ML17309A613

Forwards Response to NRC Request for Info Re Adequacy & Availability of Design Bases Info,Per 10CFR50.54(f)

ML17309A613
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	02/07/1997
From:	SMITH R E ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9702140141
Download: ML17309A613 (168)

Text

CATEGORYj.REGULAT.FORMATION DISTRIBUTION TEM(RIDS)ACCESSONNBR:9702140141 DOC.DATE:

97/02/07NOTARIZED:

YESDOCKETFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester G05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION SMITH,R.E.

Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

ForwardsresponsetoNRCrequestforinforeadequacy6availability ofdesignbasesinfo,per10CFR50.54(f).

DISTRIBUTION CODE:A074DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLS1ZE:TITLE:Responses to50.54(f)Req.forDesignBasisInfoNOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

05000244ERECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-3.PDINTERNACENTER01EXTERNAL:

NRCPDR,COPIESLTTRENCL11113311RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME "VISSING,G.

NRR/DRPM/PGEB COPIESLTTRENCL1111DENNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE'ONTACT THEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESKIROOMOWFN5D-5(EXT.

415-2083)

TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBER'FCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR8ENCL...8 ANnROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION

~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649-0001 ROBERTE.SMITHSeniorVicePresident EnergyOperotions AREACODE716724-8074FAN716724-8285February7,1997U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555

Subject:

ResponsetoNRCRequestforInformation Pursuantto10CFR50.54(f)

Regarding AdequacyandAvailability ofDesignBasesInformation R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244

Reference:

NRCletterJ.M.Taylor toR.W.Kober dated10/9/96,re:RequestforInforma-tionPursuantto10CFR50.54(f) regarding AdequacyandAvailability ofDesignBasesInformation OnOctober9,1996,theNuclearRegulatory Commission issuedtheReferenced letterrequesting thatlicensees provideinformation thatcanbeusedtoverifycompliance withthetermsandconditions oftheirlicenseandNRCregulations, andtoverifythattheplantUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisreport(UFSAR)properlydescribes theirfacility.

Specifically theNRCrequested thefollowing information:

(a)Description ofengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses, including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59, 10CFR50.71(e),

andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.(b)Rationale forconcluding thatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

(c)Rationale forconcluding thatsystem,structure, andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.(d)Description ofprocesses foridentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actions,including actionstodetermine theextentofproblems, actiontopreventrecurrence, andreporting toNRC.(e)Assessment oftheoveralleffectiveness ofRG&E'scurrentprocesses andprogramsinconcluding thatplantconfiguration isconsistent withthedesignbases.9702140141 970207PDRADQCK;,05000244 P'.'I,tr,yPDR kfq

("f")InadditiontheNRCalsorequested thatRG8cEindicatewhetherwehaveundertaken anydesignrevieworreconstitution programs; rationale fornotimplementing ifsuchprogramshavenotbeenimplemented; andadescription, status,andscheduleasapplicable forsuchprograms.

TheattachedreportisourresponsetotheNRC'srequest.~ForRequested Action(a),wehaveprovidedasummarydiscussion ofourlicensing, designandconfiguration controlprocesses.

~ForRequested Actions(b)and(c),wehavefocusedonthenumerousprogramsandprojectsconducted frominitialplantoperation tothepresenttoconfirmandenhancethephysicalandfunctional characteristics oftheplantwithrespecttotheirdesignbases.Wealsodiscussourrecenteffortstoconfirmconsistency betweentheUFSAR,plantproce-dures,andplantconfiguration.

~ForRequested Action(d),wehaveprovidedsummarydescriptions ofourcorrective actionprocesses foridentification anddetermination oftheextentofproblems, aswellasforimplementation ofcorrective actionsandreporting totheNRC.~ForRequested Action(e),wehavecompiledandevaluated theresultsofvariousreviewsintendedtoscrutinize ourprocesses andcontrolsandleadtocontinuous improvement.

Theseincludein-lineprocesscontrolsandreviews,internalQualityAssurance auditsandsurveillances, andthirdpartyreviewsandinspections, including thoseconducted bytheNRC.Additionally, wehaveprovidedabriefsummaryofouron-goingdesignreviewandretrieval effortswhichcenteraroundreviewing theUFSARforaccuracywithrespecttoplantprocedures andequipment andretrieving andreviewing designbasesdocumentation fromtheplant'soriginalNSSSsupplierandArchitect/Engineer.

Theinformation presented herein,inconjunction withRGEcE'scultureofopennessandwillingness toaddressissues,hasgivenRG&Ereasonable assurance thattheR.E.Ginna NuclearPowerPlantisbeingoperatedandmaintained withinitsdesignbases,thatitisfullycapableoffulfilling itssafetyfunctions, andthatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicisbeingprotected.

Verytrulyyours,TZRobertE.Smith It Attachment, xc:Director, OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555Mr.GuyVissing(MailStop14C7)ProjectDirectorate 1-3Washington, D.C.20555Mr.H.J.Miller,NRCRegionalAdministrator.

U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406Mr.P.DrysdaleGinnaSeniorResidentInspector UNITEDSTATESNUCHU'ttR REGULATORY COMMISSION XntheMatterofRochester Gas.&ElectricCompanyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant))DocketNo.50-244)))Mr.RobertE,Smith,beingdulysworn,statesthatheisSeniorVicePresident, EnergyOperations ofRochester Gas&ElectricCompany:thatheisauthorized onthepartofsaidcompanytosignandfilewiththeNuclearRegulatory Commission thedocumentattachedhereto;andthatthedocumentistrueandcorrecttothebestofhisknowledge, information, andbelief.RobertE.ShSubscribed andswornbeforeme,inandfortheStateofNewYorkandtheCountyofMonroe,this~Dayof1997MyCommission expires:r~/PFINotaryPublicLORETTAMARSHALLPARKER NotaryPublicmtheStateofNewYorkMONROECOUNTYCommission ExpiresDec.12.19'Jl..

~~

ROCHESTER GAS4,ELECTRICCORP.10CFR50.54(f)

RESPONSE970214014110CFR50.54(f)

Response-SummaryRcportFinalRcportTitlePage2/787

~J'-,~Itt' TABLEOFCONTENTSPageA~~CRONYMSooosooooooooooeoooooooooooooooooooosooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooeoeoooooooooooooo SUMMARYREPORT............................................................................

1INT'RODUCTIONoeoooooooooooooooooeooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooeoooooooeoosos

~1DEVELOPMENT OFRG&E'sRESPONSE.............................

2REPORTOVERVIEWeooooosooooososssssssssoooooooooeosoosssosossssoooooooeeosooos

~3IOCFR50.54(f)

RESPONSE........................................................

4RESPONSE(a)................................................................

4SPONSE(b)................................................................

5RESPONSE(C)oooooooooooooooooeoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 7RESPONSE(d)................................................................

10RESPONSE(e).................................................................

13REx/ccsssxRESPONSE(P)oooooooooooooooeooooooooooooooooooooooooooeooooooooooooeooeoeo 15ATTACHMENT A.................................................................................

18ATTACHMENT B..................................................................................

36ATTACHMENT Ceeoosoooooooeoooooos

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~soooso~~oooooe~~esses~~eooeoo~oooo~44TTACHMENT D...'...............................................................................

62ATTACHMENT E.................,................................................................

69A10CFR50.54(f)

Response-SununasyReportFinalRcportPagei2/7/97

'CZC099L86O'E'K'K,ZT0TCCVT9;K9TL'I8'K6TOZ ACRONYMSThefollowing isalistofacronymsusedinthisreportandtheirmeanings:

A/EACRSACTIONADFCSAECAFWALARAAMSACASFIASMEATWSCATSCCWCFRCIECMISCOLRDBDDCRECCDECCSEDGEDSFIEOPEPCEPIPEQERGESFASEWRFSARGLGORRGSMHPESHVACININPOIPIRISIISTITSLARLCOLERLOCALTOPICATIONREPORTCTIONARCHITECT ENGINEERADVISORYCOMMITTEE ONREACTORSAFETYABNORMALCONDITION TRACKINGINITIATION ORNOTIFADVANCEDDIGITALFEEDWATER CONTROLSYSTEMATOMICENERGYCOMMISSION AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ASLOWASREASONABLY ACHIEVABLE ATWSMITIGATION SYSTEMACTUATION CIRCUITRY AUXILIARY SYSTEMFUNCTIONAL INSPECTION AMERICANSOCIETYOFMECHANICAL ENGINEERS ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUTSCRAMCOMMI'IMENT

&ACTIONTRACKINGSYSTEMCOMPONENT COOLINGWATERCODEOFFEDERALREGULATION CHANGEIMPACTEVALUATION CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMCOREOPERATING LIMITSREPORTDESIGNBASISDOCUMENTDRAWINGCHANGEREQUESTELECTRICAL CONTROLLED CONFIGURATION DRAWINGEMERGENCY CORECOOLINGSYSTEMEMERGENCY DIESELGENERATOR ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMFUNCTIONAL INSPEEMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE COMMIITEEEMERGENCY PLANIMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION EMERGENCY RESPONSEGUIDELINES ENGINEERED SAFETYFEATUREACTUATION SYSTEMENGINEERING WORKREQUESTFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORTGENERICLETTERGINNAOWNERSREVIEWREPORTGINNASTATIONMODIFICATION HUMANPERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT SYSTEMHEATING,VENTILATION, 4,AIRCONDITIONING INFORMATION NOTICEINSTI'HITE OFNUCLEARPOWEROPERATION INTERFACE PROCEDURE INSPECTION REPORTINSERVICE INSPECTION INSERVICE TESTINGIMPROVEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LICENSEAMENDMENT REQUESTLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION LICENSEEEVENTREPORTLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENTLOWTEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION 10CFR50.54(f)

Response-SummaryRcportFinalReportPageii2/787 4rl~~srpmr,preF MDAFWMDCNMOVMRMRPIMTCNDNEINERPNOGNOVNRCNSM.NSARBNSSSODCMOEPAIDPCRPIRPORCPTLRQAQAPSOQCRCMRCSRGBRHRRMRPRPSRSACRSES/GSAFWSARSBOSCAQSESEPSERSEVSFPSGRPSIPESQUGSRSSCSSFISTSTASWSROPSWMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER MODIFICATION DESIGNCHANGENOTICEMOTOROPERATEDVALVEMAINTENANCE RULEMICROPROCESSOR RODPOSITIONINDICATION MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT NUCLEARDIRECTIVE NUCLEARENERGYINSTITUTE NUCLEAREMERGENCY RESPONSEPLANNUCLEAROPERATIONS GROUPNOTICEOFVIOLATION NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION NUCLEARSAFEIYBcLICENSING NUCLEARSAFETYAUDITANDREVIEWBOARDNUCLEARSTEAMSUPPLYSYSTEMOFF-SITEDOSECALCULATION MANUALOPERATING EXPERIENCE PIPING4,INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAMPLANTCHANGEREQUESTPORCINDEPENDENT REVIEWERPLANTOPERATIONS REVIEWCOMMIITEEPRESSUREATEMPERATURE LIMITSREPORTQUALITYASSURANCE QAPROGRAMFORSTATIONOPERATIONS QUALITYCONTROLRELIABILITY CENTEREDMAINTENANCE REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMROCHESTER GASANDELECTMCRESIDUALHEATREMOVALRESPONSIBLE MANAGERRADIATION PROTECTION REACTORPROTECTION SYSTEMRELOADSAFEIYANALYSISCHECKLIST RELOADSAFEIVEVALUATION STEAMGENERATOR STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATERSAFETYANALYSISREPORTSTATIONBLACKOUTSIGNIFICANT CONDITION ADVERSETOQUALITYSYSTEMENGINEERSYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAMSIGNIFICANT EVENTREPORTorSAFETYEVALUATION REPORTSAFETYEVALUATION SPENTFUELPOOLSTEAMGENERATOR REPLACEMENT PROJECTSIGNIFICANT INFREQUENTLY PERFORMED EVOLUTION SEISMICQUALIFICATION UTILITYGROUPSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT/

ORSAFETYRELATEDSYSTEM,STRUCTURE AND/ORCOMPONENT SAFEIYSYSTEMFUNCTIONAL INSPECTION SURVEILLANCE TESTSHIFTTECHNICAL ADVISORSERVICEWATERSYSTEMRELIABILITY OPTIMIZATION PROGRAMSERVICEWATERlOCFR50.54(0 Rcsponsc-SummaryReportFinalRcportPagerll2/7/97

SWSOPITAVETDAFWTPCNTRMTSRUFSARUSQVTMWOGWRfIRSERVICEWATERSYSTEMOPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION AVERAGEREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMTEMPERATURE TURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER TEMPORARY PROCEDURE CHANGENOTICETECHNICAL REQUIREMENT MANUALTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTUPDATEDFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORTUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONS VENDORTECHNICAL MANUALWESTINGHOUSE OWNER'SGROUPWORKREQUESTffROUBLE REPORT10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-SuretyRcportFinalRcportPageiv2/7/97 10CFR50.54(f)

RESPONSESUMMARYREPORTINTRODUCTION OnOctober9,1996,theNRCissuedaletterrequesting thatlicensees provideinformation thatcanbeusedtoverify1)compliance withthetermsandconditions oftheirlicenseandNRCregulations and2)thattheplantUFSARproperlydescribes theirfacility.

Specifically theNRCrequested thefollowing information:

(a)Description ofengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses, including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59, 10CFR50.71(e),

andAppendixBto10CFRPart50;(b)Rationale forconcluding thatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures; (c)Rationale forconcluding thatsystem,structure, andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases;(d)Description ofprocesses foridentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actions,including actionstodetermine theextentofproblems, actiontopreventrecurrence, andreporting toNRC;and(e)Assessment oftheoveralleffectiveness ofyourcurrentprocesses andprogramsinconcluding thattheconfiguration ofyourplantisconsistent withthedesignbases.("f')Inaddition, theNRCalsorequested thatRGB.Eindicate:

~whetherwehaveundertaken anydesignrevieworreconstitution

programs,

~ifnot,arationale fornotimplementing suchaprogram,~ifdesignrevieworreconstitution programshavebeencompleted orarebeingconducted, adescription ofthereviewprograms, including identification ofthesystems,structures, andcomponents (SSCs),andplant-level attributes (e.g.,seismic,high-energy linebreak,moderate-energy linebreak),including howtheprogramisintendedtoensurethecorrectness andaccessibility ofthedesignbasesinformation forourplantandthatthedesignbasesremaincurrent,~iftheprogramisbeingconducted buthasnotbeencompleted, animplementation scheduleforSSCsandplant-level designattribute reviews,theexpectedcompletion date,andmethodofSSCprioritization usedforthereview.Notethatthisrequestdidnotcarryaletterdesignation intheNRCletter;however,forreference, itwillbereferredtoas("f")herein.ThisreportisRochester GasandElectric's (RGEcE's) responsetotheNRC'srequest.IOCFR50.54(t)

Response-SummaryReportFinalReportPagei2/7/97 4~J,1re>~4Ua/gal0)IV0N DEVELOPMENT OFRG&E'sRESPONSETocoordinate thepreparation ofthisresponse, RG&Eassembled adedicated teamoffourseniorengineers fromNuclearSafety&Licensing (NS&L).ThisNS&Lteamwassupported bytheeffortsofoverfiftysubjectmatterexperts(SMEs)whocontributed information regarding specificprocesses,

programs, activities, andassessments.

Management andtechnical oversight wereprovidedbytheactiveparticipation ofNOGEngineering, Operation's, andNuclearAssessment management.

RG&E'sapproachtothisreportwasdeveloped to1)ensurethatitwouldbefullyresponsive totheNRC'sj'equest, and2)establish confidence thatthereportwouldrepresent thecollective knowledge ofthosemostcloselyassociated withtheoperating, maintenance, andengineering activities thatsupportthesafeandreliableoperation ofGinna.Specifically, RG&E'sresponsedevelopment proceeded asfollows:~TheNS&Lteamdeveloped anoutlineofthemostrelevanttopics(programs andprocesses) usedtomaintainGinnaStation.~SMEsweredesignated foreachtopiconthislistbasedupontheirfamiliarity withthetopic.Forhistorical topics,SMEsweretypically selectedbasedontheirroleintheactivityatthattime,regardless oftheircurrentfunctionwithinRG&E.~ThelistoftopicsandassignedSMEswasthendistributed totheSMEsalongwithinformation regarding theNRC10CFR50.54(f) request,thefindingsandconclusions oftheNRCleadingtotherequest,andmanagement expectations forRG&E'sresponse.

~EachSMEdeveloped asummarydescription ofthetopicassigned.

~Thededicated NS&Lteamcollected thesedescriptions, compiledthem,andfurthereditedandsummarized themintoadraftoftheRG&Eresponse.

~ReviewoftheresponseincludedtwofullreviewsbytheSMEs,including afinalattestation ofthoroughness toRG&Emanagement.

~ThePlantOperating ReviewCommittee (PORC)reviewedbothanearlydraftandthefinalreportandprovidedarecommendation ofapprovaltotheSeniorVice-President, EnergyOperations.

~TheNuclearSafetyAuditandReviewBoard(NSARB)conducted anextensive reviewanddiscussion oftheresponse.

TheNSARBgavespecificassignments tothenon-NOGmembersoftheNSARBtomaximizethequalityoftheinputfromoutsidemembers.TheNSARBreviewincludedSeniorManagersfrombothRG&Eandotherutilities aswellasamemberoftheRG&EBoardofDirectors.

TheNSARBdiscussion resultedinarecommendation ofapprovaltotheSeniorVice-President, EnergyOperations.

~Finally,themethodsusedtodevelopthisresponsewereindependently reviewedbyateamconsisting ofanRG&ENuclearAssurance engineerandaNiagaraMohawknuclearlicensing engineer.

Byfollowing thethoroughdevelopment andreviewprocessdescribed above,RG&Ehasconcluded thatthereissubstantial evidenceforreasonable assurance thattheGinnaStationisbeingoperatedandmaintained withinitsdesignbases,thatdeviations areresolvedinatimelymanner,andthatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicisbeingprotected.

10CHU0.54(f)

Response-SummaryRcportFinalReportPage22/7/97

'j4 REPORTOVERVIEWThisdocumentconsistsofaSummaryReportoftheinformation providedinresponseto.theNRC'srequestwhichbrieflyexplainsforRequests(a)through(e)l)theprocesses inplaceforlicense,design,andconfiguration control,2)theprogramsandprojectsthathaveconfirmed andenhancedtheconsistency betweendesignbases,plantprocedures, plantconfiguration, andplantoperations, 3)theprocesses toidentifyandresolveproblems, and4)ouroverallassessment oftheireffectiveness.

TheSUMMARYREPORTendswith(),adescription ofouron-goingdesignreviewandreconstitution effortswhichcenteraround1)reviewing theUFSARforaccuracywithrespecttoplantprocedures andequipment, 2)retrieving andreviewing designbasesdocumentation fromtheplant'soriginalNSSSsupplierandArchitect/Engineer (A/E),and3)confirming correctdocumentation ofchangestotheoriginaldesignandlicensing basesasaresultoflaterplantmodifications andadditions toourNRCdocket.Following thissummaryreportareaseriesofAttachments thatprovideadditional detailsforRequested Actions(a)through(e)fromtheNRC.Specifically:

ATTACHMENT A:Supporting information forRequested Action(a).TheAttachment providesabriefdiscussion ofourlicensing, designandconfiguration controlprocesses.

ATTACHMENT B:Supporting information forRequested Action(b).TheAttachment discusses severalprojectsundertaken toupdateplantprocedures aswellasourrecenteffortstoconfirmUFSAR-to-procedure consistency.

ATTACHMENT C:Supporting information forRequested Action(c).TheAttachment focusesonthenumerousprogramsandprojectsconducted overtheyearssinceinitialplantlicensing tomaintainandenhancethephysicalconfiguration andfunctional characteristics oftheplantwithrespecttothedesignbases.ATTACHMENT D:Supporting information forRequested Action(d).TheAttachment providesabriefdescription ofourcorrective actionprocesses foridentification anddetermination oftheextentofproblemsaswellasimplementation ofcorrective actionsandreporting totheNRC,asappropriate.

ATTACHMENT E:Supporting information forRequested Action(e).TheAttachment compilestheresultsofvariousreviewsintendedtoscrutinize ourprocesses/

controls/

configuration andleadtocontinuous improvement/enhancement.

Theseincludein-lineprocesscontrolsandreviews(including self-assessments),

internalQualityAssurance auditsandsurveillances, andthirdpartyreviews/inspections (including thoseconducted bytheNRC).lOCFR50.54(l)

Response-SununatyReportFinalReportPage32fl87

'i4~-~pa,~wc~jr 10CFR50.54(f)

RESPONSETheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantisa480MWWestinghouse twolooppressurized waterreactor,plantlocatedontheshoreofLakeOntarioinwesternNewYork.ItisownedandoperatedbyRochester GasandElectricCorporation (RG&E).Itwaslicensedin1969.RG&E'sintentional approachtothedesign,operation, andmaintenance ofGinnaStation(plannedandsystematic actionsnecessary toprovideadequateconfidence thatastructure, system,orcomponent willperformsatisfactorily inservice)givesRG&Econfidence andassurance thatGinnaisfullycapableoffulfilling itssafetyfunctions, i.e.,thatGinnaisoperatedandmaintained withinitsdesignbases.Thefollowing hasbeenRG&E'sapproach:

~Ginnawaslicensedto.asetofregulations andcodes.~RG&Edeveloped programs(including thequalityassurance programandadministrative procedures) tomeetthoseregulations.

~Wedeveloped bothfeedbackmechanisms andacorrective actionprocessintendedtoensurethatthoseprogramscontinuetomeetthatsetofregulations.

~Self-assessments andthirdpartyreviewssupplement ourinternalfeedbackmechanisms.

~Whenregulations changeorareadded,ourprogramsaremodifiedtoaddressourcommitments tothenewrequirements.

ThisReportisintendedtoprovidetheNRCwiththeinformation requested.

However,itisnotcomprehensive.

RG&Ehasattempted tofocusonthoseprocesses andprogramshavingthemostsignificant impactonplantdesignbasesconfiguration andconductofoperations.

Inresponding totheNRC'srequest,RG&Ehasattempted toprovidebothhistorical dataanddescriptions ofourcurrentdesign/configuration controlandcorrective actionprocesses.

Ourprocesses areunderconstantevaluation andsubjecttochangetoincorporate improvements.

Asaresult,processes maybedifferent inthefuturefromwhatisdescribed herein.NOTE:Inthefollowing descriptions, references inparentheses refertotheAttachments andSectionnumberswithintheAttachments.

Forexample,item"(A.l.G)"

willbefoundinAttachment A,Section1.G;item"(C.2.K)"

willbefoundinAttachment C,Section2.K,etc.(a)Description ofengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses, including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59, IOCFR50.71(e),

andAppendixBto10CFR50:Theprocesses thatimplement theseandsimilarregulatory requirements canbecategorized asthosethat1)controllicenserequirements and2)controlengineering designandconfiguration.

1.Theprocesses tocontrollicenserequirements resideindirectives andprocedures whichcontrolLicenseAmendments (A.l.A),Technical Specification Baseschanges(A.l.B),SafetyReviewsandSafetyEvaluations (A.l.C),UFSARupdates(A.l.D),changestoQualityAssurance requirements (A.1.E),changestotheSecurityPlan(A.l.F),changestotheEmergency Plan(A.l.G),ASMECodereliefrequests(A.l.H),andRegulatory IOCPRSO.S4(QResponse-SummasyReportFinalReportPage42/7i97

~4,14'4katl Commitment changes(A.l.I).Additionally, astheNRCprovidesgenericregulatory guidanceoridentifies newconcerns, RG&Eevaluates theirapplicability toGinnaandassesseswhether.theconcernsarealreadyknownandbeingaddressed.

Ifapplicable, andnotalreadycoveredbyon-goingactivities, RG&Etracksandincorporates appropriate changes(A.l.J)tolicensing documents andafFectedprocedures/practices.

2.Theprimaryprocesses forengineering designandconfiguration controlinclude.thePlantChange(permanent modification) process(A.2.A),theTemporary Modification process(A.2.B),andtheprocesses fortheadministrative controlofprocedures (A.2.C)anddrawings(A.2.F).TheMaintenance WorkControlSystem(A.2.D)isintendedtoensurethatproperengineering controlsarebroughttobearonequipment problemsandthatequipment iscorrectly restoredtoserviceaftermaintenance.

TheProcurement Engineering Process(A.2.G)isintendedtoensureproperengineering controlsareexercised inthepurchase, specification, receiptinspection, andstorageofcomponents, parts,andmaterials usedtomaintainandmodifytheplant.TheOperatorWork-Around controlprocess(A.2.E)looksforplantconfigurations whichcanimpacttheoperation oftheplantandcausetheOperators tousecompensatory measures.

RG&Ealsoevaluates recommendations regarding equipment whicharecommunicated viaNRCgenericcommunications orindustrynotices(A.l.J).Asappropriate, RG&Ewillimplement theserecommendations and.incorporate themintothedesignbasisoftheplant.[Note:otherprogramsrequiredbyourlicenseorbyregulation arediscussed insection(c).]Ourprocesses incorporate defense-in-depth, including multi-disciplined reviews,whichprovideindependent andbalancedperspectives.

Compliance withtheseprocesses ispartoftheRG&Eculture.Thatcultureandtheseprocesses aretheproductofcontinuous improvement.

RG&Eisresponsive tonewindustryandNRCinitiatives/developments andincorporates them,asapplicable, tokeepourprocesses current.TheNuclearOperations GroupstafF(A.3) istrained,insessionstailoredtotheusergroups'pecific needs,touseengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses correctly.

(b)Rationale forconcluding thatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures:

RG&Ehasestablished aseriesofadministrative controlsforprocesses whichcontrolprocedures orinstructions.

TheseincludethePlantChangeProcess(B.l.A,A.2.A)todetermine theimpactofmodifications onplantproc'edures, theprocedure changeprocesswithitsassociated 10CFR50.59 review(A.2.C),andtheMaintenance WorkControlSystem(B.1.C,A.2.D)withitsmulti-disciplined reviewsofprocedures/instructions beingincorporated intoworkpackages.

Inarelatedmanner,theOperating Experience processcanenhance/update thedesignbasis(B.1.D),inthatRG&Ereviewsandaddresses NRCgenericcommunications andincorporates 10CFR50.54(l)

Response-SummaryReportFinalReportPage52f7/97 CtZaL>>eLV8, resulting RG&Ecommitments intoplantprocedures andprograms.

ThesearetrackedtoclosureviatheCommitment andActionTrackingSystem(CATS).Designbasisrequirements areincorporated intoprocedures whichgoverntheoperation, maintenance, andtestingofplantsystems,structures andcomponents (SSCs).Examplesofthisareheatup/cooldown limitations inOperations startup/shutdown procedures, restrictions inEmergency Operating Procedures, andacceptance criteriainsurveillance testingprocedures.

RG&Ehasundertaken aseriesofcomprehensive projectstoupgradeprocedures, makingthemmoreusableandverifying thecorrectimplementation ofrequirements.

TheseeffortshavegivenRG&Econfidence inthevalidityofimportant plantdocumentation.

Examplesincludethedevelopment ofplantEmergency Operating Procedures (B.2.A),theCalibration Procedures andMaintenance Procedures UpgradeProjects(B.2.B),theupgradeofInservice Testingprocedures (B.2.C),theImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS)implementation plan(B.2.D)whichareintendedtoensurethatsurveillance requirements wereproperlyaddressed, andRG&E'sresponsetoGenericLetter(GL)96-01(B.2.E)regarding completeness ofcircuittesting.RG&Ehasundertaken severalsamplingprojects(B.3.A,B.3.B,B.3.C,B.3.D)tocheckifinformation intheUFSARisaccurately reflected inplantprocedures andtodetermine ifon-goingcommitments (someofwhicharereflected intheUFSAR)canbetracedbacktotheoriginalrequirements.

Generally, wheredifferences havebeenidentified andevaluated forresolution, theplantimplementing documents andtheplantconfiguration haveaccurately reflected thedesignbasesandtheUFSARhasnotbeenupdatedproperly.

ThisgivesRG&Econfidence that,eventhoughtheUFSARhasnotalwaysbeenuptodate,important configuration controlanddesignbasisinformation hasbeencorrectly translated totheplantequipment andprocedures.

Nonetheless, RG&Erecognizes theneedto1)correcttheUFSARintheshorttermand2)improveprocesses tomaintainlongtermUFSARaccuracy.

RG&Enotesthatonereasonfordifferences betweenplantprogramsandtheUFSARisthetimingofupdates.Newinformation resulting fromplantchangesissentdirectlytoprogramadministrators, whoseprogramsareauditedforcompliance separately fromtheUFSAR.RG&EhasnotrequiredthattheUFSARbeupdatedasquicklyastheprogramsitdescribes.

Consequently, theUFSAR,withitsrefueling cycleupdate(since1984;seerelatedUFSARhistory(A.l.D)),

hasnotbeenusedasareal-time confirmation ofimpactonthedesignbasis.TheNuclearOperations Groupstaffisformallytrained(B.4)onprocedures tomaintaintheirknowledge levelandkeepthemabreastofchanges.Forsomenewprocedures andevensomeprocedure changes,theResponsible Managerdetermines thatformaltrainingofaffectedstaffisrequired.

Appropriate individuals arethentrainedontheprocedure/change aswellasitsbases.Thistraininghelpscommunicate designbasisinformation throughout theorganization.

Note:Additional information regarding self-assessments, internalreviews,andthirdpartyreviewswhichsupportourconclusions inthissectionarefoundinsection(e).10CFR50.54(ri Response-SummaryReportFinalReportPage62f187

~.V,'"4If'IIf,'gI0f~<<PefI~y~<<>q1 (c)Rationale forconcluding thatsystem,structure, andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases:RGBhasensuredthatGinnaStationaccurately reflectsitsdesignbasesbyimplementing programstokeeptheplantconfiguration consistent withdesignbasisinformation, performing inspections toidentifyconfiguration discrepancies, andinitiating andcompleting aseriesofprojectswhichhaveenhancedtheknowledge anduseofdesignbasisinformation.

IP~rorams~Operations performsperiodicverifications ofsafeguards systemsconfiguration (C.l.A)intendedtoensurethatthevalve,breaker,andinstrumentation alignments ofthemajorflowpaths neededforsystemoperation areconsistent withthedesignbases.~TheSurveillance Testprogram(C.1.B)isintendedtoensureequipment operability inaccordance withitsdesignbasesforequipment requiredbytheImprovedTechnical Specifications (including relocated previousTechnical Specification requirements).

~ThePreventive Maintenance programs(C.l.C)atGinnaareestablished tomonitorandmaintaincriticalplantequipment suchthatin-service failuresareminimized andperformance reliability isenhanced, thusbetterassuringthatequipment important tothesafeoperation ofGinnaisavailable whenrequired.

Theperformance ofmanycomponents istrendedtodetectdegradation beforefailure.~,TheSafetyClassification process(C.l.D)isintendedtoidentifyandclassifyplantcomponents whichperformsafety-related functions.

Thisinformation isusedinvariousplantprocesses including plantmodifications, procurement (especially forcomponents andparts),andmaintenance planning~TheElectrical LoadGrowthControlprogram(C.l.E)isintendedtoensurethatacceptable levelsofmarginaremaintained ontheelectrical distribution systempowersupplies.

~TheEnvironmental Qualification program(10CFR50.49)

(C.l.F)isintendedtoensurethataharshenvironment, resulting fromapostulated

accident, willnotbeacommoncauseofequipment failureforelectrical equipment neededtocopewiththataccident.

~The10CFR50,AppendixRandFireProtection program(C.l.G)isintendedtomaintainconfiguration controlofequipment necessary tomitigatetheconsequences offires.s~TheImprovedTechnical Specifications Transient Monitoring program(C.l.H)tracksreactorcoolantsystemtransients toensurethattheASME.Class Icomponent fatiguedesignbasisismaintained.

lOCFR50.54(Q Rcsponsc-SunnnaryRcportFinalRcportPage72fI/97 al-~~I'4h

~TheHeavyLoadsProgram(C.1.I)controlsliftingactivities toavoidorminimizedamage'hatcouldresultfromdroppingaloadgreaterthan1500poundsontosafety-related equipment.

~TheMotorOperatedValve(MOV)program(C.l.J)isintendedto,establish thedesignconditions andrequiredthrustvaluesforeachMOVbaseduponreviewofaccidentanalyses, normalandabnormaloperation, andEmergency Operating Procedures.

~TheNuclearFuelsReloadprocess(C.l.K)isintendedtoensurethatthereloadpatternwillproducetherequiredenergyandwillbeboundedbythecoreparameters assumedintheaccidentanalysis.

I~nsections~SystemEngineer(SE)periodicwalkdowns (C.3.A)aredesignedtotakeadvantage oftheSE'sknowledge ofthedesignconfiguration ofthesystemtohelpmaintainsystemconfiguration control.s~TheSystemEngineerperformance monitoring program(C.3.B)consistsofmonitoring inaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.65, theMaintenance Rule.Thisprogramassesses, onanon-goingbasis,theeffectiveness ofmaintenance onkeysystems,structures, andcomponents inordertoidentifyandcorrectperformance problems.

~TheShiftTechnical AdvisororDesignated PlantManagement PlantTours(C.3.C)containastatedobjective ofcheckingforunauthorized modifications tothefacility.

P~ro'ects

~TheImprovedTechnical Specifications Project(C.2.A)consolidated muchofGinna'slicensing basis.Significant multi-disciplined reviewwasperformed toensurethatappropriate operability restrictions wereplaceduponequipment assumedintheUFSARaccidentanalysis.

~TheSystematic Evaluation Program(SEP)(C.2.B)provided1)an-assessment ofthesignificance ofdifferences betweenthethen-current NRCtechnical positions onsafetyissuesandthedesignbasesoftheplant,2)abasisforNRCdecisions regarding resolution ofthosedifferences, and3)adocumented NRCevaluation ofoverallplantsafetywithrespecttothereviewedtopics.~TheInstrument SetpointVerification Project(C.2.C)wasintendedtoestablish thedesignbasisandensuretheadequacyofexistingsetpoints andcalibration valuesforimportant plantinstrument andcontrolloops.lOCFRSO.S4(0 Rcsponsc~SununaryRcportFinalRcportPa8c82/7/97 0h4CPPygik'~,,4tpg

~Comprehensive PipingandInstrumentation Drawing(P&ID)andElectrical Controlled Configuration Drawing(ECCD)upgradeprojects(C.2.DandC.2.E,respectively) whichfieldverifiedcontrolled configuration drawingsagainsttheplant.~TheStationBlackoutanalysis(C.2.F),EWR4520,showshowGinnameetsthesafeshutdownrequirements of10CFR50.63, LossofAllAlternating CurrentPower.~TheDCFuseCoordination Study(C.2.G)wasintendedtoensurethattheDCdistribution systemmaintains itsdesignbasisconfiguration andtodemonstrate thattheDCsystemwillbeabletomeetitsdesignrequirements.

~TheSeismicUpgradeProject(C.2.H)consisted ofextensive piping/support analysesandappropriate fieldmodifications toupgradesupportstomorecurrentstandards.

~SeismicQualification UtilityGroup(SQUG)reconstitution program(C.2.I)isbeingperformed toupgradetheseismicqualification designbasisforequipment ontheGinnaSafeShutdownEquipment ListtotheSQUGGenericImplementation Procedure.

~TheT,reduction/18 monthfuelcycle/UFSAR Chapter15reanalysis (C.2.J)reestablished theaccidentanalysisdesignbasis.~InresponsetoGL89-13,RG&Eperformed aseriesofactionstointendedtoensuretheacceptable performance ofplantServiceWater(SW)Systems(C.2.K).Theseactionsincludedevaluations toconfirmthattheSWsystemiscapableoffulfilling itsdesignbasisfunction, enhancedmaintenance topreventdegradation, andtestingtodemonstrate performance.

Actionsincludedimplementation ofaZebraMusselcontrolprogramandaServiceWatererosion/corrosion monitoring program.~RG&Ehasreconstituted majorpartsoftheGin'nadesignbasesasfollows:0replacedsteamgenerators (S/Gs)(C.2.L)in1996.Inthecourseofdesigning thereplacement S/Gsandplanningtheirinstallation, RG&Eretrieved thedesignbasesforseveralaspectsoftheplant.Tasksofsignificance todesignbasisverification includedtheSafetyEvaluation forthetask,retrieving thecontainment designbasistopermitcuttingholesinthetopofthedome,andreconstituting thedesignbasisstructural adequacyofthecontainment spraysystem(thelatterbeinganemergentasanissueduringtheS/Greplacement outage).0performed anInstrument AirSystemfunctional review(C.2.M)0upgradedtheOff-sitePowerSystem(C.2.N)0upgradedtheSpentFuelPool(SFP)CoolingSystembyaddinganothercoolingloop(C.2.0)0performed aContainment Isolation Systemreview(C.2.P)0upgradedtoaSteamGenerator (S/G)AdvancedDigitalFeedwater ControlSystem(ADFCS)(C.2.Q)0upgradedtoaMicroprocessor RodPositionIndication (MRPI)System(C.2.R)10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-SummaryRcportFinalRcportPage92/787

0addedAnticipated-Transient-Without-Scram (ATWS)Mitigation SystemActuation Circuitry (AMSAC)(C.2.S)0addedaStandbyAuxiliary Feedwater (SAFW)System(C.2.T).TheNuclearOperations GroupstafFisformallytrained(C.4)toreportdeficiencies inconfiguration orperformance ofSSCsviaRG&E's.corrective actionprogram.Note:Additional information regarding self-assessments, internalreviews,andthirdpartyreviewswhichsupportourconclusions inthissectionarefoundinsection(e).(d)Processes foridentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actions,including actionstodetermine theextentofproblems, actiontopreventrecurrence, andreporting toNRC:CORRECTIVE ACTIONPROGRAMRG&Ehasrecentlyimplemented acorrective actionprocessandprogramfocusedontheRG&EAbnormalCondition TrackingInitiation orNotification (ACTION)Report.Thisprocessintegrates allaspectsofproblemidentification, evaluation; andresolution initiation intoasingleprocessthatcanbetrackedandtrendedtoassistinassessing theeffectiveness ofvarious.programs, processes, andorganizations, andthatcanbereadilyimprovedthroughmanagement oversight andcommunication ofexpectations

~1TheACTIONReportprocessiscurrently implemented viaIP-CAP-1, AbnormalCondition TrackingInitiation orNotification (ACTION)Report.TheACTIONReporting processisasinglecorrective actionprogramfortheidentification andresolution ofanycondition event,activity, concern,oritemthathasthepotential foraffecting thesafeandreliableoperation oftheGinnaNuclearplant.RG&E'sACTIONReportprocessmaybeusedbyanyindividual whoobservesorisawareofsuchacondition.

Theprocessincludesrequirements andprovisions for:~Identification ofproblemsandconcerns~Initialscreening ofidentified conditions forimmediate safetyand/oroperational concernsandprioritization ofthecondition forresolution

~Disposition andcausedetermination forthecondition including classification ofthecondition fortrackingandtrending~Implementation ofcorrective actionsasappropriate forthecondition including

.remediation ofthecondition, andlongtermactionstopreventrecurrence

~Requirements forreporting appropriate conditions totheNRC,e.g.,asrequiredby10CFR21.Section(D.1)ofthisreportprovidesanexplanation oftheRG&EACTIONReporting process.lOCFR50.54(f)

Response-SumnuryRcportFinalRcportPage102/7/97

~ce1~sI Theunifiedandintegrated ACTIONreporting, whichreplacedanumberofoldercorrective actionprocesses, haspermitted RG&Emanagement tobettermanagetheprocessandtoconsciously drivedowntheproblemidentification threshold.

Thislowerthreshold isintendedtoensurethatmoreconditions, eventhosewhich,takenseparately, appeartobeoflowsignificance, arebeingreportedfortracking/trending and,asappropriate, corrective action.Theprocess(D.3)forclassifying areportedcondition asadversetoqualityornon-conforming, aswellasevaluating thesignificance ofthecondition, ispartoftheACTIONReportprocess.Specificguidanceisprovidedinattachments toIP-CAP-1.

Conditions foundtobeSignificant Conditions AdversetoQuality(SCAQ)areevaluated todetermine theeffectofcontinuing activity.

Ifcontinued activitywouldobscureorprecludetheidentification ofthedeficiency, increasetheextentofthedeficiency orleadtoanunsafecondition, stopworkactionistaken.TheACTIONReportprocessdirects,whenappropriate, theuseofIP-CAP-2, RootCauseAnalysis, todetermine theextentofproblemsaswellastheactionstopreventrecurrence, andtheuseofA.61,10CFR21Screening, Evaluating, andReporting todetermine reportability under10CFRPart21.NuclearAssessment isresponsible fortrendingidentified problemsandcorrective actions(D.4)perND-CAP,Corrective ActionProgram,basedupondatafromACTIONReports.TrendingprovidesRG&Emanagement withameasureoftheoveralleffectiveness ofthecorrective actionprocessandhowwellmanagement expectation forreporting anduseofthesystemarebeingcommunicated tocognizant personnel.

Trendingalsocontributes toRG&E'sunderstanding ofhowwellotherprocesses, including thosefordesignandconfiguration control,arefunctioning andwhereimprovement andenhancements areprudent.OPERABILITY ASSESSMENT RG&Ehasestablished formaladministrative processes fordetermining theoperability ofsystemsandequipment (D.2).Theseprocesses tracksafety-related equipment out-of-service aswellascertaininoperable non-safety-related equipment toensurethattheaggregate impactofmultipleminordeficiencies inmorethanonesystemorsubsystem doesnotplacetheplantoutsideitsdesignbasesandImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS).Inadditiontoitsassociation withthecorrective actionprocessatGinna,evaluating anddetermining operability ofsystems,structures, andcomponents withrespecttoplantTechnical Specification requirements anddesignbasesisanintegralpartoftheprocesses thatdirectlyaffectplantconfiguration andperformance, e.g.,workcontrol,inservice testing,modifications.

10CFR50.54(0 ResPonse-SummasyReportFinalReportPagell2/787 T1IcaIll,y,,P'ip lg7~gs'IIjI~

REPORTINTTHENRCRG&Emeetsapplicable NRCReporting Requirements (D.S)forbothimmediate andwrittenreports.Arev'iewofRG&E'sreportstotheNRCandNRCenforcement historyconfirmsthatappropriate reportshavebeenmade.Inaddition, RG&Ehassubmitted atleastelevenvoluntary reports,whichdidnotmeetthethreshold forNRCreporting, since1988.Thereiscontinuous interaction andcommunication betweenRG&EandtheNRC(D.6).Exceptforsomeperiodicreporting, normalcommunication, whichbecomespartoftheGinnadocket,istypically betweentheVicePresident, NuclearOperations andtheNRC.Informalcommunication occursatvariouslevelsoftheorganization.

ExamplesincludeNRCattendance atPORCoratNSARBanddiscussions withtheNRCResidentInspectors, NRCProjectManager,orothermembersoftheNRCstaffTRAININGTheNuclearOperations GroupstaffhareceivedformaltrainingontheACTIONReportprocess(D.7).TheACTIONReportprocesstrainingencompasses conditions adversetoqualityandnon-conforming conditions.

Operations receivesperiodictrainingontheoperability processandonreporting totheNRC.Rootcauseanalysistrainingisconducted forselectedstaffTrainingsupportsmethodstopreventrecurrence byre-training, asappropriate, andbytrainingonlessons-learned frompreviouscorrective actions.CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEECONCERNSForanyemployeeorcontractor whodesiresanonymity orwhofeelsaconcernisnotbeingaddressed bythecorrective actionprogramdescribed above,RG&EhasanEmployeeConcernsProgram(D.8).RG&Econsiders thattheverysmallnumberofconcernsrequiring useofthe"Employee ConcernsForm"or"NRCForm3",coupledwiththelargenumbersofACTIONReportsgenerated (currently averaging about100permonth),isevidenceofoursuccessincommunicating directlywithouremployees aboutsafetyconcerns.

Theattitudeofbothouremployees andmanagement istoencourage theidentification ofpotential safetyissues.Weareconstantly improving ourproblemidentification processes toencourage self-reporting by,forexample,loweringthereporting threshold forACTIONReportsandrewarding employees foridentification ofsignificant issues.r10CFRSO.S4(t)

Response-SummuyRcportFinalRcportPage122/7/97 "Q4W<",o0~f (e)Theoveralleffectiveness ofourcurrentprocesses andprogramsinconcluding thattheconfiguration ofourplantisconsistent withthedesignbases:RG&Ehasreasonable assurance thattheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantisfullycapableoffulfilling itssafetyfunctions, i.e.,thatitisoperating safelyandcancontinuetooperatesafely,andthatitsconfiguration isconsistent withthedesignbases.-Thethreeprimaryreasonsforreachingthisconclusion are:1.Ourprogramsareintentionally developed tomeetapplicable regulations, aretheproductofcontinuous improvement, andhavebeenstrengthened bytheincorporation ofthirdpartybestpractices.

Consider, forexample,oneofthemostfundamental processes thatcanimpacttheconfiguration oftheplantwithrespecttothedesignbases,theplantchange(modification) process:~Ourdesigncontrolprocessisintendedtoensurethattheaffecteddesignbasesrequirements areresearched andunderstood beforetheplantismodified.

~Ourdesignverification process(E.l.A)providesanin-linereviewtoensurethatthedesigncontrolprocesswasperformed correctly.

~PORC(E.l.B)approvalof10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluations formodifications andrelatedoperational issuesisintendedtoensurethattheplantconfiguration iskeptconsistent withthedesignbases.~NSARBoversight ofstationoperation andPORCactivities givesfurtherassurance thatapropersafetyfocusismaintained throughout theprocess.Ourprogramshavewithstood thetestofinternalandexternalassessment.

BothRGBQA(E.2.D)andtheNRChaveidentified numerousprocessstrengths.

Specifically, areviewofNRCInspection Reports(E.3.A)revealsthefollowing recurring themes:~areference tostrongmodification controlandcorrective actionprocesses, and~goodsupportandreviewbybothEngineering andthePlantOperations ReviewCommittee (PORC).Wheretherehavebeenweaknesses, deficiencies (E.2.C),orNoticesofViolation (E.3.B),ourcorrective actionprogramhasbeeneffective inrestoring compliance andpreventing recurrence oftheproblems.

2.Asignificant samplingofsystemshasbeendoneinthepast("verticalslice"designbasisaudits).Despitesomediscrepancies, thedetailedinspection resultsconsistently showthatplantsystemsareoperableandconfiguration isconsistent withthedesignbases.RGB'nitiated itsfirstSafetySystemFunctional Inspections (SSFIs)withtheAuxiliary Feedwater systemin1988.ThiswasfollowedbyanAuxiliary SystemFunctional Inspection oftheInstrument AirsysteminresponsetoNRCGenericLetter88-14.TheNRCconducted SSFIsoftheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)systemin1989andtheElectrical Distribution system(EDSFI)andServiceWatersystem(SWSOPI)in199110CFR50.54(f)

Response-Sun@naryReportFinalReportPage132/7/97

'CIl'"icIr,y1'I (E.3.C).Althoughweaknesses werenoted,theteamsdidnotidentifyanysituations wherethecitedweaknesses hadadversely affectedthecapability ofthesystemstofunction..

tIn1989,RG&Eperformed acomprehensive assessment oftheRHRSSFIfindingswhichledtoenhancements inRG&E'sdesignandconfiguration controlprocesses tobroadlyaddresstheweaknesses citedintheSSFIs.Specificimprovements were:~animprovedPlantChangeProcesswasimplemented

~'DesignBasisDocumentRetrieval projectwasinitiated

~asearchable masterlistofDesignAnalyseswascreatedaspartoftheConfiguration Management Information System(CMIS)~commonprocedures werecreatedforengineering/plant interfacing activities

~DesignEngineers wereassignedsystems(preparation forbecomingSystemEngineers)

~ahydraulic modelfortheServiceWatersystemwasdeveloped/validated

~atestprogramformoldedcasecircuitbreakerswasdeveloped

~anelectrical loadgrowthcontrolprogramwasdeveloped.

3.RG&Ehasundertaken largescaleeffortsindesignbasisreconstitution andhasfurthereffortsunderway.

Examplesinclude:~acomprehensive evaluation andextensive reanalysis ofGinna'sUFSARChapter15accidents inordertosupportareduction inT,andan18monthfuelcycleaftersteamgenerator replacement,

~analysiscompilation fortheBasesandprocedure validation associated withconversion totheImprovedTechnical Specifications,

~upgradesviatheSystematic Evaluation Program(SEP),including amajorseismicupgrade,~acomprehensive reviewoftestingofthereactorprotection system(RPS)andengineered safeguards featureactuation system(ESFAS)intendedtoensurethatcircuitsaretestedend-to-end (response toGenericLetter96-01),~majorPipingandInstrumentation Drawing(P&ID)andElectrical Controlled Configuration Drawing(ECCD)upgrades,

~asafetyinstrumentation setpointreanalysis,

~acomprehensive DCfusecoordination study,and~arigoroussafetyclassification process,whichcharacterized thesafetyfunctions ofplantequipment.

RG&Ehasexpendedconsiderable effortthroughout thelifeoftheplanttokeepdesigninformation current.Ourprogramsaretheproductofcontinuous improvement, andtheywillcontinuetoimproveinthefuture.Asproblemsarise,wearecommitted tousinggoodengineering judgmenttoboundandsolvethem,expanding thesolutionintoaprogrammatic look,asnecessary.

Wevaluecontinued inputfromboththeNRCandtheindustrytomaintainsafeandreliableplantoperation.

10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-SummaryRcportFinalRcportPage142/7/97 N~~.~1e)~v.

("P')TheNRCrequestalsocontained arequesttoindicatewhetherwehaveundertaken anydesignrevieworreconstitution programsorarationale fornotimplementing suchprogram(s):

RG&Eisconfident intheabilityofGinnaStationtoperformitsintendedsafetyfunctions andprotectthehealthandsafetyofthepublicintheeventofanaccident.

Nevertheless, inresponding toNEIinitiative 96-05,wenotedthatdescriptive information intheUFSARhasnotalwaysbeenrigorously modifiedinaccordance withplantorprocedure changes.RG&E,therefore, intendstoundertake avoluntary initiative toperformathoroughUFSARreviewduringtheNRCs2-yearEnforcement Discretion periodforself-identification ofdiscrepancies (expected completion dateofOctober18,1998).RG&Ewillimplement amethodofUFSARreviewwhichwillmeetorexceedtheguidanceofNEI96-05,Guidelines forAssessing ProgramsforMaintaining theLicensing Basis,buttheapplication willbeextendedtotheentireUFSAR.Basedonourexperience withverticalslicedesignbasisauditsandwithperformance ofthepilotNEI96-05initiative atGinna,aminimumimpactonsafetyfunctions canbeexpectedfromourUFSARsearch.RG&E'sdesignbasisretrieval effortstodatehavebeenfocusedprimarily ontopicalareasinsteadofonsystemDesignBasisDocuments (DBDs)[seesection(c)];however,RG&Ehasdeveloped pilotDBDsforthefollowing systemsandtopicsinanefforttofindtheprocessandformatthatwouldaddthemostvalue:~ReactorCoolantSystem~SafetyInjection System~ChemicalVolumeandControlSystem~ReactorProtection System~Auxiliary Feedwater System~Instrument AirSystem~AppendixR/FireProtection.

Baseduponexperience withtheaboveefforts,RG&Econcluded thatthesourcedocuments neededforDBDdevelopment werenotreadilyavailable toRG&E.Asaresult,RG&Einitiated anefforttoretrievetheoriginalsourcedocumentation fortheplantdesignbasesfromtheNSSSvendorandthestationArchitect/Engineer.

Thisinformation isalsobeing.supplemented withrecordsofplantmodifications andchanges,aswellaswithformalcorrespondence betweenRG&EandtheNRC.RG&Ealsoconcluded thatcompiling designbasisinformation inseparate, hardcopyreportswasnotthemosteffective meansformaintaining ordistributing designbasisinformation toourNuclearOperations Grouptechnical staffAsaresult,theaboveDBDswerenotacceptedasControlled Configuration Documents (CCDs)forGinna.Rather,RG&Eispursuingthefollowing courseofaction:IOCFRSO.S4(f)

Rcsponsc-SummaryRcportFinalReportPagelS217i97 "PlI11eIII9Il',x~tI~w Makedesinbasisinformation available electronicall toGinnatechnical staff'pecifically, RG&Ehasrecentlycompleted retrieving andconverting toelectronic imagestheoriginaldesignbasissourcedocuments andcalculations formerlyheldby'Westinghouse (ourNSSSsupplier) andGilbert/Commonwealth Associates, Inc.(ourArchitect/

Engineer).

RG&Ehasretrieved about8,500and7,800designbasissourcedocuments fromWestinghouse andGilbert/Commonwealth Associates, Inc.,respectively.

Weexpectthesedocuments tobeinasearchable/retrievable electronic formatbythethirdquarterof1997.ItisRG&E'sintenttousethisinformation inelectronic formtoincreasethedesignandlicensing basisknowledge levelofNuclearOperations Grouppersonnel andtoprovidethetoolsandtrainingtofacilitate self-identification andresolution ofpotential NUREG-1600 "OldDesignIssues."Thiswillbeaccomplished byproviding electronic accessforNuclearSafety&Licensing personnel toourlicensing correspondence, aswellas,inthenearfuture,byproviding electronic accesstovalidated originalNSSSandA/Edocumentation forNOGpersonnel.

Collateandvalidateselectedinformation forsecificsstemsandtoicsandlinkthiselectrnicallwiththeSARRG&Eintendstoexaminethesedesignbasessourcedocuments toverifydesignbasesinformation forhigh-andmedium-risk significant systemsbaseduponourplantProbabilistic SafetyAssessment (14systemstotal)aswellasselectedsafety-related topics.Thefocusofthiseffortwillbedesignbasesasdefinedin10CFR50.2 consistent withtheSECY-91-364 emphasisthat"Designbases...include onlythedesignconstraints thatformthebasesforthestafFssafetyjudgments."

Plantmodifications andourlicensing databasewillalsobeexamined.

Theorderforreviewisintendedtobethesameasthatusedfortheoriginaldesignoftheplant,namelystartingwiththeReactorCoolantSystem(whichsetsdesignparameters forothersystems)andworkingoutwardfromthere(withtheexception ofeffortsinsupportofthetwointernalSSFIsin1997whicharediscussed below).Anydiscrepancies willbedocumented, evaluated,

reported, anddispositioned inaccordance withourcurrentcorrective actionprocedures.

Thisverifiedinformation willthenbemadeavailable viaelectronic linkstoappropriate sectionsoftheUFSAR.RG&E'sscheduleforcompletion oftheaboveexamination andverification ofsystemandtopicaldesignbasesinformation hasnotbeenestablished yet.RG&Eintendstodevelopafirmscheduleinthethirdquarterof1997basedonexperience gainedintheinterimfromconductoftheUFSARreview,theSSFIsscheduled, andourcontinuing effortatdesignbasissourcedocumentreviewandwillprovidethescheduletotheNRCatthattime.Severalprocessweaknesses werealsohighlighted bythis10CFR50.54(f) revieweffort.Accordingly, RG&Ewilldevelopprocessimprovements inthefollowing areas:~Developameansoftrackingcommitments inprocedures toensurethatlicensing commitments arecontrolled

~Enhancecurrentprocesses, whichcanpotentially affectinformation intheUFSAR,torequiretimelygeneration ofUFSARChangeNotices10CFRSO.S4(0 Response-SummaryReportFinalReportPagei62/7/97 WP)Ih~~a'MaL"E'00~1J,*=bSDl~$~

~AddUFSARaccuracyrequirements toself-assessments andQAaudits/surveillances.

Theseprocessimprovements willbedeveloped andimplemented concurrent withRGBsreviewoftheUFSAR,i.e.,tobecompletebyOctober18,1998.RGB'asscheduled, andincorporated intoourbusinessplanfor1997,theperformance oftwointernalSSFIs.SystemsselectedfortheseSSFIsaretheComponent CoolingWater(CCW)SystemandtheServiceWater(SW)System.TheseSSFIswillprovideanadditional measureoftheeFectiveness ofourcurrentprocesses andprograms, manyofwhichhavebeenimplemented and/orenhancedsinceourlastseriesofSSFIs.RG&Ewillidentifyandresolveanydeficiencies orweaknesses usingournormalcorrective actionprocess.BasedontheresultsoftheseSSFIs,wewillalsoassesstheneedtoconductadditional SSFIsinconjunction withtheotherdesignbaseseffortsdescribed above.Ourtrainingprogramswillsupportimplementation oftheprocessimprovements listedabove.Wealsowilluseourtrainingprogramstoinformappropriate NuclearOperations Groupp'ersonnel regarding newandenhancedunderstandings ofsystemsdesignbasesastheyareidentified byourSSFIinvestigations anddesignbasessourcedocumentreviews.10CFR50.54(t)

Response-SummaryReportFinalReportPage172/7/97 1P4ill<'1~IIl%*

10CFR50.54(f)

RESPONSEATTACHMENT A(a)Description ofengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses, including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59, 10CFR50.71(e),

andAppendix8to10CFRPart50.NOTE:THISATTACHMENT ISSUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION THATISTOBEREADINCONJUNCTION WITHITSCORRESPONDING SECTIONINTHESUMMARYREPORT.ITISN~TASTAND-ALONE DOCUMENT.

ThisAttachment isorganized asfollows:A.1.PROCESSES TOCONTROLLICENSEREUIREMENTS A.l.A.LicenseAmendments (10CFR50.90)

A;1.B.ImprovedTechnical Specification BasesControlProgram/ControlofCOLR,PTLR,andTRMA.l.C.SafetyReviewsandSafetyEvaluations (10CFR50.59)

A.l.D.UFSARUpdates(10CFR50.71(e))

A.l.E.ChangestoQualityAssurance (10CFR50.54(a))

A.l.F.ChangestotheSecurityPlan(10CFR50.54(p))

A.1.G.ChangestotheEmergency Plan(10CFR50.54(q))

A.l.H.ASMECodeReliefRequests(10CFR50.55a)

A.l.I.Regulatory Commitment ChangesA.1.J.Tracking/Incorporation ofGenericRegulatory andIndustryConcernsA.2.PRESSESFRENINEERINDESINANDNFIGATINONTROLA.2.A.PlantChangeProcesses (10CFR50, AppendixB)A.2.B.Temporary Modifications A.2.C.Administrative ControlofProcedures A.2.D.Maintenance WorkControlSystemA.2.E.OperatorWork-Arounds

/Challenges A.2.F.DrawingChangeControlProcess(DCRs)A.2.GProcurement Engineering ProcessA.3.TRAININGIOCFR50.54(0 Response-Attachment AFinalRcportPage182/7/97 A.1.PROCESSES TOCONTROLLICENSEREUIREMENTS A.1.A.LicenseAmendments (10CFR50.90)

Alicenseamendment request(LAR)isconcerned withchangestotheGinnaStationFacilityOperating LicenseandAttachment Atothatlicense.(Attachment AisreferredtoastheImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS),adocumentrepresenting alargeportionoftheGinnalicensing basis,sinceitrequiresequipment tobeoperableasassumedintheUFSARChapter15accidentanalysis.)

WithrespecttotheITS,aLARisrequiredfor1)anyITSchangethatisnotabasisstatement and2)thosebaseschangeswhichinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

[Notethatallbaseschangesrequireatleasta10CFR50.59 SafetyReview.]PerRG&E'sadministrative requirements forLARs(ND-LPC,LicenseProgramControl,EP-2-S-700,LicenseAmendment

Requests, andA-601.7,Preparation,

Approval, andImplementation ofAmendments toTechnical Specifications),

LARsarereviewedandrecommended forapprovalbyPORC,reviewedbytheNSARB;andarethensubmitted totheNRCbytheVicePresident, NuclearOperations, oranotherofficeofthecorporation, underoathoraffirmation.

A.I.B.ImprovedTechnical Specification BasesControlProgramIControlofCOLR,PTLR,TRMDesignbasesassociated withtheGinnaImprovedTechnical Specifications aredocumented intheITSBasesportionoftheTechnical Specifications.

Also,inaccordance with10CFR50.36 aspartofGinnaITSimplementation, designbasessubjecttoperiodicchange,e.g.,duetocorefuelreloadandthoserelatedtonon-design basisaccidentanalysis, havebeenremovedfromtheITSandarenowcontained inaseriesofassociated documents.

RG&Ehasimplemented aprocesstocontrolandevaluateproposedchangestothesedesignbasesdocuments.

UnliketheGinnaoriginalTechnical Specifications, theITSBasesareunderRG&EcontrolsuchthatITSBaseschanges,e.g.,resulting fromnecessary clarifications andinterpretations, canbeimplemented byRG&EwithoutpriorNRCapproval.

TheITSBasescanbechangedviatheTechnical Specification BasesControlProgramperIP-LPC-2, UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportandAssociated Documents Control.Underthisprogram,RG&Eevaluates proposedBaseschangespriortoimplementation toensuretheydonotchangeaLimitingCondition forOperation (LCO)orinvolvea10CFR50.59 unreviewed safetyquestion(USQ).IfeitherachangetoanLCO,oraUSQisidentified, theproposedchangewouldrequireaLicenseAmendment asdescribed in(A.l.A)above,approvedbytheNRC,priortoimplementation.

InadditiontotheITSBases,threeotherdocuments, directlyrelatedtotheITS,arealsocontrolled byRG&EundertheITSBasesControlProgram.Theseare:10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attaclnncnt AFinalRcportPage192/787

~4~+0I'a'aItr4il1'll1

~Core0eratinLimitsReortCOLR:Thisdocumentcontainscycle-specific parameter limitsrequiredbytheITSthatmaychangeasaresultofarefueling outage.ThevaluesmaybechangedbyRG&Eprovidedthevaluesaredetermined inaccordance withNRC-approvedmethodology specified withintheadministrative controlsoftheITS.InadditiontoITSrequirements, theCOLRcurrently containsatablelistingmajorparameters usedbytheaccidentanalysis.

~PressureandTemeralureLimitsReortTLR:ThisdocumentcontainsspecificvaluesrequiredbytheITSthatarerelatedtoreactorpressurevesselpressureandtemperature limits,including RCSheatup/cooldown curves,andthelowtemperature overpressure

'rotection (LTOP)systemforthecurrentfluenceperiod.ThevaluescannotbechangedwithoutNRCapproval; however,anLicenseAmendment Requesthasbeensubmitted toplacethisdocumentunderRG&EcontrolsimilartotheCOLR.~Technical ReNirements Mammal:Thisdocumentcontainspreviousrequirements thathavesincebeenremovedfromTechnical Specifications andplacedunderRG&Econtrol.Typically, theseitemsrelatetonon-design basisaccidentanalysisassumptions whicharerequiredbyaNRCregulation andthatrelatetotheplantOperations staffe.g.,fireprotection measuresrequiredby10CFR50,AppendixR.A.1.C.ISafetyReviewsandSafetyEvaluations (10CFR50.59)

The10CFR50.59 processissub-divided intotheSafetyReviewandtheSafetyEvaluation, implemented byIP-SEV-1, Preparation, Review,andApprovalofSafetyReviews,andbyIP-SEV-2,Preparation, Review,andApprovaloflOCFR50.59 SafetyI"valuations, respectively.

Thevariousprocesses whichcontrolplantactivities (suchasthePlantChangeProcess,procedure preparation/revision, andACTIONReports)includerequirements toconsidertheirimpactonnuclearsafetyinaccordance withtheSafetyReview/Safety Evaluation process.ITheSafetyReviewincludesanestablished setofscreening questions whichareusedtodetermine ifaSafetyReviewissufficien andthatasubsequent 10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation isnotrequired.

Thesescreening questions areintendedtoensurethatproposedchangesdonotaffectnuclearsafety,donotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, anddonotinvolveachangetotheTechnical Specifications.

ExamplesinwhichaSafetyReviewsufficesincludecaseswhereanotherexistingSafetyEvaluation addresses thechangeandcaseswherethechangeisinconsequential, e.g.,spelling, grammar,oralistofpersonnel names.The10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation isa.formal, written,technical evaluation performed whenaproposedactivitydoesnotmeetthescreening criteriaoftheSafetyReviewsothatrelevantchangestoprocedures ortosystems,structures, andcomponents described intheUFSARmaybe"specifically definedandevaluated.

Theevaluation usesaprescribed formatintendedtoensureproposedplantchangesareevaluated withrespecttosafetyconsiderations ofthecurrentplantdesignbasis,preservetheUFSAR,andconformtoTechnical Specifications.

10CFR50.54(0 Response-Attachment AFinalReportPage202/7/97 0,I':F4a,~'g'y~g~,~

Aqualified individual independently reviewstheadequacyoftheSafetyEvaluation againstthelicensing basisandtheUFSAR.TheManager,NuclearSafety&Licensing, reviewsandapprovestheSafetyEvaluation.

SafetyEvaluations arethenpresented totheon-sitereviewfunction(PORC)fortheirreviewandrecommendation ofPlantManagerapproval.

AsummaryofapprovedSafetyEvaluations isprovidedtotheNRCinaccordance with10CFR50.59(b)(2).

A.1.D.UFSARUpdates(10CFR50.71(e))

HistooftheGinnaUFSARGinnaStationreceiveditsoriginalProvisional Operating Licensebasedontheinformation providedtotheAECinthePreliminary FacilityDescription andSafetyAnalysisReportin1966,aswellastheanswersprovidedinresponseto'.AECandACRSquestions.

Thiscompilation ofinformation wasconsolidated intotheFinalFacilityDescription andSafetyAnalysisReport("FSAR")in1969.TheProvisional Operating LicensewasissuedonSeptember 19,1969.Twosupplements totheFSARwereissuedin1971and1973;otherwise, therewasnochangetotheFSARuntilafterthepublication/implementation of10CFR50.71(e).

Atthattime,RG&Ecompileddocketedcorrespondence regarding GinnaStationanddescriptions ofmodifications performed sinceplantstartuptoevaluatewhatinformation toaddtotheFSARtobringitinlinewith10CFR50.71.

Aspartofamajorupdatein1984,RG&Ealsoenhancedthedescriptive information intheFSAR.Thisresultedintheoriginal3volumeFSARexpanding intoan8volumeUpdatedFSAR(UFSAR).PeriodicupdatesoftheUFSARhavebeensubmitted totheNRCsincethattimewiththelatest,Revision13,havingbeensubmitted inDecember, 1996.ChanestotheUFSARChangestotheUFSARarecontrolled byND-LPC,LicenseProgramControl.Thisdocumentdescribes therequirements of10CFR50.71(e) andtaskstheNuclearSafety&Licensing (NS&L)groupwithoverseeing theprogram.IP-LPC-2, UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportandAssociated Documents Control,establishes theinstructions forsubmitting, reviewing, andprocessing changesandrevisions totheUFSAR.IP-LPC-2providesdirection onwhentoprepareachangetotheUFSARandliststhetypesofinformation tobereviewedforinclusion intheUFSAR.Eachrequestforachangeissupported byachangepackageofsupporting documentation.

Changepackagesarereviewedbycognizant personnel, including NuclearSafety&Licensing, SystemsEngineering, andOperations.

Approvedchangepackagesarethenincorporated intothenextUFSARrevisionper10CFR50.71(e).

A.1.E.ChangestoQualityAssurance (10CFR50.54(a))

ChangestoNuclearDirectives (NDs)whichmayafFectcommitments madetotheNRCinthe.QAProgramforStationOperations (QAPSO)areev'aluated inaccordance withND-LPC,LicenseProgramControl,byQAandNuclearSafety&Licensing per10CFR50.54(a) prior10CFR50.54(f)

Response-Attachment AFinalReportPage212/7/97

'C~1'>4hkk>>'<k'"4~~~'ww toimplementation ofthechange.Changeswhich,throughevaluation, cannotsubstantiate nNoimpact"oncommitments areconsidered tobereducti'ons incommitment.

Changesevaluated tobecommitment reductions needreviewandconcurrence bytheNRCpriortoimplementation.

Annually, QApreparesaQAPSOtransmittal whichidentifies thefollowing:

~Thechangesandreasonstheyweremade.~Thebasisforconcluding thattherevisedprogramcontinues tosatisfythe10CFR50AppendixBcriteriaandtheexistingNRC-endorsed programdescription commitments PerQA-LPC-1, RevisionandControloftheQAProgramforStationOperations, acopyofthetransmittal isforwarded totheNSARB,thePORC,NS&L,theVicePresident, NuclearOperations, andtheSeniorVicePresident, Energy.Operations forreview.'hen allcommentshavebeenresolved, theoriginalofthesubmittal issignedbytheVicePresident, NuclearOperations, oranotherofficerofthecorporation, andtransmitted totheNRC.A.1.F.ChangestotheSecurityPlan(10CFR50.54(p))

ChangestotheSecurityPlanarecontrolled byND-LPC,LicenseProgramControl.AnychangestotheGinnaStationPhysicalSecurityPlanwhichdonotresultinareduction ofphysicalsecurityeffectiveness aremade'inaccordance with10CFR50.54(p).

ThesechangesarereviewedandapprovedbytheSupervisor, NuclearSecurityandthenbythePORCpriortobeingsubmitted totheNRC,asrequiredbyND-LPC.ChangestotheSecurityPlanwhichwouldresultinareduction ofphysicalsecurityeffectiveness mustbemadeundertheprovisions of10CFR50.90.

ThesechangesarereviewedbytheSupervisor, NuclearSecurity, PORC,andtheNSARB.ThechangesmustthenbeapprovedbytheNRCpriortoimplementation.

Inadditiontotheappropriate reviewofchanges,twoother-annual reviewsareconducted:

~QA-"Applicability andAdequacyoftheSecurityPlanandAssociated SecurityActivities" (Required by10CFR73.55(g)(4))

~Operations/Security

-the'Security PlanandContingency Plan(toevaluatetheirpotential impactonplantandpersonnel safety).10CFRSO.S4(0 Rcsponsc-Attachment AFinalRcFcttPage222/7/97 tktl A.1.G.ChangestotheEmergency Plan(10CFR50.54(q))

ND-LPC,LicenseProgramControl,andA-205.2,Emergency PlanImplementing Procedures Committee, governchangestotheNuclearEmergency ResponsePlan(NERP)andtotheEmergency PlanImplementing Procedures (EPIPs).NERPorEPIPchangesarereviewedbytheEPIPcommittee, asasubcommittee toPORC.Thiscommittee currently hasrepresentatives fromEmergency

Planning, Operations, Engineering, Radiation Protection andChemistry, Maintenance,

Training, andPublicRelations.

Thecommittee isintendedensurethatNERPandEPIPprocedure changesdonotdecreasetheeffectiveness oftheplanandthatthechangesmeetthestandards of10CFR50.54(q).

ChangesarereviewedbytheCorporate NuclearEmergency PlannerandareapprovedbyPORC.AppendixHoftheNERPcontainsacross-reference oftheemergency planningrequirements (foundinNUREG-0654) tothesectionoftheNERPthatmeetstherequirement.

ThisisintendedtoensurethatchangestotheNERPandEPIPsarereviewedagainsttheplanrequirement andthattheplanrequirements reflecttheemergency planningbasesprescribed bytheNRCinNUREG-0654.

A.1.H.ASMECodeReliefRequests(10CFR50.55a)

Inservice Inspection andInservice Testingprogramsareimplemented byND-IIT,Inservice Inspection andTesting.ND-IITappliestotheexamination, repair,replacement, modification, andtestingofClass1,2,and3systemsandcomponents inaccordance withtheAmericanSocietyofMechanical Engineers (ASME)BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI,1986Edition(theCode).ASMECodereliefrequestsareusedtoobtainNRCapprovalofapositiondifferent'than thatdescribed bytheapplicable Code(primarily withrespecttotheISI/ISTprogram).

Reliefrequestsusuallyinvolvetestingandacceptance

criteria, buttheycanalsobeusedtoresolveorchangedesignorconstruction requirements.

Requestsaredeveloped bythecognizant ISI/ISTEngineerandLaboratory Inspection Servicespersonnel.

NuclearSafetyA,Licensing reviewstherequest.TherequestisthensenttoNRCforreviewandapprovalwithacopytotheGinnaSeniorResidentInspector.

Approvedreliefrequestseffectively providealternate methodsofmeetingdesignbasisrequirements.

A.1.I.Regulatory Commitment ChangesTheengineering designandconfiguration controlprocess(involving generating newcommitments anddeletingormodifying existingcommitments) isdetailedinseveralNuclearDirectives, Interface Procedures, andengineering department procedures.

Thisprocessisintendedto1)controlamendments totheFacilityOperating Licenseandchangestoprogramsthatimplement licenseconditions, commitments, orregulations, and2)assignresponsibility forimplementing theserequirements.

t10CFR50.54(Q Rcsponsc-Attachment AFinalRcportPage232/7/97 II~t+ge1w~'>\re>la~~~bLNa><<'igI4' ACommitment andActionTrackingSystem(CATS)wasimplemented in1989asanaidtoensurethatregulatory commitments andactionitemsaretracked'to completion, areadequately documented, andaresearchable.

Guidelines forprocessing documents throughCATSareprovidedinEP-3-S-701, CATSDocumentProcessing.

CATScontainsopenactivecommitments, aswellasone-time, completed commitments madesince1989.Additionally, aspartofourdesignbasisdocumentation program,docketedcorrespondence frominitialplantlicensing through1994hasbeencatalogued andiscontained withinanothersearchable databasewhichenablestheusertoelectronically searchforadesiredtopicandthenviewtheimageoftherelateddocument.

Correspondence since1994isbeingadded.Therequirement toevaluateeffectsonregulatory commitments hasbeenincorporated intochangeprocesses atGinnasuchasthe10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation processandthechangeimpactevaluation portionofthePlantChangeRequest(PCR)process.A.1.J.Tracking/Incorporation ofGenericRegulatory andIndustryConcernsThegenericregulatory processenhances/updates thedesignbasesinthatRG&Ereviewsandaddresses NRCgenericcommunications andincorporates anyresulting RG&Ecommitments intoplantprocedures andprograms.

Theseinitiatives aretransmitted byNRC,e.g.,viaInformation Notices(INs),Bulletins, andGenericLetters(GLs).TheitemsaretrackedwithinRG&EusingtheCommitment andActionTrackingSystem(CATS).Theadministrative procedures governing implementation oftheCATSareintendedtoensurethatsuchgenericregulatory documents areappropriately reviewedfortheirspecificapplicability toGinna,including anyefFectonplantoperations, procedures, andconfiguration.

RG&Ereviewofsuchgenericregulatory correspondence hasresultedindesignbasisplantenhancements such~Enhancedinstrumentation hardwareandoperating procedures tominimizethepotential forlossofdecayheatremovalcoolingduringrefueling andespecially duringreducedinventory operations (GL88-017)~Enhancedpumprecirculation pipingandtestprocedures tominimizelongterm~degradation oftheRHRpumpsduetoperiodictestingatverylowflow(Bulletin 88-004)~Revisedmaintenance procedures andguidelines intendedtoensureanddocumentthatvaporbarriersandsealsarereinstalled forelectrical equipment aftermaintenance tominimizethepotential forwaterintrusion intoelectrical enclosures (IN89-063).RG&Ehasalsoestablished anadministrative process(A-1404,Operating Experience Program,ascontrolled byIP-LPC-1, Commitment andActionTracking) forscreening andevaluating Operating Experience (OE)(consisting ofindustryeventsandvendornotices)forapplicability toGinna.Theprocessisintendedtoensurethatthesenoticesarereviewedforimpactonoperability, possibleunreviewed safetyquestions, potential degradation of,or10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponao-Attachment AFinalRcportPage242/7/97

=I"g'IIIII'Iie~I challenges to,safetysystems/equipment, andpossibleeffectsonimplementation ofEmergency Operating Procedures.

Forvendornotifications, theprocessalsodetermines whether10CFR21reportability isrequired.

ITheon-goingOEreviewprocessassistsintheevaluation oftheneedtoupgradetheplantdesignbases.Abriefreviewofpast(since1990)OEitemsfoundapplicable toGinnaandinvolving configuration controlordesignbasisissuesidentified approximately 30itemsofsignificance toGinna.TheOEreviewprocessdetermined whethertheitemwasalreadyunderevaluation andbeingresolvedbyRG&E.Ifnot,theitemswererecommended forfurtheractionandtrackedundertheCommitment andActionTrackingSystem.Examplesofindustryeventsscreenedasapplicable toGinnawhichinvolveconfiguration controltopicsinclude:~SER91-007,FailuretoControlValveLineupStatusResulting inaReactorCoolantDrainDote~SER91-021,PlantTransients CausedbyIn-HouseDistribution Transformer Failures~SER95-008,Service8'aterSpillinSwitchgear Area/Loss ofPhysicalSeparation BettveenSafety-Related Electrical Facilities.

A.2.PROCESSES FORENGINEERING DESIGNANDCONFIGURATION CONTROLA.2.A.PlantChangeProcesses (10CFR50, AppendixB)BACKGROUND Theprimaryprocessforensuringconsistency betweenplantdesignbases,plantconfiguration, andconductofoperation hasbeentheRG&Edesigncontrolprocess.Overthelifeoftheplant,thedesigncontrolprocesshasundergone severalevolutionary changesintendedtoimprovethequalityofdesigncontrolandtoensurethatappropriate aspectsoftheprocesswereappliedtochanges,including thoseoflesserscope.Duringthelaterstagesofplantconstruction andthefirstfewyearsofplantoperation, changestotheplantweremadebytheNSSSsupplier, theA/E,andbyRG&E.Theseearlychangesmadepriortoadoptionof10CFR50,AppendixB,werenotalwayscapturedindetail,becausetheconfiguration documentation requiredatthetimewasfarlessthancurrently isexpected.

Manyoftheconfiguration management effortsdiscussed inAttachment Caidedinproperlydocumenting theseearlierchanges.Also,severallargedesignprojectswereperformed bytheA/Eintheearly1970susingtheGinnaStationModification (GSM)package.Inthe1970s,theEngineering WorkRequest(EWR)becamethemajorprocessforplantmodifications.

TheEWRwaslatersupplemented byplantprocesses forTechnical StaffRequests, Technical Evaluations, andTemporary Modifications.

In1994,theEngineering WorkRequest(EWR)modification processwasreplacedbythePlantChangeRequest/Record (PCR)process.Theunderlying requirements fortheseprocesses havebeenapplicable portionsof10CFR50AppendixB,theRG&EQAprogram,andANSI45.2.11requirements.

Thebasicstepsinthedesigncontrolprocessareasfollows:10CFR50.54(0 Rcsponsc-Attachment AFinalReportPage252/7/97 Igi't~Mil~l+a~)qIC,gVygaewe~1a P~ldfiii-fiiiififiifiifiIiifififitdeficiency ortoimproveuponanexistingcondition.

~DesinInutDeveloment-Thefunctional anddesignbasis requirementsfortheaffected systems,structures, andcomponents ar'edeveloped totheextentrequiredtoperformthedesignchangeandassurethatoverallplantdesignbasesandfunctions havenotbeenadversely affected.

Forlesser,self-contained modifications (component parts.equivalency),

thismaybequitelimited;however,forcomplexchanges,designinputdevelopment canrepresent amajordesignbasisreconstitution efforttodetermine effectsonsystemperformance, interaction betweensystems,andphysicalproximity concernsforotherwise unrelated components andsystems.ForGinnamodifications, acontrolled DesignCriteriadocumentisrequiredwhichdocuments theresultsoftheseefforts.~10CFR50.59 SafetEvaluation (described elsewhere inthisdocument)

-BasedupontheDesignCriteriaforthemodification, thesafetyscreening/evaluation isintendedtoensurethatthechangeisnota10CFR50.59 Unreviewed SafetyQuestion, thatnoTechnical Specification changesarerequired, andthatitiswithinthecurrentlicensing basisforGinna.Ifnot,aLicensing Amendment Requestmustbesubmitted to,andapprovedby,NRCpriortoimplementation ofthechange.~EnineerinDesinOututs-BasedupontheDesignCriteriaand SafetyEvaluation forthechange,engineering designoutputsaredeveloped.

Someoutputsaretodemonstrate thatthedesignisconsistent withthedesignbases.Thesearetypically designanalyses, calculations, andtechnical reports.Otherdesignoutputscommunicate howthedesignchangeistobeimplemented sothattheresulting configuration willreflectdesignbases.Thesetypically includedrawings,

sketches, andspecifications including acceptance criteria.

~IndeendentDesinVerification

-Areviewofthedevelopment andresultsofthedesignchangetoconclude, independent ofthecognizant designpersonnel, thatthevariousoutputsofthedesigncontrolprocesshaveindeedmettherequirements ofthedesigninputs,specifically theDesignCriteriaandSafetyEvaluation.

Verification mayincludemultiplereviewers forcomplex,interdisciplinary changesandissometimes complemented byOperations andMaintenance impactreviews.~Construction andFabrication Oututs-Thesearedetailedoutputs,basedupontheEngineering Outputs,usedtocommunicate tothefabricator andinstaller howthechangeshouldbeimplemented andintendedtoensurethattheresulting configuration willreflectthedesignbases.Thesemayincludefabrication andinstallation

drawings, procedures, workorders,vendordocuments, billsofmaterial, andqualityassurance inspection andtestplans.~ConfirationChanes-Thesearechangenoticesissuedtoensureconsistent configuration controlofdocuments andprocesses affectedbythedesignchangetheymayinclude,butarenotlimitedto,changestooperating, maintenance, andperiodictest10CFR50.54(t)

Response-Attachment AFinalReportPage262/7/97 (glC~A4I procedures, trainingmodules,drawingsandspecifications, safetyclassification lists,applicable vendordocumentfiles,andUFSARdescriptions.

Procedural guidanceisprovidedforthepriorityandtimingofsuchchangesrelativetotheimplementation ofthedesignchange.~Imlementati nofModification

-Theconstruction andfabrication outputsareusedtobuildandinstallthechange.Installation activities aregovernedbytheplantworkcontrolprocesses andincludeprovisions forestablishing equipment holdsandtaggingwithconsideration forcomplying withImprovedTechnical Specification andequipment operability

concerns, processes forconsideration offieldchangestothedesignandimplementation basedonemergingfieldinformation (Modification DesignChangeNoticesPvK)CNs]

andTemporary Procedure ChangeNotices[TPCNs]),

andrecordsupdaterequirements toensurethechangeisdocumented aspartoftheappropriate equipment historyrecords.~Post-Modification Testin-Functional testingoftheequipment and/orsystem(s) isperformed todemonstrate thatactualperformance meetsthedesignbasesrequirements following implementation ofthedesignchangeandpriortorelyinguponthedesignchangeandassociated systemstoperformsafety-related functions.

~Close-Out

-Afinalconfirmation thatallaspectsofthedesignchangehavebeenproperlyimplemented, completed, anddocumented.

Close-out isintendedtoassurethatfinalconfiguration andprocedures associated withoperation ofthemodifiedsystemareconsistent withthedesignbasesforthechangeasdocumented inthedesigncriteriaandSafetyEvaluation.

Itisalsointendedtoensurethatthebasesandconfiguration resulting fromthechangearereadilyavailable forfuturereference, bysubmitting theappropriate documentation torecords.RG&EPLANTCHANGEREVESTCRTheprocedure whichdescribes theflowofengineering work,organizational responsibilities, andimplementing procedures fordeveloping, reviewing andapproving theEngineering documents requiredforaplantchangeisIP-DES-02, PlantChangeProcess.Interfaces betweendesignandimplementing activities arealsoaddressed including installation, testingandturnover.

IP-DES-02 alsocoversprocessing ofaPlantChangeRecord(PCR),whichisusedtodocumentplantchanges.ThePCRprovidesflexibility initsusetomostefFectively accommodate theneedsofaspecificplantchange.Screensareusedtodevelopeachplantchangepackagewiththetechnical andadministrative contentcommensurate withthenatureofthechange.Forsimple,smallerscopeplantchanges,thePCRmaybeusedasa"stand-alone" document.

Forlarger,morecomplexplantchanges,thePCRisusedprimarily asadesignrecord.ThePCRformisintendedtobeelastic.Thatis,itcanbeexpandedtoincludenecessary andapplicable information todocumentandsummarize theplantchange,oritcanbecompressed toomittopicsorinformation whicharenotapplicable.

10CFR50.54(Q Rcsponsc-Attadrrncnt AFinalRcportPage272/7/97 Procedures anddocuments whichimplement portionsofthePCRprocessandwhichmaybeusedforaPCRinclude:Engineering andInterface Procedures EP-2-P-1-10, EP-2-P-111, EP-2-P-112, EP-2-P-114, EP-2-P-117, EP-3-P-121, EP-3-P-122, EP-3-P-123, EP;3-P-124, EP-3-S-125, EP-3-P-126, EP-3-P-131, EP-3-P-132, EP-3-P-133, EP-3-P-137, EP-3-P-138, EP-3-P-139, EP-3-P-140, EP-3-P-151, EP-3-P-162, EP-3-S-304, EP-3-P-306, EP-3-P-700, EP-3-S-901, IP-SEV-1, IP-SEV-2, VendorTechnical DocumentControlProcessCMISd'cFireProtection ProgramDatabases, DataInputGuideUFSARChangeRequestsComponent SafetyClassification

.DocumentChangeRequestDesignControlDesignAnalysisDrawingControlEngineering Specification DesignVerification Equivalency Evalualion ALARADesig7ReviewFireProtection!Appendix RConformance ReviewHumanFactorsReviewComputerSoftwareControlErosion/Corrosion ConlrolProgramEnvironmental Qualification ProgramModification DesigvChangesProcurement ASMEXfRepair,Replacement d'cModification ProgramImplementation 8'orkPrioritizationChangeImpactEvalualion LicenseAmendment RequestsRecordsandDocumentControlPreparation, ReviewandApprovalofSafetyReviewsP-R-Aof10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluations 2.GinnaStationProcedures A-302.2,A-401,A-601,A-606,A-1303,A-1603.0, Evaluation ofPartstoDetermine SafetyClassification ControlofProcurement Documents PreparedforGinnaStationProcedure ConlrolDrawingChangeRequeslsStoraged'cPreservation ofMaterials andEquipment

-GinnaStationOverviewoftheGimtaStation8'orkControlSystemIOCFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attachrncnt AFinalRcportPago282fl/97

~ll'Ir 3.QualityAssurance Procedures QA-603,Controlled DocumentDistribution QA-1702,RecordsNuclearTrainingManualTR-5.5.1, TrackingPlantChanges5.GinnaStationSimulator Procedures GSS-1.1,Simulator Modification ControlThespecificresponsibilities oftheEngineer(s) assignedthePCRinclude:~InitiatethePlantChangeRecord(PCR)~Determine thetypeoftheplantchange~Determine thesafetyclassification oftheplantchange~PerformEquivalency Evaluation (whenapplicable)

~PerformaSafetyRevieworinitiateaSafetyEvaluation oftheplantchange(whenrequired)

~Determine interfaces/support requiredfortheplantchangedesigndevelopment andensurethatsupportpersonnel areinformedaboutandinvolvedinthedesignasitisdeveloped

~PerformaChangeImpactEvaluation (CIE)todetermine andidentifytheadministrative, engineering andsafetyrequirements fortheplantchange~Specifythedesigninputrequirements (including developing DesignCriteria, ifnecessary)

~Developtherequireddesignoutputdocuments (suchasdrawings, specifications, designanalyses, billofmaterials, andvendordocumentation)

~Obtainrequiredreviews,verification andapprovaloftheplantchangepackage~Supportplantchangeimplementation activities

~Updateaffectedengineering documents toreflecttheplantchange~Confirmthataffectedsystemsdrawingshavebeenupdatedandthatneworrevisedsystem/plant procedures havebeencompleted

~Coordinate anyresulting trainingissueswiththeTrainingDepartment

~Facilitate theidentification ofreliability, operability, maintainability andtestability issuesforassignedsystems~Contribute topost-modification systemorcomponent testingrequirements

~Assistintheresolution oftestinganomalies

~AssesstheimpactoftheplantchangeontheMaintenance Ruleprogram~Reviewdesignoutputstoconfirmthatdetailswillnothaveanadverseeffectonplantsafetyoroperation

~Monitorprogressofchangeinstallation 10CFR50.$

4(QRcsponso-Attaclmrcnt AFinalRcportPage29,2/7/97 I.A

~SubmitthePCRandrelatedrecordsanddocuments toRecordsManagement forretention and/ordistribution Appropriate reviewsandapprovals fortheaboveactionsareincludedintheassociated procedures.

USEOFANDCONTROLOFOUTSIDEENGINEERING RESOURCES RG&Eunderstands that,asthelicenseeforGinnaStation,weareultimately responsible forthedesignanddesignbasesoftheplant.Wemaintainalimitedprofessional relationship withbothourNSSSsupplierandoriginalA/E.However,onlyourNSSSsupplierperformsregularengineering'tasks, andthesearelimitedto1)fuelreloadandassociated accidentanalysesand2)owner'sgroupactivities.

MostplantChangesaredeveloped andimplemented usingRG&Eengineering resources.

Forlargerprojects, RG&Edoesmakeuseofoutsideengineering resources basedupon1)theirknowledge andexpertise atthespecifictask,2)theirgeneraloverallknowledge ofGinna,and3)theirpastperformance.

Whenoutsideengineering isused,RG&Eformallyexercises designresponsibility throughthedevelopment andcontrolofthedetailedDesignCriteriaandSafetyEvaluation documents, aswellasthroughappropriate engineering anddesignreviewsofoutputsproposedbyourengineering servicessuppliers.

Forexample,fortheSteamGenerator Replacement Project(SGRP),RG&Eelectedtoprocurereplacement steamgenerators fromafabricator otherthanouroriginalNSSSsupplier.

RG&Eworkedcooperatively withboththesteamgenerator fabricator andtheinstaller todeveloptheDesignCriteria, theSafetyEvaluation reports,andthedetailedequipment specification thatestablished thedesignbasesandcriteriaforthegenerators andtheirinstallation.

Approvalandcontrolofthesedocuments weremaintained byRG&E.Further,RG&Eperformed detaileddesignreviewsofthetechnical reports,analyses, andoutputdocuments developed fortheSGRP.TheSGRPwascompleted intheSpringof1996onscheduleandunderbudget,withnomajortechnical

problems, andwithanadequately documented conformance todesignbases.Theseaccomplishments wereinnosmallpartduetoRG&E'sextensive technical involvement throughout thecourseoftheproject.A.2.B.Temporary ModiTications A-1406,ControlofTemporary Modifications, isusedformosttemporary modification installations andprovidesrequirements fortheircontrolanddocumentation.

Itisintendedthatthescope,number,anddurationoftemporary modifications shouldbeminimized.

Temporary modifications aredefinedastemporary minoralterations madetoplantequipment, components, orsystemsthatdonotconformwithapproveddrawingsorotherdesigndocuments.

Thesealterations aretemporary inthattheyareexpectedtobeinstalled foroneoperating cycleorless.Thefollowing areexamplesoftemporary modifications:

~liftedleads~pullcircuitcards~disabledalarms~temporary powercables(notextension cords)10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attachment AFinalReportPage302/7/97 c.k'y'll'QP0i*10

~setpointchanges~mechanical.

jumpers,suchasspoolpieces,hoses,tubing,pipingorvalves~temporary leakrepairs(e.g.,mechanical clamps)~installed orremovedblankflanges~disabledreliefvalvesorsafetyvalves~installed orremovedfiltersorstrainers

~pluggedorcoveredfloordrains~temporary pipesupports~temporary specialriggingattachments tosafety-related systems/components/structures

~temporary computersoftwarechangesthatperformaMainControlBoardalarmcontrolfunction.

Temporary modifications controlled byotherapprovedprocedures, e.g.,certainjumpersinstalled tosupporttestingandremovedaspartofrecoveryfromthattest,areexcludedfromtherequirements ofA-1406.Proposedtemporary modifications arepreparedbyanassignedEngineerusingtheapplicable designinputsfortheaffectedsystem/component(s).

Althoughprocedural requirements differsomewhat, theresponsibilities oftheassignedEngineerareconsidered tobesimilarto,andassignificant as,thoselistedaboveforpermanent plantchanges.Theapplicable designinputsandtheirevaluation aredocumented aspartoftheprocedural process.Testingrequirements, ifany,forthetemporary modification areidentified bytheassignedengineer.

ASafetyReviewisperformed foreachTemporary Modification.

ASafetyEvaluation isperformed, iftheSafetyReviewscreening indicates thatoneisneeded.Anyrequiredmoderestrictions arenoted.TheassignedEngineerdetermines theprocessforpermanent resolution (suchasconditions forremoval,EWR,TSR,WR/TR,etc.)andtheexpectedremovaldate.Theselecteddesigninputsandevaluation arereviewedbyasecondEngineerexperienced intherelatedsubjectmatteroraffectedsystem.Theresultsofthereviewaredocumented.

Selecteddocumentation, e.g:,Operating Procedures, andcontrolroomcopiesofP&IDsarechangedtoreflectthetemporary modifications.

Forexample,affectedcontrolroomP&IDsareaffixedwithalabelindicating thetemporary modification anditsidentification number.A.2.C.Administrative ControlofProcedures Procedural HierarchTherequirements forthedevelopment ofprocedures associated withGinnaStationareestablished inND-PRO,Procedures, Instructions, andGNidelines.

Thebasicorganization andhierarchy ofprocedures isestablished byND-NPD,NuclearPolicyandDirectives ManualDescription, andareasfollows:~LiceninDocuments

-Documents (suchastheFacilityOperating License,UFSAR,andImprovedTechnical Specifications) whichhavebeendeveloped asamethodforRG&Etoshowcompliance withregulatory requirements/guidelines, industrystandards/practices, andcommitments madetoregulatory agencies.

lOCFR50.54(t)

Response-Attachment AFinalReportPat,c312/7/97 P,kCfFY,~'l>*we-UkE

~NuclearPolicies-Highlevelstatements'of commitment andendorsement fromseniorcorporate management tothemajorprinciples ofNuclearSafetyandQualityAssurance, assigning corporate responsibility fortheseprinciples.

~NuclearDirectives s-Providemanagement direction forimplementation ofcommitments toregulatory requirements, industrystandards, andcorporate policy.~NuclearInterface Procedures

-Governactivities involving interfaces betweenorganizational departments andactivities performed bymorethanonedepartment whereacommonmethodology isdesired.~DeartmentandSectionAdministrative Procedures

-Definetheorganization, assignresponsibilities withindepartments, andprescribe methodsofaccomplishing departmental activities belowtheleveladdressed inNDsandIPs.~Technical Procedures

-Step-by-step procedures whichprescribe methodsforaccomplishing activities outlinedinhighertierdocuments withinanindividual section.ExamplesofTechnical Procedures areOperating Procedures, Radiological Protection Procedures, Maintenance Procedures, andSurveillance Procedures.

ND-PROalsohasprovisions for,andrestrictions on,otherprocedural vehiclessuchasInstructions, Guidelines, Temporary Procedures, andContractor Procedures.

Procedure DevelomentandhanesND-PRO,Procedures, Instructions, andGuidelines, includesrequirements, regulatory

guidance, andmanagement expectations fortheadministrative controlofprocedures.

Neworrevisedprocedures requiredbytheAdministrative ControlsSectionofImprovedTechnical Specifications, orotherwise important tosafety,receiveaSafetyReview.IfaSafetyReviewidentifies potential changesthatmayaffectnuclearsafetyorthataredescribed intheUFSAR,a10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation isperformed.

Typically, aprocedure changerequiresdocumentation detailing thereasonforthechange,impactonequipment/systems andtheiroperability, effectonplantoperating modesoroperating equipment requirements, potential impactonaffectedNuclearOperating Grouporganizations andtheirspecificactivities andresponsibilities, andeffectonnuclearsafety.Inadditiontotheaboverequirements, majorchangestoEmergency/Abnormal procedures requireamoreextensive verification andvalidation.

Inadditionto'thetypicaltechnical accuracyreviewtoverifyincorporation ofandcompliance withappropriate technical information suchastheUFSARandImprovedTechnical Specifications, thisvalidation processutilizeseitherthesimulator orawalk-through tophysically testtheprocedure steps.ThechangesarealsoreviewedbytheEmergency Procedures Committee (EPC)fortechnical

adequacy, programmatic requirements, andsafetysignificance.

TheEPCismulti-disciplined, including representatives ofOperations, SystemsEngineering,

Training, andNSEcL.10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attachrncnt AFinalRcportPage322/7/97 q~e A.2.D.Maintenance WorkControlSystemTheMaintenance WorkControlsystemcanpotentially impacttheconfiguration oftheplant.A-1603.3, WorkOrderPlanning, providesdirection fortheMaintenance Plannersthatmaterialsubstitution, partmodifications, setpointchanges,andplantchangesarenotpermitted withoutanengineering evaluation, whichprovidesforasafetyreview.Post-Maintenance/Modification Testing(PMT)isperformed toverifythatequipment/

components fulfilltheirdesignfunctionwhenreturnedtoservicefollowing maintenance ormodification.

TheMaintenance Plannerisprovidedwithdirection fromprocedures A-1603.3andA-1603.6, Post-Maintenance/Modification Testing,forPMTrequirements.

PMTassociated withmodifications isspecified intheassociated engineering designoutputs.A.2.E.OperatorWork-Arounds

'/Challenges RG&Ehasestablished aformaladministrative process(A-52.16, Operator8'ork-Around IChallenge Confro/)toevaluatelongtermequipment deficiencies which,althoughtheydonotinthemselves compromise theabilityoftheplanttooperatewithinImprovedTechnical Specifications, havethepotential toaffectOperatordecision-making and/orresponsetime.Theprocessestablishes screening criteriaandtrackingrequirements foritemswhicharepotential work-arounds.

Itemsclassified asWork-Arounds aregivenincreased priorityforevaluation andresolution.

Management awareness ismaintained byquarterly PORCreviewsoftheWork-Arounds andperiodically discussing/listing theminthedailyplantmanagement/staff meeting(typically, onceperweek).PORCreviewsde-classification orresolution ofallWork-Arounds; additionally, anyitemsunabletobeappropriately resolvedaresubmitted toPORCforresolution.

Itemsnotevaluated astrue'Work-Aroundsn bythescreening criteriamaybetrackedas"Challenges" andareconsidered fortheiraggregate effectonOperations.

A.2.F.DrawingChangeControlProcess(DCRs)DrawingsareupdatedperQE-324,Preparation, Revie~,andDisposition ofDentingChangeRequests.

Whentheneedforchangesisidentified viafieldwalk-down, completion ofamodification, ordiscovery oftypographical errors,aDCRisusedtoimplement thesechanges.TheDCRprocessincludesprecautions intendedtoensureadesignchangeisnotinadvertently implemented viaDCR.AResponsible Engineerdispositions aDCRasfollows:t~Checkforcompleteness andaccuracy,

~VerifythattheDCRdoesnotaffectplantoperation oranyexistingdesignbases,(Forcasesinwhichthefieldcondition reportedviaDCRdoesaffectoperation ordesignbases,10CFR50.54(f)Response-Attachment AFinalRcportPage332/7/97 0~v'+~ggl'.4l~)IL4p(~Astyl~tc~CQ' appropriate actionistakentoresolvetheproblem,e.g.,aplantorprocedure changeorACTIONReport.)~Identifyadditional drawingspotentially affectedbytheDCR,screentheDCRper10CFR50.59, andincorporate thechange(s) intotheaffecteddrawings.

A.2.GProcurement Engineering Processes ND-PES,ControlofProcurement Activities,establishes therequirements 1)fortheprocurement, verification, andacceptance ofitemsandservices, and2)forthequalification andperformance evaluation ofsuppliers.

IP-PES-2, ControlofProcurement Documents PreparedforGinnaStation,providesinstructions forpreparation, review,andapprovalofprocurement andupgradedocuments forsafety-related andsafetysignificant materials, parts,components, andservicesforGinnaStation.Theprocessincludesrequirements todetermine thesafetyclassification ofitemstobepurchased.

Forsafety-related and/orsafetysignificant items,theprocessspecifies requirements forpartssafetyclassification basedupon1)thecomponent's safetyclass,2)evaluation ofthecomponents safetyfunction(s),

and3)afailuremodesandeffectsanalysisofthecomponent.

Technical andqualityrequirements forthepurchasearedeveloped, aswellasreceiptinspection andacceptance criteria.

Forreceiptinspection, especially forcommercial itemsdedicated byRG&Etosafety-related service,RG&Emakesextensive useofourin-houseLaboratory andInspection Servicesmetallurgical andmaterials expertise.

Thisincludesin-houseelectronmicroscopy withx-rayspectroscopy todetermine materialcompositions.

Forexample,duringtheGinnaSteamGenerator Replacement Project,RG&Eperformed itsownindependent metallurgical evaluations ofeachlotofsafety-related tubingasitwasproducedandpriortoitsactualinsertion intothereplacement steamgenerators.

TheRG&Eprocurement processes alsogovernsspecification andimplementation ofspecialstoragerequirements, shelfliferestrictions, andin-storage periodicmaintenance asrequired.

Asneeded,processes alsorequireTechnical Evaluations whichareintendedtoensurethatprocurement activities donotinadvertently result'in adesignchangetothefacility.

Specifically, Technical Evaluations assessreplacement components, parts,andmaterials forequivalency.

Differences affecting configuration and/ordesignareidentified andevaluated forimpact.Theprocurement processalsorequiresreviewofOperating Experience information forpastindustryexperience withtheitemstobeprocured.

A.aTRAININGInordertoachievecompliance withtheadministrative andprocedural requirements governing theengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses andprogramsdiscussed inresponses toRequested Actions(a)through(e),RG&Ehasestablished anoverallintegrated trainingprogramandadedicated NuclearTrainingDepartment.

TheTrainingDepartment's responsibility istoprovideatrainingprogramwhichensuresNuclearOperations Group10CFRSO.S4(Q Rcsponsc-Attachment AFinalRcportPage342l7/97 kaI.)),0m~-y~*II personnel areknowledgeable andfamiliarwiththerequirements, objectives, andmanagement expectations fortheseprocesses, baseduponusergroups'pecific needs.Ginna'strainingprogramisaccredited bytheNationalNuclearAccrediting Boardandmustundergoperiodicaccreditation renewal.Eachestablished trainingusergrouphasacommittee thatidentifies thecurriculum forthenecessary trainingofthatgroup.Trainingincludesinitialintroduction toselectedprocesses aswellason-goingupdatesformajorchangesand/orlessonslearned,asapplicable forjobperformance.

Trainingobjectives andcontentvarytofocusontargetedpopulations (Operations, Maintenance,

Planning, Engineering, etc.).Specificinformation isoutlinedinlessonplans,qualification signature records,andself-study assignments.

Trainingisalsoextendedtocontractpersonnel, depending onassignedduties.TheNuclearTrainingDepartment hasdeveloped andimplemented administrative.

configuration management processes intendedtoensuretrainingmaterials andmodulesarekeptcurrentwithactualplantconfiguration andoperation.

'innaStationhasconstructed andoperatesastand-alone controlroomsimulator forthetrainingofplantlicensedoperators.

Thesimulator trainingisintendedasonepartofoperatortrainingtoensureoperators arefamiliarwithcontrolroomconfiguration andprocedures, sothatplantoperation isconsistent withrequirements.

RG&EhasalsousedtheGinnasimulator toassistinthevalidation ofnewprocedures (e.g.,theEmergency Operating Procedures) andsystemmodifications (e.g.,feedwater controlstuningfortheSteamGenerator Replacement).

10CFR50.54(f)

Response-Attachment AFinalReportPage352/7/97

~eh~eI,~ee' 10CFR50.54(f)

RESPONSEATTACHMENT B(b)Rationale forconcluding thatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

NOTE:THISATTACHMENT ISSUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION THATISTOBEREADINCONJUNCTION WITHITSCORRESPONDING SECTIONINTHESUMMARYREPORT.ITISNOTASTAND-ALONE DOCUMENT.

ThisAttachment isorganized asfollows:B.l.PRESSESWHICHNTROLPROEDB.l.A.PlantChangeProcessB.l.B.Procedure Changes(10CFR50.59 Reviews)B.1.C.Maintenance WorkControlSystemB.l.D.Operating Experience B.2.PRORAMSfPROESSESTOUPRADEPROCEDURES B.2.A.Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)Development ProgramB.2.B.Calibration andMaintenance Procedure UpgradeProgramsB.2.CInservice Test(IST)Procedure UpgradeProgramB.2.D.Procedure Validation toImprovedTechnical Specifications B.2.E.RG&EResponsetoGenericLetter96-01B.3.SAMPLINGPROJECTSFRREUIREMENTS-TO-PROCEDURES B.3.A.UFSARValidation inaccordance withNEIGuidelines B.3.B.UFSAR-to-Procedures ReviewB.3.C.Radiation Protection GroupReviewofUFSARB.3.D.On-GoingCommitment SamplingProgramsB.4.TRAINlNGANDTRAININGCONFIGATIONMANAGEMENT B.1.PROCESSES WHICHCONTROLPROCEDURES B.1.A.PlantChangeProcessThePlantChangeProcessisdiscussed inA.2.A.Theprocessincludesareviewforpotential impactsonplantprocedures andprogramsandrequiresthatchangesbeprocessed toensureprocedures andprogramsarerevisedtoreflecttheimpactofthechange.10CFR50.54(f)

Response-Attachment 8FinalRcportPage36217/97 9'te+4M~'I1<<get B.1.B.Procedure Changes(10CFR50.59 Reviews)Thecontrolling processforprocedure controlandchangeisdiscussed inAttachment A(A.3.C).Theprocessincludesrequirements foraSafetyReview,andaSafetyEvaluation asappropriate, ofproposedprocedure changes.Thisprocessisintendedtoensurecompliance with10CFR50.59.

B.1.C.Maintenance WorkControlSystemGinna'sworkcontrolprocessisdiscussed inAttachment A(A.2.D).Theworkcontrolprocessincludesprovisions formulti-disciplinary reviewsofworkinstructions andworkpackages, aswellasoperations reviewforimpactonplantoperating andImprovedTechnical Specification systemsandequipment.

Theworkcontrolprocessalsodetermines post-maintenance testingrequirements intendedtoensureequipment returnedtosafetyrelatedserviceisoperablefollowing implementation ofmaintenance instructions andprocedures.

TheWorkControlprocessisestablished withadministrative controlsintendedtoensuremaintenance doesnotinadvertently altertheplantdesignorconfiguration unlessspecifically authorized bythedesignchangeprocessasdiscussed herein.B.1.D.Operating Experience TheRGBOperating Experience (OE)processisdiscussed inAttachment A(A.1.J).TheOEprocessprovidesameansforRG8cEtocompareGinna-specific procedural methodsagainstlessons-learned throughout theindustryandalsoagainstgenericsafetyconcernsoftheNRC.SomespecificexamplesofeventscitedbyOEforreviewatGinnahavebeen:~BoronDilutionJventsatPNb(INPOSOER94-002,NRCIN93-32)-RG&Ereviewedtheplantdesignandassociated procedures toensurethepotential forover-dilution wasllliilimized.

~Inadequate TestingofEmergency DieselGenerators (NRCIN91-013)-RG8cEreviewedtheEDGtestprocedures todetermine iftestingdemonstrated operation atpeakloadingconditions.

ThereviewresultedinadynamicloadstudyfortheEDGsandafullloadtestatarepresentative powerfactorin1992.IOCFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsct

-Attachment 8FinalRcpottPage372/7/97 B.2.PROGRAMS/PROCESSES TOUPGRADEPROCEDURES B.2.A.Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)Development ProgramInresponsetoNUREG-0737, ItemI.C.1,theWestinghouse OwnersGroup(WOG)developed Emergency ResponseGuidelines (ERGs)toserveasstandardtemplates fortheconstruction ofplant-specific EOPs.RG&Einitiated aprogramtodevelopplant-specific EOPsbasedupontheWOGguidelines.

Thegeneration ofeffective symptom-based EOPsfromtheseguidelines requiredacoordinated effortbetweenengineering andoperations toaddressaspectsofplantoperation thatcouldnotbesatisfactorily resolvedonagenericbasis.TheprogramwasintendedtoensurethattheWOGERGswouldbeeffective withthespecificplantconfiguration anddesignatGinnaStation.B.2.B.Calibration andMaintenance Procedure UpgradeProgramsIntheperiod1989-1992, RG&EupgradedandenhancedthemajorityoftheGinnaMaintenance andCalibration Procedures.

Amongtheobjectives oftheseupgradeeffortswere1)toprovideadequatedetailtoensuremaintenance andcalibration wereperformed correctly, 2)toensuretheprocedures reflectmanufacturer's recommended maintenance practices orthatdepartures fromsuchpractices wereclearlyidentified andevaluated, 3)toincorporate limitsandprecautions neededtoensurecompliance withUFSARandTechnical Specification requirements, and4)forcalibration procedures, toensuretheuseofaccuratesetpoints andtolerances accounting forloopuncertainties.

Supplemental tothiseffort,RG&Ealsoundertook toupgradethecontrolofVendorTechnical Manualsforplantequipment (C.l.L).B.2.C.Inservice Test(IST)Procedure UpgradeProgramDuringNRCInspection No.88-10,concernswereidentified withRG&E'sInservice PumpandValveTestingProgram;specifically thattheprogramdidnotcomplywithcertainrequirements ofASMECodeSectionXI,andthatimplementing procedures, insomecases,didnotcomplywiththeProgram.RG&Einitiated Corrective ActionReport(CAR)1877toidentifythecausesoftheseproblemsandtoresolvethem.TheCARfound'that theproblemswerecausedby1)inadequate reviewofmodifications affecting theISTProgram,2)adesignbasisfunctional reviewofallpumpsandvalvesatGinnaStationtodetermine inclusion intheprogram,3)lackofacomprehensive selection criteriaforinclusion intheprogram,4)lackofindependent assessment oftheprogram,5)lackofdetailedtestspecifications, and6)misinterpretation ofCoderequirements.

Thecorrective actionsincluded1)areviewofASMECodeSectionXIrequirements againstplantequipment designandconfiguration, 2)areviewofISTimplementing procedures toidentifydiscrepancies, augmented testing,maintenance, andinspections toenhancetheISTProgram,3)arevisedISTProgramandprocedures toresolveidentified discrepancies, and4)revisions totheplantchangeprocesstoensurefuturereviewforimpactontheISTProgram.Inaddition, responsibility oftheISTProgramwastransferred toEngineering fromQualityAssurance toenhancethecoordination 10CFR50.54(f)

Response-Attachment DFinalRepottPage382l7i97

.f,i'W<~it.g,,

oftheISTProgramwithproposedplantchangesandtoallowforindependent assessment oftheProgramviafutureQAauditsandsurveillances.

AsaresultoftheeffortsunderCAR1877,theISTProgramwasenhanced, wasbroughtintocompliance with,andismaintained incompliance withlicenserequirements andactualplantconfiguration anddesign.B.2.D.Procedure Validation toImprovedTechnical SpeciTications TosupportGinna'sconversion toImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS)inFebruary, 1996,RG&Econducted areview(usingateamassembled fromOperations, Mechanical Maintenance, Electrical Maintenance, Testing,Chemistry, andReactorEngineering) toverifythatprocedures properlyimplement andreference theITS.Thisreviewdetermined thatapproximately 1370procedures wouldrequirechanging(about25%oftheprocedures reviewed).

AsofDecember, 1996,783procedures havebeenrevised(allthoseforwhichtheITSrequiredmajororminorchangestotheprocedural instructions andsomereference changes).

Thoseremaining toberevised(about590)onlyrequireareference changefromoldtoImprovedTechnical Specifications; procedural guidanceisnotaffected.

Theseremaining 590arebeingtrackedtoensureproperclose-out.

(Note:across-reference betweenoldandImprovedTechnical Specifications iscontained withinallcontrolled copiesoftheITS.)B.2.E.RGdkEResponsetoGenericLetter96-01Duringthe1996springoutage,ateamwasformed(withrepresentation fromElectrical Engineering, NuclearSafety&Licensing, Instrumentation

&Control,Results&Test,andSystemEngineering) inresponsetoNRCGenericLetter(GL)96-01,TestingofSafety-RelatedLogicCircuits, toidentifyandreviewprocedures whichimplemented ImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS)Surveillance Requirements (SR)forsafety-related logiccircuits.

Thisreviewcomparedelectrical schematic drawingsandlogicdiagramstosurveillance test(ST)procedures toensurethatthelogiccircuitry isadequately testedandthatallSRsaresatisfied.

Findingsidentified duringthereviewwereclassified asOmissions, Deficiencies, Weaknesses, orProactive Initiatives.

Omissions orDeficiencies indicated thatthefailureofanuntestedlogiccomponent couldadversely affectarequiredsafetyfunction; Weaknesses orProactive Initiatives couldnotadversely affectarequiredsafetyfunction.

ThefindingswerezeroOmissions, 16Deficiencies, 21Weaknesses, and7Proactive Initiatives.

ACTIONReportswereinitiated totrackthefindingstoresolution.

Priortostartupfromthe1996outageandpriortotheaffectedcomponent havingtobeoperable,per theITS,the16deficiencies werecorrected viaeitherpermanent ortemporary procedure changes,andtheaffectedcomponents weresuccessfully tested.Noneoftheaffectedcomponents wasfoundtobeinafailedstate.BaseduponPORC'sreviewoftheACTIONReportsforthe1610CFR50.54(f)

ResPonse-Attachment 8FinalReportPage392/7/97

>vv deficiencies andtheirresulting recommendation, RG&EreportedthiseventtotheNRCinLER96-005.nTheGenericLetterconcludes thattherootcauseforthefindingswasthatpersonnel hadassumeditwasadequatetouseindustry-accepted methodsfortestingofsafety-related logiccircuitstomeetITSSRandthattheneedtotestparallelcircuitsandmultiplecontactswasnotrecognized.

Thespecificity ofGL96-01,including examplesforindividual

contacts, providedtheclarification neededtoidentifytheprogramdeficiencies.

Whileprecipitated byaweaknessintheSTprogram,thesubstantial, thoroughreviewandsubsequent upgradeofSTprocedures hasleftourSTprogramstrongerthanbeforeandhasgivenusadditional confidence thatourSTprocedures confirmthatequipment willperformaccording tothedesignbases.B.3.SAMPLINGPROJECTSFORREUIREMENTS-TO-PROCEDURES B.3.A.UFSARReviewinaccordance withNEIGuidelines RG&Eelectedtoparticipate inNEIs96-05UFSARpilotinitiative (NEIIndustryInitiative toAddressLicensing BasisConformance Issues)byreviewing 5systemsforUFSAR-to-procedure andUFSAR-to-plant accuracyandsampling18changeprocesses.

Theassessment isintendedtodetermine theadequacyoftheadministrative controlscurrently inuseformaintaining thelicensing basisinordertoidentifymissingorincorrectly appliedprogrammatic elementsthatcanleadtolicensing basisdifferences.

Theassessment consistsofathree-tiered samplingdata-gathering (data-gathering) phase,afterwhichresultsaredocumented, andanevaluation phase:U~PSARSii-ifIdpffi(ii*piy-Id'ksignificant systemsinrevision13-1oftheUFSAR(ServiceWater,Containment, Auxiliary Feedwater, SpentFuelPoolCooling,andOff-SitePower)bycognizant individuals fromNuclearEngineering ServicesandOperations/Performance Testing.todetermine ifthe.UFSARstatements areaccuratewithrespecttooperational practices.

~ProrammaticSamlin-areviewofasampleofcompleted orinprocesschangestodetermine ifexistingcontrolswithinthevariouschangeprocessprograms(drawingchanges,modifications, procedure changes,etc.)areadequatetomaintainconformance betweenoperational practices/configurations andtheUFSAR.~Non-ProrammaticSamlin-areviewofasampleofotheritemstodetermine ifanypotential changesindesignbasisoroperational practices mayoccurthatarenotproperlydocumented inapprovedchangecontrolprograms.

Thisareaincludedsuchitemsas;10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attaetmtent 8FinalReportPago402/7/97 4;k'~es4~-e~s,*e1 operatorwork-arounds,equipment beingoperatedinmanual,andlong-standingequipment isolations.

~Evaluation

-todetermine thesignificance ofidentified differences.

Aprocessfordetermining safetysignificance isbuiltintotheUFSARevaluation phase.Itscornerstone isareviewbytwoindividuals withSeniorReactorOperator(SRO)experience usingthefollowing guidanceforsafetysignificance screening fromNUMARC90-12,DesignBasisProgramGuidelines:

0Doesthediscrepancy appeartoadversely impactasystemorcomponent explicitly listedinTechnical Specifications?

0Doesthediscrepancy appeartocompromise thecapability ofasystemorcomponent toperformasdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReport?0Doesthediscrepancy appeartoadversely impactanyapplicable licensing commitments?

Significant findingsorfindingsofindeterminate significance becomeACTIONReports,theprocessing ofwhichincludesanoperability reviewandareportability review.Differences arebeingcategorized inordertodrawconclusions abouttheadequacyofparticular programmatic controlsformaintaining thelicensing basis(forenhancement recommendations).

Todate,thereviewhascheckedapproximately 1260statements andresultedinapproximately 290netidentified differences (anumberofthesebeingduplicated differences).

Ofthedifferences, 96%wereoflowsignificance andwerecategorized asnclarificationsn (72%),nUFSARnotupdated"(14%),ornUFSARupdateincomplete" (14%).Theclarifications weregenerally aresultoftherecentpracticeofplacingincreased emphasisonthedetailintheUFSARandthemoregeneralnatureoforiginalUFSARstatements.

Thelackof,orincomplete, updatestotheUFSARcanbeattributed tothenumberofscattered locations thatitemsappearinvarioussections.

Theremaining 4%ofthedifferences resultedinamorein-depthevaluation inaccordance withthecorrective actionprocess(6ACTIONreports),

andtheseweredetermined nottoinvolveacondition thatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant.ThereviewoftheProgrammatic andNon-Programmatic samplinginvolvedapproximately 130individual changeprocesspackagesoritemsfrom18changeprocesses.

Ofthese,therewere13differences, andtheyweredetermined tobeoflowsafetysignificance.

TheUFSARassessment hasshownthattheplantandprocedures areingeneralagreement withtheplantdesignbasis,althoughtherearesomeminorinconsistencies thatareofalowsafetysignificance.

Actionstoaddresstheseinconsistencies areinsection("f')ofthesummaryreport.10CFR50.54(f)

Response-Attachment 8FinalReportPape412/7i97 4~

B.3.B.UFSAR-to-Procedures ReviewAnRG8cECorrective ActionAnalystisperforming acomprehensive reviewoftheUFSARforUFSAR-to-procedure accuracy.

TheanalysisoftheUFSARstatements containing information whichappearedtorequireincorporation inplantprocedures isapproximately 20%complete(60ofthe300statements).

Preliminary resultshaveshownthat,todate,100%ofthestatements wereincorporated intoappropriate procedures, butthattherearenoexplicittrackingmechanisms thatwouldpreventastatement orprocedure frombeingdeleted(onestatement wasfoundinanowdeletedprocedure).

Actionstoaddressthisprocessweaknessaredescribed insection('T')ofthesummaryreport.B.3.C.'adiation Protection GroupReviewofUFSARTheGinnaRadiation Protection (RP)grouprecentlycompleted areviewoftheUFSARwithspecificfocusonequipment configuration andprocedures affecting plantRPactivities.

Thereviewidentified 84separatedifferences betweentheUFSARtextandtheactualconfiguration and/orprocedural guidanceforRP-related activities atGinna.Manyofthedifferences identified wereincorrect documentreferences thatresultedfrommovingoff-sitedoserequirements fromtheTechnical Specifications totheOff-siteDoseCalculation Manual(ODCM),asaresultoftherecentlyimplemented ITS.Othersinvolvedstationfacilities abandoned (e.g.,thelaundry)oradded(e.g.,theResinStorageArea).However,noneoftheidentified differences represented asignificant non-conforming condition ordegradation ofthesafefunctionofplantsystems,andnodesignbasisdeficiencies wereidentified duringthisreview.Manyofthediscrepancies wereresolvedintheDecember, 1996,Revision13totheUFSAR.Theremainder areunderevaluation andwillberesolvedbyournormalUFSARreviewandcorrective actionprocess.B.3.D.On-GoingCommitment SamplingProgramsNuclearSafety&Licensing undertook aninitiative toreviewasampleofon-goingcommitments.

Thesampleshowedthatsuchcommitments werereflected inourprocedures; however,italsoshowedthatthecommitment trackingand/orprocedure controlprocess(es) shouldbestrengthened toensurethatprocedure revisions donotinadvertently alterthelinkstocommitments.

IOCFRSO.S4(f)

Rcaponsc-Attachment 8FinalRcportPage422/787 Ag'a>*4'~I~1I B.4.TRAININGANDTRAININGCONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT Theprocesses for,andextentof,personnel trainingatGinnaisdiscussed inAttachment A(A.3).TheNuclearTrainingDepartment hasdeveloped andisimplementing administrative configuration management processes intendedtoensuretrainingmaterials andmodulesarekeptcurrentwithplantactualconfiguration andoperation.

GinnaStationhasconstructed andoperatesastand-alone controlroomsimulator forthetrainingofplantlicensedoperators.

RG&EhasalsousedtheGinnasimulator toassistinthevalidation ofnewprocedures (e.g.,theEmergency Operating Procedures).

10CFR50.54(Q Rcsponsc-Attaclnncnt 8FinalRcportPage432/787 C,JI.elH*tIp)Yll~'e)le,)(sF~~~asw IOCFR50.54(f)

RESPONSEATTACHMENT C(c)Rationale forconcluding thatsystem,structure, andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.NOTE:THISATTACHMENT ISSUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION THATISTOBEREADINCONJUNCTION WITHITSCORRESPONDING SECTIONINTHESUMMARYREPORT.ITISNOTASTAND-ALONE DOCUMENT.

ThisAttachment isorganized asfollows:C.l.ON-GOINGPRRAMTHATENSCONFIURATIONANDPERFORMANCE ARECONSISTENT WITHDESIGNBASESC.l.A.Operations Safeguards SystemsVerification ProgramC.l.B.Surveillance TestProgramC.l.C.Preventive Maintenance andTrendingProgramC.l.D.SafetyClassification ProgramC.l.E.Electrical LoadGrowthControlProgramC.l.F.Environmental Qualification Program(10CFR50.49)

C.l.G.AppendixRFireProtection ProgramC.l.H.Transient Monitoring ProgramC.l.I.HeavyLoadsProgramC.l.J.MotorOperatedValve(MOV)ProgramC.l.K.NuclearFuelsReloadAnalysesC.l.L.VendorTechnical ManualProgramC.2.PROJECTEFFORTSWHICHHAVEENHANCEDPLANTCONFIGURATION ONSISTENCY WITHDESIGNBASESC.2.A.ImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS)ProjectC.2.B.Systematic Evaluation Program(SEP)C.2.C.Instrument SetpointVerification ProjectC.2.D.Piping&Instrumentation Drawing(P&ID)UpgradeProjectC.2.E.Electrical Controlled Configuration Drawing(ECCD)UpgradeProjectC.2.F.StationBlackoutProjectC.2.G.DCFuseCoordination StudyC.2.H.SeismicUpgradeProgramC.2.I.SeismicQualification ProjectC.2.J.T,Reduction/18 MonthFuelCycleAccidentAnalysisC.2.K.ServiceWater(SW)SystemGenericLetter89-13ResponseC.2.L.SteamGenerator Replacement Project(SGRP)C.2.M.Instrument Air(IA)SystemReviewC.2.N.OF-sitePowerUpgrade10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attachrncnt CFinalRcportPage442/7/97 4tI\l~it@0-e4I~IP'I"'(

C.2.0.SpentFuelPool(SFP)CoolingSystemUpgradeC.2.P;Containment Isolation SystemReviewC.2.Q.SteamGenerator AdvancedDigitalFeedwater ControlSystemADFCSInstallation C.2.R.Microprocessor RodPositionIndication (MRPI)Installation C.2.S.Anticipated Transient WithoutSCRAM(ATWS)Mitigation SystemandActuation Circuitry (AMSAC)UpgradeC.2.T.StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater (SAFW)SystemAdditionC.3.INPETIONSTHATASSISTINMAINTAINING FIELDCONFIGURATION CONSISTENT WITHDESIGNBASESC.3.A.SystemEngineer(SE)Walkdowns C.3.B.SystemEngineering Performance Monitoring ProgramC.3.C.ShiftTechnical Advisor/StaffInspections

'.4.TRAININGANDTRAINlNGCONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT C.1.ON-GOINGPROGRAMSTHATENSURECONFIGURATION ANDPERFORMANCE ARECONSISTENT WITHDESIGNBASESC.i.A.Operations Safeguar'ds SystemsVerification ProgramOperations performsperiodicverifications ofsafeguards systemsconfiguration (viatheS-30seriesofprocedures and0-6.13,DailySurveillance Log)intendedtoensurethatthevalve,breaker,andinstrumentation alignments ofthemajorflowpaths neededforsystemoperation areundisturbed.

C.1.B.Surveillance TestProgramThesurveillance testprogramisintendedtoensureequipment operability inaccordance withitsdesignbases.Surveillances listedinImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS)andtheTechnical Requirements Manual(TRM)areperformed atspecified frequencies.

PumpsandvalvesmeetingtheInservice Testing(IST)Programselection criteriaaretestedasrequired.

Pumpsaremonitored fordegradation perASMEcodecommitments asreflected inISTProgramrequirements.

Acceptance criteriafromtheITSorTRMareincorporated intotheassociated testprocedures.

Determination ofwhetherequipment isoperable/operative isbasedondesignbasisrequirements orASMECodeallowable limits,whichever ismorerestrictive.

Asanenhancement, acceptance criteriabasesarecurrently beingincorporated directlyintothetestprocedures, afterbeingresearched, documented, andreviewedbytestsupervisors andtheIST10CFR50.$

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Engineer.

Testprocedures areupdatedwhenplantmodifications, designbasischanges,orASMEcodemandatedchangesoccur.C.1.C.Preventive Maintenance andTrendingProgramThePMprogramsatGinnauseaReliability CenteredMaintenance (RCM)approach.

Theequipment includedintheprogramandthePMfrequencies selectedarebaseduponinputfromvarioussourcesincluding Technical Specifications, theEQProgram,regulatory commitments, equipment operating conditions, engineering recommendations, and,maintenance historytrends.ThepurposeofRCMistofocusresources oncriticalequipment byevaluating thecriticality ofafailure,afterperforming aFailureModesandEfFectsAnalysis.

ThePMprogramsareestablished tomonitorandmaintaincriticalplantequipment suchthat,in-service failuresareminimized andperformance reliability isenhanced(run-to-failure isallowedfornon-critical equipment).

Thus,equipment important tothesafeoperation ofGinnaisbetterassuredtobeavailable whenrequired.

ThePMprogramsatGinnaincluderotatingmechanical equipment, heating,ventilating, andairconditioning (HVAC)equipment, valves,electrical equipment, heatexchangers, environmentally qualified (EQ)equipment, andinstrumentation andcontrolequipment.

Typesofmaintenance performed includepredictive (vibration

analysis, oilanalysis, thermography, acousticmonitoring, hipottesting,meggering, andsurgetesting),

preventive timedirectedtasks(cleanandinspect,lubricate),

calibrations, surveillance tests,functional tests,andwalkdowninspections.

TrendingofPMdataisintendedtoidentifyadversetrendsinperformance priortoacomponent notmeetingitsdesignrequirements.

TrendingofPMdatahasresultedinidentifying andcorrecting numerousequipment problems.

Forexample,vibration analysishelpedtoremedyseveralproblemsassociated withpumps(safetyinjection, auxiliary feedwater, servicewater,charging) andfans(containment recirculating fans,busductcoolerfans).Oilanalysishashelpedtoidentifyproblemswithmotors(condensate, feedwater, servicewater),theemergency dieselgenerators, theelectro-hydraulic controlsystem(highparticulates),

andaircompressors.

Thermography hasidentified andpermitted elimination ofproblemswithvalveseatleakage,stationservicetransformer hotconnections, equipment couplingalignment, andsteamtrapblow-by.Trendingof.instrumentation andcontrolequipment calibration datahasresultedinreplacement ofinstruments thathaveshownanadversetrend(priortofailureorlossoffunction).

C.1.D.SafetyClassiTication ProgramIn1991,RG&Einitiated thePlantEquipment SafetyClassification (Q-List)Projecttoconfirm,document, andmakeavailable foreasyuseinimplementing plantprocesses (e.g.,maintenance andprocurement) theidentityandfunctional classification ofplantcomponents whichperformsafety-related designfunctions.

TheprocessutilizedatGinnawassimilartothatdescribed inEPRINP-6895,Guidelines fortheSafetyClassification ofSystems,10CFRSO.S4(f)

Response-Attaclrrncnt CFinalReportPage462f187 45Ihji~ff'AMO'A~at~VI*44/ll~Js.Artli~P5"~'is~I'f~c>.<s Components, andPartsUsedinNuclearPowerPlantApplications (NCIG-I7),withthefunctional boundaryandsystemsafetycriteriadescribed inANSVANS-51.1-1983, NuclearSafetyCriteriaForTheDesignOfStationary Pressurized 8'aterReactorPlants.Specifically, plantsystemandstructure safetyclassifications werebasedupondesignfunctions performed whilepreventing ormitigating theconsequences ofthedesignbasisandspecialeventsdescribed inChapter15oftheUFSAR.Eachsystemandstructure waslinkedtotheprimaryorauxiliary functions whichtheymustaccomplish toachievethedesiredsafetyfunction.

Plantsystemswerethenexaminedtodetermine systemfunctional boundaries.

Thiswasintendedtoensurethatthedevicesnecessary toachieveasystem'snuclearsafetyfunctions wereidentified andaccounted for.AAerthefunctional boundaries wereestablished, thesystemswereanalyzedtoaccountforthespecificcontributions oftheindividual components.

Carefulaccounting oftherelationship betweentheaccidents, transients, andeventsdetailedinthelicensing basisandtheplantsystemandcomponent functions providesassurance thattheplantconfiguration ismanagedconsistent withthedesignbasis.Reviewandupdateofsafetyclassifications hasbeenintegrated intovariousplantprocesses including plantmodifications, procurement (especially forcomponents andparts),andmaintenance planning.

EP-2-P-114, Component SafetyClassification, definestheprocesstoaddorchangethesafetyclassification ofcomponents.

C.1.E.Electrical LoadGrowthControlProgramThepurposeoftheElectrical LoadGrowthControlProgramistoensurethatacceptable levelsofmarginare'maintained ontheelectrical distribution systempowersupplies(bothACandDC).EP-3-P-504, LoadGrowthControl,providesinstructions formonitoring thecumulative efFectsofloadchangesonGinnaStationloadcentersandrevisingimpacteddesignanalyseswhenpredetermined marginsarereached.ADesignEngineerperforming amodification thatimpactselectrical loadingprovidesdetailedinformation regarding theloadchangeincluding theloadcenterimpacted, thespecificloadschanged,theupstreampowersource,thetypeofchange,magnitude ofloadingchange,themodeinwhichequipment istobeoperated(duringESFactuation, stationblackout, etc.),andtheexpectedin-service dateofthemodification.

Theloadcoordinator reviewsthisinformation andassessestheimpact.Theloadcoordinator also,assesses,the impact,ofmultiple, loadadditions thatcanoccuroverthelongterm.Ifthecumulative loadchangereachesspecified margins,thenanyapplicable electrical analysesarerevised.Theprogramisalsointendedtoensurethatappropriate actionsaretakenshouldanyloadcenterapproachitsdesignlimits.TheElectrical LoadGrowthControlProgramisintendedtoensurethatmodifications willnotresultinpowersupplyloadingsexceeding theirdesignlimits.Thisisintendedtoensurethatthedesignbasisrequirements ofthedistribution systemarenotdegraded.

TheLoadGrowthControlProgrammonitorsloadadditions onbothsafety-related andnon-safety-related powersupplies.

10CFR50.54(f)

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TheEQprogramhasbeenestablished pertherequirements of10CFR50.49.

Theprogramisintendedtoensurethataharshenvironment, resulting fromapostulated

accident, willnotbeacommoncauseofequipment failureforelectrical equipment neededtocopewiththataccident.

TheEQprogramevaluated systemsneededtosupporttheGinnaaccidentanalyses(UFSAR,Chapter15)toidentifyequipment/parts ofthosesystemswhichweresubjecttoaharshenvironment andwereneededtomitigatethoseaccidents.

Systemelectrical equipment wasincludedintheEQProgram,iffailureduetoharshenvironmental conditions wouldcauselossofthesafetyfunctionandiftheequipment issusceptible toaccelerated degradation/failure whenexposedtoaharshenvironment.

Equipment-specific programrecordsaremaintained whichdemonstrate acceptable equipment performance underharshenvironments.

Suchrecordsincludevendorqualification files,maintenance historyfiles,andfilesofsparequalified equipment forfutureuse.EQprogramrequirements aredocumented inND-EQP,Environmental Qualification Program,andareimplemented throughagroupofrelatedprocedures, specifications, andasetofdiagrams.

Theseincludeprocedural requirements forsuchactivities asplantmodifications, maintenance andworkplanning, andpartsprocurement.

C.1.G.FireProtection Programand10CFR50,AppendixRRequirements fortheAppendixRandFireProtection (FP)Programaredocumented inND-FPP,FireProtection Program.Thisprogrammaintains configuration controlofequipment necessary tomitigatetheconsequences offiresbyensuringthat:~Installed plantFPsystemsareproperlytestedandmaintained,

'V~FPsystemimpairments arereviewedandnecessary compensatory measuresare-implemented,

~Plantfirebarriersaremaintained inacceptable configurations,

~ExistingplantFPprogramcomponents, fireresponseplansandprocedures, anddesignated safeshutdownsystemsandstrategies arenotadversely affectedbymodification activities,

~Welding,burningorcuttingactivities areadequately controlled tominimizethepotential forafireandIOCFR50.54(f)

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~Fireprotection featuresareprovided, andthatsafeshutdowncanbeachievedandmaintained, inamannerconsistent withtherequirements ofSectionIII.G,J,and0ofAppendixR.C.i.H.Transient Monitoring ProgramImprovedTechnical Specifications requireaprogramtotrackreactorcoolantsystemdesigntransients.

ThisincludesITS/UFSAR designbasestransients suchasplantheatupandcooldown, steploadchanges,reactortrip,andprimaryhydrostatic tests,aswellasfifteen:othertransients ofinterest.

ThepurposeoftheprogramisintendedtoensurethatASMEclass1components areoperatedwithintheircyclicdesignbases.Atransient logismaintained onaday-to-day basisbytheReactorEngineerand:totals aretabulated andreportedto=management periodically.

C.i.I.HeavyLoadsProgramTheheavyloadsprogram(theA-1305seriesofprocedures) isaprogramtocontrolequipment andprocedures involvedincarryingloadsgreaterthan1500poundsoversafety-relatedequipment.

Itwasdeveloped andimplemented asaresultofGenericLetter81-07.Theprogramconsistsof1)safeloadpathsforoverheadcranes,2)administrative requirements forjibcranes,thebridgecranesovertherefueling cavityandthespentfuelpool,monorails oversafety-related equipment, andspecialinstructions whenriggingtoexisting,buildingstructures whereoverheadhandlingsystemscannotbeutilized, 3)craneandliftingequipment condition inspections (performed onascheduled basisusingcontrolled procedures byqualified personnel),

4)trainingofmechanical maintenance personnel, and5)PORCapprovalofcertainheavyloadliftsperA-1305.5, ControlofHeavyLoadsinSafety-Relaled Areas.(Note:theTechnical Requirements Manual(TRM)alsocontainssomeheavyloadrequirements fortheSpentFuelPool.)C.1.J.MotorOperatedValve(MOV)ProgramInresponsetoon-goingconcernsfromtheNRC(e.g.,Bulletin86-05,GL89-10andsupplements, GL95-07,GL96-05)regarding performance ofMOVs,RGB'stablished theMOVQualification Program.Thisprogramestablishes thetechnical, operational, periodicinspection/testing andadministrative requirements neededtoensurethereliableoperation ofapplicable MOVs.Theprogramestablishes thedesignbasisfunctionofeachMOVbaseduponreviewofaccidentanalyses, normalandabnormaloperation, andemergency operating procedures.

Withproperconsideration ofvalvephysicallimits,thermalbinding,pressurelocking,andelectrical supplydegradation (reducedvoltage),

MOVoperatorsetpoints fortravellimitsandtorqueswitchesareestablished toensureperformance ofdesignbasisfunctions.

Appropriate maintenance andfunctional testingarespecified toensurethatactualconfiguration isinaccordance withthedesignbasisforeachMOVintheprogram.Testing10CFR50.54(Q Responso-Attachment CFinalReportPago492f7/97

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resultsarefedbacktoEngineering forconfirmation ofdesignbasisassumptions andperformance trending.

AnNRCinspection inAugust,1996,determined thatRG&Edidnotproperlyincorporate relevantindustryfeedbackintoitsMOVprogram,andthuscertain'valve factorsusedintheprogramapparently werenotsetconservatively.

RG&Eperformed extensive corrective action,including completion ofaHumanPerformance Enhancement System(HPES)investigation, recalculation ofavailable thrustandmarginsforallMOVsintheprogram,anddevelopment ofaMOVProgramManualwithallnecessary MOVdatainaccessible form,usingcurrently acceptable methodology.

Theseefforts,combinedwithourcontinued activeparticipation inindustryforumsrelatedtoMOVs,giveusassurance thatMOVswilloperatewhenneededduringnormaloperations andtomitigatedesigntransients/accidents.

C.1.K.NuclearFuelsReloadAnalysesAfteracontractforfuelhasbeensigned,thevendorandRG&Edeveloptheplant-specific inputdata(e.g.,pressurizer volume,pumpflows,etc.)necessary todotheaccidentanalysis.

Themostimportant parameters arecapturedinTable1oftheCOLRandtheImprovedTechnical Specifications.

Basedoncoredesignexperience, boundingcor'eparameters (e.g.,moderator temperature coefficient (MTC),rodworth,peakingfactors,etc.)areassumed.Therangeoftheseparameters isintendedtobelargeenoughtoboundanyfutureloadingpatternspecificparameters.

Theaccidentanalysisisthendoneusingtheplant-specific inputandboundingcoreparameters.

Theresultsoftheanalysisaresummarized andsubmitted toRG&Eforreviewandapproval.

ThissummarybecomesthebasisofaSafetyEvaluation fortheaccidentanalysisandfollowsthenormalRG&EreviewandapprovalprocessforSafetyEvaluations.

Foraspecificreload,Ginnadetermines theenergyrequiredbasedonoutagedate,cyclelength,andassumedcapacityfactor.Thevendorthendesignsaloadingpatternthatproducestherequiredenergyandisboundedbythecoreparameters assumedintheaccidentanalysis.

Thecomparison ofparameters isdocumented intheWestinghouse ReloadSafetyAnalysisChecklist (RSAC)whichissenttoRG&Eforcomment.Areviewisthenmadeoftheaccidents comprising thelicensing baseswhichcouldpotentially beaffectedbythefuelreload.Thisisdocumented inthecyclespecificReloadSafetyEvaluation (RSE).TheRSEbecomesthemajorportionofthebasisofaSafetyReview/Safety Evaluation forthespecificcycle.Plantprocedure changesbasedontheSafetyReview/Evaluation andspecificcoreparameters aretheninitiated bytheReactorEngineer.

C.i.L.VendorTechnical ManualProgramVendorTechnical Manuals(VTMs)typically formaportionoftheengineering basesforoperating andmaintaining equipment andarereferenced fordesignchanges,procurement, andmodifications.

Inthe1990-1993 timeframe, RG&Eimplemented aprojectto:10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attachment CFinalRePcrtPage502/7/97 0"IE4rbQ,"II'C%I%41CPl(gI'I 1.Establish abaselineoftechnically correctVTMsforplantequipment 2.Developclearandconciseprocedures tomaintaincontrolofthebaselined VTMsandtoprocessnewandrevisedVTMsduetoplantmodifications.

3.Provideacontrolled methodofcross-referencing betweenequipment intheplantandVTMs.Atthecompletion oftheinitialVTMProject,theon-goingprogramtomaintaincontrolofVTMswasproceduralized (currently inEP-2-P-110, VendorTechnical DocumentControlProcess).

Thisprocedure includesrequirements forprocessing changestotheVTMs,performing engineering andtechnical reviewsofnewandrevisedVTMs,andcross-referencing VTMstoplantequipment (viaEquipment Identification Number)inRG&E'sConfiguration Management Information System(CMIS).Inaddition, requirements forperiodic(typically biennial) contactwithsafety-related equipment vendorsisestablished viaEP-2-S-900, VendorTechnical ManualsPeriodicVendorContact.C.2.PROJECTEFFORTSWHICHHAVEENHANCEDPLANTCONFIGURATION CONSISTENCY WITHDESIGNBASESC.2.A.ImprovedTechnical SpeciTications (ITS)ProjectTheITSProjectreplacedthepreviousGinnaStation"custom"Technical Specifications withthenewindustrystandard.

GinnaStationwasthefirstWestinghouse planttoconvertto,andactuallyimplement, thenewITS.Thiswasaverylargeprojectwithsignificant multi-disciplined involvement withinRG&Esuchthatover20,000manhourswereexpendedinthedevelopment andimplementation ofITS.In1995,achangeto10CFR50.36 specified fourcriteriaforwhatmustbecontained withintheLimitingConditions forOperations (LCOs)ofalicensee's Technical Specifications.

Thesecriteriawereusedinthedevelopment ofrevisedstandardTechnical Specifications fortheindustry(NUREG-1431) which,thenformedthestartingpointfortheGinnaStationITS.TheITScontainLCOswhichcontrolthemostimportant equipment andassumptions oftheaccidentanalysisfordesignbasisaccidents.

Itwasimperative thattheITSmatchtheaccidentanalysisassumptions.

Therefore, allNRCSafetyEvaluations ontheGinnadocket,amajorportionofthelicensing basisforGinna,wereidentified andkeywordindexed.Also,Table1oftheCOLRwasdeveloped toidentifyandcontrolthemostsignificant equipment performance featuresandparameters usedintheUFSARaccidentanalysis.

NUREG-1431 andCOLRTable1wereusedtoidentifyspecificequipment requirements tobeplacedwithintheITSLCOsandbases.10CFR50.54(f)

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ThedraftLCOsandbaseswerethenreviewedindetailbyaShiftSupervisor, LicensedOperatorInstructor, andPORCmember,alldedicated totheproject.Additional reviewers werealsousedasnecessary, including Westinghouse (forreactorpowerdistribution limitsandreactivity controlrequirements) andaNSARBsubcommittee composedofthreeNSARBmembers.Thefinalpackagewasthenpresented chapterbychaptertoPORCforapproval.

TheNSARBwasinvolvedinoversight oftheprocess,andQAperformed auditsintendedtoensurethethoroughness ofreviewpriortoITSimplementation.

AspartofITSimplementation, RG&Eidentified requiredprocedure changes.Inaddition, anelectronic searchandupdateoftheUFSARwasperformed.

UFSARdeficiencies regarding nomenclature andotherhistorical information relatedtotheImprovedTechnical Specifications wereidentified andwerecorrected intheUFSARupdatefollowing theITSimplementation.

TheITSProjectconsolidated muchoftheGinnalicensing basis.Significant multi-disciplined reviewwasperformed toensurethisconsolidated basismatchedtheactualconfiguration oftheplant.C.2.B.Systematic Evaluation Program(SEP)TheNRCundertook amajorreassessment oftheGinnadesignandlicensing basisthroughitsSEPreview.SEPwasinitiated bytheNRCin1977toreviewthedesignsofearly-licensed plantstoreconfirm anddocumenttheirsafety.TheSEPprovided1)anassessment ofthesignificance ofdifferences betweenthethen-current NRCtechnical positions onsafetyissuesandthedesignbasesoftheplant,2)abasisforNRCdecisions regarding resolution ofthosedifferences, and3)adocumented NRCevaluation ofplantsafety.Thereviewspannedfiveyears,withthefinalreport(NUI&G-0821) beingissuedin1982.SEPconsidered over800different topicsforreview.Thesewereconsolidated into137topicsformoredetailedreview.Afterconsidering topicsbeingreviewedunderothergenericprograms(suchasNUREG-0737 andNUIKG-0933),

92issueswereselectedfordetailedSEPreview.Thesedesignbasisreviewsincludedsuchtopicsasseismicdesigncriteria, highenergylinebreaksinsideandoutsidecontainment, configuration ofcontainment isolation valves,designbasisfloodingandtornadoes, safetyclassification, designcodes,reliability ofresidualheatremoval(RHR)andemergency corecoolingsystem(ECCS)systems,containment design,internalflooding, systemsrequiredforsafeshutdown, loadingofdieselgenerators andbatteries, spentfuelstorage,andcapacityofventilation systems.AllofthesetopicalareaswerereviewedagainsttheStandardReviewPlan,andasummaryofdifferences andtheirsafetysignificance wereidentified intheSafetyEvaluation Report.Decisions onbackfitting weremadeduringtheIntegrated Assessment phaseoftheprogram,usingtheprinciples of10CFR50.109, engineering

judgment, andlimitedprobabilistic riskassessment techniques.

Resultant modifications weremadetohardware, procedures, andengineering

programs, including seismicandtornadoprotection, electrical penetration circuit10CFRSO.S4(t)

Rcsponsc-Attachment CFinalRcportPageS22/7/97 AC~~,V~~tv-*0>.'t~IWl0k protection, inservice inspection ofstructures, highenergylinebreakprotection, andadditionofselecteditemsintotheTechnical Specifications.

C.2.C.Instrument SetpointVerification ProjectTheInstrument SetpointVerification Projectwasintendedtoestablish thedesignbasisandensuretheadequacyofexistingsetpoints andcalibration valuesforimportant plantinstrument andcontrolloops.Thescopeoftheprojectincludedgroupings ofsimilarsafety-related instrumentation andcontrolsandsafetysignificant instrumentation requiredtoverifycompliance withTechnical Specifications.

Inaddition, theprojectalsoreviewed.

setpoints notdirectlyrelatedtoTechnical Specifications, e.g.,theEOPoperatoractionpointsandrecommended limitswithinplantoperating procedures.

Findingsresulting fromtheSetpointVerification Projecthavebeenreviewedforimmediate safetysignificance andpotential impactonoperability undertheapplicable corrective actionprogramandidentified forfutureresolution underRG&EEWR10300.C.2.D.Piping8t,Instrumentation Drawing(PEcID)UpgradeProjectTheGinnaP&IDPipingandInstrumentation DrawingUpgradeprojectwasintendedtoensurethattheP&IDdrawingsreflected theplantsystemdesignbasis,including safetyclassboundaries, systemconfiguration andalignment, component identification, systemfunctional capability, systemcomponent interaction, andprocedural requirements.

Theapproximately 190drawingswerewalkeddowninthefield,reviewedbyEngineering forconsistency withintendedoperating andsafetyfunctions, andthensenttotheoriginalA/E(Gilbert-Commonwealth) forconfirmation oforiginalsafetyclassboundarylocations andnotationoftheapplicable linespecifications.

Inaddition, amechanical equipment databasewithdetailedcomponent andconfiguration information wasdeveloped andeventually becamethebasemechanical information intheRG&E'sConfiguration Management Information System(CMIS).Over1200genericandspecificissueswereidentified overthe'course oftheproject.Allbutoneissuehasbeendispositioned.

Thatissuehasbeenreviewedforimmediate safetysignificance andpotential impactonoperability throughthecorrective actionprogram,wasfoundtobeoflowsafetysignificance, andhasbeenidentified forfutureresolution.

TheP&IDsaremaintained asControlled Configuration Drawings.

10CFR50.54(f)

Response-Attachment CFinalReportPage532/l/97 pEAt~~

C.2.E.Electrical Controlled Configuration Drawing(ECCD)UpgradeProjectApproximately 3200Electrical Controlled Configuration Drawingswereproducedand/orrevisedduringtheECCDproject.Theprojectgoalswere1)toverifythetechnical accuracyofthedrawingsviaengineering reviewofdesignandfunctionaswellasfieldwalk-downs and2)toenhancetheirusefulness bychangingtheirformat.Areaswalkeddownincludedthemaincontrolboard,relayandinstrument racks,motorcontrolcenters,andbusunits.Inaddition, detailedfieldwalkdowninformation, equipment andcomponent data,andconfiguration information wascompiledandeventually becamethebaseelectrical information intheRG8:E'sConfiguration Management Information System(CMIS).C.2.F.StationBlackoutProject10CFR50.63, LossofAllAlternating CurrentPower,isconsidered abeyondoriginaldesignbasisaccident.

Thisregulation (furtherexplained inRegulatory Guide1.155)requiresthateachlight-water coolednuclearpowerplantbeabletowithstand, bymaintaining corecoolingandappropriate containment integrity, andrecoverfromastationblackout(SBO)ofaspecified duration.

ThetermSBOreferstothecompletelossofACpowertotheessential andnon-essential switchgear busesinanuclearpowerplant.Ginna'sSBOanalysis, EWR4520,documents thestrategies andtheirbasesbywhichthestationcomplieswith10CFR50.63.

AsummaryofEWR4520isfoundintheUFSAR,section8.4.1.4.C.2.G.DCFuseCoordination StudyTheentireDCdistribution systemwasreviewedunderEWR-3341, DCSystemEvaluation.

Underthescopeofthisprojectthesystemdesignwasvalidated andtheprocessformaintaining controlofthedesignwasimplemented.

Thefollowing itemsweredeveloped tobothverifytheacceptability oftheexistingdesignandtoestablish controlsintendedtoensurethedesignismaintained inthefuture:~Engineering Specification EE-100,FuseRequirements

~ControlConfiguration DrawingSeriesforDCSystem~DesignAnalysestoevaluatespecificdesignattributes oftheDCdistribution system.Thedesigncontrolsimplemented fortheDCFuseCoordination StudyareintendedtoensurethattheDCdistribution systemmaintains itsdesignbasisconfiguration andthatitwillbeabletoperformitsdesignfunctions.

10CFR50.54(0 Response-Attachment CFinalRcportPage542/7/97 eI4ICg C.2.H.SeismicUpgradeProgramBetween1979and1990,RG&Eperformed areanalysis andmodification ofcriticalseismicpipingsystems.ThisSeismicUpgradeProgramwasavoluntary initiative whichwasaresultofissuesarisingfromNRCBulletins 79-02and79-14,aswellastheNRC'sSystematic Evaluation Program(SEP),TopicsIII-6andIII-11.-ThepurposeoftheSeismicUpgradeProgramwastoupgradecertainseismicpipingsystemsatGinnaStationtomorecurrentrequirements andtoprovideaseismicdatabaseforusewithmodifications, theISIprogram,andNRCrequests.

Analytical techniques andcomputermodelsatthetimeoftheSeismicUpgradeProgramhadimprovedconsiderably comparedtowhatwasavailable atthetimeofplantconstruction.

Floorresponsespectraweredeveloped formajorfloorelevations inaffectedbuildings, usingthen-current NRCcriteria.

Pipingwasanalyzedusingcriteriaconsistent withthephilosophy oftheoriginalconstruction code,butreflecting theconceptsofASMESectionIII.Pipesupportswereevaluated usingtherequirements ofASMESectionIII,Subsection NF.Thisextensive effortbroughttheseismiccapability ofcriticalpipingsystemstoalevelconsistent withnewerplants.C.2.I.SeismicQualiTication ProjectTheSeismicQualification UtilityGroup(SQUG)initiated aprogramtoaddressUnresolved SafetyIssue(USI)A-46,whichdealswithseismicqualification ofelectrical andmechanical equipment.

Theconcernwasthatequipment installed inolderplantshadnotbeenreviewedtothe(thencurrent)1980-81seismicqualification licensing criteria.

In-scopeequipment atGinnawaswalkeddown,inspected, andevaluated inaccordance withtheSQUGGenericImplementation Procedure (GIP).Theresulting evaluations wereenteredinadatabase.

OutlierstotheGIP"rules"weredocumented andevaluated beforetheGinnaSQUGsubmittal wenttotheNRC(onFebruary1,1997).Outlierswillbedispositioned, inaccordance withourcurrentcorrective actionprocedures.

Aschedulefordisposition hasbeenprovidedintheRG&ESQUGsubmittal.

Theintentofthisprojectistoupgradetheseismicqualification designbasisforselectedequipment totheSQUGGIP.Thiswill1)resultinaconsistent qualification basisforequipment ontheGinnaSafeShutdownEquipment Listand2)providefortheuseoftheSQUGGIPforverification ofseismicadequacywhenprocuring newandreplacement, equipment (theSeismicEquipment Qualification program).

Seismicqualifications areprimarily controlled throughtheChangeImpactEvaluation form,whichscreenspotential modifications forseismicreview.IOCFRSO.S4(f)

Response-Attaclnncnt CFinalRqertPageSS2/7/97

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C.2.J.T,,Reduction/18 MonthFuelCycleAccidentAnalysisInordertotakeappropriate advantage oftheimprovedheattransfercapability andenhancedreliability oftheGinnaReplacement Steam'enerators, RG&Eundertook effortstosupportoperation oftheReactorCoolantSystematareducedtemperature (toimpedecorrosion mechanisms) andtosupportafuelloaddesigncapableof18monthsfullpoweroperation betweenreloads.TheT,reduction/18 monthfuelcycle/UFSAR Chapter15reanalysis reestablished theaccidentanalysisdesignbasisforGinna.Theeffortinvolvedreconstituting theaccidentanalysisinputdataandassumptions.

Westinghouse requested plant-specific inputdata.RG&Esuppliedtherequested information basedonequipment performance, Ginnaconfiguration,

drawings, andlimitingoperating parameters.

Bycontract, Westinghouse suppliedcopiesofcalculation notes,microfiche oftheLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA)computerruns,andinputfilestothecomputercode(LOFTRAN).

Areviewoftheanalysisandassociated calculation notesshowshowtheanalysiswasperformed, howtheinputswereused,andwhatassumptions weremade.Themajorinputsintheaccidentanalysisdesignbasisarenowdocumented intheCoreOperating LimitsReport(COLR)toprovidegreatervisibility totheinputsused.Thisinformation allowsRG&Etobetterunderstand theaccidentdesignbasisandassesswhenequipment performance oroperating practices mightinfringeontheaccidentdesignbasis.C.2.K.ServiceWater(SW)SystemGenericLetter89-13ResponseGenericLetter89-13specified aseriesofactionstoensuretheacceptable performance ofplantSWSystems.Theseincludedaconfirmation thattheSWsystemiscapableoffulfilling itsdesignbasisfunction, enhancedmaintenance topreventdegradation oftheconfiguration, andtestingtodemonstrate performance.

InresponsetoGL89-13,RG&Edeveloped theSWSystemReliability Optimization Program(SWSROP).

In1991,theNRCconducted aSWSystemOperational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI)atGinna.Amajorityoftheteam'sfindingswereassociated withtheneedforconfirmatory analysestoassureconformance withthedesignbasesoftheSWsystem.Inresponse, RG&Eembarkeduponaneffortofcombinedanalysesandtestingtoresolvetheconcernsraised.Basedupontheseefforts,RG&Ehasdetermined thatthereisreasonable assurance thattheUFSARreflectsthedesignbasesoftheSWsystemandthecurrentSWsystemconfiguration.

Thisdetermination issupported byRG&E'srecentevaluation oftheUFSAR.Specifically, RG&EselectedtheSWsystemfortheNEIpilotinitiative regarding UFSARfidelity, asdiscussed elsewhere withinthisdocument.

Althoughmanyclarifications wereneeded,onlyonepotential difference resultedintheneedforamorein-depthevaluation, andthiswasdetermined tonotinvolveacondition thatwasoutsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.Thispotential difference, regarding theminimumrequirednumberofSWpumps,wasfirstidentified duringtheSWSOPI,andresolution iscurrently underreviewbytheNRC.Additionally, RG&Ehasreviewedheatexchanger testdataandperformed finalcalculations whichfavorably comparedperformance torequirements.

lOCFR50.54(f)

Response-Attachment CFinalRcportPage562/7/97

~1vl1IjAIIltl44~4F' C.2.L.SteamGenerator Replacement Project(SGRP)IntheSpringof1996,GinnaStationreplacedsteamgenerators (S/Gs).Designandplanningforthisreplacement beganin1992andcontinued throughtheSpring,1996,Outage.Inthecourseofdesigning thereplacement S/Gs(RS/Gs)andplanningtheirinstallation, theSGRPretrieved thedesignbasesforseveralaspectsoftheplant.Tasksofsignificance todesign,basisverification included:

~RS/GFabrication andSafetEvaluation

-AsapartofthisefFort,itwasnecessary toretrievethedesignbasisforthesteamgenerators toassurealike-in-kind replacement.

Further,aspectsoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)andoverallplantperformance withrespecttolicensing accidentanalysiswasevaluated toassurenoadverseefFectonplantsafetyasaresultofS/Greplacement.

RG&Eelectedtosubmitasupplemental UFSARrevisioninJuly,1996toincorporate significant changesthatresultedfromtheSGRP.~Installation andConstruction

-InordertoinstalltheRS/Gs,itwasnecessary tocutlargeconstruction openingsinthetopofthecontainment dome.Manyaspectsofthecontainment designbasiswereretrieved todevelopdesigncriteriaforthework.Following S/Greplacement, afullpressurestructural integrity testwasperformed ontherestoredcontainment.

Thetestacceptance criteriaweremet.~EmerinOutaeIssues-Vibrations fromcuttingtheconstruction openingsinthecontainment domeloosenedsomeofthehangerssupporting theContainment Spray(CS)systemheadersontheinteriorofthedome;consequently, theSGRPpersonnel reviewedthestructural designbasisoftheCSsystemheaders.Intheprocessofrepairing thisdamage,RG&Ediscovered thattheheaderconfiguration (pipingsupportwelds,plates,bolts,andspacers)didnotmeettheconfiguration depictedonthesystemandcomponent drawings.

(TheCSheadershadnotbeenaccessible fordetailedconfiguration verification priortoS/Greplacement.)

Thisdiscovery ledRG&Etoperformaconfiguration walkdownoftheheadersandtocomparetheas-foundconfiguration withthatusedinthestructural analysesoftheheaders.Analyseswereperformed thatdemonstrated thattheas-foundconfiguration didmeettheacceptance criteriaandtherefore wasconsistent withtheheaders'esign bases.C.2.M.Instrument Air(IA)SystemReviewInresponsetoNRCGL88-14,RG&Eretrieved thedesignbasesfortheIAsystem,testedthesystemtodemonstrate criticaldesignrequirements, andconducted anIASystemFunctional Inspection reviewing maintenance practices, alarmresponseprocedures, emergency procedures, andtraining.

ThroughtheseefForts,RG&EwasabletoverifythattheIAsystemwasreliablydelivering enoughhighqualityairtoloadstomakesystemdesignconsistent withtheoriginaldesignspecifications andrequirements.

10CFRSO.S4(f)

Rerponsc-Attachment CFinalReportPageS72/787 N,Vif4tel~n),p0'p,<>i<~5w4+yA4 C.2.¹Off-sitePowerUpgradeGinnaStationwasoriginally licensedbaseduponanoff-sitepowersupplysystemwithasingletransformer plustheabilitytoestablish abackfeedthroughtheauxiliary transformer.

Specifically, failureofthe12Atransformer requiredrelianceuponthedieselgenerators untilpowercouldbemanuallybackfedfromthe115kVlinesthroughtheunitauxiliary transformer (811).Following.

the1987Refueling Outage,theoff-sitepowersupplywasre-configured bysplitting the34.5kVon-sitebusandsupplying off-'site powerthroughtwoenergized transformers (12Aand12B).Asaresultoftheseefforts,RG&Ehasreviewed, confirmed, andenhancedthedesignperformance oftheplant'soff-sitepowersupplysystem.C.2.0.SpentFuelPool(SFP)CoolingSystemUpgradeInordertoincreasethecapacityoftheoriginalSFPcoolingsystemtoaccommodate increased numbersofstoredassemblies, asecondpermanent coolingloop(thenBnSFPloop)wasinstalled in1988underEWR1594.Thiscoolingloophadessentially doublethecapacityoftheoriginal(nAn)loop.Thenewloopwasdesignedtomorecurrentdesignstandards (seismiccategoryI,ASMEsectionIII,class3)ascomparedtotheoriginalnon-seismic forfunctionsystem.Thismodification significantly upgradedtheSFPcoolingsystemwithbothincreased capacityandtheaddedredundancy oftwopermanently installed systems;hence,thedesignbasesfortheupgradedSpentFuelCoolingSystemaremoreconsistent withcurrentregulatory andindustryrequirements.

C.2.P.Containment Isolation SystemReviewAspartofLicenseAmendments 52and54,RG&Econducted athoroughreviewofthecontainment isolation boundaries andtheirdesignbases.Detailedschematics ofeachpenetration weredeveloped,

verified, andincorporated intotheUFSAR.Procedures werereviewedagainstthisinformation toensureperiodictestingwasdemonstrating conformance todesignfunctionforeachpenetration.

Asaresultoftheseefforts,containment isolation boundaries andtheirbaseshavebeenclearlydocumented.

C.2.Q.SteamGenerator AdvancedDigitalFeedwater ControlSystem(ADFCS)Installation In1991,RG&Einstalled anenhancedS/Gwaterlevelcontrolsystem.S/Gwaterlevelisnowcontrolled byadigitalmicroprocessor-controlled automatic S/Gfeedwater controlsystemtermedtheADFCS.AspartofS/Greplacement in1996,RG&Edidadditional modelingandtestingtoconfirmoperation oftheADFCSwiththereplacement S/Gs.Asaresultofthismodification, thelevelcontrolcapability andreliability ofthesteamgenerators wereenhancedasevidenced byasignificant reduction infeedwater-related transients.

Inaddition, theDesign10CFR50.54(Q Rcsponsc-Attachment CFinalReportPa8c582/787 IJ'0I1,f Criteriadeveloped forthemodification addedtotheoverallunderstanding ofthesystem'sdesignbases.C.2.KMicroprocessor RodPositionIndication (MRPI)Installation UnderEWR3797,RG&Ereplacedtheoriginalanalogrodpositionindication systemwiththeMRPIsystemtoimprovethesystem'sperformance withrespecttosystemresistance totemperature andnoiseeFectsandtoreducerequiredmaintenance andpotential forcedoutagetime.Asaresultofthismodification, thereliability oftheplantwasenhanced.

Inaddition, theDesignCriteriadeveloped forthemodification addedtotheoverallunderstanding ofthesystem'sdesignbases.C.2.S.Anticipated Transient WithoutSCRAM(ATWS)Mitigation SystemandActuation Circuitry (AMSAC)UpgradeAsrequiredby10CFR50.62, RG&Einstalled anAMSACsystem.TheAMSACisbasedonalowfeedwater flowlogic.Itisanon-Class 1Esystemdesignedtotriptheturbineandstartthemotor-driven (MDAFW)andturbine-driven (TDAFW)auxiliary feedwater pumpsifmainfeedwater flowislostwithreactorpowerabove40%.Asaresultofthismodification, thecapability oftheplanttorespondtoafailureofthereactortripsystemwasenhanced.

Inaddition, theDesignCriteriadeveloped forthemodification addedtotheoverallunderstanding ofthesystem'sdesignbases.C.2.T.StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater (SAFW)SystemAdditionAsoriginally

designed, theauxiliary feedwater (AFW)systemintheIntermediate Building(IB)couldbesusceptible tocommonmodedamagebyahighenergylinebreak(HELB).(Note:HELBwasnotpartoftheoriginalGinnalicensing basis.)RG&E,therefore, augmented theexistingAFWsystemwithanadditional SAFWsystemwhichisindependent oftheAFWsystemandlocatedremotelytoprecludedamagefromapipebreakintheIB.Asaresultofthismodification, thereliability oftheplant'sAFWsystemswasenhanced, inthattherenowexistsa600%-capacity diversemeansofdelivering AFWtotheS/Gs.C.3.INSPECTIONS THATASSISTINMAINTAINING FIELDCONFIGURATION C.3.A.CONSISTENT WITHDESIGNBASESSystemEngineer(SE)Walkdowns SEsconductwalkdowns oftheaccessible portionsoftheirassignedsystemsonaperiodicbasis(generally quarterly).

(Systemsinsidecontainment arewalkeddownduringrefueling outages.)

RG&Ehasestablished writtenguidelines andstandards forthesewalkdowns.

The10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attachment CFinalRcportPage592/7/97 14X~'I'~'~~,~1~t1',>1>1*

primarypurposeofthesewalkdowns istoverifyacceptable materialcondition ofthesystems,configuration/status oftemporary modifications (including installed scaffolding),

andhousekeeping.

Thewalkdowns helptoensurethatthesystemsarebeingadequately maintained sothatdesignfunctions arenotcompromised.

BecauseoftheSE'sknowledge ofthedesignconfiguration ofthesystem,theseperiodicwalkdowns helpmaintainsystemconfiguration controlaswell.Abriefreviewofrecentwalkdowns indicates thefollowing configuration discrepancies identified forresolution:

~Capmissingfrom,CCWdrainline,and~Inconsistencies inEmergency Lightingdrawings.

Suchconfiguration discrepancies areidentified andresolvedviatheRGBcorrective actionprocess(D.l).C.3.B.SystemEngineerPerformance Monitoring ProgramInadditiontopredictive monitoring, thermalperformance, erosion-corrosion, performance testing,andISUIST,theSystemsEngineers (SEs)condition performance monitoring inaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.65, theMaintenance Rule(MR).TheintentoftheMRistoassess,onanon-goingbasis,theeffectiveness ofmaintenance onkeysystems,structures, andcomponents (SSCs),namely:~Safety-related (SR)SSCs~Non-SRSSCsthatmitigateaccidents ortransients h~Non-SRSSCsthatareusedintheEmergency Operating Procedures

~Non-SRSSCswhosefailurepreventsSRSSCsfromfulfilling theirsafetyfunction~Non-SRSSCswhosefailurecausesscramsoractuatesSRsystems.EachoftheSSCswithintheMRscopeiscoveredbyapreventive maintenance (PM)program,asdefinedbyNUMARC93-01,Rev0,toprovidereasonable assurance thatSSCswillbeconsistently capableofperforming theirintendedfunctionwhenrequired.

Anassessment ofeffective maintenance isperformed bymonitoring and'trending SSCs'erformance againstestablished'performance criteria(PC)(whicharebasedondesignbasisfunctions and/ordesignbasiscriteria) chosentoreflectgoodperformance (whichismaintained byappropriate maintenance).

Appropriate maintenance willresultinalownumberoffunctional failuresandhighSSCavailability and/orgoodperformance relativetodesiredengineering oroperating parameters (condition monitoring).

Whereperformance duetomaintenance hasdeclinedandaSSCisnotmeetingitsPC,theSSCisplacedinadegradedMRcondition (category (a)(1)).Specificperformance goals,increased monitoring, and/orcorrective actionsarethenrequiredtoreturnthedegradedSSCtoacondition ofacceptable performance.

10CFR50.54(f)

Response-Attachment CFinalRepottPage602/787 eewc~

C.3.C.ShiftTechnical Advisor/StaffInspections A-54.4,ShiftTechnical AdvisororDesignated PlantManagement PlantTour,containsastatedobjective ofcheckingforunauthorized modifications,to thefacility.

Toassessthevalueofthesetourstoconfirmthatsystem,structure, andcomponent (SSC)performance remainconsistent withthedesignbasis,asampleofmorethan200toursconducted bymorethan20STAsandgroupmanagerswasreviewed.

Somedeficiencies identified bythesetoursincluderestricted.

floordrains,scaFoldsnotconforming toseismiccriteria, tubingsupportdeficiencies, firebarriersnotintact,instrument indication anomalies, andflexiblehosebendradiusdeficiencies.

Thesetours,alongwithinspections perA-54.7,FireProtection Tour,andM-1306,GinnaSt'ationMaterialCondition Inspection Program,giveRG&Econfidence thatdeficiencies arebeingself-identified toassistinmaintaining properplantconfiguration andperformance.

Findingsaredocumented viatheRG&Ecorrective actionprocessandassignedtoanappropriate groupforresolution.

C.4.TRAININGANDTRAININGCONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT Theprocesses for,andextentof,personnel training'at Ginnaisdiscussed inAttachment A(A.3).Thisincludestrainingwhichaidesinkeepingconfiguration consistent withdesignbases,e.g.,Maintenance Ruletraining, trainingontheImprovedTechnical Specifications, andtrainingassociated withspecificmodifications andchangestotheplant.TheNuclearTrainingDepartment hasdeveloped andisimplementing administrative configuration management processes intendedtoensuretrainingmaterials, modules,andthesimulator arekeptcurrentwithplantactualconfiguration andoperation.

GinnaStationhasconstructed andoperatesastand-alone controlroomsimulator forthetrainingofplantlicensedoperators.

RG&EhasalsousedtheGinnaSimulator toassistinthevalidation ofsystemmodifications (e.g.,ADFCScontrolstuningfortheSteamGenerator Replacement).

10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponre-Attachment CFinalRcportPage612/7/97 eu4.t 10CFR50.54(f)

RESPONSEATTACHMENT D(d)Processes foridentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actions,including actionstodetermine theextentofproblems, actiontopreventrecurrence, andreporting toNRC.NOTE:THISATTACHMENT ISSUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION THATISTOBEREADINCONJUNCTION WITHITSCORRESPONDING SECTIONINTHESUMMARYREPORT.ITISNOTASTAND-ALONE DOCUMENT.

ThisAttachment isorganized asfollows:D.l.CRRECTIVEATIONPROCESSANDPROCEDURE GINNAACTIONREPORTD.2.OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS D.3.CONDITIONS ADVERSETOUALITYORNON-CONFORMING ONDITIONS D.4.ACTIONREPORTDATATRENDINGD.S.REPORTING TOTHENRCD.6.NTINUOUINTERACTION ANDMMUNIATINWITHNRPROJECTMANAGERESIDENTINSPECTORS ANDOTHERNRCSTAFFD.7.TRAININGD.8.EMPLYEENERNPRRAMD.1.CORRECTIVE ACTIONPROCESSANDPROCEDURE GINNAACTIONREPORIn1994,RG&Eimplemented anewcorrective actionprocessandprogramfocusedontheRG&EAbnormalCondition TrackingInitiation orNotification (ACTION)Report.Thisprocessintegrates allaspectsofproblemidentification, evaluation, andresolution intoasingleprocessthatcanbetrackedandtrendedtoassistinassessing theeffectiveness ofvariousprograms, processes, andorganizations, andthatcanbereadilyimprovedthroughmanagement oversight andcommunication ofexpectations.

10CFR50.54(f)

Response-Attachment DFinalReportPage622fl/97 t~EA~&%l~4~lef Priorto1994,RG&Ehadseveral,separatecorrective actionprocesses forsuchitemsasnon-conforming items,potential conditions adversetoquality,engineering identified concernsandpotential conditions adversetoquality,QAidentified

concerns, andprocurement andreceiptinspection deficiencies.

Basedonbothourinternalauditingandassessments, third-party reviews,andprocessevaluation viasafetysystemfunctional inspections (SSFIs),RG&Econcluded that,althoughthevariousprocesses metregulatory requirements, bytheirverynumber,theyposedapotential weaknesstoeffective corrective action.AsaresultofRG&E'srecognition oftheabove,RG&Eimplemented the'ACTION Reportprocesswhichsuperseded theseveralpreviouscorrective actionprocesses.

ERIEFRRETITINPRTheACTIONReportprocessiscurrently implemented viaIP-CAP-1, AbnormalCondition TrackingInitiation orNotij7cation (ACTION)Repon.TheACTIONReporting processisasinglecorrective actionprogramfortheidehtification andinitiation ofresolution ofanycondition event,activity, concern,oritemthathasthepotential foraffecting thesafeandreliableoperation ofGinnaStation.Theprocessincludesrequirements andprovisions for:~Identification ofproblemsandconcerns~Initialscreening ofidentified conditions forimmediate safetyand/oroperational concernsandprioritization ofthecondition forresolution

~Disposition andcausedetermination forthecondition including classification ofthecondition fortrackingandtrending~Implementation ofcorrective actionsasappropriate forthecondition, including remediation ofthecondition andlongtermactionstopreventrecurrence

~Requirements forreporting appropriate conditions totheNRC,e.g.,asrequiredby10CFR21.Thefollowing isanexplanation oftheRG&EACTIONReporting process:I~ANACTIONReportsareissuedperIP-CAP-l, whichmaybeusedbyanyindividual whoobservesorisawareofacondition orpotential condition thatcausesconcernaboutthesafe,efficient andreliableoperation ofGinnaStation,including anyunusualcondition, potential Technical Specification violation, orcondition whichmayneedtobereportedtotheNRCortomanagement.

ACTIONReportsmayalsobeinitiated foreventsorconditions thatareofverylowriskorsignificance, butwhichwouldprovideusefulprecursor information iftrackedandtrendedforrepeatoccurrence.

RG&Emanagement intentionally keepsthethreshold ofreporting lowforthepurposeofensuringthatproblemsarereadilyidentified andaddressed, frommajorindividual eventstominoreventsandconditions detectedonlybyadversetrendsandmultipleoccurrences.

lOCFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attachment DFinalRcportPage632/7/97 IP4\k'h-'lI'lA.ef.'>-~~0:,pf=s@~VAI%1~ts1q...i,tv'd4" Toensuretimelycommunication ofconditions identified viaACTIONReporttotheNOGstaff,newACTIONReportsaretypically discussed atthemorningmanagement/staff meetingandlistedinthemeetingnotes.INITIALSCREENINGS ACTIONReportsareinitially screenedbyOperations forpotential immediate safetyconcerns.

Operations (oftenwithShiftTechnical Advisorinput)performsanoperability evaluation, "identifies anyTechnical Specifications LCOsand/ormoderestrictions, determines iftheidentified condition requiresfurtherevaluation andprocessing,'and makesappropriate notifications.

Forcomplexconditions including manydesignbasesquestions, Operations mayrequestassistance fromEngineering inevaluating operability.

ThePORCChairmanordesigneethenassignsaprioritylevelandaResponsible Manager(RM)fordisposition andcorrective action.TheChairmanalsodetermines iftheACTIONReportneedstoreceiveaPORCmulti-disciplined reviewafterdisposition and/orfollowing corrective actionimplementation.

DIPITIONANDCASEDETERMINATI NTheACTIONReportprocessdirectstheRMtoinitially determine ifthecondition reportedrepresents anon-conforming itemwhichmayrequireimmediate restrictions uponitsuseorpotentially bereportable inaccordance with10CFR21.TheRMthenpreparesadisposition whichidentifies corrective andpreventive action(s),

asappropriate, toaddresstheidentified condition anditscause(s)andtopreventrecurrence oftheabnormalcondition/event.

Relatedprocedure IP-CAP-2, RootCauseAnalysis, describes theprocessforperforming arootcausesanalysis.

Multi-disciplined groupsareused,asappropriate.

Appropriate processes areinitiated toresolvethecondition, e.g.,modification process,procedure ordocumentchangeprocess.TheRMalsoensuresthatthecondition isclassified bothintermsofthecause(CauseCode),andasthecondition relatestoimplementation oftheMaintenance Rule,e.g.,maintenance preventable functional failure,sothatthecondition ismorereadilytracked/trended.

TheRMobtainsmulti-disciplinary concurrence withthedisposition asappropriate orrequiredbytheprocess,i.e.,QA,QC,RP,SystemEngineer, PORC,etc.ORRECTIVE ACTIONIMPLEMENTATION Corrective actionisimplemented bythegroupresponsible undertheappropriate engineering orworkprocess,e.g.,modification, workorder,procedure change.Whenthecorrective actionsarecompleteorscheduled viaappropriate process,e.g.,modification, procedure change,orworkorder,theRMreviewstheACTIONReportdocumentation receivedfromeachimplementing groupandobtainsorganizational concurrence withtheclosureoftheACTIONReportasappropriate andasrequiredbyprocedure, i.e.,QA,QC,etc.10CFR50.54(t)

Rcsponsc-Attachment DFinalRcportPage642/7/97 REPORTABILITY RG&Eisrequiredtoreportcertainconditions, items,andeventstotheNRCunderanumberofregulations.

Reporting associated withconditions identified viaA'CTIONReportsisproscribed bytheACTIONReportinstructions toensuretimelyassessment andappropriate reporting.

RG&E'soverallprocessforreporting suchconditions totheNRCisdiscussed inD.Sbelow.D.2.OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS RG&Ehasestablished formaladministrative processes (A-52.3,SafetyFunctionDetermination Program,A-52.4,ControlofLimitingConditions forOperating Equipment, andA-52.12,Inoperability ofEquipment Important toSafety)forevaluating theoperability ofsystemsandequipment.

Theseprocesses areintendedtoensurethatinadvertent changes(e.g.,duetoequipment failures) orminorchangestoconfiguration (e.g.,toallowformaintenance) donotcompromise thefidelityoftheplant'sconfiguration toitsdesignbases.Theseprocesses alsotrackinoperable equipment important tosafetytoassurethateventheaggregate impactofmultipledeficiencies inmorethanonesystemorsubsystem doesnotplacetheplantoutsideitsdesignbasesandImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS).Operations determines equipment operability whenthereareoperating deficiencies, failuretomeettestrequirements, orfailuretoperformanintendedfunction.

Operability concernsformorecomplexissuesaretypically resolvedbySystemsEngineering orNuclearSafety&Licensing undertheSafetyReview/Evaluation process.Procedures specifythatappropriate ITSLimitingConditions ofOperability (LCOs)areinvokedforequipment andsystemsfoundtobeinoperable.

RG&Ehasalsodeveloped procedural guidanceforvoluntary entryintoITSLCOsforon-linemaintenance/testing.

D.3.CONDITIONS ADVERSETOUALITYORNON-CONFORMING CONDITIONS Duringtheinitialscreening ofACTIONReportsforprioritization, conditions adversetoqualityandnon-conforming itemsareevaluated bythePORCChairmanforsignificance inaccordance withIP-CAP-l, AbnormalCondition TrackingInitiation orNotification (ACTION)Report.Acondition adversetoqualityornon-conforming itemdetermined byevaluation tobesignificant isidentified asaSignificant Condition AdversetoQuality(SCAQ)bythePORCChairman.

SCAQsareevaluated todetermine theefFectofcontinuing activity.

Ifcontinued activitywouldobscureorprecludetheidentification ofthedeficiency, increasetheextentofthedeficiency, orleadtoanunsafecondition, stopworkactionistaken.D.4.ACTIONREPORTDATATRENDINGTheNuclearAssessment organization isresponsible fortrendingidentified problemsandcorrective actionreportdata.Thecorrective actiontrendingprocessisdescribed inND-CAP,Corrective ActionProgram.TheprocessisbasedupondatafromACTIONReports.Data10CFR50.54(t)

Response-Attachment DFinalRcportPage652/7/97 HI,~I'II1W..U,'Xt<<rIyy~:"I usedincludecausecodes,systemcodes,component codes,equipment identification numbersandorganizational codes.Onaperiodicbasis,typically quarterly, ananalysisisperformed onthemajorcausecodesenteredintotheACTIONReportdatabaseforthepriorperiod,typically 12monthsormore.Trendingisperiodically reviewedbytheQA/QCSubcommittee ofNSARB.TwoACTIONReportmajorcausecodestypically associated withdesignbasisandplantconfiguration issuesare"ChangeManagement" and"DesignConfiguration/Analysis" baseduponnomenclature established bytheInstitute forNuclearPowerOperations (INPO).Duringthe1996calendaryear,thesetwomajorCauseCodesrepresented 5%and12%ofthecausesforACTIONReports(totalof37and94eventsrespectively outofatotalofapproximately 1200).NotethattheACTIONReportsincludedunderthesecausecodesrangefromsignificant (auxiliary feedwater valvesfailedtothrottletothedesignbasisflowrangeduringtestingduetoinadequate selection of"equivalent" replacement parts)tominoradministrative (incomplete reviewforminprocedure changenoticepackage/nomenclature differences inplantinformation).

D.5.REPORTING TOTHENRCRG&Ehascr'eatedamatrix(inEP-2-P-164, ReceiptofandResponsetoNRCCorrespondence) thatlistsapplicable NRCReporting Requirements, thetimeframeforreporting, andthegrouporindividual atRG&Ewhoisresponsible forthereport.Procedures existtoidentifyandcontroltheprocessforcomplying withthesereporting requirements, including 0-9.3,NRCImmediate Notification, A-25.6,NRC8'ritlenNotification, A-61,10CFR21Screening, Evaluating, andReporting, aswellasEP-2-P-164.

ForACTIONReports,0-9.3isreferenced, ifneeded,bytheShiftSupervisor orOperations management tomakeapromptdetermination ofreportability, andA-25.6isreferenced, ifneeded,bytheShiftTechnical Advisorregarding writtennotification (e.g.,aLicenseeEventReport).Afterthepromptreportability determination, direction isprovidedtoconsultwithNuclearSafety&Licensing, ifOperations requiresclarification oradditional information.

Furtherdetermination ofreportability includesconcurrence bythePlantOperations ReviewCommittee (PORC).AreviewofRG&E'sreportstotheNRCandNRCenforcement historyconfirmsthatappropriate reportsaremade,including somereportsthatarebelowthethreshold ofNRCreportability.

Examplesofsuchvoluntary LicenseeEventReports(LERs)submitted inthepastfewyearsinclude:P~LER88-009HeatConduction ThroughConduitSupports~LER89-007SafetyInjection PumpsInoperable duetoFlowMeterCalibration Errors~LER91-004Pre-planned ManualStartofEmergency DieselGenerators

~LER91-008Component FailurewithRedundant Equipment OperableandAvailable

~LER91-010InvalidDataUsedforHeatBalanceCalorimetric 10CFR50.54(l)

Response-Attachment DFinalReportPago662/7/97 Nos<Q!gI~,g~~-gCC~,I~~g,~l~~9/TT

~LER93-003Degradation ofValveIsolation Capability For10CFRPart21reportability, theACTIONReportprocessdirectsthedispositioner todetermine whetherthecondition reportedisanon-conforming condition.

Ifso,thedispositioner isreferredtoA-61,10CFR21Screening, Evaluating, andReporting.

Thedispositioner isdirectedtoperformascreening todetermine ifa10CFR21evaluation isrequired.

Ifso,thedispo'sitioner performsanevaluation, asspecified inA-61,todetermine whetherthenon-conforming condition represents aSubstantial SafetyHazardinaccordance with,10CFR21.

Suchevaluations mustbecompleted within60daysoftheDiscovery DateoranInterimReportmustbeissued.Iftheevaluation confirmsthatadefectorfailuretocomplyper10CFR21exists,Procedure A.61specifies responsibilities andtimeframes forreporting thecondition toNRC,including PORCreviewandconcurrence withthedispositioner's evaluation Voluntary reportstotheNRCHeadquarters Operations Officehavealsobeenmade,including severalconservative applications of10CFR21criteria.

Reportsinclude:~3/23/92FieldCalibration SourceInaccuracy (10CFR21)

~7/20/93HeatExchanger DesignDeficiency (10CFR21)

~7/14/95PumpPerformance Inadequacy (10CFR21)

~9/25/95MismatchBetweenValveDesignandInstallation Configuration (10CFR21)

~1/20/94PowerReduction DuetoLowCirculating WaterBayLevel(verbalreport)D.6.CONTINUOUS INTERACTION ANDCOMMUNICATION WITHNRCPROJECTMANAGER RESIDENTINSPECTORS ANDOTHERNRCSTAFFRG&Epersonnel communicate withtheNRCbothformallyandinformally.

ItisRG&E'smanagement philosophy toattempttokeeptheNRCinformedofactivities andissuesattheplant.Formalcommunication becomespartoftheGinnadocket.Incomingformalcommunication istypically receivedanddistributed bytheVicePresident, NuclearOperations.

Withtheexception ofsomeroutinereports,outgoingformalcommunication isnormallytransmitted totheNRCbytheVicePresident, NuclearOperations.

Thesecommunications maybeinresponsetoNRCrequestsofRG&EorRG&ErequestsoftheNRC.Suchcommunication istypically trackedinRG&E'sCommitment andActionTrackingSystem(CATS).Informalcommunication occursatvariouslevelsoftheorganization.

Itisprimarily verbalandinvolvesnocommitments orofficial.

positionstatements.

Itisgenerally usedtoclarifyorprovidedetail/background regarding on-goingactivities andemergingissues.Examplesofhowthisinformalinteraction occursincludeNRCattendance atGinna'smorningstaffmeetingoratPORC,anddiscussions withtheNRCResidentInspectors orNRCProjectManager.10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attachment DFinalRcportPage67217/97 09CCZL0-6ZGC600LOOOGK;0-9LC06001000009CCZ'K0-LVOOG'K0-9LCV60'06ZGC60'0LTO'K0KZ0'K0'K,OKZ'K'K D.7.TRAININGTheprocesses for,andextentof,personnel trainingatGinnaisdiscussed inAttachment A(A.3).Trainingincludestrainingontheimplementation oftheproblemreporting process,rootcausedetermination processandotherassociated processes described inthisAttachment.

D.SEMPLOYEECONCERNSPROGRAMRG&EhaslonghadinplaceanEmployeeConcernsProgramforconfidential identification ofproblems, bothatacorporate levelandforitsNuclearOperations Group(NOG).Employees, aswellascontractors, areencouraged toexpresstheirconcernswithrespecttosafetyorcompliance withapplicable laws.Weencourage, employees toattempttoresolvetheirconcernsbydirectcommunication withtheirsupervisors.

Ifsuchestablished linesofcommunication arenotpreferred by,orappeartobeineffective to,theemployees, theyareencouraged tousethe"Employee ConcernsForm."Theprogramallowsemployees toraiseconcernsandreceiveresponses tothoseconcernswhileensuringthattheprivacyoftheemployeeisprotected.

Weareconstantly improving ourproblemidentification processes toencourage open,self-reporting, forexample,byloweringthereporting threshold forACTIONReports.RG&Econsiders thattheverysmallnumberofconcernsrequiring useofthe"Employee ConcernsForm"or"NRCForm3",coupledwiththelargenumbersofACTIONReportsgenerated (currently averaging about100permonth),isevidenceofoursuccessincommunicating directlywithouremployees theimportance ofidentifying safetyconcerns.

RG&Eattributes thissuccesstothecloseandactivetiebetweenmanagement andworking-level personnel (atleastpartlytheresultofthefewlayersofmanagement presentintheRG&ENuclearOperations Group).Theattitudeofbothouremployees andmanagement istofostertheidentification ofpotential safetyissues.Open,frank,andevenheatedtechnical discussions areacceptedandencouraged.

RG&Erewardsemployees foridentification ofsignificant issueswithmonetaryrewards,plaques,preferential parkingspaces,etc.10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attachment DFinalRcportPat,c682/7/97

• t4I'+$~INe'*'II$PC4tVI'.j'$t%ve-~'tItIs/~~

10CFR50.54(f)

RESPONSEATTACHMENT E(e)Theoveralleffectiveness ofyourcurrentprocesses andprogramsinconcluding thattheconfiguration ofyourplantisconsistent withthedesignbases.NOTE:THISATTACHMENT ISSUPPORTlNG DOCUMENTATION THATISTOBEREADINCONJUNCTION WITHITSCORRESPONDING SECTIONINTHESUMMARYREPORT.ITISNOTASTAND-ALONE DOCUMENT.

IThisAttachment isorganized asfollows:,E.l.IN-LINETI-DISCIPLINARY REVIEWSE.l.A.DesignVerification E.l.B.PORCE.l.C.NSARBE.2.RG&EASSESSMENTS E.2.A.Self-Assessments E.2.B.QAAuditsandSurveillances E.2.C.ProcessWeaknesses Identified byQAE.2.D.ProcessStrengths Identified byQAE.3.THIRDPARTYREVIEWSOFR&EPROCEEE.3.A.NRCInspections andResultsE.3.B.Evaluation ofNRCNOVsE.3.C.SafetySystemFunctional Inspections E.1.IN-LINEMULTI-DISCIPLINARY REVIEWSE.l.A.DesignVeriTication Safety-related andsafetysignificant designchangesunderthePlantChangeProcessaredesignverifiedinaccordance withEP-3-S-125, DesignVerificalionand Technical Review.Designverification istheprocessforindependently reviewing, confirming, orsubstantiating thedesignbyoneormoremethodstoprovideassurance thatthedesignmeetsthespecified inputs.Thedesignverification includesacompletetechnical reviewandisintendedtofulfilltherequirements ofANSIN45.2.11.

Theverifiermustbecompetent andmustnothavebeeninvolvedindeveloping thecontentofthedesign.Thescopeoftheverification isscaledtothescopeofthedesignbeingreviewed.

Thedesignverification processisintendedtoprovidea10CFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attachment EFinalRcportPage692/7/97 peerreviewofeachproposeddesignthatcouldafFectthesafetyfunctionoftheplantandtoensurethateachdesignhasbeenperformed correctly.

E.i.B.PORCThePlantOperations ReviewCommittee (PORC)isdescribed intheRG&EQualityAssurance ProgramforStationOperation andND-NPD,NuclearPolicyandDirectives ManualDescription.

PORC'sfunctions aretoprovidetimelyandcontinuing monitoring ofoperating activities toassistthePlantManagerinkeepingabreastofgeneralplantconditions andtoverifythatday-to-day operating activities areconducted safelyandinaccordance withapplicable administrative controls.

PORCalsoreviewsfacilityoperations todetectpotential nuclearsafetyhazards.PORChasestablished severalindependent reviewers forSafetyReviewsand10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluations.

EachSafetyReview/Evaluation mustbereviewedbyadesignated PORCIndependent Reviewer(PIR).EachSafetyEvaluation mustbereviewedbyPORC.ForSafetyReviews,thePIRmaydesignate thatPORCevaluatetheSafetyReviewpriortotheproposedchange/activity proceeding.

PORCisintendedtoensurethatexperienced, supervisory-level plantoperations personnel scrutinize theday-to-day activities oftheplantandproposedchangesthathavethepotential toafFectnuclearsafety.PORCprovidesforplantsupervisory oversight oftheeffectiveness ofthedesignandconfiguration controlprocesses discussed withinthisreport.E.i.C.NSARBTheNuclearSafetyAuditandReviewBoard(NSARB)isdescribed intheRG&EQualityAssurance ProgramforStationOperation andND-NPD,NuclearPolicyandDirectives ManualDescription.

NSARBisanindependent corporate-level auditandreviewgroupresponsible forperiodicreviewoftheactivities ofPORC,fordirecting auditsandevaluating theirresults,andforthemanagement evaluation ofthestatusandadequacyoftheQualityAssurance ProgramatGinna.Thecomposition oftheNSARBcomplieswithANSIStandardN-18.71976,Section4.3.2.Inaddition, thecurrentcomposition includesregularmembership fromoutsideofRG&E,bothutilityandconsultant, withexperience innuclearoperations, engineering, andengineering management.

TheNSARBisintendedtoprovideindependent management oversight oftheorganizations andprocesses thatreviewandcontrolthesafety-relatedactivities atGinnaandtoprovidetomanagement anindication oftheefFectiveness oftheseactivities inensuringthesafeoperation oftheplant.IOCFR50.54(Q Response-Attachment EFinalReportPage702/7/97 eQ~QWII-w/tr E.2.RG&EASSESSMENTS E.2.A.Self-Assessments ND-ASU;Assessments andSurveillances, establishes andimplements aprogramofplannedandperiodicindependent assessments to1)confirmthatactivities affecting qualitycomplywiththeQualityAssurance Program,ImprovedTechnical Specifications, andothergoverning programsandplansand2)confirmthattheseprogramshavebeeneffectively implemented.

ND-ASUprovidesarecommended methodforimplementation ofself-assessment.

Self-assessment isanevaluation ofaparticular task,process,practice, orfunctional areainitiated bytheareaorprocessowner.ND-ASUdefinetheresponsibilities, process,conductoftheassessment, post-assessment activities, assessment reportandrecordsassociated withperformance ofself-assessments.

Self-assessments mayalsousepeersfromother.organizations withspecificexpertise intheareaunderreview.Thefollowing isalistofsomeoftheself-assessments performed byRG&Eduringthe1995-1996 timeframe;

~Maintenance RulePreparations

~ActionReportProcess~Maintenance ForeignMaterialExclusion

~PlantChangeProcess~RootCauseProcess~Procurement

~Maintenance HumanPerformance

~Corrective ActionProcess~ForcedOutage~PlantChangeIntegration Adequacy~LicensedOperators/STA/SS Program~PORC~QCPackageReviews~Procedure Adherence/Adequacy

~RCSSafetyValveOutageE.2.B.QAAuditsandSurveillances Internalauditsofselectedaspectsofquality-affecting activities areperformed atafrequency commensurate withsafetysignificance andmanagement concerns.

Eachauditrequiresthedevelopment ofanauditplantoprovideinformation abouttheaudit,suchascharacteristics andactivities tobeassessed, acceptance

criteria, areviewofpreviousassessment

findings, areviewofindustryandNRCissues,namesofthosewhowillperformtheaudit,scheduling arrangements, andthemethodofreporting findingsandrecommendations.

Auditsoftenincludetechnical specialists fromanareaotherthanthatbeingreviewed, including frequent10CFR50.54(0 Rcsponsc-Attachment EFinalRcportPage712/7/97

~'84ZT'9006896'K0'0 05099'K0-Z>8C600000005099T0-TCLL'KZ'0-ZZGCTG0Z08C6004'K0T0T80T0T,O'ZTT useofspecialists fromotherutilities.

Assessment resultsaredocumented inACTIONReportsandarereportedtotheassessor's management, thesupervisor anddivisionheadhavingresponsibility intheareaassessed, and,foraudits,totheNuclearSafetyAuditandReviewBoard.Thepersonhavingsupervisory responsibility intheareaassessedisrequiredtoreviewtheresults,takenecessary actiontocorrectthedeficiencies identified bythereport,andthendocumentandreportthecorrective action.QAprovidesfollow-up actiononauditresponses intendedtoensurethatcorrective actionisadequate, assignedtargetcompletion datesaretimely,andthatcorrective actionisimplemented foreachfindingrequiring aresponse.

E.2.C.ProcessWeaknesses Identified byQAInthecourseofperforming theirindependent oversight andauditingfunctions, RG&EQAhascitedorganizational deficiencies andweaknesses.

Forexample,areviewofAnnualQAAuditsfor1994-1996 (viadatabasequery)identified thefollowing configuration controlandcorrective actionconcerns/deficiencies:

Configuration Control-The1994QAauditofconfiguration controlidentified aconcernthatresponsibilities forvendormanualcreationandreviewwerenotclearlydefinedbetweenEngineering andProcurement.

TheChangeImpactEvaluation (CIE)formofIP-DES-02,PlantChangeProcess,nowallowstheEngineertoclearlyindicatetheresponsibility forVTMs.The1995QAauditidentified fiveconcernsandonedeficiency.

QAconcernsregarding evaluation ofchangeimpact,especially for"equivalent" changes,resultedinrevisions totheCIEformandassociated procedures for1)consideration ofimpactonISI/ISTprogramsand2)theadditionofmicroprocessor-controlled components toitemstobeconsidered forpotential softwarechangeimpacts.Adeficiency regarding postingoftemporary modifications intheControlRoomleadarevisiontoA-1406,ControlofTemporary Modifications, toindicatethatlabels,providedintheassociated WorkPackage,aretobeaffixedtotheControlRoomP&IDstoreflectthetemporary modifications.

Corrective Action-The1995QAauditidentified fourconcerns, including oneregarding theneedtoclarifythedefinition.

ofnon-conforming itemstoensurethatallsuchitemsare,reviewedinaccordance with10CFR21andthatadequatecontrolsareplacedontheuseofsuchitemswhiletheyarebeingdispositioned.,

Asaresult,IP-CAP-02, AbnormalCondition TrackingInitiation orNotification(ACTION)

Report,wasrevisedtoclarifythedefinition ofnnon-conforming item"andtosetatimelimitforthedispositioner todetermine ifanon-conforming itemisinvolved.

Thetimelimitiscommensurate with10CFR21reporting requirements aswellastheneedtoimposeappropriate andtimelycontrolsontheuseofnon-conforming items.The1996QAauditofcorrective actionidentified adeficiency inRG&E'sabilitytotrackandtrendlowlevel(ofsignificance) plantequipment degradation.

Specifically, theauditfoundnumerousWorkOrdersforvalveleaks,including severalidentical valve-type groupswithmultiplepackingleaks.Asaresultofthisfinding,RG&Ehasraisedtheawareness ofSystemsEngineering regarding 10CFR50.54(l)

Rcsponsc-Attachment EFinalRcportPage722/7/97 h41Ei&M~~t%\c/x~

multipleproblemswithinagivensystem,eventhoughtheyareinsignificant whentakenseparately.

Also,theACTIONReportprocesswasrevisedtoaddanewlow-level-of-significance categoryfortrendingonly(Category D)toassistplantpersonnel intheidentification andtrendingoflowlevelplantequipment degradation

concerns, TheaboveQAauditfindingsandresulting corrective actionsprovideexamplesthatRGB'sconstantly evaluating theeffectiveness ofprocesses andlookingformethodstoincreasethateffectiveness throughselfevaluations.

E.2.DPROCESSSTRENGTHS IDENTIFIED BYAThefollowing isa,sampling ofthestrengths citedbyRG&EQAasaresultofauditsconducted withinthelastthreeyears:~Attention todetailintherequiredcontentandreviewoftheASMESectionXIRepairandReplacement Programdocumentation (GORRForms)bytheISIorganization.

~Baseduponreviewbytechnical specialists fromotherutilities, thenewplantdesigncontrolprocess(PCR)incorporates severalstandardfeaturesthatshouldimprovetheaccuracyofchangeimpactevaluations andthequalityofdocumentation forplantchanges.~ThePORCChairman's reviewandprioritization ofACTIONReportsfordisposition focusesorganizational resources andattention onsignificant conditions.

/~GinnausesACTIONReportcausecodetrendingandnotjustcase-by-case rootcauseevaluations asameansofearlydetection ofadversequalitytrends.~Thelevelofattention paidtoplantfireprotection systemshasresultedinmostimpairments tothesesystemsbeingplannedevolutions formaintenance/operating activities ratherthanbeingcausedbyequipment failures.

Thedurationofmostsuchimpairments isshort(lto3shifts).Theseeffortshaveminimized relianceuponfirewatches.~TheconductofSignificant, Infrequently Performed Evolutions (SIPEs)hasbeenstrengthened bythoroughpreparedness andopennessduringpre-SIPEbriefings withOperations.

E.3.THIRDPARTYREVIEWSOFRG&EPROCESSES E.3.A.NRCInspections andResultsNRCInspectors performcontinuous inspections atGinna.Theseinspections areconducted pertheNRCInspection ManualandInspection Procedures, whichdefinecoreinspections.

IOCFR50.54(f)

Rcsponsc-Attachment EFinalRcPcrtPage732/7/97 G008EZ0-99ZC'KG0C809GT0-CG6C6000000C809GT0-GOCSTZ0-99ZC'KG0CG6C600LT0T0E8070'K07'KET Althoughconfiguration management isanelementofallinspections bytheResidentInspectors, itistheNRCRegionalOfficewhichperformsdesign,engineering, andprogrammatic configuration management inspections (atleastthreeengineering inspections perSALPperiod).NRCInspection Reports(IRs)arereceivedandreviewedbytheVicePresident, NuclearOperations, whoassignsresponsibility foractionitemsandhasthemtrackedbytheCommitment andActionTrackingSystem(CATS)untiltheyarecompleted.

Thevariousprocesses andprogramsdiscussed hereinuponwhichRG&Ereliestomaintainplantconfiguration andoperation consistent withthedesignbaseshavebeenscrutinized bytheNRConaregularbasis.Asonemeasureoftheadequacyoftheseprocesses andprograms, RG&EreviewedNRCIRsforGinnafor,thepastsixyears(1990-1996).

NRCinspections andassociated reportshavebeenvaluableinfocusingattention onweaknesses anddeficiencies withinourprocesses andprograms; however,thereportsalsoindicateanumberofareasinwhichthesesameprocesses andprogramsareproceeding satisfactorily.

Specificrecurring themesare:~Reference toconsistency betweentheUFSARandtheplantandtoadequately maintained designbases(NRCIRs93-03,93-09,93-13,93-23,94-03,94-07,94-14,95-01,96-02,and96-05).~Reference toanadequatemodification controlprocess(NRCIRs90-05,90-17,91-02,91-05,92-12,93-19,93-22,94-02,94-07,94-12,94-14,94-15,95-02,95-02,95-15,95-20,and96-05).~Reference toanadequate10CFR50.59 evaluation process(NRCIRs90-09,90-17,93-16,and94-11).~Reference toanadequatecorrective actionprocess(NRCIRs94-09,94-12,94-16,95-01,and96-05)~Satisfactory oversight andreviewbyEngineering, QA,thePlantOperations ReviewCommittee (PORC),andtheNuclearSafetyAuditandReviewBoard(NSARB)andappropriate self-assessments (NRCIRs91-29,92-09,92-10,92-12,92-15,93-06,93-12,94-07,94-09,94-10,94-11,94-26,and94-27).TheNRChasalsoscrutinized ourprocedures forcompliance toregulations anddesignbases.AreviewofNRCInspection Reports(IRs)since1990indicates thefollowing strengths withrespecttoplantprocesses andprocedures:

~Reference toastronginservice inspection (ISI)programwhichmeetsregulatory requirements (NRCIRs92-06,90-06,91-20,92-11,and93-02)lOCFRSO.S4(f)

Rcsponso-Attachment EFinalRcportPage742/7/97 e4~ljE~:0QBQS

~Reference toastrongandtechnically adequateerosion/corrosion program(NRCIRs92-09,90-06,91-20,and92-11)~Reference toprocesses whichresultinadequateandtimelyresolution/implementation ofNRCconcernsandnoticesincluding:

0Spentfuelpooldesignbasesacceptability (NRCEs96-03and96-05)0Pumpminimumrecirculation flowprovisions perBulletin88-04(NRCE90-24)0Provisions forlow-loop/mid-loop operations perGL88-17(NRCIR91-18)0Responses toNRCInformation Notices(INs)asindicated bysamplingresponses tovariousINsincluding 92-53,91-29,91-51(NRCEs93-21and94-26)0Effective implementation of10CFR21requirements (NRCIR93-12)0AdequateOperatorWork-Around program(NRCIR96-005)E.3.B.Evaluation ofNRCNoticesofViolation (NOVs)OverthelifeofGinnaStation,RG&Ehasdeveloped andimplemented thepractices, processes, andprogramsdiscussed aboveaspartofourcontinuing efforttomaintainplantconfiguration andoperation consistent withthedesignbases.TheNRChasconducted numerousinspections ofGinnaanditsoperation.

Asonemeasureoftheeffectiveness ofourefforts,RG&EreviewedtheNOVsreceivedoverthepast15years.Byreviewing NRCInspection Reportsbeginning in1982,RG&Eidentified NOVswhichappeartobetheresultofincorrect orinadequate knowledge oftheplantdesignbases.Additional NOVswereselectedwhichciteplantconfigurations orconditions whichappeartobeinconsistent withthedesignbases.Ofthelatter,abouthalfaretheresultofprogramdeficiencies, andhalfaretheresultoffailuretofollowprocedures (bothrepresent acondition inwhichknowndesignbasesinformation wasnotadequately communicated forimplementation inthefield).RG&E'sevaluation oftheseNOVsresulting fromincorrectly orinadequately communicated designbasesinformation indicates that,althougheachoftheserepresented aproblemwiththeassociated equipment, theactualimpacttopublichealthandsafetywas,ineachcase,minimal.Thisisnottosaythattheviolations werenotofconcerntoRG&Eorthatvigorouscorrective actionwasnotwarranted ortaken.Rather,itisanindication oftherobustness oftheplant'sdefense-in-depth whichaddstoourconfidence inthesafetyoftheplantanditssafetysystems.Additionally, manyoftheNOVswere1)self-identified byRG&Eor2)detectedwithinaveryshorttime(1day)ofthedeficiency occurring.

ThisgivesRG&Econfidence thatsurveillances andself-checking contribute tothecontinued safetyoftheplant.110CFR50.54(f)

Response-Attachment EFinalRePettPage752/7/97 O'K999L9C'0L809T900000000999L9C'0-L80979'00LTOE0L80'K0'K0T0T.L TheNRC-cited.

violations regarding designbasesproblemsappeartobedividedintotheareasofunderstanding ourdesignbases,ourabilitytocommunicate designbasesinformation, andourabilitytocomplywithspecified designbasesrequirements.

RG&Econtinues efFortstoimproveineachoftheseareas,e.g.,bydesignbasesdocumentretrieval anddevelopment, UFSARverification eForts,andemphasisonprocedural compliance.

Insummary,ourreviewofNOVsindicates that,inthoseincidents inwhichconfiguration hasnotbeensatisfactory, thepotential impactonpublicsafetyhasbeenminimal,theproblemshavebeencorrected, andourprocesses havebeenimprovedtominimizethepotential forrecurrence.

E.3.C.SafetySystemFunctional Inspections (SSFIs)RESIDUALHEATREMOVAL'SYSTEM TheNRCconducted anSSFIoftheRHRSystemanditssupporting systemsoverafive-week periodduringNovemberandDecemberof1989(NRCIR89-81).Thesix-member NRCteamdidnotidentify'any conditions thatwouldprohibittheRHRsystemfromperforming itsintendedfunctions undernormalordesignbasisaccidentconditions.

Themajorityoftheteam'sfindingswereassociat'ed withthetopicof"engineering assurance",

whichreferr'ed toitemssuchascontrolofdocumentation, engineering designinterfaces, andengineering communications withexternalorganizations.

Concernswithengineering assurance alsoincludedlackofconsistency intheimplementation ofapprovedengineering procedures amongthevariousdepartments andweaknesses intheprocessforresolving safetyconcernsraisedoutsidethemodification process.-Thelackofthoroughdesignbasisdocumentation wasalsonotedasagenericweaknessinthedocumentation anddesignprocessexistingatthetime.Bothofthetwoviolations issuedasaresultoftheSSFIinvolvedcontroloftechnical information.

Subsequent totheRHRSSFI,RG&Eperformed acomprehensive assessment oftheSSFIfindings.

Thatassessment ledtomajorprocessimprovements tocorrecttheweaknesses citedintheSSFIInspection Report.Specifically:

~AnimprovedPlantChangeProcesswasimplemented toenhancethecontrolofmodifications.

~Anewcomputerized Configuration Management Information System(CMIS)wasdeveloped.

~Asearchable listofdesignanalyseswasstoredinCMIS.~ADesignDocumentRetrieval projectwasinitiated.

~Commonprocedures weredeveloped forcertainproce'sses applicable to.bothEngineering andPlantpersonnel.

10CFR50.S4(f)

Rcsponsc-Attachment EFinalRcportPage76217/97 w>4nl"~'-0T'/'KT

~DesignEngineers wereassignedindividual systemresponsibilities.

Thiswasafirststeptowardimplementing aSystemsEngineering group.~Asingleentrypointreporting processwasrecommended topermitpersonnel withinallgroupssupporting GinnaStationtoraiseissuesofconcernandtohavethoseconcernstrackedtoresolution.

ThislaterbecametheGinnaACTIONReport.~RG&Edeveloped atestprogramformoldedcasecircuitbreakers.

Acceptability oftheprogramwasconfirmed inthe1991NRCElectrical Distribution SystemFunctional Inspection (EDSFI).~Engineering procedures wererevised.to adequately controlchangestobatteryandemergency dieselgenerator loadings.

ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION'SYSTEM FUNTIONALINSPECTION DSFITheNRCconducted anSSFIoftheElectrical Distribution Systemanditssupporting systemsoverafive-week periodduringMayandJuneof1991.Thesix-member NRCteamconcluded thattheGinnaelectrical distribution, systemwascapableofperforming itsintendedfunctionandtheengineering organization providesadequateengineering supportforthesafeoperation oftheplant.OneNotice.ofViolation andonetwo-partNoticeofDeviation wereissuedasaresultoftheEDSFI.Issuescitedintheviolation wereresolvedbyadditional analysesandconfirmatory testing.Theportionofthedeviation concerning theconfiguration ofbustiebreakerBT17-18wasresolvedbychangingthecomponent configuration andrevisingthesupporting procedures; theportionconcerning controlcablestotheComponent CoolingWatersystempumpswasresolvedviaamodification performed duringthefollowing refueling outage.Numerousaspectsoftheelectrical distribution systemanditssupporting systemswerereviewedbytheNRCinspection team.Althoughanumberofconcernswerenoted,theteamjudgedthatthesewereeitheroflowsignificance orwerenotsafetyissues.SERVICEWATERSYSTEMOPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION

~SWSOPIn1991,theNRCconducted aSWSOPIatGinna.Thesix-member SWSOPIspentthreeweeksassessing theoperational performance oftheSWsystem.Amajorityoftheteam'sfindingswereassociated withapparenterrorsandomissions inthedesignbasesfortheSWsystem.TheNRCSWSOPIteamconcluded thatapresumption ofoperability waswarranted fortheGinnaSWsystemwhileSWSOPIissueswereresolved.

Operability wasconfirmed bysubsequent analysesandtestswhichdemonstrated thattheSWsystemwascapableofperforming itsdesignbasisfunctions.

InresponsetoGL89-13andtheSWSOPI,RG&Eembarkeduponanextensive effortofcombinedanalysesandtestingtoresolveconcernsraised.Basedupontheseefforts,RG&Ebelievesthereisreasonable assurance thattheUFSARreflectsthedesignbasesoftheSW10CFR50.54(f)

Response-Attachment EFinalRcPettPage772fl/97 00CTT89C0-C809T90000089COG60CTC89C'0-C809E900LTO'K0T'0T0C0TTTT systemandthatthecurrentSWsystemconfiguration isconsistent withthosedesignbases.Asdiscussed elsewhere withinthisdocument, RG&EselectedtheSWsystemforthepilotNEIpilotinitiative regarding UFSARfidelity.

Althoughmanyclarifications wereneeded,onlyonepotential difference resultedinamorein-depthevaluation, andthiswas'determined nottoinvolveacondition thatwasoutsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.Thispotential difference, regarding theminimumrequirednumberofSWpumps,hasbeenanalyzedbyRG&E,submitted totheNRC,andiscurrently underreview.AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AFIn1988,RG&Einitiated EWR4749toperformitsfirstinternalsafetysystemfunctional inspection (SSFI).TheAFWsystemwasselected.

TheSSFIwasconducted byathird-party consultant andrepresented morethan1500man-hours ofeffortoverathreemonthperiod.TheresultsofthatSSFIindicated thatthelackofeasilyaccessible design,operational, andmaintenance information wasaprogrammatic deficiency whichwastherootcauseofamajorityofthefindingsofthatSSFIinspection.

TheSSFIresultedin73observations.

Eachobservation wasevaluated andarecommendation forresolution wasmade.Theobservations wereeithersatisfactorily resolvedortrackedlong-term byRG&EQA/QC.TheAFWSSFIalertedmanagement totheneedfor,andinitiated, manyoftheconfiguration anddesignbaseseffortsconducted byRG&Einthe1990s(described elsewhere inthisreport).Specificobservations madeduringthisSSFIwere:~Lackof"adequatetestingofsystemmotor-operated valves(MOVs)andcheckvalves~Needforimproveddocumentcontrol~Needforincreased detailintheworkcontrolprocedures

~Needforupgradetothemaintenance historyfiles~Needforimproveddesigncontrol,including checklists foruniformity ofdesign~Needforimprovedworkprioritization andtracking~Needforenhancedrootcausetracking,

trending, andanalysis.

INSTRUMENT AIRIAAspartoftheresponsetoindustryconcernsaswellasNRCrequirements (GenericLetter88-14)forreviewofIAsystems,RG&Eperformed anAuxiliary SystemFunctional Inspection (ASFI)oftheIAsystemsatGinna.Thisinspection wasanin-depthinvestigation intothedesignadequacyandoperational readiness oftheIAsystem.TheASFIwasconducted byathird-party consultant whoconcluded thattheIAsystemwascapableofreliablydelivering highqualityairtoIAloadsinsufficient volumetomeetdesignrequirements.

Nodeficiencies affecting theabilityofsafety-related equipment toperformdesignfunctions werediscovered duringtheASFI.TheASFIdidrecommend thatRG&Eperformarepairvs.replacement cost-benefit analysisforthecompressors.

The"C"IAcompressor wassubsequently replacedwithanew,screw-type compressor.

10CFRS0.54(f)

Response-Attachment EFinalRcportPage782/1/97

\.t/zv