ML17045A005

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LER 16-002-00 for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Regarding Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Design Issue
ML17045A005
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 02/09/2017
From: Lies Q S
Indiana Michigan Power Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
AEP-NRC-2017-05 LER 16-002-00
Download: ML17045A005 (7)
v • d • e


Text

m IN DIANA MICHIGAN POWER. A unit of American Electric Power February 09, 2017 Docket No.: 50-316 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 4934 Boiling Brook Parkway Rockville, MD 20852 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 316/2016-002-00 Indiana Michigan Power Cook Nuclear Plant One Cook Place Bridgman, Ml 49106 , ln'dianaMichiganPower.com AEP-NRC-2017-05 10 CFR 50.73 Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Design Issue In accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, Indiana Michigan Power , Company, the licensee for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2, is submitting as an enclosure to this letter following report: LER 316/2016-002-00:

Emergency Generators Declared Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Design Issue There are no commitments contained in this submittal.

Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Michael K. Scarpello, Regulatory Affairs Manager, at (269) 466-2649.

Sincerely, Q. Ce Lies *site Vice President RAW/mil

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report 316/2016-002-00:

Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Design Issue U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page2 c: R. J. Ancona -MPSC A. W. Dietrich -NRC Washington, DC MDEQ -RMD/RPS NRC Resident Inspector C. D. Pederson -NRC Region Ill A. J. Williamson

-AEP Ft. Wayne AEP-NRC-2017-05 Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2017-05 Licensee Event Report 316/2016-002-00 Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Design Issue NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

r Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections . ':]" (See Page 2 for required number of digtts/characters for each block) Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail .... : .. I to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control htt12://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nu regs/staff/sr1 022/r3{) number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 13. PAGE Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 05000316 1 OF4 4. TITLE Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Design Issue 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO. MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 12 13 2016 2016 -002 -00 02 09 2017 05000 9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 4 D 20.2201 (b) D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

D 20.2201 (d) D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

D 20.2203(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(4)

D so.73(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1

)(ii)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71(a)(4)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

D so.36(c)(2)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

D 73.71(a)(5) 0 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D 73.77(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 181 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D)

D 73.77(a)(2)(i)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)

D so.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 OTHER Speclfy in Abstract below or in NRG Form 366A 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT NUMBER (lndude Area Code) Michael K. Scarpello, Requlatorv Affairs Manager 269)-466-2649

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TOEPIX FACTURER TOEPIX B EK DG W315 y 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR [8J YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) D NO SUBMISSION DATE 04 14 2017 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On December 13, 2016, the Unit 1 AB Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) developed a fuel oil leak from a fuel injector pump Delivery Valve Holder (DVH) during a maintenance run of the diesel. On December 21, 2016, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode 4 during a refueling outage, it was determined that the failed DVH on the Unit 1 AB EOG was due to a design and manufacturing issue. Subsequently the Unit 1 CD EOG, Unit 2 AB EOG, and Unit 2 CD EOG were conservatively declared inoperable due to multiple affected diesel fuel pump DVHs being installed on each EOG. The Root Cause was determined to be due to insufficient Corrective Action Program oversight by Engineering to ensure product quality and issue resolution in relation to a previous EOG DVH failure in 2013. Testing is being conducted to determine the resulting impact to associated EDGs. The affected DVHs have been replaced.

A Loss of Safety Function was reported via Event Notification 52456 for Unit 2 in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(v)(D).

The Loss of Safety Function is required to be reported in a Licensee Event Report in accordance with "50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function." NRG FORM 366A (06-2016)

NRC FORM 366A (06-2016)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and lnfonmation Collections CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this fonn http://www.nrc.gov/reading-nn/doc-collections/nu regs/staff/sr1 0221r3D Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME 2 DOCKET NUMBER 3. LERNUMBER Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 NARRATNE INTRODUCTION 05000-316 YEAR I 2016 SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER -002 REV NO. -00 On December 21, 2016 with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode 4 during a refueling outage, the Unit 1 CD Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)[EK][DG], Unit 2 AB EDG, and Unit 2 CD EDG were declared inoperable due to a discovered design and manufacturing issue involving multiple diesel fuel injector pump [P] delivery valve holders (DVH)[INV]

installed on each EDG. Unit 1 entered into Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, AC Sources -Operating, Condition B, for one required EDG inoperable.

Unit 2 entered into TS 3.8.1, AC Sources -Operating, and descended to mode 5 in accordance with Condition G for Condition F not being met with two required EDGs inoperable.

EVENT DESCRIPTION On December 13, 2016, the Unit 1 AB EDG developed a fuel oil leak from a fuel injector pump DVH during a surveillance run of the diesel. The failed DVH was replaced and the Unit 1 AB EDG was restored to operable status. The investigation conducted following the initial failure identified that nineteen additional suspect DVHs were installed in the Unit 1 AB EDG, Unit 1 CD EDG, Unit 2 AB EDG, and Unit 2 CD EDG. On December 21, 2016, the investigation determined that the failure was attributed to a previously identified condition for a design and manufacturing flaw and the suspect DVHs were susceptible to a similar failure. The Unit 1 AB EDG had two suspect DVHs installed.

An engineering evaluation determined that the Unit 1 AB EDG remained operable with the two affected DVHs. The Unit 1 CD EDG, Unit 2 AB EDG, and the Unit 2 CD EDG were declared inoperable as follows: At 1047 on December 21, 2016, the Unit 2 AB EDG was declared inoperable for the identified condition.

Operations entered TS 3.8.1, Condition B; restore the EDG to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, in Unit 2. Following the declaration of the Unit 2 AB EDG being inoperable, the extent of condition revealed additional affected DVHs installed on the Unit 1 CD EDG and the Unit 2 CD EDG. At 2300 on December 21, 2016, the Unit 1 CD EDG was declared inoperable for the identified condition.

Operations entered TS 3.8.1, Condition B; restore the affected EDG to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, in Unit 1. At2300 on December21, 2016, the Unit 2 CD EDG was declared inoperable forthe identified condition.

Due to having both of the Unit 2 EDGs inoperable for greater than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> per TS 3.8.1 condition F, operations entered TS 3.8.1, Condition G; be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and be in mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. At 1435 on December 22, 2016, Unit 2 entered Mode 5 and exited TS 3.8.1, Conditions B, C, F, and G. At 1558 on December 22, 2016, replacement of the suspect DVHs installed on the Unit 1 CD EDG was completed and it was returned to operable status and Unit 1 exited TS 3.8.1, Condition B. The remaining suspect DVHs were replaced on the Unit 2 AB EOG and Unit 2 CD EOG. Both EDGs were restored to operable status prior to mode ascension.

NRC FORM 366A (06-2016)

Page 2of4 NRC FORM 366A (06-2016)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 " * . . ';, .. , ........ / LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/readinq-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LERNUMBER Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 05000-316 YEAR 2016 EVENT ANALYSIS I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER -002 I REV NO. -00 Having both EDGs in Unit 2 declared inoperable concurrently while in Mode 4 met the reporting requirements for an Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.

Testing is being conducted to understand the impact of the manufacturing issue on the capability to perform the required safety function for the affected EDGs. The results of the testing will allow the site to determine the past operability of the affected EDGs. If as a result of the testing additional 10 CFR 50. 73 reporting is required, it and supporting information will be provided in a supplement to this LER. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES NUCLEAR SAFETY The failure of the Unit 1 AB EDG injection pump during the monthly surveillance run resulted in no actual nuclear safety impacts. The EDG was declared inoperable and the pump was subsequently replaced within the requirements of the Unit 1 TSs. All normal and reserve offsite power sources and the supplemental emergency diesel generators were available and administratively controlled.

The extent of condition of the degraded fuel injection pump resulted in multiple fuel injection pump replacements on the Unit 2 EDGs. Unit 2 was in Mode 4 at the time of the discovery of the condition and was subsequently required to be taken to Mode 5 per Unit 2 TSs. The actual significance and impact on EDG safety function resulting from the condition will be determined once engineering testing is complete.

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY There was no actual impact on industrial safety as a result of the fuel injection pump failure. The potential risk for an industrial safety event in response to the repair and recovery was increased due to emergent repairs to both the operating and shutdown units' EDGs. RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY There was no actual or potential radiological safety hazard resulting from the inoperability of both Unit 2 EDGs. The EDGs are located outside the radiological controlled area and were not being to supply emergency power to safety related or radiological equipment at the time of the event. This condition did not result in any unplanned radiological exposure, release, or contamination.

PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (PRA) The PRA will be provided in a supplement to this LER following the completion of testing and determination of actual impact on the EDG function.

ROOT CAUSE Insufficient Corrective Action Program (CAP) oversight by Engineering to ensure product quality and issue resolution in relation to a previous Emergency Diesel Generator DVH failure in 2013. As a result, affected DVHs were placed back into inventory and subsequently installed on the EDGs. NRG FORM 366A (06-2016)

Page 3 of 4 NRC FORM 366A (06-2016)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022fr3t)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch {T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of lnfonmation and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LERNUMBER Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 05000-316 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Immediate Corrective Actions Taken Suspect DVHs have been replaced.

Unit 2 was moved from Mode 4 to Mode 5 to comply with TS 3.8.1 action statements.

Planned Corrective Actions Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition YEAR 2016 I SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER -002 REV NO. -00 Revise applicable procedures to require corrective actions that are changed following Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) approval to be taken back .to CARB for review and concurrence.

Revise applicable procedures to require a verification of corrective actions entered into CAP for evaluation products.

Additional Corrective Actions Revise applicable procedures to require Engineering Apparent Cause Evaluations and In-depth Apparent Cause Evaluations to be reviewed by GARB. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS In January 2013, a DVH developed a crack that resulted in a fuel oil leak on the Unit 1 CD EDG during a test run. Forensic analysis revealed a circumferential crack around the main body of the DVH. Failure analysis determined that the cracking was due to a corner inside the DVH that was machined with too sharp of a radius, which created a region of higher stress during operation that allowed a crack to start and propagate.

The vendor concluded that the problem occurred due to a tooling issue with a particular lot of DVHs. Additionally, the radius had not been included as a critical characteristic nor had it received 100 percent inspection during manufacture.

Engineering evaluation concluded that all of the affected EDGs maintained the capability to perform their required safety function.

NRC FORM 366A (06-2016)

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