ML18102A672

LER 96-032-00:on 961112,failure of Service Water Inlet Valve to Open for 2B Diesel Generator Occurred.Caused by Mispositioning of 22SW39 Manual Valve Operator.Manual Valve Operator modified.W/961212 Ltr

ML18102A672
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	12/12/1996
From:	GARCHOW D F, THOMAS B Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-96-032, LER-96-32, LR-N96414, NUDOCS 9612190162
Download: ML18102A672 (5)

Text

e Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit DEC 121996 LR-N96414 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

LER 272/96-032-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION -UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50*-272 This Licensee Event Report (LER) entitled "Failure of Service Water Inlet Valve to Open for 2B Diesel Generator" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (ii). This LER also satisfies the special reporting requirements of Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.4.

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J David F. General Manager -Salem Operations BJT/ PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR C Distribution LER File 3.7 The pmwr is in your hands. 95-2168 REV. 6/94 NRC FORM 366 (4-95) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FACILITY NAllE (1) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150--0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

I NUllBER (2) 05000272 PAGE (3) 1 OF 4 Failure of Service Water Inlet Valve to Open for 2B Diesel Generator EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) MONTH DOCKET NUMBER DAY YEAR I SEQUENTIAL

'REVISION NUMBER NUMBER YEAR MONTH DAY FACILITY NAME YEAR Salem, Unit 2 05000311 11 12 96 96 032 00 12 12 96 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING N THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11) MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 0 0 0 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) Brian Thomas, Licensing Engineer 609-339-2022 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) 11---C_A_U_S_E SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) I YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). Xltm EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE(15) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) MONTH DAV YEAR On November 12, 1996, while performing the monthly diesel run on the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG), the Equipment Operators (EOs) noticed that the open indication light for valve 22SW39 was not lit. The EOs had started the diesel at 1424 hours0.0165 days <br />0.396 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.41832e-4 months <br /> and secured the EOG at 1429 hours0.0165 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.437345e-4 months <br /> when they identified that the 22SW39 valve was jammed closed by the engagement of the manual valve operator.

The cause of the failure of the 22SW39 to open is attributed to inadvertent mispositioning of the 22SW39 manual valve operator.

PSE&G has modified the manual valve operator to prevent the inadvertent mispositioning of the SW39 valves for both Salem Units 1 and 2. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)

(2) (ii), any event or condition that caused the plant to be in a seriously degraded condition or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromised plant safety. This LER also satisfies the special reporting requirements of Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.4.

NRC FORM 366 (4-95)

NRC FOR!!i' 366A (4-95) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse

-Pressurized Water Reactor Service Water System (SWS) {BI/-} Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) {EK/-} YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 2 96 -032 00

• Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC} CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE OF At the time of identification, Salem Units 1 and 2 were shutdown and defueled.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On November 12, 1996, while performing the monthly diesel run on the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), the Equipment Operators (EOs) noticed that the open indication light for valve 22SW39 was not lit. The 22SW39 valve is the SW inlet valve to the EDG. The EOs had started the diesel at 1424 hours0.0165 days <br />0.396 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.41832e-4 months <br /> and secured the EDG at 1429 hours0.0165 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.437345e-4 months <br /> when they identified that the 22SW39 valve was jammed closed by the engagement of the manual valve operator.

Inspection of the 22SW39 valve by the EO and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) identified that the declutching spring (spring clip) that holds the manual valve operator declutching pin in place was broken. Inspection of the other remaining Unit 2 and the Unit 1 EDGs did not reveal any spring clips on the other EDGs' SW39 valves. Although the spring clips were not found to be damaged for the remaining valves, the service water inlet valves were found to be improperly positioned (manual wheels were not in the fully withdrawn position).

Proper positioning prevents this type of occurrence on these valves. The broken spring clip was replaced on the 22SW39 manual valve operator and the remaining SW39 valves were positioned properly to avoid interference with the automatic opening function of the SW39 valve. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE In order for the SW39 valve to lock in the closed position, three physical acts must occur; 1) the declutch pin has to be out of its indent (pin is held in place by the spring clip), 2) the handwheel must be driven down by some force in the downward direction, and 3) the handwheel must be turned to align the wormgear to the segment gear to engage the handwheel.

The results of the root cause evaluation to date suggests that the failure of the valve to open was a result of inadvertent .mispositioning and was not solely driven by the failure of the spring clip. Failure of the spring clip alone could not by itself lead to the mispositioning of the valve. Some additional actions would be necessary (i.e, manipulation of the valve, inadvertent stepping on the manual valve operator, inadvertent placement of equipment on top of the manual valve operator) to misposition the SW39 valve. Corrective actions are being undertaken to prevent the inadvertent of the SW39 valves. NRC FORM 366A (4-95) 4 NRC FOR" 366A (4-95) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 2 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 3 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) The root cause investigation identified other the same type spring clip. These valves were been verified to be in the correct position.

deformed spring clip on the 22SW72 valve. A replace the spring clip for this valve prior APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE 96 -032 -00 safety related valves which use inspected by operations and have This inspection identified one work order has been generated to to Unit 2 entry into Mode 3. The cause of the failure of the 22SW39 to open is attributed to inadvertent mispositioning of the 22SW39 manual valve operator.

The mispositioning of the manual valve operator jammed the valve in the closed position preventing the 22SW39 from opening when the 2B EDG was started. Corrective actions have been implemented for the SW39 valves to prevent the inadvertent mispositioning of the valves. PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs submitted for Salem Units 1 and 2 for the past two years did not identify any similar occurrences related to equipment failure as a result of valve mispositioning.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS Mispositioning of the SW39 valves could result in the loss of service water flow to the EDGs during an automatic start of the EDGs. However, when the EDGs receive an automatic start signal, an operator is dispatched to the EDGs and would arrive at the EDGs within minutes of the EDG start. The operator would be able to intervene at this point and establish service water flow to the EDGs by opening the SW39 valve. The previous surveillance performed on October 13, 1996, for the 2B EDG did not identify a problem with the operation of the 22SW39 valve. For the period of time from the previous surveillance test on the 2B EDG and the failure of the 22SW39 to open on November 12, 1996, Salem Unit 2 was in a defueled condition and the Unit 2 EDGs were not required to be operable.

Although the manual valve operator for the SW39 valves on the Unit 1 and other Unit 2 EDGs were identiZied as not being in the fully withdrawn position, the monthly surveillance testing performed for these EDGs, prior to the 22SW39 failure to open, did not identify any failures of the other EDG's SW39 valves to open. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

,.

• NRC FOR" 366A (4-95) U.S. NUCLEAR.REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 2 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 96 -032 -00 TEXT {If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PAGE (3) 4 OF 4 1. PSE&G has modified the manual valve operator to prevent the inadvertent mispositioning of the SW39 valves for both Salem Units 1 and 2. 2. The spring clips were replaced on all six EDGs for Salem Unit 1 and 2. 3. A work order has been generated to replace the spring clip for valve 22SW72 prior to Unit 2 entry into Mode 3. 4. Additional corrective actions unrelated to the operability of these valves have been identified in the root cause analysis and will be tracked in accordance with PSE&G's corrective action program. Special Reporting Requirements The 2B EDG failure is a non-valid failure in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.9 (component malfunctions or operating errors that did not prevent the EDG from being restarted and brought to load within a few minutes) and RG 1.108. Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.4 states: "All diesel generator failures, valid or non-valid, shall be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to specification

6.9.2 within

30 days. Reports of diesel generator failures include the information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977 .... " REPORT DETAILS The following information is provided as specified in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977: 1. Diesel Generator unit involved:

2B 2. Number of failures in the last 100 valid tests: The 2B EDG has experienced 2 failures in the last 100 valid tests. Since this failure is a non-valid failure (test) there are no changes to these numbers. 3. The cause of the 2B EDG failure is described previously in the LER. 4. The corrective actions taken are described previously in the LER. 5. 2B EDG was returned to service immediately following the opening of the 22SW39 valve. 6. The current surveillance frequency for the 2B EDG is monthly and is not ;::iffPr'.t"Prl hV t"hi.<:: nnn-u;::ilirl f;::iilllrP NRC FORM 366A (4*95)