 through DWIT-08 (continued)
All available drywell coolers should be started in an effort to reduce drywell average temperature, unless actual LOCA conditions
exist in the drywell.Step DWIT-07, through EOP-01-SEP-10, allows inhibiting
of the LOCA signal-drywell
cooler lockout if reactor water level is low.Defeating of interlocks
recognizes
that concurrent
actions by other procedures (Le.Level/Power
Control)may otherwise preclude normal drywell cooler operation.
RBCCW pressure and temperatures
should be verified to ensure proper system operation.
If the Reactor Building is accessible, additional
RBCCW heat exchangers
and/or SW to the RBCCW heat exchangers
can be placed in service.In addition, nonessential
equipment serviced by RBCCW can be taken out of service and isolated.Step DW IT-05 is used to alert the operator that elevated drywell temperatures
may adversely affect reactor level instrumentation.Adetailed discussion
of this caution is contained within the EOP User's Guide.If drywell temperature
can be maintained
below 150°F, then the operator is directed back into Step DW IT-02 so that he can continue to monitor and control drywell temperatures
until they reach the normal operating value.1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 17 of 581
STEPS PC/P-01 through PC/P-03 PC/P*01 PC/P*03 PC/P VENT THE DRYWB.L USING SBGT lOP*10).AS REQUIRED STEP BASES: These steps provide the initial action taken to control primary containment
pressure which employs the same methods typically used during normal plant operations:
monitoring
its status and using containment
and drywell pressure control systems (including
Standby Gas Treatment System), as required, to maintain containment
pressure below the high drywell pressure scram setpoint.These steps thus provide a smooth transition
from general plant operating procedures
to the Emergency Operating Procedures, and assure that normal methods of primary containment
pressure control are attempted in advance of initiating
more complex actions to terminate rising primary containment
pressure.1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 24 of 581
STEPS PC/P-04 through PC/P-07 1.7 PSIG 11.5 PSIG CAN PRIMARY CTMT PRESS BE MAINTAINED
BELOW 1.7PSIG SUPPRESSION
CHAMBER PRESS REACHES 11.5 PSIG INITIATE SUPPRESSION
POOL SPRAY PER EOP*01*SEP*03 EXCEPT RHR PUMPS REQUIRED FOR ADEQUATE CORE COOLING BY CONTINUOUS
OPERATION IN LPCI MODE YES____----'----..:..P""CIP.06
IF SUPPRESSION
CHAMBER PRESS DROPS TO LESS THAN 2.5 PSIG, THEN TERMINATE SUPPRESSION
POOL SPRAYS pc/p*O?STEP BASES: Operation of suppression
pool sprays reduces primary containment
pressure by condensing
steam that may be present in the suppression
chamber airspace, and by absorbing heat energy from the enclosed atmosphere
through the processes of evaporative
and convective
cooling.1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 25 of 581
STEPS PC/P-04 through PC/P-07 (continued)
The Suppression
Chamber Spray Initiation
Pressure is defined to be the lowest suppression
chamber pressure which can occur when 95%of the noncondensibles
in the drywell have been transferred
to the airspace of the suppression
chamber.This pressure is utilized to preclude chugging: the cyclic condensation
of steam at the downcomer openings of the drywell vents.When a steam bubble collapses at the exit of the downcomers, the rush of water filling the void (some of it drawn up into the downcomer pipe)induces a severe stress at the junction of the downcomer and the vent header.Repeated application
of this stress can cause these joints to experience
fatigue failure (Le., crack)thereby creating a pathway which bypasses the pressure suppression
function of the containment.
Subsequent
steam discharges
through the downcomers
would directly pressurize
the suppression
chamber airspace rather than being discharged
to and condensed in the suppression
pool.Scale model tests have demonstrated
that chugging will not occur so long as the drywell atmosphere
contains at least 1%noncondensibles.
To preclude the occurrence
of conditions
under which chugging may happen, the Suppression
Chamber Spray Initiation
Pressure is conservatively
defined by specifying
5%noncondensibles.
Although operation of suppression
pool sprays may not, by itself, preclude chugging, suppression
pool sprays are initiated before reaching the Suppression
Chamber Spray Initiation
Pressure (11.5 psig)to assure that operation of this system is attempted for reducing primary containment
pressure before operation of drywell sprays is directed.The operation of suppression
pool sprays is terminated
when suppression
chamber pressure decreases to 2.5 psig to assure that primary containment
pressure is not reduced below atmospheric.
Maintaining
a positive suppression
chamber pressure precludes air from being drawn in through the vacuum relief system to deinert the primary containment, and also assures that a positive margin to the negative design pressure of the primary containment
exists.It is acceptable
to use drywell pressure instead of suppression
chamber if the suppression
chamber instruments
are not available.
It should be noted however that during transient conditions;
Le., a steam leak in drywell, drywell pressure may be significantly
higher than suppression
chamber pressure.The NPSH (Net Positive Suction Head)limits are defined to be the highest suppression
pool temperature
which provides adequate net positive suction head for pumps taking suction on the pool.TheNPSH Limits are functions of pump flow and suppression
chamber overpressure (airspace pressure plus the hydrostatic
head of water over the 1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 26 of 581
STEPS PC/P-04 through PC/P-07 (continued}
pump suction).It is utilized to preclude pump damage from cavitation.
It should be noted that containment
pressurization
of up to 5 psig is credited for maintaining
NPSH margins for BNP.Therefore, as actions are taken that reduce suppression
chamber pressure (Le.suppression
pool cooling, containment
sprays), pump NPSH requirements
should be considered, and closer attention directed towards observing the performance
of the RHR and Core Spray pumps for signs of NPSH problems.The NPSH limit is addressed through a caution for the following reasons: a.It is difficult to define in advance exactly when the limits should be observed and when pumps should be operated irrespective
of the limits.b.Pumps to which the limits apply are used in more than one parameter control path, or in different procedures.
RHR pumps, for example, may be used in the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure, the Level/Power
Control procedure, or the Primary Containment
Control Procedure.
Authorizing
operation of the pumps irrespective
of NPSH in one path may conflict with instructions
in another path where flow would normally be controlled
below the limits.The identified
systems should be operated within the NPSH and vortex limits if possible.If the situation warrants, however, the limits may be exceeded.A judgment as to whether a pump should be operated beyond its limits in a particular
event should consider such factors as: a.The availability
of other systems b.The current trend of plant parameters
c.The anticipated
time such operation will be required d.The degree to which the limit will be exceeded e.The sensitivity
of the pump to operation beyond the limit f.The consequences
of not operating the pump beyond the limit Immediate and catastrophic
failure is not expected if a pump is operated beyond the NPSH or vortex limit.Suppression
chamber sprays are initiated per Suppression
Pool Spray Procedure (EOP-01-SEP-03).
1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 27 of 581
STEPS PC/P-08 through PC/P-13 NO NO NO INmATE DRYWEU SPRAYS PER EOP-01-SEP*02
EXCEPT RHR PUMPS REQUIRED FOR ADEQUATE CORE COOUNG BY CONTINUOUS
OPERATION INLPCIMODE
PC/P*i2 IF DRYWEU PRESSURE DROPS TO lESS THAN 2.5 PSlG THEN TERMINATE DRYWELL SPRAY PC/P*i3 STEP BASES: If suppression
pool sprays could not be initiated or if their operation was not effective in reversing the rising trend of primary containment
pressure, as evidenced by suppression
chamber pressure exceeding the Suppression
Chamber Spray Initiation
Pressure (11.5 psig), drywell sprays are initiated to effect the desired pressure reduction.
The Suppression
Chamber Spray Initiation
Pressure is described in the discussion
of Step PC/P-06.1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 28 of 581
STEPS PC/P-08 through PC/P-13 (continued}
The NPSH (Net Positive Suction Head)limits are defined to be the highest suppression
pool temperature
which provides adequate net positive suction head for pumps taking suction on the pool.The NPSH Limits are functions of pump flow and suppression
chamber overpressure (airspace pressure plus the hydrostatic
head of water over the pump suction).It is utilized to preclude pump damage from cavitation.
It should be noted that containment
pressurization
of up to 5 psig is credited for maintaining
NPSH margins for BNP.Therefore, as actions are taken that reduce suppression
chamber pressure (Le.suppression
pool cooling, containment
sprays), pump NPSH requirements
should be considered, and closer attention directed towards observing the performance
of the RHR and Core Spray pumps for signs of NPSH problems.The initiation
of drywell sprays is conditioned
on the following restrictions
on the plant.First, the recirculation
pumps and drywell cooling fans are required to be secured prior to the initiation
of drywell sprays.These actions are covered in EOP-01-SEP-02.
A second restriction
on the initiation
of drywell sprays is for suppression
pool water level to be below+21 inches.This provides protection
for the operation of the suppression
chamber-to-drywell
vacuum breakers.The vacuum breakers will not function as designed if any portion of the valve is covered with water.The specified water level assures that no portion of the drywell side of the valve is submerged for any drywell below wetwell differential
pressure less than or equal to the valve opening differential
pressure.Spray operation with vacuum breakers inoperable (Le., with no drywell vacuum relief capability)
may cause the containment
differential
pressure capability
to be exceeded and is therefore not permitted.
Step PC/P-12 assures adequate core cooling takes precedence
over initiating
drywell spray in this case since catastrophic
failure of the primary containment
is not expected under the conditions
for which spray requirements
are established.
The wording of the stepdoespermit
alternating
between reactor vessel injection and drywell spray modes as the need for each occurs, provided adequate core cooling can be maintained.
Drywell sprays are secured if drywell pressure drops to 2.5 psig.This is a backup step to the automatic securing of the sprays during a LOCA condition when the spray permissive
interlock drops out.This precludes air from being drawn in through the vacuum relief system to de-inert the primary containment
and also provides a positive margin to the negative design pressure of the primary containment.
The drywell sprays are actuated in accordance
with EOP-01-SEP-02.
1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 29 of 581
STEPS PC/P-14 through PC/P-16 PSP EMERGEHCYOEPRESSURUE
TliE REACTOR PER THE RCIP SECTION OF EOP*01 PC/P*16 STEP BASES: If suppression
pool and/or drywell sprays could not be initiated or if operation was not effective in reversing the rising trend of primary containment
pressure, as evidenced by not being able to maintain suppression
chamber pressure below the Pressure Suppression
Pressure, the reactor is depressurized
to minimize further release of energy from the reactor vessel to the primary containment.
This action serves to terminate, or reduce as much as possible, any continued primary containment
pressure rise.The Pressure Suppression
Pressure is defined to be the lesser of either (1)the highest suppression
chamber pressure which can occur without steam in the suppression
chamber airspace or (2)the highest suppression
chamber pressure at which initiation
of reactor depressurization
will not result in exceeding Primary Containment
Pressure Limit A before reactor pressure drops to the Minimum Reactor Flooding Pressure, or (3)the highest suppression
chamber pressure which can be maintained
without exceeding the suppression
pool boundary design load if SRVs are opened.This pressure is a function of primary containment
water level, and it is utilized to assure the pressure suppression
function of the containment
is maintained
while the reactor is at pressure.(For additional
information
about the Pressure Suppression
Pressure see the EOP User's GUide.)1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 30 of 581
STEPS PC/P-14 through PC/P-16 (continued)
A note is added to remind the operator that rapid depressurization
per the reactor pressure control guidance of the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure may be allowed prior to the direction to Emergency Depressurize.
See discussion
on Step SPIT-11.1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 31 of 581
STEPS PC/H*01 through PC/H*04 PC/H MONITOR AND CONTROL PRIMARY CTMT HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN CONCENTRATIONS
H2 AND 02 READINGS ARE COMPENSATED
BY ERFIS.H2 AND 02 READINGS ON CAC*AT.4409 AND 4410 MUST BE COMPENSATED
FOR PRIMARY CTMT CONDITIONS
USING ATTACHMENT
12 OF"USERS GUIDE" (EOP*01*UG)STEP BASES: The primary containment
hydrogen control (PC/H)section of the Primary Containment
Control Procedure specifies appropriate
actions for controlling
combustible
gas concentration
in containment.
Hydrogen and oxygen must both be present and in sufficient
concentration
for combustion
to occur.Measurable
levels of hydrogen could appear in the primary containment
from the following sources: a.The high temperature
reaction of metal (typically
with water to produce hydrogen gas and metal oxide b.Radiolysis
of water to produce hydrogen and oxygen c.Feedwater injection of hydrogen to control reactor water chemistry 1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 49 of 581
,.VW"M STEPS PC/H-01 through PC/H-04 (continued)
Elevated concentrations
of oxygen are not expected during normal power operations
except during brief periods at startup and shutdown of the plant when the containment
atmosphere
is being inerted and deinerted.
However, oxygen may be generated due to the radiolysis
of water, and oxygen could enter the containment
from leaks in the instrument
air system and from operation of Reactor Building-to-suppression
pool vacuum breakers.Oxygen concentration
is routinely monitored and controlled
during reactor operation in accordance
with Technical Specification
requirements.
These steps are included to ensure the monitors are placed in service as required.Step PC/H-04 alerts the operator of the need to compensate
for H2/02 based on primary containment
conditions.
1001-37.8 Rev.4 Page 50 of 581