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Response Amendment to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.3 Seismic
	ML13143A168
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	05/22/2013
From:	Allen B; Pacific Gas & Electric Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
	DCL-13-054
	Download: ML13143A168 (124)
	v • d • e

Pacific Gas and Electric Company May 22, 2013 PG&E Letter DCL-13-054 u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 2 Barry S. Allen Site Vice President Diablo Canyon Power Plant Mail Code 104/6 P. O. Box 56 Avila Beach, CA 93424 805.545.4888 Internal: 691.4888 Fax: 805.545.6445 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Response Amendment to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendation 2.3 Seismic

References:

1. NRC Letter, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Cod~ of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012

2. NRC Letter, "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Draft Report 1025286, 'Seismic Walkdown Guidance,'" dated May 31,2012

3. PG&E Letter DCL-12-066, "Pacific Gas and Electric Company's 120-Day Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," dated July 10, 2012

4. PG&E Letter DCL-12-119, "Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Unit 2," dated November 27, 2012

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E). Enclosure 3 of Reference 1 contains the requested information and required responses associated with Recommendation 2.3 Seismic.

In Reference 1, the NRC requested that each addressee confirm that it will use the industry-developed NRC-endorsed seismic walkdown procedures. Reference 2 documents the NRC's endorsement of EPRI 1025286. In Reference 3, PG&E confirmed that it would use EPRI 1025286, as endorsed by Reference 2, as the basis for the seismic walkdowns at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP).

A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing)

Alliance Callaway

Comanche Peak

Diablo Canyon

Palo Verde

San Onofre

South Texas Project

Wolf Creek

Docu ment Control Desk May 22, 2013 Page 2 PG&E Letter DCL-13-054 of Reference 1 states that within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of the walkdown process, each addressee will submit its final response for the requested information. It also states that the response should include a list of any areas that are unable to be inspected due to inaccessibility and a schedule for when the walkdown will be completed.

Reference 4 provided PG&E's response to Recommendation 2.3 Seismic for DCPP Unit 2 accessible components and a commitment to provide an update on inspections of inaccessible components within 60 days following the completion of the 17th refueling outage for Unit 2 (2R17). 2R17 was completed on March 23, 2013. of this letter identifies the amendments to Reference 4 and the basis for the amendments. Enclosure 2 of this letter provides the amended Reference 4 pages with changes shown as electronic markups with a revision bar in the margin (deletions crossed out and insertions italicized). Enclosure 2 Attachments I and J include only the new seismic walkdown checklists and area walk-by checklists and do not include the previously submitted checklists.

PG&E makes no regulatory commitments (as defined by NEI 99-04) in this letter.

This letter includes no revisions to existing regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions, or require additional information, please contact Mr. Terence L. Grebel at (805) 545-4160.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on May 22, 2013.

Sincerely, J3 Cfo7 5. Ad----

Barry S. ~lIen Site Vice President dmfn/SAPN 50465913 Enclosures cc:

Diablo Distribution cc/enc:

Thomas R. Hipschman, NRC, Senior Resident Inspector Arthur T. Howell, III, NRC Region IV Eric J. Leeds, NRC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation James T. Polickoski, NRR Project Manager A

member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Shari ng)

Alliance Callaway

Comanche Peak

Diablo Canyon

Palo Verde

San Onofre

South Texas Project

Wolf Creek PG&E DCL-13-054 Diablo Canyon Power Plant 2.3 Seismic Submittal Changes Affected DCL-12-119, Reason for Change Section Page 1, Purpose PG&E completed inspections of components that were previously inaccessible.

Page 13, NRC Request d Updated number of walkdown packages completed and the number of potentially adverse seismic conditions identified. Removed references to inaccessible items. There are no remaining inaccessible items.

Page 14: References Added reference to PG&E Letter DCL-12-119 and made format changes.

Page 15, Attachment List Corrected attachment reference for the Unit 2: Area Walk-By Checklists.

Attachment A Updated walkdown team member information.

Attachment C Bus F was inspected instead of the equivalent Bus G, which was not available during the 17th refueling outage in Unit 2. References to Bus G were changed to Bus F.

Attachment G Added four potentially adverse seismic conditions, which were entered into the corrective action program, resulting from the inaccessible component inspections. Updated status of corrective actions.

Attachment H Deleted list of inaccessible Unit 2 components and added note that PG&E completed walkdowns of all previously-identified Unit 2 inaccessible components during the 17th refueling outage in Unit 2.

Attachment I Added 22 seismic walkdown checklists resulting from walkdowns of inaccessible components. Only the added seismic walkdown checklists and associated licensing basis evaluations (LBEs) are included.

Attachment J Added 10 area walk-by checklists resulting from walkdowns of inaccessible components. Only the added area walk-by checklists and associated LBEs are included.

Attachment K Added two peer review comments to the seismic walkdown checklist review, and one peer review comment to the LBE review.

PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 1 of 15 Amended Response to Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 2 Acronyms used in this response are defined in Attachment L to this enclosure.

==

Introduction:==

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued letter, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident" (Reference 1). Enclosure 3 of Reference 1 contains a request for information related to the results of the seismic design basis walkdowns performed in accordance with NRC Letter, "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Draft Report 1025286, 'Seismic Walkdown Guidance,'" dated May 31,2012, (Reference 2).

Purpose:

Reference 1 requests that within 180 days of NRC's endorsement of the walkdown procedure, each addressee will submit its final response for the requested information arid that the response should include a list of any areas that are unable to be inspected due to inaccessibility and a schedule for when the walkdowns will be completed. This Enclosure contains PG&E's response for the requested information for Unit 2, which includes the results of the walkdowns performed and any further actions required. This response also includes a list of any components that PG&E 'Nas unable to inspect due

. to inaccessibility and a schedule for 'Nhen PG&E 'Nill complete those 'Nalkdo'Nns.

PG&E Letter DCL-12-119, dated November 17,2012, provides PG&E's response for the requested information, which includes the inspection results of accessible components. This enclosure provides the results of items identified in PG&E Letter DCL-12-119 as inaccessible.

NRC Request:

a. Describe the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation PG&E Response:

The seismic inputs applicable to the design of DCPP are described in the DCPP UFSAR, Sections 2.5 and 3.7. Since the development of the seismic inputs for DCPP predates the issuance of 10 CFR 100, Appendix A, "Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," the following DCPP-specific earthquakes are defined:

Design Earthquake PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 2 of 15 The design earthquake (0.2g) is defined as the maximum size earthquake that can be expected to occur at DCPP during the life of the reactor. The design earthquake is the equivalent of the operating basis earthquake, as described in 10 CFR 100, Appendix A.

Double Design Earthquake The double design earthquake (0.4g) is defined as the hypothetical earthquake that would produce accelerations twice those of the design earthquake. The double design earthquake is the equivalent of the safe shutdown earthquake, as described in 10 CFR 100, Appendix A.

Hosgri Earthquake The Hosgri earthquake (0.75g) is defined as the predicted ground motion at DCPP due to a Richter magnitude 7.5 earthquake on the offshore Hosgri fault. The Hosgri earthquake does not correspond to an operating basis earthquake or safe shutdown earthquake.

Long Term Seismic Program In addition to the above three earthquakes, PG&E implemented a program to reevaluate DCPP's seismic design, as described below. As part of the operating license issuance for DCPP Unit 1, the NRC imposed a license condition that required in part: "PG&E shall develop and implement a program to reevaluate the seismic design bases used for the DCPP."

PG&E's reevaluation effort in response to the license condition was titled the "Long Term Seismic Program." In June 1991, the NRC issued SSER 34, in which the NRC concluded that PG&E had satisfied the license condition described above. In SSER 34, the NRC requested certain confirmatory analyses from PG&E, and PG&E subsequently submitted the requested analyses. The NRC's final acceptance of the L TSP is documented in a letter to PG&E dated April 17, 1992.

Although the L TSP contains extensive databases and analyses that update the basic geologic and seismic information in the UFSAR, the L TSP material does not alter the design bases for DCPP. In SSER 34, the NRC states: "The Staff notes that the seismic qualification basis for Diablo Canyon will continue to be the original design basis plus the Hosgri evaluation basis, along with associated analytical methods, initial conditions, etc."

Classification of SSCs PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 3 of 15 The classification system applicable to SSCs at DCPP is described in the UFSAR, Section 3.2. Since the development of the classification system for DCPP predates Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification," DCPP does not use SC I terminology. Instead, DCPP uses the following classifications:

Design Class I: SSCs necessary to ensure: (a) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (b) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (c) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that.could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR 100 are classified as Design Class I. Design Class I SSCs are designed for the design earthquake, double design earthquake, and Hosgri earthquake.

Design Class I SSCs correspond to SC I SSCs, as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.29.

Design Class II: SSCs important to reactor operation but not essential to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor, and failure of which would not result in the release of substantial amounts of radioactivity, are classified as Design Class II. In general, Design Class II SSCs correspond to non-SC I SSCs, as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.29. Some Design Class II SSCs are required for the operation of certain Design Class I features and are designed for the double design earthquake or the Hosgri earthquake.

Therefore, as discussed above, all Design Class I and selected Design Class II components that are designed for the double design earthquake or the Hosgri earthquake are scoped in as equivalent to SC I for the purpose of this evaluation.

Codes, Standards, and Methodology Given the above considerations regarding Design Class I and II equipment, some of the major codes and standards used include:

(1)

ANSI 831.1, "Power Piping" (1967 Edition up to and including 1973 Addenda)

(2)

ANSI 831.7, "Nuclear Power Piping" (1969 Edition with 1970 Addenda)

(3)

ACI-318-63, "8uilding Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete" (4)

AISC, Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for 8uildings (1969)

(5)

IEEE 344-1971, "IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class I Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." Specific cases have been supplemented by seismic qualification criteria per IEEE 344-1975.

Additional codes and standards are identified in the UFSAR.

PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 4 of 15 NRC-approved methodologies were used for design, construction, and any modification of seismic-related SSCs at DCPP Unit 2. The various methodologies used for the SSCs are identified in the UFSAR.

NRC Request:

b.

Present information related to the implementation of the walkdown process PG&E Response:

Personnel Qualifications:

The development of the various teams of personnel for the DCPP seismic walkdown effort was consistent with EPRI 1025286, Section 2.

The equipment selection personnel were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs to be walked down in accordance with the guidance of EPRI 1025286, Section 4. The equipment selection personnel were selected based on their knowledge of the following areas:

(1) plant operations (2) plant documentation (3) associated SSCs (4) the IPEEE program The SWEs were responsible for the required walkdown inspections per the approved plant procedures and/or practices. The SWEs were required to have the following qualifications:

(1) a degree in mechanical or civil/structural engineering or equivalent (2) experience in seismic engineering as it applies to nuclear power plants (3) successful completion of either the NTTF 2.3 seismic walkdown training course or the SQUG walkdown training course The licensing basis reviewers were responsible for the performance of evaluations of potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during the walkdowns against the licensing basis for the SSCs. They were selected based on having knowledge and experience in the following areas:

(1) the seismic licensing bases of DCPP (2) seismic qualification methods and documentation used at DCPP (3) the DCPP requirements and procedures for entering documentation into the plant records system and the CAP PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 5 of 15 The peer review personnel were responsible for collectively reviewing the following:

(1) the SWEL for scope (2) a sample of completed SWCs and AWCs to validate the process and to identify and communicate any lessons learned for the remaining walkdown efforts (3)

LBEs and the decisions on entering potentially adverse seismic conditions into CAP (4) this response being submitted to the NRC to determine that the objectives and requirements of the NRC and the endorsed EPRI guidance were met The peer reviewers included members of the teams above and other plant personnel that have expertise in related plant processes.

Attachment A to this enclosure provides a summary of the qualifications of each of the team members and a table of activities that they performed.

SWEL Development The process for selecting the DCPP SSCs for the SWEL included appropriate variety of classes of equipment, environments, primary and secondary systems, new and replacement equipment, and other elements consistent with EPRI 1025286, Section 3.

The DCPP SWELs were developed for the following two groups of SSCs:

(1) a sample ofSSCs required to safely shutdown the reactor and maintain containment integrity (SWEL-1)

(2) a sample of SSCs required to support SFP-related processes including components that could potentially allow rapid drain-down of the SFP in the event of an earthquake (SWEL-2)

Development of SWEL-1 The development of the SWEL-1 followed a process defined in EPRI 1025286 through the application of the following four screens:

(1)

Screen No.1 - Seismic Category I (2)

Screen No.2 - Equipment or System (3)

Screen NO.3 - Support for Five Safety Functions (4)

Screen NO.4 - Sample Considerations Screen No. 1 - Seismic Category I Screen No. 1 narrowed the scope of SSCs included in SWEL-1 from the total population of SSCs to those that are classified as SC I, where SC I is defined in Regulatory Guide 1.29. However, as discussed in the UFSAR Section 3.2.1, the licensing basis for PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 6 of 15 the seismic classification system for DCPP does not include Regulatory Guide 1.29, so SSCs are not explicitly classified as SC I. However, as discussed in the UFSAR Section 3.2.1, the licensing basis for the seismic classification system for SSCs meets the intent of Safety Guide 29, which uses the term "Category I" for "all structures, systems, and components important to safety" that must remain functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake.

The application of Screen No. 1 was based on the equivalency between DCPP's classification system and SC I as discussed previously in this enclosure. Design Class I SSCs and those Design Class II SSCs that have been seismically qualified for double design earthquake or Hosgri earthquake screened-in under Screen No.1.

Screen No.2 - Equipment or Systems Screen No.2 narrowed the scope of SSCs in SWEL-1 by selecting only those SSCs that do not regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the DCPP licensing basis. The following types of SSCs screened-out of SWEL-1 under Screen No.2:

(1)

SC I - equivalent structures (2) containment penetrations (SWEL-1 includes certain CIVs)

(3)

SC I - equivalent piping systems Screen NO.3 - Support for the Five Safety Functions Screen NO.3 narrowed the scope of SSCs in the SWEL-1 to those that are associated with maintaining the following five safety functions:

(1) reactor reactivity control (2) reactor coolant pressure control (3) reactor coolant inventory control (4) decay heat removal (5) containment function Screen NO.3 was applied in two steps: (1) application to the output of Screen No.2 and (2) application to the "previous equipment list." These steps are described in the following subsections.

(1)

Application to the Output of Screen No.2 The application of Screen NO.3 to the output from Screen No.2 was completed and the list of SSCs that screen-in through the application of Screen NO.3 served as input to Screen NO.4.

(2)

Application to the Previous Equipment List PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 7 of 15 In accordance with EPRI 1025286, Section 3, DCPP used "previous equipment lists" as part of the application of Screen No.3. DCPP used a combination of all SSCs from the following previous equipment lists that are SC I-equivalent.

(a)

DCPP IPEEE, completed in 1994, and documented in the "Individual Plant Examination for External Events Report for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2 in Response to Generic Letter 88-20 Supplement 4."

(b)

UFSAR, Appendix 9.5G, "Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown,"

includes a tabulation of the minimum equipment required to bring the plant to a cold shutdown condition.

Screen No.4 - Sample Considerations Screen No.4 modifies the scope of the SWEL-1 from that selected in Screen No.3 to sufficiently represent a broad population of SC I-equivalent SSCs in order to meet the overall objective of the seismic walkdowns. The following five sample selection attributes were applied under Screen No.4:

(1) a variety of types of systems (2) major new and replacement equipment (3) a variety of types of equipment (4) a variety of environments (5) equipment enhancements associated with the IPEEE program (note that no vulnerabilities were identified during the implementation of the IPEEE program for DCPP)

Finalization of the SWEL-1 The SWEL-1 was finalized to include representative item(s) from each of the above five attributes. In addition, the risk significance of specific SSCs was considered in the final selection process. See Attachment C of this enclosure for the final SWEL-1 list.

Development of SWEL-2 The development of the DCPP SWEL-2 followed a process defined by EPRI 1025286 through the application of the following four screens:

(1)

Screen No.1 - Seismic Category I (2)

Screen No.2 - Equipment or System (3)

Screen No.3 - Sample Considerations (4)

Screen No.4 - Rapid Drain-Down

Screen No. 1 - Seismic Category I PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 8 of 15 Screen No. 1 narrowed the scope of SFP-related SSCs included in the SWEL-2 from the total population of SFP-related SSCs at DCPP to those that are classified as SC I, where SC I is defined in Regulatory Guide 1.29. Since Regulatory Guide 1.29 is not directly applicable to DCPP, the screening was based on equivalency between DCPP's classification system and SC I.

Screen No.2 - Equipment or Systems Screen No.2 narrowed the scope of SSCs in the DCPP SWEL-2 by selecting only those that do not regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the DCPP licensing basis. The following types of SSCs were screened-out of the SWEL-2 under Screen No.2:

(1)

SC I - equivalent structures (2)

SC I - equivalent piping systems Screen NO.3 - Sample Considerations Screen NO.3 modified the scope of the SWEL-2 from that selected in Screen No.2 to sufficiently represent a broad population of SC I-equivalent SSCs in order to meet the overall objective of the seismic walkdowns. The following sample selection attributes were applied under Screen NO.3:

(1) a variety of types of systems (2) major new and replacement equipment (3) a variety of types of equipment (4) a variety of environments Screen No.4 - Rapid Drain-down Screen NO.4 identified items that could allow the SFP to drain rapidly. The scope of these items was typically limited to hydraulic lines connected to the SFP and the equipment connected to those lines.

All piping entering the SFP was added to the SWEL-2 to verify that siphoning of water from the SFP was not possible.

SFP Penetrations EPRI 1025286 requires for Screen NO.4 that penetrations below about 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies be evaluated for rapid drain-down. At DCPP there are no such penetrations.

PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 9 of 15 SFP Configurations Associated with Refueling Outages Drain-down flow paths that could exist as a result of the various SFP configurations associated with refueling outages at DCPP were investigated. SSCs associated with these flow paths were added to the SWEL-2.

Finalization of the SWEL-2 The SWEL-2 was finalized to include representative item(s) having each of the attributes associated with Screen NO.3 and all items associated with potential rapid drain-down.

The Unit 2 components that were excluded from the SWEL-2 are listed in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Unit 2 Components Excluded from the SWEL-2 Listing Component Basis for Exclusion Refueling water purification pump Not required for SFP inventory control or cooling.

Refueling water purification filter Not required for SFP inventory control or cooling.

SFP demineralizers and resin traps Not required for SFP inventory control or cooling, inaccessible due to high radiation levels.

Spent fuel storage racks Racks are free-standing (no anchorage to SFP),

are passive (no moving parts), and are not classified as targets in the SISIP.

Cask pit platform Used for anchorage of spent fuel transfer cask during cask loading operations. No functional relationship to SFP cooling or inventory control.

New fuel storage rack Not located in SFP.

SFP bridge crane No functional relationship to SFP inventory control or cooling.

New fuel elevator No functional relationship to SFP inventory control or cooling.

480-V electric power Provides power to the SFPCS pumps, but components from this system have already been included in the SWEL-1.

120-V electric power Provides power for SFP-related instrumentation, but components from this system have already been included in the SWEL-1.

SFP cooling system pressure instrumentation No functional relationship to SFP inventory control or cooling.

FHBVS fire dampers Associated with fires, not seismic events.

FH BVS fan air monitors Not required for operation of FHBVS.

FH BVS emergency exhaust section Post-accident mitigation components; not required for normal operation of FHBVS.

FHBVS normal roughing and HEPA filters Post-accident mitigation components; not required for normal operation of FHBVS.

Combination of the SWEL-1 and the SWEL-2 PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 10 of 15 Based on the guidance in EPRI 1025286, Figure 1-3, "Seismic Walkdowns, Area Walk-Bys, and Licensing Evaluations," the final DCPP SWEL is the combination of SWEL-1 and SWEL-2.

Requested Summary Lists (1)

Attachment B to this enclosure provides the Unit 2 SWEL-1 Base List 1, which is the equipment coming out of Screen No.3 and entering Screen No.4 of the SWEL-1.

(2)

Attachment C to this enclosure provides the Unit 2 SWEL-1 list, which is the equipment coming out of Screen No.4 selected for seismic walkdown.

(3)

Attachment D to this enclosure provides the Unit 2 SWEL-2 Base List 2 of the equipment coming out of Screen No.2 and entering Screen No.3 SWEL-2.

(4)

Attachment E to this enclosure provides the Unit 2 SWEL-2 Rapid Drain-Down list of equipment coming out of Screen No.4 determined to potentially cause SFP to rapidly drain-down.

(5)

Attachment F to this enclosure provides the Unit 2 SWEL-2 list, which is a combination of the equipment coming out of Screens No.3 and No.4.

The system diversity of these lists is shown below in Table 2 and the equipment class diversity is shown in Table 3:

Table 2: Unit 2 Diablo Canyon Power Plant System Diversity Listing (SWEL-1)

System No.

System Description

Selected Equipment Count 03 Feedwater 6

04 Turbine Steam Supply 9

08 Chemical and Volume Control 7

09 Safety Injection 5

10 Residual Heat Removal 5

14 Component Cooling Water 6

17 Salt Water 2

21 Diesel Engine Generator 21 23 Ventilation and Air Conditioning 20 25 Compressed Air 1

36 Eagle 21 2

38 Solid State Protection 4

41 Reactor Control Rods 1

43 Plant Annunciators 1

63 4.16-kV Electrical 3

64 480-V Electrical 3

System No.

System Description

65 120-V Instrument AC 67 125-V and 250-Vdc 96 Multiple System Panels Total PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 11 of 15 Selected Equipment Count 3

4 9

112 Table 3: Unit 2 Diablo Canyon Power Plant Equipment Class Diversity Listing (SWEL-1)

Class Class Title Selected Equipment Count 0

Miscellaneous 11 1

Motor Control Centers 1

2 Low Voltage Switchgear 3

3 Medium Voltage Switchgear 1

4 Transformers 3

5 Horizontal Pumps 6

6 Vertical Pumps 2

7 Fluid Operated Valves 16 8

Motor Operated Valves, Solenoid Operated Valves 14 9

Fans 4

10 Air Handlers 5

11 Chillers 01 12 Air Compressors 1

13 Motor Generators 02 14 Distribution Panels 3

15 Batteries on Racks 1

16 Battery Chargers and Inverters 2

17 Engine Generators 2

18 Instruments on Racks 4

19 Temperature Sensors 2

20 Instrumentation and Control Panels and Racks 23 21 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 8

Total 112 Notes:

1.

DCPP does not have any chillers, since there is not a chilled-water system. Seismically-qualified air conditioning systems at DCPP use Freon-based cooling coils, condensers, and compressors.

2.

The only motor generators at DCPP are those for the control rod drive system, which are not seismically qualified (excluded at Screen No.1), so they cannot be included in the seismic walkdowns.

Summary of Walkdown Process PG&E DCl-13-054 Page 12 of 15 An SWC or an AWC package was prepared for each item on the SWEL. The actual walkdowns and walk-bys were performed by a minimum of two qualified SWEs.

Each walkdown or walk-by package contains, as a minimum, the following:

(1)

SWC or AWC, as appropriate (2) relevant drawings (components, locations, etc.)

(3) location (unit, area, etc.)

(4) relevant anchorage details (for components subject to configuration verification)

(5) relevant technical information Each component walkdown and area walk-by was completed by a team of at least two qualified SWEs. Any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the team were noted in the SWCs and AWCs. For each of the potentially adverse seismic-related conditions and observations, a lBE was performed to determine the component's ability to perform its required function. If this evaluation resulted in no potentially adverse seismic conditions, no further action was necessary and the results were documented in the walkdown checklists. For seismic conditions or observations that were determined to be adverse, the condition or observation was documented in the walkdown checklist and entered into the CAP. Other non-seismic related items identified during the team walkdowns were documented on the checklists and entered into the CAP.

The lBEs were performed by DCPP cognizant engineers and subject to a peer review.

Potentially adverse seismic conditions that could not readily be resolved were entered into the CAP. The peer review team consisted of a minimum of two individuals and any comments were addressed.

NRC Request:

c.

Present a list of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including any seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings) identified by the IPEEE and a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them (including their completion dates)

PG&E Response:

As provided in PG&E letter DCl 94-133, "Response to Generic letter 88-20 Supplement 4, 'Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," dated June 27, 1994, (Reference 3), based on the results presented in the IPEEE study, no vulnerabilities with regard to seismic induced core damage exist at DCPP. There were other completed plant improvements that have a beneficial impact on the PRA that were included in the SWEl development.

NRC Request:

PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 13 of 15

d.

Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions. Include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these conditions using the guidance in Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20, Rev 1, Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, ((Operating Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety, " including entering the condition in the corrective action program.

PG&E Response:

The completed walkdowns (SWEL-1 and SWEL-2 combined) for Unit 2 was-were comprised of 4-00-128 SWCs and a4---64 AWCs. Sixteen Twenty potentially adverse seismic conditions were identified, placed in CAP and evaluated. The engineering evaluations were completed and the conditions did not adversely affect the performance of any required safety function. In ooe--two instances a-components was-were conservatively declared inoperable (due to anchorage degradationrelated issues), and it was repaired/restored, and returned to service; subsequent evaluation showed that these components would have performed #s-their seismic safety function. The CAP status of these items is identified in Attachment G of this enclosure.

Attachment H of this enclosure provides a listing of components that vlere inaccessible in accordance 'Nith EPRI 1025286 and could not be inspected prior to submittal of this response. These inaccessible items '-vi" be inspected prior to the end of the next refueling outage for Unit 2 (2R17). 2R17 is currently scheduled to be completed in March 2013. An update from those inspections 'Ni" be submitted 'Nithin 60 days fo"ovving the completion of 2R17.

Attachment I of this enclosure contains the SWCs including any associated LBEs that were not included in PG&E Letter DCL-12-119 due to inaccessibility.

Attachment J of this enclosure contains AWCs including any associated LBEs that were not included in PG &E Letter DCL 119 due to inaccessibility.

In summary, there were no deficiencies entered into CAP for Unit 2 that resulted in any safety related SSCs being inoperable or non-functional.

NRC Request:

e.

Discuss any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features PG&E Response:

There are currently no planned or newly-insta"ed changes to the plant as a result of implementing this seismic walkdown guidance.

NRC Request:

PG&E DCl-13-054 Page 14 of 15 f

Results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review PG&E Response:

Various members of the peer review team reviewed the entire process of the DCPP seismic walkdown guidance as well as each element. Peer reviewers did not review their own work. The peer review process included reviewing the following: *

(1) the selection of the SSCs in the SWEl (2) a sample of the SWCs and the AWCs (3) the lBEs and decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into CAP (4) the submittal response Attachment K of this enclosure provides a table that corresponds to each of these activities and includes the results of the reviews and any actions taken to address those results.

References:

1.

NRC letter, dated March 12, 2012, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," March 12, 2012,

2.

NRC letter, "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Draft Report 1025286, 'Seismic Walkdown Guidance,'" dated May 31,2012

3.

PG&E letter DCl 94-133, dated June 27, 1994, "Response to Generic letter 88-20. Supplement 4, ~ Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, ", June 27, 1994 2r.4. PG&E Letter DCL 12-119, "Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Unit 2, "

November 27, 2012

Attachment A

B C

D E

F G

H I

hJ K

L Attachment List Title PG&E DCL-13-054 Page 15 of 15 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Team Personnel Qualifications Unit 2: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-1 Base List 1 Unit 2: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-1 Unit 2: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-2 Base List 2 Unit 2: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-2 Rapid Drain-Down List Unit 2: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-2 Unit 2: Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions Entered into the Corrective Action Program Unit 2: Inaccessible Component List Unit 2: Seismic Walkdown Checklists Unit 2: Area Walk-By Checklists Unit 2: Summary Findings of the Peer Reviews List of Acronyms

Attachment A PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment A Page 1 of 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Team Personnel Qualifications The following contains a brief summary of the industry and educational qualification of the personnel that were directly involved with the equipment selection, seismic walkdowns, licensing basis reviews, individual plant examination of external events reviews, and peer reviews.

Team Members Nozar Jahangir, PE is DCPP's manager of project engineering and the seismic project team lead. Mr. Jahangir is a degreed civil engineer and has over 30 years in the nuclear power industry at DCPP involved in plant seismic design and qualifications.

William Horstman, PE is a DCPP senior civil engineer on the Fukushima response project. Mr. Horstman is a degreed civil engineer specializing in structural engineering. Mr. Horstman has 32 years of experience in the commercial nuclear power industry, including over 22 years at DCPP, where he has provided services in civil engineering, seismic design, seismic analysis,.

license amendments, design criteria development, and licensing basis impact evaluations.

David Miklush is a degreed mechanical engineer with 34 years of experience in the nuclear industry at DCPP. Mr. Miklush was licensed as an operator for both units at DCPP for 7 years. Mr. Miklush has also served as operations director, maintenance director, and engineering director.

Patrick Huang, PE is a degreed civil engineer and has over 30 years of experience in the nuclear industry. Mr. Huang has worked for DCPP performing seismic equipment qualification for 23 years.

Matthew Sage is a degreed mechanical engineer and provided engineering support for this project.

Scott Maze, PE is a degreed civil engineer and has over 23 years of structural engineering experience including experience in seismic design, most of that in support of DCPP.

David Cryer is a degreed mechanical engineer, and has over 34 years in the nuclear power industry. Most of Mr. Cryer's work has been for DCPP in seismic qualification of equipment and pipe support.

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment A Page 2 of 3 Thomas Kipp is a degreed aeronautical engineer and has 42 years of experience in the nuclear power industry in fields including PRA, fragility analysis, and the LTSP at DCPP.

Kevin Moore is a degreed structural engineer with over a year of experience in the nuclear power industry, including work at several nuclear generating stations.

Mr. Moore also participated in seismic walkdowns for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.

Fred Grant is a degreed engineer specializing in mechanics of structures and has 7 years of experience in mechanical and structural engineering. Four of Mr.

Grant's years in the industry have been dedicated to seismic walkdowns and seismic fragility analysis.

Krishna Amirineni, PE is a degreed civil engineer and with 4 years of seismic structural engineering experience in the nuclear power industry.

John Gantner is a degreed civil engineer with 5 years of structural engineering experience in the power industry.

David Nakaki, Ph.D, PE is a degreed engineer with 25 years in the nuclear power industry. Mr. Nakaki has been involved with DCPP L TSP program in developing equipment fragility evaluations since the 1980s.

Nathan Barber is a degreed nuclear engineer with 10 years of experience in PRA at DCPP.

Murrell Evans provided operations support for this project. Mr. Evans has 36 years of experience in the nuclear industry, over 31 of which have been in support of DCPP, including holding positions as an operations shift manager and maintenance operation support manager.

Philippe Soenen is a degreed mechanical engineer and has 10 years of licensing experience in the nuclear industry, most of that in support of DCPP.

Mr. Soenen is a licensing supervisor.

Thomas Baldwin, PE is a degreed mechanical engineer with 26 years of experience with DCPP, holding positions such as a design engineer, senior reactor operator; engineering supervisor, procedure services manager, and licensing manager.

Personnel SWE Personnel Functions and Qualifications Training EPRII Ops I Licensing Individuals SQUG SWE ESP Ops Systems IPEEE Basis Reviewer Nozar Jahangir EPRI X

X William Horstman EPRI X

X X

Scott Maze EPRI X

X David Cryer EPRI X

X David Miklush N/A X

X X

Murrell Evans N/A X

David Nakaki SQUG X

Thomas Kipp SQUG X

Kevin Moore BetREPRI X

Fred Grant EPRI X

Krishna Amirineni EPRI X

X John Gantner EPRI X

Nathan Barber N/A X

Matthew Sage N/A Patrick Huang N/A X

Philippe Soenen N/A Thomas Baldwin N/A System Engineers N/A x

NOTE: There are four peer review activities listed -below. The numbers correspond to the review performed.

1.

Peer review of the selection of the SSCs in the SWEL

2.

Peer review of a sample of the SWCs and the AWCs

3.

Peer review of the LBEs and the decisions for entering the potentially conditions into CAP

4. Review of the submittal report PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment A Page 3 of 3 PEER Support Reviewer Personnel (see note) 1,2,3 2.3 3

3 4

1 1,2,3 X

1 X

3 4

4 X

Attachment B Unit 2: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-1 Base List 1 EPRI 1025286 Screen No.3 ( Five SF or CF)

RRC RCPC RCIC DHR CF IPEEE SSEL Component (YIN)

(YIN)

Volume control tank outlet to CCP suction Y

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

valves (LCV-1128, LCV-112C)

Emergency borate valve to charging pump Y

Y Y

N Y

flow path (8104)

Valves in flow path to RCS through Y

Y Y

N Y

regenerative Hx (8107,8108,8145,8146, 8147, 8148)

Charging pump discharge FCV-128 Y

Y Y

N Y

RCP seal water relief valve (RV-8121)

Y Y

Y N

Y RWST to charging pump suction valves N

N N

N Y

Y Y

(8805A, 88058)

RWST to Sl pump suction valves (8976)

N N

Y Y

N RHR discharge to charging pump suction N

N N

N Y

Y N

va~es(8804A, 88048)

Charging pump injection valves (8801A, N

N N

N Y

Y Y

88018, 8803A, 88038)

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment B Page 1 of 5 Remarks Flow path pressure boundary and CIVs Added from SSEL.

Added from SSEL.

Valves in the recirculation between RHR Sl and CCP are not safe shutdown equipment; only valves that are CIVs are included.

Valves in the recirculation between RHR SI and CCP are not safe shutdown equipment; only valves that are CIVs are included.

EPRI 1025286 Screen No.3 ( Five SF or CF)

RRC RCPC RCIC DHR CF Component (YIN)

(YIN)

Containment recirculation suction valves N

N N

N Y

(8982A, 89828)

Accumulator outlet valves to cold leg valve N

N N

N Y

CCW pumps N

N Y

Y Y

CCWHxs N

N Y

Y Y

CCW surge tank N

N Y

Y Y

CCW header A and 8 FCVs N

N N

N Y

(FCV-430, FCV-431)

SG blowdown isolation valves (FCV-151, N

N N

N Y

157,160,244,246,248,250,760,761,762, 763)

CCW pump auxiliary lube oil pumps N

N Y

Y Y

(CCWAP1, CCWAP2, CCWAP3)

DG fuel off shutoff valves (LCV-85 to LCV-90)

Y Y

Y Emergency DG, including engines Y

Y Y

DG main lead terminallbox Y

Y Y

DG air start receiver Y

Y Y

DG inlet air filter Y

Y Y

DG inlet silencer Y

Y Y

DG exhaust silencer Y

Y Y

DFODT Y

Y Y

DG radiatorlwater pump Y

Y Y

4160-V switchgear (Bus F, G, H)

Y Y

Y ASW pump overcurrent relays Y

Y Y

IPEEE SSEL (YIN)

(YIN)

Y N

N Y

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment B Page 2 of 5 Remarks Valves in the recirculation between RHR SI and CCP are not safe shutdown equipment; only valves that are CIVs are included.

Added from SSEL.

Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment CIVs only Added from SSEL.

Added from SSEL.

Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment

EPRI 1025286 Screen No.3 ( Five SF or CF)

RRC RCPC RCIC DHR CF Component (YIN)

(YIN)

ASW pump undervoltage relays Y

Y Y

CCW pump undervoltage relay Y

Y Y

CCW pump overcurrent relays Y

Y Y

4160-V load center transformer overcurrent Y

Y Y

relays (51 HF1 0 to 51 HH1 0)

CCP overcurrent relays Y

Y Y

AFW motor driven pump overcurrent relays Y

Y Y

Startup transformer overcurrent relays Y

Y Y

(Bus F, G, H)

ASW pump control transfer switch relay Y

Y Y

CCW pump control transfer switch relays Y

Y Y

4160-V potential transformers (Bus F, G, H)

Y Y

Y DG shutdown relays Y

Y Y

DG overcurrent Relays Y

Y Y

DG oil pressure timer relays Y

Y Y

DG overcrank timer relays Y

Y Y

DG oil pressure relays Y

Y Y

DG jacket water temperature trip relays Y

Y Y

DG engine start relays Y

Y Y

DG overcrank relays Y

Y Y

DG excitation cubicle Y

Y Y

DG control panel Y

Y Y

Safeguard relay panel (Bus F, G, H)

Y Y

Y 480-V breaker cabinets (load centers)

Y Y

Y (SPF to SPH)

CCW FCV Motor Control Contactors Y

Y Y

IPEEE SSEL (YIN)

(YIN)

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

EPRI 1025286 Screen No.3 ( Five SF or CF)

RRC RCPC RCIC OHR CF Component (YIN)

(YIN)

CCW FCV control switches Y

Y Y

(FCV-430, FCV-431) 480-V auxiliary relay panel Y

Y Y

4160-V/480-V transformers Y

Y Y

(THF10 to THH1 0)

Instrument breaker panels (PY21 to PY26)

Y Y

Y 120-V inverters (IY21 to IY24)

Y Y

Y 125-Vdc batteries (BAT21 to BAT23)

Y Y

Y Battery racks Y

Y Y

Battery chargers (BTC21, BTC22, BTC221, Y

Y Y

BTC231, BTC232) 125-V and 250-Vdc switchgearlbreaker Y

Y Y

panels (S021 to S023)

Nuclear auxiliary relay rack Y

Y Y

SSPS Y

N Y

Y Y

Auxiliary safeguards cabinet Y

N Y

Y Y

Process control and protection system N

Y Y

N Y

Process control and protection instrument N

Y Y

N Y

racks (P1A to P1C)

Main control boards (2VB 1 to 2VB5) and Y

Y Y

control console (1 to 3)

Hot shutdown panel Y

Y Y

Containment fan coolers N

N N

N Y

Containment purge valves N

N N

N Y

(RCV-11, RCV-12, FCV-660, FCV-661)

Auxiliary building supply fans (S-37, S-38)

N Y

Y Y

Y IPEEE SSEL (YIN)

(YIN)

N Y

Y N

Y Y

N Y

N PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment B Page 4 of 5 Remarks Added from SSEL.

Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment

EPRI 1025286 Screen NO.3 ( Five SF or CF)

RRC RCPC RCIC OHR CF Component (YIN)

(YIN)

(YIN) 480-V switchgear room supply fans N

Y Y

(S-45, S-46)

Auxiliary building exhaust fans (E-45, E-46)

N Y

Y Y

Y Auxiliary building shutoff (discharge) dampers N

Y Y

(FCV-5045, FCV-5046)

Auxiliary building backdraft dampers N

Y Y

(BOO-45, BOO-46)

ASW pump control switch relays Y

Y Y

ASW pump control switch relays at hot Y

Y Y

shutdown panel CCW pump control switch relays Y

Y Y

CCW pump control switch relays at hot Y

Y Y

shutdown panel Auxiliary transformer overcurrent relays Y

Y Y

(Bus F, G, H)

IPEEE (YIN)

Y Y

Y SSEL (YIN)

N N

N PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment B Page 5 of 5 Remarks Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment Safe shutdown equipment

System Equipment New or Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC (YIN)

AFW lead 1 temperature element 3

19 MIE N

N TDAFWpump 1 3

5 MIE N

N AFW pump 2 (Motor-Driven) 3 5

MIE N

N TD AFW pump discharge to SG 3

7 OE N

N LCV-110 AFW pump discharge to SG 3

7 MIE N

N LCV-115 TD AFW pump discharge to SG 3

8 OE N

N LCV-106 Isolation valve FCV-95 control switch contactor (supply to TD 4

1 MIE N

N AFW pump)

Stop valve FCV-152 on supply to 4

0 MIE N

N TDAFW pump 1 MS FCV-41 4

7 OE N

N MS PORV No. PCV-20 4

7 OE N

N (10% Dump)

Isolation valves on supply to TD 4

8 MIE N

N AFW pump (FCV-37)

MSSV RV-13 4

7 MIE N

N MSSV RV-3 4

7 OE N

N MSSV RV-61 4

7 MIE N

N MSSV RV-8 4

7 OE N

N Boric acid storage tank No. 1 level transmitter No. L T -102 8

18 MIE N

Y Seal water Hx 8

21 MIE N

Y CCP 1 (emergency) 8 5

MIE N

Y Attachment C Unit 2: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-1 Safety Function Risk RCPC RCIC DHR CF Significance SSEL (YIN)

(YIN)

N N

Y N

Y Y

N N

Y N

Y Y

N N

N Y

N N

N Y

N N

N Y

N N

Y N

N N

Y N

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

N N

Y N

N N

Y N

N N

Y N

N N

Y N

N N

N Y

N N

N Y

Y Y

N N

Y Y

N N

Y Y

IPEEE IPEEE Enhancement (YIN)

(YIN)

N N

Y N

N N

Y N

N N

Y N

N N

Y N

Walkdown Package No.

DC-2-03-I-E-TE-117 DC-2-03-M-PP-AFWP 1 DC-2-03-M-PP-AFWP2 DC-2-03-P-VOH-FW-2-LCV-110 DC-2-03-P-VOH-FW-2-LCV-115 DC-2-03-P-VOM-FW-2-LCV-106 DC-2-04-LD30 DC-2-04-P-V-MS-2-FCV-152 DC-2-04-P-VOA-MS-2-FCV-41 DC-2-04-P-VOA-MS-2-PCV-20 DC-2-04-P-VOM-MS-2 -F CV-37 DC-2-04-P-VR-MS-2-RV-13 DC-2-04-P-VR-MS-2-RV-3 DC-2-04-P-VR-MS-2-RV-61 DC-2-04-P-VR-MS-2-RV-8 DC-2-08-I-T-LT-102 DC-2 M-HX -SWH E 1 DC-2-08-M-PP-CCP1 PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment C Page 1 of 7 Remarks Added for variety of types of systems and variety of equipmenttypes (19).

Added based on peer review.

Added from SSEL. Special type of control valve for steam turbine.

Added from SSEL.

Added from SSEL and variety of systems. Mounted in local panel No. XLT102.

Added based on recommendation from PRA group. Variety of equipment types (21). Added for variety of systems.

Includes subcomponent: APi

Safety Function System Equipment New or Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC RCPC RCIC DHR (YIN)

CCP 3 (normal) 8 5

MIE Y

Y Y

Y N

Boric acid blender inlet valve no.

8 7

MIE Y

N N

FCV-110A Emergency borate valve to 8

8 MIE N

Y Y

Y N

charging pump (8104)

Volume control tank outlet to CCP 8

8 MIE N

Y Y

Y N

suction valve No. LCV-112B SI pump 1 9

5 MIE N

N N

Containment recirculation sump, sump strainer, trash rack, and 9

0 ICE Y

N N

Y Y

vortex suppressor SI accumulator No. 1 9

21 ICE N

N N

RWST to charging pump suction 9

8 MIE N

N N

valve No. 8805A SI pump suction valves from 9

8 MIE N

N N

RWST (8923A)

RHR Hx 1 10 21 MIE N

N N

N Y

RHR pump 2 10 6

MIE N

N N

N Y

RHR pump suction valve 8700A 10 8

MIE N

N N

N Y

RHR pump recirculation valve 10 8

MIE Y

N N

N Y

FCV-641A RHR pump recirculation valve 10 8

MIE Y

N N

N Y

FCV-641B CCW header A FCV-430 14 8

MIE Y

N N

CCW Hx output thermocouple 14 19 MIE N

N N

N Y

TE-6 CCW Hx 1 14 21 MIE N

N N

Y Y

CCW pump 1 14 5

MIE N

N N

Y Y

CCW surge tank 14 21 OE N

N N

Y Y

CCW Hx FCV-365 14 7

MIE Y

N N

ASWpump 1 17 6

SWIE N

N N

Y Y

ASW FCV-602 17 7

MIE N

N N

Y Y

DG No. 1 lube oil electric heater 21 0

DIE Y

Y Y

Risk IPEEE CF Significance SSEL IPEEE Enhancement (YIN)

(YIN)

N N

Y Y

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

Y N

N Y

Y Y

N N

N Y

Y N

N N

Y N

N Y

Y N

N Y

Y Y

N N

Y N

N N

N Y

N N

Y N

N N

Y Y

Y N

N Y

N N

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

N N

N Y

N N

N Y

Y Y

N N

N Y

Y N

N N

N Walkdown Package No.

DC-2-08-M-PP-CCP3 DC-2-08-P-VOA-CVCS FCV-110A DC-2 P-VOM-CVCS 8104 DC-2 P-VOM-CVCS LCV-112B DC-2-09-M-PP-SIP1 DC-2-09-M-STR-STR-RHR 1 DC-2-09-M-TK-AT1 DC-2-09-P-VOM-SI-2-8805A DC-2-09-P-VOM-SI-2-8923A DC-2-10-M-HX-RHE1 DC-2-10-M-PP-RHRP2 DC-2-10-P-VOM-RHR 8700A DC-2-1 O-P-VOM-RH R FCV-641A DC-2-10-P-VOM-RHR FCV-641 B DC-2-14-E-P-VOM-CCW FCV-430 DC-2-14-I-E-TE-6 DC-2-14-M-HX-CCWHE1 DC-2-14-M-PP-CCWP1 DC-2 M-TK-CCWST 1 DC-2-14-P-VOA-CCW FCV-365 DC-2-17 -M-PP-ASP1 DC-2-17 -P-VOA-SW-2-FCV-602 DC-2-21-E-HT -LOH 1 PG&E DCL-13-0S4 Attachment C Page 2 of7 Remarks Originally a reciprocal charging pump, replacement dissimilar to CCP1.

Major modification Added based on modification.

Seismically supported valve Added from SSEL.

Seismically supported Added due to association with L TSP/IPEEE modification.

Added as major modification.

Added for variety of environments.

Added due to association with L TSP/IPEEE modification.

Added based on peer review.

Associated with L TSP/IPEEE mod ification.

Added for variety of equipment (19).

Electrical location code XTE-006 Includes subcomponent: CCWAP1 Added from SSEL.

New component

Safety Function System Equipment New or Risk Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC RCPC RCIC DHR CF Significance SSEL (YIN)

(YIN)

DG No.1 control panel 21 20 DIE N

Y Y

Y N

N DG NO.3 control panel 21 20 DIE N

Y Y

Y N

N DG No.1 excitation cubicle 21 20 DIE N

Y Y

Y N

N DG NO.3 excitation cubicle 21 20 DIE N

Y Y

Y N

N DG No.1 DC power supply 21 14 DIE N

Y transfer switches Y

Y Y

Y N

N DG NO.3 DC power supply 21 14 DIE N

Y transfer switches Y

Y Y

Y N

N DG No. 1 engine 21 17 DIE N

Y Y

Y DG NO.3 engine 21 17 DIE N

Y Y

Y DG No.1 radiator A 21 17S DIE N

Y Y

Y N

N IPEEE IPEEE Enhancement (YIN)

(YIN)

Walkdown Package No.

Y N

DC-2-21-E-PN L-GQD21 Y

N DC-2-21-E-PNL-GQD23 Y

N DC-2-21-E-PNL-SED21 Y

N DC-2-21-E-PNL-SED23 N

N DC-2-21-E-S-EQD-21 N

N DC-2-21-E-S-EQD-23 Y

N

. DC-2-21-M-EN-DEG1 Y

N DC-2-21-M-EN-DEG3 Y

N DC-2-21-M-HX-JWR1A PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment C Page 3 of 7 Remarks Includes relay Nos.

- SDR-11/SDR-21

- OCT1-11/0CT1-21

- ESR1-11/ESR1-21

- JWTR-11/JWTR-21

- OPR-11/0PR-21

- OPT1-11/0PT1-21

- OCR-11/0CR-21 DG 2-3 associated with a major modification credited in the IPEEE SPRA, and is dissimilar from other DGs.

Includes relay Nos.

- SDR-13/SDR-23

- OCT1-13/0CT1-23

- ESR1-13/ESR1-23

- JWTR-13/JWTR-23

- OPR-13/0PR-23

- OPT1-13/0PT1-23

- OCR-13/0CR-23 DG 2-3 associated with a major modification credited in the IPEEE SPRA, and is dissimilar from other DGs.

Added for variety of types of equipment (14).

Added for variety of types of equipment (14). DG 2-3 associated with a major modification credited in the IPEEE SPRA, and is dissimilar from other DGs.

Includes sUbcomponents:

- DFODT1

-JWP1

- Main Lead Terminal Box

- Generator Includes subcomponents:

- DFODT3

-JWP3

- Main Lead Terminal Box DG 2-3 associated with a major modification credited in the IPEEE SPRA, and is dissimilar from other DGs.

System Equipment New or Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC (YIN)

DG No.3 radiator A 21 17S DIE N

Y DG No. 1 exhaust silencer 21 0

DIE N

Y DG No.3 exhaust silencer 21 0

DIE N

Y DG No. 1 inlet silencer 21 0

DIE N

Y DG No.3 inlet silencer 21 0

DIE N

Y DG No.1 air start receiver A 21 21 DIE N

Y DG No. 3 air start receiver A 21 21 DIE N

Y DG No.1 inlet air filter 21 0

DIE N

Y DG No.3 inlet air filter 21 0

DIE N

Y DG No. 1 fuel off shutoff valve 21 7

header A DIE N

Y DG No.3 fuel off shutoff valve 21 7

header A DIE N

Y Post-LOCA sampling room 23 0

MIE N

N ventilation duct heater No. 29A Control room ventilation control 23 20 MIE N

N cabinet No. CCR1 CFCU SI system and auto bus 23 20 MIE Y

Y transfer relay cabinet, Bus F Control room ventilation air conditioning compressor 23 12 DIE N

N CP-37 Auxiliary building ventilation 23 9

DIE N

N exhaust fan E-1 Control room ventilation supply 23 10 DIE N

N fan S-37 Containment fan cooler No. 1 23 10 ICE N

N Safety Function Risk RCPC RCIC DHR CF Significance (YIN)

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

N N

N Y

Y Y

Y N

N N

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

Y N

N N

Y N

IPEEE SSEL IPEEE Enhancement lY/Nl lY/Nl (YIN)

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

Y N

Y Y

N N

N Y

N N

N Y

N N

N Y

N N

Y N

Walkdown Package No.

DC-2-21-M-HX-JWR3A DC-2-21-M-MISC-ES1 DC-2-21-M-MISC-ES3 DC-2-21-M-M I SC-I S 1 DC-2-21-M-MISC-IS3 DC-2-21-M-TK-AR1A DC-2-21-M-TK-AR3A DC-2-21-P-FL-CAF1 DC-2-21-P-FL-CAF3 DC-2-21-P-V-DEG-2-LCV-89 DC-2-21-P-VOA-DEG LCV-87 DC-2-23-E-HT -2EH-29A DC-2-23-E-PN L-CRC6 DC-2-23-E-PNL-PCCFC1 DC-2-23-M-BC-CP-37 DC-2-23-M-BF-2E-1 DC-2-23-M-BF-2S-37 DC-2-23-M-BF-CFC2-1 PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment C Page 4 of 7 Remarks DG 2-3 associated with a major modification credited in the IPEEE SPRA, and is dissimilar from other DGs.

DG 2-3 associated with a major modification credited in the IPEEE SPRA, and is dissimilar from other DGs.

DG 2-3 associated with a major modification credited in the IPEEE SPRA, and is dissimilar from other receivers.

DG 2-3 associated with a major modification credited in the IPEEE SPRA, and is dissimilar from other DGs.

DG 2-3 associated with a major modification credited in the IPEEE SPRA, and is dissimilar from other DFODTs.

Added based on recommendation from PRA group. Added for variety of systems and for a variety of types of equipment (10).

Added as new component. Includes relay nos.:

-2F1,2F1A,2F2,2F2A

- 4HFXF1, 4HFXF2 Located in 480V switchgear room Bus F Added for variety of environments.

Added for safety function.

Includes coil cooling units C35/C37 as subcomponents.

System Equipment New or Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC (YIN)

ASW pump compartment exhaust fan E-104 23 9

SWIE N

Y 480-V switchgear ventilation 23 10 OE N

N exhaust fan E-45 Auxiliary building ventilation 23 9

DIE N

N supply fan S-33 480-V switchgear ventilation 23 9

OE N

N supply fan S-45 Control room ventilation air 23 10 DIE N

N conditioning condenser CR37 480-V switchgear ventilation shutoff (discharge) damper 23 7

OE N

N FCV-5045 Control room ventilation supply 23 8

DIE N

N fan suction damper No. MOD-10 Control room ventilation supply 23 8

DIE N

N fan suction damper No. MOD-9 Control room ventilation filter 23 18 DIE N

N FU39 Containment purge valve 23 7

ICE N

N FCV-660 Containment purge valve RCV-11 23 7

ICE N

N Hydrogen monitoring system 23 8

ICE N

N supply valve FCV-238 Post-LOCA sample system return line to containment valve 23 8

MIE N

N FCV-700 ASW FCV-602 backup air 25 21 MIE N

N accumulator Auxiliary relay rack No. RNARA 36 20 MIE N

N Process control and protection system -

process control rack 36 18 MIE N

N No. 1A SSPS -

input relay cabinet 38 20 MIE N

Y No. RNSIA SSPS -

logic cabinet No. RNSLA 38 20 MIE N

Y Safety Function Risk RCPC RCIC DHR CF Sig n ificance (YIN)

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

N N

N Y

Y Y

Y N

N N

Y N

N N

N Y

N N

Y N

N N

N Y

N N

Y Y

N N

Y N

N N

N Y

Y N

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

IPEEE SSEL IPEEE Enhancement JY/Nl iY/Nl (YIN)

Y N

N Y

Y N

N N

N Y

Y N

N Y

N N

Y N

N N

Y N

N Y

N N

N Y

N N

Y Y

N Y

N N

Y N

Walkdown Packaile No.

DC-2-23-M-BF-E-104 DC-2 M-BF -E-45 DC-2-23-M-BF-S-33 DC-2-23-M-BF-S-45 DC-2-23-M-HX-CR37 DC-2-23-P-D-VAC-2-FCV-5045 DC-2-23-P-D-VAC-2-MOD-10 DC-2-23-P-D-VAC-2-MOD-9 DC-2-23-P-FL-FU41 DC-2-23-P-VOA-VAC FCV-660 DC-2-23-P-VOA-VAC RCV-11 DC-2-23-P-VOS-VAC FCV-238 DC-2-23-P-VOS-VAC FCV-700 DC-2-25-M-TK-BUAS-602 DC-2-36-E-PNL-RNARA DC-2-36-I-PNL-RN01A DC-2-38-I-PNL-RNSIA DC-2-38-I-PNL-RNSLA PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment C Page 5 of 7 Remarks Added from SSEL. Added for variety of environments.

Added for safety function.

Added for variety of environments.

Variety of types of equipment (10)

Associated with I PEEE modification.

Added based on recommendation from PRA group.

Added for variety of equipment types (8)

Added for variety of systems.

Associated with IPEEE modification.

System Equipment New or Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC (YIN)

SSPS -

output relay cabinet 38 20 MIE N

Y No. RNSOA SSPS -

test cabinet No. RNSTA 38 20 MIE N

Y Reactor trip switchgearlcontrol 41 20 MIE N

Y panel No. B1 Process control and protection system -

computer input rack 43 18 MIE N

N No. RNCl1 4160-V switchgear, Bus FG 63 3

MIE Y

Y 4160-V safeguard relay panels, 63 20 MIE N

Y BusF 4160-V potential transformer, 63 4

MIE N

Y Bus FG 480-V breaker cabinets (Load 64 2

MIE N

Y Centers), Bus F Auxiliary relay panel 64 20 MIE N

Y 4160-V/480-V transformer 64 4

MIE N

Y No. THF10 120-Vac instrument breaker panel 65 2

MIE N

Y No. PY21 120-VacC inverter No. IY21 65 16 MIE Y

Y Regulating transformer 65 4

MIE Y

Y No. TRY21 125-Vdc batteries and battery 67 15 MIE Y

Y rack No. BAT21 125-Vdc battery charger 67 16 MIE Y

Y No. BTC21 125-Vdc distribution panel 67 14 MIE N

N No. PD25 125-Vdc switchgearlbreaker panel 67 2

MIE N

Y No. S021 Control console No. CC1 96 20 MIE N

Y Safety Function Risk RCPC RCIC DHR CF Significance (YIN)

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

N N

N Y

Y N

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

Y Y

Y N

N N

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

IPEEE SSEL IPEEE Enhancement iY/Nl iY/Nl (YIN)

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

N N

Y Y

N N

Y N

N Y

Y N

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

Y N

N N

N Y

Y N

Y Y

N N

Y Y

N N

Y N

Walkdown Package No.

DC-2-38-I-PN L-RNSOA DC-2-38-I-PN L -RNST A DC-2-41-E-PNL-PORTB1 DC-2-43-I-PNL-RNCI1 DC-2-63-E-LC-SHFG DC-2-63-E-PNL-RHFG DC-2-63-E-XF-SI=lG~~P+SHF13PT DC-2-64-E-LC-SPF DC-2-64-E-PNL-ARP DC-2-64-E-XF-THF1 0 DC-2-65-E-LC-PY21 DC-2-65-E-U PS-IY21 DC-2-65-E-XF-TRY21 DC-2-67 -E-BT -BAT21 DC-2-67 -E-BTC-BTC21 DC-2-67 -E-LC-PD25 DC-2-67 -E-LC-SD21 DC-2 E-P N L -2CC 1 PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment C Page 6 of 7 Remarks Includes breakers and relays:

- 52RTA, 52RTB

- 27UVXA, 27UVXB Associated with IPEEE modification.

Breakers re~laGed as ~aFt ef rnajer rnedifiGatien.

InGiudes relays:

i~XI=IG~4, i~XI=IG~J i~ I=IG9, i~ I=IGg, i~ I=IG7, i~ I=IG~~

i~ I=IG9, i~ I=IGi, i~ I=IG~ Q, i~ I=IG~ J, i~I=IG~4

~7gGI=IG~~, ~7gGI=IGg 4JI=IG~~ +S Includes subcomponent relays: 1 F-11/42-2F-11 1 F-23/42-2F-23 Associated with 480-V motor control centers.

Added for variety of types of equipment (4) and as replacement equipment.

Batteries and racks replaced as part of major modification.

No safety function, but seismically qualified. Added for a variety of types if equipment (14).

System Equipment New or Component No.

Class Environment Replacement RRC (YIN)

Main control board No. VB 1 96 20 MIE N

Y Hot shutdown panel 96 20 MIE N

Y Mechanical panel No. PM-101 (CCW supply header 96 20 MIE N

N instru mentation)

Mechanical panel No. PM-103 96 20 OE Y

N (SG No. 1 instrumentation)

Mechanical panel No. PM-185 (condensate storage tank 96 20 MIE Y

N instrumentation)

Mechanical panel No. PM-45 96 20 MIE Y

N (SG level instrumentation)

Mechanical panel No. PM-79 (reactor level/wide range pressure 96 20 ICE N

N instrumentation)

Mechanical panel No. PM-89 (RC loop 2 cold leg 96 20 ICE N

N instrumentation)

Safety Function Risk RCPC RCIC DHR CF Significance (YIN)

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y N

N N

Y N

N N

N Y

Y N

N N

Y Y

N N

IPEEE SSEL IPEEE Enhancement (YIN)

{Y/Nl (YIN)

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

N N

Y N

N Y

N N

Walkdown Package No.

DC-2-96-E-P N L -2VB 1 DC-2-96-E-PNL-HSP DC-2-96-M-P N L -P M-1 01 DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-103 DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-185 DC-2 M-P N L -P M-45 DC-2-96-M-P N L -PM-79 DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-89 PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment C Page 7 of 7 Remarks Includes control switch Nos.:

- 9003A-CS, 9003B-CS

- 8923A-CS, 8923B-CS

- FCV-430-CS, FCV-431-CS

- CCWP1-CS, CCWP2-CS, CCWP3-CS

- ASP1-CS, ASP2-CS Includes control switch Nos.:

- CCWP1-CSH, CCWP2-CSH, CCWP3-CSH

- ASP1-CSH, ASP2-CSH Contains transmitter Nos.:

- FT-65, FT-68, FT-69 Added from SSEL.

Contains transmitter Nos.:

- PT-514, PI-518 Contains transmitter No. L T-40.

Contains transmitter No. LT-529.

Contains transmitter No. PT-403.

Contains transmitter No. PT-460.

Attachment D PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment D Unit 2: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-2 Base List 2 Component Quick opening transfer tube closure Spent fuel pool pumps Spent fuel pool heat exchanger Spent fuel pool pump transfer switches Spent fuel pool cooling system temperature instrumentation Fuel handling building ventilation system supply fans Fuel handling building ventilation system fan flow control damper Fuel handling building ventilation system mode dampers Fuel handling building ventilation system backdraft dampers (fan shutoff dampers)

Fuel handling building ventilation system normal exhaust fan Fuel handling building ventilation system normal backdraft dampers (fan shutoff dampers)

Fuel handling building ventilation system normal fan flow control damper PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment E Attachment E Unit 2: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-2 Rapid Drain-Down List Spent Fuel Pool Rapid Drain-Down Equipment List Component Comments aOTTC Verify condition of aOTTC SFP fill piping from hold-up tank recirculation Verify that pipe terminates above elevation 122 ft pumps and check for anti-siphon hole.

Suction piping to SFP pumps Verify that the SFP wall penetration is above elevation 122 ft.

Return piping from SFPCS Hxs Verify that anti-siphon hole is present and unobstructed.

SFP skimmer suction piping Verify that suction point is above elevation 122 ft.

SFP skimmer return piping Verify that termination point is above elevation122 ft.

Fuel transfer tube expansion joint Verify condition of expansion joint.

Return piping from makeup water transfer Verify that removable spool has been removed or that submerged termination of pipe is above pumps elevation 122 ft.

Attachment F Unit 2: Seismic Walkdown Equipment List-2 List Rapid New or System Equipment S-Q Drain-Replacement Component No.

Class Environment (YIN) down (YIN)

SFP fill piping from hold-up tank 8

0 MIE N

Y N

recirculation pumps SFPC temperature 13 19 MIE Y

N N

instrumentation SFP Hx 13 21 MIE Y

N N

SFP pump 1 13 5

MIE Y

N N

SFP pump transfer switch No.2 13 1

MIE Y

N N

SFP skimmer suction piping 13 0

MIE N

Y N

line-1080 SFP skimmer suction piping 13 0

MIE N

Y N

line-1118 SFP skimmer return piping 13 0

MIE N

Y N

line-1121 SFP skimmer return piping 13 0

MIE N

Y N

line-1122 SFP skimmer return piping 13 0

MIE N

Y N

line 1123 Suction piping to SFP pumps 13 0

MIE Y

Y N

WID Package No.

DC-2-08-P-P-LlNE-1119 DC-2-13-1-I-TI-653 DC-2-13-M-HX-SFPHE1 DC-2-13-M-PP-SFPP1 DC-2 SFPPTS1 DC-2-13-P-P-LlNE-1080 DC-2-13-P-P-LlNE-1118 DC-2-13-P-P-LlNE-1121 DC-2-13-P-P-LlNE-1122 DC-2-13-P-P-LlNE-1123 DC-2-13-P-P-LlNE-154 PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment F Page 1 of 2 Remarks Verify that pipe terminates above elevation 122 ft and check for anti-siphon hole.

Mounted on SFPCS Hx outlet piping.

Verify that suction point is above elevation 122 ft.

Verify that termination point is above elevation 122 ft.

Verify that the SFP wall penetration is above elevation 122 ft.

Rapid System Equipment S-Q Drain-Component No.

Class Environment (YIN) down Return piping from SFPCS Hxs 13 21 MIE N

Y Return piping from makeup water 16 0

MIE N

Y transfer pump (line-2242)

FHBVS normal exhaust Fan E-4 23 9

DIE Y

N Fuel transfer tube expansion joint 42 0

MIE Y

Y QOTTC 42 0

ICE Y

Y New or Replacement WID Package (YIN)

No.

N DC-2-13-P-P-LlNE-159 N

DC-2-16-P-P-LlNE-2242 N

DC-2-23-M-BF-2E-4 N

DC-2-42-M-EJ-FTC-2-EJ2 N

DC-2-42-M-MISC-QOTTC PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment F Page 2 of 2 Remarks Verify that anti-siphon hole is present and unobstructed.

Verify that removable spool has been removed or that submerged termination of pipe is above elevation 122 ft.

Similar SSCs in a damp indoor environment have been included in the SWEL-1.

Attachment G Unit 2: Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions Entered into the Corrective Action Program Description Walkdown SWC/AWC Finding Damper stiffener channels not shown on drawing 2-CP-37 Configuration Loose clamps on conduit No. K8115 2-E-45 Degraded - Other Loss of shim on RR 2025-8RT 2-FCV-41 Degraded - Other Broken mounting bracket on fire extinguisher 2-PORTB1 Degraded - Other Light fixture chains not completely secured 2-PORTB1 Configuration Gap issue at valve MS-2-FCV-25 (clearance to the adjacent DC-2-04-P-VOA-MS-2-FCV-41 Configuration bracket)

Clearance between hand wheel for MS-2-1 020 & MS-2-FCV-DC-2-04-P-VOA-MS-2-FCV-41 Configuration 41 CCW Hx 2-1 support: cracked concrete (edge of pedestal)

DC-2-14-M-HX-CCWHE1 Degraded - Other Use of finger shims on hanger No.28-44R (Not shown on DC-2-17 -M-PP-ASP1 Configuration drawing)

Anchorage anomaly on DG 2-3 exhaust silencer (washer too DC-2-21-M-M I SC-ES3 Configuration small for elongated hole)

Weld size discrepancy for Fan 2S-37 DC-2-23-M-BF-2S-37 Configuration PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment G Page 1 of 2 Status Note NeteClosed Note Note Closed Note Note Note NeteClosed Note NeteClosed Fan S-33: Corroded skid & anchor bolts on one corner.

DC-2-23-M-BF-S-33 Degraded - Corrosion Closed

Description Walkdown SWC/AWC Damper stiffener channels not shown on drawing DC-2-23-P-D-VAC-2-MOD-10 Incorrect drawing for FU41 support anchor (calculation DC-2-23-P-FL-FU41 reflects as-built)

Panel RNARA base connection weld anomaly DC-2-36-E-PNL-RNARA Panel RNARB base connection weld anomaly (EOC during DC-2-36-E-PNL-RNARA-EOC RNARA inspection)

Undersized welds on THF10 cabinet DC-2-64-E-XF-THF1 0 UPS IY21 mounting bolts connecting the transformer to DC-2-65-E-U PS-IY21 grating (missing screws)

Insufficient welds on anchorage of 125-Vdc load center SD21 DC-2-67-E-LC-SD21 Potential interaction between light fixture & rack RN01A DC-2-99-I-PNL-RN01A Finding Configuration Config u ration Configuration Configuration Configuration Configuration Configuration Spatial Interaction -

SISI PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment G Page 2 of 2 Status Note NeteClosed NeteClosed NeteClosed Note Note Closed NeteClosed Note: In accordance with EPRI 1025286, these conditions have been entered into the CAP. These items are open and have been prioritized in accordance with CAP guidance.

Attachment H PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment H Unit 2: Inaccessible Component List All inaccessible components identified in PG&E Letter DCL-12-119 were walked down.

There are no further inaccessible components to be walked down in the scope of Recommendation 2.3 Seismic for Unit 2.

SeismiG ).3Jalkdov.(R AFea \\3JalkdoJ/JR Component GheGklist No.

GheGklist No.

Outage gG Ne. 2 ~ eeAtFeI ~aAel gG 2 2~ E PNb GQQ2~

2 gEG 2~

m-1-7 QG Ne. 2 ~ ex:eitatieA etleiele gG 2 2~ E PNb SEg2~

2 gEG 2~

m-1-7 QG Ne. 2 ~ FaeiateF Ne. ~A gG 2 2~ M FIX JVVR~A 2 gEG 2~

m-1-7 QG Ne. 2 J eeAtFel ~aAel QG 2 2~ E PNb GQQ2J 2 QEG 2J m-1-7 QG Ne. 2 J ex:eitatieA etleiele gG 2 2~ E PNb SEQ2J 2 QEG 2J m-1-7 gG Ne. 2 J FaeiateF Ne. JA QG 2 2~ M FIX JV)JRJA 2 gEG 2J m-1-7 4 gG V eFeakeF eaeiAet ~Ieae eeAteF~

QG 2 64 E bG SPF 2 MGG F m-1-7

~

4 ~ 6G W4 gG V tFaASfeFFAeF Ne.

gG 2 64 E XF +FlF~G 2 MGG F m-1-7

~

ReaeteF tF i ~ switehgeaF/eeAtFeI QG 2 4~ E PNb POR+B~

2 POR+B~

m-1-7

~aAel Ne. POR+B~

MeehaAieal ~aAel Ne. PM g9 gG 2 96 M PNb PM g9 2 PM g9 m-1-7

~RG bee~ 2 eele leg iAstFtlFAeAtatieA~

SI aeetiFAbJlateF Ne. 2 ~

gG 2 G9 M +K A+~

2 SIA+~

m-1-7 GeAtaiAFAeAt FeeiFebJlatieA StlFA~,

gG 2 G9 M S+R S+R RFlR~

2 S+R RFlR~

m-1-7 SbJFA~ stFaiAeF, tFash Faek, aAe veFtex: Stl~~FeSSeF QO++G gG 2 42 M MISG QO++G 2 QO++G m-1-7 FlyeFegeA FAeAiteFiAg systeFA sbJ~~ly QG 2 2J P VOS VAG 2 FGV 2 FGV 2J9 m-1-7 valve VAG 2 FGV 2Jg

~

GeAtaiAFAeAt ~tlFge valve QG 2 2J P VOA VAG 2 RGV 2 PEN62 m-1-7

~l-AG 2 RGV ~ ~

44-GeAtaiAFAeAt ~tlFge valve QG 2 2J P VOA VAG 2 FGV 2 PE~J6~

m-1-7

~l-AG 2 FGV 66G OW MeehaAieal ~aAel Ne. PM 4[3 gG 2 96 M PNb PM 4[3 2 PM 4[3 m-1-7

~SG level iAstFtlFAeAtatieA~

GeAtaiAFAeAt faA eeeleF Ne. 2 ~

QG 2 2J M BF GFG2 ~

2 GFG2~

m-1-7

~ 2[3 Vee switehgeaFleFeakeF ~aAel gG 2 67 E bG Sg2~

2 B+G2~

m-1-7 Ne. SQ2~

4 ~ 6G V switehgeaF Btls G gG 2 6J E bG SFiG 2 4KV G m-1-7 4 ~ 6G V safegbJaFe Felay ~aAel Btls G gG 2 6J E PNb RFiG 2 4KV G m-1-7 4 ~6G V ~9teAtial tFaASfeFFAeF Btls F QG 2 6J E XF SFlF22P+

2 4KV G m-1-7 I I I

I I

Attachment I Unit 2: Seismic Walkdown Checklists SWC Number Number of SWC Number Checklist pages of LBEs DC-2-03-I-E-TE-117 2

0 DC-2-03-M-P P-AFWP 1 2

0 DC-2-03-M-P P-AFWP2 2

0 DC-2-03-P-VOH-FW-2-LCV-110 2

2 DC-2-03-P-VOH-FW-2-LCV-115 2

0 DC-2-03-P-VOM-FW-2-LCV-106 2

0 DC-2-04-LD30 2

0 DC-2-04-P-V-MS-2-FCV-152 2

0 DC-2-04-P-VOA-MS-2-FCV-41 2

3 DC-2-04-P-VOA-MS-2-PCV-20 2

0 DC-2-04-P-VOM-MS-2-FCV-37 2

0 DC-2-04-P-VR-MS-2-RV-13 2

0 DC-2-04-P-VR-MS-2-RV-3 2

0 DC-2-04-P-VR-MS-2-RV-61 2

0 DC-2-04-P-VR-MS-2-RV-8 2

0 DC-2-08-I-T-L T-102 2

0 DC-2-08-M-HX-SWH E 1 2

0 DC-2-08-M-P P-CC P 1 2

0 DC-2-08-M-P P-CC P3 2

0 DC-2-08-P-P-U N E-1119 2

0 DC-2-08-P-VOA-CVCS-2-FCV-110A 2

0 DC-2-08-P-VOM-CVCS-2-8104 2

0 DC-2-08-P-VOM-CVCS-2-LCV-112B 2

0 DC-2-09-M-PP-SIP1 2

0 DC-2-09-M-STR-STR-RHR 1 2

0 DC-2-09-M-TK-A T1 2

0 DC-2-09-P-VOM-SI-2-8805A 2

0 DC-2-09-P-VOM-SI-2-8923A 2

0 DC-2-10-M-HX-RHE1 2

0 DC-2-10-M-PP-RHRP2 2

0 DC-2-10-P-VOM-RHR-2-8700A 2

0 DC-2-10-P-VOM-RHR-2-FCV-641A 2

0 DC-2-1 0-P-VOM-RHR-2-FCV-641 B 2

0 DC-2-13-1-I-TI-653 2

0 DC-2-13-M-HX-SFPH E 1 2

0 PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment I Page 1 of 4 Number of LBE pages 0

0 0

2 0

0 0

0 3

0 0

SWC Number Number of SWC Checklist pages DC-2-13-M-PP-SFPP1 2

DC-2-13-P-P-LlNE-1080 2

DC-2 P-P-LI N E-1118 2

DC-2-13-P-P-LlNE-1121 2

DC-2-13-P-P-LI N E-1122 2

DC-2-13-P-P-LlNE-1123 2

DC-2-13-P-P-LI N E-154 2

DC-2-13-P-P-LlNE-159 2

DC-2-13-SFPPTS1 2

DC-2-14-E-P-VOM-CCW-2-FCV-430 2

DC-2-14-I-E-TE-6 2

DC-2-14-M-HX-CCWH E 1 2

DC-2-14-M-PP-CCWP1 2

DC-2-14-M-TK-CCWST1 2

DC-2-14-P-VOA-CCW-2-FCV -365 2

DC-2-16-P-P-LI N E-2242 2

DC-2-17 -M-PP-ASP1 2

DC-2-17 -P-VOA-SW-2-FCV-602 2

DC-2-21-E-HT -LOH 1 2

DC-2-21-E-PNL-GQD21 2

DC-2-21-E-PNL-GQD23 2

DC-2-21-E-PNL-SED21 2

DC-2-21-E-PNL-SED23 2

DC-2-21 -E-S-EQD-21 2

DC-2-21-E-S-EQD-23 2

DC-2-21-M-EN-DEG1 2

DC-2-21-M-EN-DEG3 2

DC-2-21-M-HX-JWR1 A 2

DC-2-21-M-HX-JWR3A 2

DC-2-21-M-MISC-ES1 2

DC-2-21-M-M I SC-ES3 2

DC-2-21-M-MISC-IS1 2

DC-2-21-M-MISC-IS3 2

DC-2-21-M-TK-AR 1 A 2

DC-2-21-M-TK-AR3A 2

DC-2-21-P-FL-CAF1 2

DC-2-21-P-FL-CAF3 2

Number of LBEs 0

0 0

2 0

1 0

0 2

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 1

0 0

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment I Page 2 of 4 Number of LBE pages 0

0 0

2 0

1 0

0 2

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 1

0 0

SWC Number Number of SWC Checklist pages DC-2-21 -P-V-DEG-2-LCV-89 2

DC-2-21-P-VOA-DEG-2-LCV-87 2

DC-2-23-E-HT -2EH-29A 2

DC-2-23-E-PNL-CRC6 2

DC-2-23-E-PNL-PCCFC1 2

DC-2-23-M-BC-CP-37 2

DC-2-23-M-BF-2E-1 2

DC-2-23-M-BF-2E-4 2

DC-2-23-M-BF-2S-37 2

DC-2-23-M-BF-CFC2-1 2

DC-2-23-M-BF-E-104 2

DC-2-23-M-BF-E-45 2

DC-2-23-M-BF-S-33 2

DC-2-23-M-BF-S-45 2

DC-2-23-M-HX-CR37 2

DC-2-23-P-D-VAC-2-FCV-5045 2

DC-2-23-P-D-VAC-2-MOD-10 2

DC-2-23-P-D-VAC-2-MOD-9 2

DC-2-23-P-FL-FU41 2

DC-2-23-P-VOA-VA C-2-FCV-660 2

DC-2-23-P-VOA-VAC-2-RCV-11 2

DC-2-23-P-VOS-VA C-2-FCV-238 2

DC-2 P-VOS-V AC-2-FCV -700 2

DC-2-25-M-TK-BUAS-602 2

DC-2-36-E-PNL-RNARA 2

DC-2-38-I-PNL-RNSIA 2

DC-2-38-I-PNL-RNSLA 2

DC-2-38-I-PN L-RNSOA 2

DC-2-38-I-PNL-RNSTA 2

DC-2-41-E-PNL-PORTB1 2

DC-2-42-M-EJ-FTC-2-EJ2 2

DC-2-42-M-MISC-QOTTC 2

DC-2-43-I-PN L-RNCI1 2

DC-2-63-E-LC-SHF 2

DC-2-63-E-PNL-RHF 2

DC-2-63-E-XF-SHF13PT 2

DC-2-64-E-LC-SPF 2

Number of LBEs 0

0 0

0 2

0 0

1 2

1 1

0 1

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 1

0 0

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment I Page 3 of 4 Number of LBE pages 0

0 0

0 4

0 0

1 2

1 18 0

1 0

0 0

5 0

0 0

1 0

0 0

0

SWC Number Number of SWC Checklist pages DC-2-64-E-PNL-ARP 2

DC-2-64-E-XF-THF1 0 2

DC-2-65-E-LC-PY21 2

DC-2-65-E-U PS-IY21 2

DC-2-65-E-XF-TRY21 2

DC-2-67 -E-BT -BAT21 2

DC-2-67 -E-BTC-BTC21 2

DC-2-67 -E-LC-PD25 2

DC-2-67-E-LC-SD21 2

DC-2-96-E-PNL-2CC1 2

DC-2-96-E-PNL-2VB 1 2

DC-2-96-E-PN L -H SP 2

DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-101 2

DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-103 2

DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-185 2

DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-45 2

DC-2-96-M-PN L-PM-79 2

DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-89 2

DC-2-99-I-PN L-RNO 1 A 2

Number of LBEs 0

1 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

1 1

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment I Page 4 of 4 Number of LBE pages 0

1 0

3 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

1 1

Note: Pages include applicable portions of the checklists and LBE required by EPRI 1025286 guidelines.

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.

DC-2-09-M-STR-STR-RHR1 Equipment Class 12 O. COther)

Equipment

Description:

Containment Recirculation Sump, Sump Strainer, Trash Rack, and Vortex Suppressor Sheet 1 of7 Status: ~

Location: Bldg.

-'=C'--__ _

Floor E1.

..:0.,.9",-1' __ _

Room,Area

=2~-RHR~~1 ____________________________ __

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

~n/~a~ ___________________________________________ _

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of the checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1.

Is the anchorage configuration verification required (Le., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2.

Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3.

Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface corrosion?

The anchor bolts and other anchorage is stainless steel and free of corrosion

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchorage?

Although the concrete surface is painted, no visual cracks were observed around the anchorage

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6.

Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

The anchorage of the complete system cannot be observed due to inaccessibility, but based on the anchorage that was accessible there is enough confidence that the anchorage is free of potentially adverse seismic conditions Interaction Effects

7.

Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Electrical panels, fire extinguishers, overhead conduits, ladders were observed in the vicinity and are adequately anchored. Therefore, no credible sources exist in the area.

8.

Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

There is a significant amount of overhead conduit which runs over the recirculation sump which is adequately supported.

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is the equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

12 Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment N

y y

y N/A y

y y

Seismic Walkdown Checklis.t (SWC)

Eqnipment ill No.

DC-2w09-M-STR-STR-RHRl Equipment Class12

o. COther)

Equipment

Description:

Contairunent Rccircillation Sump. Sump Strainer, Trash Rack, and Vortex Suppressor Other Adverse Conditions II.

Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety fUllction of the plant equipment?

No other adverse conditions.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary) 02/03/2013 02/03/2013 12 Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment Sheet 2 of?

Status: ~

y I

I 1 !

I I I

I

)

f j

j I

I

SeismicWaI M1 ist()

Status:

Y

---~----- ---------

Equipment ID No DC-2-09-M-TK-AT1 Equipment Class: 21 Equipment

Description:

SI Accumulator No.1 Location:

Building: Containment FloorEJ. 91 Room, Area:

2-SIAT1 Manufacturer, model, Etc. -- -------------------------------....

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (Le, is the item oile of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent. broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is reql:'ired.)

Consistent with drawings 663216 sheets 9 and 15.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and fighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do ClttClched lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction eva/ualions, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions toat could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

eql,Jipment?

Page 1 of 8

Seismic Walkdown Checldist ~)

Status:

Y

.~--

Equipment ID No DC-2-09-M-TK-AT1 Equipment Class:

21 Equipment

Description:

SI Accumulator No.1 Comment:

Evaluated by:

KTM.~~ 4/lb/'u)l3 Page 2 of 8

Seismic Walkdovvn Checklist ~)

Status:

Y

-~~-~.~~~-----------------------------~~

Equipment 10 No OC-2-21-E-PNL-GQ021 Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

DG No. 1 Control Panel Location:

Building: Turbine FloorEI. 85 Room, Area: 2-DEG-21 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

~----.. --~----.-----.,--.-.-.. --....,~.. --.~.,---..

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the fol/owing guestions may be used to record the results oOudgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchora~e

1. Js the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

No bent, broken Dr missing hardware

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

Minor surface corrosion noted on the interior mounting machine bolts in the vertical panel

4. Is the anohorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

No cracks observed near the anchors

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is requir~d.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effec1s

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Possible soft targets are the annuciator and hand switches on the front of the vertical panel and gauges and meters on the top of the low side papel. However, there are no credible interaotion sources.

a. Are overhead eqUipment, distribution systems, ceiling liles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Overhead lighting, conduits} piping, monorail emergenoy fighting, and warning light are well supporled. No masonry weJls

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

All conduits entering the panel have flex oonneotions

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that CQuid adversely affect the safety function of the Y

eqUipment?

No other adverse conditions Page 1 of 12

Seismic WaIKDOlIWI Cheddist (SVVC)

Status:

Y

-,~---,--,--,-",-----,-,-,------",~---~

Equipment ID No DC-2-21-E-PNL-GQD21 Equipment Class; 20 Equipment

Description:

DG No. 1 Control Panel Comment:

The vertical panel anchorage includes vibration isolators at the four comers. The angle frame is bolted to each isolator with a 5/8" machine bolt (1" flat to flat on the hex head) Each iso/afor Is anchored with two 1/2" Kwik Bolts.

The east side ofthe low panel is anchored by a machine bolt connecting the frame to a steel base plate. The base plate is anohored with 3 - 5/8" anohors.

The top of the vertical panel is braced In the front-ia-back direction by a unistrut system tha't is welded to the building column. The welded connection of the unisfruf to the column is covered with plaster.

The internal devices mounted to the panel are adequately mounted. No missing hardware was noted.

Evalualed by:

D~

4f,a~:/'2.0 13 WRH

_L--=:;.>.~~~~R~.~~=--._ 4 i '23/2013 Page 2 of 12

" a 11 n

~

_....._.. ""'_....."............ _~_ **,_. _________________

-......._.-...-......-.~&...... __............ __..,..... I.*'Y........ __ _..*._........ *.......,..... ".p... u.. __............... ;..........,.....,-................. - ************* ~~

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-2-21-E-PNL-GQD23 Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

DG NO.3 Control Panel Location:

Building: Turbine Floor EI. 85 Room, Area:

2-DEG-23 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (Le, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification )?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broker\\ missing or loose hardware?

No missing, bent or broken hardware

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

Mild surface corrosion on back north anchors within the vertical panel

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

No cracks observed

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

As noted on the drawings, the isolators are present on the vertical portion of the panel (4 anchor points at west side). The two anchor points on the east on the instrument panel are hard shims (i.e. no isolators).

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Potential soft targets are the switches on the front panel and gauges on the top of the low side panel. However, interaction is unlikely.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Overhead Cardox, piping, conduit, and cable trays are well supported. Wall mounted battery operated emergency light is cable restrained.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Conduits entering the panel have flex connections.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions Y

Y Y

Y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

No other adverse conditions noted.

Page 1 of 17

Seismicwal W1 Checklist (SVVC)

Status:

Y Equipment JD No DC-2-21-E-PNL-GQD23 Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

DG No.3 Control Panel Comment:

The vertical panel and the low.side panel are bolted together. A tube steel strut braces the vertical panel to the side panel in the side to side direction. The vertical panel is top braced in the front to back direction by Unisfrut that is anchored back to the building column.

Components and devices mounted within the panel are securely mounted. No missing or loose hardware was observed.

Evaluated by:

Dk~IA4~ __ +I;::/.z.' '3 SMM

_~~~~=-----.L'I /,?oiJ>

Page 2 of 17

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (S\\ftIC)

Status:

Y Equipment Class:

2.Q Equipment

Description:

DG No. 1 Excitation Cubicfe Location:

Building= Turbine Floor EI. 85 Room, Area:

2-DEG-21 Manufacturer, model, Etc. ~

rnstructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on' the SWEL The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

AnchQrage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

No bent, broken or missing hardware

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

Minor surfaoe corrosian observed on the nuts of the anohor bolts inside the cabinet

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrele near the anchors?

No cracks obseNed near the anchors y

y y

'y

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is

. Y one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required,)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

y No adverse condition noted Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment o( structures?

Potential soft targets on the front panel include hand switches, meters, indicator lights, and buttons. However, there are no cred;ble interaotion sources

8. Are overhead eqUipment! distribution systems, ceiling liles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the eqUipment?

Overhead lighting, conduits, piping, monorail emergency lighting, and warning light are well supported. No masonry wa/ls.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Conduits Bre rigidly supported to the adjacent wall and the top of the panel is braoed. Therefore differential displacements are expected to be low and no signifioant loading is antiCipated.

, 10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic 'conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

No other adverse conditions noted.

Page 1of14

,------,-.-------~

Seismic Walkrlovvn Cheddist (SVVC)

Status:

Y

,-------~-------------------~~--

--~.--~,--... -.~

Equipment ID No DCM2-21-E-PNL-SED21 Equipment Class: 2Q Equipment

Description:

DG No 1 Excitation Cubicle Comment:

The exoitation clIbiole is supported on a C12 ohannel base frame. The panel is bolted to the base frame with 4 ea-1 inoh bolts. The base frame is anchored to the concrete floor with 4 - 1 inch studs that are welded to embedded steel plates. The top of the panel is braced in both the front-to-back and side-to-side directions by a unisfrut frame.

The unislrut frame is both anchored to the floor and to the building column. The welded connection of the unistrut to the column is oovered with plaster.

The internal devices are adequately mounted to the panel. No missing or loose hardware was noted.

Evaluated by:

DK~.. fAI I. "

/J..

~te. I

~ \\~

,',i (.013 WRH

.w.~&lW-Page 2 of 14

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-2-21-E-PNL-SED23 Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

DG No.3 Excitation Cubicle Location:

Building: Turbine Floor EI.

85 Room, Area:

2-DEG-23 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Basler Electric Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

No broken, bent, or missing hardware

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

No corrosion observed y

Y Y

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

Y No cracks observed

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is Y

one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

4 - 1 inch anchor bolts in the corners of the panel. The configuration of the structural steel bracing system is consistent with the drawings.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Y No other adverse conditions noted.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Hand switches and meters are located *on the front panel, but interaction is unlikely.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Overhead lighting, Cardox, piping, conduit, and cable trays are well supported. No masonry walls. The wall mounted emergency light is cable restrained.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Cables have flex connections entering the top of the panel. Other conduits are rigidly supported to the adjacent wall, differential displacements are expected to be low and no significant loading expected.

10: Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions Y

Y y

Y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

No other adverse conditions noted.

Page 1 of 18

Seismic walkdown Checklist (SVV'C)

Status:

Y Equipment fD No DC-2-21-E-PNL-SED23 Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

DG No.3 Excitation Cubicle Comment:

The excitation oubiole is supported on a C12 steel base channel frame. The panel is bolted to the base frame with 4 ee - 1 inch bolts. The top of the panel is braced in both the front to back and side to side directions by a structural steel frame.

Components and devices within the cabinet are securely mounted. No missing or loose hardware was observed.

Evaluated by:

DK~ ~

Date:

4 { (a (.-z.t) 13

""-"'~"-'--"--..... -........... '-'~"-".. -..

,... -. -"...... ~-. __.".-..... _-... _... -

SMM

~b-~

</J~/J$

Page 2 of 18

Seismic walkdolNn Cheddist (SV\\IC)

Status:

y Equipment to No DC-2-21-M-HX-JWR1A Equipment Class: H Equipment

Description:

DG No.1 Radiator A Location:

Building: I.Y.rnl.rui FloorEI. 85.

Room, Area: 2-DEG-21 Manufacture'r, model, Etc.

Instructions for CompJeting Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL The space below each of the fol/owing questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

No ben~ broken, or missing hardware.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

Only very minor surface corrosio{1 N

y y

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

Y

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is N/A one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations. is the anchorage free of potentially adVerse seismic conditions?

y Interact jon EffaQts

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

No soft targets

8. Are overhead equipment. distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Adjacent HVAC duct is well supported, no other potential interaotion sources

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction*

effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversafy affect the safety function of the equipment?

The fan that draws air through the radiator is located within the radiator enolosure. The fan mounting is looated Internal to the enclosure.

y y

N/A y

Y Page 1 of 17

_---_______._. ___,.. __.***.** " ___ ".*. __.,.* "._ *. _.* _.~. ~M~*".. ~~_"".~,._*~~J~~=~=*~**..

. i I

I I

Seismic walkdovvn ctaeddist (SWC)

Status:

Y

.--~--------------~.

Equipment 10 No DC-2-21-M-HX-JWR1A Equipment Class: fI Equipment Description; DG No.1 Radiator A Comment:

The Jacket Wafer Radiator is mounted on one end of the continuous Diesel Generator skid. At the radiator en~

tho top of the skid Is flared outward on both sides to accommodate the width of the radiator. In this area} the skid Is stiffened with large gusset plates. The Radiator Is boiled to the skid by (4) 314" bolts on both sides in auditiDn to a se,;es of smaller bolts on the sides that afe threaded into the sMd framework.

Corrosion is noted on the outside of the the radiafor call frame, somewhat more than surface corrosion. This is observed dn both sides of the radiator, worst at the WBst side. Notification 50553181 Is written to address the corrosIon.

The radiator fan Is welded to the fan housing base plate. - no concerns.

The fan shafts are restrained. The Vertical shaft Is laterally restralned by rod braoing. The coil units are adeqUately restrained. The internal piping has mechanical couplings at the coils, but the pIpe Is supported and has very short spans so no significant differential displacments Bfe expected.

Surface corrosion noted on the fan shaft coupling, the fan hub, and rod bracing. However, this is not a structural Integrity issue.

Evaluated by' DKN~~

DRC,WRH

~flP~ c--- ~~~J:;:

Page 2 of 17

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-2-21-M~HX-JWR3A Equipment Class:

Equipment

Description:

DG No.3 Radiator A Location:

Building: Turbine Floor EI.

85 Room, Area:

2-DEG-23 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (Le, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification )?

The Jacket Water Radiator is mounted on one end of the continuous Diesel Generator skid. The skid is extended on both sides to accommodate the width of the radiator and the extensions are stiffened with large gusset plates.

The Radiator is bolted to the skid by (4) 3/4" bolts on both sidess In addition a series of smaller bolts on the sides assist in securing the coil assemblies within the fan enclosure.

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

The Radiator anchorage is consistent with drawing DC-6011476-481-1. The DG skid is anchored consistent with drawings 498524-1 and 498528-1.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

The enclosure for the radiator is not a soft target. Nearby HVAC ducting is rigidly supported and the large air straightener located on top of the fan enclosure is well supported. There is a flexible connection between the air straightener housing and the fan enclosure.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to*

collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Cooler and DG engine are mounted on a common skid.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions Y

Y Y

N/A Y

Y Y

Y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

The fan that draws fresh air across the coils and exhausts it outside the building is located between the coil assemblies inside the locked fan enclosure.

Page 1 of 15

Seismic walkdOMIn Cheddist (SWC)

Status:

Y Equipment 10 No DCw2-21-M-HX-JWR3A, Equipment

Description:

OG No, 3 Radiator A EquIpment Class:.a Comment:

The radlaior fan Is welded to the (anhousfng base plate. - no concerns.

The fan shafts aie res/mined. The vertical shaft Is latert;J11y restrained by rpd bmo/ng. The coli units are adequately restraIned, The Infernal pIping has mechanical cOuplings at/he calls,.but the plp.e is supported and has very S/lOrt spans so no signlfioanldifferontial displaomeilts Bre expected.

Surface cOTTosionnoted on the (an shaft, couplfng, tile fan hub, and rod braoing. However, this Is not a slruclural Inlegti/y ISSI/8.

Evalualet! bl". ~

~r*.. o:'/(*S!.zo ($

. _.. _~_.£...._

.t//I-/~/5

-A.I SM~M

~_'/111o,A:3 4 ItS 201

Page 2 of 15.

..... -.----...... -........,--~--.-- ~.--~---.-..... -- -.. -

Seismic Equipment ID No DC-2-23-M-BF-CFC2-1 Status:

Y Equipment Class; 10 Equipment

Description:

Containment Fan Coolers Location:

Building: Containment FloorEI. 140 Room, Area:

2-CFC21 Manufacturer, mode', Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the res!Jlts of the Seismic Walkdowi1 of an item of equipment on the SWEL The space below eaCh of the folloWing questions may be used torecord the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?-.

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

_ 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

The anchorage is consistent with.the inter-office memorandum As-built information for Unit 2 Fan cooler supports, 11 D.A. Rockwell to G. V. Cranston, February 24, 1983, CHRON013615, RLOC 10671-0008 through 0024.

6. Based on the above ~nchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting. and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

.9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations. is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

There are a number of equipment carts stored atop the coollng unit within the railing. Tllese carts are found to be in support of tbe outage and will be removed prior to restart of operations.

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Baffles between fin-tube cooling coil units are severely corroded and have been previously identified and documented in SAPN 500343103.

Page 1 of 18

Seismic WalkdolM1 ChE!d<Ilst (SWC)

Status:

Y Equipment rD No DC-2-23-M-BF-CFC2-1 Equipment Class:

10 Equipment

Description:

Containment Fan Coolers Comment:

This review included the fan, gear box, and fan motor as well as the cooling unit. The fan assembly is separated from the cooling unit::'~Li:::~b~::COU~ k? J~

Date: f ;jt../ ~/3 Page 2 of 18

Seismic WalkdOlivn Status:

Y Equipment 10 No OC-2-23-P-VOA-VAC-2-FCV-660 Equipm~nt Class: I Equipment

Description:

Containment Purge Valves location:

Building: Containment FloorEI. ill Room, Area: 2-PEN62 Manufacturer, mode', Etc.

c---,-

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEl. The space below _each of the fol/owingquestions may i:le used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additiona' space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

_________________________ 0._. _______. ________. ___

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are' soft targets free' from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to col/apse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions N

y y

y N/A y

y y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 7

SeismicWal Equipment 10 No DC-2-23-P-VOA-VAC-2-FCV-660 Equipment

Description:

Containment Purge Valves Comment:

Evaluated by:

KTM Status:

Y

.--'----,-~:.....--- ---

Equipment Class: Z Date: 'h' i

-~/'Jh/~/3

-~~--

11 114/d.Ib\\3 Page 20f 7

Seismic Walkdo1Nn Chedd (SWC)

Status:

Y Equipment ID No DC-2-23-P-VOA-VAC-2-RCV-11 Equipment Class: Z Equipment

Description:

Containment Purge Valves location:

Building: Containment Floor EI. ill Room, Area:

2-PEN62 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

fnstruc:tions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findirigs. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. -'s the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEl items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent. broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact py nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations,' is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions N

y y

y N/A y

y y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page lof7

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SlIVC)

Status:

Y

.----C.----'-,-,...-. ___

Equipment ID No DC-2-23-P-VOA-VAC-2-RCV-11 Equipment Class: Z Equipment

Description:

Containment Purge Valves Comment:

Evaluated by:

KTM

"~

.. ~

-L-~---=--. - _____.-_

'4/lb/~13 Page 2 of7

Seismic Status:

y

-'-------_._----, --------.*.. ------.----.----.... --~.--... ---'---'---.----

Equipment ID No DC-2-23-P-VOS-VAC-2-FCV-238 Equipment Class: ft Equipment

Description:

Hydrogen Monitoring System supply valves Location:

Building: Containment Floor EI.

101 Room. Area:

2-FCV-238 Manufacturer, model. Etc.

-~-,---,--. --._--------.----_._---------"

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e. is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification) ?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage eval~ations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems. ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse. onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions N

y y

N/A N/A y

y y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 4

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (~In'~~

Status:

Y

-'--~~--'------'--'--------

Equipment ID No DC-2-23-P-V08.. VAC-2-FCV-238 Equipment Class:

!1 Equipment

Description:

Hydrogen Monitoring System supply valves Comment:

Evaluated by:

IRK

/' R' i

~~-

.-~--

Date:,/ I I

. 1-/Jkj2c/3

~<TM

-~~-

Page 2 of 4

.. __.. _--_.. - -~-.------

Seismic WaIKaCl~wn Checklist (SWC)

Status:

Y Equipment ID No DC-2-41-E-PNL-PORTB1 Equipment Class: 20 Equipment

Description:

Reador Trip Switchgear/Control Panel Location:

Building: Auxiliary Floor EI. ill Room. Area:

2-PORTB1 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Westinghouse Instructions for Completing Checklist Thh? checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

Anchorage consists of (5) 3116" fillet welds both front and back.

2. Is the anchorage free of bent. broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment. distribution systems, ceiling tiles. and lighting. and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Conduit welT supported.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions N

Y Y

Y N/A Y

Y y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 12

,-----------------.. -----.---.---.------.---------.~-------

Seismic Wall.l'"lU'l~'Il6UIIII" Checklist t~~)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-2-41-E-PNL-PORTB1 Equipment

Description:

Reactor Trip Switchgear/Control Panel Comment:

Evaluated by:

TRK~/ £./

~.----.--.~-.

KTM

-~~.--

Equipment Class:

20 Page 2 of 12

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.

DC-2-42-M-MISC-QOTTC Equipment Classl2 Equipment

Description:

Quick Opening Transfer Tube Closure Location: Bldg.

..::::C=on=t:.!-. __ Floor El.

-":.1=00,,-' __ _

Room, Area Westinghouse Manufacturer) Model) Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checldist 2-QOTTC

42. (Other)

Sheet 1 of5 Status: ~

This checklist mOay be used to doc~nnent the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of the checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1.

° Is the anchorage configuration verifiQation'required (i.,e., is the item one of the 50% ofSWEL items requiring such verification)?

o.

0

2.

Is t~e anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3.

]s the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface corrosion?

The anchor boIts and other anchorage is stainless steel and free of corrosion

4.

Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchorage?

5.

Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% foi' which anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6.

Based 011 the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects N

y y

y NIA y

7.

Are soft targets free Jl'om impact by nearby equipment or structures?

N/A The QOTTC does not have any soft targets attached to it.

8.

Are overhead equipment~ distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block waIls not Y

likely to collapse onto the equipment?

The QOTTC is located in a recess and by virtue of its location it is free fi'0111 any targets collapsing on to the equipment.

9.

Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

NIA

] O.

Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is the equipment free of potentially adverse Y

seismic interaction effects?

12 Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment lO No.

DC-2-42-M-MISC-OOTTC Equipment Class 12

42. (Other)

Equipment

Description:

Quick Opening Transfer Tube Closure Other Adverse Conditions 1 I.

Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the plant equipment?

No other adverse conditions.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

NIA Evaluated by:

KA Date:

03/11/2013 WRH 03111/2013 12 Enter the equipment class name fi.-om Appendix B: Classes of Equipment Sheet 2 of5 Status: ~

y

ismicWal Status:

Y

--~.-----.---.-._---_. __._- ---.--.----

Equipment fD No DC-2-63-E-LC-SHF Equipment Class:

~

Equipment

Description:

4160V Switchgear. Bus F.

Location:

Building: Turbine Floor EI. 119 Room, Area:

2-4KV-F Manufacturer, model, Etc.

General Electric Instructions for COmpleting Ghecklist This checklist may be used to d9cument the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checkUst for documenting other comments.

.... _----.. ---------_. ----_._--,-'---- --~---'-

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Consists of a total of (1) 3/8" fillet welds located in the front section. All (7) can be seen. 3 Welds at the front are about 21t in length; 1 weld on either side near the middle of the front section are about 4" in length; and 1 weld on either side near the rear of the front section ate a/so about 4" in length.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

y y

y

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete ne~r the anchors?

Y

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is Y

one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Consistent with drawing 050053 sheet 164 - 166.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially. adverse seismic conditions?

y Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targ.ets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

End cabinet of bus has virtually no clearance to potential transformer cabinet and suppod frame. Calculation ES-64 shows that the relays are not affected by any polentail impact of the Potential Transfonnercabinets with the first cabinet in the 4160V Bus (the Potential Transfonner Frame is stiff relative to the 4160V Breaker Bus and the relys in the doorpanel are not sensitive to horizontal accel/etations).

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Block walls are reinforced at about 8' intervals.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

All cabling exits via the bus duct at one end of the Bus.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is eqlJipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

y.

y y

11. Have you looke.d for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Mechanism lifts breaker Into place. (2) tabs front and back are welded to the breaker. These rest on four arms that protrude from the mechanism. The breaker is supported both front-ta-back and side-lo-side by the mechanism framework.

Page 1 of 15

~-:----,-- ---_._.-.. _--

SeismicWal

""" CheClldlSt (SWC)

Status:

Y Equipment ID No DC-2-63-E-lC-SHF Equipment

Description:

4160V Switchgear. Bus F Comment:

Evaluated by:

TRK

./

. k? '/'

~

.... -.,~-~

KTM Equipment Class: ;i ff/;/~3 LJllb/;ret3 Page 2 of 15

Status:

Y

.~-. --.-. ---. -----._-------

Equipment 10 No OC-2-63-E-PNL-RHF Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

4160V Safeguard Relay Panels Location:

Building: Turbine.

Floor EI.

119 Room, Area:

2-4KV-F Manufacturer. model. Etc.

General Electric

.~--'------.--.-----.-.-----

.. --~--.------

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. Thf3 space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additionafspace is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken. missing or loose hardware?

Anchorage consists of (4) at least 5/8" puddle welds located both front and back.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby.equipment or structures?

Stand-alone panel. Overhead lighting poses only falfing hazard but is well restrained.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block. walls not likely to collapse onto the eqUipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Cables exit through floor.

10.. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions N

y y

y NfA y

y y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

. eqUipment?

Page 1 of 13

,Seisnic

neadllSt' ('SWC)

Status:

Y

.-.. --.------:,..~----------"

Equipment fD No DC-2-63-E-PNL-RHF Equipment

Description:

4160V Safeguard Relay Panels Comment:

Evaluated by:

KTM ~~

.. /~~---

Equipment Class:

2.Q Date:

o/t~Zo/3 L.\\//b/;t..o\\3 Page 2 of 13

Seismic WalkdolNll Checklist ~SV\\IC)

Status:

Y EquipmentlD No DC-2-63-E-XF-SHF13PT Equipment Class:

~

Equipmeht

Description:

4160V Potential Transformers Location:

Building: Turbine Flool'EI. ill Room. Area:

2-4KV-F Manufacturer, model, Etc.

General Electric Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL The space below each of the following. questions may be used to record the results of judgements cmd findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (Le, is the item one of the pO% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2, Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

PT cabinets are anchored to the framework by (4) 3/8" bolts and the (4) structural angle legs of the framework are welded to embedded floor plates by 1/4" fillet welds (total weld length for each leg is at least 6'1.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

y y

y

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

Y

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies iOhe item is Y

one of the 50% f~r which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Consi$tent with drawing 050053 slleets 155 - 157.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

y Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

PT cabinet is located immediatelyadjacent to the end cabinet of the 4 kV Bus.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Masonry walls are reinforced.

9. Do attached fines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

Rigid conduit runs from back of cabinet to tbe floor.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions N/A y

y y

11. Have you loo~ed for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

eqUipment?

Page 1 of 11

Seismic Walkdovvn C"~* aaaist (SWC)

Status:

Y Equipment ID No DC-2-63-E-XF-SHF13PT Equipment Class:

~

Equipment

Description:

4160V Potential Transformers Comment:

Evaluated by:

KTM Page 2 of 11

Seismic Walkdo1Nl1 (';11E!CIGlst (~ ** ""'~

Status:

Y

~

Equipment 10 No DG-2-64-E-LC-SPF Equipment Class; 2 Equipment

Description:

480V Breaker Cabinets (Load Centers)

Location:

Building: Auxiliary Floor EI. 100 Room, Area:

2-PNL-ARP Manufacturer, model, Etc.

WestInghouse Instructions for Completing Checkli9t This checklist may be used to document the results ofthe Seismic Walkdown oran item of equipment on the SWEL The space below each ofthe following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (Le, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such Y

verification)?

Load center consists of (11) breaker cabinets with breakers loaded both front (breakers 01-29) and back (breakers 30 - 68). Anchorage consists of 3116" fillet welds about 1-112" in length. There are 2 welds front and back for the Y

19" wide cabinets and (3) welds font and back for the 28" wide cabinets. Front-to-back top support is provided by a strongback that runs the length of the bus which is supported back to the columns at either end.

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anChorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies ifthe item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Top support consistent with drawings 050053 sheets 132 - 147. Base welds consistent with drawing 050053 Sheet 2 Note 6a).

B. Based on the above anchorage evaluations! is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equIpment or structures?

8. Are riverhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Conduit and cable trays well supported.

9. 00 attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations. is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

Y y

Y Y

y 11, Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 19

Seismic Walkdown C1hedldlSt 1IoaoiIlIr~)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-2.;64-E-LC-SPF Equipment Class: 2.

Equipment

Description:

480V Breaker Cabinets (Load Centers)

Commeht:

Evaluated by:

Page 2 of 19

Seismic Walkdown Chedd (SVVC)

Status:

N Equipment ID No DC-2-64-E-XF-THF10 Equipment Class:

~

Equipment

Description:

4160-V/480-V Transformers Location:

Building: Auxiliary Floor EI.

100 Room, Area: 2-PNL-ARP Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Westinghouse (

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorag'e configuration veriftcatioh required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification )?

2. Is the anchorage fre~ of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially.adverse seismic conditions?

The three coil assemblies are not supported at the top. Each coil assembly is bolted to the channel base by (4) bolts. At the four corners the channel base is bolted to mounting plates by (2) 3/8" bolts. The four mounting plates are in turn bolted to transverse structural angle members by single 112" bolts. These are in turn welded.on the vertical face orthe angle to the enclosure base plates that are 1/2" steel plates running the length of the transformer. On one side, six small welds (1116 to 3/32" effective size) of various lengths are used to secure the enclosure base plate to embedded plates. At the end on this same side (beyond the end of the embedded plate a single structural angle that is bolted to the floor by a 1/2" expansion anchor secures the end. On the opposite side there are (7) marginal fillet welds plus the angle section. See Attachment 1 for disposition.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions N

'y y

y N/A N

y y

11. Have you rooked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 18

Seismic Walkdown Checklist ()

Status:

N Equipment ID No DC'-2-64-E.. XF-THF10 Equipment Class:

~

Equipment

Description:

4160-v/480-V Transformers Comment:

Evaluated by:

TRK

~6WL41 Date:-

5/Z/-UV3 KTM ~--~

-.-~-,--

._-- ~---

Page 2 of 18

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit.1...

Equipment No. DC-2-64-E-XF-THF10, Page 1 of 1 Licensing Basis Evaluation The welds used to secure the base of the transformer enclosure are not consistent with the welds specified on the applicable design drawing (drawing no. 050053J sheet 22, rev. 12). Specifically, the drawing specifies the use of 1/8" fillet welds, but the as-found weld size was approximately 3/3211 for six of the welds along the front edge of the cabinet and 1116" or less for the seventh weld at the front edge (weld at far left end of weld pattern).

Evaluation:

Based on a review of the anchorage calculation for the 4160~v/480-v transformers (calculation no. EQP-207.2),

the enveloping anchorage condition is the transformer for Bus 2G, where there are only six welds present along the front edge. In addition, the two 1/Z' diameter expansion anchors at right end of the base are not credited in the calculation.

If the size of the weld used in the calculation is reduced from 1/8 11 to 3/32 11

, the calculated weld stresses will remain below the alJowable stress level. Therefore, this condition does not impact the seismic qualification of the transformer cabinet, so the transformer will remain capable of performing its intended function during a seismic event.

Recommendations:

- Update drawing to show as-built weld sizes

- Revise calculation no. EQP-207.2 to formally evaluate the as-built weld sizes Notification Required: Yes (50545886)

Potentially Adverse Seismic c~ndition: Yes 1

~

Evaluated by:

wrh cJ ~

1?"

t1tn-k,,---~---

Reviewed by:

=Ii,.~~

t" -

'-:S b'3} 13 3,\\,%,\\:s~

I i

i I I I

I I

[

I

Seismicwal wn (';I'H!aClist ~)

Status:

N Equipment 10 No DC-2-67-E-LC-SD21 Equipment Class: 2.

Equipment DesQription:

125V DC Switchgear/Breaker Panels Location:

Building: Auxiliary Floor EI. lli Room, Area:. 2-BTC21 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

ITE Circuit Breaker Company Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Wa*,kdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the.end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (Le, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?.

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with pla,nt documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Based on the walkdown, the cabinet is welded at six locations along the lower front channel using 1/8" by 1" fillet welds and the panel is anchored to the wall using (2) sheet metal angle brackets on either end of the cabinet set.

This anchorage detail is in conformance with Drawing 050053 Sh. 11 Rev. 12. However, burnt marks and signs of grinding were observed on the lower back channel and this seems to suggest that additional welds may have been present at some point.

On further investigation, Calculation for the Unit 1 125V DC panels (EQP 220. 1) suggests that the panels should be welded at 9 locations on the lower front channel and at an additional 9 locations on the lower back channel.

Therefore, although the observed anchorage matches the configuration shown in the standard detail (Dwg. 050053 Sh. 11, Rev. 12), it does not match the weld requirements mentioned in the Calculation for Unit 1 125v DC panels.

See Attachment 1 for disposition.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

A relay is mounted on the front panel. Howeverno credible interaction sources

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Conduit and cable trays are well supported. Cable trays are not overfilled. Lighting is conduit hung with ball and socket and closed hook connections at the ceiling. The lights can sway, but maintain positive vertical load. The adjacent masonry wall has been seismically strengthened.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

. The panel has clearance to avoid contact with the thru-bolt in the adjacent masonry wall.

y y

N N

y y

Page 1 of 13

Seismic WalkdolM1 Cheddist (SWC)

Status:

N Equipment ID No DC-2-67-E-LC.. SD21 Equipment Class: 2.

Equipment

Description:

125V DC Switchgear/Breaker Panels Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Comment:

The internal components are securely mounted to the Evaluated by:

ORC/KTM

.~~

.~Ja s { q,./f'Lo, '5 Date:

5/~/~6\\3 5/l(ZOI3 Page 2 of 13

Seismic Walkdbwn Checklist (SWC)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit.£ Equipment No. DC-2-67-E-LC-SD21, Page 1 of 1 Licensing Basis Evaluation Issue:

The configuration of the welds used to secure the base of the distribution panel to the embedded steel floor plates is consistent with the configuration specified on the applicable design drawing (six welds along the front

of the panel per drawing no.. 050053, sheet 4, note 21), but is not consistent with the configuration evaluated in the anchorage calculation (nine welds along the front and nine welds along the back of the panel per calculation no. EQP-220.1).

Evaluation:

An initial review of the anchorage calculation for the distribution panel (calculation no. EQP-220.1) indicated that the as-found weld configuration was not sufficient to resist the applied seismic loads. Based on this review, Engineering was unable to justify the acceptability of the anchorage and Operations declared the distribution panel inoperable. At this point, Engineering issued the appropriate design documentation to modify the anchorage to match the configuration evaluated in the anchorage calculation, the modifications were implemented, and the distribution panel was returned to service within two days of the identification of th~

issue. This issue was entered in to the Corrective Action Program (CAP), appropriate extent of condition and Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) were performed.

Subsequently, Engineering performed a past-operability assessment (calculation no. ES-016.1) which demonstrated that the panel, in the as-found condition, would have been capable of performing its intended safety function during a seismic event. Therefore, the initial declaration of inoperability was conservative.

Recommendations:

Modify anchorage configuration on panel to match configuration evaluated in the calculation (complete)

Update drawing to show a weld configuration that is consistent with the anchorage calculation (complete)

Inspect anchorage configuration of all 125-volt DC distribution panels (SD11, SD12, S013, SD22, and S023) to determine extent of condition (complete)

Notification Required: Yes (50540606)

Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition: Yes Evaluated by:

wrh 11~i1A.1:.vn (?, t+/-m A.--.

-.Reviewed by:

--IJ.Q.e~~

4jL,d/3 4-f 2-.C! "3

Seismic Ikdown Cheddist (SWC)

Status:

y Equipment ID No DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-45 Equipment Class: 20 Equipment

Description:

Mechanical Panel No. PM-45 (CCW HX Differential Pressure Instrumentation)

Location:

Building: Containment Floor EI. ill Room, Area:

2-PM~45 Manufacturer, model, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist

. This checklist maybe used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the. following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (Le, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken. missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild sUlface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Consistent with drawing 101903 sheets 3 and 22.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations. is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles, and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do*attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions y

y y

y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Page 1 of 14

-.----------.. -... --.----.-.. ---~~~

Seismic WalkdolMl CitU.V"Ulist (SWC)

Status:

Y Equipment 10 No DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-45 Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

Mechanical Panel No. PM-45 (CCW HX Differential Pressure Instrumentation).

Comment:

Infernal components well mounted.

Evaluated by:

Page 2 of 14

Seismic Status:

y Equipment 10 No OC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-89 Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

Mechanical Panel No. PM-89 (Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Cold Leg Instrumentation)

Location:

Building: Containment Floor EI. ill.

Room, Area:

2-PM-89 Manufacturer, modeJ, Etc.

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be us~d to document the results oflhe Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space*

below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e, is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such Y

verification)?

The panel spans a drain gutter. On both sides the panel is bolted to the top flange of a structural channel section.

The channel section a/so spans the gutter and is balled to the floor by (2) 3/8" expansion anchors. There is no Y

anchorage at the back, but (2) tabs welded 10 the top-back comers of the panel are bolted to horizontally running Unistrut section that spans lhe width of the panel. The Unistrut section is in tum bolted to the innqr containment wall.

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

Y Mild surface corrosion on Unistrut section and il anchor plates.

4. Is the anchorage free of Visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

Y 5, Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is Y

one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Nearly consistent with drawing 101903 sheet 17 except the galvanized heel plate that sits in the gutter is not present. This does not affect the anchorag~ capacity of the panel. See Attachment 1 for disposition.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Y Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles. and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to col/apse onto the equipment?

9. 00 attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions Y

Y Y

Y

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the Y

equipment?

Pag~ 1 of 16

Seismic Walkdown CheClCIist (SWC)

Status:

Y Equipment 10 No DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-S9 Equipment Class:

20 Equipment

Description:

Mechanical Pariel No. PM,,89 (Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Cold Leg Instrumentation)

Comment:

Internal devices properly mounted.

Evaluated by:

Date:

-~~*,/3 KTM

-7Ua;~ l-lll 61 d-!>I s Page 2 of 16

.. _.......... ---.-~-~-

Seismi~ Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit.2-Equipment No. DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-89 Licensing Basis Evaluation Issue:, Page 1 of 1 The Heel Support plate (3/8" galv. plate) specified on drawing no. 101903, sheet 7, rev. 12 (between the bottom of the dralnage trench and the C4x5.3 galv. channel) was miSSing.

Evaluation:

The heel support appears to have been a construction aid for the original installation of the panel, since it is not anchored to the bottom of the trench or the support channel. Per Calculation IS-1.17, the mechanical panel is supported over the trench as a cantilever and is analyzed such that the entire load is supported by the expansion anchors holding down the panel. Therefore, the heel support is not functionally part of the supporting system and the fact that it is missing will not impact the seismic qualification of the panel.

Recommendations:

- revise drawing no. 101903, sheet 17 to indicate that the heel plate has been removed from PM-89

- perform an extent of condition review of the other panels shown on this drawing to determine if the heel support is also missing from these panels.

Notification Required: Yes (50547156)

Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition: No Evaluated by:

wrh W~

(2 ~

Reviewed by:

---A ~~

Attachment J Unit 2: Area Walk-By Checklists AWC Number Number of AWC Number of Checklist pages LBEs 2-4KV-F 1

0 2-8700A 1

0 2-AFWP1 1

0 2-AFWP2 1

1 2-ASP1 1

0 2-BAT21 1

0 2-BF-2E-1 1

0 2-BFE4 1

0 2-BFS-33 1

1 2-BTC21 1

0 2-CFC21 1

0 2-CCP1 1

0 2-CCP3 1

0 2-CCWHE 1

0 2-CCWP1 1

0 2-CCWST1 1

3 2-CP-37 1

1 2-CR-37 1

1 2-DEG-21 1

0 2-DEG-23 1

1 2-0EG-ES-21 1

0 2-0EG-ES-23 1

1 2-E-45 1

6 2-EAGLE21 1

0 2-EJ2 2

0 2-FCV-238 1

1 2-FCV-365 1

0 2-FCV-37 1

0 2-FCV-41 1

1 2-FCV-641A 1

0 2-FCV700 1

0 2-HT -EH-29A 1

2 2-LCV-110 1

2 2-LCV-112B 1

2 2-LCV115 1

0 PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment J Page 1 of 2 Number of LBE p~ges 0

0 0

4 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

3 18 1

0 1

6 0

0 1

0 0

1 0

0 2

2 2

0

AWC Number Number of AWC Checklist pages 2-LD30 1

2-LPH79 1

2-L T-1 02 1

2-PCV-20 1

2-PD25 1

2-PEN62 1

2-PM-101 1

2-PM-103 1

2-PM-185 1

2-PM-45 1

2-PM-79 1

2-PM-89 1

2-PNL-ARP 1

2-PORTB1 1

2-QOTTC 2

2-RHE1 1

2-RHR1 2

2-RHRP2 1

2-RNAR-A 1

2-RV-13 1

2-SFPHE1 1

2-SFPP1 1

2-SIAT1 1

2-SIP1 1

2-SSPS 1

2-SWHE1 1

2-TE117 1

2-TRY21 1

2-VB1 1

Number of LBEs 0

0 1

0 2

0 0

2 0

0 1

0 0

2 0

0 0

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment J Page 2 of 2 Number of LBE pages 0

0 1

0 2

o.

0 2

0 0

1 0

0 2

0 0

0 Note: Pages include applicable portions of the checklists and LBE required by EPRI 1025286 guidelines.

Area Walk-By Checklist (AVVC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Turbjne Floor EI. 119 Room. Area:

2-4KV-F Instructions for Completi~g Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following Questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

.. ---.,.---.-----.---... ----'--.~---. __._._-_

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets)

Reviewed area lighting, emergency, lighting, bus duct, C02 hose reel, C02 alarm light, wall mounted lighting panel, and fire extinguisher.

2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y 3.Based on visual inspection from the floor. do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of Y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the y

area(e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray y

in the area?

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

V

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping V

practices, storage of portable equipment. and temporary installations (e.g, scaffolding. lead shielding)?

Step ladders are restrained and unanchored table is well removed from critical equipment.

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the V

equipment in the area?

Comments Includes DC-2-63-E-LC-SHF, DC-2-63-E-PNL-RHF, and DC-2-63-E-XF-SHF22PT.

Evaluated by: ~

RK

/J~ Date' '/!

e:

' '1/ I~ "2G>/5

.--~

. ----~- ~

KIM ~~

Lf. /1"/~\\3 Page 1 of 17

Area Walk-Checklist (AYIC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Containment FloorEI. 140 Room, Area:

2-CFC21 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of eqUipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets) 2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y 3.Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducling appear to be free of Y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the Y

area(e.g.* ceiling tiles and lighting)?

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray Y

in the area?

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

Y

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping Y

practices, storage of portable eqUipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding, lead shielding)?

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the Y

equipment in the area?

Comments Includes DC-2-23-M-BF-CFC2-1.

Evaluated by:

Page lof9

Area Walk-By CII~IRIIIIIIIoIiP'" (AWC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Containment FloorEI. 101 Room,Area:

2-FCV-238 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets) 2.00es anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y 3.8ased on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of Y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the y

area(e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

5. Does it appear that the area is free* of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray y

in the area?

Swinging fire hose reel can impact its 2" supply valve which is connected by a threaded coupling. See for disposition.

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

Y

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping Y

practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding, lead shielding)?

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the

. Y equipment in the area?

Comments Includes DC-2-23-P-VOS-VAC-2-FCV-238.

Evaluated by:

l{llb/~l3 Page 1 of 11

Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit.£ Location: Building: Containment Floor EJ. 91 Room, Row/Col: 2-FCV-238, Page 1 of 1 Licensing Basis Evaluation Issue:

Fire hose reel station no. FW-96-C2-2 (Containment, elev. 91 ft., azimuth 135 deg. attached to Annulus Structure column no. 3) is free-swinging in the horizontal direction and could potentially impact firewater system valve no. FP-2-525, resulting in damage to the valve and potential leakage for water inside the Containment.

Evaluation:

The hose reel station and valve are both seismically qualified components (Design Class II, QA Class G).

Based on a review of the weight, geometry, and properties of the portion of the hose reel that could potentially impact the valve body (the outer rim of the reel), the seismic accelerations at this elevation of the Containment (approximately 1 g at long periods per DCM C-17, Attachment A), and the configuration of the valve body, any seismically-induced impact would not result in damage to the valve that would impair the ability of the valve to function.

Therefore, this postulated interaction is acceptable.

. Recommendations:

None Notification Required: No Potentially Adverse Seismic con~iti~n: No

,A ____ I ___

Evaluated by:

wrh W~

0. ~---

Reviewed by:

.A ~~

""iJ ) I 'V j r?J 31r g ll.3.

Area Walk-By Checklist (AVVC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Containment FloorEI. ill Room,Area:

2-PEN62

~---------.-~-----

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space be/ow each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

~--~-.. --~----- -----,---- ------.. --.~.--.-~

~--------. ---------

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets) 2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y 3.Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducling appear to be free of y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports Is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the Y

area(e.g., ceiling tiles and fighting)?

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray Y

. in the area?

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

Y

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping Y

practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding, lead shielding)?

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic con~itions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the Y

equipment in the area?

Comments Includes DC-2-23-P-VOA-VAC-2-RCV-11 and DC-2-23-P-VOA-VAC-2-FCV-660.

Evaluated by:

~/._~

Date: q/tu/~/~

KTM ~~

Page 1 of 19

Area Walk-Checklist (AVVC)

Status Y

location:

Building: Containment Floor EI. ill Room, Area:

2-PM-45 Instructions for Completing Checklist This Checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEl items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets) 2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y 3.Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducling appear to be free of Y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the Y

area(e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray y

in the area?

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

Y

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping Y

practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding. lead shielding)?

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the Y

equipment in the area?

Comments Includes DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-45.

Evaluated by: ~R~

Date:

KTM ~~~

Page 1 of 7

Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Containment Floor EI. !li Room, Area:

2-PM-89 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL Items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets) 2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y 3.Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of Y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the Y

area(e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray y

in the area?

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

Y

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping Y

practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding, lead shielding)?

8. Have you rooked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the Y

equipment in the area?

Comments Includes DC-2-96-M-PNL-PM-89.

Evaluated by:

14/l~/d-O\\3

BY '~he<:kIist (AWC)

Status N

Location:

Building: Auxiliary Floor EI. 115 Room, Area:

2-PORTB1 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets)

Reviewed conduit, cable trays, area lighting, fire extinguisher, maintenance equipment, tables, crane rail, and junction boxes.

2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Clamp securing a wall mounted fire extinguisher is broken. See Attachment 1 for disposition.

N

3. Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of Y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the N

area(e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

Area lighting is marginally supported in several cases. In nine cases, light weight chains are attached to hooks in the outlet that are not properly closed as designed. In one case light weight chains are attached to a conduit run by cable ties. See Attachment 2 for disposition.

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray y

in the area?

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

Y

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping Y

practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Non essential items are adequately restrained.

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that eQuid adversely affect the safety functions of the Y

equipment in the area?

Comments Includes DC-2-41-E-PNL-PORTB1.

Evaluated by:

Date:

~~/2/;W/"5 Page 1 of 15

Area Walk-By Checklist (AWe)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit 2-Location: Building: Auxiliary Bldg Floor EI. 115 Room, Area:. 2-PORTB1 Licensing Basis Evaluation Issue:, Page 1 of 1 The tab on the hooks that attach the hanger chains to the electrical junction boxes for various light fixtures are not placed in the closed position after the hanger chains were placed on the hooks. This applies to a total of nine light fixtures in the vicinity of PORTB1. In one case light weight chains are attached to a conduit run by cable ties.

Evaluation:

The light fixtures are not seismically qualified components, but are classified as sources under the Seismically Induced Systems Interaction Program (SISIP). Per SISIP Manual Figure 09, these light fixtures are located in SISIP TargetArea no. 2H-115-04. SISP Manual Page F9-4 indicates that this are includes the following SISIP Targets:

- Controller for Fan Nos. S-46 and E-43

- Reactor Trip Switchgear cabinet nos. PORTB1 and PORTB2

- Miscellaneous.electrical conduits Based on a review of the configuration of the hook and the seismic loading associated with this area, the chain may become slack due to upwards accelerations acting on the light fixtures t but since the chain cannot transmit compression, the top link of the chain will not be lifted out of the hook, preventing the fixture from potentially falling on any SISIP Targets during an earthquake. Also, cable ties have sufficient capacity to support a light fixture and therefore, the structural integrity of the light fixture is not expected to be affected.

Therefore, there is no impact on the ability of the safety-related SSCs to perform their required functions.

Recommendations:

- Bend the tabs on the hooks to properly secure the light fixture chains

- inspect other light fixtures in the surrounding area for similar problems Notification Required: Yes (50539547)

Evaluated by: _....:..:w~rh:....:......-__

.-~~_~...:.....;;...;:.....=~~_"_3+-1.!..-12-f-1..,,.,,{3!::....-__________ _

Reviewed by: ____

---"--"l~::....=..-=.;:::..:.....L...:..--_""""F--__

g_l_l...;...13--+I-J ~:::......_ _________ _

I

Area Walk-By Checklist (AWe)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit 2-Location: Building: Auxiliary Bldg Floor EL 115 Room, Area: 2-PORTB1 Licensing Basis Evaluation Jssue:, Page 1 of 1 The band associated with the mounting bracket for Fire Extinguisher No. PE-A11S.06-12 js damaged.

Specifically, the bolt attaching the left end of the band to the fixed*portion of the bracket was broken and the nut was missing.

As an immediate corrective action, the damaged band was temporarily secured in order to prevent the fire extinguisher from becoming dislodged from its mounting bracket during an earthquake.

Evaluation:

Since the fire extinguisher has been temporarily secured, there is presently no potential for the fire extinguisher to damage any nearby equipment during an earthquake.'

Recommendations:

- repair/replace the damaged mounting band.

Notification Required: Yes (50539546)

Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition: Yes

,11.1 Ll ()

~

Evaluated by; wrh

.A)AIl1A f\\.. ~

Reviewed by:

...JJ.~~.Vl

Area Walk-By Checklist (AWe)

Sheet 1 of6 Status: ~

Location:. Bldg.

..=C=on=t".., __ Floor El.

.=..10.:::..;0,,-1 __

Room, Area13

=2.....;-O:.:...O=-.:::.TT-=:...;::C'--____________

Instructions foJ' Completing Checklist T.his checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-by near one or moreBWEL items. The space *below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of the checklist for documenting other comments,

1.

Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adver~e seism ic conditions (if Y

visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?

The mast of the manipulator crane, manipulator crane, polar crane, containment spray piping, light fixtures, Containment Upper Internals Laydown Supports, ladders were observed in th~ area and appear to be adequately supported and fi'ee of potentially adverse seismic conditions.

2.

Is anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y

3.

Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HV AC ducting appear Y

to be fi'ee of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of support s is adequate and fIll conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4.

Does it appear that the area is fi'ee of potentially adverse seismic.spatial interactions with other Y

equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and Jighting)?

The light fixtures in the area appear to be adequately supported.

5.

Does it appear that the area is fi'ee ofpotentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding Y

or spray in the area?

The area is flooded during refueling operations, but is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding during the plant operation.

6.

Does it appear that the area is fl:ee of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fIre in Y

the area?

There are no systems containing flammable liquids or gases in the area.

7.

Does it appear that the area is fi:ee of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of equipment, and temporary instalIations (e,g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Many outage related equipment, lead shielding and ~arts were observed in the area but are expected to be removed after the outage.

8.

Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety, function of the equipment in the area?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary) 13 If the room jn which the SWEL item is located is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), the area selected should be described. This selected area should be based on judgment, e.g., on the order of35 feet fl:om the SWEL item.

Y Y

Sheet 2 of6.

Status: ~

Area Walk~By Checklist (AWe)

Location: Bldg.

..::::;C.=on=t::-. __ Floor EL

..::::..10,,-,,0,--1 __ ROOIn, Ar{\\a13 =2--"Oo:....:O"'-T"'-T:::...;C=--____________ _

Evaluated by:

...;.l::<A:..:.-_--.::=t=~~~~~~~~~---.::::::g+~~- Date:

03/11/13 WRH 03/11113 1~ If the room in which the SWEL item is located is very large (e.g., TUl'bine Hall), the area selected should be descl:ibed. This selected area should be based on judgment, e.g., on the order of35 feet from the SWEL item.

Area Walk-By Checklist (AWe)

Sheet 1 of6 Status: ~

Location:' Bldg.

..:::::C:.::::.o~nt,--__ Floor E1.

.::;..9.:-1 ' __ _

Room, Area13

.:::2~-RHR~=I ______________ _

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results ofthe Area Walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of the checklist for documenting other comments.

1.

Does anchorage of equipment jn the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if Y

visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?

Electrical PM-122, PM-91, PM-86 and PM-6.9, Fire extinguishers and other equipment in the area are adequately anchored and the area is free of potentially adverse seismic conditions

2.

Is anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y There appears to be minor surface corrosion on the anchorage of the electrical panels in the area and does not impact the structural capacity of the anchorage.

3.

Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HV AC ducting appear Y

to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of support s is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

All electrical conduit appear to be adequately anchored.

4.

Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

Containment evacuation strobe light, fire extinguisher, MOVs and other equipment in the area are adequately anchored.

Y

5.

Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding Y

or spray in the area?

6.

Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in Y

the area?

7.

Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with Y

housekeeping practices, storage of equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Lead shield storage area is anchored to the ground using anchor bolts and Chain link fence are anchored to the ground using a tie-down cable.

8.

Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety function of the equipment in the area?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary) 13 lfthe room in which the SWEL item is located is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), the area selected should be described. This selected area should be based on judgment, e.g., on the order of 35 feet from the SWEL item.

y

Ar~a Walk"8y Checklist (AWe)

Sheet 2 of6 Status: ~

Location: Bldg.

..!;;:C;.>:.o~nt~ __ Floor EL

..9,;....1 ' __ _

Room, Area13

~2-~R~HR=1,--____________ _

Evaluated by:

KA Date:

JG Z/3/13 13 If the room in which the SWEL item is located is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), the area selected should be described. This selected area should be based on judgment, e.g., on the order of35 feet from the SWEL item.

I I

f !

I i

i i

I I

i I j

i f

f !

Area Walk-By C:heClldlSl: (AWC)

Status Y

Location:

Building: Containment FloorEI. 91 Room, Area:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the area walk-by near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgements and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does the anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible Y

without necessarily opening cabinets) 2.Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant degraded conditions?

Y 3.Based on visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of Y

potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the Y

area(e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray Y

in the area?

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause fire in the area?

Y

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping Y

practices, storage of portable eqUipment, and temporary installations (e.g. scaffolding. lead shielding)?

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the Y

equipment in the area?

Comments Includes OC-2-09-M-TK-A T1.

Evaluated by:

Date:

Ltllb/;to\\ s Page lof9 PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment K Page 1 of 13 Attachment K Summary Findings of the Peer Reviews Peer Review: SWEL-1 and SWEL-2 The peer review of the SWEL-1 and SWEL-2 was performed during several meetings held while these lists were being developed and during the performance of the inspections. A summary of the issues identified during the peer review, and their resolution, is provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Peer Review Issues and Resolutions for SWEL-1 and SWEL-2 Issue Resolution SWEL development does not consistently Updated to include reference to the Q-List identify SSCs by their Q-List Item No.

Item No. where applicable.

SWEL-1, Screen No.2 allows exclusion of These valves were included to meet other valves associated with containment criteria. Discussion of Screen No.2 penetrations, but the final SWEL-1 included exclusions updated to indicate that this certain CIVs.

exclusion was not used in its entirety.

SWEL-1 should consider safe shutdown The safe shutdown equipment identified in equipment identified in UFSAR Appendix UFSAR Appendix 9.5G was added to SWEL 9.5G "Equipment Required for Safe development documentation to address these Shutdown."

components and their inclusion as candidates for the selection of SWEL-1.

SWEL-1 should include AFW pump Valves LCV-111 through LCV-115 added to discharge to SG LCVs, since these are important to the AFW system operation.

list of candidates for the SWEL-1.

SWEL-1 should include RHR pump Valves FCV-641A and FCV-641B added to list recirculation valve since these are important of candidates for the SWEL-1.

to the RHR operation.

SWEL-1 should include FCVs for the motor-Valves FCV-106, FCV-107, FCV-108, and driven AFW pumps since these are FCV-109 added to list of candidate for the important to the operation of the pumps.

SWEL-1.

SWEL-1 should include auxiliary building ventilation system supply and exhaust fans Fans E-1, E-2, S-31, S-32, S-33, and S-34 since these are important to the cooling of added to list of candidates for the SWEL-1.

the auxiliary building and are subjected to a corrosive environment.

SWEL-1 should include chemical and Valves 8145 and 8148 added to list of volume control system spray valves, since candidates for the SWEL-1.

these are important to system operation.

SWEL-1 should include valves in the RHR Valves 8701, 8702, 8809A, 8809B, 8700A, system normal shutdown cooling flowpath.

8700B, HCV-637, and HCV 638 added to list of candidates for the SWEL-1.

SWEL-1 should include valves in charging Valves 8107,8108, and HCV-142 added to list system flowpath to reactor.

of candidates for the SWEL-1.

Issue SWEL-1 should include valves associated with boric acid storage tank and transfer pumps.

SWEL-1 should include the main annunciator.

SWEL-1 should include SG level and pressure instrumentation.

SWEL-1 should include wide range and source range neutron detectors.

SWEL-1 assignment of five safety functions (Screen No.3) - certain seismically qualified SSCs do not perform any of these functions, so they will screen-out, but still may be added back-in under Screen No.4 (diversity) or under SWEL-2 (SFP-related SSCs).

Risk significance is not well defined and must be addressed more clearly.

SWEL-2 development uses 10 feet above top of fuel assemblies as an absolute number, but EPRI 1025286 states "for SFP penetrations below about 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies... " This gives some latitude as to the exact elevation for drain-down.

Operating experience report IER L3-12-63, "Anti-Siphon Devices in Spent Fuel Pool Missing" was recently received and should be addressed in the development of the SWEL-2.

Question was asked if EPRI guideline requires consideration of SFP drain-d?~n during various operating modes, speCifically during refueling operations, when the SFP gate is open, transfer canal is flooded, etc.

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment K Page 2 of 13 Resolution Valves 8104, FCV-110A, and FCV-111A added to list of candidates for the SWEL-1.

This is not seismically qualified, so it is excluded at Screen No.1.

SG level transmitters (L T-516, L T-517, etc.)

and pressure transmitters (PT-538, etc.)

added to list of candidates for the SWEL-1.

These detectors are included in the list of candidates for the SWEL-1, but were not selected in the finalization of the SWEL-1.

This is addressed in SWEL development documentation.

Risk significance data was received from the PRA group and incorporated into SWEL-1 SWEL-2 development documentation revised to be consistent with EPRI 1025286.

I ER L3-12-63 added as an input reference for the SWEL-2 and verification of the presence of anti-siphon holes added as an inspection attribute for piping entering the SFP.

The NEI frequently asked questions clarified this issue and it is addressed in SWEL-1.

Issue During the 1980s, the blind flange on the Containment end of the fuel transfer tube was replaced with a QOTTC device. If the SFP gate (not seismically qualified) and the fuel transfer tube manual gate valve (not seismically qualified per the component data) were to fail during an earthquake, the QOTTC would act as a part of the SFP pressure boundary. The concern is whether the QOTTC has been designed to resist the hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads associated with this scenario.

The FLOC data for the SFP gate indicates that this SSC is not seismically qualified, and that the air supply and back-up nitrogen supply for the inflatable gate seals is not seismically qualified. However, it appears that the gate is very robust and even with deflation of the seals, the rate of leakage through the SFP gate into the fuel transfer canal will not allow the SFP to drain-down within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Even though the SFP skimmers are anchored to the wall at the SFP water surface, we need to investigate possibility that they break loose (non-seismic support) and sink into the pool, allowing siphoning of the pool inventory.

Monitoring of the SFP level is a key issue, so the SFP level monitoring instrumentation should be added to the SWEL-2.

The SFP cooling water pump transfer switch (a local contactor) is key to the cooling of the SFP and should be added to the SWEL-2.

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment K Page 3 of 13 Resolution This concern was entered into the CAP.

Development documentation for SWEL-2 updated to show gate as being seismically qualified.

Review of the civil engineering calculation files located a seismic qualification calculation for the SFP gate. Therefore, gate can be credited to survive an earthquake. Request to update the FLOC data was entered into CAP.

SWEL-2 updated to include check of the maximum depth based on hose/tubing length between wall penetration and skimmer to inspection attributes. This will address the maximum depth to which skimmers could sink.

The SFP level instrumentation was considered for inclusion in the SWEL-2, but it was determined that this instrumentation is not seismically qualified, so it initially screened-out at Screen No.1.

SWEL-2 updated to include switch.

Issue The various ways to provide pure water (to replace evaporation/boiling) or borated water (to replace leakage) to the SFP were discussed. OP AP-22 (Spent Fuel Pool Abnormalities), Appendix A (Addition of Water to the SFP) indicates that the condensate storage tank is the "only source of makeup water to the SFP with a flow path that is completely Design Class I."

This flow path should be included in the SWEL-2. See OP B-7:11 for details of flow path The FHBVS is required to cool various SFP-related equipment. Portions associated with the mitigation of a fuel handling accident do not need to be included (e.g., filters), but other equipment should be considered for inclusion.

SFP cooling system pressure instrumentation does not serve any post-earthquake function and can be exclude from the SWEL-2.

Screen No.3 of the EPRI guidelines for the development of the SWEL-2 require the inclusion of a diversity of equipment classes (similar to Screen No.4 for the SWEL-1),

but due to the limited scope of equipment associated with the SFP, it is not possible to include representatives of all 21 classes.

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment K Page 4 of 13 Resolution SWEL-2 development basis document enhanced to discuss this flow path.

The SWEL-1 already includes the auxiliary building ventilation system, which has components that are similar to the FHB ventilation system. However, an FHB exhaust fan was added to the SWEL-2.

Pressure instrumentation deleted from the SWEL-2.

This is acceptable, since the SWEL-1 already includes a diverse selection of equipment classes. A discussion of this was added to the SWEL-2 development documentation.

The following methods were selected for the verification of elevations:

Difficulties associated with the verification of

the elevation of the various underwater pipe penetrations through the walls of the SFP Underwater cameras Verification of the elevation of the pipe where it exits the concrete on the outside of the SFP were discussed.

Approximate visual verification from the water surface

Issue Fuel transfer tube expansion joint has been included in SWEL-2 (failure could drain SFP, if SFP gate is open during a refueling outage). Suggest reviewing DCM C-28 (Seismic and LOCA displacements) to determine differential displacements.

SWEL-2 includes various pipes which penetrate the SFP wall that are potential rapid drain-down paths. How do we document the walkdowns of these pipes?

Operating procedure AP-22 includes the use of a fire hose for emergency refilling of the SFP. The associated hose reel stations should be included in the SWEL-2.

Document "Frequently Asked Questions on Seismic Walkdown Guidance" (August 10, 2012) was provided by the NEI, not the EPRI.

Discussion of seismic classification system relative to Regulatory Guide 1.29 is not clear.

EPRI definition of SFP rapid drain-down applies to the "top of fuel assemblies", and could result in exclusion of SFP gate from SWEL-2, while the "about 10ft above fuel assemblies" applies to penetrations through walls of SFP.

Rationale for the exclusion of the fuel storage racks from the SWEL-2 is not adequate.

SWEL-1 did not adequately address risk significance.

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment K Page 5 of 13 Resolution Review of DCM C-28 indicates that the seismic differential displacements (containment structure vs. auxiliary building) are small at this location (less than 0.2 inches), but the LOCA differential displacement is large (approximately 1 inch).

The combination of seismic and LOCA displacements is enveloped by the vendor-allowed differential displacements for the expansion joint.

The EPRI guidelines do not address this.

Since these guidelines require the use of the SWC form, the walkdown will be documented on an SWC, with most of the inspection attributes marked as "N/A". The "comments" section will be used to describe any observations.

Hose reel station FW-120-A38-1 added to the SWEL-2.

The SWEL development documentation was revised.

Clarified discussion in the SWEL development documentation.

Clarified discussion to distinguish between two applications in SWEL development documentation.

Expanded discussion to address criticality/spacing criteria, lack of anchorage, submersion in borated water, etc., in the SWEL development documentation.

Risk significance data was received from the PRA group and incorporated into SWEL-1 PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment K Page 6 of 13 Peer Review: Seismic Walkdown Checklists and Area Walk-by Checklists Introduction In accordance with the guidance provided in EPRI 1025286, the results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys were peer reviewed. Daily debrief of the walkdown team and peer review of a sample of SWCs and AWCs were performed early in the process to check the initial quality of the checklists and to ensure that any the general comments are incorporated in the remaining checklists prepared at later stages. In addition to the early peer reviews, all the SWCs and AWCs were reviewed to verify that the SWEs followed the guidance provided in EPRI 1025286 for performing the walkdowns.

Peer Review Team The seismic walkdown and area walk-by results peer review team was led by the project team leader, with various individuals acting as team members.

Peer Review Process The results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys were peer reviewed in two steps:

(1)

Each completed SWC or AWC was reviewed by a peer review team member.

This step included a review of the completed checklistand any attached photographs and in some cases discussion with walkdown team members.

Depending on the complexity of the issue, this step included visiting the plant and visually inspecting the subject equipment or area. Any peer review questions or comments were discussed with the SWEs and after all the questions and comments had been resolved, the completed checklist was signed by both the SWEs.

(2)

All completed SWCs/AWCs were reviewed by peer review team leader for overall accuracy and consistency. Comments or questions from the team leader were discussed with the SWEs and resolved.

Summary of Peer Review Findings and Resolutions The peer review findings are divided into two categories: generic findings and specific findings. The following are the general comments:

(1)

Problem Identification: Provide a clear and concise description of the problem/issue. Do not provide extraneous details or opinions.

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment K Page 7 of 13 (2)

Redundant Problems: A specific problem should only be identified on one check list. If the problem is identified on the SWC for the specific SSC, do not describe the same problem on the AWC or assign a status of N or U on the AWC. It is okay to cross reference between the AWC and SWC for a problem.

(3)

Recommendations: The AWC/SWC should identify and characterize the potential issue. Do not include statements such as, "valve should be cleaned and painted", "means of anchoring should be improved," or "further evaluation is recommended."

(4)

Disposition of Problems: The goal is to not have any remaining open problems on the checklists. Therefore, as part of the checklist finalization, each problem should be linked to its disposition. Create supplemental sheets to be added to the checklists as attachments for this purpose. The AWC/SWC should reference these attachments (e.g., "See Attachment No. xx for disposition."). The SAP notification number is to be referenced on the attachment, not the checklist.

(5)

Final Checklist Status: Once all of the issues and comments on a checklist have been dispositioned, the "U" statuses in the checklist should be changed to either "Y" (the condition is acceptable) or "N" (the condition is not acceptable, but will be addressed in the CAP). It is not necessary for the checklist to address any follow-up on CAP actions.

(6)

Electronic AWC and SWC Templates: Some aspects of the electronic templates used to generate the hardcopies of the completed checklists from the Access database do not match the format of the checklist forms included in EPRI 1025286, Appendix C. The templates should be reviewed against Appendix C and corrected as necessary.

(7)

Description of Room, Area for AWCs: The AWC form (EPRI 1025286, Appendix C), includes a field for "Room, Area." DCPP has used this field for the AWC number (typically the unit number, followed by an acronym for the piece of equipment in the room - e.g., "1-ASP1"). Since this entry does not actually define the room/area covered by the AWC (as required by Footnote 13 in EPRI1025286), it is recommended that a set of maps be developed to define the areas.

Table 2: Specific Findings for Unit 2 - AWCs No.

AWC/SWC Title Issue Resolution The AWC documents degradation Reference to the of the fan skid and corrosion of degradation of fan skid and 1

2-BFS-33 anchor bolts of the fan belt shroud corrosion of anchor bolts support. These were already deleted from the AWC.

identified in the component SWC.

No.

AWC/SWC Title Issue Identify the specific conduit and junction box which are corroded.

2 2-PM-103 In the comments section include "corrosion was noted on damper 3

2-E-45 No. FCV-5046, including valve actuator, damper, ducting and miscellaneous steel. See for disposition.

Delete the AWC and incorporate 4

2-FCV-641B the information in AWC 2-RHRP2, as this area is a subset of the area covered by 2-RHRP2.

In response to Question 1, the SWE suggests "Further evaluation is needed to justify the structural 5

2-CP-37 integrity" of the identified issue.

Delete the above mentioned statement, prepare a LBE to address the issue and refer to the LBE in the AWC.

Loose shim plates on rupture restraints found in the area were not mentioned in the AWC.

6 2-FCV-41 Table 3: Specific Findings for Unit 2 - SWCs No.

AWC/SWC Title Issue Response to question 2 1

DC-2-13-M-HX-SFPHE1 refers to Unit 1 anchorage "Same anchorage as DC 13-M-HX-SFPHX1".

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment K Page 8 of 13 Resolution Included the following in response to Question 8 "Flaking paint and oxidation were noted on conduits in the vicinity, including vital conduit no. K5882 and junction box BJF19. See for disposition."

Comment incorporated as requested.

AWC 2-FCV-641 B is deleted and SWC for the component now refers to the Area 2-RHRP2.

The suggestion for further evaluation is deleted, a LBE was performed, and is referenced for disposition.

Included the following observation in response to Question 8: "Loose Shim plate on rupture restraint found in area. See for disposition."

Resolution Reference to Unit 1 component anchorage is deleted.

No.

AWC/SWC Title Issue The SWC does not identify the transformer anchorage non-conformance issue.

2 DC-2-65-E-UPS-IY21 Response to question 7 suggests that contact is possible between the air operator valve MS-2-FCV -

DC-2-04-P-VOA-MS 25 and the support for the 3

FCV-41 limit switch MS-2-FCV-41.

The Status of question 7 and the checklist is still shown as "Y" in spite of a possible impact on soft target.

Include the observations on the ceiling tiles and space above false ceiling from 4

DC-2-38-I-PNL-RNSLA AWC 2-VB1 and delete "Further evaluation is needed to verify that the ceiling tiles are seismically restrained."

The inconsistency of the shim on the bumpers with the design drawings is not 5

DC-2-17-M-PP-ASP1 identified on the SWC.

In response to question 5, the anchorage details are 6

DC-2-1 O-M-HX-RHE 1 explained in great detail. A reference to the original design drawing could be provided instead.

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment K Page 9 of 13 Resolution Included in response to question 11, "The mounting brackets for the transformers at the bottom left side of the panel have (8) locations for securing the transformers to the grating on the panel bottom. Only (6) of the holes have bolts. Similarly, only (5) of the (8) holes are utilized (have bolts) for securing the transformers on the bottom right side of the panel. See Attachment 1 for disposition."

The status of the checklist and question 7 changed to "N."

Deleted the statement and included the following information from AWC 2-VB1 "The suspended ceiling is hung with a braced unistrut system. The HVAC is braced and the registers are independently rod hung."

Included the following statement in response to question 5 "The shims on these bumpers are not consistent with the drawings.

See Attachment 2 for disposition. "

Reference provided to the design drawings.

No.

AWC/SWC Title Issue The SWC currently does not identify the corrosion on base plates associated with the lateral braces on the 7

DC-2-14-M-TK-CCWST1 east and west side of the CCW surge tank. This should be identified in response to question 3 of the checklist.

In response to question 3, heavy corrosion is identified on the unit skid and it is 8

DC-2-23-M-HX-CR37 identified that a design change is in process for replacing the skid and no evaluation is performed of the existing condition.

The status of question 5 is currently shown as "N" 9

DC-2-36-E-PNAL-RNARA although the component is not part of the 50%>

anchorage check.

The room, row/column information on the SWC is 10 DC-2-23-E-PNL-PCCFC 1 currently identified as "2-PCCFC1" although the area is now replaced with 2-PNL-ARP.

Status of question 11 and the checklist are currently ItU". Also, the corrective 11 DC-2-21-M-HX-JWR1 A action to address the corrosion issue in the comments section has been referenced.

The status of question 6 is currently Ity", even though 12 DC-2-64-E-XF-THF1 0 the as-found configuration does not match the configuration shown in the design documents.

PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment K Page 10 of 13 Resolution Included the following in response to question 3:

"Surface corrosion on base plates associated with lateral braces on the east and west sides of the CCW surge tank. See Attachment 1 for disposition."

Prepared a LBE for the existing condition.

The status of question 5 changed to "N."

Room, row/column information changed from "2-PCCFC1" to "2-PNL-ARP."

Change status of question 11 and the checklist to Ity". Refer to the referenced corrective action for the corrosion issue in the comments section.

Change the status to ItN" and as a result also change the checklist status to ItN".

Peer Review: Licensing Basis Evaluations Introduction PG&E DCL-13-0S4 Attachment K Page 11 of 13 A LBE was performed for each potentially adverse seismic issue identified on the SWC and AWC. The LBEs, which are documented in attachments to the individual checklists, include a determination of the need for entry of the issue into the CAP.

Peer Review Team The LBE peer review team was led by the project team leader, with various individuals acting as team members.

Peer Review Process The LBE peer review was performed in two steps:

(1)

Each potentially adverse seismic condition was evaluated by a cognizant engineer and peer reviewed by a designated review team member. This step included a review of the completed checklist, review of the photograph (if applicable), discussions with the preparer of the LBE, review of the supporting documentation (e.g., drawings, design criteria memoranda, calculations) and, in some cases, discussions with the walkdown team members who performed the field inspections.

The completed LBE was signed by the preparer and the peer reviewer.

(2)

All completed LBEs were reviewed by the peer review team leader for overall accuracy and consistency. Comments or questions from the team leader were discussed with the preparer and reviewer, and resolved as necessary.

Summary of Peer Review Findings and Resolutions The peer review findings are divided into two categories: (a) generic findings; and (b) specific findings. The following provides an overall summary of the two categories of findings, and their resolution.

PG&E OCL-13-054 Attachment K Page 12 of 13 Table 4: General Findings from the Licensing Basis Evaluation Peer Review Finding Resolution Each LBE should be self-contained within LBEs that were split between multiple the attachment and not reference other attachments were restructured to be self-attachments to the same checklist for contained.

input.

The seismic requirements for the SSC LBEs were updated, as appropriate.

being addressed should be clearly stated, using OCPP's classification as defined in the FLOC data (i.e., design classification and seismic qualification requirement).

A LBE for one unit should not reference Cross references between units the LBE for a similar issue in the other eliminated.

unit.

A LBE should provide specific reference References added to LBE, as to the source of information (e.g.,

appropriate.

calculation number, drawing number, etc.)

Table 5: Specific Findings from the Licensing Basis Evaluation Peer Review LBE No.

Finding Resolution 2-CP-37, The LBE recommendations did not Recommendation to update Attach. 1 address the need to revise the design the drawings added to the drawing to reflect the as-built LBE.

configuration of the dampers.

2-CP-37, The LBE recommendations did not Recommendation to update Attach. 2 address the need to revise the design the drawings added to the drawing to reflect the as-built LBE.

configuration of the dampers.

2-CR-37, The LBE did not clearly indicate the LBE updated to clarify Attach. 1 function of the vertical legs and the functions of these support triangular frames.

components.

2-0EG-23, LBE used incorrect values for the LBE updated to reference Attach. 1 vertical and horizontal Hosgri OCM C-17 as source of earthquake accelerations for the accelerations and use the location of the fire extinguisher, and correct values.

did not provide a source reference.

LBE No.

Finding 2-DEG-ES-LBE addressed the impact of the 23, Attach. 1 corrosion on the functionality of the pipe support, but did not address the impact on the building column.

2-E-45, LBE recommendation indicated that Attach. 2 the corroded nut should be cleaned and replaced, but this is not practical, based on the extent of the corrosion.

DC-2-64-E-LBE indicates that the issue is not a XF-THF10 potentially adverse seismic condition, although the as-found configuration is not the intended configuration.

Peer Review: Submittal Response PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment K Page 13 of 13 Resolution LBE updated to discuss impact on building column function.

LBE recommendation changed to request that the corroded nut be replaced.

Change the LBE to reflect the issue as a 'potentially adverse seismic condition."

To meet this requirement, David Miklush, Philippe Soenen, and Tom Baldwin performed independent peer reviews of this submittal. In addition, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station personnel performed a review of the submittals. All comments were evaluated and resolved.

Comments included:

(1)

Clarify how unique DCPP seismic categories compare to SC I.

(2)

Clarify independence of peer reviewers.

(3)

Clarify where engineering evaluations of potentially seismically adverse conditions are included in the submittal.

(4)

Indicate status of the walkdown observations entered in to CAP.

2R17 AC ACI AFW AISC ANSI ASW AWC CAP CCP CCW CF CFCU CIV de DCM DCPP DEG DFODT DG DHR DIE EOC EPRI ESP FCV FHB FHBVS FLOC ft HEPA HVAC Hx ICE IEEE IER IPEEE LBE LCV LOCA LTSP Attachment L List of Acronyms Unit 2 Refueling Outage 17 Alternating curr~nt American Concrete Institute Auxiliary feedwater American I nstitute of Steel Construction American National Standards Institute Auxiliary saltwater Area walk-by checklist Corrective Action Program Centrifugal charging pump Component cooling water Containment function Containment fan cooler unit Containment isolation valve Direct current Design criteria memorandum Diablo Canyon Power Plant Diesel emergency generator Diesel fuel oil day tank Diesel generator Decay heat removal Damp indoor environment Extent of condition Electric Power Research Institute Equipment selection personnel Flow control valve Fuel handling building Fuel handling building ventilation system Functional location Feet High efficiency particulate air Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning Heat exchanger Inside containment environment Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Industry Event Response Individual Plant Examination for External Events Licensing basis evaluation Level control valve Loss of coolant accident Long Term Seismic Program PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment L Page 1 of 3

MIE MS MSSV N

NEI No.

NRC NTTF OE Ops PCV PE PG&E PHD PORV PRA Q-List QOTTC RC RCIC RCP RCPC RCS RCV RHR RRC RV RWST SC SF SG SFP SFPCS SI SISI SISIP SPRA SQUG SSC SSEL SSER SSPS SWC SWE Mild indoor environment Main steam Main steam safety valve No Nuclear Energy Institute Number Nuclear Regulatory Committee Near-term Task Force Outside environment Operations Pressure control valve Professional Engineer Pacific Gas and Electric Company Doctor of Philosophy Power operated relief valve Probabilistic risk assessment Quality classification list Quick opening transfer tube closure Reactor coolant Reactor coolant inventory control Reactor coolant pump Reactor coolant pressure control Reactor coolant system Radiation control valve Residual heat removal Reactor reactivity control Reactor vessel Raw water storage tank Seismic category Safety function Steam generator Spent fuel pool Spent fuel pool cooling system Safety injection Seismically induced system interaction Seismically induced system interaction program Seismic probabilistic risk assessment Seismic Qualification Utilities Group Structures, systems, and components Safe shutdown equipment IList Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report Solid state protection system Seismic walkdown checklist Seismic walkdown engineer PG&E DCL-13-054 Attachment L Page 2 of 3

SWIE TO SWEL U

UFSAR UPS Y

Saltwater interior environment Turbine-driven Seismic walkdown equipment list Unknown Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Uninterruptable power supply Yes PG&E OCL-13-054 Attachment L Page 3 of 3

DCL-13-054, Response Amendment to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.3 Seismic: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 08:20, 11 January 2025

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