ML18101B344

LER 96-005-01:on 960403,failed to Perform Channel Checks for Degraded Voltage Required by Ts.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls for Development & Maint of TS Surveillance Procedures.Logged Channel Checks of Tavg.W/960501 Ltr

ML18101B344
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	05/03/1996
From:	HASSLER D V, WARREN C Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-96-005, LER-96-5, LR-N96112, NUDOCS 9605060301
Download: ML18101B344 (6)

Text

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit MAY 0 1 1996 LR-N96112 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

LER 272/96-005-01 SALEM GENERATING STATION -UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 This Licensee Event Report Supplement entitled "Failure to Perform Channel Checks for Tavg as Required by the Technical Specifications" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B). Attachment SORC Mtg.96-051 DVH/tcp C Distribution LER File 3.7 9605060301 960503 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR The powe: is in yDur hands. Sincerely, f#le14' Clay Warren General Manager -Salem Operations o o 1 o .: 1 .. ' .. 95-2168 REV. 6/94 ... ** .. I

*./ Document Control Desk LR-N96112 Attachment A The following item represents commitments that Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) relative to this LER (272/96-005-01).

The commitments are as follows: 1. Channel Checks of Tavg instruments will be incorporated into the operating logs for Modes 1 through 4 prior to each Unit restart. 2. Channel Checks of the Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments will be incorporated into the operating logs for Modes 1 through 4 prior to each Unit restart. 3. A Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was described previously in LER 311/95-008-00.

The TSSIP review is expected to be completed.by December 31, 1997. ., , l --' *1 ; *-* *. .. . . . ** . -***-*** . ...._. -*-.*. * * ** **-*-**-*-------**-

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.* . NRC FORll 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95) EXPIRES 04130198 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: llO.O HRS. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION (See reverse for required number of AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC TO digits/characters for each block) THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT E OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, 20503. FACILITY NAllE (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAOE(3) SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 05000272 1 OF4 TITLE (4) Failure to Perform Channel Checks for Degraded Voltage as Required by the Technical Specifications EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) YEAR I FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL

!REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Salem, Unit 2 05000311*

04 03 96 96 005 01 05 03 96 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER --05000 OPERATING N THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANTT0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11) MODE(9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73(a)(2)(i)

50. 73(a)(2)(vili)

• POWER 0 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

50. 73(a)(2)(ii)

50. 73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL(10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 imq 20.2203(a)(2)(li) 20.2203(a)(4)

50. 73(a)(2)(iv)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1)

50. 73(a)(2)(v)

Abatract below or In C Form 368A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2)

50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) Dennis v. Hassler, LER Coordinator 609-339-1989 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) .... ...

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE

! CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS >. TONPRDS i -

SUPPLEMEl\ITAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR 'YES XINO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). DATE(15) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single*spaced typewritten lines) (16) ) On April 3, 1996, the TSSIP Team identified a Technical Specification violation regarding Channel Checks required by Technical Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

Item 7.b of Table 4.3-2 requires that Channel Checks be performed on the Sustained Degraded Voltage instrument channels at least once per shift in Modes 1, 2 and 3. The TSSIP determined the Sustained Degraded Voltage instrument channels did not receive Channel Checks as required by Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

Subsequent investigation determined that in addition to Item 7b, the Channel Checks required for the Vital Bus Undervoltage instruments (Item 7 of Table 4.3-2 prior to the installation of the Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments, and Item 7.a following installation) were also not performed satisfactorily prior to 1989. *The apparent cause of this occurrence is attributed to a lack of adequate controls for the development and maintenance of Technical Specification surveillance procedures.

This weakness was previously identified in LER 311/95-008.

-:.,,_ .. --* Channel Checks of Tavg and Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments will be incorporated into the operating logs for Modes 1 through 4 prior to each Unit restart. A Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program, described previously in LER 311/95-008-00, is expected to be completed by December 31,1997. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 73 (a) (2) (i) (B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

NRC FORM 368 (4-95) -. ::. -.,._., ... -...

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NRC FORM 366A (4-95) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER C2) LER NUMBER (6) 050002272 YEAR I SEtfillr:&[kAL I SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 96 -005 01 TEXT (If more space i1 required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse

-Pressurized Water Reactor Tavg Instrumentation (RCP) {AB/-}* Sustained Degraded Voltage Instrumentation (4KV) {EB/-} PAGE (3) 2 OF 4

• Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear in the text as (SS/CCC).

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of identification, Salem Units 1 and 2 were shutdown and defueled.

The Technical Specification surveillance Mode applicability is 1, 2 and 3. DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE As a Corrective Action from. LER 311/95-006 a Technical Specification Surveillance improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated.

Additional deficiencies found during the TSSIP will be documented in supplements to this LER. LER 272/96-005-00 described an event that occurred due to the identification of a* Technical Specification (TS) surveillance test inadequacy.

• This supplement describes an additional occurrence of a Technical Specification surveillance implementation deficiency identified during the Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) review. On March 25, 1996, during a review of the implementation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.1, the TSSIP team identified a potential Technical Specification violation regarding channel Checks. Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.l requires a Channel Check on the instrument channels listed in Table 4.3-2. Items 1.f and 4.d of Table 4.3-2 list Engineered Safety Feature Actuations which occur on Stearn Flow in Two Stearn Lines--HIGH coincident with Tavg--LOW-LOW or Stearn Line Pressure--LOW.

The Channel Check requirements apply such that a comparison of the Stearn Line Flow {SB/-} indications is to be made once per shift in Modes 1, 2 and 3, as are comparisons of the Tavg instruments, and the Stearn Line Pressure instruments.

A further review determined that Channel Checks were not being performed on the Tavg instruments since at least November 23, 1979 as required in Modes 1, 2 and 3. On April 3, 1996, during a review of the implementation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.1, the team identified a Technical Specification violation regarding Channel Checks. Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1.1 requires a Channel Check on the instrument channels listed in Table 4.3-2. Item 7.b of Table 4.3-2 lists Engineered Safety Feature Actuations which occur upon a Vital Bus Sustained Degraded Voltage. The three'(3)

Vital Bus Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments on each 4KV bus require Channel Checks once per shift in Modes 1, 2 and 3. The TSSIP dete.rmined that the Vital Bus Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments were not adequately Channel Checked in Modes 1, 2 and 3 as required by Technical Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

NRC FORM 366A ('4-95) -*--........ _ .. **-.-.. -*-*. -'*---*****-----

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• U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY.

COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 95 -005 -01 TEXT (!f mo.re space .I* required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) The Sustained Degraded Voltage instrumentation was added to Salem Unit 1 and 2 vital 4KV buses in April of 1982 and June of 1983, respectively.

The Technical Specifications for both units were revised to reflect the Sustained Degraded Voltage instrumentation effective July 23, 1982 by Amendments 45 (Unit 1) and 10 (Unit 2). A review of historical documentation concluded that the Channel Check requirements specified in the revised Technical Specifications were not implemented.

The review also identified that the Channel Check requirements for 4KV Vital Bus Pndervoltage instruments were apparently not satisfied from initial plant operation of either unit until 1989. These checks were required in Modes 1, 2 and 3 by Item 7 of Table 4.3-2 in the original issue of Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications, which became Item 7.a when the Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments were installed.

This conclusion is based on the oldest record found which was a Unit 1 log taken for Modes 1 through 4, dated November 23, 1979, and review of subsequent revisions to the same log. In January of 1988, the Unit 1 Sustained Degraded Voltage instrumentation was changed from a 2 out of 3 bus logic to a 2 out of 3 per bus logic in response to the Salem Unit 2 event of August 26, 1986, which resulted in the Unit 2 vital buses transferring back and forth between Station Power Transformers 21 and 22 until they finally separated from offsite power. Salem Unit 2 was similarly modified in March of 1990. The Technical Specifications for both units were revised by Amendments 102 (Unit 1) and 79 (Unit 2), effective

• September 25, 1989, to address the modifications.

The review of available documentation concluded that the Channel Check requirements specified in the revised Technical Specifications were not implemented.

As described above, a Channel Check of the 4KV Vital Buses was added to the Operating Logs for Modes 1-4 in 1989. CAUSE OF The cause of the missed Tavg, Sustained Degraded Voltage, and Vital Bus Undervoltage Channel Checks is attributed to a lack of adequate controls for the development and maintenance of Technical Specification surveillance procedures.

This weakness was previously identified in LER 311/95-008.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 identified three LERs in the last two years related to missed Technical Specification Surveillances due to a procedural deficiency:

LER 272/96-004 "Technical Specification 4.6.1.1 Incomplete Containment Isolation Valve Position Verification Surveillance" identified an occurrence where Containment Isolation valves were omitted from monthly position verification surveillances due to inadequate implementation of Technical Specification surveillance requirements into procedures.

LER 272/94-008 "Quarterly Channel Functional Testing of Position Indication For Power Operated Relief Valves Missed was revised in response to Specifications which resulted Valves while in Modes 1 and 2. NRC FORM 366A (4-95) On Both Units" identified an occurrence where a procedure Generic Letter 90-06 without a revision to Technical in missed surveillance testing of Power Operated Relief NRC FORlll 366A (4-95) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FACILITY NAME (1) SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 TEXT CONTINUATION . DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3) 05000272 YEAR I I == 4 OF 4 96 -005 -01 TEXT (If more space i* required, use additional copias of NRC Form 366A) (17) PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES (cont'd) LER 311/95-008, "Technical Specification

4.9.9 Missed

Isolation Initiation Testing" identified an occurrence where Containment Purge and Pressure-Vacuum Relief system isolation logic was not fully tested prior to and during Core Alterations due to inadequate implementation of Technical Specification surveillance requirements into procedures.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS Tavg Channel Checks: There were no safety consequences for this occurrence since plant operators monitor Tavg readings for each loop once every eight (8). hours in Modes 1 and 2, and every 30 minutes if the reactor is critical and Tavg is below 551°F with the Tavg-Tref in alarm. In addition, the RC Loops Tavg Deviation alarm provides a continuous monitor of the deviation between all Tavg channels -alarming at a preset value. While not a Technical Specification required function, this alarm would readily alert operators to any .significant deviation between Tavg indications.

The alarm response requires monitoring Tavg readings and initiating repairs to restore faulty instrumentation.

Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected. Undervoltage Instrument Channel Checks: There were no safety consequences for this occurrence since plant operators

• monitor the vital 4KV bus voltages and the 13KV bus voltages every shift in Modes 1, 2 and 3 with minimum and maximum acceptable values specified.

Channel Functional Tests of the Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments are performed on a monthly basis in Modes 1, 2 and 3 and verify operability of the instruments.

Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1. Channel Checks of Tavg instruments will be incorporated into the operating logs for Modes 1 through 4 prior to each Unit restart. 2. Channel Checks of the Sustained Degraded Voltage instruments will be incorporated into the operating logs for Modes 1 through 4 prior to each Unit restart. 3. A Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was described previously in LER 311/95-008-00.

The TSSIP review is expected to be completed by December 31, 1997. NRC FORM 366A (4-95) ---**-* .

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